[Sidenote: Certain officials and classes exempted.]

The Selective Service Law required certain persons to be exempted from military service, including Federal and State legislative, executive, and judicial officers, ministers of religion, students of divinity, persons in the military or naval service of the United States, and certain aliens. The law further authorized the discharge from draft, under such regulations as the President might prescribe, of county and municipal officers, customhouse clerks and other persons employed by the United States in certain classes of work, pilots and mariners, and, within prescribed limitations, registrants in a status with respect to persons dependent upon them for support, and persons found physically or morally unfit. Exemption from combatant service only was authorized in the case of persons found to be members of any well-recognized religious sect or organization whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form, and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein.

[Sidenote: Rules governing discharges.]

On June 30, 1917, the President promulgated rules and regulations as authorized by the law prescribing the reasons for and manner of granting discharges, and the procedure of local and district boards.

The selective service system required the 4,557 local boards to conduct the physical examination of registrants within their jurisdictions, and to determine and dispose of claims of exemption and discharge in the first instance, excepting industrial and agricultural claims.

[Sidenote: The power of the district boards.]

The 156 district boards which were established as above stated, proved to be the fulcrum of balance between the local boards and the registrants. In practically every instance their members have been chosen from among the most able and conspicuous representatives of the legal and medical professions, and from the fields of industry, commerce, and labor.

[Sidenote: Appeal agents appointed.]

By regulation the case of every person discharged from the operation of the selective service law by a local board on the ground of dependency was automatically taken to the district board for review, the appeal being noted by Government appeal agents appointed by the Provost Marshal General.

[Sidenote: Dependency cases the most difficult.]

Registrants whose claims were disallowed by local boards appealed in large numbers to district boards. Thus was obtained a high degree of uniformity of decisions in dependency cases, which were by far the most difficult of determination and disposition, as well as the most numerous, of the classes of cases throughout the first draft.

Cases involving claims for discharge on agricultural and industrial grounds, of which district boards have original jurisdiction, are appealable to the President, and to date approximately 20,000 of these have been received and indexed, of which about 80 per cent are claims for discharge based on agricultural grounds and 20 per cent on industrial grounds. Of cases already disposed of on appeal from the district boards less than 7 per cent have been reversed. The pending of an appeal to the President does not operate as a stay of induction into military service except where the district board has expressly so directed, and the number of such stays is negligible.

[Sidenote: The total cost of the draft.]

The total cost of the draft can not be estimated accurately at this time, but, based upon the data at hand, the total registration and selection of the first 687,000 men has amounted to an approximate expenditure of $5,600,000, or about $8.11 unit cost.

[Sidenote: Universal willingness to serve.]

[Sidenote: High quality of men obtained.]

The unprecedented character of this undertaking is a matter of common knowledge. Congress, in the consideration of the act which authorized it, entertained grave doubts as to whether a plan could be devised which would apply so new a principle of selection for national service without much misunderstanding and unhappiness. But the results have been of a most inspiring kind and have demonstrated the universal willingness of our people to serve in the defense of our liberties and to commit the selection of the Nation's defenders to the Nation itself. The men selected have reported to the camps and are in course of training. They constitute as fine a body of raw material as were ever trained in military science. They are already acquiring the smartness and soldierly bearing characteristic of American troops, and those who once thought that the volunteer spirit was necessary to insure contentment and zeal in soldiers now freely admit that the men selected under this act have these qualities in high degree and that it proceeds out of a patriotic willingness on the part of the men to bear their part of the national burden and to do their duty at the Nation's call.

[Sidenote: Ability of Provost Marshal General.]

[Sidenote: This mode of selection made necessary by conditions of modern war.]

[Sidenote: The democratic fairness of the plan.]

The success of this great undertaking is, of course, primarily due to the painstaking forethought and the statesmanlike breadth of view with which the Provost Marshal General and his associates organized the machinery for its execution. But other elements have contributed to its success, and first among these was the determination to rely upon the cooperation of the governors of States and State agencies in the assembling of the registration and exemption boards. By reason of this association of State and local agencies with the National Government the law came as no outside mandate enforced by soldiers, but as a working of the home institutions in the hands of neighbors and acquaintances pursuing a clear process of selection, and resulting in a gift by the States to the Nation of a body of men to be trained. The press of the country cooperated in a most helpful way, drawing the obvious distinctions between this mode of selection and those punitive drafts which have sometimes been resorted to after the failure of volunteering, and pointing out the young men of the country that the changed conditions of warfare made necessary a mode of selection which would preserve the industrial life of the Nation as a foundation for successful military operations. Indeed, the country seemed generally to have caught enough of the lessons of the European war to have realized the necessity of this procedure, and from the very beginning criticism was silenced and doubt answered by the obvious wisdom of the law. Moreover, the unquestioned fairness of the arrangements, the absence of all power of substitution, the fact that the processes of the law were worked out publicly, all cooperated to surround the draft with assurances of fairness and equality, so that throughout the whole country the attitude of the people toward the law was one of approval and confidence, and I feel very sure that those who at the beginning had any doubts would now with one accord agree that the selective service act provides not only a necessary mode of selecting the great armies needed under modern conditions, but that it provides a better and more democratic and a fairer method of distributing the burden of national defense than any other system as yet suggested.

[Sidenote: Fundamental questions settled.]

[Sidenote: Unity of spirit of American people.]

This does not mean, of course, that the law is perfect either in its language or in its execution, nor does it mean that improvements may not be made as our experience grows and as the need for more intense national efforts increases; but such amendments as may hereafter be required will proceed with the fundamental questions settled and we have now only to consider changes which may be required to a better ordering of our military strength and a more efficient maintenance of our industrial and agricultural life during the stress of war. The passage and execution of this law may be regarded as a milestone in our progress toward self-consciousness and national strength. Its acceptance shows the unity of spirit of our people, and its operation shows that a democracy has in its institutions the concentrated energy necessary to great national activities however much they may be scattered and dispersed, in the interest of the preservation of individual liberty, in time of peace.

[Sidenote: The Officer's Reserve Corps.]

[Sidenote: Physicians commissioned in the Medical Department.]

[Sidenote: Men from the Plattsburg training camps.]

The problem presented involved not merely the selection of forces to be trained into armies but officers to do the training. By the provisions of the national defense act of June 3, 1916, Officers' Reserve Corps had been authorized. Rules and regulations for their organization were promulgated in July, 1916, and amended in March, 1917. Immediately upon the passage of the act, the building up of lists of reserve officers in the various sections of the Military Establishment was undertaken, with the result that at the end of the fiscal year some of the branches of the service had substantial lists of men available for duty in the event of call. The largest number of commissions were issued in the technical services, for which professional nonmilitary training was the principal requisite. The largest reserve corps was that in the Medical Department, in which more than 12,000 physicians were commissioned. The expansion of these technical services proceeded easily upon the basis of the reserve corps beginning, but the number of applicants for commissions in the strictly military or combatant branches of the service was relatively small. They consisted of men who had had military experience either in the Regular Army or the National Guard, and men who were graduates of schools and colleges affording military training, and of the training camps which for several years had been maintained at Plattsburg and throughout the country. Their number, however, was wholly inadequate, and their experience, while it had afforded the elements of military discipline, had not been such as was plainly required to train men for participation in the European war with its changed methods and conditions. The virtue of the law authorizing the Officers' Reserve Corps, however, became instantly apparent upon the declaration of war, as it enabled the department to establish officers' training camps for the rapid production of officers.

[Sidenote: A series of officers training camps.]

[Sidenote: Officers commissioned.]

Accepting the Plattsburg experiment as the basis and using funds appropriated by Congress for an enlargement of the Plattsburg system of training, the department established a series of training camps, sixteen in number, which were opened on the 15th of May, 1917. The camps were scattered throughout the United States so as to afford the opportunity of entrance and training with the least inconvenience and expense of travel to prepare throughout the entire country. Officers previously commissioned in the reserve corps were required to attend the camps, and, in addition, approximately 30,000 selected candidates were accepted from among the much greater number who applied for admission. These camps were organized and conducted under the supervision of department commanders; applicants were required to state their qualifications and a rough apportionment was attempted among the candidates to the several States. At the conclusion of the camp, 27,341 officers were commissioned and directed to report at the places selected for the training of the new army. By this process, we supplied not only the officers needed for the National Army but filled the roster of the Regular Army, to which substantial additions were necessary by reason of the addition of the full number of increments provided by the National Defense Act of 1916.

[Sidenote: The second series of officers' training camps.]

[Sidenote: Officers needed also for staff duties.]

[Sidenote: Constant experimentation necessary.]

[Sidenote: Victory rests on science as much as on soldiers.]

The results of the first series of camps were most satisfactory and, anticipating the calling of further increments of the National Army, a second series of camps was authorized, to begin August 27, 1917, under rules for the selection of candidates and their apportionment throughout the country which were much more searching and embodied those improvements which are always possible in the light of experience. Approximately 20,000 candidates are now attending this second series of camps, and those found qualified will shortly be commissioned and absorbed into the Army for the performance of the expanding volume of duties which the progress of preparation daily brings about. It is to be remembered that the need for officers exists not only in connection with the actual training of troops in camp and the leadership of troops in the field, but a vast number of officers must constantly be employed in staff duties, and great numbers must as constantly be engaged in military research and in specialized forms of training associated with the use of newly developed arms and appliances. In other words, we must maintain not merely the special-service schools which are required to perfect the training of officers in the special arms of the service, but we must constantly experiment with new devices and reduce to practical use the discoveries of science and the new applications of mechanical and scientific arts, both for offensive and defensive purposes. It would be out of place here to enumerate or describe in any detail the service of science in this war, but when the history of the struggle comes to be written it will be found that the masters of the chemical and physical sciences have thrown their talents and their ingenuity into the service, that their researches have been at the very basis of military progress, and that the victory rests as much upon a nation's supremacy in the researches and adaptations of science as it does upon the number and valor of its soldiers. Indeed, this is but one of the many evidences of the fact that modern war engages all of the resources of nations and that that nation will emerge victorious which has most completely used and coordinated all the intellectual, moral, and physical forces of its people.

[Sidenote: Fundamentals of military discipline do not change.]

[Sidenote: Professional soldiers still needed.]

It would be a national loss for me to fail to record in this place a just estimate of the value to the Nation of these training camps for officers. They disclosed an unsuspected source of military strength. Nobody will suppose that, with the growing intricacy of military science and the industrial arts related to it, a country can dispense with trained professional soldiers. The fundamentals of military discipline remain substantially unchanged and, in order that we may assemble rapidly and effectively adequate military forces, there must always be in the country a body of men to whom the life of a soldier is a career and who have acquired from their youth those qualities which have, from the beginning, distinguished the graduates of the Military Academy at West Point: the disciplined honor, the unfaltering courage, the comprehension of sacrifice, and that knowing obedience which proceeds from constant demonstrations of the fact that effective cooperation in war requires instant compliance with the command of authority, the sort of obedience which knows that a battle field is no place for a parliament. Added to these mental and moral qualities, the body of professional soldiers must devote themselves unremittingly to the development of the arts of war, and when the emergency arises must be familiar with the uses of science and the applications of industry in military enterprise. But these training camps have taught us that, given this relatively small body of professional soldiers, the Nation has at hand an apparently inexhaustible body of splendid material which can be rapidly made to supplement the professional soldier.

[Sidenote: Athletes from the colleges.]

[Sidenote: Adaptability of American youth.]

[Sidenote: Atmosphere of industrial and commercial democracy.]

[Sidenote: Many officers assigned to training of troops from their homes.]

When the first camp was opened, the colleges, military schools, and high schools of the country poured out a stream of young men whose minds had been trained in the classroom and whose bodies had been made supple and virile on the athletic field. They came with intelligence, energy, and enthusiasm and, under a course of intensive training, rapidly took on the added discipline and capacities necessary to equip them for the duties of officers. They have taken their places in the training camps and are daily demonstrating the value of their education and the adaptability of the spirit of American youth. A more salutary result would be impossible to imagine. The trained professional soldiers of the Army received this great body of youthful enthusiasm and capacity with hospitality and quickly impressed upon it a soldierly character. The young men brought to their training habits which they had formed for success as civilians, but which their patriotic enthusiasm rendered easily available in new lines of endeavor for the service of the country. They brought, too, another element of great value. They were assembled from all parts of the country; they were accustomed to the democracy of the college and high school; they recognized themselves as new and temporary adventurers in a military life; and they, therefore, reflected into our military preparation the fresh and invigorating atmosphere of our industrial and commercial democracy. This has undoubtedly contributed to the establishment of a happy spirit which prevails throughout the Army and has made it easy for the young men chosen under the selective service act to fall in with the training and mode of life which the military training camp requires. An effort was made by the department as far as possible to assign these young officers to the training of troops assembled from their own homes. By this means, a preexisting sympathy was used, and admiration and respect between officer and man was transferred from the home to the camp.

[Sidenote: The three divisions of the Army.]

[Sidenote: Enlistments may be for the period of the war.]

[Sidenote: Men anxious to get to France soon.]

[Sidenote: Traditions of military organizations preserved.]

The three divisions of the Army, namely, the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the National Army, were very different organizations as we contemplated them at the time of the passage of the act for the temporary increase of the Military Establishment. The Regular Army was a veteran establishment of professional soldiers; the National Guard a volunteer organization of local origin maintained primarily for the preservation of domestic order in the several States, with an emergency duty toward the national defense; the National Army an unknown quantity, made up of men to be selected arbitrarily by tests and rules as yet to be formulated, unorganized, untrained, existing only in theory and, therefore, problematical as to its spirit and the length of time necessary to fit it for use. Congress, however, most wisely provided as far as possible for an elimination of these differences. Enlistments in the Regular Army and National Guard were authorized to be made for the period of the war rather than for fixed terms; the maximum and minimum ages of enlistment in the Regular Army and National Guard were assimilated; the rights and privileges of members of the three forces were made largely identical. Indeed, the act created but one army, selected by three processes. The wisdom of Congress in this course became instantly apparent. Spirited young men throughout the country began at once to enlist in the Regular Army and National Guard who might have been deterred from such enlistment had their obligation been for a fixed period rather than for the duration of the war. Many men asked themselves but one question: "By which avenue of service will I earliest get to France?" The men in the National Army soon caught this spirit and, while the department is endeavoring to preserve as far as possible in the National Guard and the National Army those intimacies which belong to men who come from the same city or town, and to preserve the honorable traditions of military organizations which have histories of service to the country in other wars, the fact still remains that the army is rapidly becoming the army of the United States, with the sense of origin from a particular State, or association with a particular neighborhood, more and more submerged by the rising sense of national service and national identity.

[Sidenote: Sites selected for cantonments.]

[Sidenote: Sixteen divisional cantonments.]

[Sidenote: Emergency construction division established.]

I have described above the process of the execution of the selective service law. The preparation of places for the training of the recruits thus brought into the service was a task of unparalleled magnitude. On the 7th of May, 1917, the commanding generals of the several departments were directed to select sites for the construction of cantonments for the training of the mobilized National Guard and the National Army. The original intention was the construction of 32 cantonments. The appropriations made by Congress for this purpose were soon seen to be insufficient, and further study of the problem seemed to show that it would be unwise so seriously to engage the resources of the country, particularly in view of the fact that the National Guard was ready to be mobilized, that its training by reason of service on the Mexican border was substantial, and that its early use abroad in conjunction with the Regular Army would render permanent camps less important. The number was, therefore, cut to 16 divisional cantonments, and the National Guard was mobilized in camps for the most part under canvas, with only certain divisional storehouses and quarters for special uses constructed of wood. Because of the open weather during the winter months, the National Guard camps were located in the southern States. The National Army cantonments were located within the lines of the military division. A special division of the Quartermaster General's Department was established, known as the emergency construction division, and to it was given the task of erecting the cantonment buildings and such buildings as should be necessary for the National Guard.

On May 17, 1917, Col. I. W. Littell, of the Regular Army, was detailed to assemble and direct an organization to be known as the cantonment division of the Quartermaster Corps, whose duties were to consist of providing quarters and camps for the training and housing of the New National Army, which was to be selected by conscription as provided in the act of Congress dated May 18, 1917.

Able assistance was rendered by the following members of the committee on emergency construction and contracts, a subcommittee of the Munitions Board of the Council of National Defense:

Major W. A. Starrett, chairman; Major William Kelly; C. M. Lundoff; M. C. Tuttle; F. L. Olmsted; J. B. Talmadge, secretary.

[Sidenote: Specialists in purchasing and constructing secured.]

Inquiries were immediately made and all available means used by telegraph, correspondence, and consultation to get in touch with the ablest constructors, engineers, draftsmen, purchasing agents, and other specialists of broad experience in their respective vocations from which an efficient and experienced organization could be selected.

All of those selected who became attached to the organization in an official capacity gave up responsible and remunerative positions to give the Government the benefit of their services. They all being over the draft-age limit and representative technical men of repute and standing in their community, a splendid precedent of patriotism was established.

The assembling of an organization and the planning and execution of the work was undertaken with a view of accomplishing all that human ingenuity, engineering, and constructing skill could devise in the brief time available.

[Sidenote: The plans formulated.]

[Sidenote: Magnitude of the task.]

Plans were formulated by engineers, architects, and town planners who had given much thought to the particular problems involved. Camp sites comprising from 2,000 to 11,000 acres each were selected by a board of Army officers under the direction of the department commanders. Names of responsible contracting firms were secured and every effort made to perfect an organization competent to carry out the work of completing the camps at the earliest possible moment. The magnitude of assembling an organization for carrying on the work and securing the labor and materials therefor can in some measure be realized by reference to the following table, showing quantities of the principal materials estimated to be used in the construction of the National Army cantonments.

[Sidenote: Approximate quantities of materials.]

The approximate quantities of principal materials used in the construction of the various National Army camps are shown in the following tables. This does not include National Guard, embarkation, or training camps.

Quantity. Lumber (feet b. m.) 450,000,000 Roofing paper (square feet) 76,000,000 Doors 140,000 Window sash 700,000 Wall board (square feet) 29,500,000 Shower heads 40,000 Water-closet bowls 54,000 Tank heaters and tanks 11,000 Heating boilers 1,800 Radiation (square feet) 4,200,000 Cannon stoves 20,000 Room heaters 20,000 Kitchen stoves and ranges 10,000 Wood pipe for water supply (feet) 1,000,000 Cast-iron supply pipe (feet) 470,000 Wire, all kinds and sizes (miles) 5,500 Wood tanks (aggregate capacity) 8,300,000 Hose carts 600 Fire engines 90 Fire extinguishers 4,700 Fire hose (feet) 392,500 Fire hydrants 3,600 Hand-pump tanks 12,700 Fire pails 163,000 Cots 721,000

Sixteen National Army camps were constructed in various parts of the United States at points selected by the War Department. The camps were carefully laid out by experienced town planners and engineers to give best results considering all viewpoints.

[Sidenote: Extent of a typical National Army cantonment.]

[Sidenote: Roads constructed and improvements installed.]

A typical cantonment city will house 40,000 men. Each barrack building will house 150 men and provide 500 cubic feet of air space per man. Such a cantonment complete contains between 1,000 and 1,200 buildings and covers about 2,000 acres. In addition, each cantonment has a rifle range, drill, parade, and maneuver grounds of about 2,000 acres. In many cases all or a large part of the entire site had to be cleared of woods and stumps. The various military units were located on principal or primary roads—a regiment being treated as a primary unit. About 25 miles of roads were constructed at each cantonment, and sewers, water supply, lighting facilities, and other improvements installed.

[Sidenote: The special buildings required.]

An infantry regiment requires 22 barrack buildings, 6 for officers' quarters, 2 storehouses, 1 infirmary building, 28 lavatories, with hot and cold shower baths, or a total of 59 buildings. In addition to the buildings necessary for the regimental units, each cantonment has buildings for divisional headquarters, quartermaster depots, laundry receiving and distributing stations, base hospitals having 1,000 beds, post exchanges, and other buildings for general use.

[Sidenote: Remount stations.]

At several of the cantonments remount stations have been provided, some of them having a capacity to maintain 12,000 horses.

[Sidenote: Other necessary camps.]

In addition to the National Army camps, plans were made for the construction of 16 National Guard, two embarkation and one quartermaster training camp, but the construction of these items did not involve so large an expenditure as the National Army camps, as provision was made for fewer units and only tentage quarters for the men in the National Guard camps was provided. Modern storehouses, kitchens, mess shelters, lavatories, shower baths, base hospitals, and remount depots were built, and water, sewerage, heating, and light systems installed at an expenditure of about $1,900,000 for each camp.

[Sidenote: The demand for construction and supplies.]

[Sidenote: Savings effected by standardization.]

With the advent of the United States into the war, there has appeared not only one of the world's greatest builders, but the world's greatest customer for supplies and human necessaries. We have not only to equip, house, and supply our own army, but meet the demands arising from the drainage of the resources of the entente allies. Small shopping and bargaining are out of the question. Enormous savings were, however, effected, due to the fact that materials were purchased in large quantities and consequently at a much reduced price. Standardization of sizes saved from $5 to $6 per thousand feet b. m. on lumber, and a further saving of from $3 to $11 over prevailing prices was effected by the lumber subcommittee of the Council of National Defense. The Raw Materials Committee effected similar savings in prepared roofing, nails, and other construction materials. The lead subcommittee procured 500 tons of lead for caulking pipe at 3 cents less than market price. When it is considered that this construction work is, next to the Panama Canal, the largest ever undertaken by the United States, the country is to be congratulated on having available the men and materials to accomplish the feat of providing for the maintenance of the newly organized army in so short a period.

[Sidenote: Extensive construction work for National Army.]

I have described at length the work of building necessary for the National Army camps, but at the same time extensive building was necessary at the 16 sites selected for the mobilization and training of the National Guard. While the National Guard troops were themselves quartered under canvas, many wooden buildings and storehouses had to be constructed for their use and, of course, the important problems of water supply, sewage, and hospital accommodations required substantially as much provision upon these subjects as upon those selected for the National Army.

[Sidenote: Labor assembled from great distances.]

[Sidenote: The assistance rendered by Mr. Gompers.]

At the very outset of this hurried and vast program, it became apparent that labor would have to be assembled from great distances, and in wholly unaccustomed numbers, that the laboring men would be required to separate themselves from home and family and to live under unusual and less comfortable circumstances than was their habit. It was also clear that no interruption or stoppage of the work could be permitted. I therefore took up with Mr. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, the question of a general agreement which would cover all trades to be employed in assuring continuity of work, provide just conditions of pay, recognize the inequalities which exist throughout the country, and yet avoid controversy as between the contractor and his employees, which, wherever the justice of the dispute might lie, could have only a prejudicial effect upon the interests of the Government, by delaying the progress necessary to be made. Mr. Gompers and those associated with him in the building trades promptly and loyally entered into a consideration of the whole subject, with the result that the following agreement was made:

[Sidenote: Commission for labor adjustment.]

"WASHINGTON, D. C., June 19, 1917.

"For the adjustment and control of wages, hours, and conditions of labor in the construction of cantonments, there shall be created an adjustment commission of three persons, appointed by the Secretary of War; one to represent the Army, one the public, and one labor; the last to be nominated by Samuel Gompers, member of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, and President of the American Federation of Labor.

[Sidenote: Consideration given to scales in locality.]

"As basic standards with reference to each cantonment, such commission shall use the main scales of wages, hours, and conditions in force on June 1, 1917, in the locality where such cantonment is situated. Consideration shall be given to special circumstances, if any arising after said date which may require particular advances in wages or changes in other standards. Adjustments of wages, hours, or conditions made by such board are to be treated as binding by all parties."

* * * * *

[Sidenote: Labor difficulties easily adjusted.]

[Sidenote: Early completion of cantonments.]

The contractors throughout the country were notified of the existence of this agreement and of the determination of the Government to carry it out faithfully. The scope of the agreement was subsequently enlarged so as to include other emergency construction done by the War Department, and a board of adjustment was appointed which, at the beginning, consisted of General E. A. Garlington, formerly General Inspector of the Army, Mr. Walter Lippmann, and Mr. John R. Alpine, to whom all complaints were referred, and by whom all investigations and determinations in enforcement of the agreement were made. The personnel of this board was subsequently changed, and its activities associated with a similar board appointed by the concurrent action of the Secretary of the Navy and Mr. Gompers, but I need here refer only to the fact that, by the device of this agreement, and through the instrumentality of this board, labor difficulties and disputes were easily adjusted, and the program of building has gone rapidly forward, with here and there incidental delays due sometimes to delay in material, sometimes to difficulties of the site, and doubtless to other incidental failures of coordination, but in the main, the work has been thoroughly successful. When its magnitude is appreciated, the draft it made upon the labor market of the country, the speed with which it was accomplished, and the necessity of assembling not only materials but men from practically all over the country, it seems not too much to say that the work is out of all proportion larger than any similar work ever undertaken in the country, and that its completion substantially on time, is an evidence of efficiency both on the part of those officers of the Government charged with responsibility for the task and the contractors and men of the trades and crafts employed to carry on the work.

[Sidenote: Camps for training military engineers.]

This great division of the War Department in times of peace devotes the major part of its energy to works of internal improvements and to the supervision of, improvement, and maintenance of navigable waters; but in time of war it immediately becomes a fundamental part of the Military Establishment. It was, therefore, called upon not only to render assistance of an engineering kind in the establishment of training camps, but had to establish camps for the rapid training in military engineering of large additions to its own personnel, and to undertake the rapid mobilization and training of additional engineer troops, of which at the beginning of the war there were but two regiments.

[Sidenote: Importance of railroad transportation in war.]

[Sidenote: Regiments of engineers sent to France.]

One of the earliest opportunities for actual assistance to the countries associated with us in this war was presented to this department. In the war against Germany transportation, and particularly railroad transportation, is of the utmost importance. It was easily foreseen that our own army in France would require large railroad facilities both in the operation of permanent railroads for the handling of our equipment and supplies and in the construction and operation of temporary roads behind our Army. In the meantime regiments of engineer troops, if speedily organized and dispatched to Europe, could both render valuable assistance to the British and French Armies and acquire the training and experience which would make them valuable at a later stage to us. Accordingly nine such regiments were organized and have for some months been rendering active and important service along the actual battle front. In addition to these, a tenth regiment, composed of men skilled in forestry and lumbering, was organized and sent abroad, and is now operating in a foreign forest cutting out lumber supplies for the use of our associates and ourselves.

[Sidenote: Arrangements to operate our own railways in France.]

[Sidenote: Creation of entire transportation system.]

Concurrently with the formation of these special engineer troops the department undertook the collection of material for the establishment and operation of our own lines of supply abroad. The railways of France have been maintained in a state of high efficiency by the French people, and they are performing the tremendous transportation task imposed upon them by the French and English military operations with complete success; but in order not to impose a burden which they were not designed to meet, by asking them to expand to the accommodation of our services, it has been found necessary for us ourselves to undertake the accumulation of railroad material for our own use in the theater of war. This work is on a large and comprehensive scale. Any detailed description of it would be inappropriate at this time, but it involves the creation of entire transportation systems and the actual construction and operation of railroads with the elaborate terminal facilities needed for the rapid unloading and dispatch of supplies, equipment, and troops.

[Sidenote: The Quartermaster General's problem.]

[Sidenote: Vast equipment needed.]

[Sidenote: Intensive production of food and clothing.]

[Sidenote: Associated nations must be supplied.]

[Sidenote: Emergency appropriation.]

[Sidenote: Great extent of purchases.]

The problem facing the Quartermaster General has been serious. For the small Regular Army of the United States a well-defined and adequate supply system had been created. It was large enough and flexible enough to permit us to make gradual accumulations of reserve as Congress from time to time provided the necessary money; but when the mobilization of the National Guard on the Mexican frontier took place, such reserves as we had were rapidly consumed, and the maintenance of the military establishment on the border required an increase which quite equaled the entire capacity of those industries ordinarily devoting themselves to the production of military supplies. When the present enlarged military establishment was authorized it involved an enlarged Regular Army, an enlarged National Guard and the new National Army, thus bringing upon us the problem of immediate supply with adequate reserves for an Army of 2,000,000 men; and these men were not to be stationed about in Army posts, but mobilized into great camps under conditions which necessarily increased the wear and tear upon clothing and equipment, and correspondingly increased the reserves needed to keep up the supply. In addition to this these troops were assembled for overseas use, and it therefore became necessary to accumulate in France vast stores of clothing and equipment in order to have the Army free from dependence, by too narrow a margin, upon ocean transportation with its inevitable delays. As a consequence the supply needs of the department were vastly greater than the capacity of the industrial organization and facilities normally devoted to their production, and the problem presented was to divert workshops and factories from their peace-time output into the intensive production of clothing and equipment for the Army. Due consideration had to be given to the maintenance of the industrial balance of the country. Industries already devoted to the manufacture of supplies for the nations associated with us in the war had to be conserved to that useful purpose. Perhaps some aid to the imagination can be gotten from the fact that 2,000,000 men constitute about one-fiftieth of the entire population of the United States. Supply departments were, therefore, called upon to provide clothing, equipment, and maintenance for about one-fiftieth of our entire people, and this in articles of uniform and of standardized kinds. The great appropriations made by Congress tell the story from the financial point of view. In 1917 the normal appropriation for the Quartermaster Department was $186,305,000. The emergency appropriation for this department for the year 1918 was $3,000,000,000; a sum greater than the normal annual appropriation for the entire expenses of the Federal Government on all accounts. Another illustration can be drawn from the mere numbers of some familiar articles. Thus of shoes more than 20,000,000 pairs have already been purchased and are in process of delivery; of blankets, 17,000,000; of flannel shirting, more than 33,000,000 yards; of melton cloth, more than 50,000,000 yards; of various kinds of duck for shelter tents and other necessary uses, more than 125,000,000 yards; and other staple and useful articles of Army equipment have been needed in proportion.

[Sidenote: Resources, industry and transportation mobilized.]

To all of this it has been necessary to add supplies not usual in our Army which, in many cases, had to be devised to meet needs growing out of the nature of the present warfare. It was necessary, therefore, to mobilize the resources and industry, first to produce with the greatest rapidity the initial equipment, and to follow that with a steady stream of production for replacement and reserve; second, to organize adequate transportation and storage for these great accumulations, and their distribution throughout the country, and then to establish ports of embarkation for men and supplies, assemble there in orderly fashion for prompt ship-loading the tonnage for overseas; and to set up in France facilities necessary to receive and distribute these efficiently.

[Sidenote: Civilian agencies cooperate with government.]

The Quartermaster General's Department was called upon to set up rapidly a business greater than that carried on by the most thoroughly organized and efficiently managed industrial organization in the country. It had to consider the supply of raw materials, the diversion of industry, and speed of production, and with its problem pressing for instant solution it had to expand the slender peace-time organization of the Quartermaster Department by the rapid addition of personnel and by the employment and coordination of great civilian agencies which could be helpful.

[Sidenote: The Council of National Defense is aided by men of great ability.]

The Council of National Defense, through the supply committees organized by it, afforded the immediate contact necessary with the world of commerce and industry, while men of various branches of business and production engineers brought their services freely to the assistance of the Department. The dollar-a-year man has been a powerful aid, and when this struggle is over, and the country undertakes to take stock of the assets which it found ready to be used in the mobilization of its powers, a large place will justly be given to these men who, without the distinction of title or rank, and with no thought of compensation, brought experience, knowledge, and trained ability to Washington in order that they might serve with patriotic fervor in an inconspicuous and self-sacrificing, but indispensably helpful way.

[Sidenote: Sound beginnings made.]

The problems of supply are not yet solved; but they are in the course of solution. Sound beginnings have been made, and as the military effort of the country grows the arrangements perfected and organizations created will expand to meet it.

[Sidenote: The American Railway Association's special committee.]

In this general connection it seems appropriate to refer to the effective cooperation between the department and the transportation agencies of the country. For a number of years the Quartermaster General's Department has maintained close relations with the executives of the great railway systems of the country. In February, 1917, a special committee of the American Railway Association was appointed to deal with questions of national defense, and the cooperation between this committee and the department has been most cordial and effective, and but for some such arrangement the great transportation problem would have been insoluble. I am happy, therefore, to join the Quartermaster General in pointing out the extraordinary service rendered by the transportation agencies of the country, and I concur also in his statement that "of those who are now serving the Nation in this time of stress, there are none who are doing so more whole-heartedly, unselfishly, and efficiently than the railroad officials who are engaged in this patriotic work."

[Sidenote: Codes established for the garment industry.]

One other aspect of the work of the Quartermaster General's Office has engaged my particular attention, and seems to me to have been fruitful of most excellent results. The garment working trades of the United States are largely composed of women and children, and of men of foreign extraction. More than any other industry in the United States it has been menaced by the sweatshop system. The States have enacted codes and established inspection agencies to enforce sanitary conditions for these workers, and to relieve the evils which seem everywhere to spring up about them. To some extent the factory system operated under rigid inspection has replaced home work, and has improved conditions; but garment making is an industry midway in its course of being removed from the home to the factory, and under pressure of intensive production, home work in congested tenements has been difficult to eradicate.

[Sidenote: Dangers in home work system.]

The vice of this system is not merely the invasion of the home of the worker, and the consequent enfeeblement of the family and family life. Work done under such circumstances escapes the inspector, and the crowded workers in the tenement are helpless in their struggle for subsistence under conditions which are unrelieved by an assertion of the Government's interest in the condition under which these workers live. Moreover, wide distribution of garments made under such conditions tends to spread disease, and adds another menace from the public point of view.

[Sidenote: Standards inserted in contracts.]

The department determined, therefore, to establish minimum standards as to wages, inspection, hours, and sanitation. These standards were inserted in the contracts made for garment production, and a board was appointed to enforce an observance of these standards. The effect of this has been that it is now possible to say that no uniform worn by an American soldier is the product of sweatshop toil, and that so far as the Government is concerned in its purchases of garments it is a model employer.

[Sidenote: The worker feels a national interest.]

This action has not delayed the accumulation of necessary supplies, and it has added to our national self-respect. It has distributed national interest between the soldier who wears and the worker who makes the garment, regarding them each as assets, each as elements in our aggregated national strength.

[Sidenote: The Ordnance Department.]

On the 1st day of July, 1916, there was a total of 96 officers in the Ordnance Department. The commissioned strength of this department increased substantially 2,700 per cent, and is still expanding. The appropriations for ordnance in 1917 were $89,697,000; for 1918, in view of the war emergency, the appropriations for that department aggregate $3,209,000,000.

[Sidenote: Most difficult problems of the war.]

This division of the War Department has had, in some respects, the most difficult of the problems presented by the transition from peace to war. Like the Department of the Quartermaster General, the Ordnance Department has had to deal with various increases of supply, increases far exceeding the organization and available capacity of the country for production. The products needed take longer to produce; for the most part they involved intricate machinery, and highly refined processes of manufacture. In addition to this the industrial agencies of the country have been devoting a large part of their capacity to foreign production which, in the new set of circumstances, it is unwise to interrupt.

[Sidenote: Organization of the Council of National Defense.]

[Sidenote: An advisory body.]

[Sidenote: Advisory function should not be impaired.]

[Sidenote: The council supplements the Cabinet.]

Legislation enacted on August 29, 1916, as a part of the National Defense Act provided for the creation of a Council of National Defense. Shortly thereafter the council was organized, its advisory commission appointed, a director chosen, and its activities planned. It appropriately directed its first attention to the industrial situation of the country and, by the creation of committees representative of the principal industries, brought together a great store of information both as to our capacity for manufacture and as to the re-adaptations possible in an emergency for rapid production of supplies of military value. Under the law of its creation, the Council of National Defense is not an executive body, its principal function being to supervise and direct investigations and make recommendations to the President and the heads of the executive departments with regard to a large variety of subjects. The advisory commission is thus advisory to a body which is itself advisory, and the subordinate bodies authorized to be created are collectors of data upon which advice can be formulated. There was no intention on the part of Congress to subdivide the executive function, but rather to strengthen it by equipping it with carefully matured recommendations based upon adequate surveys of conditions. The extent of the council's powers has been sometimes misunderstood, with the result that it has been deemed an inapt instrument, and from time to time suggestions have been made looking to the donation to it of power to execute its conclusions. Whatever determination Congress may hereafter reach with regard to the bestowal of additional executive power and the creation of agencies for its exercise, the advisory function of the Council of National Defense ought not to be impaired, nor ought its usefulness to be left unrecognized. In the first place, the council brings together the heads of the departments ordinarily concerned in the industrial and commercial problems which affect the national defense and undoubtedly prevents duplications of work and overlappings of jurisdiction. It also makes available for the special problems of individual departments the results attained in other departments which have been called upon to examine the same problem from other points of view. In the second place, the council supplements the activities of the Cabinet under the direction of the President by bringing together in a committee, as it were, members of the Cabinet for the consideration of problems which, when maturely studied, can be presented for the President's judgment.

[Sidenote: The council directs the aroused spirit of the nation.]

[Sidenote: The General Munitions Board.]

[Sidenote: Field of priorities in transportation and supplies.]

With the declaration of a state of war, however, the usefulness of the Council of National Defense became instantly more obvious. The peace-time activities and interests of our people throughout the country surged toward Washington in an effort to assimilate themselves into the new scheme of things which, it was recognized, would call for widespread changes of occupation and interest. The Council of National Defense was the only national agency at all equipped to receive and direct this aroused spirit seeking appropriate modes of action, and it was admirably adapted to the task because among the members of the council were those Cabinet officers whose normal activities brought them into constant contact with all the varied peace-time activities of the people and who were, therefore, best qualified to judge the most useful opportunities in the new state of things for men and interests of which they respectively knew the normal relations. For the more specialized problems of the national defense, notably those dealing with the production of war materials, the council authorized the organization of subordinate bodies of experts, and the General Munitions Board grew naturally out of the necessities of the War and Navy Departments, which required not only the maximum production of existing munition-making industries in the country, but the creation of new capacity for production and its correlation with similar needs on the part of the foreign governments. The work done by the General Munitions Board was highly effective, but it was soon seen that its problem carried over into the field of transportation, that it was bound up with the question of priorities, and that it was itself divisible into the great and separate fields of raw material supply and the production of finished goods. With the growth of its necessary interests and the constant discovery of new relations it became necessary so to reorganize the General Munitions Board as both to enlarge its view and more definitely recognize its widespread relations.

[Sidenote: The War Industries Board.]

[Sidenote: Knowledge of war needs of the United States and Allies.]

[Sidenote: The Council of National Defense a natural center.]

Upon the advice of the Council of National Defense, the General Munitions Board was replaced by the War Industries Board, which consists of a chairman, a representative of the Army, a representative of the Navy, a representative of labor and the three members of the Allied Purchasing Commission through whom, under arrangements made with foreign Governments by the Secretary of the Treasury, the purchasing of allied goods in the United States is effected. This purchasing commission consists of three chairmen—one of priorities, one of raw materials, and one of finished products. By the presence of Army and Navy representatives, the needs of our own Government are brought to the common council table of the War Industries Board. The board is thus enabled to know all the war needs of our Government and the nations associated with us in war, to measure their effect upon the industry of the country, to assign relative priorities in the order of serviceableness to the common cause, and to forecast both the supply of raw material and our capacity for completing its manufacture in such a way as to coordinate our entire industrial capacity, both with a view to its maximum efficiency and to its permanent effect upon the industrial condition of the country. Under legislation enacted by Congress, the President has committed certain definite problems to special agencies. The food administration, the fuel administration, and the shipping problem being each in the hands of experts specially selected under appropriate enactments. In large part, these activities are separable from the general questions considered by the Council of National Defense and the War Industries Board, but there are necessary relations between them which it has been found quite simple to arrange by conference and consultation, and the Council of National Defense, with the Secretary of the Treasury added as an important councilor, has seemed the natural center around which to group these agencies so far as any common activity among them is desirable.

[Sidenote: The War Department indebted to the council.]

[Sidenote: Unremunerated service of able citizens.]

[Sidenote: Business confidence in the Government.]

In the meantime the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense and the council itself have continued to perform the original advisory functions committed to them by the National Defense Act. The War Department is glad to acknowledge its debt to the council and the commission. I refrain from specific enumeration of the services which the department has received through these agencies only because their number is infinite and their value obvious. The various supply committees created by the Supply Commission, the scientific resources placed at the disposal of the department, the organization of the medical profession, the cooperation of the transportation interests of the country, the splendid harmony which has been established in the field of labor, are all fruits of the actions of these bodies and notably of the Advisory Commission. It has been especially in connection with the activities of the council and the commission that we have been helped by the unremunerated service of citizens who bore no official relation to the Government but had expert knowledge of and experience with the industries of the country which it was necessary rapidly to summon into new uses. Through their influence, the trade rivalries and commercial competitions, stimulating and helpful in times of peace, have been subordinated to the paramount purpose of national service and the common good. They have not only created helpful relations for the present emergency but have established a new confidence in the Government on the part of business and perhaps have led to clearer judgments on the part of the Government in its dealings with the great organizations, both of labor and of capital, which form the industrial and commercial fabric of our society. The large temporary gain thus manifest is supplemented by permanent good; and in the reorganizations which take place when the war is over there will doubtless be a more conscious national purpose in business and a more conscious helpfulness toward business on the part of the Government.

[Sidenote: General Pershing goes to France.]

[Sidenote: The Navy transports troops without any loss.]

[Sidenote: Terminal facilities organized.]

[Sidenote: Cooperation of the Shipping Board.]

[Sidenote: Reserve equipment and food.]

As a result of the exchanges of views which took place between the military missions to the United States and our own Government, it was determined to begin at once the dispatch of an expeditionary force of the American Army to France. This has been done. General John J. Pershing was selected as commander in chief and with his staff departed for France, to be followed shortly by the full division, consisting entirely of Regular Army troops. Immediately thereafter there was formed the so-called Rainbow Division, made up of National Guard units of many States scattered widely throughout the country. The purpose of its organization was to distribute the honor of early participation in the war over a wide area and thus to satisfy in some part the eagerness of these State forces to be permitted to serve in Europe. The Marines, with their fine traditions and honorable history, were likewise recognized, and regiments of Marines were added to the first forces dispatched. It would, of course, be unwise to attempt any enumeration of the forces at this time overseas, but the Army and the country would not have me do less than express their admiration and appreciation of the splendid cooperation of the Navy, by means of which these expeditionary forces have been safely transported and have been enabled to traverse without loss the so-called danger zone infested by the stealthy and destructive submarine navy of the enemy. The organization and dispatch of the expeditionary force required the preparation of an elaborate transport system, involving not only the procurement of ships and their refitting for service as troop and cargo transports, but also extensive organizations of terminal facilities both in this country and France; and in order to surround the expeditionary force with every safeguard, a large surplus of supplies of every kind were immediately placed at their disposal in France. This placed an added burden upon the supply divisions of the department and explains in part some of the shortages, notably those of clothing, which have temporarily embarrassed mobilization of troops at home, embarrassments now happily passed. In the organization of this transport the constant and helpful cooperation of the Shipping Board, the railroads, and those in control of warehousing, wharfing, lighterage, and other terminal facilities has been invaluable. Our activities in this regard have resulted in the transporting of an army to France fully equipped, with adequate reserves of equipment and subsistence, and with those large quantities of transportation appliances, motor vehicles, railroad construction supplies, and animals, all of which are necessary for the maintenance and effective operations of the force.

[Sidenote: Technical troops cooperate with British and French.]

The act authorizing the temporary increase of the military establishment empowered the department to create special organizations of technical troops. Under this provision railroad and stevedore regiments have been formed and special organizations of repair men and mechanics, some of which have proceeded to France and rendered service back of the British and French line in anticipation of and training for their later service with the American Army. No complete descriptions of these activities can be permitted at this time, but the purpose of the department has been to provide from the first for the maintenance of our own military operations without adding to the burdens already borne by the British and French, and to render, incidentally, such assistance to the British and French Armies as could be rendered by technical troops in training in the theater of operations. By this means the United States has already rendered service of great value to the common cause, these technical troops having actually carried on operations for which they are designed in effective cooperation with the British and French Armies behind hotly contested battle fronts.

[Sidenote: The Red Cross organizes base hospital units.]

[Sidenote: Doctors and nurses aid British and French armies.]

[Sidenote: The medical profession rallies around the service.]

[Sidenote: Convalescent and reconstruction hospitals.]

[Sidenote: Physical fitness necessary for military service.]

Working in close association with the medical committee of the Council of National Defense and the Red Cross and in constant and helpful contact with the medical activities of the British, French, and other belligerents, the Surgeon General has built up the personnel of his department and taken over from the Red Cross completely organized base-hospital units and ambulance units, supplemented them by fresh organizations, procured great quantities of medical supplies and prepared on a generous scale to meet any demands of our Army in action. Incidentally and in the course of this preparation, great numbers of base hospital organizations, ambulance units, and additional doctors and nurses have been placed at the disposal of the British and French armies, and are now in the field of actual war, ministering to the needs of our Allies. Indeed, the honor of first participation by Americans in this war belongs to the Medical Department. In addition to all this preparation and activity, the Surgeon General's department has been charged with the responsibility for the study of defense against gas attack and the preparation of such gas masks and other appliances as can be devised to minimize its effects. The medical profession of the country has rallied around this service. The special laboratories of the great medical institutions have devoted themselves to the study of problems of military medicine. New, effective, and expeditious surgical and medical procedures have been devised and the latest defensive and curative discoveries of medical science have been made available for the protection and restoration of our soldiers. Far-reaching activities have been conducted by the Medical Department here in America, involving the supervision of plans for great base hospitals in the camps and cantonments, the planning of convalescent and reconstruction hospitals for invalided soldiers and anticipatory organization wherever possible to supply relief to distress and sickness as it may arise. Moreover, the task of the Medical Department in connection with the new Army has been exacting. Rigid examinations have been conducted, in the first instance by the physicians connected with the exemption boards, but later at the camps, in order to eliminate from the ranks men whose physical condition did not justify their retention in the military service. Many of the rejections by the Medical Department have caused grief to high-spirited young men not conscious of physical weakness or defect, and perhaps having no weakness or defect which embarrassed their usefulness in civilian occupation; but both the strength of the Army and justice to the men involved require that the test of fitness for military service should be the sole guide, and the judgments of the most expert physicians have been relied upon to give us an army composed of men of the highest possible physical efficiency.

* * * * *

The capture of Jerusalem by the British under Allenby on December 8th, 1917, sent a thrill throughout the civilized world. The deliverance of the Holy City from the Turks marked another great epoch in its history, which includes possession by Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, and Turks. The entrance of the British troops into Jerusalem is described in the following narrative.



THE CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM

GENERAL E. H. H. ALLENBY

[Sidenote: General Allenby's instructions.]

When I took over the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force at the end of June, 1917, I had received instructions to report on the conditions in which offensive operations against the Turkish Army on the Palestine front might be undertaken in the autumn or winter of 1917.

After visiting the front and consulting with the Commander of the Eastern Force, I submitted my appreciation and proposals in a telegram dispatched in the second week of July.

[Sidenote: Situation on the Palestine front.]

The main features of the situation on the Palestine front were then as follows:

The Turkish Army in Southern Palestine held a strong position extending from the sea at Gaza, roughly along the main Gaza-Beersheba Road to Beersheba. Gaza had been made into a strong modern fortress, heavily entrenched and wired, offering every facility for protracted defence. The remainder of the enemy's line consisted of a series of strong localities, viz.: the Sihan group of works, the Atawineh group, the Baha group, the Abu Hareira-Arab el Teeaha trench system, and, finally, the works covering Beersheba. These groups of works were generally from 1,500 to 2,000 yards apart, except that the distance from the Hareira group to Beersheba was about 4 1/2 miles.

[Sidenote: Turks have good communications.]

The enemy's force was on a wide front, the distance from Gaza to Beersheba being about 30 miles; but his lateral communications were good, and any threatened point of the line could be very quickly reinforced.

My force was extended on a front of 22 miles, from the sea, opposite Gaza, to Gamli.

[Sidenote: Lack of water on the British front.]

Owing to lack of water I was unable, without preparations which would require some considerable time, to approach within striking distance of the enemy, except in the small sector near the sea coast opposite Gaza.

My proposals received the approval of the War Cabinet, and preparations were undertaken to enable the plan I had formed to be put into execution.

[Sidenote: To strike on Turk's left flank.]

I had decided to strike the main blow against the left flank of the main Turkish position, Hareira and Sheria. The capture of Beersheba was a necessary preliminary to this operation, in order to secure the water supplies at that place and to give room for the deployment of the attacking force on the high ground to the north and north-west of Beersheba, from which direction I intended to attack the Hareira-Sheria line.

[Sidenote: Necessary to take Beersheba.]

This front of attack was chosen for the following reasons. The enemy's works in this sector were less formidable than elsewhere, and they were easier of approach than other parts of the enemy's defences. When Beersheba was in our hands we should have an open flank against which to operate, and I could make full use of our superiority in mounted troops, and a success here offered prospects of pursuing our advantage and forcing the enemy to abandon the rest of his fortified positions, which no other line of attack would afford.

[Sidenote: Attacked Gaza to deceive enemy.]

[Sidenote: Assurance of naval cooperation at Gaza.]

It was important, in order to keep the enemy in doubt up to the last moment as to the real point of attack, that an attack should also be made on the enemy's right at Gaza in conjunction with the main operations. One of my Commanders was therefore ordered to prepare a scheme for operations against Gaza on as large a scale as the force at his disposal would permit. I also asked the Senior Naval Officer of Egypt, Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., to afford me naval cooperation by bombarding the Gaza defences and the enemy's railway stations and depots north of Gaza. Rear-Admiral Jackson afforded me cordial assistance, and during the period of preparation Naval Officers worked in the closest cooperation with my staff at General Headquarters and the staff of the G.O.C. troops operating in that region.

[Sidenote: Difficulties regarding water and transport.]

The difficulties to be overcome in the operations against Beersheba and the Sheria-Hareira line were considerable, and careful preparations and training were necessary. The chief difficulties were those of water and transport, and arrangements had to be made to ensure that the troops could be kept supplied with water while operating at considerable distances from their original water base for a period which might amount to a week or more; for, though it was known that an ample supply of water existed at Beersheba, it was uncertain how quickly it could be developed or to what extent the enemy would have damaged the wells before we succeeded in occupying the town. Except at Beersheba, no large supply of water would be found till Sheria and Hareira had been captured.

[Sidenote: No good roads south of Gaza-Beersheba line.]

[Sidenote: Railway lines to be laid.]

The transport problem was no less difficult; there were no good roads south of the line Gaza-Beersheba, and no reliance could therefore be placed on the use of motor transport. Owing to the steep banks of many of the wadis which intersected the area of operations, the routes passable by wheeled transport were limited, and the going was heavy and difficult in many places. Practically the whole of the transport available in the force, including 30,000 pack camels, had to be allotted to one portion of the eastern force to enable it to be kept supplied with food, water, and ammunition at a distance of 15 to 20 miles in advance of railhead. Arrangements were also made for railhead to be pushed forward as rapidly as possible towards Karm, and for a line to be laid from Gamli toward Beersheba for the transport of ammunition.

A railway line was also laid from Deir el Belah to the Wadi Ghuzze, close behind the sector held by another portion of the eastern force.

[Sidenote: Rushing up artillery and supplies.]

Considerable strain was thrown on the military railway from Kantara to the front during the period of preparation. In addition to the normal requirements of the force, a number of siege and heavy batteries, besides other artillery and units, had to be moved to the front, and large depots of supplies, ammunition, and other stores accumulated at the various railheads. Preparations had also to be made and the necessary material accumulated to push forward the lines from Deir el Belah and Shellal.

[Sidenote: The enemy determined to maintain Gaza to Beersheba line.]

During the period from July to October, 1917, the enemy's force on the Palestine front had been increased. It was evident, from the arrival of these reinforcements and the construction of railway extensions from El Tine, on the Ramleh-Beersheba railway, to Deir Sineid and Belt Hanun, north of Gaza, and from Deir Sineid to Huj, and from reports of the transport of large supplies of ammunition and other stores to the Palestine front, that the enemy was determined to make every effort to maintain his position on the Gaza-Beersheba line. He had considerably strengthened his defences on this line; and the strong localities mentioned had, by the end of October, been joined up to form a practically continuous line from the sea to a point south of Sheria, except for a gap between Ali Muntar and the Sihan Group. The defensive works round Beersheba remained a detached system, but had been improved and extended.

[Sidenote: Date of attack on Beersheba.]

The date of the attack on Beersheba, which was to commence the operations, was fixed as October 31, 1917. Work had been begun on the railway from Shellal towards Karm, and on the line from Gamli to El Buggar. The development of water at Ecani, Khalasa, and Asluj proceeded satisfactorily. These last two places were to be the starting point for the mounted force detailed to make a wide flanking movement and attack Beersheba from the east and north-east.

[Sidenote: The Turks make a strong reconnaissance.]

On the morning of October 27 the Turks made a strong reconnaissance towards Karm from the direction of Kauwukah, two regiments of cavalry and two or three thousand infantry, with guns, being employed. They attacked a line of outposts near El Girheir, held by some Yeomanry, covering railway construction. One small post was rushed and cut up, but not before inflicting heavy loss on the enemy; another post, though surrounded, held out all day, and also caused the enemy heavy loss. The gallant resistance made by the Yeomanry enabled the 53rd (Welsh) Division to come up in time, and on their advance the Turks withdrew.

[Sidenote: Bombardment of Gaza defenses.]

The bombardment of the Gaza defences commenced on October 27, and on October 30 warships of the Royal Navy, assisted by a French battleship, began cooperating in this bombardment.

On the evening of October 30 the portion of the eastern force, which was to make the attack on Beersheba, was concentrated in positions of readiness for the night march to its positions of deployment.

[Sidenote: Imperial Camel Corps, Infantry and Cavalry.]

The night march to the positions of deployment was successfully carried out, all units reaching their appointed positions up to time. The plan was to attack the hostile works between the Khalasa road and the Wadi Saba with two divisions, masking the works north of the Wadi Saba with the Imperial Camel Corps and some infantry, while a portion of the 53rd (Welsh) Division further north covered the left of the corps. The right of the attack was covered by a cavalry regiment. Further east, mounted troops took up a line opposite the southern defences of Beersheba.

[Sidenote: Enemy's advanced works taken.]

As a preliminary to the main attack, in order to enable field guns to be brought within effective range for wire-cutting, the enemy's advanced works at 1,070 were to be taken. This was successfully accomplished at 8.45 a.m., after a short preliminary bombardment, by London troops, with small loss, 90 prisoners being taken. The cutting of the wire on the main line then proceeded satisfactorily, though pauses had to be made to allow the dust to clear; and the final assault was ordered for 12.15 p.m. It was successful all along the front attacked, and by about 1 p.m. the whole of the works between the Khalasa road and the Wadi Saba were in our hands.

Some delay occurred in ascertaining whether the enemy still occupied the works north of the road; it was decided, as they were still held by small parties, to attack them from the south. After a preliminary bombardment the works were occupied with little opposition by about 7.30 p.m.

[Sidenote: British casualties light.]

The casualties were light, considering the strength of the works attacked; a large proportion occurred during the advance towards the positions previous to the assault, the hostile guns being very accurate and very difficult to locate.

[Sidenote: The road toward Beersheba.]

Meanwhile, the mounted troops, after a night march, for part of the force of 25 and for the remainder of 35 miles, arrived early in the morning of the 31st about Khasim Zanna, in the hills some five miles east of Beersheba. From the hills the advance into Beersheba from the east and north-east lies over an open and almost flat plain, commanded by the rising ground north of the town and flanked by an underfeature in the Wadi Saba called Tel el Saba.

A force was sent north to secure Bir es Sakaty, on the Hebron road, and protect the right flank, this force met with some opposition and was engaged with hostile cavalry at Bir es Sakaty and to the north during the day. Tel el Saba was found strongly held by the enemy, and was not captured till late in the afternoon.

[Sidenote: Rapid advance of Australian Light Horse.]

Meanwhile, attempts to advance in small parties across the plain towards the town made slow progress. In the evening, however, a mounted attack by Australian Light Horse, who rode straight at the town from the east, proved completely successful. They galloped over two deep trenches held by the enemy just outside the town, and entered the town at about 7 p. m., capturing numerous prisoners.

The Turks at Beersheba were undoubtedly taken completely by surprise, a surprise from which the dash of London troops and Yeomanry, finely supported by their artillery, never gave them time to recover. The charge of the Australian Light Horse completed their defeat.

[Sidenote: Prisoners and guns taken.]

A very strong position was thus taken with slight loss, and the Turkish detachment at Beersheba almost completely put out of action. About 2,000 prisoners and 13 guns were taken, and some 500 Turkish corpses were buried on the battlefield. This success laid open the left flank of the main Turkish position for a decisive blow.

[Sidenote: Complete success of Beersheba operations.]

[Sidenote: The attack on Gaza.]

The actual date of the attack at Gaza had been left open till the result of the attack at Beersheba was known, as it was intended that the former attack, which was designed to draw hostile reserves towards the Gaza sector, should take place twenty-four to forty-eight hours previous to the attack on the Sheria position. After the complete success of the Beersheba operations, and as the early reports indicated that an ample supply of water would be available at that place, it was hoped that it would be possible to attack Sheria by November 3 or 4. The attack on Gaza was accordingly ordered to take place on the morning of November 2. Later reports showed that the water situation was less favorable than had been hoped, but it was decided not to postpone the attack.

[Sidenote: The works on Umbrella Hill principal objectives.]

The objective of this attack were the hostile works from Umbrella Hill (2,000 yards south-west of the town) to Sheikh Hasan, on the sea (about 2,500 yards north-west of the town). The front of the attack was about 6,000 yards, and Sheikh Hasan, the furthest objective, was over 3,000 yards from our front line. The ground over which the attack took place consisted of sand dunes, rising in places up to 150 feet in height. This sand is very deep and heavy going. The enemy's defences consisted of several lines of strongly built trenches and redoubts.

As Umbrella Hill flanked the advance against the Turkish works further west, it was decided to capture it by a preliminary operation, to take place four hours previous to the main attack. It was accordingly attacked, and captured at 11 p. m. on November 1 by a portion of the 52nd (Lowland) Division. This attack drew a heavy bombardment of Umbrella Hill itself and our front lines, which lasted for two hours, but ceased in time to allow the main attack, which was timed for 3 a. m., to form up without interference.

It had been decided to make the attack before daylight owing to the distance to be covered between our front trenches and the enemy's position.

[Sidenote: Success of the attack on Umbrella Hill.]

[Sidenote: Capture of the south-western defenses.]

The attack was successful in reaching all objectives, except for a section of trench on the left and some of the final objectives in the centre. Four hundred and fifty prisoners were taken and many Turks killed. The enemy also suffered heavily from the preliminary bombardment, and subsequent reports from prisoners stated that one of the divisions holding the Gaza sector was withdrawn after losing 33 per cent of its effectives, one of the divisions in general reserve being drawn into the Gaza sector to replace it. The attack thus succeeded in its primary object, which was to prevent any units being drawn from the Gaza defences to meet the threat to the Turkish left flank, and to draw into Gaza as large a proportion as possible of the available Turkish reserves. Further, the capture of Sheikh Hasan and the south-western defences constituted a very distinct threat to the whole of the Gaza position, which could be developed on any sign of a withdrawal on the part of the enemy.

Our losses, though considerable, were not in any way disproportionate to the results obtained.

[Sidenote: Water and transport difficulties.]

Meanwhile on our right flank the water and transport difficulties were found to be greater than anticipated, and the preparations for the second phase of the attack were somewhat delayed in consequence.

On the early morning of November 1 the 53rd (Welsh) Division, with the Imperial Camel Corps on its right, had moved out into the hills north of Beersheba, with the object of securing the flank of the attack on Sheria. Mounted troops were also sent north along the Hebron Road to secure Dhaheriyeh if possible, as it was hoped that a good supply of water would be found in this area, and that a motor road which the Turks were reported to have constructed from Dhaheriyeh to Sheria could be secured for our use.

The 53rd (Welsh) Division, after a long march, took up a position from Towal Abu Jerwal (six miles north of Beersheba) to Muweileh (four miles north-east of Abu Irgeig). Irish troops occupied Abu Irgeig the same day.

[Sidenote: Advance on Kohleh and Khuweilfeh.]

On November 3 we advanced north on Ain Kohleh and Tel Khuweilfeh, near which place the mounted troops had engaged considerable enemy forces on the previous day. This advance was strongly opposed, but was pushed on through difficult hill country to within a short distance of Ain Kohleh and Khuweilfeh. At these places the enemy was found holding a strong position with considerable and increasing forces. He was obviously determined not only to bar any further progress in this direction, but, if possible, to drive our flankguard back on Beersheba. During the 4th and 5th he made several determined attacks on the mounted troops. These attacks were repulsed.

[Sidenote: Hostile cavalry between Khuweilfeh and Hebron Road.]

By the evening of November 5 the 19th Turkish Division, the remains of the 27th and certain units of the 16th Division had been identified in the fighting round Tel el Khuweilfeh, and it was also fairly clear that the greater part of the hostile cavalry, supported apparently by some infantry ("depot" troops) from Hebron, were engaged between Khuweilfeh and the Hebron Road.

[Sidenote: Enemy tries to draw forces north of Beersheba.]

The action of the enemy in thus employing the whole of his available reserves in an immediate counter-stroke so far to the east was apparently a bold effort to induce me to make essential alterations in my offensive plan, thereby gaining time and disorganizing my arrangements. The country north of Beersheba was exceedingly rough and hilly, and very little water was to be found there. Had the enemy succeeded in drawing considerable forces against him in that area the result might easily have been an indecisive fight (for the terrain was very suitable to his methods of defence) and my own main striking force would probably have been made too weak effectively to break the enemy's centre in the neighborhood of Sheria Hareira. This might have resulted in our gaining Beersheba, but failing to do more—in which case Beersheba would only have been an incubus of a most inconvenient kind. However, the enemy's action was not allowed to make any essential modification to the original plan, which it had been decided to carry out at dawn on November 6.

[Sidenote: Effort to reach Sheria.]

By the evening of November 5, all preparations had been made to attack in the Kauwukah and Rushdi systems and to make every effort to reach Sheria before nightfall.

The mounted troops were to be prepared in the event of a success by the main force to collect, as they were somewhat widely scattered owing to water difficulties, and push north in pursuit of the enemy. Tel el Khuweilfeh was to be attacked at dawn on the 6th, and the troops were to endeavor to reach line Tel el Khuweilfeh-Rijm el Dhib.

[Sidenote: The plan of attack.]

At dawn on the 6th the attacking force had taken up positions of readiness to the S.E. of the Kauwukah system of trenches. The attack was to be commenced by an assault on the group of works forming the extreme left of the enemy's defensive system, followed by an advance due west up the railway, capturing the line of detached works which lay east of the railway. During this attack London and Irish troops were to advance towards the Kauwukah system, bringing forward their guns to within wire-cutting range. They were to assault the southeastern face of the Kauwukah system as soon as the bombardment had proved effective, and thence take the remainder of the system in enfilade.

[Sidenote: All objectives of the attack captured.]

The attack progressed rapidly, the Yeomanry storming the works on the enemy's extreme left with great dash; and soon after noon the London and Irish troops commenced their attack. It was completely successful in capturing all its objectives, and the whole of the Rushdi system in addition. Sheria Station was also captured before dark. The Yeomanry reached the line of the Wadi Sheria to Wadi Union; and the troops on the left were close to Hareira Redoubt, which was still occupied by the enemy. This attack was a fine performance, the troops advancing 8 or 9 miles during the day and capturing a series of very strong works covering a front of about 7 miles, the greater part of which had been had and strengthened by the enemy for over six months. Some 600 prisoners were taken and some guns and machine-guns captured. Our casualties were comparatively slight. The greatest opposition was encountered by the Yeomanry in the early morning, the works covering the left of the enemy's line being strong and stubbornly defended.

[Sidenote: Mounted troops are ordered to take up the pursuit.]

During the afternoon, as soon as it was seen that the attack had succeeded, mounted troops were ordered to take up the pursuit and to occupy Huj and Jemmamah.

The 53rd (Welsh) Division had again had very severe fighting on the 6th. Their attack at dawn on Tel el Khuweilfeh was successful, and, though they were driven off a hill by a counterattack, they retook it and captured another hill, which much improved their position. The Turkish losses in this area were very heavy indeed, and the stubborn fighting of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, Imperial Camel Corps, and part of the mounted troops during November 2 to 6 drew in and exhausted the Turkish reserves and paved the way for the success of the attack on Sheria. The 53rd (Welsh) Division took several hundred prisoners and some guns during this fighting.

[Sidenote: Bombardment of Gaza continues.]

The bombardment of Gaza had meanwhile continued, and another attack was ordered to take place on the night of the 6th-7th.

The objectives were, on the right, Outpost Hill and Middlesex Hill (to be attacked at 11.30 p. m. on the 6th), and on the left the line Belah Trench-Turtle Hill (to be attacked at dawn on the 7th).

[Sidenote: Airmen observe enemy movements.]

During the 6th a certain amount of movement on the roads north of Gaza was observed by our airmen and fired on by our heavy artillery, but nothing indicating a general retirement from Gaza.

The attack on Outpost Hill and Middlesex Hill met with little opposition, and as soon, after they had been taken, as patrols could be pushed forward, the enemy was found to be gone. East Anglian troops on the left also found at dawn that the enemy had retired during the night, and early in the morning the main force occupied the northern and eastern defences of Gaza. Rearguards were still occupying Beit Hanun and the Atawineh and Tank systems, from whence Turkish artillery continued to fire on Gaza and Ali Muntar till dusk.

[Sidenote: The Turks evacuate Gaza.]

[Sidenote: Turkish rearguard makes counterattacks.]

As soon as it was seen that the Turks had evacuated Gaza a part of the force pushed along the coast to the mouth of the Wadi Hesi, so as to turn the Wadi Hesi line and prevent the enemy making any stand there. Cavalry had already pushed on round the north of Gaza, and became engaged with an enemy rearguard at Beit Hanun, which maintained its position till nightfall. The force advancing along the coast reached the Wadi Hesi by evening, and succeeded in establishing itself on the north bank in the face of considerable opposition, a Turkish rearguard making several determined counterattacks.

On our extreme right the situation remained practically unchanged during the 7th; the enemy made no further attempt to counterattack, but maintained his positions opposite our right flank guard.

[Sidenote: London troops take Tel el Sheria.]

In the centre the Hareira Tepe Redoubt was captured at dawn; some prisoners and guns were taken. The London troops, after a severe engagement at Tel el Sheria, which they captured by a bayonet charge at 4 a. m. on the 7th subsequently repulsing several counterattacks, pushed forward their line about a mile to the north of Tel el Sheria; the mounted troops on the right moved towards Jemmamah and Huj, but met with considerable opposition from hostile rearguards.

[Sidenote: Charge of the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry.]

[Sidenote: Reports of the Royal Flying Corps.]

During the 8th the advance was continued, and interest was chiefly centred in an attempt to cut off, if possible, the Turkish rearguard which had held the Tank and Atawineh systems. The enemy had, however, retreated during the night 7th-8th, and though considerable captures of prisoners, guns, ammunition, and other stores were made during the day, chiefly in the vicinity of Huj, no large formed body of the enemy was cut off. The Turkish rearguards fought stubbornly and offered considerable opposition. Near Huj a fine charge by some squadrons of the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry captured 12 guns, and broke the resistance of a hostile rearguard. It soon became obvious from the reports of the Royal Flying Corps, who throughout the 7th and 8th attacked the retreating columns with bombs and machine-gun fire, and from other evidence, that the enemy was retiring in considerable disorganization, and could offer no very serious resistance if pressed with determination.

Instructions were accordingly issued on the morning of the 9th to the mounted troops, directing them on the line El Tine-Beit Duras, with orders to press the enemy relentlessly. They were to be supported by a portion of the force, which was ordered to push forward to Julis and Mejdel.

[Sidenote: Enemy pursued toward Hebron by the Yeomanry.]

The enemy opposite our right flank guard had commenced to retreat towards Hebron on the morning of the 8th. He was pursued for a short distance by the Yeomanry, and some prisoners and camels were captured, but the Yeomanry were then recalled to rejoin the main body of the mounted troops for the more important task of the pursuit of the enemy's main body.