I am rather keen on this question of the best means of checking the recoil of a field carriage. A very strongly made drag-shoe fitted with chains to the centre of gun trail will do very well; and these were, later on in the campaign, fitted by the Ordnance authorities at Maritzburg to new "Percy Scott" carriages, which they sent up to us to replace the original "Percy Scott" carriages, which, as I remarked before, were not strongly enough built, particularly as regards the wheels, to stand any very bad country or a lengthened campaign, in both of which we found ourselves involved. In these remarks, please let no one think that I am running down the 12-pounder carriage for a purpose; not so. I simply wish to point out details that, if more time had been available, would certainly have been avoided in them by their very clever designer, Captain Percy Scott, R.N., to whom the service in general (and I personally) owe a debt of gratitude; for assuredly not a Q.-F. gun, or a single one of us with the batteries, would ever have been landed unless it had been for him and his brains and his determination to have the Royal Navy represented in the campaign, as was their due—being on the spot with what was most wanted, namely, heavy guns.

Here I wish to distinctly state my own opinion, and that also of the many officials and gunners, Naval and Military, with whom I have talked over the matter, i.e., that not only did the Naval guns save Ladysmith, but they also in a great measure helped to save the campaign outside for its relief, and with it Natal. And my opinion now, when the war is nearly over, is only strengthened and confirmed by what I have heard the Boers say of the guns, viz., that they are the only things when using shrapnel that have shaken them much during the fighting, and, considering the country, naturally so. That it was to the Navy and not to the garrison gunners that the original credit has gone, was simply because we were here and they were at home at the start. One is, as regards their gunnery powers, as good as the other, and the garrison gunners earned their laurels later on. Still, I have a great hankering after a gun's crew of "handy men" to beat any crew in this world for all-round service and quick shooting, and I am ready to back my opinion heavily.

Returning from this digression to the subject of recoil, we found that sandbags placed at a certain distance in rear of each wheel not only effectually checked the carriage, but also (a great consideration) ran it out again. This system was used both by the 4.7's and ourselves at the end of the war; and seeing that the guns had only half crews, it was a most important saving to men who had perhaps marched ten miles, loaded and off-loaded ammunition, and then had perhaps to fight the guns under a hot sun for hours. To fill and carry the bags, however, is a nuisance, and some better system on the same principle is needed, such as the inclined wedges that I saw by photos the Boers were using in rear of wheels; and I should very much like to see some such system substituted for our present one. I have not seen the hydraulic spade used, perhaps that is the best.

To put it briefly, the hastily improvised gun-carriage of the 12-pounders had, on account of this very haste, the following defects:—

(1.) Too weak generally in all parts, particularly wheels and axles, for any long campaign.

(2.) Wheels and axles being a scratch lot, none in any of the batteries were interchangeable, which caused many times later in the campaign when wheels began to give out, much anxiety. Several times we only had guns ready for action or trekking by the "skin of one's teeth," and it must be borne in mind that any new wheels wired-for sometimes took two months to arrive on the very overcrowded railway—a single line.

(3.) The system of checking the recoil of the field carriage was a bad one.

(4.) All the 12-pounders except two were in the first instance sent up without limbers, and therefore had to be limbered up to wagons. This for practical purposes in the country we had to trek over was absolutely useless and caused endless delays. Eventually we all got limbers built at Maritzburg, and equivalent gun-oxen to drag the guns separately from the wagons.

(5.) The trail of the gun consisted of a solid block of wood some 12 feet long; so that if one laid the gun to any long range (in most over 7,000 yards, I think) the oil cylinder under the gun, on trying to elevate it, would bring-up against this trail and prevent laying. This therefore necessitated digging pits for trails to shoot much over 7,000 yards, which in bad ground often took some considerable time. To obviate this defect would of course be very easy with a steel trail of two side plates, and space for gun and the cylinder between the sides.

(6.) The general idea of all the mountings I saw was narrow axles and high wheels, whereas, for all trekking purposes, it should be broad space between the wheels and low wheels. This was amply proved to us by the number of times the high-wheeled narrow mountings upset on rocky ground, whilst the broad low type went along steadily. The 12-pounder gun itself did its work beautifully, shooting hard and lasting well, and owing to the dry climate of Africa we had no trouble at all to keep the guns clean and all gear in good order.

(7.) Perhaps the most troublesome defect of all was that the gun-carriage had no brake fitted. The gunnery drill-book system of "lash gun wheels" may be at once erased from the book for all practical purposes over any rocky or bad country; it simply, as we soon found, tears the wheels to pieces, and chokes the whole mounting up. An ordinary military Scotch cart brake, or a brake fitted as the trek wagons here have, under the muzzle of the gun on the forepart of the wheels, acts very well, and my bluejackets, although not carpenters, fitted these for me. They are screw-up brakes.

The sighting of the gun (drum and bar system) cannot be beaten, I think. Perhaps a V-shaped notch to give one the centre of the H, or hind sight, might be an improvement, as here personal error often occurs. Lieutenant, now Commander, Ogilvy, R.N., always made his men correct their final sighting of the gun for elevation from about six paces in rear of the trail, and my experience is that this is a small but important matter, especially for fine shooting say at a trench at 5,000 yards, which merely appears to one as a line on the ground. One invariably finds that the gun, with the eye of a man laying close up to the hind sight, is laid slightly short of the object; so this should be noticed in the gunnery drill-book as regards field guns. Telescopic sights, the patent, I believe, of Lieutenant-Colonel L. K. Scott, R.E., were sent out and used by us with the 12-pounders to fire on the trenches at Spion Kop and Brakfontein, when fine shooting was required. These sights had the cross wires much too thick, so we substituted cobwebs picked off the bushes and stuck on with torpedo composition, and these did admirably. Still this sight was not altogether a success. The power of the telescope, especially in the rays of the sun, was poor, and it took a man a long time to lay his gun with it, thus further reducing the quick-firing power of the 12-pounder reduced already by the recoiling field carriage. As to the 4.7's, it was found that the ordinary Naval small telescope, fitted on a bar and with light cross wires, could not be beaten as a sight for ranges they had to fire at. It is a very good useful glass, and it was, I believe, used both in Natal and elsewhere right through the campaign, and I unhesitatingly give it the palm.

As to the system of firing and gear used, electric firing was very successful as long as one had the gear for refitting and repairing and an armourer attached to one's guns; this, of course, as the guns became split up into pairs was impossible, and I may say that carting electric batteries (which of necessity for quickness have to be kept charged) in wagons or limbers over rocks and bad roads, and with continual loading and off-loading, becomes a trouble and anxiety to one. So for active service I should certainly recommend that percussion firing should be regarded as the first and principal method to be used with guns on the move, carrying also the electric gear for use if guns are left for any time at fixed spots as guns of position. I may here remark that when firing with electricity from a field carriage the battery has to be placed on the ground, clear of recoil, and therefore the wire leads must be adjusted in length accordingly. I am uncertain whether our other 12-pounders used mostly electric or percussion, but I think on the whole, percussion; and, speaking for myself, I certainly did so after experiencing the disappointments which miss-fires often gave one, when trying to get in a quick shot, say from the line of march, with the electric gear. These "miss-fires" are, moreover, often unavoidable under active service conditions, such as we had with our semi-mobile guns. The guns and connections get sometimes an inch thick in mud or dust and require time to clean, when one has no time to spare: the use of percussion tubes avoids all this.

Before we leave the subject of guns the following description of the French 3" Creusot gun by the Revue d'Artillerie will be of interest, viz.:—

South Africa.—The Field Artillery of the Boers consists for the most part of Creusot 3" rapid-firing guns made after the 1895 model. These guns were purchased by the South African Republic during the year 1896.... The gun, which is constructed of forged and tempered steel, has a 3" bore. Its total length is 8 feet and its weight is 726 pounds. The body of the gun consists of three elements:—1. A tube in which the breech piece is fixed. 2. A sleeve covering the tube for a length of 3 feet 6 inches. 3. A chase hoop. The chamber is provided with twenty-four grooves of variable pitch which have a final inclination of 8 deg..

The system of breech closing is that of the interrupted screw, which presents four sectors, two of them threaded and two plain, so that the breech is opened or closed by a quarter revolution of the screw. The mechanism is of the Schneider system, patented in 1895, and has the advantage of allowing the opening or closing of the breech to be effected by the simple motion of a lever from right to left, or vice versa.

The gun is fired by means of an automatically-cocked percussion apparatus. A safety device prevents any shots from being fired until after the breech is closed.

The carriage is provided with a hydraulic recoil-cylinder fitted with a spring return. It is also furnished with a "spade," which is placed under the stock at an equal distance from the trail and the axle, and which is of the model that General Engelhardt has adopted for the Russian Artillery.

During a march this spade is turned back and fastened to the stock. The carriage is likewise provided with a road brake, which is to be employed in firing only when the nature of the ground is such that the spade cannot be used.

The gun is placed in a bronze sleeve that carries the brake cylinders and the various other connecting pieces for the return spring and the aiming apparatus.

The hydraulic recoil consists of two cylinders placed laterally and at the height of the axis of the piece.

The axle has the peculiarity that in its centre there is a wide opening in which are placed the cradle and the gun. It is provided with two screw trunnions, around which the pivoting necessary for lateral aiming is effected. This arrangement of the gun with respect to the axle has the effect of greatly diminishing the shocks that firing tends to produce.

Elevation and depression are accomplished by rotating the axle in the wheels of the carriage. This is done by means of a crank which, through an endless screw and pinion, controls a toothed sector attached to the sleeve.

Pointing in direction is done by means of a lever known as a tail piece. Mounted upon the axle there are two small sights, forming a line of aim, that permit of bringing the carriage back in the direction of the target as soon as a shot has been fired. All that the gunner has to do is to give the piece a slight displacement laterally with respect to the carriage by means of a hand-wheel, which turns the gun 2 deg. to one side or the other.

The line of aim is found by a back and front sight arranged upon the right side of the sleeve in which the gun is mounted. The back side permits of aiming while the gun is being loaded. It carries a small oscillating level that indicates the elevation of the gun during rapid firing.

The weight of the carriage, without wheels, is 1,146 lbs. and with wheels, 1,477 lbs.

The ammunition consists of cartridges containing charge and projectile and having a total weight of 19 lbs. The powder employed is of the smokeless kind, designated by the letters B.N. The weight of the charge is 1-3/4 lbs. The projectiles are of three kinds—ordinary shells, shrapnel shells, and case shot. The weight of each is the same, say 14-1/4 lbs. The shrapnel shells contain 234 balls, weighing 155.8 grains each, and an explosive charge of 3.13 ozs.

As the gun can be pointed at a maximum angle of 20 deg., and the initial velocity is 1,837 feet, the projectiles can be fired to a distance of 26,248 feet.

The crew necessary to serve the gun consists of six men—a gunner, a man to manoeuvre the breech-piece, a man to manoeuvre the pointing lever, two men to pass the ammunition, and a man to regulate the fuse. The rapidity of firing can easily be raised to ten shots a minute.

The accuracy of the gun is most remarkable. Upon the occasion of the trials made when the guns were received, the following firing was done: a regulating shot, a first volley of six shots in forty-two seconds, and a second volley of six shots in forty-six seconds.

The fore carriage of the gun and that of the caisson are identical. They carry a chest containing thirty-six cartridges, and are capable of accommodating four men.

The back carriage of the caisson carries two chests like that of the fore carriage.

The total weight of the gun and fore carriage loaded is 3,790 lbs., and that of the caisson 4,330 lbs.

On reading over this description of the French 3" Creusot gun, it seems to me that the kind of axle used with it is first class and should be used in our field carriages for quick-firing guns; it must certainly take the strain of recoil off the centre of the axle, which recoil we found cracked our axles as we used them (once in my own guns) so badly that the whole thing had to be shifted and replaced. Another advantage it has is to lower the whole gun and mounting, and the centre of gravity of the weight of it and carriage, and therefore the gun is much harder to upset on rocky ground or going up steep precipices, as we had to do in Natal. This detail of wheels and axle is, I think, the most important one almost in a field carriage. The axle I mention is one bent down in its centre for about two-thirds of its length.

In regard to the ammunition. The cordite charges in their brass cylinders and zinc-lined boxes did admirably, and the amount of knocking about which the cases and boxes out here stand is marvellous. At one time early in the campaign before Colenso and Ladysmith, a decided variation in shooting of our guns was noticed, and was put down in many cases to the variation of the cordite itself, the brass cases sometimes lying out, in fact, in a powerful sun for hours, while the guns were waiting or in action, and often becoming then too hot to touch. Now, however, I personally don't think that this theory was right but am of opinion that the variation then noticed, and even after in the shooting, was simply due to the varying recoil of guns on different slopes of ground and with indifferent drag-shoes. Royal Artillery officers confirm one in this opinion.

As for the shells, both common and shrapnel, they stood the knocking about well, and I never saw or heard of a single common shell used with 12-pounders not exploding on striking, which speaks well for the base fuse. The shrapnel I am not quite so sure about; one noticed often a great deal of damp collected in the threads of the fuse plug and nose of the shell; owing, I presume, to condensation in their shell boxes under the change of heat and cold. Still they did very well and I think seldom failed to burst when set the right distance. I say the right distance because this at first was a slight puzzle to us, the subject of height in feet above the sea-level of course never having before presented itself to us as altering very considerably the setting of the time fuse; and I don't think that a table of correction for this exists in the Naval Service; at any rate, I have never seen one.

To illustrate this, we found at Spion Kop (about 3,500 feet above the sea-level) that it was necessary to set the time fuse for any given range some 500 yards short to get the shell to burst at all before striking; and on the top of Van Wyk, fronting Botha's Pass (some 6,500 feet above sea-level) I had to allow the fuse 800 to 900 yards short of the range, and similarly at Almond's Nek. This is, I take it, due to the projectile travelling further against a reduced air pressure at any height than it does for the same sighting of the gun at sea-level, for which of course all guns are sighted. I should like to talk to experts regarding this as we are not quite sure about it up here.[6]

[Footnote 6: I am since glad to hear from Lieutenant Henderson of H.M.S. Excellent, that he is engaged in working out a table of corrections, such as I mention, and is also interesting himself in the question of "range-finders," and "filters," and other necessities for naval service.]

Of course this firing from a height gives one therefore some 1,000 yards longer range with shrapnel, say at 6,000 feet up, which is a most important fact to remember in shore fighting, and was well illustrated by the Boer 6" gun at Pougwana Mount (7,000 feet) over Laing's Nek, killing several of our Infantry on Inkwelo (Mount Prospect) at 10,000 yards range; of course this was helped by the height they were up, as well as by their superior double-ringed time fuse which we have picked up on their shrapnel, and which gives them in shrapnel fire a great advantage over any of our guns, which have not got these fuses at present. It is interesting to note that many 4.7 lyddite shells were picked up, or rather dug up, by our own men and others, quite intact—this, of course, was always in soft ground, noticeably near the river (Tugela), and shows that the "direct action fuse" should have been screwed into the nose of the shell, instead of the "delay action fuse" that it had in it for use against thin plates of ships.

Before leaving this subject of the gun and its fittings (12-pounder), I again wish to emphasise the fact of how important is the question of recoil. At one time, in front of Brakfontein with the 8-gun 12-pounder battery, we all dug trail pits and blocked the trails completely up in rear to prevent the guns recoiling at all on the carriage. This most certainly gave a gun thus blocked up over one allowed to recoil on the level an advantage of several hundred yards at an ordinary range of say 6,000 yards; but of course it threw on our weak makeshift wooden trails an undue strain, and after a couple had been smashed had to be given up. Still, although I would never advocate doing this to any field gun (i.e., bringing a gun up short as it shakes the mounting too much) the fact remains that the range or shooting power of the gun may be varied with the recoil in a great degree, and that therefore what I mention about a system to check recoil uniformly and with certainty seems to me to be an important one with our Naval field guns. This fact of increased range, got by blocking up a gun, is useful to remember in many cases, especially in this war when the Boers had the pull of our guns at first, and when it might have been worth while just temporarily disabling one gun, and to get one shot into them and so frighten them off.

The newspaper controversy, very hot at one time, as to whether the Boer guns were better or not than ours, and the ridiculous statements one both read and heard from persons who knew little about the matter, were rather amusing and perhaps a little annoying. I unhesitatingly state that on all occasions the British Naval guns inch for inch outranged and outshot the Boer guns; and that the 4.7 Q.-F. even outranged, by some 2,000 yards, the Boer 6" Creusot. This I saw amply proved, at least to my own satisfaction, at Vaal Krantz, when the Boer 6" gun on about the same level as our 4.7 was, on Signal Hill, vainly tried to reach it and couldn't, whilst our gun was all the time giving them an awful hammering and blew up their magazine.

In one way, and one only, the Boer guns had the advantage over us in shooting, that is, with their shrapnel shell, many of which were fitted with a special long range time fuse (double-ringed); here they certainly overshot us, but failed to make much use of the advantage, as they invariably burst their shrapnel, through incorrect setting of fuse, either too high up in the air to hurt much or else on striking the ground. Another great advantage the Boer guns as a rule possessed was the heights at which they were placed, generally firing down upon our guns and troops. Notwithstanding all this, I say again, that their guns inch for inch were not in the hunt with ours as regards shooting power, nor was this likely or possible seeing the great length of the Naval Q.-F. gun and its much heavier charge.

It must be remembered that Naval guns are solely designed and built for use at sea, or in forts, or against armour; and so to get the necessary muzzle energy, velocity, and penetration, a long gun is required; whereas the Boer gun was essentially a field or heavy land service gun. Their guns up to the 6" being on proper field mountings, and much lighter, shorter in the barrel, and consequently more mobile than ours, while firing a lighter charge; and perhaps in this way only it could be said that they were certainly better and handier than our guns. On the march and trekking up mountains this must have helped them a good deal, and from photos which I saw after the Boers had been driven out of Natal I should certainly say that their heavy guns on the march must have been much easier to move than ours.

To give an idea of the difference in weight between the heavier guns I may quote the following figures; that of the Boer guns I take as I read of them in Military Intelligence books:

Weight. Weight. British Naval 6" Q.-F. gun } (wire) 7 tons 8 cwt. } Boer 6" Creusot gun, British Naval 4.7 Q.-F. } 2 tons 10 cwt. wire gun 2 tons 2 cwt. }

From these weights it may be at once noticed that inch for inch there is no comparison between the Boer and British heavy gun as regards range and power of gun itself, consequent on our heavier charges. Taking their 3-1/2" Creusot Q.-F. guns (15 lbs.) and comparing them with our Elswick Naval 12-pounders I should say that there is little to choose between them, they having the advantage only in their long range fuses for shrapnel shell, which fuses should be issued to ours as soon as possible. One always heard these small French Q.-F. guns alluded to with great awe as the "high velocity" gun of the enemy, but I doubt much if they have one foot per second more mean velocity at ordinary ranges than our Naval 12-pounder, although perhaps they may have more at the muzzle, which is of little account.

To illustrate what small use the Boer gunner made of his advantage over us in long range shrapnel, I should say that it was generally noticed by all in the Natal Field Force how very high up they burst their shell as a rule, and so doing much less damage than they might have done; as Tommy described it, the bullets often came down like a gentle shower of rain and could be caught in the hand and pocketed. This of course, I should say, was the result of faulty setting of their time fuse; probably they did not apply the necessary correction for height above sea-level and so the shell either burst at too high a period of its flight, or else on striking did little damage to us. The front face of this kopje from where I am now writing (Grass Kop at Sandspruit, and 6,000 feet high) is full of holes made by Boer shrapnel shell, burst after striking in the hole dug by the shell itself and leaving all their bullets and pieces buried in these holes. There was no damage done by their heavy shrapnel fire at all when the Dorsets took the hill, and solely because of this faulty setting of the time fuse. We have dug up many of these shells here, and bullets simply strew the ground.

The 12-pounder gun limber, especially made by our Ordnance people from a design supplied by Lieutenant James, R.N., when at Maritzburg in November, was afterwards supplied to all the guns, and none too soon; but we did not get them till Ladysmith was relieved and they were badly wanted all the time. These limbers were very well made and very excellent, fitted to carry forty rounds complete of 12-pounder Q.-F. ammunition which was invariably found by us as sufficient, as a first or ready supply, giving eighty rounds to a pair of guns. More could, however, have been carried if necessary, up to sixty rounds complete on each limber; these limbers were strong, with very good wheels and broad tyres (a great contrast to the wretched little gun wheels we had to get along with at one time) and on them there was room also for gun's crew's great-coats, leather gear, gun telescopes, and other impedimenta, which was most convenient.

One fault in them, I think, might be corrected if again required; i.e., the platform or floor of the limber instead of being built only on the forepart of the axle should extend also behind or on rear side of the axle; by this means the Q.-F. boxes of ammunition may be distributed to balance the weight equally on each side of the axle, and so bring the least weight possible on the necks of the oxen or other draught animals drawing the limber and gun along. This, in a hilly country, is important.

I would here note that when on the march with guns under any conditions, one's men should always be allowed to march light, slinging their rifles on the gun muzzles and putting leather gear with S.A. ammunition, water bottles and days' provisions handy on top of the limbers. The carrying of any of these things only exhausts the men for no object, and when one remembers what heavy work they may have to do on the march at any moment—bringing guns into action, rapid firing and running out the guns, digging pits and trenches, off-loading and loading the Q.-F. ammunition, and keeping up a supply which in South Africa at any rate may be at the bottom of a steep kopje with the gun at the top—one recognises the great advantage gained in giving the men as much latitude as possible, and bringing them into action after a march comparatively fresh. For these reasons I would advocate that a gun limber should be made for any service gun, with the object of allowing a certain amount of extra room for the gun's crew's gear and stores.

In respect to range finding, the mekometer (range finder) as supplied to the Royal Horse Artillery and Royal Artillery and also to every company in a regiment (and which therefore was easy to borrow during the campaign), proved most useful to us in getting ranges roughly. To get a range over 5,000 yards one has to use the double base with this instrument, and ranges may then be found up to 10,000 yards, and, with practised observers, fairly correctly. At any rate it is most useful to have something to start on when you get up into position. This instrument is extremely small and portable and should be supplied to Naval field batteries, and also a certain proportion to the rifle companies for land service; it may be carried slung like a small Kodak camera on one's back. Of course ranges can be very quickly found by shooting one or two shots to find them out, and this was done by our guns a good deal, and necessarily so when in action when one has no time to waste and the objects are moving ones; but I strongly advise anyone who gets his guns into a position where he is likely to stop, such as in defence of a camp, or on top of a kopje defending a railway line, or in position to bombard an enemy's fixed trenches and lines, at once to find his ranges roughly all round to prominent objects by the mekometer, as it gives one added confidence and is invaluable when shooting over the heads of one's own men to cover their attack, which is often a ticklish job and to be successful must be continued up to the very last moment it can be, with safety.

This instrument, the mekometer, together with the clinometer, for setting the gun for elevation independent of the sight arc, and an ordinary spirit-level to place on gun trail to tell which way the wheels or carriage of the gun are inclined on uneven ground (so altering the deflection scale), might in my opinion be supplied to every Naval field battery, heavy or light.[7]

[Footnote 7: Since writing this opinion I think, perhaps, it will be well to pause till the results of Professor George Forbes', F.R.S., experiments with a new stereoscopic instrument in South Africa are to hand; he is there at present by request of Lord Kitchener with his new invention. For full report of this instrument I would refer to Professor Forbes' paper read at the Society of Arts, December 18th, 1901. It is sufficient now to say that the instrument folds up to 3 foot 6 inches in length, can be used by one observer only standing, kneeling, or lying down, has great accuracy and portability, and has received the support of Sir George Clarke and other authorities.]

I may mention that the 4.7's and 6" Q.-F. were often fired at elevations which did not even come on the graduated elevation arc, and so the clinometer had to be borrowed from the military and used to lay the guns; it is most useful.

For night firing on shore, as practised by us at Colenso and Spion Kop, guns are laid for required distant object just before dusk. The position of the wheels is accurately marked by pegs and lines, and when the gun is laid the sight is lowered to some white object placed fifty yards in front of gun, on which when dark a lantern may be placed; the elevation is read off either on arc of sight or by clinometer placed on the gun. To keep on firing at this distant object when dark, the gun is run out to same wheel marks every time and laid for same direction by the lantern on the near object, and elevation by clinometer. The C.O.'s of regiments always most kindly put their mekometer and trained observers at our disposal on escorting us up to a position.

A plane table survey, using a mekometer to measure one's base, is pretty easily made to get position of kopjes, trenches, well-defined gun emplacements and their ranges, roughly, but it wants a certain amount of time to do it.

As to the emplacing of a 12-pounder or other Q.-F. gun for attack or defence, all hard and fast rules may, in my opinion, be at once dismissed, the matter entirely depending on the nature of the ground occupied and the direction and extent of fire required. Still I submit the following points as being useful to remember:—

(1.) Carefully select the ground. If on a ridge, hill, or kopje, the emplacement must be over the sky-line either on one slope or the other; take a place where Nature helps you, if possible screened by trees, free of rocks, and with soft ground, dongas, or water round it, so that the enemy's shells will bury themselves and not burst on striking. Of course in South Africa, except on the flat, this could hardly ever be done.

(2.) The best form of emplacement is a gun pit about 1 foot 6 inches deep, according to our experience in Natal, the earth or rock taken out forming a circular parapet 3 feet 6 inches high, and as bulky or thick as ever you like on the front face, the floor of the pit being levelled and a gradual slope made out of it for guns to be moved easily in and out of the pit. The size of the pit should be just enough to allow the gun trail to move round on any arc of training when the gun muzzle is run out over the front face or parapet, and to allow three feet more over and above this for the recoil of the gun in the drag-shoes, so as not to fetch the trail up sharp on recoiling.

A narrow ditch may be dug all round the inside of the parapet to allow the crew to get into it for additional cover, and the ammunition boxes may either be placed in this ditch or a magazine dug and sandbagged over when plenty of time is available. A couple of drainage holes may be required in heavy rains to empty the pits on each side. The circular parapet can be built up any thickness, as just said; it should then be sandbagged over till the required height. If in grassy ground, instead of sandbags put large sods of grass to hide the emplacement and to keep the dust from flying, as sandbags are conspicuous. If neither grass nor sandbags are available, make your Kaffirs or camp followers cow-dung the surface of your parapet instead; this dries, and all dust under muzzle on firing is avoided. I constantly tried this plan and found it very effective.

Of all points this avoidance of dust is the most important, as, unless prevented, it rises in a cloud under the muzzle of the gun at every shot. At long ranges, used by the Boers and ourselves, it was almost impossible to locate a gun firing cordite or other smokeless powder except by this cloud dust. So avoid it at all costs. Make the colour of your emplacement as much like that of the surrounding ground as possible, including your sandbags, if used.



APPENDIX 1

HINTS ON EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING FOR ACTIVE SERVICE.

As a few hints in regard to an officer's kit for active service may not be unacceptable to some, I offer a few observations on the subject so far as I am able to speak from my own experiences.

Good telescopes are most important articles to have in any land company of soldiers or sailors; they were especially useful in South Africa. The Naval Service long-telescope with its big field is very good and powerful in any light where there is no haze (at or before sunrise or when the sun is low for instance), but when the sun is well up it becomes of little use; and then comes the turn of the smaller telescope as used by all Naval officers on board ship. This is a particularly useful glass, and I myself felt quite lost, late in the campaign, when I unfortunately dropped the top of mine when riding. As to binoculars, we found the Zeiss or Ross's very excellent, and all military officers seemed to use them; but, in my humble opinion, they are not to be compared with a good small telescope.

At the start of the campaign the want of good telescopes among the military was most marked, and ours were generally in great request. Many military officers with whom I have talked on the subject agree with me in thinking that a certain proportion of small telescopes should be supplied, say two for every company in a regiment, for the use of those on outpost and look-out duties. It is astonishing to see the added interest which any man placed on these duties shows when he can really make out for himself advancing objects and enemy's positions without being entirely dependent on their officers to tell them. A good glass will render reports from these men reliable and valuable, instead of, as they often are, mere guesswork. At Grass Kop, where we had one Volunteer Company all armed with binoculars which were presented to them on leaving England (with the South Lancashires), the hill was always lined with look-out men on their own account; so interested were they in the matter.

Our water supply, as at first run, with one water-cart to the whole Naval Brigade, was inadequate; but later on each unit with guns got, as they should have, their own water-cart, or else made them with a cask fixed upon axle wheels, which we were obliged to do for a long time. Transport for these was either mule or ox; the former, quickest and best. A field filter for each unit should be supplied if possible.[8]

[Footnote 8: The proper filtering of water for use in water-bottles and indeed for all drinking purposes, is most important, and especially so in hot weather, when men are always wanting a drink at off times, and will have it of course. Late in the war, the "Berkefeld Field Service Filter" was supplied to us by the Ordnance Department, and is very good; it packs up in what looks like a large-sized luncheon basket, and is very portable; it is simple to look after, if directions are followed, and will make about thirty-four pints in ten minutes, or, enough to fill fifteen men's water-bottles; consequently it can easily be used on the march during short halts, and whenever water is passed to fill up water-bottles, and it is quickly packed up again. For any individual who wishes to carry a filter on his own person, I would recommend a small "Berkefeld Cylinder or porous candle" and small "Pasteur pump" with the necessary rubber tubes; this makes a very small parcel; it would only take up about one quarter of the Service haversack, and is well worth taking I am sure. The "Berkefeld Filter" should be supplied to ships in case of landing Brigades—one to every unit of 100 is the proper proportion as recommended by the firm.]

A few remarks may not here be out of place as to the best fighting kit to have ready for an officer who wishes to be comfortable, and also perhaps at certain times smart, when stationary in a standing camp for some time or on lines of communication. Needless to say that when actually marching or fighting one wears anything and everything that first comes to hand. Khaki has certainly done us very well; twill at first during the heat, and serge or cord later on when the cold came on; but it is well to avoid khaki twill in cold weather as it becomes clammy and uncomfortable. Personally I should say that a serge or cord, thin for heat and thick for cold weather, is much the best for general wear.

I started the campaign with two pairs of khaki twill riding breeches and two serge tunics (thin); these supplemented by a thick pair of khaki riding cord breeches that I got made at Durban when the cold came on, lasted me well through the campaign. For camp wear one can always use the ordinary twill or serge trousers, as served out from time to time by the Ordnance to all hands if required. On one's legs one should wear ordinary brown leather or canvas riding gaiters, only not the Naval Service gaiters, as they are of no use for hard work or much riding. Many of us wore putties, and the men all did, but I don't like them myself as they are too hot in hot weather and make one's legs sore in cold.

Riding breeches should be strapped inside the knee and doubled, and perhaps to lace up at the knee would be more comfortable than buttoning. Here I should mention that all the Naval officers commanding guns were mounted, and eventually all got mounts in some way; so riding plays a great part and is absolutely necessary if one wishes to be useful.

I also had two pairs of strong brown boots (an emphasis on the brown), they are far the best; and the soles should be protected with small nails carefully put in so as not to hurt one's feet. A pair of rubber-soled shoes for scouting, sporting, or camp work, and a pair of warm slippers to sleep in are indispensable. Long rubber or sea-boots, on account of their weight and bulk, are a nuisance. When it rained in South Africa it so quickly dried up that we found rubber shoes quite good enough for everything.

It is useful to take three flannel shirts, and under-clothing in proportion; cholera belts also become necessary to most of us I am afraid, and are very important; it is also advisable to have plenty of socks and to change them frequently. Light silk neck-scarves are most useful and prevent sunburnt necks; and in the cold and bitter winds we experienced, and when sleeping in the open at night with heavy frosts, Balaclavas, woollen comforters, Tam-o'-shanters, and Jaeger gloves are highly desirable. Thanks to our kind friends at home we were loaded with these articles during the campaign and found them invaluable.

In the hat line our bluejackets' straw hats, smartly covered with khaki twill and with cap ribbon, did very well for the sun and are nice and shady; they also last a long time when covered well, or even when painted khaki colour which stiffens and preserves them. I found my helmet also useful till I lost it. It is as well to take one Service cap with khaki covers, and a squash hat of gray or khaki; these latter are most comfortable and everybody wore them in camp; but I found that they don't keep out the sun enough during the day, they stow very close however, and can always be worn if one loses or smashes one's other hats.

As to bedclothes, this is a most important matter in the freezing cold. I advise a Wolseley valise to be got at the Army and Navy Stores, with mattress and pillow and Jaeger bag inside; one should have over one at night the two Service blankets allowed, and one's great-coat. Unless one sleeps on a stretcher, which can't be always got, it is well to cut long grass and put it under the valise in the cold weather, as it makes a wonderful difference on the frozen ground and gives one a good night as a rule.

If there are means of transport, it is as well to carry a Wolseley kit bag to hold one's clothes and boots, etc. I think that every officer in this war had these two things, the kit bag and valise, although of course a great deal may be rolled up and carried in the valise only and the bag left behind if it comes to a pinch.

The following articles are most useful to carry always, viz.:—Service telescope, and also binoculars as well if one can afford it (Zeiss or Ross's); a knife with all implements (especially corkscrew); a light tin cylinder to hold charts, plans, intelligence maps, and private maps or sketches; also writing materials, diary and order books, can be carried in a flat waterproof sponge bag case. As luxuries which can be done without:—A collapsible india-rubber bath basin and waterproof sheet, very compact as got at the Army and Navy Stores; a small mincing machine (the only means of digesting a trek ox), and sparklet bottle and sparklets are very handy. Such other luxuries as cigars, cigarettes, pipes, etc., can always be stowed in some corner of the valise or bag. Carry brown leather polish, dubbing, and laces.

Leather gear as carried on one's back should be a "Sam Brown Belt" of the single cross strap kind, in preference to the Naval Service gear. On this one can carry one's revolver, water-bottle, and haversack, which with glasses slung over all and separately, complete all one requires as a gunner. Swords were not carried during this war by officers, as in cases where the rifle was substituted, they only proved an incumbrance. A stick for the marching officer, like "Chinese Gordon" had, cannot be beaten.

A hint as to food before we part. Don't go on the principle "because I am campaigning I must resign myself to feed badly on what I can pick up and on what my stomach is entirely unaccustomed to." There was never a greater mistake. On the contrary, feed yourself and those under you on the best, sparing no expense, and when you can get wine instead of muddy water, drink it to keep you going and your blood in good order. Do yourself as well as you can, is my advice and experience, after perhaps rather thinking and going the other way at first. It simply means that when others run down and go sick with dysentery, fever and other ills, you are still going strong and fit for work. Naturally advice on this point is entirely dependent on means of transport; but when this exists, as it did with the Naval Brigade who had ammunition wagons, a hundred pounds weight or so makes little difference to them if not already overloaded. Take the best advantage, therefore, of it that you can within reason, and up to a certain extent, there being of course always a limit to all good things.

Tents are a great and important feature in any long campaign. I don't hesitate to say that the single canvas bell tent as supplied to the British Forces, should be at once converted into double canvas tents. In the many long sweltering days when the Natal Field Force before Colenso, and later at Elandslaagte, were forced to lie doing nothing, the heat of the sun coming through the tent was very bad; one was always obliged to wear a helmet inside one's tent; and I think in the men's tents (ours with, say, ten in them, and the military who had, I am told, up to fifteen in one tent) the state of things was abominably unhealthy under the blazing South African sun, and I am persuaded that half the sickness among the forces was due to this insufficient protection from the sun. The double canvas bell tent with air space in between the two parts does very well, in both keeping heat and cold off. The Indian tents, of khaki canvas, double and generally square-shaped, are much the best ones we saw on the Natal side and should be used generally in the Army; the extra expense would be saved in the end by prevention of fever and sunstroke.

My own experience (when I and three other officers lay in a field hospital outside Ladysmith just after the relief, in a single bell tent, and saw Tommies all around us crowded into these tents with fever and dysentery, whereby all our cases, I am sure, were made much worse by the torturing sun which poured in all day on our heads), makes me very glad that the "Hospital Commission" is now sitting, and I sincerely hope that such absurd mistakes will be noticed and corrected by them for the good of the whole British Forces.

Regarding the Mauser rifle, as compared with the Lee-Metford, I personally have little experience, but I can only say that the Mauser to hold and carry is much the better balanced of the two, and that the fine sighting is superior. Also some military officers seem to say it is a better shooter at long ranges, and its magazine action is far quicker and superior.[9] Revolvers, as far as I know, have had no test at all in this war. The cavalry carbine, I believe, is universally condemned by all cavalry officers out here, and is doomed to go I hope, being, if used against foes with modern weapons, only waste lumber.

[Footnote 9: Since writing this about the Mauser, Captain Cowper of the Queen's tells me that on the whole he considers the Lee-Metford superior, and that the Boers he has met have told him they hold it to be a harder shooter at long ranges. However, it seems to me that the better balance and magazine of the Mauser counteract this and give it the preference.]

I believe that I am right in saying that pouches for carrying the rifle ammunition are universally condemned in favour of a bandolier, with flaps over every ten cartridges or so. In our Naval bandoliers the want of these flaps was especially noticeable, and the wastage of ammunition dropped out was, I am sure, excessive, besides leaving loose ammunition lying about for Boer or Kaffir to pick up, as they are reported to be doing. The web bandolier is lighter than the leather, and better, so I recommend it, if fitted with flaps, to the notice of the Naval authorities.



APPENDIX II

EXTRACTS FROM SOME OF THE DESPATCHES, REPORTS, AND TELEGRAMS, REGARDING OPERATIONS MENTIONED IN THIS JOURNAL

[London Gazette, January 26th, 1900.]

From General Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., G.C.B.

Chieveley Camp, December 17th, 1899.

[Extract.]

I enclose a reconnaissance sketch of the Colenso position. All visible defences had been shelled by eight naval guns on the 13th and 14th. During all this time and throughout the day, the two 4.7 and four 12-pounder Naval guns of the Naval Brigade and Durban Naval Volunteers, under Captain E. P. Jones, R.N., were being admirably served, and succeeded in silencing every one of the enemy's guns they could locate.

* * * * *

[London Gazette, March 30th, 1900.]

From Captain E. P. Jones, R.N., Commanding Naval Brigade.

Chieveley Camp, December 16th, 1899.

[Extract.]

The whole force under Sir Redvers Buller advanced at 4 a.m. yesterday, intending to take the positions of the enemy on the other side of the Tugela. The Brigade under my command was disposed as follows:—Two 4.7 guns and four 12-pounders which were on the outpost line in a position 10,000 yards from the main works of the enemy, from which place we had been shelling them on the previous day, advanced to a small rise about 5,000 yards from the entrenched hills across the Tugela. Six 12-pounders under Lieutenant Ogilvy with Lieutenant James of H.M.S. Tartar and Lieutenant Deas of Philomel were attached to the Field Artillery under Colonel Long. Two 12-pounders under Lieutenant Burne held the kopje from which we advanced.

* * * * *

[London Gazette, March 12th, 1901.]

From Captain Jones, R.N., Commanding Naval Brigade, Natal.

Naval Camp, Spearmans Hill, February 8th, 1900.

[Extract.]

As to Vaal Krantz, the Naval guns were disposed as follows: ... Two 12-pounders with Lieutenant Burne on the plateau between this hill and the river. At daylight on the 6th, Lieutenant Burne's two guns were moved to a position at the east of Zwartz Kop.

February 18th, 1900. Lieutenant Burne with two 12-pounder guns was left with General Warren at Spearmans and marched on the 10th to Springfield Bridge where he remains under Colonel Burn-Murdoch.

From General Sir R. Buller to Admiral Sir R. Harris, March 5th, 1900. "I much appreciate your congratulations. I can hardly tell you how much of our successes are due to the Navy: their gunnery was admirable."

* * * * *

Report from Lieutenant Burne, R.N., February 16th, 1900, enclosed in letter of March 28th, 1900, from the Commander-in-Chief, Cape of Good Hope Station.

Report from Lieutenant Burne, R.N.

Springfield Camp, February 16th, 1900.

I have the honour to report as follows:—

Since being detached from Lieutenant Ogilvy's command I moved back across the Tugela river from the advanced kopjes on February 1st. On Sunday, February 4th, I learnt that I was attached to Sir Charles Warren's Division, and received my orders from him personally on that day on Gun Plateau, regarding the next day's operations; I also interviewed yourself on that day in reply to signal received. On Monday, 5th, my guns were shelling the enemy incessantly all day in conjunction with the feint on the left, and in reply to a Boer 3" Creusot and two Maxim Vickers 1-1/4 lbs. I received many directions from both General Warren and General Talbot-Coke, as to points they wished shelled, and at the end of the day had expended 250 common and shrapnel shell. At 8 p.m. I received orders from General Warren to march at daybreak on Tuesday, and join the Commander-in-Chief at the fort of Zwartz Kop; this I did, and though delayed on the hill by wagons and by the 7th Battery R.F.A. coming up, and later, by streams of ambulance in the narrow road close to Zwartz Kop, I arrived and reported my guns to General Buller about 8 a.m., at the foot of the kopje. He told me to bring my guns into action, and help to silence the Boer 6" Creusot, and, if possible, the 3" Creusot, which were firing from Spion Kop (position 2) at our field batteries.

As I came into action, and was aiming my right gun at the Boer 6", a shell from it struck twenty yards in front, and covering us with dirt, jumped over our heads without exploding; the shell was plainly visible in the air to me on coming down, and I saw it strike on its side and the fuse break off. The shell was picked up intact at my wagons which were just coming up, by Edward House, A.B., and we have it now. I concentrated my fire on the 6" gun at 6,400 yards, and in an hour it was silenced for the rest of the day; this, of course, was effected in conjunction with the fire from the 5" guns just in front of me, and from one 4.7 on Signal Hill.

During the day my guns also drove back at least two Boer field guns at 6,500 yards, which had been brought down into Vaal Krantz, and which tried to find our range but just fell short; they shifted position, but were finally driven over the sky-line. There was also a 1-1/4 lb. Pom-pom in a donga in the valley, which we silenced many times, and at the end of the day had fired some 230 rounds.

On Wednesday, February 7th, we commenced again at daylight; the 6" opened a heavy fire on one pontoon (No. 3), and on the field batteries in front of us, which had been pushed forward there before daybreak. My fire was directed solely at the big gun; my No. 2 standing by and firing directly he saw it appear. During the day my ammunition supply was kept up by direct communication by orderly with the column under Major Findlay. In the forenoon the Boer field guns were brought down again in the valley, and shelled the pontoon, Krantz Kop, and us; they were driven off in an hour or so, but recommenced again later.

In the afternoon, more field guns and Pom-poms on the burnt kopjes to the left of us opened a heavy fire on Krantz Kop, but were driven off by our guns, the howitzer battery (100 yards in our rear), and by the Naval guns on Zwartz Kop.

About 5 p.m. the fire from the Boer 100-pounder was very heavy, and came all round us, the Staff, and Infantry in reserve, and twice my crews only escaped by lying down. Just at that moment I got the order from Colonel Parsons, R.A., to withdraw my guns by moonlight, and cover our retirement on Gun Plateau. This was done, but the steep hill being jammed with traffic, I did not get up to my old position on Gun Plateau till next morning, when I reported to General Warren.

Between February 8th and 9th, I assisted to cover the retirement of our troops over the Tugela, and on the 9th was withdrawn at 11 a.m., and arrived at Springfield Bridge at 3 p.m.

On February 10th, by order of Colonel Burn-Murdoch (1st Dragoons) and the Camp Commandant, I placed my guns in the entrenched camp half a mile beyond the bridge, and up to 14th was employed in making gun epaulements and pits, and finding the ranges.

On February 13th, the Boers appearing in force on the kopjes to our left at 9,000 yards, I rode out with Colonel Burn-Murdoch and other Commanding Officers, to reconnoitre, and find gun positions. They sniped at us at 1,600 to 2,000 yards, and at the advanced Cavalry pickets all night, but next morning, the 14th, after "A" Battery Royal Horse Artillery and my guns had been pushed forward, they were found to have retreated altogether, and we surmised them to be a commando of Free State Boers returning to the Free State.

To-day, the 16th, we received news of General French's relief of Kimberley. All quiet in this neighbourhood.

At present I have 500 rounds of ammunition with me, and 300, in reserve, in charge of the officer of the ammunition column here.

I will conclude by saying that I have nothing but praise for the conduct and hard work performed by my men during the last ten days, especially when under fire; their spirit is now excellent. I should specially mention my captains of guns, T. Mitchell, 1st class P.O., and J. Mullis, 1st class P.O., for their hard work, the latter the best and quickest shot of the two. I must recommend E. A. Harvey, P.O., 2nd class, and leading shipwright, as rendering me most useful and clever work on the gun mountings, etc., and for further designs. Of the rest P. Treherne, A.B.; D. Shepherd, A.B., S.G.T.; Henry House, A.B.; W. Jones, A.B., S.G.T.; Fred Tuck, O.S.; C. Patton, signalman; and W. Dunetal, stoker, deserve special mention. Mr. White, midshipman, has rendered me useful assistance. Mr. Freeman, conductor, has done very well; and the white drivers, McPheeson and Blewitt, excellently. I find the gun teams of eight oxen under the two latter are very useful.

* * * * *

[The Times, Thursday, March 1st, 1900.]

The following despatch from General Buller has been received at the War Office:—

Headquarters, Hlangwane Plain, February 28th, 8.5 a.m.

Finding that the passage of Langewachte Spruit was commanded by strong entrenchments, I reconnoitred for another passage of the Tugela. One was found for me below the cataract by Colonel Sandbach, Royal Engineers.

On the 25th we commenced making an approach to it, and on the 26th, finding that I could make a practicable approach, I crossed guns and baggage back to the south side of the Tugela, took up the pontoon bridge on the night of the 26th, and relaid it at the new site, which is just below the point marked "cataract."

During all the time the troops had been scattered, crouching under hastily-constructed small stone shelters, and exposed to a galling shell and rifle fire, and throughout maintained the most excellent spirit.

On the 27th General Barton, with two Battalions 6th Brigade and the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, crept about one and a half miles down the banks of river, and, ascending an almost precipitous cliff of about 500 feet, assaulted and carried the top of Pieters Hill.

This hill to a certain extent turned the enemy's left, and the 4th Brigade, under Colonel Norcott, and the 11th Brigade, under Colonel Kitchener, the whole under General Warren, assailed the enemy's main position, which was magnificently carried by the South Lancashire Regiment about sunset.

We took about sixty prisoners and scattered the enemy in all directions.

There seems to be still a considerable body of them left on and under Bulwana Mountain.

Our losses, I hope, are not large. They certainly are much less than they would have been were it not for the admirable manner in which the artillery was served, especially the guns manned by the Royal Navy and the Natal Naval Volunteers.

* * * * *

[The Times, Thursday, March 8th, 1900.]

From our Special Correspondent.

Ladysmith, March 5th.

The following special Army Order has been issued:—

"The relief of Ladysmith unites two forces which have striven with conspicuous gallantry and splendid determination to maintain the honour of their Queen and country. The garrison of Ladysmith for four months held the position against every attack with complete success and endured its privations with admirable fortitude. The relieving force had to make its way through unknown country, across unfordable rivers, and over almost inaccessible heights in the face of a fully-prepared, well-armed tenacious enemy. By the exhibition of the truest courage, which burns steadily besides flashing brilliantly, it accomplished its object, and added a glorious page to our history. Sailors, soldiers, Colonials, and the home-bred have done this, united by one desire, and inspired by one patriotism.

"The General Commanding congratulates both forces on their martial qualities, and thanks them for their determined efforts. He desires to offer his sincere sympathy to the relatives and friends of the good soldiers and gallant comrades who have fallen in the fight.

"BULLER."

* * * * *

From Captain Jones, R.N., Naval Brigade.

Ladysmith, March 10th, 1900.

[Extract.]

I enclose reports sent in to me by Lieutenants Ogilvy and Burne, who were mostly detached from me.

* * * * *

Enclosure from Lieutenant Burne, R.N.

Colenso, March 7th, 1900.

Since my last letter dated from Springfield Bridge, I have the honour to report that I left Springfield on February 23rd, marching with the York and Lancaster Regiment to rejoin the main column. We reached Chieveley Camp on the 24th, and I pitched camp on Gun Hill, where I found Lieutenant Drummond and the 6" gun. We remained here till a telegram and written orders were handed me on the night of the 26th, from Lieutenant Drummond, to march at daybreak with the York and Lancaster Regiment to join the 10th Brigade. We marched at 6 a.m. on the 27th, with the Regiment, by Hussar Hill round Hlangwane. Here we found the Commander-in-Chief, who told me, on my reporting the guns, that the 10th Brigade were in Colenso; he added that it was no fault of mine that we had come out of the way, as the orders had not been clear, but told me to cross the Tugela by the Pont as quickly as possible, the pontoon bridge having been removed. At the Pont I had to off-load all my wagons, as the drift below was impassable; and after having got one gun and ox team safely across, the Pont was upset in the middle of the river, and all the work was jammed. During this time there was a heavy shell fire on Colenso Station from a Boer 3" gun, but we were not touched. I had the Pont righted, and my men baled it out before daylight on the 28th, and I took my other gun and two wagons and loads of ammunition across, and hurried on to join General Coke. On the morning of March 1st a body of men rode in from Ladysmith. They proved to be Ladysmith scouts, and brought General Coke his first intimation of the relief of Ladysmith on the previous evening. My guns were in position, and we bivouacked with the troops for some days, but I have now pitched camp and withdrawn the guns. Hearing many rumours here that the Naval men are to return to their ships, I should like to bring to your notice the very excellent service which has been rendered me by my captains of guns, R. Mitchell, P.O., 1st class, and especially G. Mullis, P.O., 1st class, and the clever and hard work of F. Harvey, P.O., 2nd class (leading shipwright), and to mention the following names not before mentioned:—H. House, A.B., F. Long, O.S. (bugler), S. Ratcliffe, O.S., and to state my appreciation of the work done by all.

* * * * *

[The Times of April 16th, 1900.]

Extract from "Times" Natal Military Correspondent, dated March 22nd, 1900.

The Naval contingent of the Powerful left Ladysmith for England on the 7th, and that of the Terrible left to rejoin their ship on the 11th. The 4.7 guns remain in the hands of the Naval gunners of the Forte, Philomel, and Tartar, under Captain Jones of the Forte, but most of the 12-pounders have now been handed over to the 4th Mountain Battery. It seems a great pity that the Naval gunners of the Terrible could not have been spared to finish the campaign. Three months' practice ashore has made them nearly perfect in the management of their guns, and they themselves would be the first to admit that, at any rate in that part of the gunnery that was not learnt on board ship, such as rapidity of fire under their present altered conditions and mobility, they have improved twofold since they first landed. Their rapidity of fire was wonderful when it is remembered that their carriages are fitted with none of the automatic appliances for returning the gun to the firing position, but have to be dragged back every time by hand, and then carefully adjusted with the wheels at exactly the same level. As regards mobility, they have on at least one occasion—namely Zwartz Kop—taken their guns up a place condemned by the Royal Artillery as impossible. All this experience is now to be made no further use of, and the guns pass into the hands of men who will have to learn it afresh. A great advantage the Naval gunners had over the Royal Artillery was their use of the glass. Besides the telescopic sights used with the big guns, they were provided with a large telescope on a tripod, at which an officer was always seated watching the effect of the shells, and, in the case of an advance the movements of our Infantry as well, and they were never guilty, as the Royal Artillery have been more than once, of firing on our own men. On January 24th, whilst the fighting on the top of Spion Kop was taking place, the Naval guns on Mount Alice were able at a distance of rather over four miles clearly to distinguish our men from the Boers, and shell the latter. Compare this with one instance that came under my personal observation on February 27th. An officer in command of a battery was totally unable to distinguish, with a pair of the field-glasses supplied by Government, at a distance of a little over one mile, between our Infantry charging and the Boers running away. I see that your Cape correspondent has already said that in this campaign, where we are perpetually fighting against an invisible foe, good glasses are of paramount importance to the rifle. They are even more essential to the gunners than to the other branches of the service, and they are in this respect most inadequately supplied.

* * * * *

Speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Goschen) at Royal Academy Banquet, May 5th, 1900.

"I do not propose to dilate on the courage or resourcefulness, or other great qualities of the Naval Brigades. The nation has acclaimed them. The Sovereign with her own lips has testified to their deeds....

"The ships' companies of the Powerful and Terrible would be sorry if they were to monopolise the public eye, clouding the performances of men from other ships. Many other ships have sent contingents to the front—the Monarch, the Doris, the Philomel, the Tartar, the Forte—all these ships have sent men who have taken their part in those gallant combats of which we read."

* * * * *

Again at Reception of Naval Brigade (H.M.S. "Powerful") in London, May 7th, 1900.

"With your comrades in other forces of the Queen, by the defence and the relief of Ladysmith you have saved the country from such a disaster as has never fallen the British arms. The defence and relief of Ladysmith will never be forgotten in British history."

* * * * *

[London Gazette, March 12th, 1901.]

From Captain Jones, R.N., Naval Brigade.

De Wet's Farm, June 5th, 1900.

[Extract.]

"On May 14th, two more 12-pounders under Lieutenant Steele (Lieutenant Burne having had a severe fall from his horse, and being incapacitated) occupied another hill across the river....

"Lieutenant Burne has quite recovered from his injuries and has returned to duty at Glencoe."

* * * * *

From Captain Jones, R.N., Naval Brigade.

Volksrust, June 14th, 1900.

[Extract.]

"It became apparent that the hill (Van Wyk) must be held. General Hildyard was out there and decided to hold it, sending back for the rest of the Brigade.

"I arrived back in camp at 4 p.m. and was ordered to start after dark—as the route was exposed to the enemy's fire—and, if possible, to get two 12-pounders (Lieutenant Burne's) up the hill by daylight, and the 4.7's to the bottom. This we did after a most difficult march, arriving at the bottom at 4 a.m. I halted the 4.7's and pushed the 12-pounders up to the top. One arrived at daylight, the other broke a wheel and did not get up to the top till we were able later to get another pair of wheels from a limber and adapt them."

* * * * *

From General Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., G.C.B.

Laing's Nek, Natal, June 19th, 1900.

[Extract.]

"On June 5th I directed General Hildyard, who with the 5th Division was encamped at De Wet's farm, to occupy on the 6th the height south of the Botha's Pass Road, marked on the map as Van Wyk.... The ascent of the hill was very difficult, and it was due to the energy of Captain Jones, R.N., and the officers and men of the Naval Brigade that one 12-pounder (Lieutenant Burne) was in position at Van Wyk at daylight. The other 12-pounder lost a wheel in the bad ground.... The Naval guns and the 10th Brigade were brought down from Van Wyk during the night. I may here remark that hard and well as Captain Jones and the men of the Naval Brigade worked during this war, I do not believe they ever had harder work to do or did it more willingly than in getting their guns up and down Van Wyk. They had to work continuously for thirty-six hours...."

* * * * *

From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, V.C., G.C.B.

Pretoria, July 10th, 1900.

"I have much pleasure in supporting the recommendations put forward by Sir Redvers Buller on behalf of the Officers and Petty Officers of the Royal Navy."

* * * * *

Report from Lieutenant Burne, R.N.

H.M.S. Monarch's (late H.M.S. Tartar's) 12-pounder Q.-F. Battery,

Grass Kop, Sandspruit. October 24th, 1900.

On withdrawal from the front, I wish to forward for the favourable consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Robert Harris, K.C.M.G., a short report on detachment of H.M.S. Monarch's (late Tartar's) men now under my command, and who have served on shore with the Natal Army for over a year. Since my last report to Captain Jones, R.N., the Officer commanding Naval Brigade, on June 16th, after the victory of Almond's Nek, this battery has taken part in the march on Wakkerstroom and its occupation, the defence of Sandspruit and action four miles north of it, with Cavalry and other Artillery, under General Brocklehurst, M.V.O., which was a spirited little affair, and where the battery earned the commendation of the General on the shooting; later, the attack on Grass Kop and its occupation by the Dorsets was covered by these guns and other artillery on July 24th, and drew a heavy shell fire from four Boer Creusot guns in its defence, this battery at that time being led by Lieutenant Clutterbuck, R.N., when I was ill with jaundice, but whom I again relieved on July 27th, and have continued since that date in the defence of Grass Kop. My guns from here covered the right flank of two separate attacks in force on Comersfoort, the first under General Hildyard on July 30th, and the second under Sir Redvers Buller on August 7th, when the town was taken. We have also covered many reconnaissances, and have come into action at long ranges several times against marauding Boers on the plain at the foot of this hill, but hitherto they have not attacked us, as the hill is magnificently entrenched and has been held in turn by the Dorsets, the South Lancashires, and now the Queen's Regiment. The whole of the intelligence from Grass Kop as to movements of the enemy since July 24th up to this date, has been furnished by my look-outs with our long telescope; and this I need scarcely say has been a considerable and arduous duty for the men under the conditions of violent winds, rain, mist, and storms which prevailed up here (a height of 6,500 feet), since we occupied the hill. These wind-storms have destroyed our tents once, sometimes continuing for days, and have caused much discomfort both to ourselves and the troops, and I have lost a good many oxen by exposure and lung sickness. Orders having come for the withdrawal of the Naval Brigade, I can only say I have been well and faithfully served by the Officers and men of the detachment under my command; and during these months have formed a high opinion of their excellence as a battery, under the varying conditions of climate, heights, and positions, they have gone through in Natal, the Orange Colony, and the Transvaal. All these men, in spite of much sickness at times, have stuck to their work with the Natal Army for a year now, and consequently I think, fully deserve any advancement or reward it is possible to give them, and I am sure H.M.S. Tartar may be proud of the men representing her during the war. I wish to bring this general opinion of the men of the detachment, which I hold, to the favourable notice of the Commander-in-Chief, and to specially recommend the following for good service rendered with the guns:

A. L. Munro, C.P.O. and torpedo instructor (late of H.M.S. Tartar).

G. H. Epsley, P.O., 2nd class and captain 1st gun (late of H.M.S. Tartar).

E. Cheeseman, A.B., S.G., and acting captain 2nd gun (late of H.M.S. Tartar).

D. Smith, A.B., S.G.T., gun crew (late of H.M.S. Tartar).

J. Macdonald, A.B., S.G., gun crew (late of H.M.S. Tartar).

G. Baldwin, A.B., S.G., gun crew (late of H.M.S. Tartar).

J. Sawyer, A.B., S.G., gun crew (late of H.M.S. Tartar).

H. Wright, A.B., T.M., gun crew (late of H.M.S. Tartar).

For his good services as armourer and work drawing ordnance and transport, stores, money, and in charge of commissariat, I particularly recommend O. A. Hart, armourer's mate, H.M.S. Tartar (late), a man thoroughly reliable.

As regards the Officer and six men of H.M.S. Philomel attached to my command, three of whom have since been invalided, I must strongly recommend Mr. W. R. Ledgard, midshipman, who since July 28th I have detached, as ordered by G.O.C. 5th Division, in independent command of one gun, first at Opperman's Kraal, and then at Paardekop; he has carried out this duty with ability and success, and for a young officer I know it has been a trying one.

I also recommend T. Payne, A.B., S.G., H.M.S. Philomel, for good service with the guns.

Expressing my gratification at having had the opportunity to command H.M.S. Tartar's (now Monarch's) Detachment, I have, etc.



APPENDIX III

DIARY OF THE BOER WAR UP TO OCTOBER 25TH, 1900.

1899.

Oct. 11.—Time fixed by the Boers for compliance with "ultimatum" expired at 5 p.m.

Oct. 14.—Boers march on Kimberley and Mafeking.

Oct. 15.—KIMBERLEY ISOLATED.

Oct. 20.—Boer position on TALANA HILL captured by the British under Symons.

Oct. 21.—White moves out force under French to eject Boers from ELANDSLAAGTE. Boers routed.

Oct. 22.—Yule retires from Dundee on Ladysmith via Beith.

Oct. 23.—Death of General Symons at Dundee.

Oct. 30.—General sortie from Ladysmith. Naval guns silence Boer siege artillery.

Surrender of part of two battalions and a Mountain Battery at Nicholson's Nek.

Oct. 31.—General Sir Redvers Buller lands at Capetown.

Nov. 1.—Boers invade Cape Colony.

Nov. 2.—LADYSMITH ISOLATED.

Nov. 9.—General attack on Ladysmith repulsed with heavy loss to Boers.

Nov. 15.—Armoured train wrecked by Boers near Chieveley. Over 100 British troops captured.

Nov. 19.—Lord Methuen's column for the relief of Kimberley concentrated at Orange River.

Nov. 23.—Methuen attacks Boers at BELMONT with Guards' Brigade and 9th Brigade. Boers driven from their position.

Nov. 25.—Methuen attacks Boers in position at Enslin and dislodges them.

General Sir Redvers Buller arrives in Natal.

Nov. 28.—Methuen engages 11,000 Boers at MODDER RIVER. Battle lasting all day. Boers evacuate position.

Nov. 30.—Sixth Division for South Africa notified.

Dec. 1.—Australian and Canadian Contingents leave Capetown for the front.

Dec. 10.—Gatacre attempts night attack on STORMBERG, but is surprised and driven back with heavy loss.

Dec. 11.—Methuen attacks Boer position at MAGERSFONTEIN and is repulsed with heavy loss. General Wauchope killed.

Dec. 15.—Buller advances from Chieveley against Boer positions near COLENSO. British Force repulsed on Tugela with 1,100 casualties and loss of 12 guns.

Mobilization of 7th Division ordered.

Dec. 18.—Lord Roberts appointed Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, with Lord Kitchener as Chief of Staff.

Dec. 19.—Regulations issued for employment of Yeomanry and Volunteers in South Africa.

Dec. 20.—Formation of City of London Volunteer Corps for South Africa announced.

1900

Jan. 6.—Suffolk Regiment loses heavily near Rensburg, over 100 prisoners taken.

BOER ATTACK ON LADYSMITH REPULSED.

Jan. 10.—LORD ROBERTS AND LORD KITCHENER ARRIVE AT CAPETOWN.

Jan. 10.—Forward movement for relief of Ladysmith resumed.

Jan. 11.—Dundonald seizes pont on Tugela at Potgieter's Drift.

Jan. 18.—Buller makes SECOND ATTEMPT to relieve Ladysmith. Dundonald having crossed Tugela engages Boers near Acton Homes.

Crossing of Tugela by Warren and Lyttelton concluded.

Jan. 21.—Warren attacks Boers' right flank.

Jan. 23-4.—SPION KOP captured and held during 24th, but evacuated on the night of Jan. 24-25. General Woodgate fatally wounded.

Jan. 26-7.—Buller's force recrosses the Tugela.

Feb. 3.—Macdonald with Highland Brigade marches out from Modder River.

Feb. 5.—Buller's THIRD ATTEMPT to relieve Ladysmith commenced. Lyttelton crosses Tugela, and delivers attack on VAAL KRANTZ, which he captures and occupies.

Feb. 7.—Vaal Krantz evacuated and British Force withdrawn across the Tugela.

Feb. 9.—Lord Roberts arrives at Modder River.

Feb. 11.—French, having been summoned from Southern Frontier, leaves Modder River with Cavalry Division and Horse Artillery.

Feb. 13.—Lord Roberts at Dekiel's Drift.

Feb. 15.—Lord Roberts at Jacobsdal.

RELIEF OF KIMBERLEY.

Feb. 17.—Rearguard action between Kelly-Kenny and Cronje en route to Bloemfontein.

FOURTH ATTEMPT to relieve Ladysmith.

Buller presses advance on Monte Christo Hill.

Feb. 19.—Buller takes Hlangwane Hill.

Feb. 20.—Boers under Cronje, having laagered near Paardeberg, are bombarded by Lord Roberts.

Feb. 21.—Fifth Division crosses Tugela.

Feb. 23.—Buller unsuccessfully attacks Railway Hill.

Feb. 26.—Buller makes fresh passage of Tugela.

Feb. 27.—CRONJE SURRENDERS AT PAARDEBERG.

PIETERS HILL, the main Boer position between Ladysmith and the Tugela, carried by Hildyard.

Feb. 28.—RELIEF OF LADYSMITH.

Clements occupies Colesberg.

Mar. 5.—Gatacre occupies Stormberg.

Brabant again defeats and pursues Boers.

Overtures of peace made by Boer Presidents.

Mar. 6.—Field Force arrives at Carnarvon to quell rising in North-West.

Mar. 7.—Lord Roberts routs a large force of Boers at Poplar Grove.

Mar. 10.—Lord Roberts defeats Boers at Driefontein.

Mar. 11.—Overtures of peace rejected by Lord Salisbury.

Mar. 13.—Lord Roberts, without further fighting, takes possession of BLOEMFONTEIN. Boers retire on Kroonstad.

Mar. 27.—DEATH OF GENERAL JOUBERT.

Mar. 31.—Broadwood attacked at Waterworks. During retirement R.H.A. and convoy entrapped at Koorn Spruit. Six guns lost, 350 casualties.

April 3.—Detachment of Royal Irish Rifles and Mounted Infantry surrounded near Reddersburg.

April 7.—Colonel Dalgety isolated near Wepener.

April 15.—Chermside leaves Reddersburg to relieve Wepener.

April 25.—Dalgety relieved. Boers retreat northwards, under Botha.

May 10.—Zand River crossed, Boers rapidly retreating before Lord Roberts's advance.

May 12.—Lord Roberts enters KROONSTAD without opposition, President Steyn having retired to Heilbron, which he proclaims his new capital.

Attack on Mafeking repulsed, 108 Boer prisoners, including Commandant Eloff, taken.

May 13.—Mahon with Mafeking Relief Column repulses attack at Koodoosrand.

May 15.—Buller occupies Dundee and Glencoe, having driven the Boers from the Biggarsberg.

Plumer, reinforced by Canadians and Queenslanders from Carrington's Division, joins hands with Mahon.

May 17-18.—RELIEF OF MAFEKING.

May 24.—Advance portion of Lord Roberts's force crosses the Vaal near Parys.

May 28.—ANNEXATION OF ORANGE FREE STATE under name of Orange River Colony formally proclaimed at Bloemfontein.

May 30.—FLIGHT OF PRESIDENT KRUGER FROM PRETORIA.

May 31.—BRITISH FLAG HOISTED AT JOHANNESBURG.

Surrender of 500 Yeomanry at Lindley.

June 2-4.—Futile negotiations between Buller and Christian Botha for armistice.

June 5.—OCCUPATION OF PRETORIA.

June 8.—Hildyard takes Botha's Pass.

Surrender of 4th Derbyshires at Roodeval.

June 11.—Stubborn fight at Almond's Nek. Heavy Boer losses.

June 12.—Boers evacuate Laing's Nek.

Roberts defeats Botha at DIAMOND HILL, east of Pretoria.

June 14.—Boer attack on Zand River repulsed.

July 4.—Roberts and Buller join hands at Vlakfontein.

Railway to Natal clear.

July 11.—Surrender of Scots Greys and Lincolns at Uitval Nek.

July 21.—Advance eastwards towards Komati Poort begins.

July 30.—SURRENDER OF PRINSLOO and 3,000 Boers to Hunter in Brandwater basin.

Aug. 16.—Elands River garrison relieved.

Aug. 25.—Execution of Cordua for conspiracy to kidnap Lord Roberts.

Aug. 26-7.—Fighting at DALMANUTHA.

Aug. 30.—British occupy Nooitgedacht and release 2,000 prisoners.

Sept. 6.—Buller occupies Lydenburg.

Sept. 11.—KRUGER, FLYING FROM THE TRANSVAAL, takes refuge at Lorenzo Marques.

Sept. 13.—Proclamation issued by Roberts calling on burghers to surrender.

French occupies Barberton.

Sept. 25.—British Force occupies Komati Poort. Many Boers cross Portuguese frontier and surrender to Portuguese.

Oct. 9.—De Wet driven across the Vaal out of Orange River Colony.

Oct. 19.—Kruger sails from Lorenzo Marques for Marseilles on Dutch man-of-war.

Oct. 24.—Buller sails from Capetown for England.

Oct. 25.—FORMAL ANNEXATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, to be styled Transvaal Colony.



APPENDIX IV

THE NAVY AND THE WAR.

A RESUME OF OFFICERS AND MEN MENTIONED IN DESPATCHES FOR THE OPERATIONS IN NATAL.

Extract from "Natal Advertiser."

GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER, in his despatches which have just been published with reference to the operations in Natal, calls attention to a number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men whose services deserve "special mention." He gives thanks to Sir W. Hely-Hutchinson, the Governor of Natal; to Colonel the Hon. A. H. Hime, Prime Minister, and all the members of the Government of the colony. Rear-Admiral Sir R. H. Harris, K.C.M.G., had also been most helpful. Then follows the list of men "especially worthy of consideration":—

Captain Percy Scott, C.B., H.M.S. Terrible, has discharged the difficult duties of Commandant of Durban with the greatest tact and ability, and has been most helpful in every way.

Captain E. P. Jones, H.M.S. Forte, as senior officer of the Naval Brigade, has earned my most heartfelt thanks. The assistance they have rendered to me has been invaluable; the spirit of their leader was reflected in the men, and at any time, day or night, they were always ready, and their work was excellent.

Commander A. H. Limpus and Lieutenant F. C. A. Ogilvy, H.M.S. Terrible, and Lieutenant H. W. James, H.M.S. Tartar. These three Officers were indefatigable. There never was a moment in the day that they were not working hard and well to advance the work in hand.

The names of the following officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the Naval Brigade, Sir Redvers Buller adds, have been brought to his notice for gallant or meritorious services by general officers and officers commanding units:—

OFFICERS—NAVAL BRIGADE.

Lieutenant C. P. Hunt, H.M.S. Forte. Lieutenant C. R. N. Burne, H.M.S. Philomel. Staff-Surgeon F. J. Lilly, H.M.S. Forte. Surgeon C. C. Macmillan, H.M.S. Terrible. Surgeon E. C. Lomas, H.M.S. Terrible. Acting-Gunner J. Wright, H.M.S. Terrible. Midshipman R. B. Hutchinson, H.M.S. Terrible. Midshipman H. S. Boldero, H.M.S. Terrible. Midshipman G. L. Hodson, H.M.S. Terrible. Clerk W. T. Hollin, H.M.S. Philomel.



WARRANT, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, AND MEN.

Chief Petty Officer T. Baldwin, H.M.S. Terrible. Chief Petty Officer W. Bate, H.M.S. Terrible. Chief Petty Officer B. Stephens, H.M.S. Terrible. First-Class Petty Officer P. Cashman, H.M.S. Philomel. Second-Class Petty Officer C. Challoner, H.M.S. Terrible. Second-Class Petty Officer J. J. Frennett, H.M.S. Philomel. Master-at-Arms G. Crowe, H.M.S. Terrible. Armourer Ellis, H.M.S. Terrible. F. Moore, A.B., H.M.S. Forte.

THE NAVAL BRIGADE.

General Sir Redvers Buller, in a despatch dated Laing's Nek, June 19th, 1900, says: "I desire to bring to notice the following officer:—

"Captain E. P. Jones, R.N., Naval Brigade.

"It was due to the energy and perseverance of the officers and men alike, following the excellent example set them by their Commander, Captain Jones, that it was possible to place the Naval guns in position on the 8th, and get them forward subsequently in time to accompany the advance on the 10th. The excellent marksmanship of the Naval Brigade, and the skilful distribution of their fire, contributed materially to the successful result of the attack on Allemann's Nek on June 11th."

The following names are mentioned by Commanders as having performed good services, in addition to those previously mentioned:—

Lieutenant G. P. Hunt, H.M.S. Forte. Lieutenant F. W. Melvill, H.M.S. Forte. Lieutenant C. R. N. Burne, H.M.S. Philomel. Lieutenant A. Halsey, H.M.S. Philomel. Midshipman W. R. Ledgard, H.M.S. Philomel. John Restal, chief armourer, H.M.S. Tartar. Alexander Monro, C.P.O., H.M.S. Tartar. J. Weatherhead, P.O., H.M.S. Philomel. E. Waring, yeoman of signals.

Referring to the work at the base and on the lines of communication, General Buller, in the despatch dated ss. Dunvegan Castle, November 9th, says:—

"The Naval transport work at Durban has been throughout under the charge of Captain Van Koughnet, R.N. I desire to take this opportunity of bringing to notice the excellent service which he has rendered. Owing to his tact and ability, the difficult and ofttimes very heavy work of embarkations and disembarkations has passed smoothly and well.

"Commander G. E. Holland, D.S.O., Indian Marine, has also been employed at Durban throughout. His genius for organisation, and his knowledge of transport requirements, is, I should say, unrivalled. He undertook the alteration of the transports which were fitted at Durban as hospital ships, and the result of his work has been universally admitted to have been a conspicuous success. I strongly recommend him to your consideration.

"Warrant Officer Carpenter S. J. Lacey, R.N., has rendered valuable service in supervising the fitting of hospital ships and in transport work generally. I recommend him to your favourable notice.

"The following officers acted as my aides-de-camp, and I submit their names for your favourable consideration. Each and all of them are thoroughly capable and deserving officers, and rendered me great assistance:—

"Commander Edgar Lees, Royal Navy (and others).

"Lieutenant A. Halsey, R.N., H.M.S. Philomel, commanded the last detachment of the Naval Brigade which was left with the Natal Field Force, and, like all the rest of the Brigade, their services were most valuable."

THE END