Mr. Evarts offered further on behalf of the President, "to prove that at the meeting of the Cabinet, at which Mr. Stanton was present, held while the Tenure-of-office Bill was before the President for his approval, the advice of the Cabinet in regard to the same was asked by the President and given by the Cabinet, and thereupon the question whether Mr. Stanton and the other Secretaries who had received their appointment from Mr. Lincoln were within the restriction upon the President's power of removal from office created by said Act, was considered, and the opinion was expressed that the Secretaries appointed by Mr. Lincoln were not within such restrictions." The Chief Justice decided "that this testimony is proper to be taken into consideration by the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment," whereupon Senator Drake of Missouri demanded that the question be submitted to the Senate, and by a vote of 26 to 22 the Chief Justice was again overruled and the testimony declared to be inadmissible.

On behalf of the President, Mr. Evarts then offered "to prove that at the Cabinet meetings between the passage of the Tenure-of-office Act and the order of the 21st of February, 1868, for the removal of Mr. Stanton, upon occasions when the condition of the public service was affected by the operation of that bill and it came up for consideration and advice by the Cabinet, it was considered by the President and the Cabinet that a proper regard for the public service made it desirable that upon some proper case a judicial determination of the constitutionality of the law should be obtained." The Managers objected to the admission of the testimony, and the Chief Justice, apparently tired of having his decisions overruled, submitted the question at once to the Senate. By a vote of 30 to 19 the testimony was declared to be inadmissible. All the proffered testimony on these several points was excluded while the Hon. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, was on the stand. He was to be the first witness to substantiate the offer of proof which the President's counsel had made; to be corroborated, if need by, by other members of the Cabinet—possibly by Mr. Stanton himself.

The testimony on both sides having been concluded, on the 22d of April General John A. Logan, one of the Managers on the part of the House of Representatives, filed his argument in the case. It was carefully prepared, well written, and throughout logical in its analysis. It was uncompromisingly pungent in tone and severe in its method of dealing with President Johnson. "The world," said General Logan, "in after times will read the history of the depth to which political and official perfidy can descend. His great aim and purpose has been to subvert law, usurp authority, insult and outrage Congress, reconstruct the rebel States in the interest of treason, and insult the memories and resting-places of our heroic dead."

Mr. Boutwell on the two succeeding days made a strong arraignment of the President. Indeed he made all that well could be made out of the charges preferred by the House. He exhibited throughout his address the earnestness and the eloquence which come from intense conviction. He believed that the President had committed high crimes and misdemeanors, and he believed that the safety of the Republic required his removal from office. With this belief his argument was of course impressive. "The House of Representatives," said he in closing, "have presented this criminal at your bar with equal confidence in his guilt and in your disposition to administer exact justice between him and the people of the United States. I do not contemplate his acquittal: it is impossible. Therefore I do not look beyond; but, senators, the people of the United States of America will never permit an usurping Executive to break down the securities for liberty provided in the Constitution. The cause of the Republic is in your hands. Your verdict of Guilty is PEACE to our beloved country." Mr. Nelson of Tennessee followed Mr. Boutwell with a long and earnest plea in behalf of the President, somewhat effusive in its character but distinguished for the enthusiasm with which he defended his personal friend.

Mr. Groesbeck next addressed the Senate on behalf of the President. He made a clear, forcible presentation of the grounds of defense. Mr. Boutwell had asserted "that the President cannot prove or plead the motive by which he professes to have been governed in his violation of the laws of the country. . . . The necessary, the inevitable presumption in law is that he acted under the influence of bad motives in so doing, and no evidence can be introduced controlling or coloring in any degree this necessary presumption of the law." In reviewing this position, Mr. Groesbeck reminded the Senate that President Lincoln had "claimed and exercised the power of organizing military commissions under which he arrested and imprisoned citizens within the loyal States. He had no Act of Congress warranting it, and the Supreme Court has decided that the act was against the express provisions of the Constitution. According to the gentleman on the other side, then, Mr. Lincoln must be convicted. . . . The gentleman seems to acknowledge that there must have been a motive. There can be no crime without motive; but when the party comes forward and offers to prove his motive, the answer is, 'You shall not prove it.' When he comes forward and offers to prove it from his warm, living heart, the answer is, 'We will make up your motive out of the presumptions of law and conclude you upon that subject. We will not hear you.'"

Mr. Boutwell renewed with vigor the argument that the exception made in the Tenure-of-office Act, in regard to members of the Cabinet, did not give the President power to remove Mr. Stanton. "We maintain," said Mr. Boutwell, "that Mr. Stanton was holding the office of Secretary of War for and in the term of President Lincoln, by whom he had been appointed. . . . It was not a new office; it was not a new term. Mr. Johnson succeeded to Mr. Lincoln's office and for the remainder of Mr. Lincoln's term of office. He is serving out Mr. Lincoln's term as President."

Mr. Groesbeck's reply on this point was effective: "The gentleman has said this is Mr. Lincoln's term. The dead have no ownership in offices or estate of any kind. Mr. Johnson is President of the United States with a term, and this is his term. But it would make no difference if Mr. Lincoln were living to-day. If Mr. Lincoln were the President to-day he could remove Mr. Stanton. Mr. Lincoln would not have appointed him during this term. It was during Mr. Lincoln's first term that Mr. Stanton received his appointment, and not this term; and an appointment by a President during one term, by the operation of this law, will not extend the appointee during another term because that same party may happen to be re-elected to the Presidency. Mr. Stanton therefore holds under his commission and not under the law."

Mr. Thaddeus Stevens attempted to address the Senate, but found himself too much exhausted and handed his manuscript to General Butler, who read it to the Senate. The argument had many of the significant features of Mr. Stevens's style, but lacked the vigor which in the day of his strength he had always shown. He was rapidly failing in health and was then within a few weeks of his death. Hon. Thomas Williams of Pennsylvania followed Mr. Stevens with a written argument, rhetorically finished and read with great emphasis. It presented in new and attractive form the arguments already submitted, but towards the close contained the imprudent expression that "the eyes of an expectant people are upon the Senate."

Mr. Evarts followed with an argument of great length, reviewing every phase and feature of the case and making a remarkably effective plea on behalf of his eminent client. It was as strong in its logic as it was faultless in its style. The concluding portion of the address was especially eloquent and convincing. "We never dreamed," said he, "that an instructed and equal people, with a government yielding so readily to the touch of popular will, would have come to the trial of force against it. We never thought that the remedy to get rid of a ruler would bring assassination into our political experience. We never thought that political differences under an elective Presidency would bring in array the departments of the Government against one another to anticipate by ten months the operation of the regular election. And yet we take them all, one after another, and we take them because we have grown to the full vigor of manhood. But we have met by the powers of the Constitution these great dangers—prophesied when they would arise as likely to be our doom—the distractions of civil strife, the exhaustions of powerful war, the intervention of the regularity of power through the violence of assassination. We could summon from the people a million of men and inexhaustible treasure to help the Constitution in its time of need. Can we summon now resources enough of civil prudence and of restraint of passion to carry us through this trial, so that whatever result may follow, in whatever form, the people may feel that the Constitution has received no wound? To this court, the last and best resort for its determination, it is to be left."

Mr. Stanbery, unable to deliver his well-prepared argument, employed one of the officers of the Attorney-General's department to read the greater part of it. During his service as Attorney-General he had become personally and deeply attached to the President, and now made an earnest plea in his behalf. "During the eighty years of our political existence," said Mr. Stanbery, "we have witnessed the fiercest contests of party. . . . A favorite legislative policy has more than once been defeated by the obstinate and determined resistance of the President, upon some of the gravest and most important questions we have ever had or are ever likely to have. The Presidential policy and the legislative policy have stood in direct antagonism. During all that time this fearful power of Impeachment was in the hands of the legislative department, and more than once a resort to it has been advised by extreme party men, as a sure remedy for party purposes; but happily that evil hitherto has not come upon us."

Hon. John A. Bingham summed up the case on behalf of the House and reviewed all the charges against the President, answering point by point the argument of his counsel. "I ask you, senators," said Mr. Bingham, "how long men would deliberate upon the question of whether a private citizen, arraigned at the bar of one of your tribunals of justice for criminal violation of law, should be permitted to interpose a plea in justification of his criminal act that his only purpose was to interpret the Constitution and laws for himself, that he violated the law in the exercise of his prerogative to test its validity hereafter, at such day as might suit his own convenience, in the courts of justice. Surely, senators, it is as competent for the private citizen to interpose such justification in answer to crime as it is for the President of the United States to interpose it, and for the simple reason that the Constitution is no respecter of persons, and vests neither in the President nor in the private citizen judicial power. . . . For the Senate to sustain any such plea would in my judgment be a gross violation of the already violated Constitution and laws of a free people."

When the counsel on both sides had finished, a certain period was allowed for senators to prepare and file their opinions on the case. This was done by twenty-nine senators(4) and the question was thus re-argued with consummate ability, for the Senate contained a number of lawyers of high rank and long experience at the bar. On the 11th of May the Senate was ready to vote, and the interest in the result was intense. There had been much speculation as to the position of certain senators, but as all the members of the body had maintained discreet silence during the trial, it was impossible to forecast the result with any degree of certainty. The only judgment that had the least significance was founded on the votes given to admit or to reject certain testimony proposed by the President's counsel. This of course gave no certain indication of the vote of senators; though the general belief was that the Impeachment would fail. The transfer of the entire House to the floor of the Senate, the galleries crowded with citizens from all parts of the Republic, the presence of all the foreign ministers in the Diplomatic Gallery eagerly watching the possible and peaceful deposition of a sovereign ruler, the large attendance of the representatives of the press,—all attested the profound impression which the trial had made and the intense anxiety with which its conclusion was awaited.

By an order of the Senate the first vote was taken on the last Article, which was a summary of many of the charges set forth at greater length in some of the preceding Articles of Impeachment. Upon the call of his name each senator was required to rise and answer "Guilty" or "Not guilty." The roll was called in breathless silence, with hundreds of tally-papers in the hands of eager observers on the floor and in the gallery, carefully noting each response as given. The result, announced at once by the Chief Justice, showed that thirty-five senators had declared the President "guilty" and nineteen had declared him "not guilty."(5) As conviction required two-thirds the Impeachment on the Eleventh Article had failed. A debate then arose on a proposition to rescind the resolution in regard to the order in which the vote should be taken upon the other Articles of Impeachment, but without reaching a conclusion, the Senate as a Court of Impeachment adjourned, on motion of Mr. Cameron of Pennsylvania, until Tuesday the 26th day of May.

During the intervening period of fifteen days the air was filled with rumors that the result would be different when the Senate should come to vote on the remaining Articles. A single senator changing against the President would give thirty-six for conviction, and leave only eighteen for acquittal. This would be fatal to the President, as it would give the two-thirds necessary for conviction. But it was not so ordained. When the Senate re-assembled on the 26th, the vote was taken on the Second Article, and then upon the Third, with precisely the same results as was previously reached on the Eleventh Article. When Mr. Ross of Kansas answered "Not guilty," there was an audible sensation of relief on the part of some, and of surprise on the part of others, showing quite plainly that rumor had been busy with his name as that of the senator who was expected to change his position. Satisfied that further voting was useless, the Senate abandoned the remaining Articles, and as a Court of Impeachment adjourned sine die.

The great trial was over, and the President retained his high office. In the ranks of the more radical portion of the Republican party there was an outbreak of indignation against the Republican senators who had voted "Not guilty." In the exaggerated denunciations caused by the anger and chagrin of the moment, great injustice was done to statesmen of spotless character. But until time had been given for reflection on the part of the excited mass of disappointed men, it was idle to interpose a word in defense, much less in justification, of the senators who had conscientiously differed from the main body of their political associates. While, however, the majority of Republicans shared in the chagrin caused by the defeat of Impeachment, a large and increasing number of the cool-headed and more conservative members of the party rejoiced at the result as a fortunate exit from an indefensible position, which had been taken in the heat of just resentment against the President for his desertion of those important principles of public policy to which he had been solemnly pledged. Still another class, even more numerous than the last-named, took a less conscientious but more sanguine view of the situation—rejoicing both in the act of Impeachment and in the failure to convict. Their specious belief was that the narrow escape which the President had made would frighten him out of all mischievous designs for the remainder of his term; while the narrow escape which the party had made, left to it in the impending Presidential contest all the advantage of a political power so firmly held by Congress, and at the same time imposed upon the Democrats the responsibility for a discredited and disgraced Administration of the Government.

The sober reflection of later years has persuaded many who favored Impeachment that it was not justifiable on the charges made, and that its success would have resulted in greater injury to free institutions than Andrew Johnson in his utmost endeavor was able to inflict. No impartial reader can examine the record of the pleadings and arguments of the Managers who appeared on behalf of the House, without feeling that the President was impeached for one series of misdemeanors, and tried for another series. This was perhaps not unnatural. The Republicans had the gravest cause to complain of the President's course on public affairs. He had professed the most radical creed of their party, had sought their confidence, had received their suffrages. Entrusted with the chief Executive power of the Nation by Republican ballots, he professed upon his accession to office the most entire devotion to the principles of the party; but he had, with a baseness hardly to be exaggerated, repudiated his professions, deserted the friends who had confided in him, and made an alliance with those who had been the bitterest foes of the Union in the bloody struggle which had just closed.

In the outraged and resentful minds of those who had sustained the Union cause through its trials, the real offenses of the President were clearly seen, and bitterly denounced:—his hostility to the Fourteenth Amendment; his unwillingness to make citizenship National; his opposition to all efforts to secure the safety of the public debt, and the sacredness of the soldier's pension; his resistance to measures that would put the rebel debt beyond the possibility of being a burden upon the whole nation or even upon the people of the Southern States; his determination that freedmen should not be placed within the protection of Organic law; his eagerness to turn the Southern States over to the control of the rebel element, without condition and without restraint; his fixed hostility to every form of reconstruction that looked to national safety and the prevention of another rebellion; his opposition to every scheme that tended to equalize representation in Congress, North and South, and his persistent demand that the negro should be denied suffrage, yet be counted in the basis of apportionment; his treacherous and malignant conduct in connection with the atrocious massacre at New Orleans; his hostility to the growth of free States in the North-West, while he was constantly urging the instant re-admission of all the rebel States; his denial of a morsel of food to the suffering and starving negro and white Unionist of the South in their dire extremity, as shown by his veto of the Freedmen's-bureau Bill; his cruel attempt to exclude the colored man from the power to protect himself by law, in his shameless veto of the Civil Rights Bill; and last, and worst of all, his heartless abandonment of that Union-loving class of white men in the South who became the victims of rebel hatred, from which he had himself escaped only by the strength of the National arms. In recounting all the acts which made up the roll of his political dishonor, Johnson had, in Republican opinion, committed none so hideous as his turning over the Southern Unionists to the vengeance of those who, as he well knew, were incapable of dealing with them in a spirit of justice, and who were unwilling to show mercy, even after they had themselves received it in quality that was not strained.

Could the President have been legally and constitutionally impeached for these offenses he should not have been allowed to hold his office for an hour beyond the time required for a fair trial. But the Articles of Impeachment did not even refer to any charge of this kind, and a stranger to our history, in perusing them, could not possibly infer that behind the legal verbiage of the Articles there was in the minds of the representatives who presented them a deadly hostility to the President for offenses totally different from the technical violation of a statue, for which he was arraigned,—a statute that never ought to have been enacted, as was practically confessed by its framers, when, within less than a year after the Impeachment trial had closed, they modified its provisions by taking away their most offensive features.

The charges on which the House actually arraigned the President were in substance, that he had violated the Tenure-of-office Act; that he had conspired with Lorenzo Thomas to violate it; that he had consulted with General Emory to see whether, independent of the General-in-Chief, he could not issue orders to the army to aid him in his determination to violate it; and lastly, that he had spoken of Congress in such a manner as tended to bring a co-ordinate branch of the Government into "disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach." The charge of conspiring with Lorenzo Thomas, as well as that in respect to General Emory, appeared in the end to be not only unsustained, but trivial. The President had conspired in precisely the same way with General Sherman when he urged him to accept the post of Secretary of War as Mr. Stanton's successor. The charge that he had attempted to bring Congress into "disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach," was laughingly answered in popular opinion, by the fact that he not been able to say half so many bitter things about Congress as Congress had said about him; and that, as the elections had shown, Congress had triumphed, and turned the popular contempt and ridicule against the President. Besides, the offense charged against the President had been committed nearly two years before, and seemed to be recalled now for popular effect in the construction of the Articles of Impeachment. This charge richly deserved the satire it received at the hands of Judge Curtis when he spoke of "the House of Representatives erecting itself into a school of manners, and desiring the judgment of the Senate whether the President has not been guilty of an indecorum; whether he has spoken properly?" . . . "Considering the nature of our government," said Judge Curtis, "and the experience we have had on this subject, that is a pretty lofty claim!"

In fact there was but one charge of any gravity against the President —that of violating the Tenure-of-office Act. But on the charge there was a very grave difference of opinion among those equally competent to decide. Mr. Fessenden, one of the ablest lawyers, if not indeed the very ablest that has sat in the Senate since Mr. Webster, believed on his oath and his honor—an oath that was sacred and an honor that was stainless—that the President had a lawful and Constitutional right to remove Mr. Stanton at the time and in the manner he did. Mr. Trumbull, whose legal ability had been attested by his assignment to the chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee, believed with Mr. Fessenden, as did Mr. Grimes of Iowa, one of the strongest members of the Senate, and Mr. Henderson of Missouri, whose legal attainments have since given him a high professional reputation. Let it be frankly admitted that lawyers of equal rank conscientiously believed in the President's guilt. This only proves that there was ground for a substantial and fundamental difference of opinion, and that it could not therefore with certainty be charged that the President, "unmindful of the high duties of his office, did this act in violation of the Constitution of the United States." This was the very question in dispute,—the question in regard to which lawyers of eminent learning and impartial mind, members of the Republican party and zealous opponents of the President's policy, radically differed in judgment. Opinions of distinguished lawyers on the Democratic side of the Senate, like Reverdy Johnson, are not quoted, because partisan motives would be ascribed to their conclusions.

Perhaps the best test as to whether the act of the President in removing Mr. Stanton was good ground for impeachment, would be found in asking any candid man if he believes a precisely similar act by Mr. Lincoln, or General Grant, or any other President in harmony with his party in Congress, would have been followed by impeachment, or by censure, or even by dissent. It is hardly conceivable, nay, it is impossible, that under such circumstances the slightest notice would be taken of the President's action by either branch of Congress. If there was a difference of opinion as to the intent and meaning of a law, the general judgment in the case supposed would be that the President had the right to act upon his own conscientious construction of the statute. It might not be altogether safe to concede to the Executive the broad scope of discretion which General Jackson arrogated to himself in his celebrated veto of the Bank Bill, when he declared that "The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others." But without approving the extreme doctrine which General Jackson announced with the applause of his party, it is surely not an unreasonable assumption that in the case of a statute which has had no judicial interpretation and whose meaning is not altogether clear, the President is not to be impeached for acting upon his own understanding of its scope and intent:—especially is he not to be impeached when he offers to prove that he was sustained in his opinion by every member of his Cabinet, and offers further to prove by the same honorable witnesses that he took the step in order to subject the statute in dispute to judicial interpretation.

It is to be noted that in the progress of the trial the Managers on the part of the House and the counsel of the President proceeded upon entirely different ground as to what constituted an offense punishable with impeachment. General Butler, who opened the case against the President with circumspection and ability, took care to exclude the idea that actual crime on the part of the officer was essential to justify impeachment. Speaking for all the Managers he said, "We define an impeachable high crime or misdemeanor to be one in its nature or consequences subversive of some fundamental or essential principle of government or highly prejudicial to the public interest; and this may consist of a violation of the Constitution, of law, of an official oath, or of duty, by an act committed or omitted; or, without violating a positive law, by the abuse of discretionary powers from improper motives or for any improper purpose." This of course would give great latitude in proceedings against the President. It would challenge his discretion, erect sins of omission into positive offenses, and make inquest of his motives and purposes. There has not been an occupant of the Executive Chair since the organization of the Government, who did not at some period in his career commit an act which in the judgment of his political opponents was "highly prejudicial to the public interest," and therefore if his opponents should happen to be in the majority they might impeach him, simply for disagreement upon an issue of expediency upon which men equally competent to judge might reasonable and conscientiously hold different opinions. This was in effect the same position assumed by Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, that "in order to sustain impeachment under the Constitution it is not necessary to prove a crime as an indictable offense, or any act malum in se. It is a purely political proceeding." The counsel for the President dissented altogether from this definition of the grounds of Impeachment as given by the Managers. Judge Curtis declared that "when the Constitution speaks of treason, bribery, and other high crimes and misdemeanors, it refers to and includes only high criminal offenses against the United states, made so by some law of the United States existing when the acts complained of were done. . . . Noscitur a sociis. High crimes and misdemeanors! so high that they belong in this company with treason and bribery." The position of Judge Curtis was fortified by the fact that in the five cases of Impeachment trial before the President was accused—the cases of Blount, of Pickering, of Chase, of Peck, and of Humphries—the charges preferred by the House involved criminality.

Outside of professional opinion there was supposed to be a popular demand, so far as the Republican party represented the people, for the President's conviction—a demand found to be based, when analyzed, upon other acts of the President than those for which he was arraigned in the Articles of Impeachment. The people in this respect followed precisely in the line of their Representatives. It was certainly not a praiseworthy procedure that this supposed popular wish should have been mentioned at all as an argument for conviction. The most dignified of the many comments which this feature of the trial elicited was by Senator Fessenden, in the official opinion which accompanied his vote:—"To the suggestion that popular opinion demands the conviction of the President on these charges, I reply that he is not now on trial before the people, but before the Senate. In the words of Lord Eldon, upon the trial of the Queen, 'I take no notice of what is passing out of doors, because I am supposed constitutionally not to be acquainted with it. . . . It is the duty of those upon whom a judicial task is imposed to meet reproach, and not to court popularity.' . . . The people have not taken an oath to do impartial justice according to the Constitution and the law. I have taken that oath."

The trial of President Johnson is the most memorable attempt made by any English-speaking people to depose a sovereign ruler in strict accordance with all forms of law. The order, dignity and solemnity which marked the proceedings may therefore be realized with pride by every American citizen. From the beginning to the end there was no popular menace, or even suggestion of disturbance or violence, let the trial end as it might. If the President had been convicted he would have quietly retired from the Executive Mansion and Benjamin F. Wade, President of the Senate, sworn by the Chief Justice in the presence of the two Houses of Congress, would have assumed the power and performed the duties of Chief Magistrate of the Nation. During the original agitation of Impeachment in the House of Representatives some imprudent expressions had been made by hot-headed partisans, in regard to the right of the President to disperse Congress and appeal directly to the people to vindicate his title to his office. But these declarations were of no weight and their authors would have promptly retracted them in the hour of danger.

The time within which the trial of the President was comprised, from the presentation of the charges by the House of Representatives until the final adjournment of the Senate as a Court of Impeachment, was eighty-two days. Within that period the amplest opportunity was afforded to submit testimony and to hear the pleas of counsel. The gravity of the procedure was fully realized by all who took part in it, and no pains were spared to secure the observance of every Constitutional requirement to the minutest detail. In conserving its own prerogatives Congress made no attempt to curtail the prerogatives of the President during his trial. The army and the navy were under his control, together with the power to change that vast host of Federal officers and employees whose appointment does not require the confirmation of the Senate. Confidence in the reign of law was so absolute that no one ever dreamed it possible for the President to resist the force of its silent decree against him if one more voice in the Senate had pronounced him guilty.

The trial of Warren Hastings is always quoted as a precedent of imposing authority and consequence. But that was simply the arraignment of a subordinate official, upon charges of peculation and cruelty—misdemeanors not uncommon with the Englishmen of that day who were entrusted with Colonial administration. The great length of the Hastings trial, and especially the participation of Edmund Burke as original accuser and chief manager, have given it an extraneous importance to students of English history and law. The Articles of Impeachment, drawn by Mr. Burke, were presented at the bar of the House of Lords in April, 1786. They were so elaborate as to fill a stately octavo volume of five hundred pages. Mr. Burke's opening speech was not made for two years thereafter, and his closing plea was made in June 1794. During these eight years his splendid eloquence was the admiration and pride of the English people, and gave to the arraignment of Hastings an extrinsic interest far beyond the real importance. It bore no comparison in any of its essential aspects with a change of Rulership in a Republic of forty millions of people. Scarcely an incident of Hastings' life in India would be known to the popular reader, except for the association of his name with the most celebrated period of Mr. Burke's majestic career. Baron Plassy, a far greater man in the same field of achievement, is, compared with Hastings, little known—the title not being remembered even by the mass of his countrymen to-day as part of the reward to Robert Clive for founding the British Empire in India.

But the importance of the President's Impeachment does not depend upon the fame of his accusers or upon the length of his trial. The case in itself possesses intrinsic and enduring interest. It was not affected by factitious circumstances. It is notable especially because of the extreme tension to which it subjected the Constitution, and the attestation it affords of the restraint which a free people instinctively impose upon themselves in times of public excitement. It will be studied as a precedent, or as a warning, by the citizens of the Great Republic during the centuries through which, God grant, it may pass with increasing prosperity and renown. And it may well happen that in the crises of a distant future the momentous trial of 1868, though properly resulting in acquittal of the accused, will be recalled as demonstrating the ease and the serenity with which, if necessity should demand it, the citizens of a free country can lawfully deprive a corrupt or dangerous Executive of the office he has dishonored and the power he has abused.

Mr. Stanton promptly resigned his post when the Impeachment failed and returned to private life and to the practice of his profession. He was accompanied into his retirement by a vote of thanks from Congress for "the great ability, purity and fidelity with which he had discharged his public duties"; and in confirming his successor, the Senate adopted a resolution that Mr. Stanton was not legally removed, but had relinquished his office. He was broken in health and very keenly disappointed by the failure of the Impeachment. He supported General Grant for the Presidency and made one or two important public speeches in aid of his election. On the 20th of December, 1869, he was appointed by President Grant an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. For many years of his eminent professional life this high judicial position was the one ambition which Mr. Stanton had cherished. But its realization came too late. His prolonged labors, his anxieties and his disappointments had done their work, and on the 24th of December, five days after he had completed his fifty-fifth year, he sank to his grave, after herculean labors for the safety and honor of his country.

General John M. Schofield was nominated by the President as Mr. Stanton's successor and was confirmed by the Senate. He had an unexceptional record as a soldier, was a man of spotless personal character, and possessed of sound judgment and discretion. His ability for civil administration had been tested and satisfactorily demonstrated during his command of the District of Virginia in the period of reconstruction, and also in a certain degree during the war when Mr. Lincoln entrusted to him the difficult task of preserving loyal ascendency in Missouri. He took charge of the War Department at a difficult and critical time, but his administration of it was in all respects successful and received the commendation of fair-minded men in all parties.

Immediately after his acquittal the President renominated Mr. Stanbery for Attorney-General. The Senate, in a spirit of resentment not altogether praiseworthy or intelligible, rejected him. It was rumored that Mr. Stanbery's previous course as Attorney-general "in construing the Reconstruction Acts" had given offense to certain senators. No reason, however, was assigned and indeed no good reason could be given, for this personal injustice to an able lawyer and an honorable man. He was simply a victim to the political excitement of the hour. Upon Mr. Stanbery's rejection the President nominated Mr. Evarts to his first official position under the National Government. He was promptly confirmed, and, it need not be added, discharged the duties of Attorney-General with eminent ability and with a popularity which tended to re-establish in some degree those relations of personal courtesy always so desirable between Congress and the Executive Departments.

[(1) The following is General Grant's testimony in full, touching the point referred to. It was given under oath before the Judiciary Committee on the 18th of July, 1867.

MR. BOUTWELL: "Have you at any time heard the President make any remark in reference to the admission of members of Congress from the rebel States into either House?"

GENERAL GRANT: "I cannot say positively what I have heard him say on the subject. I have heard him say as much, perhaps, in his published speeches last summer, as I ever heard him say at all upon that subject. I have heard him say—and I think I have heard him say it twice in his speeches—that if the North carried the elections by members enough to give them, with the Southern members, a majority, why would they not be the Congress of the United States? I have heard him say that several times."

MR. THOMAS WILLIAMS: "When you say 'the North,' you mean the Democratic party of the North; or, in other words, the party favoring his policy?"

GENERAL GRANT: "I mean if the North carried enough members in favor of the admission of the South. I did not hear him say that he would recognize them as the Congress. I merely heard him ask the question, 'Why would they not be the Congress?'"

MR. JAMES F. WILSON: "When did you hear him say that?"

GENERAL GRANT: "I heard him say that in one or two of his speeches. I do not recollect when."

MR. BOUTWELL: "Have you heard him make a remark kindred to that elsewhere?"

GENERAL GRANT: "Yes, I have heard him say that, aside from his speeches, in conversation. I cannot say just when: it was probably about that same time."

MR. BOUTWELL: "Have you heard him at any time make any remark or suggestion concerning the legality of Congress with the Southern members excluded?"

GENERAL GRANT: "He alluded to that subject frequently on his tour to Chicago and back last summer. His speeches were generally reported with considerable accuracy. I cannot recollect what he said, except in general terms; but I read his speeches at the time, and they were reported with considerable accuracy."

MR. BOUTWELL: "Did you hear him say any thing in private on that subject, either during that trip or at any other time?"

GENERAL GRANT: "I do not recollect specially."

MR. BOUTWELL: "Did you at any time hear him make any remark concerning the Executive Department of the Government?"

GENERAL GRANT: "No: I never hear him allude to that."

MR. BOUTWELL: "Did you ever hear him make any remark looking to any controversy between Congress and the Executive?"

GENERAL GRANT: "I think not."]

[(2) The following is the vote of the House, in detail, on the first Impeachment resolution. Republicans are given in Roman; Democrats in Italic:—

AYES.—Messrs. Anderson, Arnell, James M. Ashley, Boutwell, Bromwell, Broomall, Butler, Churchill, Reader W. Clarke, Sidney Clarke, Cobb, Coburn, Covode, Cullom, Donnelly, Eckley, Ela, Farnsworth, Gravely, Harding, Higby, Hopkins, Hunter, Judd, Julian, Kelley, Kelsey, William Lawrence, Loan, Logan, Loughridge, Lynch, Maynard, McClurg, Mercur, Mullins, Myers, Newcomb, Nunn, O'Neill, Orth, Paine, Pile, Price, Schenck, Shanks, Aaron F. Stevens, Thaddeus Stevens, Stokes, Thomas, John Trimble, Trowbridge, Robert T. Van Horn, Ward, Thomas Williams, William Williams, and Stephen F. Wilson—57.

NOES.—Messrs. Adams, Allison, Ames, Archer, Delos R. Ashley, Axtell, Bailey, Baker, Baldwin, Banks, Barnum, Beaman, Beck, Benjamin, Benton, Bingham, Blaine, Boyer, Brooks, Buckland, Burr, Cary, Chanler, Cook, Dawes, Dixon, Dodge, Driggs, Eggleston, Eldridge, Eliot, Ferriss, Ferry, Fields, Garfield, Getz, Glossbrenner, Golladay, Griswold, Grover, Haight, Halsey, Hamilton, Hawkins, Hill, Holman, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Asahel W. Hubbard, Chester D. Hubbard, Richard D. Hubbard, Hulburd, Humphrey, Ingersoll, Johnson, Jones, Kerr, Ketcham, Knott, Koontz, Laflin, George V. Lawrence, Lincoln, Marshall, Marvin, McCarthy, McCullogh, Miller, Moorhead, Morgan, Mungen, Niblack, Nicholson, Perham, Peters, Phelps, Pike, Plants, Poland, Polsley, Pruyn, Randall, Robertson, Robinson, Ross, Saywer, Sitgreaves, Smith, Spalding, Starkweather, Stewart, Stone, Taber, Taylor, Upson, Van Aernam, Van Aucken, Van Trump, Van Wyck, Cadwalader C. Washburn, Elihu B. Washburne, Henry D. Washburn, William B. Washburn, Welker, James F. Wilson, John T. Wilson, Woodbridge, and Woodward—108.

ABSENT OR NOT VOTING.—Messrs. Barnes, Blair, Cake, Cornell, Finney, Fox, Jenckes, Kitchen, Mallory, Moore, Morrell, Morrissey, Pomeroy, Ram, Scofield, Seelye, Shellabarger, Taffe, Twichell, Burt Van Horn, Windom, and Wood—22.]

[(3) The following is the vote of the House, in detail, on the second Impeachment resolution, February 24, 1868. Republicans are given in Roman; Democrats in Italic:—

AYES.—Messrs. Allison, Ames, Anderson, Arnell, Delos R. Ashley, James M. Ashley, Bailey, Baker, Baldwin, Banks, Beaman, Beatty, Benton, Bingham, Blaine, Blair, Boutwell, Bromwell, Broomall, Buckland, Butler, Cake, Churchill, Reader W. Clarke, Sidney Clarke, Cobb, Coburn, Cook, Cornell, Covode, Cullom, Dawes, Dodge, Driggs, Eckley, Eggleston, Eliot, Farnsworth, Ferriss, Ferry, Fields, Gravely, Griswold, Halsey, Harding, Higby, Hill, Hooper, Hopkins, Asahel W. Hubbard, Chester D. Hubbard, Hulburd, Hunter, Ingersoll, Jenckes, Judd, Julian, Kelley, Kelsey, Ketcham, Kitchen, Laflin, George V. Lawrence, William Lawrence, Lincoln, Loan, Logan, Loughridge, Lynch, Mallory, Marvin, McCarthy, McClurg, Mercur, Miller, Moore, Moorhead, Morrell, Mullins, Myers, Newcomb, Nunn, O'Neill, Orth, Paine, Perham, Peters, Pike, Pile, Plants, Poland, Polsley, Price, Raum, Robertson, Sawyer, Schenck, Scofield, Seelye, Shanks, Smith, Spalding, Starkweather, Aaron F. Stevens, Thaddeus Stevens, Stokes, Taffe, Taylor, Trowbridge, Twichell, Upson, Van Aernam, Burt Van Horn, Van Wyck, Ward, Cadwalader C. Washburn, Elihu B. Washburne, William B. Washburn, Welker, Thomas Williams, James F. Wilson, John T. Wilson, Stephen F. Wilson, Windom, Woodbridge, and the Speaker—126.

NOES.—Messrs. Adams, Archer, Axtell, Barnes, Barnum, Beck, Boyer, Brooks, Burr, Cary, Chanler, Eldridge, Fox, Getz, Glossbrenner, Golladay, Grover, Haight, Holman, Hotchkiss, Richard D. Hubbard, Humprhey, Johnson, Jones, Kerr, Knott, Marshall, McCormick, McCullough, Morgan, Morrissey, Mungen, Niblack, Nicholson, Phelps, Pruyn, Randall, Ross, Sitgreaves, Stewart, Stone, Taber, Lawrence S. Trimble, Van Aukern, Van Trump, Wood, and Woodward—47.

ABSENT OR NOT VOTING.—Messrs. Benjamin, Dixon, Donnelly, Ela, Finney, Garfield, Hawkins, Koontz, Maynard, Pomeroy, Robinson, Shellabarger, Thomas, John Trimble, Robert T. Van Horn, Henry D. Washburn, and William Williams.—17.]

[(4) The following senators filed opinions:—

Messrs. Ferry of Connecticut, Trumbull and Yates of Illinois, Hendricks of Indiana, Grimes and Harlan of Iowa, Pomeroy of Kansas, Davis of Kentucky, Fessenden and Morrill of Maine, Johnson and Vickers of Maryland, Sumner and Wilson of Massachusetts, Howard of Michigan, Henderson of Missouri, Tipton of Nebraska, Stewart of Nevada, Patterson of New Hampshire, Frelinghuysen and Cattell of New Jersey, Sherman of Ohio, Williams of Oregon, Buckalew of Pennsylvania, Edmunds and Morrill of Vermont, Van Winkle of West Virginia, Howe and DOOLITTLE of Wisconsin.]

[(5) The following is the vote of the Senate in detail. Republicans are given in Roman, Democrats in Italic, Administration Republicans in small capitals. Every senator was present and voted.

GUILTY.—Messrs. Anthony of Rhode Island, Cameron of Pennsylvania, Cattell of New Jersey, Chandler of Michigan, Cole of California, Conkling of New York, Conness of California, Corbett of Oregon, Cragin of New Hampshire, Drake of Missouri, Edmunds of Vermont, Ferry of Connecticut, Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, Harlan of Iowa, Howard of Michigan, Howe of Wisconsin, Morgan of New York, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton of Indiana, Nye of Nevada, Patterson of New Hampshire, Pomeroy of Kansas, Ramsey of Minnesota, Sherman of Ohio, Sprague of Rhode Island, Stewart of Nevada, Sumner of Massachusetts, Thayer of Nebraska, Tipton of Nebraska, Wade of Ohio, Willey of West Virginia, Williams of Oregon, Wilson of Massachusetts, and Yates of Illinois.—35.

NOT GUILTY.—Messrs. Bayard of Delaware, Buckalew of Pennsylvania, Davis of Kentucky, DIXON of Connecticut, DOOLITTLE of Wisconsin, Fessenden of Maine, Fowler of Tennessee, Grimes of Iowa, Henderson of Missouri, Hendricks of Indiana, Johnson of Maryland, McCreery of Kentucky, NORTON of Minnesota, PATTERSON of Tennessee, Ross of Kansas, Saulsbury of Delaware, Trumbull of Illinois, Van Winkle of West Virginia, and Vickers of Maryland.—19.]

CHAPTER XV.

The stirring events which preceded the Presidential campaign of 1868 brought both parties to that contest with aroused feeling and earnest purpose. The passionate struggle of which President Johnson was the centre, had inspired the Republicans with an ardor and a resolution scarcely surpassed during the intense period of the war. The failure, on the 16th of May, to find the President guilty as charged in the Eleventh Article of Impeachment, was received by the public as a general acquittal, without waiting for the vote of the 26th. A large proportion of the delegates to the Republican National Convention which met at Chicago on the 20th of May, gathered under the influence of keen disappointment at the President's escape from what they believed to be merited punishment. Though baffled in their hope of deposing the man whom they regarded with the resentment that always follows the political apostate, they were none the less animated by the high spirit which springs from conscious strength and power. They were the representatives of an aggressive and triumphant party, and felt that though suffering an unexpected chagrin they were moving forward with certainty to a new and brilliant victory. The chief work of the Convention was determined in advance. The selection of General Grant as the candidate for the Presidency had for months been clearly foreshadowed and universally accepted by the Republican party. At an earlier stage there had been an effort to direct public thought towards some candidate who was more distinctively a party chief, and who held more pronounced political views; but public sentiment pointed so unmistakably and irresistibly to General Grant that this effort was found to be hopeless and was speedily abandoned. The enthusiasm for General Grant was due to something more than the mere fact that he was the chief hero of the war. It rested upon broader ground than popular gratitude for his military services—great as that sentiment was. During the conflict between Congress and the President, General Grant had been placed in a trying position, and he had borne himself with a discretion and dignity which deepened the popular confidence in his sound judgment and his tact. The people felt that besides the great qualities he had displayed in war, he was peculiarly fitted to lead in restoring peace and the reign of law.

Though the main work of the Convention was simply to ratify the popular choice, the party sent many conspicuous men as delegates. Joseph R. Hawley, William Claflin, Eugene Hale, George B. Loring, and William E. Chandler were present from the New-England States. New York was especially strong in the number of its prominent men. General Daniel E. Sickles, with his honorable war record, Lyman Tremaine, who had been Attorney-General of the State, Charles Andrews, since its Chief Justice, Moses H. Grinnell, Chauncey M. Depew, Ellis H. Roberts, Frank Hiscock, and others of scarcely less rank made up the notable delegation. Pennsylvania sent Colonel Forney and General Harry White, while Colonel A. K. McClure appeared in the Convention as a substitute. Maryland sent John A. J. Creswell, afterward in General Grant's Cabinet. John A. Bingham came from Ohio. The Indiana delegation included Richard W. Thompson and Senator Henry S. Lane. John A. Logan and Emory A. Storrs represented the great State of which General Grant was a citizen. Governor Van Zandt of Rhode Island, Senator Cattell and Cortlandt L. Parker of New Jersey, Ex-Attorney-General Speed of Kentucky, Carl Schurz and Governor Fletcher of Missouri, added strength and character to the roll of delegates.

The Convention rapidly completed its work, being in session but two days. The opening speech by the Chairman of the National Committee, Governor Ward of New Jersey, was short and pointed. He expressed the dominant thought in the minds of all when he said: "If, as indicated by the unanimity of feeling which prevails here, you shall designate as our leader the great Captain of the age, whose achievements in the field have been equaled by his wisdom in the Cabinet, the Nation will greet is as the precursor of victory to our cause, of peace to the Republic." Carl Schurz was selected as temporary chairman, and his speech reflected the prevalent feeling of all Republicans. He exulted in the great achievements of the party, now freshly recalled in its first National Convention since the successful close of the war, and proclaimed its purpose to finish and perfect the work of reconstructing the Union on the broad basis of equal rights.

For permanent President of the Convention General Sickles and General Hawley had both been prominently mentioned and warmly advocated. The vote between them in the committee on permanent organization was a tie. But New York bent every thing to the purpose of nominating Governor Fenton for the Vice-Presidency, and feared that the selection of General Sickles for the highest honor of the Convention might prejudice his chances. By the casting vote of Hamilton Harris of Albany, a special friend of Governor Fenton and a man of marked sagacity in political affairs, the choice fell upon General Hawley. His speech on taking the chair was earnest and impressive. He briefly reviewed what the party had accomplished, in war and in peace, and emphasized the obligation of crowning these triumphs with the permanent establishment of equal and exact justice. He was especially forcible in rebuking the current financial heresies and in insisting that the full demands of the Nation's honor should be scrupulously observed. "For every dollar of the national debt," he declared, "the blood of a soldier is pledged." "Every bond, in letter and in spirit, must be as sacred as a soldier's grave." As these patriotic maxims were pronounced by General Hawley, the whole Convention broke forth in prolonged applause.

The platform, reported on the second day, succinctly stated the Republican policy. It made two principles conspicuous: first, equal suffrage; and second, the maintenance of the public faith. These were the pivots on which the political controversy of the year turned. They embraced the two supreme questions left by the war. The one involved the restoration of public liberty, in harmony with public safety, in the lately rebellious States. The other involved the honor of the Republic in observing its financial obligations. The Reconstruction policy rested on equal suffrage as its corner-stone, and the Convention congratulated the country on its established success, as shown by its acceptance already in a majority of the Southern States, and its assured acceptance in all. Equal suffrage was still regarded however rather as an expedient of security against disloyalty than as a measure of National right, rather as an incident to the power of re-organizing rebellious communities than as a subject of National jurisdiction for all the States.

The Fourteenth Amendment was about to be proclaimed, and would place American citizenship under Constitutional protection. The Fifteenth Amendment, ordaining equal political and civil rights, had not yet come. In this period of transition the platform asserted that the guarantee of suffrage to the loyal men of the South must be maintained, but that the question of suffrage in the loyal States belonged to the States themselves. This was an evasion of duty quite unworthy of the Republican party, with its record of consistent bravery through fourteen eventful years. It was a mere stroke of expediency to escape the prejudices which negro suffrage would encounter in a majority of the loyal States, and especially in Indiana and California, where a close vote was anticipated. The position carried with it an element of deception, because every intelligent man knew that it would be impossible to force negro suffrage on the Southern States by National authority, and leave the Northern States free to exclude it from their own domain. It was an extraordinary proposition that the South, after all the demoralization wrought by the war, should be called upon to exhibit a higher degree of political justice and virtue than the North was willing to practice.

On the financial issue the platform was earnest and emphatic. It denounced all forms of repudiation as a national crime, and demanded the payment of the public debt in the utmost good faith, according to the letter and the spirit of the law. The resolutions reflected universal Republican feeling in an impassioned arraignment of President Johnson. At the same time they commended the spirit of magnanimity and forbearance with which those who had taken up arms against the Union were received into fellowship with loyal men, and favored the removal of all political disabilities as rapidly as was consistent with public safety.

When the preliminary business of the Convention had been concluded, John A. Logan, in a vigorous and eloquent speech, presented the name of General Grant for President. On a call of the roll the nomination was repeated by the entire Convention without a dissenting voice. The announcement of his unanimous nomination was received with a great outburst of enthusiasm. The parallel to his unanimity could be found in but few instances in our political history, and it augured well for the success of the canvass in which General Grant was thus made the standard-bearer.

The absence of any contest on the chief nomination imparted unusual spirit and interest to the struggle for the Vice-Presidency. Three candidates were urged by their respective friends with great zeal and earnestness. Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio, President pro tempore of the Senate, was already acting Vice-President. If the Impeachment trial had ended in the conviction of President Johnson, Mr. Wade would have succeeded him for the unexpired term, and from this coign of vantage would doubtless have secured the nomination for the second office. The failure of Impeachment, though fatal to his success, did not dissipate the support which his long services and marked fidelity had commanded, without any of the adventitious aids of power. He had entered the Senate seventeen years before and found there but four members devoted to the cause of free soil. Seward, Sumner, Chase, and John P. Hale had preceded him. Less favored than these senators in the advantages of early life, less powerful in debate, he yet brought to the common cause some qualities which they did not possess. His bluff address, his aggressive temper, his readiness to meet the champions of slavery in physical combat as well as in intellectual discussion, drew to him a large measure of popular admiration.

For several years Governor Fenton had been rising to leadership among New-York Republicans. His political skill had been shown while a member of the House, in forming the combination which made Galusha A. Grow Speaker of the Thirty-seventh Congress. Though not conspicuous in debate he had gained a high reputation as a sagacious counselor and a safe leader. Of Democratic antecedents, he had never been in favor with the political dynasty which so long ruled New York, and of which Thurlow Weed was the acknowledged head. With his conservative views that consummate politician could not keep pace with his party during the war, and thus lost the mastery which he had so long held without dispute. Thereupon Mr. Fenton quietly seized the sceptre which Mr. Weed had been compelled to relinquish. Elected Governor over Horatio Seymour in 1864, he was re-elected in 1866 over John T. Hoffman, and his four years in that exalted office not only increased his reputation but added largely to his political power. The New-York delegation to the National Convention was chosen under his own eye and was admirably fitted to serve its purpose. It was not only earnest in its loyalty but strong in character and ability. It embraced an unusual number of representative men, and with the favorable estimate which Republicans everywhere held of Governor Fenton's services and administration, their efforts made a marked impression upon the Convention.

The friends of Schuyler Colfax relied less on thorough organization and systematic work than upon the common judgment that he would be a fit and available candidate. He was then at the height of his successful career. He was in the third term of his Speakership, and had acquitted himself in that exacting place with ability and credit. Genial and cordial, with unfailing tact and aptitude, skilful in cultivating friendships and never provoking enmities, he had in a rare degree the elements that insure popularity. The absence of the more rugged and combative qualities which diminished his force in the stormy struggles of the House, served now to bring him fewer antagonisms as a candidate.

Beside the names of Wade, Fenton, and Colfax, two or three others were presented, though not so earnestly urged or so strongly supported. Senator Wilson of Massachusetts had warm friends and was fourth in the rank of candidates. Pennsylvania presented Governor Curtin, but with a divided and disorganized force which crippled at the outset the effort in his behalf. The delegation was nominally united for him, but fourteen of the number were friends of Senator Cameron, and were at heart hostile to Governor Curtin. Mr. J. Donald Cameron, son of the senator, appeared in person as a contesting delegate. The State Convention had assumed the authority to name the delegates from the several Congressional districts. Mr. Cameron denied that the State Convention had any such prerogative. He presented himself with the Dauphin credentials as the champion of the right of district representation. He was admitted to nothing more than an honorary seat, but the opposition of himself and his friends had the desired effect in preventing the candidacy of Governor Curtin from becoming formidable.

On the first ballot Mr. Wade led with 147 votes. Mr. Fenton was next with 126, Mr. Colfax followed with 125, and Mr. Wilson with 119. Mr. Curtin had 51, and the remainder were scattering. Several of the minor candidates immediately dropped out, and on the second ballot the vote for Wade was raised to 170, for Colfax to 145, and for Fenton to 144. The third and fourth ballots showed nearly equal gains for Wade and Colfax, while Fenton made no increase. All other names were withdrawn. Wade had been weakened by the fact that after the first ballot his own State of Ohio had given several votes for Colfax, to whom the tide now turned with great strength. Iowa was the first State to break solidly. Pennsylvania turned her vote to Colfax instead of Wade whose friends had confidently counted upon it. Other changes rapidly followed, until the fifth ballot, as finally announced, showed 541 for Colfax, 38 for Wade, and 69 for Fenton. The result was received with general and hearty satisfaction, and the Convention adjourned with undoubting faith in a great victory for Grant and Colfax. General Grant's brief letter of acceptance followed within a week, and its key-note was found in the memorable expression, "Let us have peace!" It was spoken in a way and came from a source which gave it peculiar strength and significance.

The Democratic National Convention of 1868 was invested with remarkable interest, less from any expectation that it would seriously contest and jeopard Republican ascendency, than from the several personal issues which entered into it, and the audacious public policies which would be urged upon it. The general drift of the party was clear and unmistakable, but its personal choice and the tone of its declarations would determine how bold a stand it would take before the country. Would it openly proclaim the doctrine of paying the public debt in depreciated paper money, and emphasize its action by nominating Mr. George H. Pendleton, the most distinct and conspicuous champion of the financial heresy? Would it attempt a discussion and review of its tendency and designs, and make what would approach a new departure, in appearance if not in fact, by going outside of its own ranks and nominating Chief Justice Chase? Would the recreancy of President Johnson to his own party and his hope of Democratic support find any considerable response? And aside from the issue of virtually repudiating the public debt, would the party now re-assert its hostile and revolutionary attitude towards the well-nigh completed work of Reconstruction? These various possibilities left a degree of uncertainty which surrounded the Convention with an atmosphere of curious expectation.

The movement most deliberately planned and most persistently pressed was that on behalf of Mr. Pendleton. The Greenback heresy had sprung up with rapid growth. The same influence which had resisted the issue of legal-tender notes during the war, when they were deemed vital to the National success, now demanded that they be used to pay the public debt, though depreciated far below the standard of coin. "The same currency for the bond-holder and the plough-holder" was a favorite cry in the mouths of many. This plausible and poisonous fallacy quickly took root in Ohio, whose political soil has often nourished rank and luxuriant outgrowth of Democratic heresies, and it came to be known distinctively as "The Ohio Idea." The apt response of the Republicans was, the best currency for both plough-holder and bond-holder! Mr. Pendleton was peculiarly identified with the Ohio Idea. If not its author he had been its zealous advocate, and had become widely known as its representative. The policy which typified the easy way of paying debts spread through the West and South, and brought to Mr. Pendleton a wide support. His popular address and attractive style of speech increased his strength as a candidate, and his partisans came to the Convention under the lead of able politicians, with the only movement which was well organized and which had positive and concentrated force behind it.

While the Pendleton canvass was earnestly, openly, and skilfully promoted it was also adroitly opposed. The keen and crafty politicians of New York were neither demonstrative nor frank in indicating their course, but they were watchful, sinuous, and efficient. Their plot was carefully concealed. They were ready to have a New-York candidate thrust upon them by other sections. If called upon to look outside of their own State and select from the list of avowed aspirants, they modestly suggested Mr. Hendricks of Indiana, a friend and co-laborer of Mr. Pendleton. But the favorite scheme in the inner councils of the New-York Regency, was to strike beyond the Democratic lines and nominate Chief Justice Chase. This proposition was little discussed in public, but was deeply pondered in private by influential members of the Democratic party. Mr. Chase himself presented no obstacle and no objection. He cherished an eager ambition to be President. He had desired and sought the Republican nomination in 1864, and though the overwhelming sentiment for Mr. Lincoln had soon driven him from the field, the differences he had encouraged led to his retirement from the Cabinet. His elevation to the highest judicial office in the land did not subdue or even check his political aspirations. For a time he looked forward with hope to the Republican nomination in 1868; but when it became evident that none but General Grant could be the chosen leader, his thoughts evidently turned towards the Democratic Convention.

Certain circumstances made the possible selection of the Chief Justice as the Democratic candidate a less inconsistent procedure than his long antagonism to the party might at first suggest. In the beginning of his political career Judge Chase had leaned towards the Democratic party, and at a more recent period had been promoted to the Senate by the aid of Democrats. He had consistently advocated the fundamental principles which originally distinguished the party. Recent circumstances had separated him from active sympathy with the Republicans and placed him in opposition to the policy of some of its leading members. He had taken occasion to criticise what he called the military governments in the Southern States. Other causes had tended to separate him from the Republican party and to commend him to the Democracy. When he took his seat on the bench of the Supreme Court a majority of the judges belonged to the Democratic party, and with them he soon acquired personal intimacy and confidential relations. He had secured many friends in the South by joining in the opinions pronounced by Mr. Justice Field for the court in 1867, in regard to the test-oaths prescribed in the Missouri constitution, and also in regard to the test-oath of lawyers known as the case ex parte Garland. All the impressions touching his Democratic tendencies had been deepened and increased during the Impeachment trial. It was evident that he was not in harmony with the Republican senators, and he took no pains to conceal his willingness to thwart them, so far as was consistent with his duty, in the position of Presiding officer.

This demonstration of political sympathy, made manifest through judicial channels, had brought Judge Chase and the Democratic managers nearer together. Both realized however that a complete change of position would defeat its own purpose. On one important point indeed Judge Chase never wavered and was unwilling to compromise. In all utterances and all communications he firmly maintained the principle of universal suffrage as the primary article of his political creed. If the Democrats should accept him they must accept this doctrine with him. Six weeks prior to the Convention Mr. August Belmont in a private letter advised him that the leading Democrats of New York were favorable to his nomination, and urged upon him that with the settlement of the slavery question, the issue which separated him from the Democratic party had disappeared. Judge Chase replied that the slavery question had indeed been settled, but that in the question of Reconstruction it had a successor which partook largely of the same nature. He had been a party to the pledge of freedom for the enfranchised race, and the fulfillment of that pledge required, in his judgment, "the assurance of the right of suffrage to those whom the Constitution has made freemen and citizens."

Not long after this correspondence the Chief Justice caused a formal summary of his political views to be published, with the evident purpose of gaining the good will of the "American Democracy." The summary touched lightly on most of the controversial political questions, and contained nothing to which the Democrats would not have readily assented except the declaration for universal suffrage. To this policy all Democratic acts and expressions had been uncompromisingly hostile, and the sentiment of the party might not easily be brought to accept a change which was at once so radical and so repugnant to its temper and its training. Judge Chase hoped to induce its acquiescence and believed that such an advance might open the way to success. But his tenacity on this point was undoubtedly an obstacle to his nomination. Another difficulty was the strenuous opposition of the Ohio delegates and the zealous preference for Mr. Pendleton. Superadded to all these objections was a popular aversion to any thing which looked like a subordination of judicial trust to political aims. Incurring this reproach through what seemed to be inordinate ambition, Judge Chase had forfeited something of the strength to secure which could be the only motive for his nomination by his old political opponents.

Notwithstanding all these apparent obstacles, there was among the most considerate men of the Convention a settled purpose to secure the nomination of the Chief Justice. They intended to place him before the people upon the issues in regard to which he was in harmony with the Democratic party, and omit all mention of issues in regard to which there was a difference of view. This was a species of tactics not unknown to political parties, and might be used with great effect if Mr. Chase should be the nominee. The astute men who advocated his selection saw that the great need of the Democracy was to secure a candidate who had been unquestionably loyal during the war, and who at the same time was not offensive to Southern feeling. The prime necessity of the party was to regain strength in the North—to recover power in that great cordon of Western States which had for so many years prior to the rebellion followed the Democratic flag. The States that had attempted secession were assured to the Democracy as soon as the party could be placed in National power, and to secure that end the South would be wise to follow the lead of New York as obediently as in former years New York had followed the lead of the South. It was a contest which involved the necessity of stooping to conquer.

The Chief Justice was, so far as his position would permit, active in his own behalf. He was in correspondence with influential Democrats before the Convention, and in a still more intimate degree after the Convention was in session. On the 4th of July he wrote a significant letter to a friend who was in close communication with the leading delegates in New York. His object was to soften the hostility of the partisan Democrats, especially of the Southern school. Referring to the policy of Reconstruction, he said, "I have always favored the submission of the questions of re-organization after disorganization by war to the entire people of the whole State." This was intended to assure Southern men that if he believed in the justice of giving suffrage to the negro, he did not believe in the justice of denying it to the white man.

The strangest feature in Judge Chase's strange canvass was the apparent friendship of Vallandingham, and the apparent reliance of the distinguished candidate upon the strength which the notorious anti-war Democrat could bring to him. Vallandingham had evidently been sending some kind messages to the Chief Justice, who responded while the Democratic Convention was in session, in these warm words: "The assurance you give me of the friendship of Mr. V., affords me real satisfaction. He is a man of whose friendship one may well be proud. Even when we have differed and separated most widely, I have always admired his pluck and consistency, and have done full justice to his abilities and energies." The plain indication was that Vallandingham, who had come to the Convention as an earnest friend of Pendleton, was already casting about for an alternative candidate in the event of Pendleton's failure, and was considering the practicability of nominating the Chief Justice.

President Johnson had also aspired to the Democratic candidacy. Ambitious, untiring, and sanguine, this hope of reward had served him in the bitter quarrel with his own party. The fate of Tyler and Fillmore had no terrors and no lessons for one who eagerly and blindly sought a position which would at once gratify his ambition and minister to his revenge. He was using all the powers of the Executive in a vain fight to obstruct and baffle the steadily advancing Republican policy. The Democrats, instead of following a settled chart of principles, were making the cardinal mistake of supporting him in all his tortuous course of assumptions and usurpations, and it was not strange that he should expect them to turn towards him in choosing a leader to continue the contest. But it is an old maxim, repeatedly illustrated, that while men are ready to profit by the treason, they instinctively detest the traitor. Mr. Johnson had embittered the party he had sought to serve. By his attempt to re-establish the political power of the elements which had carried the South into rebellion he had acquired some friends in that section, but his intemperate zeal had so greatly exasperated public feeling in the North that even those who applauded his conduct were unwilling to take the hazard of his candidacy.

The re-awakened opposition and designs of the Southern leaders were shown in the active participation of several of the conspicuous Confederate chiefs in the Convention. When the last preceding National Convention was held they were in arms against the Government. This was the first occasion upon which they could re-appear in the arena of National politics. It had been suggested to them from friendly sources that while the memory of their part in the bloody strife was still so fresh it would be prudent for them to remain in the background, but they vigorously resented this proposed exclusion. General Forrest of Tennessee published an indignant letter, in which he referred to "the counsel of timid men" that those who had prominently borne the flag of rebellion should abstain from any share in political action. He vehemently repelled the suggestion. Instead of exacting only secondary places he boldly asserted the highest claims. He appealed to the people and directly urged upon his associates, "that we, who are the true representatives of the greater portion of the true Constitutional men of the States, shall not exclude ourselves from the Democratic Convention." This spirit found a hearty response, and a large number of Confederate officers appeared in the National council of the party; of whom the foremost were Generals Forrest, Wade Hampton, John B. Gordon, and William Preston.

The Convention met in New York on the fourth day of July. Besides those active in the rebel armies, there were several leaders who had been conspicuous in the civil councils of the Confederacy. A. H. Garland of Arkansas, Benjamin H. Hill of Georgia, Zebulon B. Vance of North Carolina, and R. Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina were the most widely known. Louisiana sent two delegates whom she has since advanced to the Senate—Randall L. Gibson and James B. Eustis. Thomas S. Bocock, fourteen years a representative in the National Congress, afterwards Speaker of the Confederate Congress, came from Virginia. Montgomery Blair, who like his more impulsive brother Frank had fallen back into the party which seemed to be the natural home of the Blair family, came from Maryland as the colleague of William Pinckney Whyte. New York presented a strong array of delegates, among whom the most conspicuous were Horatio Seymour, Samuel J. Tilden, Henry C. Murphy, Augustus Schell, and Francis Kernan. Several of the regularly chosen delegates from Ohio gave way in order that the State might, in Mr. Pendleton's interest, secure greater parliamentary and debating talent; and to this end, Allen G. Thurman, Clement L. Vallandingham, George E. Pugh, and George W. Morgan appeared on the floor of the Convention. Pennsylvania sent ex-Senator Bigler and Judge George W. Woodward, whose ability was equaled by his rank Bourbonism. William R. Morrison and William A. Richardson of Illinois, William W. Eaton of Connecticut, Josiah G. Abbott of Massachusetts, James A. Bayard of Delaware, John G. Carlisle of Kentucky, Joseph E. McDonald and Daniel W. Voorhees of Indiana, were names familiar in Democratic councils.

Mr. August Belmont's lurid speeches had become the accepted signal-guns of national Democratic conventions, and he did not disappoint expectation on this occasion. His prophetic vision and historic recital were even more expanded and alarming than before. He drew a dark picture of evils which he charged upon the Republican party, and then proceeded: "Austria did not dare to fasten upon vanquished Hungary, nor Russia to impose upon conquered Poland, the ruthless tyranny now inflicted by Congress on the Southern States. Military satraps are invested with dictatorial powers, overriding the decisions of the courts and assuming the functions of the civil authorities; and now this same party which has brought all these evils upon the country comes again before the American people asking for their suffrages! And whom has it chosen for its candidate? The General commanding the armies of the United States. Can there be any doubt as to the designs of the Radicals if they should be able to keep their hold on the reins of government? They intend Congressional usurpation of all the branches and factions of the Government, to be enforced by the bayonet of a military despotism."

Apparently it never occurred to Mr. Belmont that each succeeding sentence of his speech carried with it its own disproof. With loud voice and demonstrative manner, speaking in public before a multitude of people, with his words certain to be quoted in the press on account of the accident of his position, Mr. Belmont denounced the policy of our Government as more tyrannical than that of Russia or Austria. What did Mr. Belmont suppose would have been his fate if on the soil of Russia or Austria he had attempted the slightest denunciation of the policy of those empires? How long would he have ventured upon a tithe of the unrestrained vituperation which he safely indulged in here? In his visions he now saw General Grant upholding a Congressional usurpation with bayonets. Four years before, he saw in Mr. Lincoln's election "the utter disintegration of our whole political and social system amid bloodshed and anarchy." Mr. Belmont had evidently not proved a true prophet and did not aspire even to be a trustworthy historian.

Mr. Henry M. Palmer of Wisconsin, who was chosen temporary chairman, did not delay the Convention, and the organization was speedily completed by the election of Governor Seymour as permanent president. He had filled the same position in the convention of 1864. He was destined to hold a still more important relation to the present body, but that was not yet foreseen. His admirers looked to him as a political sage, who if not less partisan than his associates was more prudent and politic in his counsels. No other leader commanded so large a share of the confidence and devotion of his party. No other equaled him in the art of giving a velvety touch to its coarsest and most dangerous blows, or of presenting the work of its adversaries in the most questionable guise. It was his habit to thread the mazes of economic and fiscal discussion, and he was never so eloquent or apparently so contented as when he was painting a vivid picture of the burdens under which he imagined the country to be suffering, or giving a fanciful sketch of what might have been if Democratic rule had continued. From the beginning of the war he had illustrated the highest accomplishments of political oratory in bewailing, like the fabled prophetess of old, the coming woes—which never came. In his address on the present occasion he arraigned the Republican party for imposing oppressive taxes, for inflicting upon the country a depreciated currency, and for enforcing a military despotism. Like all the other speakers he affected to see a serious menace in the nomination of General Grant. Referring to the Republican platform and candidate he said, "Having declared that the principles of the Declaration of Independence should be made a living reality on every inch of American soil, they put in nomination a military chieftain who stands at the head of that system of despotism which crushes beneath its feet the greatest principles of the Declaration of Independence." And with this allusion he proceeded to condemn an assumed military rule with all its asserted evils.

Extreme as was the speech of Mr. Seymour, it was moderate and conservative in spirit compared with other displays and other proceedings of the Convention. The violent elements of the Democratic party obtained complete mastery in the construction of the platform. They presented in the resolutions the usual declarations on many secondary questions, together with an elaborate and vehement arraignment of Republican rule. But the real significance of the new Democratic creed was embodied in two salient and decisive propositions. The first was the declaration "that all the obligations of the Government, not payable by their express terms in coin, ought to be paid in lawful money." This was a distinct adoption of the Greenback heresy. The movement to nominate Mr. Pendleton did not succeed in its personal object, but it did succeed in embodying its ruling thought in the Democratic creed. It proved to be the guiding and mastering force of the Convention. The greenback issue went there with the positive, resolute support of a powerful candidate, and of a formidable array of delegates who knew precisely what they wanted. It was organized under a name and had the strength of a personality. There was opposition, but it was not coherent, organized or well led. In fact the platform was expressly framed to fit Mr. Pendleton; and if, as often happens, the champion and the cause did not triumph together, he compelled his party to commit itself fully and unreservedly to his doctrine.

The second vital proposition related to the policy and Acts of Reconstruction. If Chief Justice Chase was to be nominated, the party must accept the broad principle of universal suffrage or it must abandon his lifelong professions. But universal suffrage, especially if ordained by National authority, was irreconcilable with Democratic traditions and Democratic prejudices. The Democrats had uniformly maintained that the right of suffrage was a question which came within the political power of the States and did not belong to National jurisdiction. They denied that the States had in any degree, even by rebellion, forfeited their prerogatives or changed their relations. They insisted that nothing remained but to recognize them as restored to their old position. In framing the present platform they re-affirmed this doctrine, under the declaration that "any attempt of Congress, on any pretext whatever, to deprive any State of its right (to regulate suffrage), or interfere with its exercise, is a flagrant usurpation of power, which cannot find any warrant in the Constitution." This broad assertion was designed to deny even the right of Congress to make impartial suffrage in the revised constitutions a condition precedent to the re-admission of the rebellious States to representation. But the platform did not stop here. With a bolder sweep it declared "that we regard the Reconstruction Acts of Congress as usurpations, unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void." This extreme proposition, deliberately adopted, was calculated to produce a profound public impression. It was not a mere challenge of the policy or rightfulness of the Reconstruction Acts; it was not a mere pledge of opposition to their progress and completion; but it logically involved their overthrow, with the subversion of their results, in case the Democratic party should acquire the power to enforce its principles and to execute its threats.

The import of this bold declaration received additional light from the history of its genesis and adoption. Its immediate paternity belonged to Wade Hampton of South Carolina. In a speech at Charleston, within two weeks from the adjournment of the Convention, General Hampton recounted the circumstances which attended its insertion in the platform, and proudly claimed it as his own plank. He himself was a member of the Committee on Resolutions, and took an active part in its deliberations. All the members, he said, agreed that the control of suffrage belonged to the States; but General Hampton himself contended that the vital question turned on what were the States. In order that there might be no room for dispute he proposed that the platform should specifically say "the States as they were before 1865." To this however some of the members objected as impolitic and calculated to raise distrust, and it was accordingly dropped. General Hampton then proposed to insert the declaration that the "Reconstruction Acts are unconstitutional, revolutionary, and void;" and the manner in which this suggestion was received is given by General Hampton himself: "When I presented that proposition every member, and the warmest were from the North, came forward and pledged themselves to carry it out." He further reported to his people that the Democratic leaders declared their "willingness to give us every thing we could desire; but they begged us to remember that they had a great fight to make at the North, and they therefore besought us not to load the platform with a weight that they could not carry against the prejudices which they had to encounter. Help them once to regain the power, and then they would do their utmost to relieve the Southern States and restore to us the Union and the Constitution as it had existed before the war."

This declaration received still further emphasis from at least one of the nominations to which the Convention was now ready to proceed. The New-York delegation, which was believed to be friendly to Chief Justice Chase, had determined to mask itself for the present behind a local candidate, and it chose Sanford E. Church for that purpose. Pennsylvania, whose ultimate design was less certain, put forward Asa Packer in the same way. James E. English of Connecticut, Joel Parker of New Jersey, and several minor candidates, were presented as local favorites. The first ballot verified the claims of Mr. Pendleton's friends, and showed him to be decisively in the lead, though still far short of the number necessary to nominate. He had 105, while Andrew Johnson had 65, Judge Church 34, General Hancock 33, Packer 26, English 16, with the remainder scattering. President Johnson had a higher vote than was expected, but after the first ballot it immediately and rapidly declined. On the second ballot Pendleton fell of to 99, but recovered on the third, rising to 119, and thereafter slowly declining. The first day of voting, which was the third of the Convention, ended after six ballots without any material change or decisive indication.

The name of Mr. Hendricks of Indiana had been brought forward just at the close of the third day with thirty votes, and at the opening of the following day he immediately developed more strength. The adroit use of his name, devised by the New-York regency, was fatal to Mr. Pendleton. Coming from the adjoining State Mr. Hendricks divided a section on which the Ohio candidate relied. A majority of the Indiana delegation deserted to his banner. New York, with an air of gratified surprise, withdrew Church and voted solidly for Hendricks. Pendleton reached his highest vote of 156-1/2 on the eighth ballot and thenceforward steadily declined. Meanwhile Hancock had been gaining as well as Hendricks. South Carolina, Virginia, and several other States changed to his support. Then Illinois broke from Pendleton and cast half her vote for Hendricks. On the twelfth ballot the announcement of 1/2 a vote from California for Chief Justice Chase was received with a great and prolonged outburst of cheering. It was suspected that a single delegate from the Pacific coast had cast the vote at the instigation of the New-York managers, in order to test the sense of the galleries as well as of the Convention. The day closed with the eighteenth ballot, on which Hancock had 144-1/2, Hendricks 87, and Pendleton 56-1/2. With such an apparent lead after so many ballots, the nomination of General Hancock on the ensuing day would, under ordinary circumstances, have been reckoned as a probable result. But it was not expected. It was indeed against the logic of the situation that a Democratic Convention could at that time select a distinguished Union general, of conservative record and cautious mind, for a Presidential candidate. General Hancock's name was in fact used only while the actual contestants of the Convention were fencing for advantageous position in the final contest.

The outlook for Mr. Hendricks was considered flattering by his immediate supporters, but to the skilled political observer it was evident that the figures of the eighteenth ballot gave no assurance to the friends of any candidate. After the adjournment of the Convention, and throughout the night that followed, calculation and speculation took every shape. The delegations from New York and Ohio absorbed the interest of the politicians and the public. The two delegations were playing at cross-purposes—each trying to defeat the designs of the other, and each finding its most available candidate in the State of the other. The tactics of New York had undoubtedly defeated Pendleton, and the same men were now planning to nominate Chief Justice Chase. The leading and confidential friends of Mr. Pendleton were resolved that the New York plot should not succeed, and that Mr. Chase should not, in any event, be the candidate. In a frame of mind which was half panic, half reason, they concluded that it would be impossible to defeat the Chief Justice if his name should be placed before the Convention by the united delegation of New York speaking through the glowing phrases of Mr. Seymour, who, as it was rumored, would next morning leave the chair for that purpose. It was concluded, therefore, in the consultations of Mr. Pendleton's friends, that the movement should be anticipated by proposing the name of Mr. Seymour himself. The consultations in which these conclusions were reached were made up in large part of the aggressive type of Western Democrats, who had been trained to political fighting under the lead of Stephen A. Douglas. Among the most active and combative was Washington McLean of the Cincinnati Enquirer. It was this class of Democrats that finally rendered the nomination of the Chief Justice impossible.

On the following morning (of the last day of the Convention, as it proved), the Ohio delegation took the first and most important step, in formally withdrawing the name of Mr. Pendleton. The voting was then resumed, and the nineteenth and twentieth ballots showed a slight loss for Hancock, and a corresponding gain for Hendricks. On the twenty-first ballot Hancock had 135-1/2, and Hendricks 132; with 48-1/2 divided among minor candidates. At this point the Ohio delegation, having been absent in conference, entered the hall, and amid a hush of expectation and interest proposed the name of Horatio Seymour. Mr. Seymour had been frequently mentioned, and would have been formidable from the first if he had permitted the use of his name, but he had invariably met the proposition with the answer that he could under no circumstances become a candidate. He now repeated this statement from the chair, but Ohio insisted and New York assented. With a whirl of excitement all the States followed, and the nomination was made on the twenty-second ballot by a unanimous vote. Mr. Seymour had, no doubt, been sincere in declining to be a candidate; but the prolonged balloting had produced a great anxiety among the delegates, and the pressure had at last come in a form which he could not resist.

The ticket was completed without delay. Just prior to the Convention General Frank Blair had written a remarkable letter to Colonel Brodhead, one of the Missouri delegates. General Blair's name had been mentioned as a Presidential candidate, and in this letter he defined his position. He insisted, as the supreme issue, that the Reconstruction Acts and their fruits must be overthrown. How they should be overthrown he thus indicated: "There is but one way to restore the Government and the Constitution, and that is for the President to declare these Acts null and void, compel the army to undo its usurpations at the South, dispossess the carpet-bag State governments, allow the white people to re-organize their own governments and elect senators and representatives." General Blair contended that this was "the real and only question," and that until this work was accomplished "it is idle to talk of bonds, greenbacks, the public faith, and the public credit." This letter, as will be noted, harmonized in thought and language with the plank which Wade Hampton had inserted in the platform, and its audacious tone commended its author to those who had been potential in committing the Convention to this extreme position. General Preston of Kentucky, who had won his stars in the Confederate army, presented General Blair for Vice-President. General Wade Hampton, distinguished in the same cause, seconded it, and the nomination was made of acclamation.

The Democratic party thus determined, through its platform and partially through its candidates, to fight its battle on the two issues of paying the debt in depreciated paper currency and overthrowing Reconstruction. Other questions practically dropped out. The whole discussion of the canvass turned on these two controlling propositions. No violence of design which the Republicans imputed to their adversaries exceeded their open avowals. The greater positiveness of General Blair, the keener popular interest in the Southern question and the broader realization of its possible dangers, made the issue on Reconstruction overshadow the other. The utterances of Southern leaders confirmed its superior importance in the public estimate. The jubilant expressions of Wade Hampton at Charleston have already been given. In a speech at Atlanta, Robert Toombs declared that "all these Reconstruction Acts, as they are called, these schemes of dissolution, of violence and of tyranny, shall no longer curse the statute-book nor oppress the free people of the country; these so-called governments and legislatures which have been established in our midst shall at once be made to vacate. The convention at New York appointed Frank Blair specially to oust them." Howell Cobb and Benjamin H. Hill also made incendiary speeches during the canvass, proclaiming their confidence in the practical victory of those who had waged the Rebellion; and Governor Vance of North Carolina boasted that all they had lost when defeated by Grant they would regain when they triumphed with Seymour.

It is not probable that the Democrats could, by any policy, have achieved success in this contest. The prestige of Grant's great fame and the momentum given to the Republican party by his achievements during and immediately after the war, would have defeated any opposition, however skillful. But had Governor Seymour himself framed the platform on which he was to stand, and had he been free from the burden and the embarrassment of Blair's imprudent and alarming utterances, his greater sagacity and adroitness would have insured a more formidable battle. As it was, the rash action of the Democratic Convention made it reasonably clear from the beginning that the ticket was doomed to defeat. The progress of the canvass strengthened this impression; the Democracy was placed everywhere on the defensive; its own declarations shotted every gun that was aimed against it; and its orators and organs could neither make effective reply nor divert public attention from its fatal commitment.