The Secretary of the Treasury still adhered to the policy of contraction, and yet was charged with putting into circulation legal-tender notes that had been once withdrawn, in order to affect the market. Thus in August, 1866, between the 8th and the 23d inclusive, he had withdrawn and destroyed $12,530,111, and of the 31st of that month he issued $12,500,000. He had again in October, 1866, cancelled $500,000 on the 24th, and issued anew the same sum on the 25th. On the 31st of January, 1867, he had issued anew $4,000,000, May 31 $2,500,000, and during December, 1867, $1,842,400. In answer to remonstrance against this practice the Secretary maintained that the authority to contract and to cancel the legal-tender notes did not require him to do it, but left it within his discretion. This was unquestionably the law of the case.

Mr. McCulloch in his official report insisted on the funding or payment of the balance of interest-bearing notes, and upon a continued contraction of the currency, as the first measure for promoting the National prosperity; and he presented a strong argument in favor of permanent specie payment. He reported that he had not always retired notes in each month to the extent permitted, but he declared that the effect of the policy as carried out had been salutary and that its continuation would be obviously wise. Yet he feared that financial views were inculcated, which if not corrected might lead to its abandonment. The truth was that the Secretary's policy was counter to the popular wish, and evidence was accumulating that Congress would not sustain him in its continued enforcement. The Secretary had confidently relied upon the bankers and commercial men of the country; but the serious fact was now developed, that many of the most prudent financiers had concluded that the changes in the volume of the currency were causing mischief, and that the process of contraction had been carried as far as was desirable.

The Secretary argued bravely and wisely in his report, in favor of paying the principal and interest of the Government bonds in coin. His argument was designed to meet heresies which had found favor in unexpected quarters. The plea was urged by the new and short-lived school of finance that the notes of the National banks should be withdrawn and greenbacks substituted for them, that all payments by the Government on the principal of the bonds should be in its own paper. It was admitted by these novel theorists that the bonds on their face promised coin for interest; but they maintained that the bonds had been issued in large part when gold was at a heavy premium for paper, and could rightfully be liquidated in paper at its advanced value. Propositions were frequently presented to stop the issue of bonds and to pay out notes for any obligations of the Government offered at the Treasury on becoming due in any form. The pressure of rapid contraction secured a hearing for every extravagant proposition. Prejudice against speculators in gold, who during the war had grown rich on the disasters of the Union, was added to the discussion, especially while the premium was maintained and the National credit charged with odium on its account.

At the opening of the second session of the Fortieth Congress (December, 1867) numerous resolutions and bills demanding the stoppage of contraction were referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. Five days afterwards Mr. Schenck reported a bill of four lines, by which the "further reduction of the currency by retiring and cancelling United-States notes is prohibited." It had the unanimous approval of the Committee on Ways and Means, and was passed by the House,—ayes 127, noes 32. The minority included a goodly number of leading Republicans. In the Senate Mr. Sherman, in supporting the bill, stated the amount of contraction since August 1, 1866, at $140,122,168. He argued from these figures that "contraction should go no farther while industry is in a measure paralyzed, and that Congress ought to resume control of the currency, which should not be delegated to any single officer." He declared that the measure was entirely preliminary to other legislation, "which must include the banking system, the time and manner of resuming specie payments, the payment of the debt and the kind of money in which it may be paid, and the reduction of expenditures and taxes." Debate was somewhat prolonged, and a conference committee gave final form to the measure, which failed to receive the President's signature, but became a law without it. It is known as the "Act of February 4, 1868, prohibiting any further reduction of the currency, and authorizing the replacing of mutilated notes." By this Act the minimum limit of legal-tender notes was fixed at $356,000,00,—the volume then afloat after Mr. McCulloch's policy of contraction had done its work.

The actual legislation of the second session of the Fortieth Congress included also the repeal of the tax on raw cotton, and the further reduction of internal revenue, by the Acts of March 31 and July 20 (1868). Great relief was given to manufactures by the abolition of the five per cent tax on a variety of products. The surrender of revenue was estimated at $23,000,000 on cotton at $45,000,000 on manufactures. These concessions were much needed, for the producers of cotton were crippled by the condition of their States, and manufacturers found that prices did not justify the payment of these war charges.

In his annual message to Congress in December, 1868, President Johnson argued "that the holders of our securities have already received upon their bonds a larger amount than their original investments, measured by the gold standard. Upon this statement of fact it would seem but just and equitable that the six per cent interest now paid by the Government should be applied to the reduction of the principal, in semi-annual installments, which in sixteen years and eight months would liquidate the entire National debt." This bold and shameless advocacy of repudiation was less mischievous than it would have been if Mr. Johnson had held a longer lease of power, and if the people had not in the Presidential election pronounced so clear and positive a verdict in favor of the maintenance of the National credit. The Senate deemed it worth while to put on record a resolution condemning this part of Mr. Johnson's message. Mr. Hendricks of Indiana moved a substitute indorsing the statement in the message, and closing with the words of the Democratic National Convention in favor of paying the bonds in lawful money. Only seven senators supported his substitute, while forty-five opposed it; and President Johnson's proposal for repudiation was, by the action of the Senate, "utterly disapproved and condemned," —ayes 43, noes 6. In the House of Representatives a similar resolution was passed by a vote of 155 ayes to 6 noes, 60 not voting. No Democratic member in that body seemed willing to assume the objectionable position taken by Mr. Hendricks in the Senate, and a declaration "that all forms of repudiation are odious to the American people" was adopted without a division.

The financial achievement of the National Government herein reviewed, for the four years following the war, may be briefly summarized. The National debt was reduced by the sum of nearly $300,000,000, while at the same time the Government reduced its revenue to the amount of $140,000,000 per annum by the repeal of a long series of internal taxes. During this period more than $35,000,000 had been paid from the Treasury towards the construction of the Union and Central Pacific Railroads, and $7,200,000 was paid to the Russian Government on account of the purchase of the Territory of Alaska. It is also to be noted that within this period were embraced all the expenses incident to the disbandment of the Union army, and also a very large addition to the pension-list. Notwithstanding all these enormous expenditures the business interests of the country continued prosperous, and the fact that so large a reduction had been made in internal taxes gave promise that within a comparatively short period the Government would be able to remove all levies that were in any degree oppressive or even vexatious to private interests.

By reason of his official and personal connection with the President, Mr. McCulloch had failed to secure cordial support from Congress, and had moreover given offense by his obvious sympathy with the free-traders, who were already beginning to assault the protective tariff which the necessities of war had led the country to adopt. The Secretary had also gone far beyond the popular wish and the best business judgment of the country in regard to the rapid contraction of the currency. But while his politics and his policies were not acceptable to Congress or to the people, he is entitled to high credit for his direct, honest, intelligent administration of the Treasury Department. In the peculiar embarrassments to the administration of the Government, caused by the course of President Johnson, it was a matter of sincere congratulation that a Secretary of the Treasury, so competent and trustworthy as Mr. McCulloch had approved himself, was firmly in place before the serious political disturbances began—a congratulation in which his most ardent Republican opponents were ready to join, knowing how fatal it might prove if President Johnson had the opportunity to nominate his successor.

Throughout the more difficult period of his administration of the department, Mr. McCulloch was aided by two most intelligent and efficient officers. Mr. William E. Chandler, though only twenty-nine years of age, was appointed First Assistant Secretary in March, 1865, and exhibited great aptitude, discrimination, and ability in his position. He developed an admirable talent for details, a quick insight into the most difficult problems that came before the Department, and at all times an honorable devotion to public duty. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, the most important of the Treasury Department, was under the direction of another citizen of New Hampshire, Edward Ashton Rollins. The Bureau for a time collected more than half the revenue of the United States, and required in its Commissioner integrity, administrative talent, and singular skill in providing against every form of fraud. No department of the Government had to contend against so many corrupt combinations to rob the Government, and the slightest relaxation of vigilance on the part of the Commissioner might involve at any time a loss of millions to the National Treasury. In the complex and difficult duties of this station, Mr. Rollins proved himself equal to every requirement.

The purchase of Alaska was completed by the Act of July 27, 1868, which appropriated the amount agreed upon in the treaty of March 30, 1867,— negotiated by Mr. Seward on behalf of the United States, and by Baron Stoeckl representing the Emperor of all the Russias. The Russian Government had initiated the matter, and desired to sell much more earnestly than the United States desired to buy. There is little doubt that a like offer from any other European government would have been rejected. The pressure of our financial troubles, the fact that gold was still at a high premium, suggested the absolute necessity of economy in every form in which it could be exercised; and in the general judgment of the people the last thing we needed was additional territory. There was, however, a feeling of marked kindliness towards Russia; and this, no doubt, had great weight with Mr. Seward when he assented to the obvious wishes of that government. But while there was no special difficulty in securing the ratification of the treaty by the Senate, a more serious question arose when the House was asked to appropriate the necessary amount to fulfill the obligation. Seven million two hundred thousand dollars in gold represented at that time more than ten million dollars in the currency of the Government; and many Republicans felt, on the eve, or rather in the midst, of a Presidential canvass, that it was a hazardous political step (deeply in debt as the Government was, and with its paper still at a heavy discount) to embark in the speculation of acquiring a vast area of "rocks and ice," as Alaska was termed in the popular and derisive description of Mr. Seward's purchase.

When the bill came before the House, General Banks, as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, urged the appropriation with great earnestness, not merely because of the obligation imposed upon the Government by the treaty, which he ably presented; not merely by reason of the intrinsic value of the territory, which he abundantly demonstrated; but especially on account of the fact that Russia was the other party to the treaty, and had for nearly a century shown a most cordial disposition towards the United States. General Banks maintained that at every step of our history, from 1786 to the moment when he was speaking, Russia had been our friend. "In the darkest hour of our peril," said he, "during the Rebellion, when we were enacting a history which no man yet thoroughly comprehends, when France and England were contemplating the recognition of the Confederacy, the whole world was thrilled by the appearance in San Francisco of a fleet of Russian war vessels, and nearly at the same time, whether by accident or design, a second Russian fleet appeared in the harbor of New York. Who knew how many more there were on their voyage here? From that hour France, on the one hand, and England on the other, receded, and the American Government regained its position and its power. . . . Now, shall we flout the Russian Government in every court in Europe for her friendship? Whoever of the representatives of the American people in this House, on this question, turns his back, not only upon his duty, but upon the friends of his country, upon the Constitution of his Government, and the honor of his generation, cannot long remain in power."

Mr. Cadwalader C. Washburn answered the speech of General Banks on the succeeding day (July 1, 1868). He assumed the leadership of the opposition to the treaty. He proposed to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the House five distinct propositions: "First, that at the time the treaty for Alaska was negotiated, not a soul in the whole United States asked for it; second, that it was secretly negotiated, and in a manner to prevent the representatives of the people from being heard; third, that by existing treaties we possess every right that is of any value to us, without the responsibility and never-ending expense of governing a nation of savages; fourth, that the country ceded is absolutely without value; fifth, that it is the right and duty of the House to inquire into the treaty, and to vote or not vote the money, according to its best judgment." Mr. Washburn made an able speech in support of his radical propositions.

General Butler sustained Mr. Washburn's position in a characteristic speech, especially answering General Banks's argument that we should pay this amount from a spirit of friendship for Russia. "If," said General Butler, "we are to pay this price as usury on the friendship of Russia, we are paying for it very dear indeed. If we are to pay for her friendship, I desire to give her the seven million two hundred thousand dollars in cash, and let her keep Alaska, because I think it may be a small sum to give for the friendship if we could only get rid of the land, or rather the ice, which we are to get by paying for it." He maintained that it was in evidence before the House officially, "that for ten years the entire product of the whole country of Alaska did not exceed three million dollars."

—Mr. Peters of Maine pronounced the territory "intrinsically valueless; the conclusive proof of which is found in the fact that Russia is willing to sell it." He criticised the action of the Senate in negotiating the treaty. "If the treaty-making power can buy, they can sell. If they can buy land with money, they can buy money with land. If they can buy a part of a country, they can buy the whole of a country. If they can sell a part of our country, they can sell the whole of it!"

—Mr. Spalding of Ohio, on the other hand, maintained that "notwithstanding all the sneers that have been cast on Alaska, if it could be sold again, individuals would take it off our hand and pay us two or three millions for the bargain."

—General Schenck thought the purchase in itself highly objectionable, but was "willing to vote the money because the treaty has been made with a friendly power; one of those that stood by us,—almost the only one that stood by us when all the rest of the powers of the world seemed to be turning away from us in our recent troubles."

—Mr. Stevens supported the measure on the ground that it was a valuable acquisition to the wealth and power of the country. He argued also in favor of the right of the Senate to make the treaty.

—Mr. Leonard Myers was sure that if we did not acquire Alaska it would be transferred to Great Britain. "The nation," said he, "which struggled so hard for Vancouver and her present Pacific boundary, and which still insists on having the little island of San Juan, will never let such an opportunity slip. Canada, as matters now stand, would become ours some day could her people learn to be Americans; but never, if England secures Alaska."

—Mr. Higby of California answered the objections relating to climate. "I do not know," said he, "whether the people of the East yet believe what has been so often declared, that our winters on the Pacific are nearly as mild as our summers, and yet such is the fact. In my own little village, situated over fourteen hundred feet above the level of the ocean, I have seen a plant growing in the earth green through all the months from October to April."

—Mr. Shellabarger opposed the purchase. He said those nation which had been compact and solid had been the most enduring, while those which had the most extended territory lasted the least space of time.

—Mr. Price of Iowa thought that it was "far better to expend the $7,200,000 in improving the Mississippi River, in order that bread-stuffs may be transported cheaply from the West to the seaboard." He had no faith in the value of the territory proposed to be purchased.

—Mr. McCarthy of New York rejected the plea that we should purchase Alaska because Russia is a friendly power. "I ask this House," said he, "whence this friendship comes. It comes from self-interest. She is the absorbing power of the Eastern continent, and she recognizes us as the absorbing power of the western continent; and through friendship for us she desires to override and overbalance the governments of Europe which are between her and us."

—General Butler moved a proviso, that "the payment of $500,000 of said appropriation be withheld until the Imperial Government of Russia shall signify its willingness to refer to an impartial tribunal all such claims by American citizens against the Imperial Government as have been investigated by the State Department of the United States and declared to be just, and the amounts so awarded to be paid from said $500,000 so withheld."

—General Garfield, presiding at the time over the Committee of the Whole, ruled it out of order, and on an appeal being taken the decision was sustained by ayes 93, noes 27. After dilatory motions and the offer of various amendments, which were rejected, the bill was passed by ayes 113, noes 43.

—The House prefaced the bill by a preamble, asserting in effect that "the subjects embraced in the treaty are among those which by the Constitution are submitted to the power of Congress, and over which Congress has jurisdiction; and for these reasons, it is necessary that the consent of Congress should be given to the said stipulations before the same can have full force and effect." There was no mention of the Senate's ratification, merely a reference to the fact that "the President has entered into a treaty with the Emperor of Russia, and has agreed to pay him the sum of seven million two hundred thousand dollars in coin." The House by this preamble evidently claimed that its consent to the treaty was just as essential as the consent of the Senate,—that it was, in short, a subject for the consideration of Congress.

The Senate was unwilling to admit such a pretension, especially when put forth by the House in this bald form, and therefore rejected it unanimously. The matter was sent to a conference, and by changing the preamble a compromise was promptly effected, which preserved the rank and dignity of both branches. It declared that "whereas the President had entered into a treaty with the Emperor of Russia, and the Senate thereafter gave its advice and consent to said treaty, . . . and whereas said stipulations cannot be carried into full force and effect, except by legislation to which the consent of both Houses of Congress is necessary; therefore be it enacted that there be appropriated the sum of $7,200,000" for the purpose named. With this compromise the bill was readily passed, and became a law by the President's approval July 27, 1868.

The preamble finally agreed upon, though falling far short of the one first adopted by the House, was yet regarded as a victory for that branch. The issue between the Senate and the House, now adjusted by a compromise, is an old one, agitated at different periods ever since the controversy over the Jay treaty in 1794-95. It is simply whether the House is bound to vote for an appropriation to carry out a treaty Constitutionally made by the President and the Senate, without judging for itself whether, on the merits of the treaty, the appropriation should be made. After the appropriation required under the Jay treaty had been voted by the House, that body declared in a resolution which was adopted by ayes 57, noes 35, "that it is the Constitutional right and duty of the House of Representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon as in their judgment may be most conducive to the public good." But that was the declaration of the House only; whereas the preamble agreed to in the appropriation of money for the purchase of Alaska contained the assent of both branches.

Though the Constitutional principle involved may not be considered as one settled beyond a fair difference of opinion, there has undoubtedly been a great advance, since the controversy between the two branches in 1794, in favor of the rights of the House when an appropriation of money is asked to carry out a treaty. The change has been so great indeed that the House would not now in any case consider itself under a Constitutional obligation to appropriate money in support of a treaty, the provisions of which it did not approve. It is therefore practically true that all such treaties must pass under the judgment of the House as well as under that of the Senate and the President. Judge McLean of the Supreme Court delivered an opinion which is often referred to as embodying the doctrine upon which the House rests its claim of power.* "A treaty," said the learned Justice, "is the supreme law of the land only when the treaty-making power can carry it into effect. A treaty which stipulates for the payment of money undertakes to do that which the treaty-making power cannot do; therefore the treaty is not the supreme law of the land. To give it effect the action of Congress is necessary, and in this action the representatives and senators act on their own judgment and responsibility and not on the judgment and responsibility of the treaty-making power. A foreign government may be presumed to know that the power of appropriating money belongs to Congress. No act of any part of the Government can be held to be a law which has not all the sanctions to make it law."(2)

The territory which we thus acquired is of vast extent, exceeding in its entire area a half million square miles. Its extreme length is about eleven hundred miles; its extreme width about eight hundred. It stretches nearly to the seventy-second degree of north latitude, three hundred and fifty miles beyond Behring's Straits; and borders upon the Arctic Ocean for more than a thousand miles. The adjacent islands of the Aleutian group are included in the transfer, and reach two-thirds of the way across the North Pacific in the latitude of 60 degrees,—the westernmost island being within six hundred miles of the coast of Kamtchatka. The resources of the forests of Alaska are very great,—the trees growing to a good height on the mountain sides as far as two thousand feet above the tide level. The timber is of the character generally found in Northern climates: yellow cedar of durable quality, spruce, larch, fir of great size, and hemlock. In the world's rapid and wasteful consumption of wood, the forests of Alaska will prove not merely a substantial resource for the interests of the future, but a treasure-house in point of pecuniary value. To this source of wealth on land that of the water must be added, in the seal and food fish which are found in immeasurable quantities along the coast of the mainland and the islands.

From the time of the acquisition of Louisiana until the purchase of Alaska, the additions of territory to the United States had all been in the interest of slavery. Louisiana, stretching across the entire country from South to North, was of equal value to each section; but the acquisition of Florida, the annexation of Texas, the territory acquired from Mexico by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, with the addition of Arizona under the Gadsden treaty, were all made under the lead of Southern statesmen to strengthen the political power and the material resources of the South. Meanwhile, by the inexcusable errors of the Democratic party, and especially of Democratic diplomacy, we lost that vast tract on the north known as British Columbia, the possession of which, after the acquisition of Alaska, would have given to the United States the continuous frontage on the Pacific Ocean from the south line of California to Behring's Straits. Looking northward for territory, instead of southward, was a radical change of policy in the conduct of the Government,—a policy which, happily and appropriately, it was the good fortune of Mr. Seward to initiate under impressive and significant circumstances.

[(1) Turner vs. The American Baptist Missionary Union, 5 McLean, 544.]

[(2) Mr. Jefferson, more promptly than other great statesmen of his generation, appreciated the degree of power residing in the House of Representatives. In a private letter discussing the subject he expressed views in harmony with Justice McLean's opinion, long before that opinion was delivered. He wrote to Mr. Monroe: "We conceive the Constitutional doctrine to be, that though the President and Senate have the general power of making treaties, yet whenever they include in a treaty matters confided by the Constitution to the three branches of the Legislature, an act of legislation will be necessary to confirm these articles, and that the House of Representatives, as one branch of the Legislature, are perfectly free to pass the act or to refuse it, governing themselves by their own judgment whether it is for the good of their constituents to let the treaty go into effect or not. On this depends whether the powers of legislation shall be transferred from the President, Senate, and House of Representatives, to the President, Senate, and Piamingo, or any other Indian, Algerine, or other chief."]

CHAPTER XIV.

As the result of the great victory over the President in the political contest of 1866, and of his stubborn maintenance of a hostile attitude, the ardent and extreme men of the Republican party began, in the autumn of that year, to discuss the propriety of ending the whole struggle by impeaching Mr. Johnson and removing him from office. They believed that his contumacious and obstinate course constituted a high crime and misdemeanor, and the idea of Impeachment, as soon as suggested, took deep root in minds of a certain type. When Congress came together in December the agitation increased; and on the 7th of January (1867), directly after the holidays, two Missouri representatives (Loan and Kelso) attempted in turn to introduce resolutions in the House proposing an Impeachment, but each was prevented by some parliamentary obstruction. At a later hour of the same day Mr. James M. Ashley of Ohio rose to a question of privilege and formally impeached the President of high crimes and misdemeanors. "I charge him," said Mr. Ashley, "with an usurpation of power and violation of the law: in that he has corruptly used the appointing power; in that he has corruptly used the pardoning power; in that he had corruptly used the veto power; in that he has corruptly interfered in elections and committed acts which in contemplation of the Constitution are high crimes and misdemeanors."

Mr. Ashley's charges were very grave, but they created slight impression upon the House and did not alarm the country. Every one present felt that they were gross exaggerations and distortions of fact, and could not be sustained by legal evidence or indeed by reputable testimony of any kind. They were however referred in due form to the Judiciary Committee, with full power to send for persons and papers, to administer the customary oath to witnesses, and to make in all respects a thorough investigation. Nothing was heard from the committee until the 2d of March, when on the eve of the expiration of Congress they reported that many documents had been collected, a large number of witnesses examined, and every practicable thing done to reach a conclusion of the case; but that not having fully examined all the charges preferred against the President, they did not deem it expedient to submit any conclusion beyond the statement that sufficient testimony had been brought to the committee's notice to justify and demand a further prosecution of the investigation. They therefore passed the testimony they had taken into the custody of the Clerk of the House, as a notification to the succeeding Congress that inquiry into the matter should be pursued. The report was made by Mr. James F. Wilson of Iowa, chairman of the committee, and concurred in by all the Republican members. Mr. Rogers, a Democratic member from New Jersey, made a minority report, stating that he had carefully examined all the testimony in the case; that there was not one particle of evidence to sustain any of the charges which had been made; that the case was entirely void of proof; and that most of the testimony taken was of a secondary character, such as could not be admitted in any court of justice. He objected to continuing the subject and thereby keeping the country in a feverish state. No action was taken by the House except to lay both reports upon the table.

There was on the part of conservative Republicans a sincere hope that nothing more would be heard of the Impeachment question. If a committee industriously at work for sixty days could find nothing on which to found charges against the President, they thought that wisdom suggested the abandonment of the investigation. But Mr. Ashley, with his well-known persistency, was determined to pursue it; and on the 7th of March, the third day after the new Congress was organized, he introduced a resolution directing the Judicial Committee to continue the investigation under the same instructions as in the preceding Congress, with the additional power to sit during the recess. Mr. Ashley expressed the hope that "this Congress will not hesitate to do its duty because the timid in our own ranks hesitate, but will proceed to the discharge of the high and important trust imposed upon it, uninfluenced by passion and unawed by fear." He was answered with indignation by Mr. Brooks and Mr. Fernando Wood of New York, and the question becoming a party issue Mr. Ashley's resolution was carried without a division after an ineffectual attempt to lay it on the table,—a motion which was sustained by only thirty-two votes. The committee proceeded in their work during the recess of Congress, and reported the testimony on the 25th of the ensuing November (1867).

Some ninety-five witnesses had been examined, and the report of testimony covered twelve hundred octavo pages. Much of the evidence seemed irrelevant, and that which bore directly upon the question of the President's offense fell far below the serious character assigned to it by previous rumors. This was especially true in regard to the testimony given by General Grant. There were secret and ominous intimations that General Grant had been approached by the President with the view of ascertaining whether, if it should be determined to constitute a Congress of Democratic members from the North and rebel members from the South (leaving the Republicans to come in or stay out as they might choose), the Army could be relied upon to sustain such a movement. There is no doubt that many earnest Republicans were so impressed by the perverse course of President Johnson that they came to believe him capable of any atrocious act. They gave credulous ear, therefore, to these extravagant rumors; and in the end they succeeded in making a deep impression upon the minds of certain members of the Committee charged with the investigation into the President's official conduct.

The persons who were giving currency to these rumors never seemed to realize that General Grant, with his loyalty, his patriotism, and his high sense of personal and official honor, could not for a moment have even so much as listened to a proposition which involved an attack upon the legitimacy of the Congress of the United States, and practically contemplated its overthrow through means not different from those by which Cromwell closed the sessions of the Long Parliament. Nothing can be more certain than the fact that if President Johnson had ever made such an intimation to General Grant, it would have been at once exposed and denounced with a soldier's directness; and the President would have been promptly impeached for an offense in which his guilt would not have been doubtful.

It was not surprising, therefore, that by General Grant's testimony,(1) the entire charge was dissipated into thin air, and proved to be only one of the thousand baseless rumors which in that exciting period were constantly filling the political atmosphere. It was perhaps the intention of the Committee in examining General Grant on this point, to give him an opportunity in an official report to stamp the current rumors as utterly false. It can hardly be possible that a single member of the Committee believed that General Grant had silently received from the President a deliberate proposition to revolutionize the Government. When the essential truth of the matter was reached, it was found that General Grant had never heard any thing from the President, on the question of organizing Congress, at all different from the premises he had assumed in the series of disreputable speeches delivered by him in his extraordinary tour through the country the preceding year.

There was a marked divergence of views in the recommendations from the Judiciary Committee. The majority, Messrs. George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts, Francis Thomas of Maryland, Thomas Williams of Pennsylvania, William Lawrence of Ohio, and John C. Churchill of New York, reported a resolution directing that "Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors." Mr. Wilson of Iowa and Mr. Frederic Woodbridge of Vermont, submitted a minority report, with a resolution directing that "the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from further consideration of the proposed impeachment of the President of the United States, and that the subject be laid upon the table." The two Democratic members of the committee, Mr. Marshall of Illinois and Mr. Eldridge of Wisconsin, while agreeing with the resolution submitted by Mr. Wilson, desired to express certain views from the Democratic stand-point. They therefore submitted a separate report, reviewing the entire proceeding in language more caustic than Mr. Wilson and Mr. Woodbridge had seen fit to employ.

The effect of Mr. Boutwell's report was seriously impaired by the fact that the chairman of the committee and another Republican member had refused to concur, and it was at once evident from the position in which this division left the question, that the House would not sustain an Impeachment upon the testimony submitted. By an arrangement to which only a few members objected, the discussion of the reports was confined to two speeches, one by Mr. Boutwell and one by Mr. Wilson. Mr. Boutwell's was delivered on the 5th and 6th of December, and Mr. Wilson's reply immediately after Mr. Boutwell had concluded on the second day. Both speeches were able and positive, holding the attention of members in a marked and exceptional degree. A large majority of the House desired the vote to be taken as soon as Mr. Wilson had concluded; but some dilatory motions kept off the decision until the succeeding day (December 7, 1867), when amid much excitement, and some display of angry feeling between members, the resolution calling for the impeachment of the President was defeated by an overwhelming majority,—ayes 57, noes 108.(2) The affirmative vote was composed entirely of Republicans, but a larger number of Republicans were included in the negative; so that apart from any action of the Democratic party the advocates of Impeachment were in the minority.

By this decisive vote the project of impeaching the President was in the public belief finally defeated. But those best acquainted with the earnestness of purpose and the determination of the leading men, who had persuaded themselves that the safety of the Republic depended upon the destruction of Johnson's official power, knew that the closest watch would be kept upon every action of the President, and if an apparently justifying cause could be found the project of his removal would be vigorously renewed. It is difficult to understand the intensity of conviction which had taken possession of certain minds on this subject—difficult to understand why the same causes and the same reasons which operated so powerfully on certain Republicans in favor of Impeachment, should prove so utterly inadequate to affect others. Why should Mr. Boutwell be so decidedly on one side and Mr. Dawes with equal firmness on the other? Why should General Schenck and William Lawrence vote for impeachment and General Garfield and John A. Bingham against it? Why should Thaddeus Stevens and Judge Kelley vote in the affirmative and the four Washburns in the negative?

Geographically there was a traceable division in the vote. In New England, usually so radical, only five members favored Impeachment. New York gave but two votes for it and Pennsylvania gave but six. The large majority of those who exhibited such an earnest desire to force the issue to extremes came from the West, but even in that section the Republicans who opposed it were nearly equal in number to those who favored it. The vote led to no little recrimination inside the ranks of the party—each side regarding the other as pursuing an unwise and unjustifiable course. The advocates of Impeachment were denounced as rash, hot-headed, sensational, bent on leading the party into an indefensible position; while its opponents were spoken of as faint-hearted, as truckling to the Administration, as afraid to strike the one blow imperatively demanded for the safety of the Republic. But outside of this quarrel of partisans the great mass of quiet citizens and more especially the manufacturing, commercial, and financial communities, were profoundly grateful that the country was not, as they now believed, to be disturbed by a violent effort to deprive the President of his great office.

The prophets of Peace were disappointed in their hopes and their predictions. A train of circumstances, not unnaturally growing out of the political situation, led in the ensuing month to the renewal of the scheme of Impeachment because of the President's attempt to appoint a new Secretary of War. The President himself narrates what he had done to secure the resignation of Mr. Stanton: "I had come to the conclusion that the time had arrived when it was proper for Mr. Stanton to retire from my Cabinet. The mutual confidence and general accord which should exist in such a relation had ceased. I supposed that Mr. Stanton was well advised that his continuance in the Cabinet was contrary to my wishes, for I had repeatedly given him to understand by every mode short of an express request that he should resign." On the fifth day of August (1867), the President addressed Mr. Stanton a brief note in these words: "Public considerations of a high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted." Mr. Stanton replied immediately, acknowledging the receipt of the letter and adding: "I have the honor to say that public considerations of a high character, which alone have induced me to continue at the head of this Department, constrain me not to resign the Secretaryship of War before the next meeting of Congress."

Not acting with angry haste, but reflecting for a week upon the situation resulting from Mr. Stanton's refusal to resign, the President on the 12th of August suspended him from the Secretaryship of War under the power conferred by the Tenure-of-office Act, and added in a note to him: "You will at once transfer to General Ulysses S. Grant, who has this day been authorized and empowered to act as Secretary of War ad interim, all records, books, papers and other public property now in your custody and charge." Mr. Stanton replied to the President: "Under a sense of public duty I am compelled to deny your right under the Constitution and laws of the United States, without the advice and consent of the Senate and without legal cause, to suspend me from the office of Secretary of War, or the exercise of any of the functions pertaining to the same; but inasmuch as the General commanding the armies of the United States has been appointed ad interim and has notified me that he has accepted the appointment, I have no alternative but to submit, under protest, to superior force." It is evident that General Grant and his legal advisers saw no force in Mr. Stanton's denial of the President's power to suspend him from office. The General's acceptance of the Secretaryship of War was plain proof that he recognized the President's course as entirely lawful and Constitutional. General Grant's willingness to succeed Mr. Stanton was displeasing to a certain class of Republicans, who thought he was thereby strengthening the position of the President; but the judgement of the more considerate was that as Mr. Johnson had determined in any event to remove Stanton, it was wise in General Grant to accept the trust and thus prevent it from falling into mischievous and designing hands.

By the provisions of the Tenure-of-office Law the President was under obligation to communicate the suspension to the Senate, with his reasons therefor, within twenty days after its next meeting. He did this in his message of the 12th of December (1867), in which he reviewed with much care the relations between himself and the Secretary of War. He certainly exhibited to an impartial judge, uninfluenced by personal or party motives, strong proof of the utter impossibility of Mr. Stanton and himself working together harmoniously in the administration of the Government. If the President of the United States has the right to Constitutional advisers who are personally agreeable to him and who share his personal confidence, then surely Mr. Johnson gave unanswerable proof that Mr. Stanton should not remain a member of his Cabinet. But the Senate was not influenced either by the general considerations affecting the case or by the special reasons submitted by the President. The question was not finally decided by the Senate until the 13th of January (1868), when by a party vote it was declared that "having considered the evidence and reasons given by the President in his report of December 12, 1867, for the suspension of Edwin M. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War, the Senate does not concur in such suspension." The Secretary of the Senate was instructed to send an official copy of the resolution to the President, to Mr. Stanton, and to General Grant.

Upon receipt of the resolution of the Senate, General Grant at once locked the door of the Secretary's office, handed the key to the Adjutant-General, left the War-Department building and resumed his post at Army Headquarters on the opposite side of the street. Secretary Stanton soon after took possession of his old office, as quietly and unceremoniously as if he had left it but an hour before. Perhaps with some desire to emphasize the change of situation, he dispatched a messenger to Headquarters to say in the phrase of the ranking position that "the Secretary desires to see General Grant." General Grant did not like the way in which Mr. Stanton had resumed control of the War Office. He did not think that he had been treated with the same courtesy which he had shown to Mr. Stanton when he succeeded him the preceding August. In fact, he had not expected, nor did he desire, the restoration of Mr. Stanton, and but for differences that arose between him and the President might have used his influence against Mr. Stanton's remaining. He had indeed warmly seconded a suggestion of General Sherman (who was then in Washington), made the day after Mr. Stanton's restoration, that the President should immediately nominate Governor Cox of Ohio for Secretary of War.

The President did not accept the suggestion respecting the name of Governor Cox. His chief purpose was to get rid of Mr. Stanton, and he did not believe the Senate would consent in any event to his removal. He expressed surprise that General Grant did not hold the office until the question of Mr. Stanton's Constitutional right to resume it could be judicially tested. A heated controversy ensued a fortnight later on this point, leading to the exchange of angry letters between the President and General Grant. Mr. Johnson alleged that the fair understanding was that General Grant should, by retaining his portfolio, aid in bringing the case before the Supreme Court of the United States. General Grant denied this with much warmth, declaring in a letter addressed to the President that the latter had made "many and gross misrepresentations concerning this subject." It was doubtless in the beginning a perfectly honest misapprehension between the two. General Grant had on a certain occasion remarked that "Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the courts to re-instate him," and the President, hastily perhaps, but not unnaturally, assumed that by this language General Grant meant that he would himself aid in bringing the matter to judicial arbitrament. But the President ought to have seen and realized that such a step would be altogether foreign to the duty of the Commander of the Army, and that with General Grant's habitual prudence he never could have intended to provoke a controversy with Congress, and get himself entangled in the meshes of the Tenure-of-office Law. The wrath of both men was fully aroused, and the controversy closed by leaving them enemies for life—unreconciled, irreconcilable.

The severance of friendly relations between the President and General Grant was not distasteful to the Republicans of the country. Indeed it had been earnestly desired by them. Many of those who were looking forward to General Grant's nomination as the Republican candidate for the Presidency in 1868, had been restless lest he might become too much identified with the President, and thus be held in some degree accountable for his policy. General Grant's report on the condition of the South in 1865 had displeased Republicans as much as it had pleased the President. He had created still further uneasiness in Republican ranks by accompanying the President in 1866 on his famous journey to Chicago, when he "swung around the circle." His acceptance of the War Office in 1867 as the successor to Mr. Stanton was naturally interpreted by many as a signal mark of confidence in the President. It was said by General Grant's nearest friends that in his position as the Commander of the Army he was bound in courtesy to comply with the President's requests; but others maintained that as these requests all lay outside his official duties, and were in fact political in their nature, he might decline to respond to them if he chose. It was in fact known to a few persons that General Grant had declined (though requested by the President) to accompany Minister Lewis D. Campbell to Mexico and hold an interview with the officials of the Juarez Government, in the autumn of 1866. The President, however, did not insist on General Grant's compliance with his request, and at the suggestion of the latter readily substituted Lieutenant-General Sherman, who went upon the mission, with results—according to his own narrative—more laughable than valuable. General Grant always believed that Mr. Seward had originated the suggestion, and had desired him to go upon the mission from some motives of his own not made fully apparent. The incident did not interfere with the kindly relations between the President and General Grant, as was shown by General Grant's acceptance of the War Office ten months after the Mexican Mission had come to its profitless conclusion.

From all the circumstances of the case, it is not difficult therefore to understand why the quarrel between the President and General Grant should be viewed with substantial satisfaction by the Republicans of the country. The National Convention of the party of 1868 had already been called, and it might be awkward for its members, while denouncing President Johnson in the platform, to be reminded that the candidate of their party was on terms of personal friendship with him, and had been so throughout his administration. Such a fact would embarrass the canvass in many ways, and would dull the edge of partisan weapons already forged for the contest. General Grant as a Presidential candidate was likely to draw heavily on the Democratic voters of the Northern States, and Republicans felt assured that his quarrel with Johnson would cause no loss even in that direction. In every point of view, therefore, the political situation was satisfactory to the Republicans—the last possible suggestion of discontent with General Grant's expected nomination for the Presidency having been banished from the ranks of the party.

By the Senate's refusal to concur in the suspension of Secretary Stanton, a confidential adviser under the Constitution was forced upon the President against his earnest and repeated protest. This action appears the more extraordinary, because when the Tenure-of-office Bill was pending before the Senate, the expression of opinion on the part of the majority was against any attempt to compel the President to retain an unwelcome adviser. In fact the Senate voted by a large majority to except Cabinet officers from the operation of the law. The expressions of opinion by individual senators were very pointed on this question.

—Mr. Edmunds said it was "right and just that the Chief Executive of the Nation in selecting these named Secretaries, who, by law and by the practice of the country, and officers analogous to whom, by the practice of all other countries, are the confidential advisers of the Executive respecting the administration of all his Departments, should be persons who are personally agreeable to him and in whom he can place entire confidence and reliance; and whenever it should seem to him that the state of relations between him and any of them had become so as to render this relation of confidence and trust and personal esteem inharmonious, he should in such case be allowed to dispense with the services of that officer in vacation and have some other person act in his stead."

—Mr. Williams of Oregon sustained the position of Mr. Edmunds, but added: "I do not regard the exception as of any great practical consequence, because I suppose if the President and any head of Department should disagree so as to make their relations unpleasant, and the President should signify a desire that that head of Department should retire from the Cabinet, that would follow without any positive act of removal on the part of the President. . . . It has seemed to me that if we revolutionize the practice of the Government in all other respects, we might let this power remain in the hands of the President of the United States; that we should not strip him of this power, which is one that it seems to me is necessary and reasonable that he should exercise."

—Mr. Fessenden said: "A man who is the head of a Department naturally wants the control of that Department. He wants to control all his subordinates. . . . In my judgment, in order to the good and proper administration of all the Departments, it is necessary that that power should exist in the head of it, and quite as necessary that the power should exist in the President with reference to the few men who are placed about him to share his counsel and to be his friends and agents."

—Mr. Sherman said: "If a Cabinet officer should attempt to hold his office for a moment beyond the time when he retains the entire confidence of the President, I would not vote to retain him, nor would I compel the President to have about him in these high positions a man whom he did not entirely trust both personally and politically. It would be unwise to require him to administer the Government without agents of his own choosing. . . . And if I supposed that either of these gentlemen was so wanting in manhood, in honor, as to hold his place after the politest intimation from the President of the United States that his services were no longer needed, I certainly, as a senator, would consent to his removal at any time, and so would we all."

Still more significant and conclusive was the action of both Senate and House on the final passage of the Tenure-of-office Act. That action was based upon the report of a conference committee, of which Mr. Sherman was chairman on the part of the Senate, and General Schenck on the part of the House. It will be remembered that the Senate had insisted that officers of the Cabinet should be excepted from the operation of the Tenure-of-office Act, and the House had insisted that they should not be excepted. A compromise was made by the conference committee, the result of which was thus explained to the Senate by Mr. Sherman: "In this case the committee of conference —I agreed to it, I confess, with some reluctance—came to the conclusion to qualify to some extent the power of removal over a Cabinet minister. We provide that a Cabinet minister shall hold his office, not for a fixed term, not until the Senate shall consent to his removal, but as long as the power that appoints him holds the office." General Schenck, representing the original House amendment, said: "A compromise was made, by which a further amendment is added to this portion of the bill, so that the term of office of the heads of Departments shall expire with the term of the President who appointed them, allowing these heads of Departments one month longer." These were the well-considered explanations made to their respective branches by the chairmen of the committees that composed the conference. It was upon this uncontradicted, unqualified, universally admitted construction of the Bill that the House and Senate enacted it into a law.

It must not be forgotten that if the Senate had consented to the removal of Mr. Stanton, as was confidently anticipated from the expressions of opinion above quoted, no new Secretary could have been installed without the Senate's explicit consent, and that meanwhile the War Department would remain under the control of General Grant, in whose prudent and upright discharge of duty every senator had perfect confidence. The complaint of the President's friends, therefore, was that senators, while perfectly able to exclude from the control of the War Department a man in whom they had no confidence, demanded that the President should retain at the head of that Department an officer in whom he had no confidence. Hence it was that for the first time in the history of the United States, an officer distasteful to the President and personally distrusted and disliked by him was forced upon him as one of his confidential advisers in the administration of the Government. In the prima facie statement of this case the Senate was in the wrong. Upon the record of its votes and the expression of opinion by its own members, the Senate was in the wrong. The history of every preceding Administration and of every subsequent Administration of the Federal Government proves that the Senate was in the wrong.

The situation in which the President was left by this action was anomalous and embarrassing. One of the most important Departments of the Government—especially important at that era—was left under the control of a man with whom he did not even hold personal relations. If this could be done in one Department it could with equal justice be done in all, and the extraordinary spectacle would be presented of each Executive Department under the control of an officer, who in matters of personal feeling and in public policy was deadly hostile to the President of the United States. Even those who insisted most warmly upon Mr. Stanton's being retained in his position, must have seen that such a course would contradict the theory of the National Constitution and be in direct contravention of the practice of the Federal Government. Every one could see that these circumstances had brought about an unnatural situation—a situation that must in some way be relieved. It presented a condition of affairs for which there was no precedent, and the wisest could not foresee to what end it might lead.

The issue was brought to a head by the President, who informed the senate on the 21st of February (1868), that in the exercise of the power and authority vested in him by the Constitution of the United States, he had that day removed Mr. Stanton from office and designated the Adjutant-General of the Army—Lorenzo Thomas—as Secretary of War ad interim. The communication was received with great astonishment by the Senate and with loud expressions of indignation against the President. With short debate and with little delay the Senate passed a resolution declaring "that under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the President has no power to remove the Secretary of War and to designate any other officer to perform the duties of that office ad interim." The Senate could do nothing more than express and record this opinion, but it did that promptly, resentfully, almost passionately.

The House took up the matter in hot temper and in hot haste. A flagrant offense against the Constitution and the laws had, in the judgment of a majority of its members, been committed by the President. In defiance of the letter and spirit of the Tenure-of-office Act he had removed the Secretary of War from office. He had done this under circumstances of peculiar aggravation, because the Senate had passed upon all his reason therefor when the question of Mr. Stanton's suspension was before that body; and if even the suspension was not justifiable, how very grave must be the offense of removing the Secretary from office! These views and the discussion to which they led engrossed the attention of the House as soon as it was known that the President had sent a message to the Senate communicating his action in regard to Mr. Stanton. The Senate had no sooner recorded its dissent from the Executive power of removal than Mr. Covode of Pennsylvania, on the same day, rose to a privileged question in the House and offered a resolution that "Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors." The resolution was referred to the Committee on Reconstruction and the House adjourned. On the next day (February 22d) Mr. Stevens, chairman of the Reconstruction Committee, reported the resolution back to the House with the recommendation that it pass, suggesting that the question might immediately be taken without debate.

—Mr. Brooks of New York had hoped for time to prepare a minority report, but contented himself with a long speech earnestly protesting against the Impeachment. "Suppose," said he, "you succeed. You settle that hereafter a party having a sufficient majority in the House and the Senate can depose the President of the United States. You establish a precedent which all future parties in all time to come will look to. The curse of other countries, the curse of France, the curse of the South-American Republics, has been that they followed such a precedent as you call upon us to establish here to-day—the overthrow of their Executive, not by law, not by the Constitution, but by the irregular and arbitrary and revolutionary exercise of power, in order merely to obtain a temporary possession of the Government."

—Mr. Spalding of Ohio followed Mr. Brooks, earnestly supporting the Impeachment. There seemed to be an inordinate desire among gentlemen who had hitherto been conservative on the question, as well as among those who had been constantly in favor of Impeachment, to place themselves on record against the President.

—Mr. John A. Bingham said that "the President having criminally violated the Constitution and the laws, I propose for one to put him on trial."

—Mr. Farnsworth of Illinois declared that "no student of our Constitution, no citizen, can doubt that Andrew Johnson has been guilty of a flagrant violation of our Constitution, which is justly impeachable."

—Judge Kelley of Pennsylvania warned "those who have spoken on the other side to-day, that they had better exercise the privilege of revising their words, and that it will be well for others to pause before they speak in defense of the great criminal whom the American people arraign for thousands of crimes."

—General Logan, answering those who feared that Impeachment might lead to some form of revolution, said "that a country which in time of war and excitement can stand the assassination of so good and just a President as Abraham Lincoln, can and will stand the Impeachment of as bad a President as Andrew Johnson."

—Mr. Ingersoll of Illinois, in the course of his remarks sustaining Impeachment, read a telegram from Governor Oglesby, declaring his belief "that the people of Illinois demand the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, and will heartily sustain such action by our Congress." Mr. Ingersoll declared that the telegram from the Governor of Illinois "is but the voice of the people of the whole country on the question. There have been grave doubts with regard to the policy and the right of impeaching the President upon the facts as presented heretofore, but at the present hour I know of no man who loves his country more than party who will not pronounce a verdict against the President. And, sir, I shall for one be grievously disappointed if, within ten days from this time, honest old Ben Wade (now President of the Senate) is not President of the United States."

The proceedings were carried far into the night, and their deep seriousness had been somewhat relieved by amusing effort on the part of several Democratic members to have Washington's Farewell Address read in honor of the day. But they failed to accomplish it, because a resolution to that effect could not take precedence of the privileged subject which was holding the attention of the House. At a late hour Mr. Holman of Indiana, unable to secure the reading of the address, obtained leave to print it in connection with his remarks, and thus left in the columns of the Globe a somewhat striking contrast—on the one hand, the calm words of Washington counseling peace and good will among his countrymen, and warning them of the evils of party spirit; on the other, the exciting and inflammatory attempt to remove one of Washington's successors from office by impeaching him of high crimes and misdemeanors.

The hours of the intervening Sunday did not appease the temper or cool the ardor of the Republican representatives, now so evidently bent on impeaching the President. The House had adjourned on Saturday night to meet at ten o'clock Monday morning, with the declared intention on the part of the majority to force the resolution of Impeachment to a vote on that day. Mr. Ashley of Ohio opened the debate with a fierce attack upon the President, and was followed by Mr. Burton C. Cook of Illinois in a brief but pointed legal argument to prove that the President had violated the letter and spirit of the law.

—Mr. Julian of Indiana made a somewhat remarkable speech. "Is it not most fortunate," said he, "that this single act of lawlessness has been evoked which so beautifully consolidates into a unit all the friends of the country in this House and throughout the nation? It is true the removal of the Secretary of War is relatively a simple matter. It is scarcely a peccadillo when considered beside the New-Orleans massacre and many other of the wholesale enormities of which he has been known to be guilty for many months past, but I believe it would be regarded as scarcely sufficient ground for this proceeding if not considered in the light of far greater previous offenses."

—Mr. James F. Wilson of Iowa said: "I will vote for the pending resolution to the end that law may be vindicated by the removal of an unworthy public servant from an official position, which he has dishonored by his perverse disregard of duty and his unjustifiable contempt for the supremacy of the law."

—General Butler, after a careful recital of the acts of the President, said: "For a tithe of these acts of usurpation, lawlessness and tyranny our fathers dissolved their connection with the government of King George; for less than this King James lost his throne, and King Charles lost his head; while we, the representatives of the people, adjudge only that there is probable cause shown why Andrew Johnson should be deprived of the office he has desecrated and the power he has abused, and if convicted by the court to which we shall send him, be forever incapable of filling that office—the ambition to be again nominated to which has been the moving spring of all these crimes."

—Mr. Washburne of Illinois said: "In my judgment the safety of the country, the cause of good government, the preservation of Constitutional right and public liberty, depend upon the prompt impeachment of the President of the United States."

—Mr. Woodward of Pennsylvania, a bitter anti-war Democrat, formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of his State, protested earnestly against Impeachment, on the ground that all the States not being represented either in House or Senate, there was no competent branch to impeach and none to try an officer. "If I were the President's counselor," said he, "I would advise him, if you preferred Articles of Impeachment, to demur to your jurisdiction and to that of the Senate, and issue a proclamation giving you and all the world notice that while he held himself impeachable for misdemeanors in office before the Constitutional tribunal, he never would subject the office he holds in trust to the irregular, unconstitutional, and fragmentary bodies who propose to strip him of it."

—Mr. Boutwell spoke very earnestly and ably in favor of Impeachment. "I can but indicate," said he, "the plot in which the President is engaged. He desires first to get control of the War Department, in order that, as in 1861, the munitions of war, arms and material might be used for te purpose of enabling him to succeed in his aspirations to be President of the United States. He knew that if he could corrupt the leaders of the Army, if he could bend these men to his will, these ten States were in his control, and that he could send to the Democratic Convention, to be holden on the 4th of July next, men who would sustain his claim for the Presidency. Then, upon the allegation which he could well carry out and which no other man could make good, that with the Army and his influence among the rebels of the South, whom he had brought to his support by his previous violations of law, he could secure the electoral votes of those ten States by excluding the negroes whom we have enfranchised from all participation in the election. Succeeding in this, we were to be met next February with the electoral votes of those ten States given for himself as President of the United States. If by fortune, as was his hope, he should receive a sufficient number of votes in the North to make a majority, then, with the support of the Army which he had corrupted, he had determined to be inaugurated President of the United States at the hazard of civil war. To-day, sir, we escape from these evils and dangers."

—Mr. Kerr of Indiana, speaking for the Democrats, said: "I and those with whom I act in this House had no knowledge whatever of the purpose of the Executive to do the act for which the movement is again inaugurated for his deposition. We are therefore free in every sense to submit to the guidance alone of reason and duty."

Late in the afternoon Mr. Stevens rose to close the debate. He said: "In order to sustain Impeachment under our Constitution I do not hold that it is necessary to prove a crime as an indictable offense, or any act malum in se. I agree with the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania, on the other side of the House (Mr. Woodward), who holds this to be a purely political proceeding. It is needed as a remedy for malfeasance in office and to prevent the continuance thereof. Beyond that it is not intended as a punishment for past offenses or for future example." He made one of his peculiarly pungent speeches, which for some unexplained reason was scarcely less bitter on General Grant than upon President Johnson. The whole day's proceedings had been extraordinary. Never before had so many members addressed the House on a single day. The speeches actually delivered and the speeches for which leave to print was given, fill more than two hundred columns of the Congressional Globe. When Mr. Stevens closed the debate, many members who still desired to be heard were cut off by the previous question.

The vote on the resolution impeaching the President resulted in ayes 126, noes 47, not voting 17.(3) Mr. Stevens immediately offered a resolution directing the "appointment of a committee of two members to appear at the bar of the Senate, and in the name of the House of Representatives and of the people of the United States to impeach Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors in office, and to acquaint the Senate that the House will in due time exhibit particular Articles of Impeachment against him and make good the same, and that the committee demand that the Senate take order for the appearance of Andrew Johnson to answer to said Impeachment." Mr. Stevens further moved that "a committee of seven be appointed to prepare and report Articles of Impeachment against Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, with power to send for persons and papers." The resolutions were adopted by a strict party vote. The Speaker appointed Mr. Stevens and Mr. Bingham the committee to notify the Senate of the impeachment of the President, and further appointed Mr. Boutwell, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Bingham, Mr. J. F. Wilson, Mr. Logan, Mr. Julian, and Mr. Hamilton Ward of New York, the committee to prepare Articles of Impeachment against the President.

Five days afterwards, on the 29th of February, Mr. Boutwell, chairman of the committee appointed to prepare Articles of Impeachment against the President, made his report. The Articles were debated with even greater manifestation of feeling than had appeared in the discussion on the resolution of Impeachment. They were adopted March 2d, by a party vote. The House then proceeded to elect managers of the Impeachment by ballot, and the following gentlemen were chosen (their names being given in the order of the number of votes which each received): John A. Bingham, George S. Boutwell, James F. Wilson, Benjamin F. Butler, Thomas Williams, John A. Logan, and Thaddeus Stevens. The votes for the several managers did not widely differ. The highest, 114, was given to Mr. Bingham; the lowest, 105, to Mr. Stevens. The latter was failing in health and was considered by many members unequal to the arduous work thus imposed on him. The Democrats presented no candidates and took no part in the election of managers.

The aggregate ability and legal learning of the Managers were everywhere conceded. Mr. Stevens in the period of his active practice held a very high rank at the bar of Pennsylvania. General Butler was in the profession of the law, as in all other relations, somewhat peculiar in his methods, but his intellectual force and his legal learning were recognized by his friends and his enemies—and he had a full quota of each. Mr. Bingham, Mr. Boutwell, Mr. Wilson, General Logan, and Mr. Williams represented the strength of the Republican party in the House. Each was well known at the bar of his State, and each was profoundly convinced of the necessity of convicting the President. The most earnest—if there was any difference in zeal among the Managers—were Mr. Boutwell and Mr. Williams. Mr. Boutwell, for a man of cool temperament, thoroughly honest mind, and sober judgment, had wrought himself into a singularly intense belief in the supreme necessity of removing the President; while Mr. Williams, who tended towards the radical side of all public questions, could not with patience hear any thing said against the wisdom and expediency of Impeachment. Mr. Bingham and Mr. Wilson were the only Managers who on the first effort to impeach the President had voted in the negative.

President Johnson was well advised during this exciting period in Congress and betrayed no uneasiness. He was guarded against the folly of talking, which was his easily besetting sin, and he sought to fortify his position by promptly submitting a nomination for Secretary of War. On Saturday, February 22d, the day following the removal of Mr. Stanton, he sent to the Senate the name of Thomas Ewing (senior) of Ohio as his successor. The Senate had adjourned when the President's Secretary reached the Capitol, but the nomination was formally communicated on the following Monday. No name could have given better assurance of good intentions and upright conduct than that of Mr. Ewing. He was a man of lofty character, of great eminence in his profession of the law, and with wide and varied experience in public life. He had held high rank as a senator in the Augustan period of the Senate's learning and eloquence, and he had been one of the ablest members of the distinguished Cabinets organized by the only two Presidents elected by the Whig party. He had reached the ripe age of seventy-eight years but was still in complete possession of all his splendid faculties. He had voted for Mr. Lincoln at both elections, had been a warm supporter of the contest for the Union, and was represented by his own blood on many of the great battle-fields of the war. The Lieutenant-General of the army, with his illustrious record of service, second only to that of General Grant, was his son-in-law.

Of whatever deadly designs Mr. Johnson might be suspected, there was no man of intelligence in the United States willing to believe that Mr. Ewing could be tempted to do an unpatriotic act, to violate the Constitution, or to fail in executing with fidelity the laws of the land. If the President intended to corrupt the army, as charged by Mr. Boutwell, he had certainly chosen a singular co-laborer in the person of Mr. Ewing. Wild rumors had been in circulation that the President was determined to install General Thomas by military force, and to eject Mr. Stanton with violence from the War Office which he refused to surrender. The public uneasiness resulting from these sensational reports was in large degree allayed, when it was announced that the President had signified his desire that a grave and considerate man with long-established reputation for ability and probity should serve as Secretary of War. The surprise in the whole matter was that the President should have selected Mr. Ewing, who, as was known to a few friends, had earnestly advised Mr. Johnson against removing Secretary Stanton.

The Senate however was in no mood to accept any nomination for the War Office from President Johnson. The issue was not whether Mr. Ewing was a judicious and trustworthy man for the vacancy, but whether any vacancy existed. If Mr. Johnson had removed or attempted to remove Mr. Stanton from office in an unlawful and unconstitutional manner, the Senate, in the judgment of those who were directing its action, would be only condoning his offense by consenting to the appointment of a successor. Mr. Johnson's right to nominate any one was denied, and when the name of Mr. Ewing was received it was known by all that a committee of Representatives might at any moment appear at the bar of the Senate to present an Impeachment against the President for unlawfully attempting to remove Mr. Stanton. The course of the Senate had been fully anticipated by the President and his advisers, and they had, in their own judgment at least, obtained an advantage before the public by so complete an abnegation of all partisan purposes as was implied in the offer to confide the direction of the War Department to Mr. Ewing.

The formal presentment of the charges against the President at the bar of the Senate, presided over by the Chief Justice of the United States, and sitting as a Court of Impeachment, was made on the fifth day of March (1868), when the House of Representatives, the grand inquest of the nation, attended the Managers as they came to the discharge of their solemn duty. Mr. Bingham, the chairman of the managers, read the Articles of Impeachment against Andrew Johnson. At the conclusion of the reading the Senate adjourned to the 13th, when the counsel of the President appeared and asked that forty days be allowed for the preparation of his answer to the charges. The time was regarded as unreasonably long, and the Senate voted to adjourn until the 23d of March, when it was expected that the President's counsel would present his answer. The President's cause was represented by an imposing array of ability and legal learning. The Attorney-General, Henry Stanbery, had from an impulse of chivalric devotion resigned his post for the purpose of defending his chief. His reputation as a lawyer was of the first rank in the West, where for nearly forty years he had been prominent in his profession. But though first named, on account of his personal and official relations with the President, he was not the leading counsel. The two men upon whom the success of the President's cause chiefly rested were Judge Curtis and Mr. Evarts.

Benjamin R. Curtis, when he appeared in the Impeachment case, was in the fullness of his powers, in the fifty-ninth year of his age. At forty-one he had been appointed to the Supreme Bench of the United States at the earnest request and warm recommendation of Mr. Webster, then Secretary of State. Mr. Webster is reported to have said that he had placed the people of Massachusetts under lasting obligation to him by inducing Governor Lincoln, in 1830, to appoint Lemuel Shaw Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State, a position which he honored and adorned for thirty years. Mr. Webster thought he was doing an equal service to the people of the entire Union when he induced the President to call Mr. Curtis to the Supreme Bench. But judicial life had not proved altogether agreeable to Judge Curtis, and after a remarkable and brilliant career of six years he resigned, in October, 1857, and returned to the practice of the law—his learning increased, his mind enriched and broadened by the grave national questions engaging the attention of the court during the period of his service. Thenceforward during his life no man at the bar of the United States held higher rank. He was entirely devoted to his profession. He had taken no interest in party strife, and with the exception of serving two sessions in the Massachusetts Legislature he had never held a political office. In arguing a case his style was peculiarly felicitous—simple, direct, clear. In the full maturity of his powers and with all the earnestness of his nature he engaged in the President's defense; and he brought to it a wealth of learning, a dignity of character, an impressiveness of speech, which attracted the admiration and respect of all who had the good fortune to hear his great argument.

William M. Evarts, who was associated with him, was nine years the junior of Mr. Curtis. He had followed his profession with equal devotion, and, like his illustrious colleague, had never been deflected from its pursuit by participation in the honors of political life. His career had been in the city of New York, where, against all the rivalry of the Metropolitan bar, he had risen so rapidly that at forty years of age his victory of precedence was won and his high rank established. A signal tribute was paid to his legal ability and his character when, in the early stages of the civil war, the National Government sent him abroad on an important and delicate errand in connection with our international relations,—an errand which could be safely entrusted only to a great lawyer. As an advocate Mr. Evarts early became conspicuous, and, in the best sense, famous. But he is more than an advocate. He is an orator,—affluent in diction, graceful in manner, with all the rare and rich gifts which attract and enchain an audience. He possesses a remarkable combination of wit and humor, and has the happy faculty of using both effectively, without inflicting deadly wounds, without incurring hurtful enmities. Differing in temperament and in manner from Judge Curtis, the two seemed perfectly adapted for professional co-operation, and united they constituted an array of counsel as strong as could be found at the English-speaking bar.

It was expected that Judge Jeremiah S. Black would add his learning and ability to the President's counsel, but at the last moment before the trial began he withdrew, and his place was filled by William S. Groesbeck of Cincinnati. Mr. Groesbeck was favorably known to the country by his service as a Democratic representative in the Thirty-sixth Congress, but little had been heard of his legal learning outside of Ohio. He took no part in the conduct of the Impeachment case, but his final argument was a surprise to the Senate and to his professional brethren, and did much to give him a high reputation as a lawyer.—The counsel for the President was completed by the addition of a confidential friend from his own State, Hon. T. A. R. Nelson. Mr. Nelson had been closely associated with Mr. Johnson in the Tennessee struggles for the Union, had gained reputation as a representative in the Thirty-sixth Congress, and had acquired a good standing at the bar of his State.

The answer of the President to the Articles of Impeachment having been presented on the 23d, the replication of the House duly made, and all other preliminary and introductory steps completed, the actual trial began on Monday, the thirtieth day of March (1868), when General Butler, one of the Managers on behalf of the House of Representatives, made the opening argument. It was very voluminous, prepared with great care in writing, and read to the Senate from printed slips. It was accompanied by a brief of authorities upon the law of impeachable crimes and misdemeanors, prepared by Hon. William Lawrence of Ohio with characteristic industry and learning. While every point in the charges preferred by the House was presented by General Butler with elaboration, the weight of his argument against the President lay in the fact that the removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War was, as he averred, an intentional violation of the Tenure-of-office Act, an intentional violation of the Constitution of the United States. This was set forth in every possible form, and argued in every possible phase, with the well-known ability of General Butler; and though other charges were presented against the President, the House of Representatives relied mainly upon this alleged offense for his conviction.

General Butler in his argument was evidently troubled by the proviso in the Tenure-of-office Act, that members of the Cabinet should hold their offices "during the term of the President by whom they were appointed, and for one month longer." He sought to anticipate his opponents' argument on this point. "By whom was Mr. Stanton appointed?" asked General Butler. "By Mr. Lincoln. Whose Presidential term was he holding under when the bullet of Booth became the proximate cause of this trial? Was not his appointment in full force at that hour? Had any act of President Johnson up to the twelfth day of August last vitiated or interfered with that appointment? Whose Presidential term is Mr. Johnson now serving out? His own or Mr. Lincoln's? If his own, he is entitled to four years up to the anniversary of the murder, because each Presidential term is four years by the Constitution, and the regular recurrence of those terms is fixed by the Act of May 8, 1792. If he is serving out the remainder of Mr. Lincoln's term, then his term of office expires on the 4th of March, 1868, if it does not before."

At the conclusion of General Butler's argument, the Managers submitted their testimony in support of the charges brought by the House. Some twenty-five witnesses in all were introduced by the prosecution. Many of them were merely for the verification of official papers which were submitted in evidence. The President's speeches defaming Congress were produced and sworn to by the reporters who took the notes when the President delivered them. The Managers concluded their testimony on the fourth day of April and the Senate took a recess for five days.

On the 9th of April Judge Curtis of the President's counsel opened for the defense. He had no labored introduction, but went directly to his argument. He struck his first blow at the weak point in General Butler's strong speech. Judge Curtis said: "There is a question involved which enters deeply into the first eight Articles of Impeachment and materially touches two of the others; and to that question I desire in the first place to invite the attention of the court, namely, whether Mr. Stanton's case comes under the Tenure-of-office Act? . . . I must ask your attention therefore to the construction and application of the first section of that Act, as follows: 'that every person holding an official position to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and every person who shall hereafter be appointed to any such office and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is and shall be entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly qualified, except as herein otherwise provided.' Then comes what is 'otherwise provided.' 'Provided however that the Secretaries of the State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Interior Departments, the Postmaster-General and Attorney-General, shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.'

"The first inquiry which arises on this language," said Judge Curtis, "is to the meaning of the words 'for and during the term of the President.' Mr. Stanton, as appears by the commission which has been put into the case by the honorable Managers, was appointed in January, 1862, during the first term of President Lincoln. Are these words, 'during the term of the President,' applicable to Mr. Stanton's case? That depends upon whether an expounder of this law judicially, who finds set down in it as a part of the descriptive words, 'during the term of the President,' has any right to add 'and during any other term for which he may be afterwards elected.' I respectfully submit no such judicial interpretation can be put on the words. Then if you please, take the next step. 'During the term of the President by whom he was appointed.' At the time when this order was issued for the removal of Mr. Stanton, was he holding during the term of the President by whom he was appointed? The honorable Managers say, Yes; because, as they say, Mr. Johnson is merely serving out the residue of Mr. Lincoln's term. But is that so under the provisions of the Constitution of the United States? . . . Although the President, like the Vice-President, is elected for a term of four years, and each is elected for the same term, the President is not to hold his office absolutely during four years. The limit of four years is not an absolute limit. Death is a limit. A 'conditional limitation,' as the lawyers call it, is imposed on his tenure of office. And when the President dies his term of four years, for which he was elected and during which he was to hold provided he should so long live, terminates and the office devolves upon the Vice-President. For what period of time? For the remainder of the term for which the Vice-President was elected. And there is no more propriety, under those provisions of the Constitution of the United States, in calling the time during which Mr. Johnson holds the office of President, after it was devolved upon him, a part of Mr. Lincoln's term than there would be propriety in saying that one sovereign who succeeded another sovereign by death holds part of his predecessor's term."

Judge Curtis consumed two days in the delivery of his argument. He made a deep impression, not only on the members of the Senate but on all who had the privilege of listening to him. His manner was quiet and undemonstrative, with no gestures, and with no attempt at loud talk. His language expressed his meaning with precision. There was no deficiency and no redundancy. He seldom used a word more or a word less than was needed to give elegance to his diction, explicitness to his meaning, completeness to his logic. He analyzed every argument of the Impeachment with consummate skill. Those who dissented from his conclusions united with those who assented to them in praise of his masterly presentment of the President's defense.

After Judge Curtis had concluded, witnesses were called on behalf of the President. The struggle that followed for the admission or exclusion of testimony obviously strengthened the President's case in popular opinion, which is always influenced by considerations of what is deemed fair play. Exclusion of testimony by an arbitrary vote on mere technical objections, especially where men equally learned in the law differ as to its competency and relevancy, is not wise in a political case that depends for its ultimate judgment upon the sober thought of the people. Judge Curtis had maintained with cogent argument that the President was entitled to a judicial interpretation of the Tenure-of-office Law, and his associate counsel, Mr. Evarts, in the progress of the case made this proposition:—

"We offer to prove that the President at a meeting of the Cabinet while the bill was before him for his approval, laid the Tenure-of-office Bill before the Cabinet for their consideration and advice respecting his approval of the bill, and thereupon the members of the Cabinet then present gave their advice to the President that the bill was unconstitutional and should be returned to Congress with his objections, and that the duty or preparing the message setting forth the objections to the constitutionality of the bill was devolved upon Mr. Seward and Mr. Stanton." The Managers of the House objected to the admission of the testimony and the question of its admissibility was argued at length by General Butler, by Judge Curtis, and by Mr. Evarts. Chief Justice Chase decided "that the testimony is admissible for the purpose of showing the intent with which the President has acted in this transaction." Mr. Howard of Michigan thereupon demanded that the question be submitted to the Senate, and by a vote of 29 to 20 the decision of the Chief Justice was overruled and the testimony excluded. This exclusion impressed the public most unfavorably.