10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate the natures of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the most perfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short of the skill of art Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake of the superior; therefore the universal nature does so too. And, indeed, hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have their foundation: for justice will not be observed, if we either care for middle things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived and careless and changeable (v. 16. 30; vii. 55).

11. If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of which disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy judgment about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding.

12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure when it is neither extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor dispersed, nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which it sees the truth,—the truth of all things and the truth that is in itself (viii. 41, 45; xii. 3).

13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I will be mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless indeed he only assumed it. For the interior [parts] ought to be such, and a man ought to be seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with anything nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that which at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what is for the common advantage may be done in some way?

14. Men despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to raise themselves above one another, and crouch before one another.

15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal with thee in a fair way!—What are thou doing, man? There is no occasion to give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought to be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man's character is,+ he immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and good ought to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that the bystander as soon as he comes near him must smell whether he choose or not. But the affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick.[A] Nothing is more disgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid this most of all. The good and simple and benevolent show all these things in the eyes, and there is no mistaking.

[A] Instead of [Greek: skalme] Saumaise reads [Greek: skambe]. There is a Greek proverb, [Greek: skambon xylon oudepot orthon]: "You cannot make a crooked stick straight."

The wolfish friendship is an allusion to the fable of the sheep and the wolves.

16. As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be indifferent, if it looks on each of these things separately and all together, and if it remembers that not one of them produces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes to us; but these things remain immovable, and it is we ourselves who produce the judgments about them, and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, it being in our power not to write them, and it being in our power, if perchance these judgments have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them out; and if we remember also that such attention will only be for a short time, and then life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in doing this? For if these things are according to nature, rejoice in them and they will be easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, seek what is conformable to thy own nature, and strive towards this, even if it bring no reputation; for every man is allowed to seek his own good.

17. Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, + and into what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it has changed, and that it will sustain no harm.

18. [If any have offended against thee, consider first]: What is my relation to men, and that we are made for one another; and in another respect I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a bull over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles, from this. If all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all things: if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the superior, and these for the sake of one another (ii. 1; ix. 39; v. 16; iii. 4).

Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so forth; and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions they are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what they do (viii. 14; ix. 34).

Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be displeased: but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power of behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word wrong-doers to their neighbors (vii. 62, 63; ii. 1; vii. 26; viii. 29).

Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong, and that thou art a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either through cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such mean motive, thou dost abstain from such faults (i. 17).

Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are doing wrong or not, for many things are done with a certain reference to circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable him to pass a correct judgment on another man's acts (ix. 38; iv. 51).

Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man's life is only a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead (vii. 58; iv. 48).

Seventh, that it is not men's acts which disturb us, for those acts have their foundation in men's ruling principles, but it is our own opinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment about an act as if it were something grievous, and thy anger is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee: for unless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity do many things wrong, and become a robber and everything else (v. 25; vii. 16).

Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we are angry and vexed (iv. 39, 49; vii. 24).

Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible if it be genuine, and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature for something else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art injuring thyself, my child.—And show him with gentle tact and by general principles that this is so, and that even bees do not do as he does, nor any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. And thou must do this neither with any double meaning nor in the way of reproach, but affectionately and without any rancor in thy soul; and not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may admire, but either when he is alone, and if others are present ...[A]

[A] It appears that there is a defect in the text here.

Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But thou must equally avoid nattering men and being vexed at them, for both are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human nature, so also are they more manly; and he who possesses these qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and not the man who is subject to fits of passion and discontent. For in the same degree in which a man's mind is nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is it nearer to strength: and as the sense of pain is a characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain and he who yields to anger, both are wounded and both submit.

But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of the Muses [Apollo], and it is this,—that to expect bad men not to do wrong is madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to allow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any wrong, is irrational and tyrannical.

19. There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty against which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou hast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each occasion thus: This thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy social union: this which thou art going to say comes not from the real thoughts; for thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things for a man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence of the diviner part within thee being overpowered and yielding to the less honorable and to the perishable part, the body, and to its gross pleasures (iv. 24; ii. 16).

20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee, though by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to the disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the compound mass [the body]. And also the whole of the earthy part in thee and the watery, though their tendency is downward, still are raised up and occupy a position which is not their natural one. In this manner then the elemental parts obey the universal; for when they have been fixed in any place, perforce they remain there until again the universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then strange that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient and discontented with its own place? And yet no force is imposed on it, but only those things which are conformable to its nature: still it does not submit, but is carried in the opposite direction. For the movement towards injustice and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature. And also when the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that happens, then too it deserts its post: for it is constituted for piety and reverence towards the gods no less than for justice. For these qualities also are comprehended under the generic term of contentment with the constitution of things, and indeed they are prior[A] to acts of justice.

[A] The word [Greek: presbytera], which is here translated "prior," may also mean "superior;" but Antoninus seems to say that piety and reverence of the gods precede all virtues, and that other virtues are derived from them, even justice, which in another passage (xi. 10) he makes the foundation of all virtues. The ancient notion of justice is that of giving to every one his due. It is not a legal definition, as some have supposed, but a moral rule which law cannot in all cases enforce. Besides, law has its own rules, which are sometimes moral and sometimes immoral; but it enforces them all simply because they are general rules, and if it did not or could not enforce them, so far Law would not be Law. Justice, or the doing what is just, implies a universal rule and obedience to it; and as we all live under universal Law, which commands both our body and our intelligence, and is the law of our nature, that is, the law of the whole constitution of a man, we must endeavor to discover what this supreme Law is. It is the will of the power that rules all. By acting in obedience to this will, we do justice, and by consequence everything else that we ought to do.

21. He who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be one and the same all through his life. But what I have said is not enough, unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as there is not the same opinion about all the things which in some way or other are considered by the majority to be good, but only about some certain things, that is, things which concern the common interest, so also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a common kind [social] and political. For he who directs all his own efforts to this object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will always be the same.

22. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm and trepidation of the town mouse.[A]

23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of Lamiae,—bugbears to frighten children.

24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere.

25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas[B] for not going to him, saying, It is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends; that is, I would not receive a favor and then be unable to return it.

26. In the writings of the [Ephesians][C] there was this precept, constantly to think of some one of the men of former times who practiced virtue.

[A] The story is told by Horace in his Satires (ii. 6), and by others since but not better.

[B] Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for other writers say that it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who invited Socrates to Macedonia.

[C] Gataker suggested [Greek: Epekoureion] for [Greek: Ephesion].

27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we may be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things and in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of their purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.

28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin, after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates said to his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him when they saw him dressed thus.

29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down rules for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules thyself. Much more is this so in life.

30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for thee.

31. And my heart laughed within. Odyssey, ix. 413.

32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words. HESIOD, Works and Days, 184.

33. To look for the fig in winter is a mad-man's act: such is he who looks for his child when it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, iii. 24, 87).

34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to himself, "To-morrow perchance thou wilt die."—But those are words of bad omen.—"No word is a word of bad omen," said Epictetus, "which expresses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad omen to speak of the ears of corn being reaped" (Epictetus, iii. 24, 88).

35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape, are all changes, not into nothing, but into something which exists not yet (Epictetus, iii. 24).

36. No man can rob us of our free will (Epictetus, iii. 22, 105).

37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with respect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must be careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be consistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of the object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away from it; and as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in our power.

38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but about being mad or not.

39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, souls of rational men or irrational?—Souls of rational men.—Of what rational men, sound or unsound?—Sound.—Why then do you not seek for them?—Because we have them.—Why then do you fight and quarrel?



XII.

All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous road thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And this means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the future to providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety and justice. Conformably to piety that thou mayest be content with the lot which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for thee and thee for it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayst always speak the truth freely and without disguise, and do the things which are agreeable to law and according to the worth of each. And let neither another man's wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations of the poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the passive part will look to this. If, then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be near to thy departure, neglecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be afraid not because thou must some time cease to live, but if thou shalt fear never to have begun to live according to nature—then thou wilt be a man worthy of the universe which has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to be a stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at things which happen daily as if they were something unexpected, and to be dependent on this or that.

2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all men bared of the material vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual part alone he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been derived from himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to do this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards not the poor flesh which envelops him, surely will not trouble himself by looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and such like externals and show.

3. The things are three of which thou art composed: a little body, a little breath [life], intelligence. Of these the first two are thine, so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is, from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou hast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee because they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee or in the breath [life], which is by nature associated with the body, is attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt from the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is just and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached to it by the impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and of time that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles' sphere,

"All round and in its joyous rest reposing;"[A]

and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is, the present,—then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which remains for thee up to the time of thy death free from perturbations, nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that is within thee] (ii. 13, 17; iii. 5, 6; xi. 12).

4. I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion of himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher should present himself to a man and bid him to think of nothing and to design nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it, he could not endure it even for a single day.[B] So much more respect have we to what our neighbors shall think of us than to what we shall think of ourselves.

[A] The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. It has been restored by Peyron from a Turin manuscript, thus:—

[Greek: Sphairos kykloteres monie perigethei gaion.]

[B] iii. 4.

5. How can it be that the gods, after having arranged all things well and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men, and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances have been most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died should never exist again, but should be completely extinguished?

But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be possible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had it so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have been so: for thou seest even of thyself that in this inquiry thou art disputing with the Deity; and we should not thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and most just; but if this is so, they would not have allowed anything in the ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and irrationally.

6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of accomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all other things for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously than the right hand; for it has been practised in this.

7. Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be when he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the boundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter.

8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things bare of their coverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what pleasure is, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his uneasiness; how no man is hindered by another; that everything is opinion.

9. In the application of thy principles thou must be like the pancratiast, not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the sword which he uses and is killed; but the other always has his hand, and needs to do nothing else than use it.

10. See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form, and purpose.

11. What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve, and to accept all that God may give him.

12. With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought to blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we should blame nobody (ii. 11, 12, 13; vii. 62; 18 viii. 17).

13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at anything which happens in life.

14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind providence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director (iv. 27). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou resist? But if there is a providence which allows itself to be propitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if there is a confusion without a governor, be content that in such a tempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if the tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor breath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it will not carry away.

15. Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendor until it is extinguished? and shall the truth which is in thee and justice and temperance be extinguished [before thy death]?

16. When a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong [say], How then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has done wrong, how do I know that he has not condemned himself? And so this is like tearing his own face. Consider that he who would not have the bad man do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree to bear juice in the figs, and infants to cry, and the horse to neigh, and whatever else must of necessity be. For what must a man do who has such a character? If then thou art irritable, + cure this man's disposition.[A]

17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say it. [For let thy efforts be—][B]

[A] The interpreters translate [Greek: gorgos] by the words "acer, validusque," and "skilful." But in Epictetus (ii. 16, 20; iii. 12, 10) [Greek: gorgos] means "vehement," "prone to anger," "irritable."

[B] There is something wrong here, or incomplete.

18. In everything always observe what the thing is which produces for thee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the material, the purpose, and the time within which it must end.

19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more divine than the things which cause the various affects, and as it were pull thee by the strings. What is there now in my mind,—is it fear, or suspicion, or desire, or anything of the kind (v. 11)?

20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second, make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end.

21. Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor will any of the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those who are now living. For all things are formed by nature to change and be turned and to perish, in order that other things in continuous succession may exist (ix. 28).

22. Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay.

23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its proper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has done this act, does he suffer any evil for this reason, that the act has ceased. In like manner then the whole, which consists of all the acts, which is our life, if it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for this reason, that it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series at the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper time and the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature of man, but always the universal nature, by the change of whose parts the whole universe continues ever young and perfect.[A] And everything which is useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore the termination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not opposed to the general interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable, and profitable to and congruent with the universal. For thus too he is moved by the Deity who is moved in the same manner with the Deity, and moved towards the same thing in his mind.

[A] vii. 25.

24. These three principles thou must have in readiness: In the things which thou doest, do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than as justice herself would act; but with respect to what may happen to thee from without, consider that it happens either by chance or according to providence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse providence. Second, consider what every being is from the seed to the time of its receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to the giving back of the same, and of what things every being is compounded, and into what things it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised up above the earth, and shouldst look down on human things, and observe the variety of them how great it is, and at the same time also shouldst see at a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell all around in the air and the ether, consider that as often as thou shouldst be raised up, thou wouldst see the same things, sameness of form and shortness of duration. Are these things to be proud of?

25. Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from casting it away?

26. When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this, that all things happen according to the universal nature; and forgotten this, that a man's wrongful act is nothing to thee; and further thou hast forgotten this, that everything which happens, always happened so and will happen so, and now happens so everywhere; forgotten this too, how close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race, for it is a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of intelligence. And thou hast forgotten this too, that every man's intelligence is a god and is an efflux of the Deity;[A] and forgotten this, that nothing is a man's own, but that his child and his body and his very soul came from the Deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and lastly thou hast forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and loses only this.

[A] See Epictetus, ii. 8, 9, etc.

27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained greatly about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then think where are they all now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a tale. And let there be present to thy mind also everything of this sort, how Fabius Catellinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in his gardens, and Stertinius at Briae, and Tiberius at Capreae, and Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of the eager pursuit of anything conjoined with pride;[A] and how worthless everything is after which men violently strain; and how much more philosophical it is for a man in the opportunities presented to him to show himself just, temperate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all simplicity: for the pride which is proud of its want of pride is the most intolerable of all.

[A] [Greek: met' oieseos. Oiesis kai typhos], Epict. i. 8, 6.

28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou comprehend that they exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the first place, they may be seen even with the eyes;[A] in the second place, neither have I seen even my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate them.

[A] "Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that this may be explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or living being (iv. 40), and that the celestial bodies are gods (viii. 19). But the emperor may mean that we know that the gods exist, as he afterwards states it, because we see what they do; as we know that man has intellectual powers, because we see what he does, and in no other way do we know it. This passage then will agree with the passage in the Epistle to the Romans (i. v. 20), and with the Epistle to the Colossians (i. v. 15), in which Jesus Christ is named "the image of the invisible god;" and with the passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv. v. 9).

Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of learning, and all of it sound and good, quotes a passage of Calvin which is founded on St. Paul's language (Rom. i. v. 20): "God by creating the universe [or world, mundum], being himself invisible, has presented himself to our eyes conspicuously in a certain visible form." He also quotes Seneca (De Benef. iv. c. 8): "Quocunque te flexeris, ibi illum videbis occurrentem tibi: nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet." Compare also Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), Xenophon's Cyropaedia (viii. 7), and Mem. iv. 3; also Epictetus, i. 6, de Providentia. I think that my interpretation of Antoninus is right.

29. The safety of life is this, to examine everything all through, what it is itself, that is its material, what the formal part; with all thy soul to do justice and to say the truth. What remains, except to enjoy life by joining one good thing to another so as not to leave even the smallest intervals between?

30. There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by walls, mountains, and other things infinite. There is one common substance,[A] though it is distributed among countless bodies which have their several qualities. There is one soul, though it is distributed among infinite natures and individual circumscriptions [or individuals]. There is one intelligent soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in the things which have been mentioned, all the other parts, such as those which are air and matter, are without sensation and have no fellowship: and yet even these parts the intelligent principle holds together and the gravitation towards the same. But intellect in a peculiar manner tends to that which is of the same kin, and combines with it, and the feeling for communion is not interrupted.

[A] iv. 40.

31. What dost thou wish—to continue to exist? Well, dost thou wish to have sensation, movement, growth, and then again to cease to grow, to use thy speech, to think? What is there of all these things which seems to thee worth desiring? But if it is easy to set little value on all these things, turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason and God. But it is inconsistent with honoring reason and God to be troubled because by death a man will be deprived of the other things.

32. How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time is assigned to every man, for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal! And how small a part of the whole substance; and how small a part of the universal soul; and on what a small clod of the whole earth thou creepest! Reflecting on all this, consider nothing to be great, except to act as thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common nature brings.

33. How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all lies in this. But everything else, whether it is in the power of thy will or not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke.

34. This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt of death, that even those who think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still have despised it.

35. The man to whom that only is good which comes in due season, and to whom it is the same thing whether he has done more or fewer acts conformable to right reason, and to whom it makes no difference whether he contemplates the world for a longer or a shorter time—for this man neither is death a terrible thing (iii. 7; vi. 23; x. 20; xii. 23).

36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the world];[A] what difference does it make to thee whether for five years [or three]? for that which is conformable to the laws is just for all. Where is the hardship then, if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away from the state, but nature, who brought thee into it? the same as if a praetor who has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage.[B]—"But I have not finished the five acts, but only three of them."—Thou sayest well, but in life the three acts are the whole drama; for what shall be a complete drama is determined by him who was once the cause of its composition, and now of its dissolution: but thou art the cause of neither. Depart then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is satisfied.

[A] ii. 16; iii. 11; iv. 29.

[B] iii. 8; xi. 1.



INDEXES.

INDEX OF TERMS.

[Greek: adiaphora] (indifferentia, Cicero, Seneca, Epp. 82); things indifferent, neither good nor bad; the same as [Greek: mesa].

[Greek: aischros] (turpis, Cic.), ugly; morally ugly.

[Greek: aitia], cause.

[Greek: aitiodes], [Greek: aition], [Greek: to], the formal or formative principle, the cause.

[Greek: akoinonetos], unsocial.

[Greek: anaphora], reference, relation to a purpose.

[Greek: anypexairetos], unconditionally.

[Greek: aporroia], efflux.

[Greek: aproaireta], [Greek: ta], the things which are not in our will or power.

[Greek: arche], a first principle.

[Greek: atomoi] (corpora individua, Cic.), atoms.

[Greek: autarkeia] est quae parvo contenta omne id respuit quod abundat (Cic.); contentment.

[Greek: autarkes], sufficient in itself; contented.

[Greek: aphormai], means, principles. The word has also other significations in Epictetus. Index ed. Schweig.

[Greek: gignomena], [Greek: ta], things which are produced, come into existence.

[Greek: daimon], god, god in man, man's intelligent principle.

[Greek: diathesis], disposition, affection of the mind.

[Greek: diairesis], division of things into their parts, dissection, resolution, analysis.

[Greek: dialektike], ars bene disserendi et vera ac falsa dijudicandi (Cic.).

[Greek: dialysis], dissolution, the opposite of [Greek: sygkrisis].

[Greek: dianoia], understanding; sometimes, the mind generally, the whole intellectual power.

[Greek: dogmata] (decreta, Cic.), principles.

[Greek: dynamis noera], intellectual faculty.

[Greek: enkrateia], temperance, self-restraint.

[Greek: eidos] in divisione formae sunt, quas Graeci [Greek: eide] vocant; nostri, si qui haec forte tractant, species appellant (Cic.). But [Greek: eidos] is used by Epictetus and Antoninus less exactly and as a general term, like genus. Index Epict. ed. Schweig.—[Greek: Hos de ge ahi protai ousiai pros ta alla echousin, outo kai to eidos pros to genos echei hypokeitai gar to eidos to genei]. (Aristot. Cat. c. 5.)

[Greek: eimarmene] (fatalis necessitas, fatum, Cic.), destiny, necessity.

[Greek: ekkliseis], aversions, avoidance, the turning away from things; the opposite of [Greek: orexeiz.]

[Greek: empsycha, ta] things which have life.

[Greek: energeia], action, activity.

[Greek: ennoia], [Greek: ennoiai], notio, notiones (Cic.), or "notitiae rerum;" notions of things. (Notionem appello quam Graeci tum [Greek: ennoian], tum [Greek: prolepsin], Cic.).

[Greek: enosis], [Greek: e], the unity.

[Greek: epistrophe], attention to an object.

[Greek: euthymia], animi tranquillitas (Cic.).

[Greek: eumenes], [Greek: to], [Greek: eumeneia], benevolence; [Greek: eumenes] sometimes means well-contented.

[Greek: eunoia], benevolence.

[Greek: exousia], power, faculty.

[Greek: epakolouthesin], [Greek: kata], by way of sequence.

[Greek: hegemonikon], [Greek: to], the ruling faculty or part; principatus (Cic.).

[Greek: theoremata], percepta (Cic.), things perceived, general principles.

[Greek: kathekein], [Greek: to], duty, "officium."

[Greek: kalos], beautiful.

[Greek: katalepsis], comprehension; cognitio, perceptio, comprehensio (Cic.).

[Greek: kataskeue], constitution.

[Greek: katorthoseis, katorthomata]; recta, recte facta (Cic.); right acts, those acts to which we proceed by the right or straight road.

[Greek: kosmos], order, world, universe.

[Greek: kosmos, ho olos], the universe, that which is the One and the all (vi. 25).

[Greek: krima], a judgment.

[Greek: kyrieuon, to endon], that which rules within (iv. 1), the same as [Greek: to hegemonikon]. Diogenes Laertius vii., Zeno. [Greek: hegemonikon de einai to kyriotaton tes psyches].

[Greek: logika, ta], the things which have reason.

[Greek: logikos], rational.

[Greek: logos], reason.

[Greek: logos spermatikos], seminal principle.

[Greek: mesa, ta], things indifferent, viewed with respect to virtue.

[Greek: noeros], intellectual.

[Greek: nomos], law.

[Greek: nous], intelligence, understanding.

[Greek: oiesis], arrogance, pride. It sometimes means in Antoninus the same as [Greek: typhos]; but it also means "opinion."

[Greek: oikonomia] (dispositio, ordo, Cic.) has sometimes the peculiar sense of artifice, or doing something with an apparent purpose different from the real purpose.

[Greek: holon, to], the universe, the whole: [Greek: he ton olon physis].

[Greek: onta, ta], things which exist; existence, being.

[Greek: orexis], desire of a thing, which is opposed to [Greek: ekklisis], aversion.

[Greek: horme], movement towards an object, appetite; appetitio, naturalis appetitus, appetitus animi (Cic.).

[Greek: ousia], substance (vi. 49). Modern writers sometimes incorrectly translate it "essentia." It is often used by Epictetus in the same sense as [Greek: hyle]. Aristotle (Cat. c. 5) defines [Greek: ousia], and it is properly translated "substantia" (ed. Jul. Pacius). Porphyrius (Isag. c. 2): [Greek: he ousia anotato ousa to meden pro autes genos hen to genikotaton].

[Greek: parakolouthetike dynamis, he], the power which enables us to observe and understand.

[Greek: peisis], passivity, opposed to [Greek: energeia]: also, affect.

[Greek: peristaseis], circumstances, the things which surround us; troubles, difficulties.

[Greek: pepromene, he], destiny.

[Greek: proairesis], purpose, free will (Aristot. Rhet. i. 13).

[Greek: proaireta, ta], things which are within our will or power.

[Greek: proairetikon, to], free will.

[Greek: prothesis], a purpose, proposition.

[Greek: pronoia] (providentia, Cic.), providence.

[Greek: skopos], object, purpose.

[Greek: stoicheion], element.

[Greek: synkatathesis] (assensio, approbatio, Cic.), assent; [Greek: synkatatheseis] (probationes, Gellius, xix. 1).

[Greek: synkrimata], things compounded (ii. 3).

[Greek: synkrisis], the act of combining elements out of which a body is produced, combination.

[Greek: synthesis], ordering, arrangement (compositio).

[Greek: systema], system, a thing compounded of parts which have a certain relation to one another.

[Greek: hyle], matter, material.

[Greek: hylikon, to], the material principle.

[Greek: hypexairesis], exception, reservation; [Greek: meth' hypexaireseos], conditionally.

[Greek: hypothesis], material to work on; thing to employ the reason on; proposition, thing assumed as matter for argument and to lead to conclusions. (Quaestionum duo sunt genera; alterum infinitum, definitum alterum. Definitum est, quod [Greek: hypothesin] Graeci, nos causam: infinitum, quod [Greek: thesin] illi appellant, nos propositum possumus nominare. Cic. See Aristot. Anal. Post. i. c. 2).

[Greek: hypokeimena, ta], things present or existing, vi. 4; or things which are a basis or foundation.

[Greek: hypolepsis], opinion.

[Greek: hypostasis], basis, substance, being, foundation (x. 5). Epictetus has [Greek: to hypostatikon kai ousiodes]. (Justinus ad Diogn. c. 2.)

[Greek: hyphistasthai], to subsist, to be.

[Greek: phantasiai] (visus, Cic.); appearances, thoughts, impressions (visa animi, Gellius, xix. 1): [Greek: phantasia esti typosis en psyche].

[Greek: phantasma], seems to be used by Antoninus in the same sense as [Greek: phantasia]. Epictetus uses only [Greek: phantasia].

[Greek: phantaston], that which produces a [Greek: phantasia: phantaston to tepsiekos ten phantasian aistheton]

[Greek: physis], nature.

[Greek: physis he ton olon], the nature of the universe.

[Greek: psyche], soul, life, living principle.

[Greek: psyche logike, noera], a rational soul, an intelligent soul



GENERAL INDEX.

*** The paragraphs (par.) and lines (l.) are those of the sections.

Active, man is by nature, ix. 16.

Advice from the good to be taken, vii. 21; viii. 16.

Affectation, vii. 60; viii. 30; xi. 18 (par. 9), 19.

Anger discouraged, vi. 26, 27; xi. 18.

Anger, offenses of, ii. 10.

Anger, uselessness of, v. 28; viii. 4.

Appearances not to be regarded, v. 36; vi. 3, 13.

Astonishment should not be felt at any thing that happens, viii. 15; xii. 1 (sub fine), 13.

Attainment, what is within every one's, vii. 67; viii. 8.

Attention to what is said or done, vi. 53; vii. 4, 30; viii. 22.

Bad, the, ii. 1.

Beautiful, the, ii. 1.

Casual. See Formal.

Change keeps the world ever new, vii. 25; viii. 50 (l. 13); xii. 23 (l. 10).

Change, law of, iv. 3 (sub f.), 36, v. 13, 23; vi. 4, 15, 36; vii. 18; viii. 6; ix. 19, 28 (par. 2), 35; x. 7, 18; xii. 21.

Change, no evil in, iv. 42.

Christians, the xi. 3.

Circle, things come round in a, ii. 14.

Comedy, new, xi. 6.

Comedy, Old, xi. 6.

Complaining, uselessness of, viii. 17, 50.

Connection. See Universe.

Conquerers are robbers, x. 10.

Contentment. See Resignation.

Co-operation. See Mankind and Universe.

Daemon, the, ii. 13, 17; iii. 6 (l. 8), 7, 16 (l. 18); v. 10 (sub f.) 27; xii. 3 (sub. f.).

Death, ii. 11, 12, 17; iii. 3, 7; iv. 5; v. 33; vi. 2, 24, 28; vii. 32; viii. 20, 58; ix. 3, 21; x. 36; xii. 23, 34, 35.

Death inevitable, iii. 3; iv. 3 (l. 22), 6, 32, 48, 50; v. 33; vi. 47; viii. 25, 31.

Desire, offenses of, ii. 10.

Destiny, iii. 11 (l. 19); iv. 26; v. 8 (l. 13, etc.), 24; vii. 57; x. 5.

Discontent. See Resignation.

Doubts discussed, vi. 10; vii. 75; ix. 28, 39; xii. 5, 14.

Duty, all-importance of, vi. 2, 22; x. 22.

Earth, insignificance of the, iii. 10; iv. 3 (par. 1, sub f.); vi. 36; viii. 21; xii. 32.

Earthly things, transitory nature of, ii. 12, 17; iv. 32, 33, 35, 48; v. 23; vi. 15, 36; vii. 21, 34; viii. 21, 25; x. 18, 31; xii. 27.

Earthly things, worthlessness of, ii. 12; v. 10, 33; vi. 15; vii. 3; ix. 24, 36; xi. 2; xii. 27.

Equanimity, x. 8.

Example, we should not follow bad, vi. 6; vii. 65.

Existence, meanness of, viii. 24.

Existence, the object of, v. 1; viii. 19.

External things cannot really harm a man, or affect the soul, ii, 11 (l. 22); iv. 3 (par. 2, sub f.); 8, 39, 49 (par. 2); v. 35; vii. 64; viii. 1 (sub f.); 32, 51 (par. 2); ix. 31; x. 33.

Failure, x. 12.

Fame, worthlessness of, iii. 10; iv. 3 (l. 45), 19, 33 (l. 10); v. 33; vi. 16, 18; vii. 34; viii. 1, 44; ix. 30.

Fear, what we ought to, xii. 1 (l. 18).

Fellowship. See Mankind.

Few things necessary for a virtuous and happy life, ii. 5; iii. 10; vii. 67; x. 8 (l. 22).

Flattery, xi. 18 (par. 10).

Formal, the, and the material, iv. 21 (par. 2); v. 13; vii. 10, 29; viii. 11; ix. 25; xii. 8, 10, 18.

Future, we should not be anxious about the, vii. 8; viii. 11; ix. 25; xii. 1.

Gods, perfect justice of the, xii. 5 (par. 2).

Gods, the, vi. 44; xii. 28.

Gods, the, cannot be evil, ii. 11; vi. 44.

Good, the, ii. 1.

Habit of thought, v. 16.

Happiness, what is true, v. 9 (sub f.), 34; viii. 1; x. 33.

Help to be accepted from others, xii. 7.

Heroism, true, xi. 18 (par. 10).

Ignorance. See Wrong-doing.

Independence. See Self-reliance.

Indifferent things, ii. 11 (sub f.); ix. 39; vi 32; ix, 1; (l. 30).

Individual, the. See Interests.

Infinity. See Time.

Ingratitude. See Mankind.

Injustice, ix. 1.

Intelligent soul, rational beings participate in the same, iv. 40; ix. 8, 9; x. 1 (l. 15); xii. 26, 30.

Interests of the whole and the individual identical, iv. 23; v. 8 (l. 34); vi. 45, 54; x. 6, 20, 33 (sub f.); xii. 23 (l. 12).

Justice, v. 34; x. 11; xi. 10.

Justice and reason identical, xi. 1 (sub f.).

Justice prevails everywhere, iv. 10.

Leisure, we ought to have some, viii. 51.

Life, a good, everywhere possible, v. 16.

Life can only be lived once, ii. 14; x. 31 (l. 11).

Life, shortness of, ii. 4, 17; iii. 10, 14; iv. 17, 48 (sub f.). 50; vi. 15, 36, 56; x. 31, 34.

Life to be made a proper use of, without delay, ii. 4; iii. 1, 14; iv. 17, 37; vii. 56; viii. 22; x. 31 (l. 14); xii. 1 (l. 18).

Life, whether long or short, matters not, vi. 49; ix. 33; xii. 36.

Magnanimity, x. 8.

Mankind, co-operation and fellowship of, one with another; ii. 1 (l. 11), 16; iii. 4 (sub f.); 11 (sub f.); iv. 4, 33 (sub f.); v. 16 (l. 11), 20; vi. 7, 14 (sub f.), 23, 39; vii. 5, 13, 22, 55; viii. 12, 26, 34, 43, 59; ix. 1, 9 (sub f.), 23, 31, 42 (sub. f.); x. 36, (l. 16); xi. 8, 21; xii. 20.

Mankind, folly and baseness of, v. 10 (l. 9); ix. 2, 3 (l. 13), 29; x. 15, 19.

Mankind, ingratitude of, x. 36.

Material, the. See Formal.

Nature, after products of, iii. 2; vi. 36.

Nature, bounds fixed by, v. 1.

Nature, man formed by, to bear all that happens to him, v. 18; viii. 46.

Nature, nothing evil, which is according to, ii. 17 (sub f.); vi. 33.

Nature of the universe. See Universe, nothing that happens is contrary to the nature of the.

Nature, perfect beauty of, iii. 2; vi. 36.

Nature, we should live according to, iv. 48 (sub. f.), 51; v. 3. 25; vi. 16 (l. 12); vii. 15, 55; viii. 1, 54; x. 33.

New, nothing, under the sun, ii. 14 (l. 11); iv. 44; vi. 37, 46; vii. 1, 49; viii. 6; ix. 14; x. 27; xi. 1.

Object, we should always act with a view to some, ii. 7, 16 (l. 12); iii. 4; iv. 2; viii. 17; x. 37; xi. 21; xii. 20.

Obsolete, all things become, iv. 33.

Omissions, sins of, ix. 5.

Opinion, iv. 3 (par. 2) (sub f.), 7, 12, 39; vi. 52, 57; vii. 2, 14, 16, 26, 68; viii. 14, 29, 40, 47, 49; ix. 13, 29 (l. 12), 32, 42 (l. 21); x. 3; xi. 16, 18; xii. 22, 25.

Others' conduct not to be inquired into, iii. 4; iv. 18; v. 25.

Others, opinion of, to be disregarded, viii. 1 (l. 12); x. 8 (l. 12), 11; xi. 13; xii. 4.

Others, we should be lenient towards, ii. 13 (sub f.); iii. 11 (sub f.); iv. 3 (l. 16); v. 33 (l. 17); vi. 20, 27; vii. 26, 62, 63, 70; ix. 11, 27; x. 4; xi. 9, 13, 18; xii. 16.

Others, we should examine the ruling principles of; iv. 38; ix. 18, 22, 27, 34.

Ourselves often to blame for expecting men to act contrary to their nature, ix. 42 (l. 31).

Ourselves, reformation should begin with, xi. 29.

Ourselves, we should judge, x. 30; xi. 18 (par. 4).

Pain, vii. 33, 64; viii. 28.

Perfection not to be expected in this world, ix. 29 (l. 7).

Perseverance, v. 9; x. 12.

Persuasion, to be used, vi. 50.

Perturbation, vi. 16 (sub f.); viii. 58; ix. 31.

Pessimism, ix. 35.

Philosophy, v. 9; vi. 12; ix. 41 (l. 15).

Pleasure, he who pursues, is guilty of impiety, ix. 1 (l. 24).

Pleasures are enjoyed by the bad, vi. 34; ix. 1 (l. 30).

Power, things in our own, v. 5, 10 (sub f.); vi. 32, 41, 52, 58; vii. 2, 14, 54, 68; x. 32, 33.

Power, things not in our own, v. 33 (sub f.); vi. 41.

Practice is good, even in things which we despair of accomplishing, xii. 6.

Praise, worthlessness of, iii. 4 (sub f.); iv. 20: vi. 16, 59; vii. 62; viii. 52, 53; ix. 34.

Prayer, the right sort of, v. 7; ix. 40.

Present time the only thing a man really possesses, ii. 14; iii. 10; viii. 44; xii. 3 (sub f.)

Procrastination, See Life to be made a proper use of, etc.

Puppet pulled by strings of desire, ii. 2; iii. 16; vi. 16, 28; vii. 3, 29; xii. 19.

Rational soul. See Ruling part.

Rational soul, spherical form of the, viii. 41 (sub f.); xi. 12; xii. 3 (and see Ruling part).

Reason, all-prevailing, v. 32; vi. 1, 40.

Reason and nature identical, vii. 11.

Reason the, can adapt everything that happens to its own use, v. 20; vi. 8; vii. 68 (l. 16); viii. 35; x. 31 (sub f.).

Reason, we should live according to. See Nature.

Repentance does not follow renouncement of pleasure, viii. 10.

Resignation and contentment, iii. 4 (l. 27, etc.), 16 (l. 10, etc.); iv. 23, 31, 33 (sub f.), 34; v. 8 (sub f.), 33 (l. 16); vi. 16 (sub f.), 44, 49; vii. 27, 57; ix. 37; x. 1, 11, 14, 25, 28, 35.

Revenge, best kind of, vi. 6.

Rising from bed, v. 1; viii. 11.

Ruling part, the, ii. 2; iv. 11, 19, 21, 26; vi. 14, 35; vii. 16, 55 (par. 2); viii. 45, 48, 56, 57, 60, 61; ix. 15, 26; x. 24, 33 (l. 21), 38; xi. 1, 19, 20; xii. 3, 14.

Self-reliance and steadfastness of soul, iii. 5 (sub f.), 12; iv. 14, 29 (l. 5), 49 (par. 1); v. 3, 34 (l. 5); vi. 44 (l. 15); vii. 12, 15; ix. 28 (l. 8), 29 (sub f.); xii. 14.

Self-restraint, v. 33 (sub f.).

Self, we should retire into, iv. 3 (l. 4 and par. 2); vii. 28, 33, 59; viii. 48.

Senses, movements of the, to be disregarded, v. 31 (l. 10); vii. 55 (par. 2); viii. 26, 39; x. 8 (l. 13); xi. 19; xii. 1 (l. 18).

Sickness, behavior in, ix. 41.

Social. See Mankind.

Steadfastness of soul. See Self-reliance.

Substance, the universal, iv. 40; v. 24; vii. 19, 23; xii. 30.

Suicide, v. 29; viii. 47 (sub f.); x. 8 (l. 35).

Time compared to a river, iv. 43.

Time, infinity of, iv. 3 (l. 35), 50 (sub f.); v. 24; ix. 32; xii. 7, 32.

Tragedy, xi. 6.

Tranquillity of soul, iv. 3; vi. 11; vii. 68; viii. 28.

Ugly, the, ii. 1.

Unintelligible things, v. 10.

Universe, harmony of the, iv. 27, 45; v. 8 (l. 14).

Universe, intimate connection and co-operation of all things in the, one with another, ii. 3, 9; iv. 29; v. 8, 30; vi. 38, 42, 43; vii. 9, 19, 68 (sub f.); viii. 7; ix. 1; x. 1.

Universe, nothing that dies falls out of the, viii. 18, 50 (l. 13); x. 7 (l. 25).

Universe, nothing that happens is contrary to the nature of the, v. 8, 10 (sub f.); vi. 9, 58; viii. 5; xii. 26.

Unnecessary things, v. 45.

Unnecessary thoughts, words, and actions, iii. 4; iv. 24.

Vain professions, x. 16; xi. 15.

Virtue, vi. 17.

Virtue its own reward, v. 6; vii. 73; ix. 42 (l. 47); xi. 4.

Virtue, omnipotence of, iv. 16.

Virtue, pleasure in contemplating, vi. 48.

Whole, integrity of the, to be preserved, v. 8 (sub f.).

Whole, the. See Interests.

Wickedness has always existed, vii. 1.

Wickedness must exist in the world, viii. 15, 50; ix. 42; xi. 18 (par. ii); xii. 16.

Worst evil, the, ix. 2 (l. 9.)

Worth and importance, things of real, iv. 33 (sub f.); v. 10 (l. 16); vi. 16, 30 (l. 7), 47 (sub f.); vii. 20, 44, 46, 58, 66; viii. 2, 3, 5; ix. 6, 12; x. 8 (l. 27), 11; xii. 1, 27, 31, 33.

Wrong-doing cannot really harm any one, vii. 22; viii. 55; ix. 42 (l. 25); x. 13 (par. 1); xi. 18 (par. 7).

Wrong-doing injures the wrong-doer, iv. 26; ix. 4, 38; xi. 18 (par. 3).

Wrong-doing owing to ignorance, ii. 1, 13; vi. 27; vii. 22, 26, 62, 63; xi. 18 (par. 3); xii. 22.

Wrong-doing to be left where it is, vii. 29; ix. 20.



THE END.