But, my lords, the negligence of the Dutch is a motive which ought to incite us to vigour and despatch; since it is not for the sake of the Dutch but ourselves, that we desire the suppression of France. If the Dutch are at length convinced of the ease of slavery, and think liberty no longer worth the labour of preserving it,—if they are tired with the task of labouring for the happiness of others, and have forsaken the stand on which they were placed, as the general watch of the world, to indulge themselves in tranquillity and slumber,—let not us, my lords, give way to the same infatuation; let not us look with neglect on the deluge that rolls towards us till it has advanced too far to be resisted. Let us remember, that we are to owe our preservation only to ourselves, and redouble our efforts in proportion as others neglect their duty. Let us show mankind, that we are neither afraid to stand up alone in defence of justice and of freedom, nor unable to maintain the cause that we have undertaken to assert.

But if it should be thought by any of this noble assembly, that the concurrence of the Dutch is absolutely necessary to a prospect of success, it may be reasonably answered, that by engaging in measures which can leave no doubt of either our power or our sincerity, the concurrence of the Dutch is most likely to be obtained. By this method of proceeding, my lords, was formed the last mighty confederacy by which the house of Bourbon was almost shaken into ruins. The Dutch then, as now, were slow in their determinations, and perhaps equally diffident of their own strength and our firmness; nor did they agree to declare war against France, till we had transported ten thousand men into Flanders, and convinced them that we were not inviting them to a mock alliance; but that we really intended the reduction of that empire which had so long extended itself without interruption, and threatened in a short time to swallow up all the western nations.

Thus, my lords, it appears, that the measures which have been pursued are just, politick, and legal; that they have been prescribed by the decrees of former senates, and therefore cannot be censured as arbitrary; and that they have a tendency to the preservation of those territories which it was once thought so much honour to acquire: and it may be yet farther urged, that though they are to be considered only as the first tendencies to secure greater designs, they have already produced effects apparently to the advantage of the common cause, and have obliged the French to desist from their pursuit of the queen of Hungary, and rather to inquire how they shall return home than how they shall proceed to farther conquests.

In condemnation of these measures, my lords, it has indeed been urged, that a moderate conduct is always eligible; and that nothing but ruin and confusion can be expected from precipitation and temerity. Moderation, my lords, is a very captivating sound; but I hope it will have now no influence on this assembly; because on this occasion it cannot properly be employed. I have always been taught, that moderation is only useful in forming determinations or designs, but that when once conviction is attained, zeal is to take place; and when a design is planned, it ought to be executed with vigour.

The question is not now, my lords, whether we shall support the queen of Hungary, but in what manner she shall be supported; and, therefore, it cannot be doubted, but that such support should be granted her as may be effectual; and I believe it will not be thought, that we can assist her without exerting an uncommon degree of vigour, and showing, that we consider ourselves as engaged in a cause which cannot be abandoned without disgrace and ruin.

If the noble lord had, before he entered upon his encomium on moderation, considered what effects could be promised from his favourite virtue, he would have had no inclination to display his eloquence upon it. By moderation, my lords, uninterrupted moderation of more than twenty years, have we become the scorn of mankind, and exposed ourselves to the insults of almost every nation in the world. By moderation have we betrayed our allies, and suffered our friendship to lose all its value; by moderation have we given up commerce to the rapacity of an enemy, formidable only for his perseverance, and suffered our merchants to be ruined, and our sailors to be enslaved. By moderation have we permitted the French to grasp again at general dominion, to overrun Germany with their armies, and to endanger again the liberties of mankind; and by continuing, for a very few years, the same laudable moderation, we shall probably encourage them to shut up our ships in our harbour, and demand a tribute for the use of the Channel.

I need not observe to your lordships, that all the great actions that have, in all ages, been achieved, have been the effects of resolution, diligence, and daring activity, virtues wholly opposite to the calmness of moderation. I need not observe, that the advantages enjoyed at present by the French are the consequences of that vigour and expedition, by which they are distinguished, and which the form of their government enables them to exert. Had they, my lords, instead of pouring armies into the Austrian dominions, and procuring, by the terrour of their troops, the election of an emperour, pursued these measures of moderation which have been so pathetically recommended, how easily had their designs been defeated?

Had they lost time in persuading the queen of Hungary by a solemn embassy to resign her dominions, or attempted to influence the diet by amicable negotiations, armies had been levied, and the passes of Germany had been shut against them; they had been opposed on the frontiers of their own dominions, by troops equally numerous and warlike with their own, and instead of imposing a sovereign on the empire, had been, perhaps, pursued into their own country.

But, my lords, whether moderation was not recommended to them by such powerful oratory as your lordships have heard, or whether its advocates met with an audience not easily to be convinced, it is plain that they seem to have acted upon very different principles, and I wish their policy had not been so strongly justified by its success. By sending an army into Germany, my lords, when there were no forces ready to oppose them, they reduced all the petty princes to immediate submission, and obliged those to welcome them as friends, who would gladly have united against them as the inveterate enemies of the whole German body; and who, had they been firmly joined by their neighbours, under a general sense of their common danger, would have easily raised an army able to have repelled them.

This, my lords, was the effect of vigour, an effect very different from that which we had an opportunity of experiencing as the consequence of moderation; it was to no purpose that we endeavoured to alarm mankind by remonstrances, and to procure assistance by entreaties and solicitations; the universal panick was not to be removed by advice and exhortations, and the queen of Hungary must have sunk under the weight of a general combination against her, had we not at last risen up in her defence, and with our swords in our hands, set an example to the nations of Europe, of courage and generosity.

It then quickly appeared, my lords, how little is to be expected from cold persuasion, and how necessary it is, that he who would engage others in a task of difficulty, should show himself willing to partake the labour which he recommends. No sooner had we declared our resolution to fulfil our stipulations, and ordered our troops to march for the relief of the queen of Hungary, than other princes discovered that they had the same dispositions, though they had hitherto thought it prudent to conceal them; that they, equally with ourselves, hated and feared the French; that they were desirous to repress their insolence and oppose their conquests, and only waited for the motions of some power who might stand at the head of the confederacy, and lead them forwards against the common enemy. The liberal promises of dominion made by the French, by which the sovereigns of Germany had been tempted to concur in a design which they thought themselves unable to oppose, were now no longer regarded; they were considered only as the boasts of imaginary greatness, which would at last vanish into air; and every one knew, that the ultimate design of Europe was to oppress equally her enemies and friends; they wisely despised her offers, and either desisted from the designs to which they had been incited by her, or declared themselves ready to unite against her.

This, my lords, has been the consequence of assembling the army, which, by the motion now under our consideration, some of your lordships seem desirous to disband, an inclination of which I cannot discover from whence it can arise.

For what, my lords, must be the consequence, if this motion should be complied with? what but the total destruction of the whole system of power which has been so laboriously formed and so strongly compacted? what but the immediate ruin of the house of Austria, by which the French ambition has been so long restrained? what but the subversion of the liberties of Germany, and the erection of an universal empire, to which all the nations of the earth must become vassals?

Should the auxiliary troops be disbanded, the queen of Hungary would find what benefit she has received from them by the calamities which the loss of them would immediately bring upon her. All the claims of all the neighbouring princes, who are now awed into peace and silence, would be revived, and every one would again believe, that nothing was to be hoped or feared but from France. The French would again rush forward to new invasions, and spread desolation over other countries, and the house of Austria would be more weakened than by the loss of many battles in its present state.

The support of the house of Austria appears not, indeed, much to engage the attention of those by whom this motion is supported. It has been represented as a house equally ambitious and perfidious with that of Bourbon, and equally an enemy both to liberty and to true religion; and a very celebrated author has been quoted to prove, that it is the interest of the Germans themselves to see a prince at their head, whose hereditary dominions may not incite him to exert the imperial power to the disadvantage of the inferiour sovereigns.

In order to the consideration of these objections, it is necessary to observe, my lords, that national alliances are not like leagues of friendship, the consequences of an agreement of disposition, opinions, and affections, but like associations of commerce, formed and continued by no similitude of any thing but interest. It is not, therefore, necessary to inquire what the house of Austria has deserved from us or from mankind; because interest, not gratitude, engages us to support it. It is useless to urge, that it is equally faithless and cruel with the house of Bourbon, because the question is not whether both shall be destroyed, but whether one should rage without control. It is sufficient for us that their interest is opposite, and that religion and liberty may be preserved by their mutual jealousy. And I confess, my lords, that were the Austrians about to attain unlimited power by the conquest or inheritance of France and Spain, it would be no less proper to form confederacies against them.

The testimony which has been produced of the convenience of a weak emperour, is to be considered, my lords, as the opinion of an author whose birth and employment had tainted him with an inveterate hatred of the house of Austria, and filled his imagination with an habitual dread of the imperial power. He was born, my lords, in Sweden, a country which had suffered much by a long war against the emperour; he was a minister to the electors of Brandenburgh, who naturally looked with envy on the superiority of Austria, and could not but wish to see a weaker prince upon the imperial throne, that their own influence might be greater; nor can we wonder, that a man thus born and thus supported should adopt an opinion by which the pride of his master would be flattered, and perhaps the interest of his own country promoted.

It is likewise, my lords, to be remarked, that there was then no such necessity for a powerful prince to stand at the head of the Germans, and to defend them with his own forces till they could unite for their own preservation. The power of France had not then arrived at its present height, nor had their monarchs openly threatened to enslave all the nations of Europe. The princes of the empire had then no oppression to fear, but from the emperour; and it was no wonder, that when he was their only enemy, they wished that his power was reduced.

How much the state of the continent is now changed, is not necessary to mention, nor what alteration that change has introduced into the politicks of all nations; those who formerly dreaded to be overwhelmed by the imperial greatness, can now only hope to be secured by it from the torrent of the power of France; and even those nations who have formerly endeavoured the destruction of Austria, may now rejoice, that they are sheltered by its interposition from tyrants more active and more oppressive.

But, my lords, though it should be granted that the house of Austria ought not to be supported, it will not, in my opinion, follow, that this motion deserves our approbation; because it will reduce us to a state of imbecility, and condemn us to stand as passive spectators of the disturbances of the world, without power and without influence, ready to admit the tyrant to whom chance shall allot us, and receive those laws which the prevailing power shall vouchsafe to transmit.

Whether we ought to support the house of Austria, to prevent its utter subversion, or restore it to its former greatness, whatever may be my private opinion, I think it not on this occasion necessary to assert; it is sufficient to induce us to reject this motion, that we ought to be at least in a condition that may enable us to improve those opportunities that may be offered, and to hinder the execution of any design that may threaten immediate danger to our commerce or our liberty.

Another popular topick, my lords, which has been echoed on the present occasion, is the happiness of peace, and the blessing of uninterrupted commerce and undisturbed security. We are perpetually told of the hazards of war, whatever may be the superiority of our skill or courage; of the certainty of the expenses, the bloodshed, and the hardships, and doubtfulness of the advantages which we may hope from them; and it is daily urged with great vehemence, that peace upon the hardest conditions is preferable to the honour of conquests, and the festivity of triumphs.

These maxims, my lords, which are generally true in the sense which their authors intended, may be very properly urged against the wild designs of ambition, and the romantick undertakings of wanton greatness; but have no place in the present inquiry, which relates to a war not made by caprice, but forced upon us by necessity; a war to which all the encomiums on peace, must in reality incite, because peace alone is the end intended to be obtained by it.

Of the necessity of peace to a trading nation it is not possible, my lords, to be ignorant; and therefore no man can be imagined to propose a state of war as eligible in itself. War, my lords, is, in my opinion, only to be chosen, when peace can be no longer enjoyed, and to be continued only till a peace secure and equitable can be attained. In the present state of the world, my lords, we fight not for laurels, nor conquests, but for existence. Should the arms of France prevail, and prevail they must, unless we oppose them, the Britons may, in a short time, no longer be a nation, our liberties will be taken away, our constitution destroyed, our religion persecuted, and perhaps our name abolished.

For the prevention of calamities like these, not for the preservation of the house of Austria, it is necessary, my lords, to collect an army; for by an army only can our liberties be preserved, and such a peace obtained, as may be enjoyed without the imputation of supineness and stupidity.

Of this the other house appears to be sufficiently convinced, and has therefore granted money for the support of the auxiliary troops; nor do I doubt but your lordships will concur with them, when you shall fully consider the motives upon which they may be supposed to have proceeded, and reflect, that by dismissing these troops, we shall sacrifice to the ambition of the French, the house of Austria, the liberties of Europe, our own happiness, and that of our posterity; and that, by resolving to exert our forces for a short time, we may place the happiness of mankind beyond the reach of attacks and violation.

Lord CARTERET replied to the following effect:—My lords, the considerations which were laid before you by the noble lords who made and seconded the motion, are so important in themselves, and have been urged with so much force and judgment, that I shall not endeavour to add any new arguments; since, where those fail which have been already offered, it is not likely that any will be effectual: but I shall endeavour to preserve them in their full force by removing the objections which have been made to them.

The first consideration that claims our attention is the reverence due to the senate, to the great council of the nation, which ought always to be consulted when any important design is formed, or any new measures adopted; especially if they are such as cannot be defeated by being made publick, and such as an uncommon degree of expense is necessary to support.

These principles, my lords, which I suppose no man will contest, have been so little regarded by the ministry on the present occasion, that they seem to have endeavoured to discover, by a bold experiment, to what degree of servility senates may be reduced, and what insults they will be taught to bear without resentment; for they have, without the least previous hint of their design, made a contract for a very numerous body of mercenaries, nor did they condescend to inform the senate, till they asked for money to pay them.

To execute measures first, and then to require the approbation of the senate, instead of advice, is surely such a degree of contempt as has not often been shown in the most arbitrary reigns, and such as would once have provoked such indignation in the other house, that there would have been no need in this of a motion like the present.

But, my lords, in proportion as the other house seems inclined to pay an implicit submission to the dictates of the ministry, it is our duty to increase our vigilance, and to convince our fellow-subjects, by a steady opposition to all encroachments, that we are not, as we have been sometimes styled, an useless assembly, but the last resort of liberty, and the chief support of the constitution.

The present design of those, who have thus dared to trample upon our privileges, appears to be nothing less than that of reducing the senates of Britain to the same abject slavery with those of France; to show the people that we are to be considered only as their agents, to raise the supplies which they shall be pleased, under whatever pretences, to demand, and to register such determinations as they shall condescend to lay before us.

This invasion of our rights, my lords, is too flagrant to be borne, though were the measures which we are thus tyrannically, required to support, really conducive in themselves to the interest of Britain, which, indeed, might reasonably have been expected; for what head can be imagined so ill formed for politicks as not to know, that the first acts of arbitrary power ought to be in themselves popular, that the advantage of the effect may be a balance to the means by which it is produced.

But these wonderful politicians, my lords, have heaped one blunder upon another; they have disgusted the nation both by the means and the end; and have insulted the senate with no other view than that of plundering the people. They have ventured, without the consent of the senate, to pursue measures, of which it is obvious that they were only kept secret because they easily foresaw that they would not be approved.

For that the hire of mercenaries from Hanover, my lords, would have been rejected with general indignation; that the proposal would have produced hisses rather than censures; and that the arguments which have been hitherto used to support it, would, if personal regards did not make them of some importance, produce laughter oftener than replies, cannot surely be doubted.

It has been said in vindication of this wise scheme, that no other troops could be obtained but those of Hanover; an assertion which I hope I may be allowed to examine, because it is yet a bare assertion without argument, and against probability; since it is generally known, how willingly the princes of Germany have on all former occasions sent out their subjects to destruction, that they might fill their coffers with their pay; nor do I doubt, but that there is now in the same country the usual superabundance of men, and the usual scarcity of money. I make no question, my lords, that many a German prince would gladly furnish us with men as a very cheap commodity, and think himself sufficiently rewarded by a small subsidy. There could be no objection to these troops from the constitution of the empire, which is not of equal force against the forces of Hanover; nor do I know why they should not rather have been employed, if they could have been obtained at a cheaper price.

The absurdity of paying levy-money for troops regularly kept up, and of hiring them at a higher rate than was ever paid for auxiliaries before, has been so strongly urged, and so fully explained, that no reply has been attempted by those who have hitherto opposed the motion; having rather endeavoured to divert our attention to foreign considerations, than to vindicate this part of the contract, which is, indeed, too shameful to be palliated, and too gross to be overlooked.

It is, however, proper to repeat, my lords, that though it cannot be confuted, it may be forgotten in the multitude of other objects, that this nation, after having exalted the elector of Hanover from a state of obscurity to the crown, is condemned to hire the troops of Hanover to fight their own cause, to hire them at a rate which was never demanded for them before, and to pay levy-money for them, though it is known to all Europe, that they were not raised on this occasion.

Nor is this the only hardship or folly of this contract; for we are to pay them a month before they march into our service; we are to pay those for doing nothing, of whom it might have been, without any unreasonable expectations, hoped, that they would have exerted their utmost force without pay.

For it is apparent, my lords, that if the designs of France be such as the noble lords who oppose the motion represent them, Hanover is much nearer to danger than Britain; and, therefore, they only fight for their own preservation; since, though they have for a single year been blessed with a neutrality, it cannot be imagined, that the same favour will be always granted them, or that the French, when they have overrun all the rest of Germany, will not annex Hanover to their other dominions.

Besides, my lords, it is well known, that Hanover is equally engaged by treaty with Britain to maintain the Pragmatick sanction, and that a certain proportion of troops are to be furnished. But, my lords, as to the march of that body of forces, I have yet heard no account. Will any lord say that they have marched? I, therefore, suppose, that the wisdom and justice of our ministers has comprehended them in the sixteen thousand who are to fatten upon British pay, and that Hanover will support the Pragmatick sanction at the cost of this inexhaustible nation.

The service which those troops have already done to the common cause, has been urged with great pomp of exaggeration, of which what effect it may have had upon others, I am not able to say; for my part, I am convinced, that the great happiness of this kingdom is the security of the established succession; and am, therefore, always of opinion, that no measures can serve the common cause, the cause of liberty, or of religion, or of general happiness, by which the royal family loses the affections of the people. And I can with great confidence affirm, that no attempt for many years has raised a greater heat of resentment, or excited louder clamours of indignation, than the hire of Hanoverian troops; nor is this discontent raised only by artful misrepresentations, formed to inflame the passions, and perplex the understanding; it is a settled and rational dislike, which every day contributes to confirm, which will make all the measures of the government suspected, and may in time, if not obviated, break out in sedition.

A jealousy of Hanover has, indeed, for a long time prevailed in the nation. The frequent visits of our kings to their electoral dominions, contrary to the original terms on which this crown was conferred upon them, have inclined the people of Britain to suspect, that they have only the second place in the affection of their sovereign; nor has this suspicion been made less by the large accessions made to those dominions by purchases, which the electors never appeared able to make before their exaltation to the throne of Britain, and by some measures which have been apparently taken only to aggrandize Hanover at the expense of Britain.

These measures, my lords, I am very far from imputing to our sovereign or his father; the wisdom of both is so well known, that they cannot be imagined to have incurred, either by contempt or negligence, the disaffection of their subjects. Those, my lords, are only to be blamed, who concealed from them the sentiments of the nation, and for the sake of promoting their own interest, betrayed them, by the most detestable and pernicious flattery, into measures which could produce no other effect than that of making their reign unquiet, and of exasperating those who had concurred with the warmest zeal in supporting them on the throne.

It is not without an uncommon degree of grief, that I hear it urged in defence of this contract, that it was approved by a very numerous council; for what can produce more sorrow in an honest and a loyal breast, than to find that our sovereign is surrounded by counsellors, who either do not know the desires and opinions of the people, or do not regard them; who are either so negligent as not to examine how the affections of the nation may be best preserved, or so rash as to pursue those schemes by which they hope to gratify the king at whatever hazard, and who for the sake of flattering him for a day, will risk the safety of his government, and the repose of his life.

It has, with regard to these troops, been asked by the noble lord who spoke last, what is the intent of this motion but to disband them? What else, indeed, can be intended by it, and what intention can be more worthy of this august assembly? By a steady pursuit of this intention, my lords, we shall regain the esteem of the nation, which this daring invasion of our privileges may be easily supposed to have impaired. We shall give our sovereign an opportunity, by a gracious condescension to our desires, to recover those affections of which the pernicious advice of flatterers has deprived him; we shall obviate a precedent which threatens destruction to our liberties, and shall set the nation free from an universal alarm. Nor in our present state is it to be mentioned as a trifling consideration, that we shall hinder the wealth of the nation from being ravished from our merchants, our farmers, and our manufacturers, to be squandered upon foreigners, and foreigners from whom we can hope for no advantage.

But it may be asked, my lords, how the great cause of liberty is to be supported, how the house of Austria is to be preserved from ruin, and how the ambition of France is to be repressed? How all this is to be effected, my lords, I am very far from conceiving myself qualified to determine; but surely it will be very little hindered by the dismission of troops, whose allegiance obliges them not to fight against the emperour, and of whom, therefore, it does not easily appear how they can be very useful allies to the queen of Hungary.

But whatever service is expected from them, it may surely, my lords, be performed by the same number of British troops; and that number may be sent to supply their place, without either delay or difficulty; I will venture to say, without any hazard. If it be objected, as it has often been, that by sending out our troops, we shall leave our country naked to invasion, I hope I may be allowed to ask, who will invade us? The French are well known to be the only people whom we can suspect of any such design. They have no fleet on this side of their kingdom, and their ships in the Mediterranean are blocked up in the harbour by the navies of Britain. We shall still have at home a body of seven thousand men, which was thought a sufficient security in the late war, when the French had a fleet equal to our own. Why we should now be in more danger from without, I cannot discover; and with regard to intestine commotions, they will be prevented by compliance with the present motion. For nothing can incite the people of Britain to oppose those who have openly dismissed the troops of Hanover.

But, my lords, I am not yet at all convinced, that the end for which those troops are said to be hired, ought to be pursued, or can be attained by us; and if the end be in itself improper or impossible, it certainly follows, that the means ought to be laid aside.

If we consider the present state of the continent, we shall find no prospect by which we can be encouraged to hazard our forces or our money. The king of Sardinia has, indeed, declared for us, and opposed the passage of the Spaniards; but he appears either to be deficient in courage, or in prudence, or in force; for instead of giving battle on his frontiers, he has suffered them, with very little resistance, to invade his territories, to plunder and insult his subjects, and to live at his expense; and it may be suspected, that if he cannot drive them out of his country, he will in time be content to purchase their departure, by granting them a passage through it, and rather give up the dominions of his ally to be ravaged, than preserve them at the expense of his own.

If we turn our eyes towards the Dutch, we shall not be more encouraged to engage in the wars on the continent; for whatever has been asserted of their readiness to proceed in conjunction with us, they appear hitherto to behold, with the most supine tranquillity, the subversion of the German system, and to be satisfied with an undisturbed enjoyment of their riches and their trade. Nor is there any appearance, my lords, that their concurrence is withheld only by a single town, as has been insinuated; for the vote of any single town, except Amsterdam, may be overruled, and the resolution has passed the necessary form, when it is opposed by only one voice.

If we take a view, my lords, of their late conduct, without suffering our desires to mislead our understandings, we shall find no reason for imagining, that they propose any sudden alteration of their conduct, which has been hitherto consistent and steady, and appears to arise from established principles, which nothing has lately happened to incline them to forsake.

When they were solicited to become, like us, the guarantees of Hanover, they made no scruple of returning, with whatever unpoliteness, an absolute refusal; nor could they be prevailed upon to grant, what we appear to think that we were honoured in being admitted to bestow. When they were called upon to fulfil their stipulation, and support the Pragmatick sanction, they evaded their own contract, till all assistance would have been too late, had not a lucky discovery of the French perfidy separated the king of Prussia from them; and what reason, my lords, can be given, why they should now do what they refused, when it might have been much more safely and more easily effected? Did they suffer the queen of Hungary to be oppressed, only to show their own power and affluence by relieving her? or can it be imagined, that pity has prevailed over policy or cowardice? They, who in contempt of their own treaties refused to engage in a cause while it was yet doubtful, will certainly think themselves justified in abandoning it when it is lost, and will urge, that no treaty can oblige them to act like madmen, or to undertake impossibilities.

I am, therefore, convinced, my lords, that they will not enter into an offensive treaty, and that they have only engaged to do what their own interest required from them, without any new stipulation, to preserve their own country from invasion by sending garrisons into the frontier towns, which they may do without any offence to France, or any interruption of their own tranquillity.

Many other treaties have been mentioned, my lords, and mentioned with great ostentation, as the effects of consummate policy, which will, I suspect, appear to be at least only defensive treaties, by which the contracting powers promise little more than to take care of themselves.

In this state of the world, my lords, when all the powers of the continent appear benumbed by a lethargy, or shackled by a panick, to what purpose should we lavish, in hiring and transporting troops, that wealth which contests of nearer importance immediately require?

It is well known to our merchants, whose ships are every day seized by privateers, that we are at war with Spain, and that our commerce is every day impaired by the depredations of an enemy, whom only our own negligence enables to resist us; but I doubt, my lords, whether it is known in Spain, that their monarch is at war with Britain, otherwise than by the riches of our nation, which are distributed among their privateers, and the prisoners who in the towns on the coast are wandering in the streets. For I know no inconvenience which they can be supposed to feel from our hostilities, nor in what part of the world the war against them is carried on. Before the war was declared, it is well remembered by whom, and with how great vehemence, it was every day repeated, that to end the war with honour we ought to take and hold. What, my lords, do we hold, or what have we taken? What has the war produced in its whole course from one year to another, but defeats, losses, and ignominy? And how shall we regain our honour, or retrieve our wealth, by engaging in another war more dangerous but less necessary? We ought surely to humble Spain, before we presume to attack France; and we may attack France with better prospects of success, when we have no other enemy to divert our attention, or divide our forces.

That we ought, indeed, to make any attempt upon France, I am far from being convinced, because I do not now discover, that any of the motives subsist which engaged us in the last confederacy. The house of Austria, though overborne and distressed, was then powerful in itself, and possessed of the imperial crown. It is now reduced almost below the hopes of recovery, and we are therefore now to restore what we were then only to support. But what, my lords, is in my opinion much more to be considered, the nation was then unanimous in one general resolution to repress the insolence of France; no hardships were insupportable that conduced to this great end, nor any taxes grievous that were applied to the support of the war. The account of a victory was esteemed as an equivalent to excises and to publick debts; and the possessions of us and our posterity were cheerfully mortgaged to purchase a triumph over the common enemy. But, my lords, the disposition of the nation with regard to the present war is very different. They discover no danger threatening them, they are neither invaded in their possessions by the armies, nor interrupted in their commerce by the fleets of France; and therefore they are not able to find out why they must be sacrificed to an enemy, by whom they have been long pursued with the most implacable hatred, for the sake of attacking a power from which they have hitherto felt no injury, and which they believe cannot be provoked without danger, nor opposed without such a profusion of expense as the publick is at present not able to bear.

It is not to be supposed, my lords, that the bulk of the British people are affected with the distresses, or inflamed by the magnanimity of the queen of Hungary. This illustrious daughter of Austria, whose name has been so often echoed in these walls, and of whom I am far from denying, that she deserves our admiration, our compassion, and all the assistance which can be given her, consistently with the regard due to the safety of our own country, is to the greatest part of the people an imaginary princess, whose sufferings or whose virtues make no other impression upon them, than those which are recorded in fictitious narratives; nor can they easily be persuaded to give up for her relief the produce of their lands, or the profits of their commerce.

Some, indeed, there are, my lords, whose views are more extensive, and whose sentiments are more exalted; for it is not to be supposed, that either knowledge or generosity are confined to the senate or the court: but these, my lords, though they perhaps may more readily approve the end which the ministry pretends to pursue, are less satisfied with the means by which they endeavour to attain it. By these men it is easily discovered, that the hopes which some so confidently express of prevailing upon the Dutch to unite with us for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, are without foundation; they see that their consent to place garrisons in the frontier towns, however it may furnish a subject of exultation to those whose interest it is to represent them as ready to concur with us, is only a new proof of what was never doubted, their unvariable attention to their own interest, since they must for their own security preserve their own barrier from being seized by France. By this act they incur no new expense, they provoke no enemies, nor give any assistance to the queen of Hungary, by which they can raise either resentment in one part, or gratitude in the other; and therefore it is not hard to perceive that, whatever is pretended, the Dutch hitherto observe the most exact laws of neutrality; and it is too evident, that if they refuse their assistance, we have very little to hope from a war with France.

Nor is this the only objection against the present measures; for it is generally, and not without sufficient reason suspected, that the real assistance of the queen of Hungary is not intended, since the troops which have been hired under that pretence, are such as cannot march against the emperour. It is known, that the Hessians have absolutely refused to infringe the constitution of the German body, by attacking him who is by a legal grant acknowledged its head; nor is it easy to conceive, why there should be a different law for Hanover than for the other electorates.

The long stay of the troops in Flanders, a place where there is no enemy to encounter, nor ally to assist, is a sufficient proof that there is nothing more designed than that the troops of Hanover shall loiter on the verge of war, and receive their pay for feasting in their quarters, and showing their arms at a review; and that they in reality design nothing but to return home with full pockets, and enjoy the spoils of Britain.

There may, indeed, be another reason, my lords, which hinders the progress of the united forces, and by which the Britons and Hanoverians may be both affected, though not both in the same degree. It is by no means unlikely, that the king of Prussia has forbidden them to advance, and declared, that the king who was chosen by his suffrage shall be supported by his arms; if this be his resolution, he is well known to want neither spirit nor strength to avow and support it; and there are reasons sufficient to convince us, that he has declared it, and that our troops are now patiently waiting the event of a negotiation by which we are endeavouring to persuade him to alter his design, if, indeed, it be desired that he should alter it; for it is not certain, that the elector of Hanover can desire the restoration of the house of Austria to an hereditary enjoyment of the imperial dignity; nor can it easily be shown why the politicks of one house, should differ from those of all the other princes of the German empire.

The other princes, my lords, have long wished for a king with whom they might treat upon the level; a king who might owe his dignity only to their votes, and who, therefore, would be willing to favour them in gratitude for the benefit. They know, that the princes of the house of Austria considered their advancement to the empire as the consequence of their numerous forces and large dominions, and made use of their exaltation only to tyrannise under the appearance of legal right, and to oppress those as sovereigns, whom they would otherwise have harassed as conquerors.

Before we can, therefore, hope for the concurrence of the princes of the empire, we must inform them of our design, if any design has been yet laid out. Is it your intention to restore the house of Austria to the full enjoyment of its former greatness? This will certainly be openly opposed by all those powers who are strong enough to make head against it, and secretly obstructed by those, whose weakness makes them afraid of publick declarations. Do you intend to support the Pragmatick sanction? This can only be done by defeating the whole power of France; and for this you must necessarily provide troops who shall dare to act against the present king. So that it appears, my lords, that we are attempting nothing, or attempting impossibilities; that either we have no end in view, or that we have made use of an absurd choice of means by which it cannot be attained.

Whatever be our design with regard to Germany, the war against Spain is evidently neglected; and, indeed, one part of our conduct proves at once, that we intend neither to assist the Austrians, nor to punish the Spaniards; since we have in a great measure disabled ourselves from either by the neutrality which captain Martin is said to have granted, and by which we have allowed an asylum both to the troops of Spain, which shall fly before the Austrians, and the privateers which shall be chased by our ships in the Mediterranean.

I am, therefore, convinced, my lords, that our designs are not such as they are represented, or that they will not be accomplished by the measures taken. I am convinced in a particular manner, that the troops of Hanover can be of no use, and that they will raise the resentment of the nation, already overwhelmed with unnecessary burdens. I know, likewise, that they have been taken into pay without the consent of the senate, and am convinced, that if no other objection could be raised, we ought not to ratify a treaty which the crown has made, without laying it before us in the usual manner. I need not, therefore, inform your lordships, that I think the motion now under your consideration necessary and just; and that I hope, upon an attentive examination of the reasons which have been offered, your lordships will concur in it with that unanimity which evidence ought to enforce, and that zeal which ought to be excited by publick danger.

To which the duke of NEWCASTLE made answer to the following purport:—My lords, I know not by what imaginary appearances of publick danger the noble lord is so much alarmed, nor what fears they are which he endeavours with so much art and zeal to communicate to this assembly. For my part, I can upon the most attentive survey of our affairs, discover nothing to be feared but calumnies and misrepresentations; and these I shall henceforward think more formidable, since they have been able to impose upon an understanding so penetrating as that of his lordship, and have prevailed upon him to believe what is not only false, but without the appearance of truth, and to believe it so firmly, as to assert it to your lordships.

One of the facts which he has thus implicitly received, and thus publickly mentioned, is the neutrality supposed to have been granted to the king of Sicily, from which he has amused himself and your lordships with deducing very destructive consequences, that perhaps need not to be allowed him, even upon supposition of the neutrality; but which need not now be disputed, because no neutrality has been granted. Captain Martin, when he treated with the king, very cautiously declined any declarations of the intentions of the British court on that particular, and confined himself to the subject of his message, without giving any reason for hope, or despair of a neutrality. So that if it shall be thought necessary, we are this hour at liberty to declare war against the king of Sicily, and may pursue the Spaniards with the same freedom on his coasts as on those of any other power, and prohibit any assistance from being given by him to their armies in Italy.

His lordship's notion of the interposition of the king of Prussia in the king's favour, is another phantom raised by calumny to terrify credulity; a phantom which will, I hope, be entirely dissipated, when I have informed the house, that the whole suspicion is without foundation, and that the king of Prussia has made no declaration of any design to support the king, or of opposing us in the performance of our treaties. This prince, my lords, however powerful, active, or ambitious, appears to be satisfied with his acquisitions, and willing to rest in an inoffensive neutrality.

Such, my lords, and so remote from truth are the representations which the enemies of the government have with great zeal and industry scattered over the nation, and by which they have endeavoured to obviate those schemes which they would seem to favour; for by sinking the nation to a despair of attaining those ends which they declare at the same time necessary not only to our happiness, but to our preservation, what do they less than tell us, that we must be content to look unactive on the calamities that approach us, and prepare to be crushed by that ruin which we cannot prevent?

From this cold dejection, my lords, arises that despair which so many lords have expressed, of prevailing upon the Dutch to unite with us. The determinations of that people are, indeed, always slow, and the reason of their slowness has been already given; but I am informed, that the general spirit which now reigns among them, is likely soon to overrule the particular interests of single provinces, and can produce letters by which it will appear, that had only one town opposed those measures to which their concurrence is now solicited, it had been long since overruled; for there want not among them men equally enamoured of the magnanimity and firmness of the queen of Hungary, equally zealous for the general good of mankind, equally zealous for the liberties of Europe, and equally convinced of the perfidy, the ambition, and the insolence of France, with any lord in this assembly.

These men, my lords, have long endeavoured to rouse their country from the sloth of avarice, and the slumber of tranquillity, to a generous and extensive regard for the universal happiness of mankind; and are now labouring in the general assembly to communicate that ardour with which they are themselves inflamed, and to excite that zeal for publick faith, of which their superiour knowledge shows them the necessity.

It has been, indeed, insinuated, that all their consultations tend only to place garrisons in those towns from which the queen of Hungary has withdrawn her forces; but this supposition, my lords, as it is without any support from facts, is, likewise, without probability. For to garrison the barrier towns requires no previous debates nor deliberations; since it never was opposed even by those by whom the assistance of the queen of Hungary has been most retarded. Nor have even the deputies of Dort, whose obstinacy has been most remarkable, denied the necessity of securing the confines of their country, by possessing with their own troops those places which the Austrians are obliged to forsake. Their present disputes, my lords, must be, therefore, on some other question; and what question can be now before them which can produce any difficulties, but that which regards the support of the Pragmatick sanction?

If these deliberations should be so far influenced by the arrival of the army in the pay of Britain, as to end in a resolution to send a sufficient number of forces into Germany, it will not be denied, that the troops which give occasion for this debate, have really been useful to the common cause; nor will his majesty lose the affections of any of his subjects, by the false accounts which have been spread of an invidious preference given to the troops of Hanover.

That every government ought to endeavour to gain the esteem and confidence of the people, I suppose we are all equally convinced; but I, for my part, am very far from thinking that measures ought only to be pursued or rejected, as they are immediately favoured or disliked by the populace. For as they cannot know either the causes or the end of publick transactions, they can judge only from fallacious appearances, or the information of those whose interest it may perhaps be to lead them away from the truth. That monarch will be most certainly and most permanently popular, who steadily pursues the good of his people, even in opposition to their own prejudices and clamours; who disregards calumnies, which, though they may prevail for a day, time will sufficiently confute, and slights objections which he knows may be answered, and answered beyond reply.

Such, my lords, are the objections which have been hitherto raised against the troops of Hanover, of which many arise from ignorance, and many from prejudice; and some may be supposed to be made only for the sake of giving way to invectives, and indulging a petulant inclination of speaking contemptuously of Hanover.

With this view, my lords, it has been asked, why the Hanoverians are preferred to all other nations? why they have been selected from all other troops, to fight, against France, the cause of Europe? They were chosen, my lords, because they were most easily to be procured. Of the other nations from whom forces have usually been hired, some were engaged in the care of protecting, or the design of extending their own dominions, and others had no troops levied, nor could, therefore, furnish them with speed enough for the exigence that demanded them.

It has been asked with an air of triumph, as a question to which no answer could be given, why an equal number of Britons was not sent, since their valour might be esteemed at least equal to that of Hanoverians? I am far, my lords, from intending to diminish the reputation of the British courage, or detract from that praise which has been gained by such gallant enterprises, and preserved by a long succession of dangers, and of victories; nor do I expect that any nation will ever form a just claim to superiority. The reason, therefore, my lords, for which the troops of Hanover were hired, was not that the bravery of our countrymen was doubted, but that the transportation of such numbers might leave us naked to the insults of an enemy. For though the noble lord has declared, that after having sent sixteen thousand into Flanders, we should still have reserved for our defence a body of seven thousand, equal to that to which the protection of this kingdom was intrusted in the late war, his opinion will upon examination be found to have arisen only from the enumeration of the names of our regiments, many of which are far from being complete, and some almost merely nominal; so that, perhaps, if a body of sixteen thousand more had been sent, there would not have remained a single regiment to have repelled the crew of any daring privateer that should have landed to burn our villages, and ravage the defenceless country.

It was desired, my lords, by the queen of Hungary, that a British army might appear on the continent in her favour, for she knew the reputation and terrour of our arms; and as her demand was equitable in itself, and honourable to the nation, it was complied with; and as many of our native troops were sent, as it was thought convenient to spare, the rest were necessarily to be hired; and it is the business of those lords who defend the motion, to show from whence they could be called more properly than from Hanover.

It has been urged with great warmth, that the contract made for these troops has not been laid before the senate, a charge which the noble lord who spoke last but one, has shown to be ill grounded; because the former determinations of the senate enabled the crown to garrison the frontier towns without any new deliberations, but which may be, perhaps, more satisfactorily confuted by showing, that it is an accusation of neglecting that which was in reality not possible to be performed, or which at least could not be performed without subjecting the government to imputations yet more dangerous than those which it now suffers.

The accounts, my lords, by which the ministry were determined to send the army into Flanders, arrived only fifteen days before the recess of the senate; nor was the resolution formed, as it may easily be imagined, till several days after; so that there was very little time for senatorial deliberations, nor was it, perhaps, convenient to publish at that time the whole scheme of our designs.

But let us suppose, my lords, that the senate had, a few days before they rose, been consulted, and that a vote of credit had been required to enable the crown to hire forces during the interval of the sessions, what would those by whom this motion is supported have urged against it? Would they not with great appearance of reason have alleged the impropriety of such an application to the thin remains of a senate, from which almost all those had retired, whom their employments did not retain in the neighbourhood of the court? Would it not have been echoed from one corner of these kingdoms to another, that the ministry had betrayed their country by a contract which they durst not lay before a full senate, and of which they would trust the examination only to those whom they had hired to approve it. Would not this have been generally asserted, and generally believed? Would not those who distinguished themselves as the opponents of the court, have urged, that the king ought to exert his prerogative, and trust the equity of the senate for the approbation of his measures, and the payment of the troops which he had retained for the support of the common cause, the cause for which so much zeal had been expressed, and for which it could not with justice be suspected, that any reasonable demands would be denied? Would not the solicitation of a grant of power without limits, to be exerted wholly at the discretion of the ministry, be censured as a precedent of the utmost danger, which it was the business of every man to oppose, who had not lost all regard to the constitution of his country?

These insinuations, my lords, were foreseen and allowed by the ministry to be specious, and, therefore, they determined to avoid them by pursuing their schemes at their own hazard, without any other security than the consciousness of the rectitude of their own designs; and to trust to the equity of the senate when they should be laid before them, at a time when part of their effects might be discovered, and when, therefore, no false representations could be used to mislead their judgment. They knew the zeal of the commons for the great cause of universal liberty; they knew that their measures had no other tendency than the promotion of that cause, and, therefore, they confidently formed those expectations which have not deceived them, that the pay of the troops would be readily granted, and ordered them, therefore, to march; though if the commons had disapproved their plan, they must have returned into their own country, or have been supported at the expense of the electorate.

The objections raised against these troops, have apparently had no influence in the other house, because supplies have been granted for their pay; and I believe they will, upon examination, be found by your lordships not to deserve much regard.

It is asserted, that they cannot act against the emperour, established and acknowledged by the diet, without subjecting their country to an interdict; and it was, therefore, suspected, that they would in reality be of no use. This suspicion, my lords, I suppose, it is now not necessary to censure, since you have heard from his majesty, that they are preparing to march; and as the consequences of their conduct can only affect the electorate, its propriety or legality with regard to the constitution of the empire, falls not properly under our consideration.

How his majesty's measures may be defended, even in this view, I suppose I need not inform any of this assembly. It is well known, that the emperour was chosen not by the free consent of the diet, in which every elector voted according to his own sense, but by a diet in which one vote of the empire was suspended without any regard to law or justice, and in which the rest were extorted by a French army, which threatened immediate ruin to him who should refuse his consent. The emperour thus chosen, was likewise afterwards recognised by the same powers, upon the same motives, and the aid was granted as the votes were given by the influence of the armies of France.

For this reason, my lords, the queen of Hungary still refuses to give the elector of Bavaria the style and honours which belong to the imperial dignity; she considers the throne as still vacant, and requires that it should be filled by an uninfluenced election.

It has been observed, my lords, that his majesty gave his vote to the elector of Bavaria; and it has been, therefore, represented as an inconsistency in his conduct, that he should make war against him. But, my lords, it will by no means follow, that because he voted for him he thinks him lawfully elected, nor that it is unjust to dispossess him; though it is to be observed, that we are not making war to dethrone the emperour, however elected, but to support the Pragmatick sanction.

This observation, though somewhat foreign from the present debate, I have thought it not improper to lay before your lordships, that no scruples might remain in the most delicate and scrupulous, and to show that the measures of his majesty cannot be justly charged with inconsistency.

But this, my lords, is not the only, nor the greatest benefit which the queen of Hungary has received from these troops; for it is highly probable, that the states will be induced to concur in the common cause, when they find that they are not incited to a mock confederacy, when they perceive that we really intend to act vigorously, that we decline neither expense nor danger, and that a compliance with our demands will not expose them to stand alone and unassisted against the power of France, elated by success, and exasperated by opposition.

If this, my lords, should be the consequence of our measures, and this consequence is, perhaps, not far distant, it will no longer be, I hope, asserted, that these mercenaries are an useless burden to the nation, that they are of no advantage to the common cause, or that the people have been betrayed by the ministry into expenses, merely that Hanover might be enriched. When the grand confederacy is once revived, and revived by any universal conviction of the destructive measures, the insatiable ambition, and the outrageous cruelty of the French, what may not the friends of liberty presume to expect? May they not hope, my lords, that those haughty troops which have been so long employed in conquests and invasions, that have laid waste the neighbouring countries with slaughters and devastations, will be soon compelled to retire to their own frontiers, and be content to guard the verge of their native provinces? May we not hope, that they will soon be driven from their posts; that they will be forced to retreat to a more defensible station, and admit the armies of their enemies into their dominions; and that they will be pursued from fortress to fortress, and from one intrenchment to another, till they shall be reduced to petition for peace, and purchase it by the alienation of part of their territories.

I hope, my lords, it may be yet safely asserted that the French, however powerful, are not invincible; that their armies may be destroyed, and their treasures exhausted; that they may, therefore, be reduced to narrow limits, and disabled from being any longer the disturbers of the peace of the universe.

It is well known, my lords, that their wealth is not the product of their own country; that gold is not dug out of their mountains, or rolled down their rivers; but that it is gained by an extensive and successful commerce, carried on in many parts of the world, to the diminution of our own. It is known, likewise, that trade cannot be continued in war, without the protection of naval armaments; and that our fleet is at present superiour in strength to those of the greatest part of the universe united. It is, therefore, reasonably to be hoped, that though by assisting the house of Austria we should provoke the French to declare war against us, their hostilities would produce none of those calamities which seem to be dreaded by part of this assembly; and that such a confederacy might be formed as would be able to retort all the machinations of France upon herself, as would tear her provinces from her, and annex them to other sovereignties.

It has been urged, that no such success can be expected from the conduct which we have lately pursued; that we, who are thus daring the resentment of the most formidable power in the universe, have long suffered ourselves to be insulted by an enemy of far inferiour force; that we have been defeated in all our enterprises, and have at present appeared to desist from any design of hostilities; that the Spaniards scarcely perceive that they have an enemy, or feel, any of the calamities or inconveniencies of war; and that they are every day enriched with the plunder of Britain, without danger, and without labour.

That the war against Spain has not hitherto been remarkably successful, must be confessed; and though the Spaniards cannot boast of any other advantages than the defence of their own dominions, yet they may, perhaps, be somewhat elated, as they have been able to hold out against an enemy superiour to themselves. But, my lords, I am far from believing, that they consider the war against us as an advantage, or that they do not lament it as one of the heaviest calamities that could fall upon them. If it be asked, in what part of their dominions they feel any effects of our hostility, I shall answer with great confidence, that they feel them in every part which is exposed to the evils of a naval war; that they are in pain wherever they are sensible; that they are wounded wherever they are not sheltered from our blows, by the interposition of the nations of the continent.

If we examine, my lords, the influence of our European armaments, we shall find that their ships of war are shut up in the harbour of France, and that the fleets of both nations are happily blocked up together, so that they can neither extricate each other by concerted motions, in which our attention might be distracted, and our force divided, nor by their united force break through the bars by which they are shut up from the use of the ocean.

But this, my lords, however important with respect to us, is perhaps the smallest inconvenience which the Spaniards feel from our naval superiority. They have an army, my lords, in Italy, exposed to all the miseries of famine, while our fleet prohibits the transportation of those provisions which have been stored in vessels for their supply, and which must be probably soon made defenceless by the want of ammunition, and fall into the hands of their enemies without the honour of a battle.

But what to the pride of a Spaniard must be yet a more severe affliction, they have on the same continent a natural confederate, who is yet so intimidated by the British fleets, that he dares neither afford them refuge in his dominions, nor send his troops to their assistance. The queen, amidst all the schemes which her unbounded ambition forms for the exaltation of her family, finds her own son, after having received a kingdom from her kindness, restrained from supporting her, and reduced to preserve those territories which she has bestowed upon him, by abandoning her from whom he received them.

These, my lords, are the inconveniencies which the Spaniards feel from our fleets in the Mediterranean; and even these, however embarrassing, however depressing, are lighter than those which our American navy produces. It is apparent, that money is equivalent to strength, a proposition of which, if it could be doubted, the Spanish monarchy would afford sufficient proof, as it has been for a long time supported only by the power of riches. It is, therefore, impossible to weaken Spain more speedily or more certainly, than by intercepting or obstructing the annual supplies of gold and silver which she receives from her American provinces, by which she was once enabled to threaten slavery to all the neighbouring nations, and incited to begin, with the subjection of this island, her mighty scheme of universal monarchy, and by which she has still continued to exalt herself to an equality with the most powerful nations, to erect new kingdoms, and set at defiance the Austrian power.

These supplies, my lords, are now, if not wholly, yet in a great measure, withheld; and by all the efforts which the Spaniards now make, they are exhausting their vitals, and wasting the natural strength of their native country. While they made war with adventitious treasures, and only squandered one year what another would repay them, it was not easy to foresee how long their pride would incline them to hold out against superiour strength. While they were only engaged in a naval war, they might have persisted for a long time in a kind of passive obstinacy; and while they were engaged in no foreign enterprises, might have supported that trade with each other which is necessary for the support of life, upon the credit of those treasures which are annually heaped up in their storehouses, though they are not received; and by which, upon the termination of the war, all their debts might at once be paid, and all their funds be reestablished.

But at present, my lords, their condition is far different; they have been tempted by the prospect of enlarging their dominions to raise armies for distant expeditions, which must be supported in a foreign country, and can be supported only by regular remittances of treasure, and have formed these projects at a time when the means of pursuing them are cut off. They have by one war increased their expenses, when their receipts are obstructed by another.

In this state, my lords, I am certain the Spaniards are very far from thinking the hostility of Britain merely nominal, and from inquiring in what part of the world their enemies are to be found. The troops in Italy see them sailing in triumph over the Mediterranean, intercepting their provisions, and prohibiting those succours which they expected from their confederate of Sicily. In Spain their taxes and their poverty, poverty which every day increases, inform them that the seas of America are possessed by the fleets of Britain, by whom their mines are made useless, and their wealthy dominions reduced to an empty sound. They may, indeed, comfort themselves in their distresses with the advantages which their troops have gained over the king of Sardinia, and with the entrance which they have forced into his dominions; but this can afford them no long satisfaction, since they will, probably, never be able to break through the passes at which they have arrived, or to force their way into Italy; and must perish at the feet of inaccessible rocks, where they are now supported at such an expense that they are more burdensome to their own master than to the king of Sardinia.

Of this prince, I know not why, it has been asserted that he will probably violate his engagements to Britain and Austria; that he will purchase peace by perfidy, and grant a passage to the army of Spain. His conduct has certainly given, hitherto, no reason for such an imputation; he has opposed them with fortitude, and vigour, and address; nor has he failed in any of the duties required of a general or an ally; he has exposed his person to the most urgent dangers, and his dominions to the ravages of war; he has rejected all the solicitations of France, and set her menaces at defiance; and surely, my lords, if no private man ought to be censured without just reason, even in familiar discourse, we ought still to be more cautious of injuring the reputation of princes by publick reproaches in the solemn debates of national assemblies.

The same licentiousness of speech has not, indeed, been extended to all the princes mentioned in this debate. The emperour has been treated with remarkable decency as the lawful sovereign of Germany, as one who cannot be opposed without rebellion, and against whom we, therefore, cannot expect that the troops of Hanover should presume to act, since they must expose their country to the severities of the imperial interdict.

The noble lords who have thus ardently asserted the rights of the emperour, who have represented in such strong language the crime of violating the German constitutions, and have commended the neutrality of the king of Prussia, as proper to be imitated by all the rest of the princes 'of the empire, have forgotten, or hoped that others Would forget, the injustice and violence by which he exalted himself to the throne, from which they appear to think it a sacrilegious attempt to endeavour to thrust him down. They forget that one of the votes was illegally suspended, and that the rest were extorted by the terrour of an army. They forget that he invited the French into the empire, and that he is guilty of all the ravages which have been committed and all the blood that has been shed, since the death of the emperour, in the defence of the Pragmatick sanction which he invaded, though ratified by the solemn consent of the imperial diet.

In defence of the Pragmatick sanction, my lords, which all the princes of the empire, except his majesty, saw violated without concern, are we now required to exert our force; we are required only to perform what we promised by the most solemn treaties, which, though they have been broken by the cowardice or ambition of other powers, it will be our greatest honour to observe with exemplary fidelity.

With this view, as your lordships have already been informed, the Hanoverian troops will march into the empire; nor has their march been hitherto delayed, either because there was yet no regular scheme projected, or because they were obliged to wait for the permission of the king of Prussia, or because they intended only to amuse Europe with an empty show: they were detained, my lords, in Flanders, because it was believed that they were more useful there than they would be in any other place, because they at once encouraged the states, alarmed the French, defended the Low Countries, and kept the communication open between the queen's dominions and those of her allies. Nor were these advantages, my lords, chimerical, and such as are only suggested by a warm imagination; for it is evident that by keeping their station in those countries they have changed the state of the war, that they have protected the queen of Hungary from being oppressed by a new army of French, and given her an opportunity of establishing herself in the possession of Bavaria; that the French forces, instead of being sent either to the assistance of the king of Spain against the king of Sardinia, or of the emperour, for the recovery of those dominions which he has lost by an implicit confidence in their alliance, have been necessarily drawn down to the opposite extremity of their dominions, where they are of no use either to their own country, or to their confederates. The united troops of Britain and Hanover, therefore, carried on the war, by living at ease in their quarters in Flanders, more efficaciously than if they had marched immediately into Bavaria or Bohemia.

Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to show the justice of our designs, and the usefulness of the measures by which we have endeavoured to execute them; and doubt not but your lordships will, upon considering the arguments which have been urged on either side, and those which your own reflections will suggest, allow that it was not only just but necessary to take into our pay the troops of Hanover, for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, and the preservation of the house of Austria; and that since the same reasons which induced the government to hire them, still make it necessary to retain them, you will prefer the general happiness of Europe, the observation of publick faith, and the security of our own liberties and those of our posterity, to a small alleviation of our present expenses, and unanimously reject a motion, which has no other tendency than to resign the world into the hands of the French, and purchase a short and dependant tranquillity by the loss of all those blessings which make life desirable.

Lord LONSDALE spoke next to the following effect:—My lords, notwithstanding the confidence with which the late measures of the government have been defended by their authors, I am not yet set free from the scruples which my own observations had raised, and which have been strengthened by the assertions of those noble lords, who have spoken in vindication of the motion.

Many of the objections which have been raised and enforced with all the power of argument, have yet remained unanswered, or those answers which have been offered are such as leave the argument in its full strength. Many of the assertions which have been produced seem the effects of hope rather than conviction, and we are rather told what we are to hope from future measures, than what advantages we have received from the past.

I am, indeed, one of those whom it will be difficult to convince of the propriety of engaging in a new war, when we are unsuccessful in that which we have already undertaken, and of provoking a more powerful enemy, when all our attempts are baffled by a weaker; and cannot yet set myself free from the apprehension of new defeats and new disgraces from the arms of France, after having long seen how little we are able to punish the insolence of Spain. I cannot but fear that by an ill-timed and useless opposition to schemes which, however destructive or unjust, we cannot obviate, we shall subject ourselves to numberless calamities, that the ocean will be covered with new fleets of privateers, that our commerce will be interrupted in every part of the world, and that we shall only provoke France to seize what she would at least have spared some time longer.

But, my lords, if it be granted, that the Pragmatick sanction is obligatory to us, though it is violated by every other power; that we should labour to reduce the powers of Europe to an equipoise, whenever accident or folly produces any alteration of the balance; and that we are now not to preserve the house of Austria from falling, but raise it from the dust, and restore it to its ancient splendour, even at the hazard of a war with that power which now gives laws to all the western nations; yet it will not surely be asserted, that we ought to be without limits, that we ought to preserve the house of Austria, not only by the danger of our own country, but by its certain ruin, and endeavour to avert the possibility of slavery, by subjecting ourselves to miseries more severe than the utmost arrogance of conquest, or the most cruel wantonness of tyranny, would inflict upon us.

I have observed, that many lords have expressed in this debate an uncommon ardour for the support of the queen of Hungary; nor is it without pleasure, that I see the most laudable of all motives, justice and compassion, operate in this great assembly with so much force. May your lordships always continue to stand the great advocates for publick faith, and the patrons of true greatness in distress; may magnanimity always gain your regard, and calamity find shelter under your protection.

I, likewise, my lords, desire to be remembered among those who reverence the virtues and pity the miseries of this illustrious princess, who look with detestation on those who have invaded the dominions which they had obliged themselves by solemn treaties to defend, and who have taken advantage of the general confederacy against her, to enrich themselves with her spoils, who have insulted her distress and aggravated her misfortunes.

But, my lords, while I feel all these sentiments of compassion for the queen of Hungary, I have not yet been able to forget, that my own country claims a nearer regard; that I am obliged both by interest and duty to preserve myself and my posterity, and my fellow-subjects, from those miseries which I lament; when they happen to others, however distant, I cannot but remember, that I am not to save another from destruction by destroying myself, nor to rescue Austria by the ruin of Britain.

Though I am, therefore, my lords, not unwilling to assist the queen of Hungary, I think it necessary to fix the limits of our regard, to inquire how far we may proceed with safety, and what expenses the nation can bear, and how those expenses may be best employed. The danger of the queen of Hungary ought not to have an effect which would be reproachful, even if the danger was our own. It ought not so far to engross our faculties as to hinder us from attending to every other object. The man who runs into a greater evil to avoid a less, evidently shows that he is defective either in prudence or in courage; that either he wants the natural power of distinguishing, or that his dread of an approaching, or his impatience of a present evil, has taken it away.

Let us, therefore, examine, my lords, the measures with which those who are intrusted with the administration of publick affairs, would persuade us to concur, and inquire whether they are such as can be approved by us without danger to our country. Let us consider, my lords, yet more nearly, whether they are not such as we ourselves could not be prevailed upon even to regard as the object of deliberation, were we not dazzled on one part by glaring prospects of triumphs and honours, of the reduction of France, and the rescue of the world; of the propagation of liberty, and the defence of religion; and intimidated on the other by the view of approaching calamities, the cruelties of persecution, and the hardships of slavery.

All the arts of exaggeration, my lords, have been practised to reconcile us to the measures which are now proposed, and, indeed, all are necessary; for the expenses to which we are about to condemn this nation, are such as it is not able to bear, and to which no lord in this house would consent, were he calm enough to number the sums.

To prove the truth of this assertion, one question is necessary. Is any lord in this assembly willing to assist the queen of Hungary at the expense of sixteen hundred thousand a year? I think the universal silence of this assembly is a sufficient proof, that no one is willing; I will, however, repeat my question. Is any lord in this assembly willing that this nation should assist the queen of Hungary at the annual expense of sixteen hundred thousand pounds? The house is, as I expected, still silent, and, therefore, I may now safely proceed upon the supposition of an unanimous negative. Nor does any thing remain in order to evince the impropriety of the measures which we are about to pursue, but that every lord may reckon up the sum required for the support of those troops. Let him take a view of our military estimates, and he will quickly be convinced, how much we are condemned to suffer in this cause. He will find, that we are about not only to remit yearly into a foreign country more than a million and a half of money, but to hazard the lives of multitudes of our fellow-subjects, in a quarrel which at most affects us but remotely; that we are about to incur as auxiliaries an expense greater than that which the principals sustain.

The sum which I have mentioned, my lords, enormous as it may appear, is by no means exaggerated beyond the truth. Whoever shall examine the common military estimates, will easily be convinced, that the forces which we now maintain upon the continent cannot be supported at less expense; and that we are, therefore, about to exhaust our country in a distant quarrel, and to lavish our blood and treasure with useless profusion.

This profusion, my lords, is useless, at least useless to any other end, than an ostentatious display of our forces, and our riches; not because the balance of power is irrecoverably destroyed, not because it is contrary to the natural interest of an island to engage in wars on the continent, nor because we shall lose more by the diminution of our commerce, than we shall gain by an annual victory. It is useless, not because the power of France has by long negligence been suffered to swell beyond all opposition, nor because the queen of Hungary ought not to be assisted at the hazard of this kingdom, though all these reasons are of importance enough to claim our consideration. It is useless, my lords, because the queen of Hungary may be assisted more powerfully, at less charge; because a third part of this sum will enable her to raise, and to maintain, a greater body of men than have now been sent her.

Nor will the troops which she may be thus enabled to raise, my lords, be only more numerous, but more likely to prosecute the war with ardour; and to conclude it, therefore, with success. They will fight for the preservation of their own country, they will draw their swords to defend their houses and their estates, their wives and their children from the rage of tyrants and invaders; they will enter the field as men who cannot leave it to their enemies, without resigning all that makes life valuable; and who will, therefore, more willingly die than turn their backs.

It may reasonably be imagined, my lords, that the queen will place more confidence in such forces, than in troops which are to fight only for honour or for pay; and that she will expect from the affection of her own subjects, a degree of zeal and constancy which she cannot hope to excite in foreigners; and that she will think herself more secure in the protection of those whose fidelity she may secure by the solemnity of an oath, than those who have no particular regard for her person, nor any obligations to support her government.

It is no inconsiderable motive to this method of assisting our ally, that we shall entirely take away from France all pretences of hostilities or resentment, since we shall not attack her troops or invade her frontiers, but only furnish the queen of Hungary with money, without directing her how to apply it. I am far, my lords, from being so much intimidated by the late increase of the French greatness, as to imagine, that no limits can be set to their ambition. I am far from despairing, that the queen of Hungary alone, supported by us with pecuniary assistance, may be able to reduce them to solicitations for peace by driving them out of her dominions, and pursuing them into their own. But as the chance of war is always uncertain, it is surely most prudent to choose such a conduct as may exempt us from danger in all events; and since we are not certain of conquering the French, it is, in my opinion, most eligible not to provoke them, because we cannot be conquered without ruin.

This method is yet eligible on another account; by proceeding with frugality, we shall gain time to observe the progress of the war, and watch the appearance of any favourable opportunity, without exhausting ourselves so far as to be made unable to improve them.

The time, my lords, at which we shall be thus exhausted, at which we shall be reduced to an absolute inability to raise an army or equip a fleet, is not at a great distance. If our late profusion be for a short time continued, we shall quickly have drained the last remains of the wealth of our country. We have long gone on from year to year, raising taxes and contracting debts; and unless the riches of Britain are absolutely unlimited, must in a short time reduce them to nothing. Our expenses are not all, indeed, equally destructive; some, though the method of raising them be vexatious and oppressive, do not much impoverish the nation, because they are refunded by the extravagance and luxury of those who are retained in the pay of the court; but foreign wars threaten immediate destruction, since the money that is spent in distant countries can never fall back into its former channels, but is dissipated on the continent, and irrecoverably lost.

When this consideration is present to my mind, and, on this occasion, no man who has any regard for himself or his posterity can omit it, I cannot but think with horrour on a vote by which such prodigious sums are wafted into another region: I cannot but tremble at the sound of a tax for the support of a foreign war, and think a French army landed on our coasts not much more to be dreaded than the annual payment to which we appear now to be condemned, and from which nothing can preserve us but the address which is now proposed.

By what arguments the commons were persuaded, or by what motives incited to vote a supply for the support of this mercenary force, I have not yet heard; nor, as a member of this house, my lords, was it necessary for me to inquire. Their authority, though mentioned with so much solemnity on this occasion, is to have no influence on our determinations. If they are mistaken, it is more necessary for us to inquire with uncommon caution. If they are corrupt, it is more necessary for us to preserve our integrity. If we are to comply blindly with their decisions, our knowledge and experience are of no benefit to our country, we only waste time in useless solemnities, and may be once more declared useless to the publick.

The commons, my lords, do not imagine themselves, nor are imagined by the nation, to constitute the legislature. The people, when any uncommon heat prevails in the other house, disturbs their debates, and overrules their determinations, have been long accustomed to expect redress and security from our calmer counsels; and have considered this house as the place where reason and justice may be heard, when, by clamour and uproar, they are driven from the other. On this occasion, my lords, every Briton fixes his eye upon us, and every man who has sagacity enough to discover the dismal approach of publick poverty, now supplicates your lordships, by agreeing to this address, to preserve him from it.

Then the SPEAKER spoke to the following purport:—My lords, having very attentively observed the whole progress of this important debate, and considered with the utmost impartiality the arguments which have been made use of on each side, I cannot think the question before us doubtful or difficult; and hope that I may promote a speedy decision of it by recapitulating what has been already urged, that the debate may be considered at one view, and by adding some observations which have arisen to my own thoughts on this occasion.

At the first view of the question before us, in its present state, no man can find any reasons for prejudice in favour of the address proposed. This house is, indeed, yet divided, and many lords have spoken on each side with great force and with great address; but the authority of the other house, added to the numbers which have already declared in this for the support of the foreign troops, is sufficient to turn the balance, in the opinion of any man who contents himself to judge by the first appearance of things; and must incline him to imagine that position at least more probable, which is ratified by the determination of one house, and yet undecided by the other.