It, therefore, appears very evident, that we have more to hope and less to fear from the troops of Hanover, than from any other; since they have the same reason with ourselves to desire the success of the queen of Hungary, and to dread the increasing greatness of the French; and that they can be suspected neither of treachery nor desertion. It is not very consistent with that candour with which every man ought to dispute on publick affairs, to censure those measures which have been proposed, without proposing others that are more eligible; for it is the duty of every man to promote the business of the publick; nor do I know why he that employs his sagacity only to obstruct it, should imagine, that he is of any use in the national council.

I doubt not but I shall hear many objections against the use of these troops, and that upon this question, virulence and ridicule will be equally employed. But for my part, I shall be little affected either with the laughter that may be raised by some, or the indignation that may be expressed by others, but shall vote for the continuance of these measures till better shall be proposed; and shall think, that these troops ought to be retained, unless it can be shown, that any others may be had, who may be less dangerous, or of greater use.

Mr. PITT then rose up, and spoke, in substance as follows:—Sir, if the honourable gentleman determines to abandon his present sentiments as soon as any better measures are proposed, I cannot but believe, that the ministry will very quickly be deprived of one of their ablest defenders; for I think the measures which have hitherto been pursued so weak and pernicious, that scarcely any alteration can be proposed that will not be for the advantage of the nation.

He has already been informed, that there was no necessity of hiring auxiliary troops, since it does not yet appear, that either justice or policy required us to engage in the quarrels of the continent, that there was any need of forming an army in the Low Countries, or that, in order to form an army, auxiliaries were necessary.

But not to dwell upon disputable questions, I think it may be justly concluded, that the measures of our ministry have been ill concerted, because it is undoubtedly wrong to squander the publick money without effect, and to pay armies only to be a show to our friends, and a jest to our enemies.

The troops of Hanover, whom we are now expected to pay, marched into the Low Countries, indeed, and still remain in the same place; they marched to the place most distant from enemies, least in danger of an attack, and most strongly fortified, if any attack had been designed; nor have any claim to be paid, but that they left their own country for a place of greater security.

It is always reasonable to judge of the future by the past; and, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, that the services of these troops will not, next year, be of equal importance with that for which they are now to be paid; and I shall not be surprised, though the opponents of the ministry should be challenged, after such another glorious campaign, to propose better men, and should be told, that the money of this nation cannot be more properly employed than in hiring Hanoverians to eat and sleep.

But to prove yet more particularly, that better measures may be taken, and that more useful troops may be retained, and that, therefore, the honourable gentleman may be expected to quit those to whom he now adheres, I shall show, that in hiring the forces of Hanover, we have obstructed our own designs; that we have, instead of assisting the queen of Hungary, withdrawn part of her allies from her; and that we have burdened the nation with troops, from whom no service can be reasonably expected.

The advocates for the ministry have, on this occasion, affected to speak of the balance of power, the Pragmatick sanction, and the preservation of the queen of Hungary, not only as if they were to be the chief care of Britain, which, though easily controvertible, might, perhaps, in compliance with long prejudices, be admitted, but as if they were to be the care of Britain alone; as if the power of France were formidable to no other people, as if no other part of the world would be injured by becoming a province to an universal monarchy, and being subjected to an arbitrary government of a French deputy, by being drained of its inhabitants, only to extend the conquests of its masters, and to make other nations equally miserable, and by being oppressed with exorbitant taxes, levied by military executions, and employed only in supporting the state of its oppressors. They dwell upon the importance of publick faith, and the necessity of an exact observation of treaties; as if the Pragmatick sanction had been signed by no other potentate than the king of Britain, or as if the publick faith were to be obligatory to us only.

That we should inviolably observe our treaties, and observe them though every other nation should disregard them; that we should show an example of fidelity to mankind, and stand firm, though we should stand alone in the practice of virtue, I shall readily allow; and, therefore, I am far from advising that we should recede from our stipulations, whatever we may suffer by performing them, or neglect the support of the Pragmatick sanction, however we may be at present embarrassed, or however inconvenient it may be to assert it.

But surely for the same reason that we observe our own stipulations, we ought to incite other powers, likewise, to the observation of theirs; at least not contribute to hinder it. But how is our present conduct agreeable to these principles? The Pragmatick sanction was confirmed not only by the king of Britain, but by the elector, likewise, of Hanover, who is, therefore, equally obliged, if treaties constitute obligation, to defend the house of Austria against the attacks of any foreign power, and to send in his proportion of troops to the support of the queen of Hungary.

Whether these troops have been sent, those whose provinces oblige them to some knowledge of foreign affairs, can inform the house with more certainty than I; but since we have not heard them mentioned in this debate, and have found, by experience, that none of the merits of that electorate are passed over in silence, it may, I think, fairly be concluded, that the distresses of the illustrious queen of Hungary have yet received no alleviation from her alliance with Hanover, that her complaints have moved no compassion at that court, nor the justice of her cause obtained any regard.

To what can we impute this negligence of treaties, this disregard of justice, this defect of compassion, but to the pernicious counsels of those men who have advised his majesty to hire to Britain those troops which he should have employed in the assistance of the queen of Hungary; for it is not to be imagined, that his majesty has more or less regard to justice as king of Britain, than as elector of Hanover; or that he would not have sent his proportion of troops to the Austrian army, had not the temptations of greater profit been industriously laid before him.

But this is not all that may be urged against this conduct; for can we imagine, that the power of France is less, or that her designs are less formidable to Hanover than to Britain? nor is it less necessary for the security of Hanover, that the house of Austria should be reestablished in its former grandeur, and enabled to support the liberties of Europe against the bold attempts for universal monarchy.

If, therefore, our assistance be an act of honesty, and granted in consequence of treaties, why may it not equally be required of Hanover? And if it be an act of generosity, why should this nation alone be obliged to sacrifice her own interest to that of others? Or why should the elector of Hanover exert his liberality at the expense of Britain?

It is now too apparent, that this great, this powerful, this formidable kingdom, is considered only as a province to a despicable electorate; and that, in consequence of a scheme formed long ago, and invariably pursued, these troops are hired only to drain this unhappy nation of its money. That they have hitherto been of no use to Britain, or to Austria, is evident beyond controversy; and, therefore, it is plain, that they are retained only for the purposes of Hanover.

How much reason the transactions of almost every year have given for suspecting this ridiculous, ungrateful, and perfidious partiality, it is not necessary to mention. I doubt not but most of those who sit in this house can recollect a great number of instances, from the purchase of part of the Swedish dominions, to the contract which we are now called upon to ratify. I hope few have forgotten the memorable stipulation for the Hessian troops, for the forces of the duke of Wolfenbuttel, which we were scarcely to march beyond the verge of their own country, or the ever memorable treaty, of which the tendency is discovered in the name; the treaty by which we disunited ourselves from Austria, destroyed that building which we may, perhaps, now endeavour, without success, to raise again, and weakened the only power which it was our interest to strengthen.

To dwell upon all the instances of partiality which have been shown, to remark the yearly visits that have been made to that delightful country, to reckon up all the sums that have been spent to aggrandize and enrich it, would be at once invidious and tiresome; tiresome to those who are afraid to hear the truth, and to those who are unwilling to mention facts dishonourable or injurious to their country; nor shall I dwell any longer on this unpleasing subject than to express my hopes, that we shall not any longer suffer ourselves to be deceived and oppressed; that we shall at length perform the duty of the representatives of the people, and by refusing to ratify this contract, show, that however the interest of Hanover has been preferred by the ministers, the senate pays no regard but to that of Britain.

Mr. Horace WALPOLE then spoke to the following purpose:—Sir, though I have long considered the mercenary scribblers of disaffection as the disgrace of the kingdom and the pest of society, yet I was never so fully sensible of their pernicious influence.

I have hitherto imagined, that the weekly journalists and the occasional pamphleteers were the oracles only of the lowest of the people; and that all those whom their birth or fortune has exalted above the crowd, and introduced to a more extensive conversation, had considered them as wretches compelled to write by want, and obliged, therefore, to write what will most engage attention, by flattering the envy or the malignity of mankind; and who, therefore, propagate falsehoods themselves, not because they believe them, and disseminate faction, not because they are of any party, but because they are either obliged to gratify those that employ them, or to amuse the publick with novelties, or disturb it with alarms, that their works may not pass unregarded, and their labour be spent in vain.

This is my opinion of the party writers, and this I imagined the opinion of the rest of mankind, who had the same opportunities of information with myself: nor should I readily have believed, that any of their performances could have produced greater effects than those of inflaming the lowest classes of the people, and inciting drunkards to insult their superiours, had I not perceived, that the honourable gentleman who spoke last, owed his opinions of the partiality shown to the dominions of Hanover, to a late treatise which has, on occasion of this contract, been very industriously dispersed among the people.

Of this detestable pamphlet, I know not the author, nor think he deserves that any inquiry should be made after him, except by a proclamation that may set a price upon his head, and offer the same reward for discovering him, as is given for the conviction of wretches less criminal: nor can I think the lenity of the government easily to be distinguished from supineness and negligence, while libels like this are dispersed openly in the streets, and sold in shops without fear and without danger; while sedition is professedly promoted, and treason, or sentiments very nearly bordering upon treason, propagated without disguise.

The scribbler of this wicked treatise has endeavoured to corrupt the principles of his majesty's faithful subjects, not only by vilifying the memory of the late king, whose justice, humanity, and integrity, are generally reverenced, but by insinuating, likewise, that our present most gracious sovereign has adopted the same schemes, and endeavours to aggrandize Hanover at the expense of Britain; that all the measures that have been taken with regard to the affairs of the continent, have been contrived with no other view than that of advancing the interest, enlarging the bounds, and increasing the riches of the Hanoverian territories; he declares, that Britain has been steered by the rudder of Hanover, and that the nation will soon be divided into two more opposite and irreconcilable parties than ever yet disturbed the publick peace, Britons and Hanoverians.

That he himself, whoever he be, longs for those times of division and confusion, may be easily believed, and the number of those who have the same wishes with himself, is, I fear, too great; but I believe their hopes will not be encouraged, nor their designs promoted in this house; and that none of those who are intrusted to represent their country, will suffer themselves to be misled by such wicked insinuations.

Mr. NUGENT then spoke to this effect:—Sir, I know not for what reason the honourable gentleman has thought it convenient, to retard the deliberations of this house, by expatiating upon the falsehood and malignity of a pamphlet, of which the author is unknown, of which no man has attempted the vindication, and which, however diligently dispersed, or however generally credited, appears to have had no great influence upon the nation, nor to have produced any effects that might give just occasion to so tragical an outcry, to censures as vehement and bitter, as if the trumpet of rebellion had been sounded, as if half the people had taken arms against their governours, as if the commonwealth was on the brink of dissolution, and armies were in full march against the metropolis.

This pamphlet, with the rest of the people, I have read; and though I am far from thinking, that the censure of that honourable gentleman can make a defence necessary, since, indeed, be has contented himself with invective instead of argument, and, whatever he may disapprove, has confuted nothing: and though I have no particular reason for exposing myself as the champion for this author, whoever he may be, yet I cannot forbear to affirm, that I read some passages with conviction, and that, in my opinion, they require a different answer from those which have been yet offered; and that the impressions which have been made upon the people, will not be effaced by clamour and rage, and turbulence and menaces, which can affect only the person of the writer, but must leave his reasons in their full force, and even with regard to his person, will have very little effect; for though some men in power may be offended, it will not be easy to quote any law that has been broken by him.

On this occasion I cannot but animadvert, I hope with the same pardon from the house, as has been obtained by the honourable gentleman whom I am now following, upon an expression in frequent use among the followers of a court, whenever their measures are censured with spirit and with justice. The papers which they cannot confute, and which they have not yet been able to obtain the power of suppressing, are asserted to border upon treason; and the authors are threatened with punishments, when they have nothing to fear from a reply.

Treason is happily denned by our laws, and, therefore, every man may know when he is about to commit it, and avoid the danger of punishment, by avoiding the act which will expose him to it; but with regard to the borders of treason, I believe no man will yet pretend to say how far they extend, or how soon, or with how little intention he may tread upon them. Unhappy would be the man who should be punished for bordering upon guilt, of which those fatal borders are to be dilated at pleasure by his judges. The law has hitherto supposed every man, who is not guilty, to be innocent; but now we find that there is a kind of medium, in which a man may be in danger without guilt, and that in order to security, a new degree of caution is become necessary; for not only crimes, but the borders of crimes are to be avoided.

What improvements may be made upon this new system, how far the borders of treason may reach, or what pains and penalties are designed for the borderers, no degree of human sagacity can enable us to foresee. Perhaps the borders of royalty may become sacred, as well as the borders of treason criminal; and as every placeman, pensioner, and minister, may be said to border on the court, a kind of sanctity may be communicated to his character, and he that lampoons or opposes him, may border upon treason.

To dismiss this expression with the contempt which it deserves, yet not without the reflections which it naturally excites, I shall only observe, that all extension of the power of the crown must be dangerous to us; and that whoever endeavours to find out new modes of guilt, is to be looked on, not as a good subject, but a bad citizen.

Having thus shown, that the censure produced against this pamphlet is unintelligible and indeterminate, I shall venture to mention some of the assertions which have heated the gentleman into so much fury. Assertions which I cannot be supposed to favour, since I wish they might be false, and which I only produce in this place to give some, whom their stations make acquainted with publick affairs, an opportunity of confuting them.

It is asserted, that the French appear to have treated all our armaments with contempt, and to have pursued all their schemes with the same confidence as if they had no other enemy to fear than the forces of Austria; this is, indeed, no pleasing observation, nor can it be supposed to give satisfaction to any Briton, to find the reputation of our councils and of our arms so much diminished, to find the nation which lately gave laws to Europe, scarcely admitted to friendship, or thought worthy of opposition in enmity, to hear that those troops, which, in the days of our former monarchs, shook the thrones of the continent, are passed by, without fear, and without regard, by armies marching against their allies, those allies in whose cause they formerly fought in the field. But the truth of the assertion is too plain to all the nations of the world; and those whose interest it may be to conceal from their countrymen what is known to all the continent, may rage, indeed, and threaten, but they cannot deny it; for what enterprise have we hitherto either prevented or retarded? What could we have done on one side, or suffered on the other, if we had been struck out from existence, which has not been suffered, or not done, though our armies have been reviewed on the continent, and, to make yet a better show, lengthened out by a line of sixteen thousand of the troops of Hanover.

It is asserted in the same treatise, that the troops of Hanover cannot act against the king, and that, therefore, they are an useless burden to the state; that they compose an army of which no other effect will be found but that they eat, and eat at the expense of Britain. This assertion is, indeed, somewhat more contestable than the former, but is at least credible; since, if we may be permitted on this, as on other occasions, to judge of the future from the past, we may conclude, that those who have let pass such opportunities as their enemies have in the height of contempt and security presented to them, will hardly ever repair the effects of their conduct, by their bravery or activity in another campaign; but that they will take the pay of Britain, and, while they fatten in plenty, and unaccustomed affluence, look with great tranquillity upon the distresses of Austria, and, in their indolence of gluttony, stand idle spectators of that deluge, by which, if it be suffered to roll on without opposition, their own halcyon territories must at last be swallowed up.

The last assertion which I shall extract from this formidable pamphlet, is more worthy of attention than the former, but, perhaps, may be suspected to border more nearly upon treason: I shall, however, venture to quote, and, what is still more dangerous, to defend it.

It is proposed that, instead of squandering, in this time of danger, the expenses of the publick upon troops of which it is at best doubtful, whether they will be of any use to the queen of Hungary, whether they can legally engage against the king, and whether they would be of any great use, though they were set free from any other restraints than regard to their own safety; instead of amusing our ally with an empty show of assistance, of mocking her calamities with unefficacious friendship, and of exposing ourselves to the ridicule of our enemies, by idle armaments without hostility, by armies only to be reviewed, and fleets only to be victualled, we should remit the sums required for the payment of the Hanoverians to the queen of Hungary, by whom we know that it will be applied to the great purposes for which the senate granted it, the establishment of the liberties of Europe, and the repression of the house of Bourbon.

This proposal, however contrary to the opinion of the ministers, I take the liberty of recommending to the consideration of the house, as, in my opinion, the most effectual method of preserving the remains of the greatness of the house of Austria. It is well known, that these troops are hired at a rate which they never expected before, that levy-money is paid for forces levied before the commencement of the bargain, that they are paid for acting a long time before they began to march, and that, since they appeared to consider themselves as engaged in the quarrel, their march has been their whole performance, a march not against the enemy, but from him; a march, in which there was nothing to fear, nor any thing to encounter; and, therefore, I think it cannot be denied, that the publick treasure might have been better employed.

The same sum remitted to the queen of Hungary, will enable her to hire a much greater number of troops out of her own dominions, troops of whose courage she can have no doubt, and whose fidelity will be strengthened by common interest and natural affection; troops that will fight like men, defending their wives and their children, and who will, therefore, bear fatigue with patience, and face danger with resolution; who will oppose the French as their natural enemies, and think death more eligible than defeat.

Thus shall we assert the rights of mankind, and support the faith of treaties, oppose the oppressors of the world, and restore our ancient allies to their former greatness, without exhausting our own country; for it is not impossible, that by the proper use of this sum, the queen may obtain such advantages in one campaign, as may incline the French to desert the king, and content themselves with the peaceable possession of their own territories; for it is to be remembered, that they are now fighting only for a remote interest, and that they will not hazard much; a firm resistance will easily incline them to wait for some more favourable opportunity, and there will be then leisure for forming our measures in such a manner, that another opportunity may never be offered them.

But of the present scheme, what effect can be expected but ignominy and shame, disgrace abroad, and beggary at home? to this expense what limits can be set? when is there to be an end of paying troops who are not to march against our enemies? as they will at all times be of equal use, there will be at all times the same reason for employing them, nor can there ever be imagined less need of idle troops, than in a time of war.

I am, therefore, afraid, that in a short time the Hanoverians may consider Britain as a tributary province, upon which they have a right to impose the maintenance of sixteen thousand men, who are to be employed only for the defence of their own country, though supported at the expense of this. I am afraid that we shall be taught to imagine, that the appearance of the Hanoverians is necessary in our own country, perhaps to check the insolence of the sons of freedom, who, without fear, border upon treason. I am afraid, that his majesty or his successour may be advised by sycophants and slaves to trust the guard of his person to the trusty Hanoverians, and advised to place no confidence in the natives of Britain.

For my part, I think it a very wise precept by which we are directed to obviate evils in the beginning; and therefore, since, in my opinion, the influence of Hanover must be destructive to the royal family, and detrimental to those kingdoms, I shall endeavour to obviate it by voting against any provision for these useless mercenaries, and declaring that I shall more willingly grant the publick money to any troops than those of Hanover.

Lord PERCIVAL spoke next as follows:—Sir, I look upon the question now under your consideration, to vary very little in reality from that which was debated here the first day of this session. The principal point in the debate of that day, was the same with that which is more regularly the debate of this, whether the Hanoverian forces should be taken into British pay?

Sir, I should then have offered my sentiments upon this question, if so many other gentlemen had not delivered my sense in so much a better manner than I thought myself able to do, that it would have appeared a great presumption in me, and would have given the house an unnecessary trouble. The same reason had induced me to have been silent also upon this occasion, if the temper of the times, the little indulgence shown by gentlemen to one another, when they happen to differ in political opinions, and the popular circumstance in which I stand, did not in some sort oblige me to protect the vote I then gave, and that which I now intend to give, by the reasons that induce me to give it.

Sir, there are three principal considerations in this question; first, whether we are to assist the house of Austria and balance of power at all, aye or no? then, whether we ought to do it with our whole force? and lastly, whether the Hanoverian troops should be made a part of that force?

As to the first consideration, a new doctrine has been taught and inculcated for some months past, that it is of no importance to this nation what may happen on the continent; that this country being an island intrenched within its own natural boundaries, it may stand secure and unconcerned in all the storms of the rest of the world. This doctrine, inconsistent as it is with all sense and reason, contrary as it is to the universal principles of policy by which this nation hath been governed from the conquest to this hour, is yet openly professed and avowed by many without these walls; and though no man has yet ventured to own this opinion publickly and directly in this house, yet some gentlemen even here, in effect maintain it, when they argue, that in no case this nation ought to assist or support the balance of power without the concurrence of the Dutch. This tends inevitably to produce the same fatal effect; it reduces this country to depend upon Holland, to be a province to Holland; and France would then have no more to do to become mistress of all Europe, than to gain over one single town of the United Provinces, or to corrupt a few members of the States; it is, therefore, a doctrine of the greatest danger. The only solid maxim is, that whoever becomes master of the continent, must in the end obtain the dominion of the sea. To confirm this, I may venture to cite an old example, nor can I be accused of pedantry in doing of it, since it is an instance drawn from the last universal monarchy to which the world submitted. The Romans had no sooner divided, broken and subdued those powers upon the continent of Europe, who had given a diversion in the great attempt they had long intended, than they attacked the Carthaginians, a maritime power, potent in arms, immensely opulent, possessed of the trade of the whole world, and unrivalled mistress of the sea. Yet these people, who enjoyed no wealth, pursued no commerce, and at the commencement of their quarrel were not masters of a single ship, at length prevailed against this enemy upon their proper element, beat and destroyed their fleets, invaded their dominions, and subdued their empire. From whence, sir, I must conclude, that we cannot wholly rely upon our situation, or depend solely on our naval power; and I may venture to reason upon this axiom, that this nation must contribute to support the house of Austria and the balance of power in some degree.

The next question that occurs, is, in what degree we ought to do it, and whether we should do it with our whole force? Taking, therefore, our footing here upon this axiom, that we must contribute to it in some degree, and taking farther to our aid the reasoning of those gentlemen, who think it a work of such extreme danger, and almost desperate, the natural and evident conclusion can be only this, that as we must do it, so we must do it with the utmost vigour, and with our whole force.

We come now to consider, whether the Hanoverian troops should be made part of that force? There are several considerations previous to the decision of this question. First, whether they are as cheap as any other forces we can hire? Then, whether they are as good? Next, whether they are as properly situated? And whether they are as much to be depended upon? If, as to every one of these particulars, the answer must be made in the affirmative, I think it will go very far to determine the question now before you.

As to the first, that they are as cheap, nay, upon the whole, much cheaper, the estimates now upon your table, notwithstanding any cavil, do sufficiently demonstrate.

That they are as good, what man can doubt, who knows the character of the German nation? What man can doubt, who knows the attention of his majesty to military discipline? Those gentlemen can least pretend to doubt it, who sometimes do not spare reflections upon that attention which they insinuate to be too great.

That these troops are not properly situated, will be hardly asserted at this time, when they are actually now in Flanders, and now acting in conjunction with our troops. Let any man consider the map of Europe, let him observe the seat of the war, and he must evidently see, that whether their service may be required in Flanders, whether upon the Rhine, or in the heart of Germany, in every one of these cases, the Hanoverian forces are as properly circumstanced and situated as any troops in Europe.

It remains in the last place to examine, whether any other troops can be better depended upon; and sure nothing can be more obvious than that we may rely with more security on these than any other. They are subjects of the same prince, and of a prince indulgent to all his subjects, and accused by those who differ in other points from me, of being partial against the interest of his German dominions. Unless, therefore, we arraign the first principle upon which a free government can be supported, and without which every exercise of arbitrary power would be warranted, we must allow that such a people will be faithful to such a prince, will defend him with a strict fidelity, and support his quarrel with the utmost zeal; with a zeal which can never be expected from the mercenary troops of any other foreign power.

This naturally leads us to inquire what other troops we can depend upon; the answer to this inquiry is short and positive; that as affairs now stand abroad, we can depend upon none but these; let us carry this consideration with us in a survey of all Europe; shall we take into our pay sixteen thousand of the Dutch? Would this be the means of bringing Holland into alliance with us? Would they act at their own expense, would they exert their own proper force? Would they pay their own troops in aid of the common cause, when they found this nation ready to do it for them? They would act like madmen if they did. Shall we hire Danes? Is there a gentleman in this house, who is not convinced that this power has been warped, for some time past, towards the interest of France? When we hired these troops in the last instance, did they not deceive us? Did they not even refuse to march? nay, farther, are they not in all appearance now upon the point of being employed in a quarrel of their own? a quarrel in which they will have need of all their force. Shall we then hire Saxons? An honourable gentleman seemed to think that there may be some possibility of this, and perhaps there may hereafter, when the king of Prussia's views are known, and the part he shall resolve to act; but Saxony is certainly now too much exposed to, and cannot fail to be alarmed at his growing power; at the great augmentation of his armies, and the secret and vast designs which he seems to meditate. This measure, therefore, is not practicable in the present conjuncture; that electorate cannot hazard its own security in these precarious circumstances, by lending out so great a body of its troops. Would gentlemen advise the hire of Prussian troops to serve us in this conjuncture? They who do advise it, must forget strangely the part so lately acted by that prince, and the variety of his conduct with regard to his different allies within the space of the two last years. I shall guard myself in my expressions, and maintain a proper respect in discoursing of so great a character; but I must say thus much, that the ministry would act with great imprudence, to put the safety of the British troops, and to risk the fate of this army, upon the event of such a measure. I need not say more; for it is not yet proved to us, that this prince would (I wish there was no reason to believe he would not) lend us this body of his men, though we should be disposed to take them into pay. The Swiss cantons, therefore, now alone remain; and indeed from them we probably might procure a greater number; but I leave it to the judgment of any man of sense and candour, whether any minister of this nation could warrant the employment of sixteen thousand Swiss in this service? For when we reflect upon the situation of these provinces, and compare it with that of our British troops who are now in Flanders, it is visible that they must pass four hundred miles upon the borders of the Rhine, flanked by the strong places of France, during their whole march, exposed to the garrisons and armies upon that frontier, by whom it can never be supposed that they would be suffered to pass unmolested, when France must so well know the intention of their march to be for no other end, but to make a conjunction with other troops in the British pay, in order afterwards to invade, or at least to interrupt the views of that kingdom with their united force.

These reasons, sir, prove invincibly to me, that if we are to assist the house of Austria by an army, we must, of prudence, nay, of necessity, in part, compose that army of the Hanoverian troops.

But yet there is another state of this question, an alternative of which some gentlemen seem very fond, whether it would not be better to assist the queen of Hungary with money only?

This opinion at first sight is extremely plausible; if the queen of Hungary has been able to do so much with an aid of 500,000 l. what might she not be able to do with a million more? Sir, a million more would by no means answer in the same proportion. When a sum is given her, which with the best economy can suffice barely to put her troops in motion, when the enemy is at her very gates, her all at an immediate stake, there can be no room for a misapplication of it. But a sum so immense as that of a million and a half, would dazzle the eyes of a court so little used to see such sums; and as an honourable gentleman, [Mr. Horace WALPOLE,] long versed in foreign affairs, and well acquainted with these matters, told you in a former debate, would be much of it squandered among the Austrian ministers and favourites. I make no scruple to add to this, that some small part might fall to the share of ministers elsewhere. But there is another danger which gentlemen who contend for this measure do not consider: can they who profess a distrust of all ministers, and particularly those who are now employed at home; they who have ever argued against all votes of credit, upon this principle, that it affords an opportunity to ministers of defrauding the service, and of putting large sums into the purse of the crown, or into their private pockets; can they now argue for this measure, which I may be bold to say, would be in effect the most enormous vote of credit that was ever given in the world? Gentlemen insinuate, that the taking the Hanoverian forces into British pay, is a criminal complaisance, calculated only to confirm an infant and a tottering administration. But how much greater means for such a purpose, would an alternative like this afford? Suppose a minister, unfirm in his new-acquired power, to ingratiate himself with his prince, should propose a scheme to replenish the coffers of an exhausted civil list, squandered in such vile purposes, that no man could have the hardiness to come to parliament, or dare to hope a supply for it by any regular application to this house? What method could be devised by such a minister himself, to do the job more excellent than this? For who can doubt that (guard it how you will) the queen of Hungary might be induced, in the condition in which she now stands, to accept a million, and to give a receipt in full for the whole sum? How could you prevent an understanding of this kind between two courts? and how easy, therefore, might it be to sink 500,000 l. out of so vast a grant? Sir, I will suspect no minister, but I will trust none in this degree; and I wonder other gentlemen do not suspect, if I do not. From hence, therefore, I consider this as a proposition both fallacious and unsafe; for though it be a fact, that the same sum of money might maintain in Austria double the number of troops; yet, if no more than half that money should be applied (as I have shown great reason to believe that it would not) to the uses of the war, it is evident that you would deceive yourselves, and would have but an equal number of raw, irregular, undisciplined, and much worse troops for it.

But, sir, there is yet a stronger argument against the supply in money only. What are our views in supporting the queen of Hungary? Our views are general and particular; general, to save the house of Austria, and to preserve a balance of power; particular, to prevent the French from making any farther acquisitions on this side of Flanders. The first might possibly be answered in a good degree, by giving that princess an equivalent in money; but the second cannot be securely provided against, without an army on this side of Europe in the British pay. Sir, is it not natural for every one of us to guard our vital parts, rather than our more remote members? Would not the queen of Hungary (stipulate and condition with her as you please) apply the greatest part of these subsidies in defence of her dominions in the heart of Germany? Might it not even induce her to enlarge her views, and to think of conquests and equivalents for what she has already lost, which it might be vain and ruinous for us to support her in? Would she not leave Flanders to shift for itself, or still to be taken care of by the Dutch and Britain? In such a case, if France should find it no longer possible to make any impression on her territories on the German side, what must we expect to be the consequence? I think it very visible she would on a sudden quit her expensive and destructive projects on that quarter, and there only carry on a defensive war, while she fell with the greater part of her force at once upon the Low Countries, which would by this measure be wholly unprovided; and she might there acquire in one campaign, before any possibility of making head against her, (which the Dutch would hardly attempt, and could certainly not alone be able to effect,) all that she has been endeavouring for the last century to obtain, and what no union of powers could be ever capable of regaining from her. All this will be effectually prevented by an army paid by us on this side of Europe; an army ready to march to the borders of her country, and to intercept her succours and supplies for the German war; an army, ready to protect the petty states, whose interest and inclination it apparently must be to declare for us, and to join their forces with us, when they no longer fear the power of France; an army, which may possibly give courage and spirit to greater powers, who may still doubt, without these vigorous measures, (after what they have formerly experienced,) whether they could even yet depend upon us; an army, (if the posture of affairs should make it necessary,) able to cause a powerful diversion to the French forces, by an attack upon Lorrain and Champagne, and still within distance to return upon its stops in time, to prevent the French from carrying any point of consequence in Flanders, should they then attempt it.

One argument more, I beg leave to mention, and it is of great weight. Admit that the sums raised upon the subject might be greater in the one case than the other, the sums remitted out of the kingdom would be infinitely less. Whatever is remitted to the queen of Hungary, is buried in the remotest parts of Germany, and can never return to us; whereas in a war carried on by troops in our own pay on this side, by much the greater part of the expense returns to us again, in part by the pay of officers, by the supply of provisions and necessaries in a country exhausted by armies, ammunition, ordnance, horses, clothing, accoutrements, and a multitude of other articles, which I need not enumerate, because experience, which is the soundest reasoner, fully proved it in the example of the last war, at the conclusion of which, notwithstanding the prodigious sums expended in it, this nation felt no sensible effect, from a diminution of its current specie.

Sir, I was prepared to have spoken much more largely to this subject, but my discourse has already been drawn to a greater length than I imagined, in treating upon the argument thus far. I shall, therefore, avoid troubling you any farther upon it at this time; I shall only observe, that in my humble opinion, it is sufficiently proved, first, that we must assist the house of Austria, and that we must do it with all our force; next, that we cannot do it with money only, but in part with a land army, and that this land army cannot be conveniently (I may say possibly) composed, at this time, without the Hanoverian troops. This question, therefore, can, I think, be no longer debated, but upon the foot of popular prejudices and insinuations of an improper connexion of Hanoverian and British interests; but as I could not enter into this subject without concern and indignation, and as it is a very delicate point for me in particular to debate upon, I shall leave this part of the question to other gentlemen, who can engage in it both with less inconvenience, and with more ability, than it is possible for me to do.

To which Mr. George GRENVILLE replied in substance:—Sir, though I am far from thinking myself able to produce, without study or premeditation, a complete answer to the elaborate and artful harangue which you have now heard, yet as I cannot be convinced of the reasonableness of the measures which have been defended with so much subtilty, I shall at least endeavour to show, that my disapprobation is not merely the effect of obstinacy, and that I have at least considered the proposals of the ministry, before I have ventured to condemn them.

Whether we ought to think ourselves indispensably obliged to maintain, at all events, the balance of power on the continent, to maintain it without allies, to maintain it against a combination of almost all Europe, I shall not now inquire; I will suppose it, for once, our duty to struggle with impossibility, and not only to support the house of Austria when it is attacked, but to raise it when it is fallen; fallen by our own negligence, and oppressed with the weight of all the surrounding powers; and shall, therefore, at present, only inquire by what means we may afford that assistance with most benefit to our allies, and least danger to ourselves.

With regard to our ally, that assistance will be apparently most advantageous to her, by which her strength will be most increased, and therefore it may, perhaps, be more useful to her to find her money than troops; but if we must supply her with troops, I doubt not but it will readily appear, that we may easily find troops which may be of more use and less expense than those of Hanover.

It has been observed, with regard to the convenient situation of those troops, that it cannot now be denied, since they are acting in Flanders in conjunction with the British forces. This is an assertion to which, though it was uttered with an air of victorious confidence, though it was produced as an insuperable argument, by which all those who intended opposition were to be reduced to silence and despair, many objections may be made, which it will require another harangue equally elaborate to remove.

That the troops of Hanover are now acting in conjunction with the Britons, I know not how any man can affirm, unless he has received intelligence by some airy messengers, or has some sympathetick communication with them, not indulged to the rest of mankind. None of the accounts which have been brought hither of the affairs of the continent have yet informed us of any action, or tendency to action; the Hanoverians have, indeed, been reviewed in conjunction with our forces, but have, hitherto, not acted; nor have the armies yet cemented the alliance by any common danger, or shown yet that they are friends otherwise than by sleeping and eating together, by eating at the expense of the same nation.

Nor am I at present inclined to grant, that either army is situated where it may be of most use to the queen of Hungary; for they now loiter in a country which no enemy threatens, and in which nothing, therefore, can be feared; a country very remote from the seat of war, and which will probably be last attacked. If the assistance of the queen of Hungary had been designed, there appears no reason why the Hanoverians should have marched thither, or why this important conjunction should have been formed, since they might, in much less time, and with less expense, have joined the Austrians, and, perhaps, have enabled them to defeat the designs of the French, and cut off the retreat of the army which was sent to the relief of Prague. But this march, though it would have been less tedious, would have been more dangerous, and would not have been very consistent with the designs of those who are more desirous of receiving wages than of deserving them; nor is it likely, that those who required levy-money for troops already levied, and who demanded that they should be paid a long time before they began to march, would hurry them to action, or endeavour to put a period to so gainful a trade as that of hiring troops which are not to be exposed.

This conduct, however visibly absurd, I am very far from imputing either to cowardice or ignorance; for there is reason to suspect, that they marched into Flanders only because they could not appear in any other place as the allies of the queen of Hungary, without exposing their sovereign to the imperial interdict.

It is, therefore, not only certain, that these troops, these boasted and important troops, have not yet been of any use; but probable, that no use is intended for them, and that the sole view of those who have introduced them into our service, is to pay their court by enriching Hanover with the spoils of Britain.

That this is in reality their intention, appears from the estimates to which an appeal has been so confidently made, but which, if they are compared with a contract made for the troops of the same nation in the last war, will show how much their price has risen since their sovereign was exalted to this throne; though I cannot find any proof that their reputation has increased, nor can discover, from their actions in Flanders, any reason to believe that their services will be greater.

It is now to little purpose to inquire, whether there are any other troops that could have been more properly employed, since it is certain, that whatever may be the general character, or the late conduct of other nations, it is the interest of Britain to employ rather any troops than these, as any evil is rather to be chosen than animosities between our sovereign and our fellow-subjects; and such animosities must inevitably arise from this detestable preference of the troops of Hanover.

[The question was carried by 67, the Ayes being 260; Noes 193. This affair was again debated with vehemence upon the report on Monday, December 13, 1742, upon a question, whether the levy-money should stand part of the general question, which was carried by 53; Ayes 230, Noes 177.]



HOUSE OF LORDS, FEBRUARY 1, 1742-3.

The order of the day for taking into consideration the several estimates of the charge of the forces in the pay of Great Britain was read, upon which lord STANHOPE rose up, and spoke in substance as follows:—

My lords, I have always understood, that the peculiar happiness of the British nation consists in this, that nothing of importance can be undertaken by the government, without the consent of the people as represented by the other house, and that of your lordships, whose large possessions, and the merits either of your ancestors or yourselves, have given you the privilege of voting in your own right in national consultations.

The advantages of this constitution, the security which it confers upon the nation, and the restraint which it lays upon corrupt ministers, or ambitious princes, are in themselves too obvious to admit of explanation, and too well known in this great assembly, by whose ancestors they were originally obtained, and preserved at the frequent hazard of life and fortune, for me to imagine, that I can make them either more esteemed or better understood.

My intention, my lords, is not to teach others the regard which the constitution of our government, or the happiness of the nation demands from them, but to show how much I regard them myself, by endeavouring to preserve and defend them at a time when I think them invaded and endangered.

Upon the examination of the estimates now before us, I cannot but think it necessary, my lords, that every man who values liberty, should exert that spirit by which it was first established; that every man should rouse from his security, and awaken all his vigilance and all his zeal, lest the bold attempt that has been now made should, if it be not vigorously repressed, be an encouragement to the more dangerous encroachments; and lest that fabrick of power should be destroyed, which has been erected at such expense and with such labour; at which one generation has toiled after another, and of which the wisdom of the most experienced and penetrating statesmen have been employed to perfect its symmetry, and the industry of the most virtuous patriots to repair its decays.

The first object which the estimates force upon our observation is a numerous body of foreign troops, for the levy and payment of which a very large sum is demanded; and demanded at a time when the nation is to the last degree embarrassed and oppressed, when it is engaged in a war with a powerful empire, and almost overwhelmed with the debts that were contracted in former confederacies; when it is engaged in a war, not for the recovery of forgotten claims, or for the gratification of restless ambition, not for the consumption of exuberant wealth, or for the discharge of superfluous inhabitants; but a war, in which the most important interests are set to hazard, and by which the freedom of navigation must be either established or lost; a war which must determine the sovereignty of the ocean, the rights of commerce, and the state of our colonies; a war, in which we may, indeed, be victorious without any increase of our reputation; but in which we cannot be defeated without losing all our influence upon foreign powers, and becoming subject to the insolence of petty princes.

When foreign troops are hired, at a time like this, it is natural to expect that they have been procured by contracts uncommonly frugal; because no nation can be supposed to be lavish in a time of distress. It is natural, my lords, to expect that they should be employed in expeditions of the utmost importance; because no trifling advantage ought to incite a people overburdened with taxes, to oppress themselves with any new expense; and it may be justly supposed, that these troops were hired by the advice of the senate; because no minister can be supposed so hardened in defiance of his country, in contempt of the laws, and in disregard of the publick happiness, as to dare to introduce foreigners into the publick service, in prosecution of his own private schemes, or to rob the nation which he professes to serve, that he may increase the wealth of another.

But upon consideration of this estimate, my lords, all these expectations, however reasonable in themselves, however consistent with the declarations of the wisest statesmen, and the practice of former times, will be disappointed; for it will be found that the troops, of which we are now to ratify the provisions for their payment, are raised at an expense never known on the like occasion before, when the nation was far more able to support it; that they have yet been employed in no expedition, that they have neither fought a battle, nor besieged a town, nor undertaken any design, nor hindered any that has been formed by those against whom they are pretended to have been raised; that they have not yet drawn a sword but at a review, nor heard the report of fire-arms but upon a festival; that they have not yet seen an enemy, and that they are posted where no enemy is likely to approach them.

But this, my lords, is not the circumstance which ought, in my opinion, most strongly to affect us; troops may be raised without being employed, and money expended without effect; but such measures, though they ought to be censured and rectified, may be borne without any extraordinary degree of indignation. While our constitution remains unviolated, temporary losses may be easily repaired, and accidental misconduct speedily retrieved; but when the publick rights are infringed, when the ministry assume the power of giving away the properties of the people, it is then necessary to exert an uncommon degree of vigour and resentment; it is as necessary to stop, the encroachments of lawless power, as to oppose the torrent of a deluge; which may be, perhaps, resisted at first, but from which, the country that is once overwhelmed by it, cannot be recovered.

To raise this ardour, my lords, to excite this laudable resentment, I believe it will be only necessary to observe, that those troops were raised without the advice or the consent of the senate; that this new burden has been laid upon the nation by the despotick will of the ministers, and that the demands made for their support may be said to be a tax laid upon the people, not by the senate, but by the court.

The motives upon which the ministry have acted on this occasion are, so far as they can be discovered, and, indeed, there appears very little care to conceal them, such as no subject of this crown ever dared to proceed upon before; they are such as the act of settlement, that act to which our sovereign owes his title to this throne, ought for ever to have excluded from British councils.

I should proceed, my lords, to explain this new method of impoverishing our country, and endeavour to show the principles from which it arises, and the end which it must promote. But some sudden indisposition obliges me to contract my plan, and conclude much sooner than I intended, with moving, "that an humble address be presented to his majesty, to beseech and advise his majesty, that considering the excessive and grievous expenses, incurred by the great number of foreign troops now in the pay of Great Britain, (expenses so increased by the extraordinary manner, as we apprehend, of making the estimates relating thereunto, and which do not appear to us conducive to the end proposed,) his majesty will be graciously pleased, in compassion to his people, loaded already with such numerous and heavy taxes, such large and growing debts, and greater annual expenses than this nation, at any time, ever before sustained, to exonerate his subjects of the charge and burden of those mercenaries who were taken into our service last year, without the advice or consent of parliament."

Lord SANDWICH spoke next in support of the motion to the following effect:—My lords, though I heard the noble lord with so much pleasure, that I could not but wish he had been able to deliver his sentiments more fully upon this important affair; yet I think the motion so reasonable and just, that though he might have set it yet more beyond the danger of opposition, though he might have produced many arguments in defence of it, which, perhaps, will not occur to any other lords; yet I shall be able to justify it in such a manner, as may secure the approbation of the unprejudiced and disinterested; and, therefore, I rise up to second it with that confidence, which always arises from a consciousness of honest intentions, and of an impartial inquiry after truth.

The measures, my lords, which have given occasion to this motion, have been for some time the subject of my reflections; I have endeavoured to examine them in their full extent, to recollect the previous occurrences by which the ministry might have been influenced to engage in them, and to discover the certain and the probable consequences which they may either immediately, or more remotely produce; I have laboured to collect from those who are supposed to be most acquainted with the state of Europe, and the scheme of British policy which is at present pursued, the arguments which can be offered in favour of these new engagements; and have compared them with the conduct of former ages upon the like occasions; but the result of all my searches into history, all my conversation with politicians of every party, and all my private meditations, has been only, that I am every hour confirmed, by some new evidence, in the opinion which I had first formed; and now imagined myself to know what I at first believed, that we are entangled in a labyrinth of which no end is to be seen, and in which no certain path has yet been discovered; that we are pursuing schemes which are in no degree necessary to the prosperity of our country, by means which are apparently contrary to law, to policy, and to justice; and that we are involved in a foreign quarrel only to waste that blood, and exhaust that treasure, which might be employed in recovering the rights of commerce, and regaining the dominion of the sea.

To prosecute the war against Spain with that vigour which interest and resentment might be expected to produce, to repress that insolence by which our navigation has been confined, and to punish that rapacity by which our merchants have been plundered, and that cruelty by which our fellow-subjects have been enslaved, tortured, and murdered, had been an attempt in which every honest man would readily have concurred, and to which all those who had sense to discern their own interest, or virtue to promote the publick happiness, would cheerfully have contributed, however loaded with taxes, oppressed with a standing army, and plundered by the vultures of a court: nor is the ancient spirit of the British nation so much depressed, but that when Spain had been subdued, when our rights had been publickly acknowledged, our losses repaired, and our colonies secured; when our ships had again sailed in security, and our flag awed the ocean of America, we might then have extended our views to foreign countries, might have assumed, once more, the guardianship of the liberties of Europe, have given law to the powers of the continent, and superintended the happiness of mankind. But in the present situation of our affairs, when we have made war for years without advantage, while our most important rights are yet subject to the chance of battle, why we should engage in the defence of other princes more than our stipulations require, I am not able to discover; nor can I conceive what motive can incite us, after having suffered so much from a weak enemy to irritate a stronger.

To the measures which are now pursued, were there no other arguments to be alleged against them, I should think it, my lords, a sufficient objection that they are unnecessary, and that this is not a time for political experiments, or for wanton expenses. I should think, that the present distresses of the publick ought to restrain your lordships from approving any steps by which our burdens may be made more heavy, burdens under which we are already sinking, and which a peace of more than twenty years has not contributed to lighten.

But that they are unnecessary, my lords, is the weakest allegation that can be offered; for they are such as tend not only to obstruct the advancement of more advantageous designs, but to bring upon us the heaviest calamities; they will not only hinder us from increasing our strength, but will sink us to the greatest degree of weakness; they will not only impoverish us for the present, which may be sometimes the effect of useful and beneficial designs, but may depress us below a possibility of recovery, and reduce us to receive laws from some foreign power.

This is, indeed, a dreadful prospect; but what other can arise to us from a war with France, with the most wealthy empire of the universe, of which we were sufficiently shown the strength in the late war, by the resistance which all the surrounding nations found it able to make against their united efforts, and which the debts that they then contracted, and the towns that were then destroyed, will not easily suffer them to forget. Of this empire, my lords, thus powerful, thus formidable, neither the dominions are contracted, nor the trade impaired, nor the inhabitants diminished. The French armies are no less numerous than under their late mighty monarch, their territories are increased by new acquisitions, their trade has long been promoted by the destruction of ours, and their wealth has been, by consequence, increased. They have not, my lords, like this unhappy nation, been exhausted by temporary expedients and useless armaments; they have not harassed their merchants to aggrandize the court, nor thrown away the opportunities which this interval of quiet has afforded them, in the struggles of faction; they have not been multiplying officers to betray the people, and taxing the people to support their oppressors; but have with equal policy, diligence, and success, recovered the losses which they then sustained, and enabled themselves to make another stand against a general confederacy.

Against this empire, my lords, are we now to be engaged in a war, without trade, and without money, loaded with debts, and harassed with exactions; for what consequences can be expected from sending our troops into the frontier towns, but that the French will charge us with beginning hostilities, and declare war against us, or attack us without a declaration; and that we shall be obliged to stand alone against the whole power of the house of Bourbon, while all our ancient allies stand at a distance spiritless and intimidated, or, perhaps, secretly incite our enemies against us, in hopes of sharing our plunder, or of rising on our ruin.

I know it has been alleged, and alleged with such a degree of confidence, as it is reasonable to hope nothing could produce but a consciousness of truth, that the Dutch have already consented to assist us; nor is it without regret, that I find myself obliged to declare, that this assertion is nothing more than one of those transient visions with which it has been for a long time the custom of British ministers to delude the people, to pacify their clamours, and lull them in security; one of those artifices from which nothing more is expected, than that it shall operate upon the nation, till the circumstances of our affairs furnish out another, which is likewise, in a short time, to be exploded only to make way for new falsehoods in a perpetual succession.

Such, my lords, is the art of government discovered by the wonderful sagacity of modern statesmen; who have found out, that it is easier to palliate than to cure; and that the people maybe quieted by political soporificks, while diseases are preying upon them, while their strength decays, and their vitals are consumed.

That these falsehoods prevail upon mankind, and that after the discovery of one cheat, another equally gross is patiently borne, cannot but raise the wonder of a man who views the world at a distance, and who has not opportunities of inquiring into the various motives of action or belief. Such an one would be inclined to think us a nation of fools, that must be stilled with rattles, or amused with baubles; and would readily conclude, that our ministers were obliged to practise such fallacies, because they could not prevail upon us by motives adapted to reasonable beings.

But if we reflect, my lords, upon the different principles upon which reports like these are propagated and opposed, it will easily be discovered that their success is not to be imputed either to superiour art on one side, or uncommon weakness on the other. It is well known that they are promoted by men hired for that purpose with large salaries, or beneficial employments, and that they can be opposed only from a desire of detecting falsehood, and advancing the publick happiness: it is apparent that those who invent, those who circulate, and, perhaps, part of those who counterfeit belief of them, are incited by the prospect of private advantage, and immediate profit; and that those who stop them in their career by contradiction and objections, can propose no other benefit to themselves, than that which they shall receive in common with every other member of the community; and, therefore, whoever has sufficiently observed mankind, to discover the reason for which self-interest has in almost all ages prevailed over publick spirit, will be able to see why reports like these are not always suppressed by seasonable detections.

A minister ought not to flatter himself that he has always deceived those who appear to credit his representations; their silence is not so often the effect of credulity, as of cowardice or indolence. Many are overborne by the pomp of great offices, and others who distinguish more clearly, and judge with greater freedom, are contented to enjoy their own reflections, without reproving those whom they despair to reform.

This report of the engagement of the Dutch in our measures, shall, however, furnish our ministers with no opportunity of boasting their address, nor shall it pass any longer without contradiction; for I shall, without any scruple, affirm in the presence of this august assembly, that the Dutch have hitherto appeared absolutely neutral; that they have not shown any approbation of our measures, nor any inclination to assist us in them. I know, my lords, how disagreeable this assertion may be to those, whose interest it is that mankind should believe them of no less importance in the eyes of foreign powers than in their own, and should imagine that the remotest nations of the world are influenced by their motions, and directed by their counsels; but however they may resent this declaration, I defy them to confute it, and now call upon them to show that the Dutch have engaged in any measure for the support of the queen of Hungary.

The late augmentation of twenty thousand men, which may possibly be mentioned as a proof of their intention, shows nothing but that they pursue their own interest with their usual prudence and attention, and with such as it is to be wished that our ministers would condescend to learn from them; and that they are too wise to suffer the towns from which the Austrians have, by our persuasions, withdrawn their troops to fall into the hands of the French. They have, therefore, substituted new garrisons, but seem to have no regard to the interest of the queen of Hungary, nor any other view than that of providing for their own security, waiting the event of the war, and laying hold of any advantage that may accidentally be offered them.

It may be urged farther by those who are desirous to deceive others, or willing to be deceived themselves, that the province of Holland has passed a vote for assisting the queen of Hungary with twenty thousand men; but if it be remembered, my lords, that this must be the general act of the United States, and that every province has its own particular views to gratify, and its own interest to reconcile with the general good, it may be very reasonably suspected, that this assistance is yet rather the object of hope than expectation; it may justly be feared, that before so many various dispositions will unite, and such different schemes will be made consistent, the house of Austria may be extinguished, that our forces may be destroyed, and Germany enslaved by the French. Then, my lords, what will remain, but that we shall curse that folly that involved us in distant quarrels, and that temerity which sent us out to oppose a power which we could not withstand; and which incited us to waste that treasure in foreign countries, which we may quickly want for the defence of our own?

It must be, indeed, confessed, that if an estimate is to be made of our condition, from the conduct of our ministers, the fear of exhausting our treasure must be merely panick, and the precepts of frugality which other states have grown great by observing, are to be absolutely unnecessary. It may reasonably be imagined that we have some secret mine, or hidden repository of gold, which no degree of extravagance can drain, and which may for ever supply the most lavish expenses without diminution.

For upon what other supposition, my lords, can any man attempt a defence of the contract, by which we have obtained for one campaign the service of the troops of Hanover? What but the confidence of funds that can never be deficient, could influence them to conclude a stipulation, by which levy-money is to be paid for troops of which not a single regiment was raised for our service, or on the present occasion; which were established for the security of the electorate of Hanover, and would have been maintained, though we had not engaged in the affairs of the continent.

What were the reasons which induced our ministry to employ the forces of Hanover, it is, perhaps, not necessary to inquire. The only motive that ought to have influenced them, was the prospect of obtaining them upon cheap terms; for, my lords, if the troops of Hanover cannot be obtained, but at the same expense with those of Britain, I am not able to discover why they should be preferred. I have never heard, my lords, any uncommon instances of Hanoverian courage, that should incline us to trust the cause of Europe rather to that nation than to our own; and am inclined to believe, that Britain is able to produce men equal in all military virtues to any native of that happy country; a country which, though it was thought worthy to be secured by a neutrality, when all the neighbouring provinces were exposed to the ravages of war, I have never heard celebrated for any peculiar excellencies; and of which I cannot but observe, that it was indebted for its security rather to the precaution of its prince, than the bravery of its inhabitants.

This demand of levy-money shocks every Briton yet more strongly, on considering by whom it is required; required by that family whom we have raised from a petty dominion, for which homage was paid to a superiour power; and which was, perhaps, only suffered to retain the appearance of a separate sovereignty, because it was not worth the labour and expense of an invasion; because it would neither increase riches nor titles, nor gratify either avarice or ambition; by a family whom, from want and weakness, we have exalted to a throne, from whence, with virtue equal to their power, they may issue their mandates to the remotest parts of the earth, may prescribe the course of war in distant empires, and dictate terms of peace to half the monarchs of the globe.

I should imagine, my lords, that when a king of the house of Hanover surveys his navies, reviews his troops, or examines his revenue, beholds the splendour of his court, or contemplates the extent of his dominions, he cannot but sometimes, however unwillingly, compare his present state with that of his ancestors; and that when he gives audience to the ambassadours of princes, who, perhaps, never heard of Hanover, and directs the payment of sums, by the smallest of which all his ancient inheritance would be dearly purchased; and reflects, as surely he sometimes will, that all these honours and riches, this reverence from foreign powers, and his domestick splendour, are the gratuitous and voluntary gifts of the mighty people of Britain, he should find his heart overflowing with unlimited gratitude, and should be ready to sacrifice to the happiness of his benefactors, not only every petty interest, or accidental inclination, but even his repose, his safety, or his life; that he should be ready to ease them of every burden before they complained, and to aid them with all his power before they requested his assistance; that he should consider his little territories as only a contemptible province to his British empire, a kind of nursery for troops to be employed without harassing his more valuable subjects.

It might be at least hoped, my lords, that the princes of the house of Hanover might have the same regard to this nation as to kings from whom they never received any benefit, and whom they ought in reality always to have considered as enemies, yet even from such levy-money was not always required; or if required, was not always received.

There was once a time, my lords, before any of this race wore the crown of Britain; when the great French monarch, Lewis the fourteenth, being under a necessity of hiring auxiliary troops, applied to the duke of Hanover, as a prince whose necessities would naturally incline him to set the lives of his subjects at a cheap rate. The duke, pleased with an opportunity of trafficking with so wealthy a monarch, readily promised a supply of troops; and demanded levy-money to be paid him, that he might be enabled to raise them. But Hanoverian reputation was not then raised so high, as that the French king should trust him with his money. Lewis suspected, and made no scruple of declaring his suspicion, that the demand of levy-money was only a pretence to obtain a sum which would never afterwards be repaid, and for which no troops would be obtained; and therefore, with his usual prudence insisted, that the troops should first march, and then be paid. Thus for some time the treaty was at a stand; but the king being equally in want of men, as the duke of money, and perceiving, perhaps, that it was really impracticable for so indigent a prince to raise troops without some pecuniary assistance, offered him at length a small sum, which was gladly accepted, though much below the original demand. The troops were engaged in the service of France; and the duke of Hanover thought himself happy in being able to amuse himself at his leisure with the rattle of money.

Such, my lords, were the conditions on which the troops of Hanover were furnished in former times; and surely what could then be produced by the love of money, or the awe of a superiour power, might now be expected as the effect of gratitude and kindness.

But not to dwell any longer, my lords, upon particular circumstances of measures, of which the whole scheme is contrary to the apparent interest of this empire, I shall not inquire farther, why auxiliaries are employed on this occasion rather than Britons, rather than those whose bravery is celebrated to the most distant corners of the earth; why, if mercenaries are necessary, those of Hanover are preferred to others: or why, if they are, indeed, preferable, they are now to be hired at a higher rate than at any former time? It appears to me of far more importance to undermine the foundation, than to batter the superstructure of our present system of politicks; and of greater use to inquire, why we have engaged in a war on the continent, than why we carry it on with ridiculous profusion.

It appears to me, my lords, that there are many reasons which, with the same circumstances, would have withheld any nation but this from such a dangerous interposition. The Dutch, we see, are content to look on without action, though they are more interested in the event, and less embarrassed on any other side. We are already engaged in a war, of which no man can foresee the conclusion; but which cannot be ended unsuccessfully, without the utmost danger to our most important interests; and which yet has hitherto produced only losses and disgrace, has impoverished our merchants, and intimidated our soldiers. Whether these losses are the effects of weakness or treachery, is a question which I am not ambitious of endeavouring to decide, and of which the decision is, indeed, by no means necessary in the present debate; since if we are too weak to struggle with Spain, unassisted as she is, and embarrassed with different views, I need not say what will be our condition, when the whole house of Bourbon shall be combined against us; when that nation which stood alone for so many years against the united efforts of Europe, shall attack us, exhausted with taxes, enervated with corruption, and disunited from all allies. Whether the troops of Hanover will assist us at that time, I cannot determine. Perhaps, in the destruction of the British dominions, it may be thought expedient to secure a more valuable and important country by a timely neutrality; but if we have any auxiliaries from thence, we must then necessarily obtain them upon cheaper terms.

If our inactivity in the European seas, and our ill success in those of America be, as it is generally suspected, the consequence of perfidious counsels, and private machinations; if our fleets are sent out with orders to make no attempt against our enemies, or our admirals commanded to retreat before them; surely no higher degree of madness can be imagined, than that of provoking new enemies before we have experienced a change of counsels, and found reason to place in our ministers and statesmen that confidence which war absolutely requires.

This is the conduct, my lords, which I should think most rational, even though we were attacked in some of our real rights, and though the quarrel about which we were debating was our own; I should think the nearest danger the greatest, and should advise patience under foreign insults, till we had redressed our domestick grievances; till we had driven treachery from the court, and corruption from the senate. But much more proper do I think this conduct, when we are invited only to engage in distant war, in a dispute about the dominion of princes, in the bowels of the continent; of princes, of whom it is not certain, that we shall receive either advantage or security from their greatness, or that we should suffer any loss or injury by their fall.

But, my lords, I know it will be answered, that the queen of Hungary has a right by treaty to our assistance; and that in becoming guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction, we engaged to support her in the dominions of her ancestors. This, my lords, is an answer of which I do not deny the justness, and of which I will not attempt to invalidate the strength. I allow that such a stipulation was made, and that treaties ought to be observed, at whatever hazard, with unviolated faith. It has been, indeed, objected, that many nations engaged with us in the same treaty, whom interest or cowardice have inclined to neglect it; and that we ought not to become the standing garrison of Europe, or to defend alone those territories, to the preservation of which so many states are obliged to contribute equally with ourselves. But this, my lords, appears to me an argument of which the ill consequences can never be fully discovered; an argument which dissolves all the obligations of contracts, destroys the foundation of moral justice, and lays society open to all the mischiefs of perfidy, by making the validity of oaths and contracts dependant upon chance, and regulating the duties of one man by the conduct of another. I pretend not, my lords, to long experience, and, therefore, in discussing intricate questions, may be easily mistaken. But as, in my opinion, my lords, morality is seldom difficult, but when it is clouded with an intention to deceive others or ourselves, I shall venture to declare with more confidence, that in proportion as one man neglects his duty, another is more strictly obliged to practise his own, that his example may not help forward the general corruption, and that those who are injured by the perfidy of others, may from his sincerity have a prospect of relief.

I believe all politicks that are not founded on morality will be found fallacious and destructive, if not immediately, to those who practise them; yet, consequentially, by their general tendency to disturb society, and weaken those obligations which maintain the order of the world. I shall, therefore, allow, that what justice requires from a private man, becomes, in parallel circumstances, the duty of a nation; and shall, therefore, never advise the violation of a solemn treaty. The stipulations in which we engaged, when we became guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction, are, doubtless, to be observed; and it is, therefore, one of the strongest objections against the measures which we are now pursuing, that we shall be perfidious at a greater expense than fidelity would have required, and shall exhaust the treasure of the nation without assisting the queen of Hungary.

To explain this assertion, my lords, it is necessary to take a view of the constitution of the German body, which consists of a great number of separate governments independent on each other, but subject, in some degree, to the emperour as the general head. The subjects of each state are governed by their prince, and owe no allegiance to any other sovereign; but the prince performs homage to the emperour, and having thereby acknowledged himself his feudatory, or dependant, may be punished for rebellion against him. The title of the emperour, and consequently his claim to this allegiance, and the right of issuing the ban against those who shall refuse it, is confirmed by many solemn acknowledgments of the diet, and, amongst others, by the grant of a pecuniary aid; this the present emperour has indisputably received, an aid having been already granted him in the diet, of a subsidy for eighteen months; and, therefore, none of the troops of Germany can now be employed against him, without subjecting the prince to whom they belong to the censure of the ban, a kind of civil excommunication.

To what purpose, then, my lords, are we to hire, at a rate never paid, or perhaps demanded before, troops which cannot serve us without subjecting their prince to the charge of rebellion? Or how shall we assist the queen of Hungary, by collecting forces which dare not act against the only enemy which she has now to fear? Or in what new difficulties shall we be engaged, should the inestimable dominions of Hanover be subjected to the imperial interdiction.

These, my lords, are questions to which, I hope, we shall hear a more satisfactory answer than I am able to conceive; for, indeed, I do not see what remains, but to confess, that these troops are hired only for a military show, to amuse this nation with a false appearance of zeal for the preservation of Europe, and to increase the treasures of Hanover at the expense of Britain.