I doubt not, my lords, but other clauses have been equally mistaken, and, therefore, think it necessary to consider them in a committee, where every lord may declare his sentiments, without the restraint of a formal debate, and where the bill may be deliberately revised, and accommodated more exactly to the present exigencies of the nation.

Lord WINCHELSEA spoke again, in substance as follows:—My lords, the only reason which has been urged for considering this bill in a committee, is the necessity of gratifying the merchants, and of showing our concern for the prosperity of commerce. If therefore it shall appear, that the merchants are indifferent with regard to its success, I hope it will be rejected without opposition.

I was this morning, my lords, informed by a merchant, who has many opportunities of acquainting himself with the opinions of the trading part of the nation, that they were fully convinced of the impossibility of adapting fixed rules to variable exigencies, or of establishing any certain method of obviating the chances of war, and defeating enemies who were every day altering their schemes; and declared that they had no hopes of security but from the vigilance of a board of admiralty, solicitous for the welfare of the merchants, and the honour of the nation.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY rose and spoke to the following purpose:—My lords, as three clauses of this bill have been universally given up, and almost all the rest plainly proved by the noble lord to be either absurd or superfluous, I cannot see why it should not be rejected without the solemnity of farther consideration, to which, indeed, nothing but the title can give it any claim.

The title, my lords, is, indeed, specious, and well fitted to the design of gaining attention and promoting popularity; but with this title there is nothing that corresponds, nor is any thing to be found but confusion and contradictions, which grow more numerous upon farther search.

That the whole bill, my lords, is unnecessary, cannot be denied, if it be considered that nothing is proposed in it which is not already in the power of your lordships, who may call at pleasure for the lists of the navy, the accounts of the cruisers, the duties of their commissions, and the journals of their commanders, (as you did in the sixth of queen Anne,) and detect every act of negligence or treachery, and every instance of desertion, or of cowardice.

Nothing is necessary to the regulation of our naval force, but that your lordships vigilantly exert that power which is conferred upon you by the constitution, and examine the conduct of every officer with attention and impartiality; no man then will dare to neglect his duty, because no man can hope to escape punishment.

Of this bill, therefore, since it is thus useless and inconsistent, I cannot but suspect, my lords, that it was concerted for purposes very different from those mentioned in the title, which it has, indeed, no tendency to promote. I believe, my lords, the projectors of it intended not so much to advance the interest of the merchants, as to depress the reputation of those whom they have long taken every opportunity of loading with reproaches, whom they have censured as the enemies of trade, the corrupters of the nation, and the confederates of Spain.

To confirm these general calumnies, it was necessary to fix on some particular accusation which might raise the resentment of the people, and exasperate them beyond reflection or inquiry. For this purpose nothing was more proper than to charge them with betraying our merchants to the enemy.

As no accusation could be more efficacious to inflame the people, so none, my lords, could with more difficulty be confuted. Some losses must be suffered in every war, and every one will necessarily produce complaints and discontent; every man is willing to blame some other person for his misfortunes, and it was, therefore, easy to turn the clamours of those whose vessels fell into the hands of the Spaniards, against the ministers and commanders of the ships of war.

These cries were naturally heard with the regard always paid to misfortune and distress, and propagated with zeal, because they were heard with pity. Thus in time, what was at first only the outcry of impatience, was by malicious artifices improved into settled opinion, that opinion was diligently diffused, and all the losses of the merchants were imputed, not to the chance of war, but the treachery of the ministry.

But, my lords, the folly of this opinion, however general, and the falsehood of this accusation, however vehement, will become sufficiently apparent, if you examine that bulky collection of papers which are now laid before you, from which you will discover the number of our fleets, the frequency of our convoys, the stations of our ships of war, and the times of their departure and return; you will find that no provision for war, no expedient likely to promote success has been neglected; that we have now more ships equipped than in the late war with France, that nothing can be added to the exactness with which our maritime force is regulated, and that there is not the least reason to doubt of the fidelity with which it has been employed.

In every war, my lords, it is to be expected that losses will be suffered by private persons on each side, nor even in a successful war can the publick always hope to be enriched; because the advantage may arise, not immediately from captures, but, consequently, from the treaties or conditions in which a prosperous war may be supposed to terminate.

What concessions we shall in this war extort from the Spaniards, what security will be procured for our merchants, what recompense will be yielded for our losses, or what extent will be added to our commerce, it cannot yet be expected that any man should be able to declare; nor will his majesty's counsellors be required to give an account of futurity. It is a sufficient vindication of their conduct, and an evident proof of the wisdom with which the war has been conducted, that we have hitherto gained more than we have lost.

This, my lords, will appear from a diligent and minute comparison of the captures on each side, and an exact computation of the value of our losses and our prizes. It will be found that if the Spaniards have taken, as it is not improbable, a greater number of ships, those which they have lost have been far more wealthy.

The merchants, indeed, seem to have distrusted the strength of the evidence which they produced in support of their allegations, by bringing it only before the other house, where, as an oath could not be administered, every man delivered what he believed as what he knew, and indulged himself without scruple in venting his resentment, or declaring his suspicions; a method of allegation very proper to scatter reproaches and gratify malevolence, but of very little use for the discovery of truth.

Had they come before your lordships, every circumstance had been minutely examined, every assertion compared with other evidence, all exaggerations repressed, and all foreign considerations rejected; each part would have been impartially heard, and it would have plainly been known to whom every loss was to be imputed. The negligence or treachery of the commanders of the convoys, wherever it had been found, would have been punished, but they would not have charged them with those miscarriages which were produced only by the obstinacy or inattention of the masters of the trading vessels.

Such inquiries, my lords, they appear to have thought it their interest to decline, and, therefore, did not proceed on their petition to this house; and if they did in reality avoid a rigorous examination, what can be inferred, but that they intended rather to offer insinuations than proofs, and rather to scatter infamy than obtain justice.

And, that nothing was indeed omitted that could secure our own commerce, or distress our enemies, may reasonably be collected from the number and great strength of our fleet, to which no empire in the world can oppose an equal force. If it has not been supplied with sailors without some delays, and if these delays have given our enemies an opportunity of adding to their securities, of fortifying their ports, and supplying their magazines, it must be ascribed to the nature of our constitution, that forbids all compulsory methods of augmenting our forces, which must be considered as, perhaps, the only inconvenience to be thrown into the balance against the blessings of liberty.

The difficulty of manning our ships of war, is, indeed, extremely perplexing. Men are naturally very little inclined to subject themselves to absolute command, or to engage in any service without a time limited for their dismission. Men cannot willingly rush into danger without the prospect of a large advantage; they have generally some fondness for their present state of life, and do not quit it without reluctance. All these reasons, my lords, concur to withhold the sailors from the navy, in which they are necessarily governed with higher authority than in trading vessels, in which they are subjected to punishments, and confined by strict regulations, without any certain term of their bondage; for such they, who know not the necessity of subordination, nor discover the advantages of discipline, cannot but account subjection to the will and orders of another.

By serving the merchants, they not only secure to themselves the liberty of changing their masters at pleasure, but enjoy the prospect of a near and certain advantage; they have not, indeed, any expectations of being suddenly enriched by a plate ship, and of gaining by one engagement such wealth as will enable them to spend the rest of their lives in ease and affluence; but they are sure of a speedy payment of their wages, perhaps, of some profits from petty commerce, and of an opportunity of squandering them at land in jollity and diversions; their labour is cheerful, because they know it will be short, and they readily enter into an employment which they can quit when it shall no longer please them.

These considerations, my lords, have no influence upon the preparations of France and Spain, where no man is master of his own fortune, or time, or life, and where the officers of the state can drive multitudes into the service of the crown, without regard to their private views, inclinations, or engagements. To man a fleet, nothing is necessary but to lay an embargo on the trading vessels, and suspend their commerce for a short time; therefore no man dares refuse to enter into the publick service when he is summoned; nor, if he should fly, as our sailors, from an impress, would any man venture to shelter or conceal him.

Absolute monarchs have, therefore, this advantage over us, that they can be sooner prepared for war, and to this must be ascribed all the success which the Spaniards have obtained. This, my lords, will not be obviated by the bill now before us, nor will it, indeed, procure any other benefit to the trade, or any addition to the power of the nation.

Of the ten clauses comprised in the bill, the greatest part is universally allowed to be injudiciously and erroneously proposed; and those few, which were thought of more importance, have been shown to contain no new expedients, nor to add any thing to the present regulations.

I cannot, therefore, discover any reason, my lords, that should induce us to refer to a committee this bill, of which part is confessedly to be rejected, and the rest is apparently superfluous.

[Then the question being put, whether the bill should be referred to a committee; it passed in the negative. Content, 25. Not content, 59.

On the rejection of this bill by the lords, a bill which related to an affair of no less importance than the security of trade and navigation, and which had been unanimously passed by the commons, it was satirically remarked, that the upper house understood trade and navigation better than the lower. However, the circumstances that attended it, made the publication of the bill, with the amendments and the reasons offered by the lords on both sides, expected with the more impatience.]



HOUSE OF LORDS, NOVEMBER 16, 1742.

Parliament having met, according to the royal summons, on this day, his majesty made a speech from the throne, which being afterwards read by the president, lord TWEEDALE rose, and spoke as follows:

My lords, it is not without the highest satisfaction, that every lover of mankind must look upon the alterations that have lately been produced in the state of Europe; nor can any Briton forbear to express an immediate and particular pleasure to observe his country rising again into its former dignity, to see his own nation shake off dependence, and rouse from inactivity, cover the ocean with her fleets, and awe the continent with her armies; bid, once more, defiance to the rapacious invaders of neighbouring kingdoms, and the daring projectors of universal dominion; once more exert her influence in foreign courts, and summon the monarchs of the west to another confederacy against the power of France.

The queen of Hungary, who was lately obliged to retire at the approach of her enemies, to leave her capital in danger of a siege, and seek shelter in the remotest corner of her dominions, who was lately so harassed with invasions, and so encircled with dangers, that she could scarcely fly from one ravager, without the hazard of falling into the hands of another, is now able to give laws to her persecutors, to return the violence which she has suffered, and instead of imploring mercy from those who had no regard but to their own interest, and were determined to annihilate her family and divide her dominions, now sits in full security on her throne, directs the march of distant armies, and dictates the terms on which those who have entered her dominions shall be suffered to escape.

Such, my lords, is the present state of the German empire; nor have the affairs of the rest of Europe been less changed; the power of the house of Bourbon has been diminished on every side, its alliance has been rejected, and its influence disregarded.

The king of Sardinia has openly engaged to hinder the Spaniards from erecting a new kingdom in Italy; and though he has hitherto been somewhat embarrassed in his measures, and oppressed by the superiority of his enemies, has at least, by preventing the conjunction of the Spanish armies, preserved the Austrians from being overwhelmed. Nor can the situation of his dominions, and the number of his forces, suffer us to doubt, that in a short time he will be able entirely to secure Italy, since he has already recovered his country, and drove back the Spaniards into the bosom of France.

The condition of the other Spanish army is such, as no enemy can wish to be aggravated by new calamities. They are shut up in a country without provisions, or of which the inhabitants are unwilling to supply them: on one side are neutral states, to which the law of nations bars their entrance; on another the Mediterranean sea, which can afford them only the melancholy prospect of hostile armaments, or sometimes of their own ships falling into the hands of the Britons; behind them are the troops of Austria ready to embarrass their march, intercept their convoys, and receive those whom famine and despair incite to change their masters, and to seek among foreign nations that ease and safety, of which the tyranny of their own government, and the madness of their own leaders, has deprived them. Such is their distress, and so great their diminution, that a few months must complete their ruin, they must be destroyed without the honour of a battle, they must sink under the fatigue of hungry marches, by which no enemy is overtaken or escaped, and be at length devoured, by those diseases, which toil and penury will inevitably produce.

That the diminution of the influence of the house of Bourbon is not an empty opinion, which we easily receive, because we wish it to be true; that other nations, likewise, see the same events with the same sentiments, and prognosticate the decline of that power which has so long intimidated the universe, appears from the declaration now made by his majesty of the conduct of the Swedish court.

That nation which was lately governed by the counsels, and glutted with the bounties of France, which watched the nod of her mighty patroness, and made war at her command against the Russian empire, now begins to discover, that there are other powers more worthy of confidence and respect, more careful to observe their engagements, or more able to fulfil them. She, therefore, requests the British monarch to extricate her from those difficulties, in which she is entangled by a blind compliance with French dictates, to restore to her the dismembered provinces, and recall that enemy which now impends over her capital, and whom the French have neither interest to appease, nor strength to resist.

Such, my lords, is the present prospect which offers itself to him who surveys Europe with a political view, and examines the present interest and dispositions of neighbouring potentates; such is the order which has been produced from general confusion, and such the reestablishment of equal power, which has succeeded these concussions of the world.

It is no small addition to the pleasure which this change must afford every man, who has either wisdom to discover his own happiness, or benevolence to rejoice in that of others, that it has been the effect not of chance but of conduct; that it is not an unforeseen event, produced by the secret operation of causes fortuitously concurring, but the result of a political and just design, well concerted and steadily pursued; that every advantage which has been gained, is the consequence of measures laid to obtain it; that our happiness has been procured by prudence, and that our counsels have not been lucky but wise.

If we reflect, my lords, upon the causes which have contributed to the rescue of Europe from impending slavery, which have reestablished the queen of Hungary in her dominions, enabled her to lay waste the territories of her invaders, confirmed her friends in their fidelity, and intimidated those whom rival interests inclined to wish her fall, or the hope of sharing in the plunder, had incited to form designs against her. If we inquire to what it is to be ascribed, that she is able to form new alliances, and defend her dominions with confederate armies, we shall find it easy to trace all these revolutions to one cause, the steady and prudent conduct of the king of Britain.

Our sovereign, my lords, has looked on the troubles of Europe with that concern which publick virtue inspires; he has seen the sufferings of this illustrious princess with that compassion which is always due to magnanimity oppressed, and formed resolutions for her assistance with that ardour, which courage naturally kindles; but with that caution, likewise, and secrecy, which experience dictates. But he remembered, my lords, that, though he was the friend of the queen of Hungary, he was to consider himself as the father of the people of Britain; that he was not to exhaust the forces of this nation in romantick expeditions, or exhaust its treasures in giving assistance which was not needed.

He therefore waited to observe the event of the war, and to discover whether the incessant struggles of the Austrians would be able to throw off the load with which they were oppressed; but he found that their spirit, however ardent, could not supply the want of strength; he found, that they were fainting under insuperable labours, and that, though they were in no danger of being conquered by the valour of their enemies, they must, in a short time, be wearied with their numbers.

His majesty then knew, my lords, that, by sending them speedy assistance, he at once promoted the interest of his people, and gratified his own inclinations; he therefore supplied the queen with such sums as enabled her to levy new forces, and drive her enemies before her. By procuring a reconciliation with the king of Prussia, he freed her from the nearest and most formidable danger, and gave her an opportunity to secure herself against the menaces of other powers.

But though she was set free from domestick dangers, though invasion was driven from her capital, though captivity no longer pursued her flight, nor usurpation hovered over her throne, her more distant dominions were still a prey to her enemies. The Spaniards had already landed one army in Italy, with which another was hastening to join. The success of this enterprise, which would have gained the greatest part of Italy, could only be hindered by the king of Sardinia, who was, therefore, solicited by the Spaniards and French to favour their design, with the strongest protestations, and the most magnificent promises. But these were overbalanced by the influence of the king of Britain, whose name was of sufficient importance to make the weaker part most eligible, and to counterbalance the force of immediate interest.

Thus was the passage into Italy barred against the Spaniards, by obstacles which they can never surmount, while the other army is besieged by our fleet, and by the Austrians; and reduced, instead of conquering kingdoms, to change their camp, and regulate their marches, with no other view than to avoid famine. While that prince, whose dominions might most commodiously afford them succour, and whom all the ties of nature and of interest oblige to assist them, is awed by the British ships of war, which lie at anchor before his metropolis, and of which the commanders, upon the least suspicion of hostilities against the queen of Hungary, threaten to batter his palaces, and destroy his city.

In this manner, my lords, has the king of Britain assisted the house of Austria with his treasures, his influence, and his navy; thus does he subdue some enemies, and restrain others; thus does he hold the balance of the war, and thus does he add the weight of power to the scale of justice.

But to secure the success that has been already obtained, and to take from the enemies of liberty all hopes of recovering the advantages which they have lost, he has now no longer confined his assistance to negotiations and pecuniary supplies. He knows that alliances are always best observed, when they confer security, or produce manifest advantages; and that money will not be always equivalent to armies. He has, therefore, now acted openly in defence of his ally, has filled Flanders, once more, with British troops, and garrisoned the frontier towns with the forces of that nation by which they were gained. The veteran now sees, once more, the plains over which he formerly pursued the squadrons of France, points the place where he seized the standards, or broke the lines, where he trampled the oppressors of mankind, with that spirit which is enkindled by liberty and justice. His heart now beats, once more, at the sight of those walls which he formerly stormed, and he shows the wounds which he received in the mine, or on the breach. The French now discover, that they are not yet lords of the continent; and that Britain has other armies ready to force, once more, the passes of Schellembourg, or break down the intrenchments of Blenheim; to wrest from them the sceptre of universal monarchy, and confine them again to their own dominions.

To the British regiments, his majesty has joined a large body of the forces of his own electorate, without regard to the danger which may threaten his dominions in the absence of his troops, having no other view than to secure the publick tranquillity at whatever hazard of his own, and being convinced that private interest is most effectually secured by a steady attention to general good.

These measures, my lords, undoubtedly demand our gratitude and applause. Gratitude is always due to favourable intentions, and diligent endeavours, even when those intentions are frustrated, and those endeavours defeated; and applause is often paid to success, when it has been merely the effect of chance, and been produced by measures ill adapted to the end which was intended by them. But, surely, when just designs have been happily executed, when wise measures are blessed with success, neither envy nor hatred will dare to refuse their acclamations; surely, those will at least congratulate, whom the corruption of their hearts hinders from rejoicing, and those who cannot love, will at least commend.

Here, my lords, I suspect no inclination to depreciate the happiness that we enjoy, or to calumniate that virtue by which it has been obtained; and therefore doubt not but your lordships will readily concur in the reasonable, motion which I have now to offer:—

"That an humble address be presented to his majesty, to return him the thanks of this house, for his most gracious speech from the throne.

"To declare our just sense of his majesty's great care and vigilance for the support of the house of Austria, and for restoring and securing the balance of power.

"To acknowledge his majesty's great wisdom and attention to the publick welfare, in sending so considerable a body of his forces into the Low Countries, and in strengthening them with his electoral troops, and the Hessians in the British pay; and thereby forming such an army as may defend and encourage those powers who are well intentioned, and give a real assistance to the queen of Hungary, and to assure his majesty of the concurrence and support of this house, in this necessary measure.

"To express our satisfaction in the good effects which the vigour exerted by Great Britain in assisting its ancient allies, and maintaining the liberties of Europe, hath already had on the affairs of the queen of Hungary, and on the conduct of several powers; and our hopes that a steady perseverance in the same measures, will inspire the like spirit and resolution in other powers, equally engaged by treaties and common interest to take the like part.

"To give his majesty the strongest assurances, that this house has the honour and safety of his majesty, the true interest and prosperity of his kingdoms, the security and advancement of their commerce, the success of the war against Spain, and the reestablishment of the balance and tranquillity of Europe entirely at heart. That these shall be the great and constant objects of our proceedings and resolutions, this house being determined to support his majesty in all just and necessary measures for attaining those great and desirable ends, and to stand by and defend his majesty against all his enemies."

Lord MONTFORT spoke next to the following effect:—My lords, the motion offered by the noble lord, is, in my opinion, so proper and just, so suitable to the dignity of this assembly, and so expressive of the gratitude which the vigilance of his majesty for the publick good, ought to kindle in every heart not chilled by ungenerous indolence, or hardened by inveterate disaffection, that I cannot discover any reason for which it can be opposed, and therefore hope that every lord will concur in it with no less alacrity and zeal than I now rise up to second it.

It may, indeed, naturally be hoped from this house, that his majesty's measures will be readily approved, since they are such as even malice and faction will not dare to censure or oppose, such as calumny will not venture to defame, and such as those who will not praise them can never mention. If it be allowed, that the interest of France is opposite to that of Britain, that the equipoise of power on the continent is to be preserved; if any of the counsels of our ancestors deserve our attention, if our victories at Cressy or at Ramillies are justly celebrated by our historians, the wisdom of our sovereign's conduct cannot be denied.

The French, my lords, whom our armies in the reign of Anne saw flying before them; who, from dividing kingdoms, and prescribing laws to mankind, were reduced to the defence of their own country; who were driven from intrenchment to intrenchment, and from one fortification to another, now grown insolent with the pleasures of peace, and the affluence of commerce, Have forgotten the power by which their schemes were baffled, and their arrogance repressed; by which their fabrick of universal monarchy was shattered, and themselves almost buried in the ruins.

Infatuated with the contemplation of their own force, elated with the number of their troops, the magnificence of their cities, and the opulence of their treasury, they have once more imagined themselves superiour to resistance, and again aspire to the command of the universe; they have now for some time assumed the haughty style of the legislators of mankind; and have expected, that princes should appeal to them as to the highest human tribunal, and that nations should submit their claims to their arbitration; they have already assumed the distribution of dominions, and expect that neither peace shall be concluded, nor war proclaimed, but by their permission or advice.

By this gradation of exorbitant claims and oppressive measures, have they at length arrived, my lords, at the summit of insolence; by these steps have they ascended once more the towering throne of universal monarchy; nor was any thing wanting to complete their plan, but that their ancient rival, the German empire, should be reduced to acknowledge their sovereignty, and that the supreme dignity of Europe should be the gift of the French bounty.

The death of the late emperour, without sons, furnished them with an opportunity of executing their design, too favourable to be neglected. They now imagined it in their power, not only to dispose of the imperial dignity, but to divide the dominions of the house of Austria into many petty sovereignties, incapable singly of opposing them, and unlikely to unite in any common cause, or to preserve a confederacy unbroken, if they should by accident agree to form it.

They, therefore, sent their armies into Germany, to superintend the approaching election, and by hovering over the territories of princes unable to resist them, extorted voices in favour of their ally; a prince, whose dominions must, by their situation, always oblige him to compliance with the demands, and to concurrence in the schemes of his protectors, and who will rather act as the substitute of France, than the emperour of Germany.

But it was to no purpose that they had graced their dependant with titular honours and ensigns of sovereignty, if the house of Austria still retained its hereditary dominions, and preserved its strength when it had lost its dignity. They well knew that armies were equally formidable, whether commanded by an emperour or an inferiour sovereign; and that a mere alteration of names, though it might afford a slight and transient gratification to vanity, would produce no real increase or diminution of power.

They, therefore, thought it necessary to improve the present time of confusion, and excite all the princes of the empire to revive their ancient claims upon the Austrian territories; claims, which how long soever they had been forgotten, howsoever abrogated by long prescription, or annulled by subsequent treaties, were now again to become valid, and to be decided by the arbitration of France.

But this project being defeated by the heroick constancy of the queen of Hungary, whose wisdom and resolution, which will equal her name in future histories with those of the most successful conquerors, rejected their mediation, and refused to own her right doubtful, by submitting it to be tried; they were obliged no longer to dissemble their designs, or make farther pretences to respect or tenderness. Her fall was necessary to their own exaltation; they, therefore, kindled a general conflagration of war, they excited all the princes to take arms against her, and found it, indeed, no difficult task to persuade them to attack a princess, whom they thought unable to form an army, whom they believed they should rather pursue than engage, and whose dominions might be overrun without bloodshed, and whom they should conquer only by marching against.

Such a combination as this, a combination of monarchs, of which each appeared able singly to have carried on a war against her, nothing but the highest degree of magnanimity could have formed a design of resisting; nor could that resistance have procured the least advantages, or retarded for a single day the calamities that were threatened, had it not been regulated by every martial virtue, had not policy united with courage, and caution with activity.

Thus did the intrepidity of this princess, my lords, support her against the storms that shook her kingdom on every side; thus did those, whom her virtues gained over to her service, and whom her example animated with contempt of superiour numbers, defend her against the forces of all the surrounding nations, led on by monarchs, and elated with the prospect of an easy conquest.

But the utmost that could be hoped from the most refined stratagems, or the most exalted courage, was only that her fate might be deferred, that she would not fall wholly unrevenged, that her enemies would suffer with her, and that victory would not be gained without a battle. It was evident, that bravery must in time give way to strength, that vigour must be wearied, and policy exhausted, that by a constant succession of new forces, the most resolute troops must be overwhelmed; and that the house of Austria could only gain by the war, the fatal honour of being gloriously extinguished.

This his majesty's wisdom easily enabled him to discover, and his goodness incited him to prevent; he called upon all the powers, who had promised to preserve the Pragmatick sanction, to have regard to the faith of nations, and by fulfilling their engagements, to preserve the liberties of Europe; but the success of his remonstrances only afforded a new instance of the weakness of justice, when opposed to interest or fear. All the potentates of the continent were restrained by the threats, or gained by the promises of France; and the disposal of the possessions of the Austrian house, seemed, by the general consent of Europe, to be resigned to the family of Bourbon.

But our sovereign was not yet discouraged from asserting the rights which he had promised to maintain, nor did he think the neglect or treachery of others a sufficient reason for refusing that assistance, which justice and policy equally required. He knew the power of his own empire, and though he did not omit to cultivate alliances, he was conscious of his ability to proceed without them; and therefore showed, by sending his troops into the Austrian territories, that the measures of the sovereign of Britain were not to be regulated by either his enemies or his confederates; that this nation is yet able to support its own claims, and protect those of its allies; and that while we attack one of the kingdoms of the house of Bourbon, we are not afraid to set the other at defiance.

The effects of this conduct, my lords, were immediately apparent; the king of Sardinia engaged to oppose the entrance of the Spaniards into Italy; the king of Prussia not only made a peace with the queen of Hungary, by whom he was more to be dreaded than any other enemy, but entered into an alliance with his majesty, who has made no small addition to his influence, by another treaty with the most powerful nations of the north.

Thus, my lords, are the dreadful arms of France, which are never employed but in the detestable and horrid plan of extending slavery, and supporting oppression, stopped in the full career of success. Thus is the scheme of universal monarchy once more blasted, and the world taught, that the preservation of the rights of mankind, the security of religion, and the establishment of peace, are not impracticable, that the power of Britain is yet undiminished, and that her spirit is not yet depressed.

By his majesty's conduct, my lords, the reputation of our country is now raised to its utmost height; we are now considered as the arbiters of empire, the protectors of right, the patrons of distress, and the sustainers of the balance of the world. I cannot, therefore, but conclude, that no man in this illustrious assembly will be unwilling to acknowledge that wisdom and firmness, which not only this nation, but the greatest part of the universe, will remember with gratitude in the remotest ages, and that the motion, which I now second, will be universally approved.

The speaker then read the motion, and asked in the usual form, whether it was their lordships' pleasure that the question should be put; upon which lord CHESTERFIELD rose up, and spoke to the following purpose:—My lords, though the motion has been, by the noble lord who made it, introduced with all the art of rhetorick, and enforced by him that seconded it, with the utmost ardour of zeal, and the highest raptures of satisfaction and gratitude; though all the late measures have been recommended to our applause, as proofs of the strictest fidelity, and the most sagacious policy; and though I am very far from intending to charge them with weakness or injustice, or from pretending to have discovered in them a secret tendency to advance any interest in opposition to that of Britain, I am yet not able to prevail upon myself to suppress those scruples which hinder me from concurring with them, and from approving the address which is now proposed.

I am less inclined, my lords, to favour the present motion, because I have long been desirous of seeing the ancient method of general addresses revived by this house; a method of address by which our princes were reverenced without flattery, and which left us at liberty to honour the crown, without descending to idolize the ministry.

I know not, my lords, what advantages have been procured by an annual repetition of the speeches from the throne, however gracious or excellent. For ourselves, we have certainly obtained no new confidence from the crown, nor any higher degree of honour among the people. The incense, which from our censers has so long perfumed the palace, has inclined the nation to suspect, that we are long enough inured to idolatry, to offer up their properties for a sacrifice, whenever they shall be required; and I cannot dissemble my suspicions, that a long continuance of this custom may give some ambitious or oppressive prince in some distant age, when, perhaps, this beneficent and illustrious family may be extinct, the confidence to demand it.

I cannot but be of opinion, and hope your lordships will be convinced upon very short reflection, that there is a style of servility, which it becomes not this house to use even to our monarchs: we are to remember, indeed, that reverence which is always due from subjects, but to preserve likewise that dignity which is inseparable from independence and legislative authority.

That we ought not to descend to the meanest of flattery, that we ought to preserve the privilege of speaking, without exaggerated praises, or affected acknowledgments, our regard not only to ourselves, but to our sovereign ought to remind us. For nothing is more evident, my lords, than that no monarch can be happy while his people are miserable; that the throne can be secure only by being guarded by the affections of the people; and the prince can only gain and preserve their affections, by promoting their interest, and supporting their privileges.

But how, my lords, shall that monarch distinguish the interest of his people, whom none shall dare to approach with information? How shall their privileges be supported, if when they are infringed, no man will complain? And who shall dare to lay any publick grievances, or private wrongs before the king of Britain, if the highest assembly of the nation shall never address him but in terms of flattery?

The necessity of putting an end to this corrupt custom, becomes every day more and more urgent; the affairs of Europe are hastening to a crisis, in which all our prudence, and all our influence will be required; and we ought, therefore, to take care not to perplex our resolutions by voluntary ignorance, or destroy our credit by a publick approbation of measures, which we are well known not to understand.

I suppose, none of your lordships, who are not engaged in the administration of affairs, will think it derogatory from the reputation of your abilities and experience, to confess, that you do not yet see all the circumstances or consequences of the measures which you are desired to applaud; measures which have been too lately taken to discover their own tendency, and with relation to which no papers have been laid before us. We are told of armies joined, and treaties concluded, and, therefore, called upon to praise the wisdom of our negotiations, and the usefulness and vigour of our military preparations; though we are neither acquainted on what terms our alliances are formed, nor on what conditions our auxiliaries assist us.

This, my lords, is surely such treatment as no liberal mind can very patiently support; it is little less than to require that we should follow our guides with our eyes shut; that we should place implicit confidence in the wisdom of our ministers, and having first suffered them to blind ourselves, assist them afterwards to blind the people.

The longer I dwell upon the consideration of this motion, the more arguments arise to persuade me, that we ought not hastily to agree to it. My lords, the address proposed, like the speech itself, is of a very complicated and intricate kind, and comprises in a few words many transactions of great importance, crowded together with an artful brevity, that the mind may be hindered by the multitude of images, from a distinct and deliberate consideration of particulars. Here are acts of negotiation confounded with operations of war, one treaty entangled with another, and the union of the Hanoverians with our troops, mentioned almost in the same sentence with the Spanish war. This crowd of transactions, so different in their nature, so various in their consequences, who can venture to approve in the gross? or who can distinguish without long examination.

I hope, my lords, that I shall not be charged with want of candour, in supposing the motion not to be an extemporaneous composition, but to be drawn up with art and deliberation. It is well known, that the address is often concerted at the same time that the speech is composed; and that it is not uncommon to take advantage of the superiority which long acquaintance with the question gives those who defend the motion, above those who oppose it.

We are indeed told, that the visible effects of his majesty's measures prove their expediency, and that we may safely applaud that conduct of which we receive the benefits. But, my lords, the advantages must be seen or felt before they can be properly acknowledged; and it has not been shown, that we have yet either intimidated the enemies of the queen of Hungary, whose interest we have been lately taught to believe inseparable from our own, or encouraged any new allies to declare in her favour.

The Dutch, my lords, are not yet roused from their slumber of neutrality; and how loudly soever we may assert our zeal, or with whatever pomp we may display our strength, they still seem to doubt either our integrity or force; and are afraid of engaging in the quarrel, lest they should be either conquered or betrayed. Nor has the approach of our army, however they may be delighted with the show, inspired them with more courage, though they are enforced by the troops of Hanover.

The addition of these forces to the British army, has been mentioned as an instance of uncommon attention to the great cause of universal liberty, as a proof that no regard has been paid to private interest, and that all considerations are sacrificed to publick good. But since no service can be so great but it may be overpaid, it is necessary that we may judge of the benefit, to inform us on what terms it has been obtained, and how well the act of succession has been observed on this occasion.

Though I am too well acquainted, my lords, with the maxims which prevail in the present age, and have had too much experience of the motives, by which the decisions of the senate are influenced, to offer any motion of my own, yet these reasons will withhold me from concurring with this. I cannot but be of opinion, that the question ought to be postponed to another day, in which the house may be fuller, our deliberations be assisted by the wisdom and experience of more than thirty lords, who are now absent, and the subjects of inquiry, of which many are new and unexpected, may be more accurately considered; nor can I prevail upon myself to return to general declarations any other than general answers.

Lord CARTERET answered in substance as follows:—My lords, as there has arisen no new question, as his majesty in assisting the queen of Hungary, has only followed the advice of the senate; I am far from being able to discover, why any long deliberation should be necessary to a concurrence with the motion now before us, or whence any doubt can arise with regard to the effects of his majesty's measures; effects which no man will deny, who will believe either his own eyes, or the testimony of others; effects, which every man who surveys the state of Europe must perceive, and which our friends and our enemies will equally confess.

To these measures, which we are now to consider, it must be ascribed, that the French are no longer lords of Germany; that they no longer hold the princes of the empire in subjection, lay provinces waste at pleasure, and sell their friendship on their own terms. By these measures have the Dutch been delivered from their terrours, and encouraged to deliberate freely upon the state of Europe, and prepare for the support of the Pragmatick sanction. But the common cause has been most evidently advanced by gaining the king of Prussia, by whose defection the balance of the war was turned, and at least thirty thousand men taken away from the scale of France.

This, my lords, was a change only to be effected by a patient expectation of opportunities, and a politick improvement of casual advantages, and by contriving methods of reconciling the interest of Prussia with the friendship of the queen of Hungary; for princes, like other men, are inclined to prefer their own interest to all other motives, and to follow that scheme which shall promise most gain.

That all this, my lords, has been effected, cannot be denied; nor can it be said to have been effected by any other causes than the conduct of Britain: had this nation looked either with cowardly despair, or negligent inactivity, on the rising power of France and the troubles of the continent; had the distribution of empire been left to chance, our thoughts confined wholly to commerce, and our prospects not extended beyond our own island, the liberties of Europe had been at an end, the French had established themselves in the secure possession of universal monarchy, would henceforth have set mankind at defiance, and wantoned without fear in oppression and insolence.

These, my lords, are consequences of the measures pursued by his majesty, of which neither the reality nor the importance can be questioned, and, therefore, they may doubtless be approved without hesitation. For surely, my lords, the addition of the Hanoverian troops to the forces of our own nation can raise no scruples, nor be represented as any violation of the act of settlement.

Of the meaning of that memorable act, I believe, I do not need any information. I know it is provided, that this nation shall not be engaged in war in the quarrel of Hanover; but I see no traces of a reciprocal obligation, nor can discover any clause, by which we are forbidden to make use in our own cause of the alliance of Hanover, or by which the Hanoverians are forbidden to assist us.

I hope, my lords, this representation of the state of our transactions with Hanover, will not be charged with artifice or sophistry. I know how invidious a task is undertaken by him who attempts to show any connexion between interests so generally thought opposite, and am supported in this apology only by the consciousness of integrity, and the intrepidity of truth.

The assistance of Hanover, my lords, was, at this time, apparently necessary. Our own troops, joined with the Hessians, composed a body too small to make any efficacious opposition to the designs of France; but by the addition of sixteen thousand men, became sufficiently formidable to oblige her to employ those troops for the security of her frontiers, with which she intended to have overwhelmed Italy, and to have exalted another Spanish prince to a new kingdom. The Spaniards, deprived of this assistance, harassed by the Austrians with perpetual alarms, and debarred by our fleet from the supplies which are provided for them in their own country, must languish with penury and hardships, being equally cut off from succour and from flight.

Thus, my lords, it is evident, that the true and everlasting interest of Britain has been steadily pursued; that the measures formed to promote it have been not only prudent, but successful. We did not engage sooner in the quarrel, because we were not able to form an army sufficiently powerful. An advantageous peace is only to be obtained by vigorous preparations for war; nor is it to be expected that our enemies should court our friendship, till they see that our opposition is really formidable. Such, my lords, is our present state; we may reasonably hope that the French will desist from their designs, because they will have a confederacy to oppose, more powerful than that by which their immortal monarch was lately humbled; and I hope that conduct will always be applauded in this house, which enables us to repress the arrogance of France.

Lord WESTMORELAND then spoke to the following purport:—My lords, though the warmth with which the noble lord has defended the motion, and the confidence with which he asserts the propriety and efficacy of the measures to which it relates, are such proofs of the strength of his conviction as leave no room to doubt his sincerity; yet as the same arguments do not operate upon different minds with the same force, I hope I shall not be thought less sincere, or less studious of the publick happiness, or the honour of the crown, though I presume to differ from him.

In the motion now before us, I cannot concur, because, though it should be allowed to contain a just representation of foreign affairs, yet it appears to me to omit those considerations which I think it the duty of this house to offer to his majesty. This nation is, in my opinion, exposed to enemies more formidable than the French; nor do I think that we are at leisure to defend the liberties of Europe, till we have made some provisions for the security of our own; or to regulate the balance of power, till we have restored our constitution to its ancient equilibrium.

That there are flagrant proofs of the most enormous corruption throughout the whole subordination of publick offices; that our publick funds are only nurseries of fraud, and that trust of every kind is only considered as an opportunity of plundering, appears evidently from the universal prevalence of luxury and extravagance, from the sudden affluence of private men, from the wanton riot of their tables, the regal splendour of their equipages, and the ostentatious magnificence of their buildings.

It is evident, likewise, that corruption is not confined to publick offices; that those who have lost their own integrity, have endeavoured to destroy the virtue of others; that attempts have been made to subject the whole nation to the influence of corruption, and to spread the contagion of bribery from the highest to the lowest classes of the people.

It is therefore necessary, before we engage in the consideration of foreign affairs, to prosecute the inquiry which was begun in the last session, to trace wickedness to its source, and drag the authors of our miseries into the light.

These, my lords, are the inquiries which the general voice of the people importunately demands; these are the petitions which ought never to be rejected; all parties are now united, and all animosities extinguished; nor is there any other clamour than for inquiries and punishment.

The other house, my lords, has been engaged in the laudable attempt to detect those who have betrayed, or plundered, or corrupted their country; and surely we ought to have so much regard to our own honour, as not to suffer them to toil alone in a design so popular, so just, and so necessary, while we amuse ourselves with applauding the sagacity of our ministers, who, whatever they may hope themselves, or promise others, have not yet prevailed on any foreign power to concur with them, or to interpose in the affairs of the continent. And, therefore, I cannot conceal my suspicion, that instead of furnishing any subject for panegyricks on our policy and caution, we are now wasting our treasures and our strength in a romantick expedition.

Since, therefore, my lords, our domestick evils seem to me most dangerous, I move, that in order to their speedy remedy, and that the people may see we do not forget their immediate interest, this addition be made to the motion now before us:

"And humbly to assure his majesty, that we will apply our constant and persevering endeavours to calm and heal animosities and divisions, unseasonable as they are at all times, and most pernicious in the present juncture, which the true fatherly tenderness of his majesty, out of the abundance of his constant care for the rights and liberties of his people, has so affectionately at the close of last session recommended from the throne, by searching thoroughly and effectually into the grounds, which are or may be assigned for publick discontent, agreeably to the ancient rules and methods of parliament."

This additional clause being delivered in writing to the speaker, he read it to the house, but said that the noble lord spoke so low, that he could not tell where he proposed to have it inserted. Lord WESTMORELAND then directed him to read the motion, which done, he desired that his clause might be added at the end.

Upon this lord RAYMOND spoke as follows:—My lords, the addition which the noble lord has offered to the address proposed, cannot, in my opinion, be properly admitted, as it has no relation to the preceding clauses, but is rather inconsistent with them.

Nor do I think it only improper with regard to the other part of the motion, but unnecessary in itself; since it has no reference to his majesty's speech, now under our consideration; since it will facilitate none of our inquiries, which may be carried on with equal vigour without any such unseasonable declaration of our design.

If, therefore, the motion for the amendment be not withdrawn, I shall move, that the first question be first put.

[The question was then put with regard to the first motion, and it passed in the affirmative, without any division.]



HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 10, 1742.

Motion in the committee of supplies, for granting pay for sixteen thousand Hanoverian troops for the four months last past.

Sir William YONGE opened the debate, and spoke in substance as follows:—Sir, though the general state of the kingdoms of Europe cannot be supposed to be wholly unknown in this assembly, yet since the decision of the question now before us, must depend upon the conceptions which every man has formed with regard to the affairs on the continent, it will be necessary to exhibit them to view in a narrow compass, that nothing which may contribute to our information may be overlooked or forgotten.

The late emperour, for some time before his death, finding that there remained little hopes of male issue, and that his family would be consequently in danger of losing part of the honours and dignities which it had so long enjoyed, turned his thoughts to the security of his hereditary dominions, which he entailed upon his eldest daughter, to preserve them from being broken into fragments, and divided among the numerous pretenders to them; and that this settlement might be preserved from violation, employed all the opportunities which any extraordinary conjunctures presented to him of obtaining the concurrence and ratification of the neighbouring states.

As it was always the interest of this nation to support the house of Austria, as a counterbalance to the power of France, it was easy to procure from us a solemn accession to this important settlement; and we, therefore, promised to support it, whenever it should be attacked. This was, in reality, only a promise to be watchful for our own advantage, and to hinder that increase of the French influence, which must, at length, be fatal to ourselves.

The like engagements were proposed to many other powers, which proposals were by most of them accepted, and among others by France, upon consideration of a very large increase of her dominions; and it was hoped, that whatever might be determined by the electors with respect to the imperial dignity, the hereditary dominions to the house of Austria would remain in the same family, and that France would be hindered by her own engagements from disturbing the peace of the empire.

But no sooner did the death of the emperour give the enemies of the house of Austria hopes of gratifying without danger their resentment and ambition, than almost all the neighbouring princes began to revive their pretensions, and appeared resolved to recover by force, what they alleged to have been only by force withheld from them. Armies were raised on all sides, invasions either attempted or threatened from every quarter, and the whole world looked upon the daughter of Austria either with pity or with joy, as unable to make any stand against the general confederacy, and under a necessity of yielding to the most oppressive terms, and purchasing peace from her enemies at their own price.

It cannot be mentioned, without indignation, that this universal combination was formed and conducted by the influence of the French, who, after having agreed to the Pragmatick sanction, omitted no endeavours to promote the violation of it; and not only incited the neighbouring princes to assert their claim by promises of assistance, but poured numerous armies into the empire, not only to procure by force, and without the least regard to equity, an election in favour of the duke of Bavaria, but to assist him in the invasion of the Austrian dominions, of which the settlement had been ratified by their concurrence, purchased at a price which might justly have been thought too great, even though they had observed their stipulations.

The pleas which they advanced in vindication of their conduct, it is not necessary to relate; since, however artfully they may be formed, the common sense of mankind must perceive them to be false. It is to no purpose, that they declare themselves not to have receded from their promise, because they enter the empire only as auxiliaries, and their troops act under the command of the elector of Bavaria; since he that furnishes troops for the invasion of those territories which he is obliged to protect, may very justly be considered as an invader; as he who assists a thief, partakes the guilt of theft.

All contracts, sir, whether between states or private persons, are to be understood according to the known intention of the two parties; and I suppose it will not be pretended, by the most hardened advocate for the conduct of the French, that the late emperour would have purchased, at so dear a rate, their accession to the Pragmatick sanction, if he had supposed, that they still thought themselves at liberty to employ all their treasure and their force in assisting others to violate it.

It is well known, that an unsuccessful war, which the French are likewise suspected of assisting, had, a short time before the death of the emperour, weakened his forces, and exhausted his revenues; and that, therefore, when he was surprised by death, he left his family impoverished and defenceless; so that his daughter being without money or armies, and pressed by enemies on every side of her dominions, was immediately reduced to such distress as, perhaps, she only was able to support, and such difficulties as no other would have entertained the least hope of being able to surmount.

In the first crush of her calamities, when she was driven by the torrent of invasion from fortress to fortress, and from kingdom to kingdom, it is not to be denied, that most of the guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction stood at gaze, without attempting that relief which she incessantly called upon them to afford her; and which, indeed, they could deny upon no other pretence, than that they were convinced it would be ineffectual, that her ruin was not to be prevented, and that she must be swallowed up by the deluge of war, which it appeared impossible to resist or to divert.

The queen, however, determined to assert her rights, and to defend her dominions; and, therefore, assembled her forces, and made such opposition, that some of her enemies finding the war, to which they were encouraged only by a belief of the certainty of success, likely to become more hazardous than they expected, soon desisted from their claims, and consented to peace upon moderate conditions; and the most formidable of her enemies, being alienated from the French by experience of their treachery, and, perhaps, intimidated by the bravery of his enemies, was at last willing to become neutral, and to be satisfied with the recovery of his own claims, without assisting the elector of Bavaria.

Thus far has this illustrious princess struggled in the tempest of the continent with very little assistance from her confederates; but it cannot be supposed, that these violent efforts have not exhausted her strength, or that she must not be, at length, overpowered by the armies which the French, enraged at the disappointment of their schemes, are sending against her. She has an incontestable claim to our assistance, promised by the most solemn stipulations, and, therefore, not to be withheld upon any views of present advantage. The prudence and magnanimity which she has discovered, prove, that she deserves to be supported upon the common principles of generosity, which would not suffer a brave man to look idly upon a heroine struggling with multitudes; and the opposition which she has been able to make alone, shows that assistance will not be vain.

These considerations, though, since the senate has determined to assist her, they are not immediately necessary in a question which relates only to the manner in which that assistance shall be given, are yet not entirely useless; since they may contribute to overbalance any prejudices that may obstruct the schemes which have been formed, and quicken the endeavours of men who might be inclined to reject those counsels to which any specious objections shall be raised, or to lose that time in deliberation, which ought to be employed in action.

As the assistance of this distressed princess has been already voted by the senate, it is now no longer to be inquired, what advantages can be gained to this nation by protecting her, or whether the benefits of victory will be equivalent to the hazards of war? These questions are already determined. It has already appeared necessary to this house, to restore the balance of power by preserving the house of Austria; and the only question, therefore, that remains is, by what means we shall endeavour to preserve it? and whether the means that have already been used, deserve our approbation?

Among the several schemes that were proposed for this end, it appeared most proper to the ministry to form an army in the low countries, whence they might be ready to march wherever their presence might be required, and where they might be easily supplied with necessaries. This army was to be raised with expedition; the affairs of the queen of Hungary could admit of no delay; auxiliary troops were, therefore, to be hired, and it appeared to them more proper to hire the troops of Hanover than of any other nation.

That the affairs of the queen of Hungary would admit of no delay, and that, therefore, the army in the low countries was very speedily to be formed, cannot be doubted by any one that compares her power with that of the nation against which she was contending; a nation incited by a long train of success to aspire to universal monarchy; a nation which has long been assembling armies, and accumulating treasures, in order to give law to the rest of the world; which had for many years stood against the united force of all the bordering powers, and to which the house of Austria is not equal in its full strength, much less when its treasures had been exhausted, and its troops destroyed in an unfortunate war before the death of the emperour; and when almost every part of its dominions was threatened by a particular power, and the troops of each province were employed in the defence of their own towns; so that no great armies could be collected, because no place could be left without defenders.

Such was the state of the Austrian dominions, when the troops of France broke in upon them; and in this state it must readily be acknowledged, that neither courage nor prudence could procure success; that no stratagems could long divert, nor any resistance repel such superiority of power, and that, therefore, relief must be speedy, to be efficacious.

That to bring the relief which we had promised, with expedition sufficient to procure any advantages to our ally, to preserve her provinces from being laid waste, her towns from being stormed, and her armies from being ruined; to repress the confidence of the French, and recall them from conquests to the defence of their own territories, it was apparently necessary to hire foreign troops; for to have sent over all our own forces, had been to have tempted the French to change their design of invading the Austrian dominions, into that of attacking Britain, and attempting to add this kingdom to their other conquests; to have raised new troops with expedition equal to the necessity that demanded them, was either absolutely impossible, or at least, very difficult; and when raised, they would have been only new troops, who, whatever might be their courage, would have been without skill in war, and would, therefore, have been distrusted by those whom they assisted, and despised by those whom they opposed.

Nothing, therefore, remained, but that auxiliaries should be tried, and the only question then to be decided, was, what nation should be solicited to supply us? Nor was this so difficult to be answered as in former times, since there was not the usual liberty of choice; many of the princes who send their troops to fight for other powers, were at that time either influenced by the promises, or bribed by the money, or intimidated by the forces of France; some of them were engaged in schemes for enlarging their own dominions, and therefore were unwilling to supply others with those troops for which they were themselves projecting employment; and, perhaps, of some others it might reasonably be doubted, whether they would not betray the cause which they should be retained to support, and whether they would not in secret wish the depression of the queen of Hungary, by means of those invaders whom they promised to resist.

Sir, amidst all these considerations, which there was not time completely to adjust, it was necessary to turn their eyes upon some power to which none of these objections could be made; and, therefore, they immediately fixed upon the electorate of Hanover, as subject to the same monarch, and of which, therefore, the troops might be properly considered as our national allies, whose interest and inclinations must be the same with our own, and whose fidelity might be warranted by our own sovereign.

It was no small advantage that the contract for these troops could be made without the delay of tedious negotiations; that they were ready to march upon the first notice, and that they had been long learned in the exactest discipline.

The concurrence of all these circumstances easily determined our ministers in their choice, and the troops were ordered to join the Britons in the Low Countries; a step which so much alarmed the French, that they no longer endeavoured to push forward their conquests, nor appeared to entertain any other design than that of defending themselves, and returning in safety to their own country.

Such was the conduct of our ministry, such were their motives, and such has been their success; nor do I doubt but this house will, upon the most rigorous examination, find reason to approve both their integrity and prudence. Of their integrity they could give no greater proof, than their confidence of the agreement of this house to measures which, though conformable in general to our resolutions, were not particularly communicated to us; because, indeed, it could not be done without loss of time, which it was necessary to improve with the utmost diligence, and a discovery of those designs, which ought only to be known by the enemy after they were executed. Of their prudence, their success is a sufficient evidence; and, therefore, I cannot doubt but gentlemen will give a sanction to their conduct, by providing, according to the estimates before the committee, for the support of troops, which have been found of so great use.

Lord POWLETT rose up next, and spoke to the effect following:—Sir, the honourable gentleman has with so much clearness and elegance displayed the state of Europe, explained the necessity of hiring foreign troops, and showed, the reasons for which the troops of Hanover were preferred to those of any other nation, that I believe it not to be of any use to urge other arguments than those which he has produced.

As, therefore, it is indisputably necessary to hire troops, and none can be hired which can be so safely trusted as those of Hanover, I cannot but agree with the right honourable gentleman, that this measure of his majesty ought to be supported.

Sir JOHN ST. AUBYN then spoke as follows:—Sir, it is with the greatest difficulties that I rise up to give you this trouble, and particularly after the honourable gentleman with whom I am so very unequal to contend. But when my assent is required to a proposition, so big with mischiefs, of so alarming a nature to this country, and which I think, notwithstanding what the honourable gentleman has most ingeniously said, must determine from this very day, who deserves the character and appellation of a Briton, I hope you will forgive me, if I take this last opportunity which perhaps I may ever have of speaking with the freedom of a Briton in this assembly.

I am not able to follow the honourable gentleman in any refinements of reason upon our foreign affairs; I have not subtilty enough to do it, nor is it in my way as a private country gentleman. But though country gentlemen have not that sagacity in business, and, for want of proper lights being afforded us, the penetration of ministers into publick affairs; yet give me leave to say, they have one kind of sense which ministers of state seldom have, and at this time it is of so acute a nature, that it must, overthrow the arguments of the most refined administration; this is the sense of feeling the universal distresses of their country, the utter incapacity it now lies under of sustaining the heavy burdens that are imposing upon it.

This I take to be the first, the great object of this day's debate. Consider well your strength at home, before you entangle yourselves abroad; for if you proceed without a sufficient degree of that, your retreat will be certain and shameful, and may in the end prove dangerous. Without this first, this necessary principle, whatever may be the machinations, the visionary schemes of ministers, whatever colourings they may heighten them with, to mislead our imaginations, they will prove in the end for no other purpose, but to precipitate this nation, by empty captivating sounds, into the private views and intrigues of some men, so low, perhaps, in reputation and authority, as to be abandoned to the desperate necessity of founding their ill possessed precarious power upon the ruins of this country.

Next to the consideration of our inward domestick strength, what foreign assistances have we to justify this measure? Are we sure of one positive active ally in the world? Nay, are not we morally certain that our nearest, most natural ally, disavows the proceeding, and refuses to cooperate with us? One need not be deep read in politicks to understand, that when one state separates itself from another, to which it is naturally allied, it must be for this plain reason, that the interest is deserted which is in common to them both. And it is an invariable rule in this country, a rule never to be departed from, that there can no cause exist in which we ought to engage on the continent, without the aid and assistance of that neighbouring state. This is the test, the certain mark, by which I shall judge, that the interest of this country is not at present the object in pursuit.

Is any man then wild enough to imagine, that the accession of sixteen thousand Hanoverian mercenaries will compensate for the loss of this natural ally? No; but it is said that this indicates such a firmness and resolution within ourselves, that it will induce them to come in. Sir, if they had any real proofs of our firmness and resolution, that the interest of this country was to be pursued, I dare say they would not long hesitate. But they look with a jealous eye upon this measure, they consider it as an argument of your weakness, because it is contrary to the genius and spirit of this country, and may, therefore, lessen his majesty in the affections of his people.

They have for some years past looked upon a British parliament as the corrupt engine of administration, to exhaust the riches, and impair the strength of this country. They have heard it talk loudly, indeed, of the house of Austria, when it was in your power to have raised her to that state, in which she was properly to be considered as the support of the balance of Europe, if timid neutralities had not intervened, and our naval strength had properly interposed to her assistance.

They have lately looked upon this parliament, and with the joy of a natural ally they have done it, resenting your injuries, bravely withstanding the power, that you might restore the authority of your government, demanding constitutional securities, appointing a parliamentary committee for inquiry and justice. Sir, they now see that inquiry suppressed, and justice disappointed. In this situation, what expectations can we form of their accession to us; talking bigly, indeed, of vindicating foreign rights, but so weak and impotent at home, as not to be able to recover our own privileges?

But this measure is said to be undertaken in consequence of the advice of parliament. There has been great stress laid upon this. It has been loudly proclaimed from the throne, echoed back again from hence, and the whole nation is to be amused with an opinion, that upon this measure, the fate of the house of Austria, the balance and liberties of Europe, the salvation of this country, depend.

But was this fatal measure the recommendation of parliament, or was it the offspring of some bold enterprising minister, hatched in the interval of parliament, under the wings of prerogative; daring to presume upon the corruption of this house, as the necessary means of his administration? The object, indeed, might be recommended, but if any wrong measure is undertaken to attain it, that measure surely should be dropt; for it is equally culpable to pursue a good end by bad measures, as it is a bad end by those that are honest.

But as to the address, I wish gentlemen would a little consider the occasion which produced it. Sir, it proceeded from the warmth of expectation, the exultation of our hearts, immediately after, and with the same breath that you established your committee of inquiry; and it is no forced construction to say, that it carries this testimony along with it, that national securities and granting supplies were reciprocal terms.

But, sir, I must own for my part, was the occasion never so cogent, Hanoverian auxiliaries are the last that I would vote into British pay; not upon the consideration only, that we ought otherwise to expect their assistance, and that we should rather make sure of others that might be engaged against us; but from this melancholy apprehension, that administrations will for ever have sagacity enough to find out such pretences, that we may find it difficult to get rid of them again.

Besides, the elector of Hanover, as elector of Hanover, is an arbitrary prince; his electoral army is the instrument of that power; as king of Great Britain he is a restrained monarch. And though I don't suspect his majesty, and I dare say the hearts of the British soldiery are as yet free and untainted, yet I fear that too long an intercourse may beget a dangerous familiarity, and they may hereafter become a joint instrument, under a less gracious prince, to invade our liberties.

His majesty, if he was rightly informed, I dare say would soon perceive the danger of the proposition which is now before you. But, as he has every other virtue, he has, undoubtedly, a most passionate love for his native country, a passion which a man of any sensation can hardly divest himself of; and, sir, it is a passion the more easily to be flattered, because it arises from virtue. I wish that those who have the honour to be of his councils, would imitate his royal example, and show a passion for their native country too; that they would faithfully stand forth and say, that, as king of this country, whatever interests may interfere with it, this country is to be his first, his principal care; that in the act of settlement this is an express condition. But what sluggish sensations, what foul hearts must those men have, who, instead of conducting his majesty's right principles, address themselves to his passions, and misguide his prejudices? making a voluntary overture of the rights and privileges of their country, to obtain favour, and secure themselves in power; misconstruing that as a secondary consideration, which in their own hearts they know to be the first.

Sir, we have already lost many of those benefits and restrictions which were obtained for us by the revolution, and the act of settlement. For God's sake, let us proceed no farther. But if we are thus to go on, and if, to procure the grace and favour of the crown, this is to become the flattering measure of every successive administration,—this country is undone!

Mr. BLADEN then rose up, and spoke to the following purport:—Sir, if zeal were any security against errour, I should not willingly oppose the honourable gentleman who has now declared his sentiments; and declared them with such ardour, as can hardly be produced but by sincerity; and of whom, therefore, it cannot be doubted, that he has delivered his real opinion; that he fears from the measures which he censures, very great calamities; that he thinks the publick tranquillity in danger; and believes that his duty to his country obliged him to speak on this occasion with unusual vehemence.

But I am too well acquainted with his candour to imagine, that he expects his assertions to be any farther regarded than they convince; or that he desires to debar others from the same freedom of reason which he has himself used. I shall therefore proceed to examine his opinion, and to show the reasons by which I am induced to differ from him.

The arguments upon which he has chiefly insisted, are the danger of hiring the troops of Hanover in any circumstances, and the impropriety of hiring them now without the previous approbation of the senate.

The danger of taking into our pay the forces of Hanover, the contrariety of this conduct to the act of settlement, and the infraction of our natural privileges, and the violation of our liberties which is threatened by it, have been asserted in very strong terms, but I think not proved with proportionate force; for we have heard no regular deduction of consequences by which this danger might be shown, nor have been informed, how the engagement of sixteen thousand Hanoverians to serve us against France for the ensuing year, can be considered as more destructive to our liberties than any other forces.

It is, indeed, insinuated, that this conduct will furnish a dangerous precedent of preference granted to Hanover above other nations; and that this preference may gradually be advanced, till in time Hanover may, by a servile ministry, be preferred to Britain itself, and that, therefore, all such partiality ought to be crushed in the beginning, and its authors pursued with indignation and abhorrence.

That to prefer the interest of Hanover to that of Britain would be in a very high degree criminal in a British ministry, I believe no man in this house will go about to deny; but if no better proof can be produced, that such preference is intended than the contract which we are now desired to ratify, it may be with reason hoped, that such atrocious treachery is yet at a great distance; for how does the hire of Hanoverian troops show any preference of Hanover to Britain?

The troops of Hanover are not hired by the ministry as braver or more skilful than those of our own country; they are not hired to command or to instruct, but to assist us; nor can I discover, supposing it possible to have raised with equal expedition the same number of forces in our own country, how the ministry can be charged with preferring the Hanoverians by exposing them to danger and fatigue.

But if it be confessed, that such numbers would not possibly be raised, or, at least, not possibly disciplined with the expedition that the queen of Hungary required, it will be found, that the Hanoverians were at most not preferred to our own nation, but to other foreigners, and for such preference reasons have been already given which I shall esteem conclusive, till I hear them confuted.

The other objection on which the honourable gentleman thought it proper to insist, was the neglect of demanding from the senate a previous approbation of the contract which is now before us; a neglect, in his opinion, so criminal, that the ministry cannot be acquitted of arbitrary government, of squandering the publick money by their own caprice, and of assuming to themselves the whole power of government.

But the proof of this enormous usurpation has not yet been produced; for it does not yet appear, that there was time to communicate their designs to the senate, or that they would not have been defeated by communication; and, therefore, it is yet not evident, but that when they are censured for not having laid their scheme before the senate, they are condemned for omitting what was not possibly to be done, or what could not have been done, without betraying their trust, and injuring their country.

It is allowed, that the senate had resolved to assist the queen of Hungary; and, therefore, nothing remained for the ministers but to execute with their utmost address the resolution that had been formed; if for the prosecution of this design they should be found to have erred in their choice of means, their mistakes, unless some ill designs may justly be suspected, are to be imputed to the frailty of human nature, and rather to be pitied, and relieved as misfortunes, than punished as crimes.

But I doubt not, that in the course of our deliberations, we shall find reason for concluding that they have acted not only with fidelity but prudence; that they have chosen the means by which the great end which the senate proposed, the succour of the queen of Hungary, and consequently the reestablishment of the balance of power, will be most easily attained; and that they have taken into the pay of this nation those troops which may be trusted with the greatest security, as they have the same prince, and the same interest.

But the honourable gentleman appears inclined to advance a new doctrine, and to insinuate, that when any vote is passed by the senate, the ministers are to suppose some conditions which are to be observed, though they were never mentioned, and without which the voice of the senate is an empty sound. In pursuance of this supposition, he calls upon us to recollect the time and circumstances in which this vote was passed; he reminds us, that the concession was made in a sudden exultation of our hearts, in the raptures of triumph, and amidst the shouts of conquest, when every man was forming expectations which have never been gratified, and planning schemes which could never be perfected.

He seems therefore to think, that our ministers insidiously took advantage of our intoxication, and betrayed us in a fit of thoughtless jollity to a promise, which when made, we hardly understood, and which we may, therefore, now retract. He concludes, that the concession which might then escape us ought not to have been snatched by our ministers, and made the foundation of their conduct, because they knew it was made upon false suppositions, and in prospect of a recompense that never would be granted.

I hope there is no necessity for declaring, that this reasoning cannot safely be admitted, since, if the vote of the senate be not a sufficient warrant for any measure, no man can undertake the administration of our affairs, and that government which no man will venture to serve must be quickly at an end.

For my part, I know not how the nation or the senate has been disappointed of any just expectations, nor can I conceive that any such disappointments vacate their votes or annul their resolutions, and therefore I cannot but think the ministry sufficiently justified, if they can show that they have not deviated from them.

Lord QUARENDON spoke next to the effect following:—Sir, I am so far from thinking that the past conduct or the present proposals of the ministry deserve approbation, that, in my opinion, all the arguments which have been produced in their favour are apparently fallacious, and even the positions on which they are founded, and which are laid down as uncontrovertible, are generally false.

It is first asserted, that we are indispensably obliged to assist the queen of Hungary against France, and to support her in the possession of the hereditary dominions of the Austrian house, and from thence is precipitately inferred the necessity of assembling armies, and hiring mercenaries, of exhausting our treasure, and heaping new burdens upon the publick.

That we concurred with other powers in promising to support the Pragmatick sanction is not to be denied, nor do I intend to insinuate, that the faith of treaties ought not strictly to be kept; but we are not obliged to perform more than we promised, or take upon ourselves the burden which was to be supported by the united strength of many potentates, and of which we only engaged to bear a certain part. We ought, undoubtedly, to furnish the troops which we promised, and ought to have sent them when they were first demanded; but there is no necessity that we should supply the deficiencies of every other power, and that we should determine to stand alone in defence of the Pragmatick sanction; that we should, by romantick generosity, impoverish our country, and entail upon remotest posterity poverty and taxes. We ought to be honest at all events; we are at liberty, likewise, to be generous at our own expense, but I think we have hardly a right to boast of our liberality, when we contract debts for the advantage of the house of Austria, and leave them to be paid by the industry or frugality of succeeding ages.

It is, therefore, at least, dubious, whether we ought to hazard more than we promised in defence of the house of Austria; and, consequently, the first proposition of those who have undertaken the defence of the ministry requires to be better established, before it becomes the basis of an argument.

But though it be allowed, that we ought to exceed our stipulations, and engage more deeply in this cause than we have promised, I cannot yet discover upon what principles it can be proved, that sixteen thousand Hanoverians ought to be hired. Why were not our troops sent which have been so long maintained at home only for oppression and show? Why have they not at last been shown the use of those weapons which they have so long carried, and the advantages of that exercise which they have been taught to perform with so much address? Why have they not, at length, been shown for what they had so long received their pay, and informed, that the duty of a soldier is not wholly performed by strutting at a review?

If it be urged, that so great a number could not be sent out of the kingdom without exposing it to insults and irruptions, let it be remembered how small a force was found sufficient for the defence of the kingdom in the late war, when the French were masters of a fleet which disputed, for many years, the empire of the sea; and it will appear, whether it ought to be imputed to prudence or to cowardice, that our ministers cannot now think the nation safe without thrice the number, though our fleets cover the ocean, and steer from one coast to another without an enemy.

But to show more fully the insufficiency of the vindication which has been attempted, and prove, that no concession will enable the ministry to defend their schemes, even this assertion shall be admitted. We will allow for the present, that it is necessary to garrison an island with numerous forces against an enemy that has no fleet. I will grant, that invaders may be conveyed through the air, and that the formidable, the detestable pretender may, by some subterraneous passage, enter this kingdom, and start on a sudden into the throne. Yet will not all this liberality avail our ministers, since it may be objected, that new forces might easily have been raised, and our own island have been, at once, defended, and the queen of Hungary assisted by our native troops.

Since the necessity of expedition is urged, it may reasonably be inquired, what it was that appeared so immediately necessary, or what has been brought to pass by this wonderful expedition? Was it necessary to form an army to do nothing? Could not an expedition in which nothing was performed, in which nothing was attempted, have been delayed for a short time, and might not the queen of Hungary have been preserved equally, whether the troops of her allies slept and fattened in her country or their own?

Nothing, surely, can be more ridiculous than to expatiate upon the necessity of raising with expedition an useless body of forces, which has only been a burden to the country in which it has been stationed, and for which pay is now demanded, though they have neither seen a siege nor a battle; though they have made no attempt themselves, nor hindered any that might have been made by the enemy.

To make this plea yet more contemptible, we are informed, that if we had raised an army of our countrymen, they would have been unacquainted with arms and discipline, and, therefore, they could not have done what has been done by these far-famed Hanoverians. This, indeed, I cannot understand, having never found, that the Britons needed any documents or rules to enable them to eat and drink at the expense of others, to bask in the sun, or to loiter in the street, or perform any of the wonders that may be ascribed to our new auxiliaries; and, therefore, I cannot but think, that all the actions of the four months for which those forces expect to be paid, might have been brought to pass by new-raised Britons, who might in the mean time have learned their exercise, and have been made equal to any other soldiers that had never seen a battle.

But if foreign troops were necessary, I am still at a loss to find out why those of Hanover were chosen, since it appears to me, that by hiring out his troops to Britain, our monarch only weakens one hand to strengthen the other. It might be expected, that he should have employed these troops against France without hire, since he is not less obliged, either by treaty or policy, to protect the house of Austria as elector of Hanover, than as king of Britain.

Since, therefore, the troops of Hanover were hired, without the consent of the senate, they have hitherto performed nothing; and since it is reasonable to expect, that without being paid by Britain they will be employed against the French, I think it expedient to discharge them from our service, and to delay the pay which is required for the last four months, till it shall appear how they have deserved it.

Mr. FOX then rose, and spoke to the following purport:—Sir, though the observations of the right honourable gentleman must be allowed to be ingenious, and though the eloquence with which he has delivered them, naturally excites attention and regard, yet I am obliged to declare, that I have received rather pleasure than conviction from his oratory; and that while I applaud his imagination and his diction, I cannot but conclude, that they have been employed in bestowing ornaments upon errour.

I shall not, indeed, attempt to confute every assertion which I think false, or detect the fallacy of every argument which appears to me sophistical, but shall leave to others the province of showing the necessity of engaging in the war on the continent, of employing a large force for the preservation of the house of Austria, and of forming that army with the utmost expedition, and of taking auxiliaries into our pay, and confine myself to this single question, whether, supposing auxiliaries necessary, it was not prudent to hire the troops of Hanover?

Nothing can be, in my opinion, more apparent, than that if the necessity of hiring troops be allowed, which surely cannot be questioned, the troops of Hanover are to be chosen before any other, and that the ministry consulted in their resolutions the real interest of their country, as well as that of our ally.

The great argument which has in all ages been used against mercenary troops, is the suspicion which may justly be entertained of their fidelity. Mercenaries, it is observed, fight only for pay, without any affection for the master whom they serve, without any zeal for the cause which they espouse, and without any prospect of advantage from success, more than empty praises, or the plunder of the field, and, therefore, have no motives to incite them against danger, nor any hopes to support them in fatigues; that they can lose nothing by flight, but plunder, nor by treachery, but honour; and that, therefore, they have nothing to throw into the balance against the love of life, or the temptations of a bribe, and will never be able to stand against men that fight for their native country under the command of generals whom they esteem and love, and whom they cannot desert or disobey, without exposing themselves to perpetual exile, or to capital punishment.

These arguments have always been of great force, and, therefore, that nation whose defence has been intrusted to foreigners, has always been thought in danger of ruin. Yet there have been conjunctures in which almost every state has been obliged to rely upon mercenaries, and in compliance with immediate necessity, to depend upon the fidelity of those who had no particular interest in supporting them. But with much greater reason may we trust the success of the present war, in some degree, to the troops of Hanover, as they are, perhaps, the only foreign forces against which the arguments already recited are of no force. They are foreigners, indeed, as they are born in another country, and governed by laws different from ours; but they are the subjects of the same prince, and, therefore, naturally fight under the same command; they have the same interest with ourselves in the present contest, they have the same hopes and the same fears, they recommend themselves equally to their sovereign by their bravery, and can neither discover cowardice nor treachery, without suffering all the punishment that can be feared by our native troops, since their conduct must be censured by the same prince of whose approbation they are equally ambitious, and of whose displeasure they are equally afraid.

As to the troops which any neutral prince might furnish, there would be reason to fear, that either for larger pay, or upon any casual dispute that might arise, they might be withdrawn from our service when they were most needed, or transferred to the enemy at a time when his distress might compel him to offer high terms, and when, therefore, there was a near prospect of an advantageous peace. But of the troops of Hanover no such suspicion can be formed, since they cannot engage against us without rebelling against their prince; for it cannot be imagined, that his majesty will fight on one side as elector of Hanover, and on the other as king of Britain; or that he will obstruct the success of his own arms, by furnishing the troops of Hanover to the enemies of this kingdom.