If therefore, my lords, the princes, whose interest is contrary to our own, have been at any time served by honest and wise men, there was a time when our ministers could act only by conjecture, and might be mistaken without a crime.

If it was always in our power to penetrate into the intentions of our enemies, they must necessarily have the same means of making themselves acquainted with our projects, and yet when any of them are discovered we think it just to impute it to the negligence of the minister.

Thus, my lords, every man is inclined to judge with prejudice and partiality. When we suffer by the prudence of our enemies, we charge our ministers with want of vigilance, without considering, that very often nothing is necessary to elude the most penetrating sagacity, but obstinate silence.

If we inquire into the transactions of past times, shall we find any man, however renowned for his abilities, not sometimes imposed upon by falsehoods, and sometimes betrayed by his own reasonings into measures destructive of the purposes which he endeavoured to promote? There is no man of whose penetration higher ideas have been justly formed, or who gave more frequent proofs of an uncommon penetration into futurity than Cromwell; and yet succeeding times have sufficiently discovered the weakness of aggrandizing France by depressing Spain, and we wonder now how so much policy could fall into so gross an errour, as not rather to suffer power to remain in the distant enemy, than transfer it to another equally divided from us by interest, and far more formidable by the situation of his dominions.

Cromwell, my lords, suffered himself to be hurried away by the near prospect of present advantages, and the apprehension of present dangers; and every other man has been, in the same manner, sometimes deluded into a preference of a smaller present advantage, to a greater which was more remote.

Let it not be urged, my lords, that politicks are advanced since the time of Cromwell, and that errours which might then be committed by the wisest administration, are now gross and reproachful; we are to remember that every part of policy has been equally improved, and that if more methods of discovery have been struck out, there have been likewise more arts invented of eluding it.

When, therefore, we inquire into the conduct, or examine the abilities of a minister, we are not to expect that he should appear never to have been deceived, but that he should never be found to have neglected any proper means of information, nor ever to have willingly given up the interest of his country; but we are not to impute to his weakness what is only to be ascribed to the wisdom of those whom he opposed.

If this plea, my lords, is reasonable, it will be necessary for those who support the motion, to prove, not only that the treaty of Vienna was never made, but that the falsehood of the report either was or might have been known by our ministers; otherwise, those who are inclined to retain a favourable opinion of their integrity and abilities, may conclude, that they were either not mistaken, or were led into errour by such delusions as would no less easily have imposed on their accusers, and that by exalting their enemies to their stations, they shall not much consult the advantage of their country.

This motion, therefore, my lords, founded upon no acknowledged, no indisputable facts, nor supported by legal evidence; this motion, which, by appealing to common fame, as the ultimate judge of every man's actions, may bring every man's life, or fortune, into danger; this motion, which condemns without hearing, and decides without examining, I cannot but reject, and hope your lordships will concur with me.

Lord CARLISLE spoke next, to the following purport:—My lords, the state of the question before us has, in my opinion, not been rightly apprehended by the noble lord who spoke last, nor is the innocence or guilt of the minister the chief question before us, because a minister may possibly mean well, and yet be, in some particular circumstances, unqualified for his station.

He may not only want the degree of knowledge and ability requisite to make his good intentions effectual, but, my lords, however skilful, sagacious, or diligent, he may be so unfortunate, in some parts of his conduct, as to want the esteem and confidence of the people.

That a very able and honest minister may be misinformed by his intelligence, disappointed by his agents, or baffled by other men of equal capacity and integrity with himself, cannot be controverted; but it must surely be owned likewise, that when this has happened so often, and in cases of such importance, as to deprive him entirely of the regard and affection of the people; when he is reduced to intrench himself behind his privileges, to employ all the influence of the crown for his own security, and make it his daily endeavour to create new dependencies, he ought to be pitied and discarded.

That this is the state of the minister whose removal is desired by the motion, cannot be denied; the exaltation of his adherents to places and preferments, the noble lord has been so far from questioning, that he has endeavoured to justify it, and has in plain terms inquired, who would have acted otherwise?

Every man, my lords, would have acted otherwise, whose character had not been blasted by general detestation; every man would have acted otherwise, who preferred the publick good to his own continuance in power; and every man has acted otherwise who has distinguished himself as a friend to the publick.

It is the interest of the nation, my lords, that every office should be filled by that man who is most capable of discharging it, whatever may be his sentiments with regard to the minister; and that his attention should be confined to his employment, rather than distracted by various concerns and opposite relations. It is, therefore, an injury to the publick, to thrust a skilful commissioner into the senate, or to embarrass an industrious senator with a post or commission.

Yet, my lords, that multitudes have obtained places, who have no acquaintance with the duties of their offices, nor any other pretensions to them, than that they have seats in the other house, and that by distinguishing himself in that assembly, any man may most easily obtain the preferments of the crown, is too obvious for controversy.

This practice, my lords, is a sufficient foundation for the motion; a practice so injurious to the nation, so long continued, and so openly avowed, requires to be vigorously opposed, lest it should become established by long custom, and entangle itself with our constitution.

If the minister, my lords, has made it necessary to employ none but his adherents and blind followers, this necessity is alone a sufficient proof how little he confides in his own prudence or integrity, how apprehensive he is of the censure of the senate, and how desirous of continuing his authority, by avoiding it. And, surely, my lords, it is our duty, as well as our right, to address the throne, that a minister should be removed who fears the people, since few men fear without hating, and nothing so much contributes to make any man an enemy to his country, as the consciousness that he is universally abhorred.

But, my lords, if this is done by him without necessity, if the general preference of his friends is only the consequence of mistaken judgment, or corrupt gratitude, this address is equally necessary, because the effects are equally pernicious.

When a minister, suspected of ill intentions, is continued in employment, discontent must naturally spread over the nation; and if the end of government be the happiness of the people; if suspicion and jealousy be contrary to a state of happiness; and if this suspicion which generally prevails, this discontent which fills the whole nation, can only be appeased by the removal of the minister; prudence, justice, and the examples of our ancestors, ought to influence us to endeavour that the affairs of the nation may be transferred to such whose greater integrity or wisdom has recommended them to the affection of the people.

In this motion, therefore, we need not be supposed to imply that the minister is either ignorant or corrupt, but that he is disliked by the people, disliked to such a degree, my lords, that it is not safe for his majesty to employ him.

It is, doubtless, our duty, my lords, to guard both the rights of the people, and the prerogatives of the throne, and with equal ardour to remonstrate to his majesty the distresses of his subjects, and his own danger. We are to hold the balance of the constitution, and neither to suffer the regal power to be overborne by a torrent of popular fury, nor the people to be oppressed by an illegal exertion of authority, or the more insupportable hardships of unreasonable laws.

By this motion, my lords, the happiness of the people, and the security of his majesty, are at once consulted, nor can we suppress so general a clamour without failing equally in our duty to both.

To what, my lords, is the untimely end of so many kings and emperours to be imputed, but to the cowardice or treachery of their counsellors, of those to whom they trusted that intercourse, which is always to be preserved between a monarch and his people? Were kings honestly informed of the opinions and dispositions of their subjects, they would never, or, at least rarely, persist in such measures, as, by exasperating the people, tend necessarily to endanger themselves.

It is the happiness of a British monarch, that he has a standing and hereditary council, composed of men who do not owe their advancement to the smiles of caprice, or the intrigues of a court; who are, therefore, neither under the influence of a false gratitude, nor of a servile dependence, and who may convey to the throne the sentiments of the people, without danger, and without fear. But, my lords, if we are either too negligent, or too timorous to do our duty, how is the condition of our sovereign more safe, or more happy than that of an emperour of Turkey, who is often ignorant of any complaints made against the administration, till he hears the people thundering at the gates of his palace.

Let us, therefore, my lords, whatever may be our opinion of the conduct of the minister, inform his majesty of the discontent of his subjects, since, whether it is just or not, the danger is the same, and whenever any danger threatens the king, we ought either to enable him to oppose, or caution him to avoid it.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, to the following effect:—My lords, I cannot but observe in this debate an ambition of popularity, in my opinion not very consistent with the freedom of debate, and the dignity of this assembly, which ought to be influenced by no other motive than the force of reason and truth.

It has been a common method of eluding the efficacy of arguments, to charge the opponent with blind adherence to interest, or corrupt compliance with the directions of a court; nor has it been less frequent to prevent inquiries into publick measures, by representing them as the clamours of faction, the murmurs of disobedience, and the prelude to rebellion.

So necessary, my lords, has it been always thought to be uninfluenced in our examinations by dependence or interest, that the most irrefragable reasons have lost the power of conviction, by the condition and characters of those by whom they were produced; and so much is it expected from innocence and justice to despise all foreign assistance, and to stand the test of inquiry without asking the support of power, that every man has been concluded guilty that has fled for shelter to the throne.

And surely, my lords, if that man's suffrage is of little weight, who appears determined to subscribe to the dictates of a minister, no greater credit can be assigned to another, who professes himself only the echo of the clamours of the populace. If it be a proof of a weak cause, and consciousness of misconduct, to apply to the crown for security and protection, it may be accounted an acknowledgment of the insufficiency of arguments, when the people is called in to second them, and they are only to expect success from the violence of multitudes.

That all government is instituted for the happiness of the people, that their interest ought to be the chief care of the legislature, that their complaints ought patiently to be heard, and their grievances speedily redressed, are truths well known, generally acknowledged, and, I hope, always predominant in the mind of every lord in this assembly. But, that the people cannot err, that the voice of fame is to be regarded as an oracle, and every murmur of discontent to be pacified by a change of measures, I have never before heard, or heard it only to disregard it.

True tenderness for the people, my lords, is to consult their advantage, to protect their liberty, and to preserve their virtue; and perhaps examples may be found sufficient to inform us that all these effects are often to be produced by means not generally agreeable to the publick.

It is possible, my lords, for a very small part of the people to form just ideas of the motives of transactions and the tendency of laws. All negotiations with foreign powers are necessarily complicated with many different interests, and varied by innumerable circumstances, influenced by sudden exigencies, and defeated by unavoidable accidents. Laws have respect to remote consequences, and involve a multitude of relations which it requires long study to discover. And how difficult it is to judge of political conduct, or legislative proceedings, may be easily discovered by observing how often the most skilful statesmen are mistaken, and how frequently the laws require to be amended.

If then, my lords, the people judge for themselves on these subjects, they must necessarily determine without knowledge of the questions, and their decisions are then of small authority. If they receive, implicitly, the dictates of others, and blindly adopt the opinions of those who have gained their favour and esteem, their applauses and complaints are, with respect to themselves, empty sounds, which they utter as the organs of their leaders. Nor are the desires of the people gratified when their petitions are granted; nor their grievances overlooked when their murmurs are neglected.

As it is no reproach to the people that they cannot be the proper judges of the conduct of the government, so neither are they to be censured when they complain of injuries not real, and tremble at the apprehension of severities unintended. Unjust complaints, my lords, and unreasonable apprehensions, are to be imputed to those who court their regard only to deceive them, and exalt themselves to reputation by rescuing them from grievances that were never felt, and averting dangers that were never near.

He only who makes the happiness of the people his endeavour, loves them with a true affection and a rational tenderness, and he certainly consults their happiness who contributes to still all groundless clamours, and appease all useless apprehensions, who employs his care, not only to preserve their quiet and their liberty, but to secure them from the fear of losing it, who not only promotes the means of happiness, but enables them to enjoy it.

Thus, it appears, my lords, that it is possible to be a friend, at the same time, to the people and the administration, and that no man can more deserve their confidence and applause, than he that dissipates their unreasonable terrours, and contributes to reconcile them to a good government.

That most of the clamours against the present government arise from calumnies and misrepresentations, is apparent from the sanction of the senate, which has been given to all the measures that are charged as crimes upon the administration.

That the army is supported by the consent of the senate, that the senate has approved the convention, and that our taxes are all imposed and continued by the senate, cannot be denied. What then is demanded by those that censure the conduct of publick affairs, but that their opinion should be considered as an overbalance to the wisdom of the senate, that no man should be allowed to speak but as they dictate, nor to vote but as they shall influence them by their rhetorick or example?

To repeat the particular topicks of accusation, and recapitulate the arguments which have been produced to confute it, would be a tedious and unnecessary labour; unnecessary, because it is well known that they once had the power of convincing this house, and that nothing has since happened to lessen their force, and because many of them now have been already repeated by the noble lords that have opposed the motion.

To search far backward for past errors, and to take advantage of later discoveries in censuring the conduct of any minister, is in a high degree disingenuous and cruel; it is an art which may be easily practised, of perplexing any question, by connecting distant facts, and entangling one period of time with another.

The only candid method of inquiry is to recur back to the state of affairs, as it then appeared, to consider what was openly declared, and what was kept impenetrably secret, what was discoverable by human sagacity, and what was beyond the reach of the most piercing politician.

With regard to the Hanover treaty, it is not, my lords, requisite that we should engage ourselves in a very minute examination; for it was not only not transacted by the right honourable gentleman whose behaviour is the subject of this debate, but cannot be proved to have been known by him till it was formally ratified. If he afterwards approved it either in the council or the senate, he cannot justly, how destructive or ridiculous soever that treaty may be thought, be charged with more than his share of the guilt, the bare guilt of a single vote.

But there is one accusation yet more malicious, an accusation not only of crimes which this gentleman did not commit, but which have not yet been committed, an accusation formed by prying into futurity, and exaggerating misfortunes which are yet to come, and which may probably be prevented. Well may any man, my lords, think himself in danger, when he hears himself charged not with high crimes and misdemeanours, not with accumulative treason, but with misconduct of publick affairs, past, present, and future.

The only charge against this gentleman, which seems to relate more to him than to any other man engaged in the administration, is the continuance of the harbour of Dunkirk, which, says the noble duke, he must be acquainted with as commissioner of the treasury; but if the title of first commissioner be denied, if his authority be but the same with that of his associates, whence comes it, my lords, that he is more particularly accused than they? Why is his guilt supposed greater if his power is only equal?

But, my lords, I believe it will appear, that no guilt has been contracted on this account, and that Dunkirk was always intended, even by those that demanded the demolition of it, to continue a harbour for small trading vessels, and that if larger ever arrived from thence, they lay at a distance from the shore, and were loaded by small vessels from the town.

With regard to other affairs, my lords, they were all transacted by the council, not by his direction, but with his concurrence; and how it is consistent with justice to single him out for censure, I must desire the noble lords to show who approve the motion.

If the people, my lords, have been, by misrepresentations industriously propagated, exasperated against him, if the general voice of the nation condemns him, we ought more cautiously to examine his conduct, lest we should add strength to prejudice too powerful already, and instead of reforming the errours, and regulating the heat of the people, inflame their discontent and propagate sedition.

The utmost claim of the people is to be admitted as accusers, and sometimes as evidence, but they have no right to sit as judges, and to make us the executioners of their sentence; and as this gentleman has yet been only condemned by those who have not the opportunities of examining his conduct, nor the right of judging him, I cannot agree to give him up to punishment.

Lord HALIFAX spoke next, in substance as follows:—My lords, though I do not conceive the people infallible, yet I believe that in questions like this they are seldom in the wrong, for this is a question not of argument but of fact; of fact discoverable, not by long deductions and accurate ratiocinations, but by the common powers of seeing and feeling.

That it is difficult to know the motives of negotiations, and the effects of laws, and that it requires long study and intense meditation to discover remote consequences, is indubitably true. And, with regard to the people in general, it cannot be denied, that neither their education qualifies them, nor their employments allow them to be much versed in such inquiries.

But, my lords, to refer effects to their proper causes, and to observe, when consequences break forth, from whence they proceed, is no such arduous task. The people of the lowest class may easily feel that they are more miserable this year than the last, and may inquire and discover the reason of the aggravation of their misery; they may know that the army is increased, or our trade diminished; that the taxes are heavier, and penal laws become more grievous.

Nor is it less easy for them to discover that these calamities are not brought upon them by the immediate hand of heaven, or the irresistible force of natural causes; that their towns are not ruined by an invasion, nor their trade confined by a pestilence; they may then easily collect, that they are only unhappy by the misconduct of their governours; they may assign their infelicity to that cause, as the only remaining cause that is adequate to the effect.

If it be granted, my lords, that they may be mistaken in their reasoning, it must be owned, that they are not mistaken without probabilities on their side: it is probable that the ministry must injure the publick interest when it decays without any other visible cause; it is still more probable, when it appears that among those whose station enables them to enter into national inquiries, every man imputes his calamities to the minister, who is not visibly dependent on his favour. It becomes more probable, yet, when it appears that it is the great business of the minister to multiply dependencies, to list accomplices, and to corrupt his judges.

At least, my lords, if it be granted, which, surely, cannot be denied, that the people may be sensible of their own miseries, it is their part to declare their sufferings, and to apply to this house for relief, and it is our business to discover the authors of them, and bring them to punishment.

That the people are very loud and importunate in their complaints, is daily evident; nor is it less apparent, that their complaints are just; if, therefore, their miseries must have an author, let the defenders of this gentleman point out the man whom they may more properly accuse.

But, my lords, nothing is more evident, than that the crimes and the criminal are equally known, that there is one man predominant in his majesty's councils, and that it has long been the practice of that man at once to oppress and ridicule the people, to plunder them, and set them at defiance.

Nothing is more known than that this man pretends to a superiour knowledge, and exerts a superiour power in the management of the publick revenues, and that they have been so ill managed for many years, that the expenses of peace have been almost equal to those of a most vigorous and extensive war.

Nothing is more probable, than that most of the foreign negotiations are conducted by his direction, nor more certain, than that they have generally tended only to make us contemptible.

That the excise was projected in his own head, that it was recommended by him upon his own conviction, and pressed upon the legislature by his influence, cannot be questioned; and if this were his only crime, if this were the only scheme of oppression that ever he planned out, it is such a declaration of war upon the publick liberty, such an attack of our natural and constitutional rights, as was never, perhaps, pardoned by any nation.

Nor is it less notorious, that the late infamous convention was transacted by one of his own dependents, that he palliated or concealed the losses of our merchants, that he opposed the declaration of war, and has since obstructed its operations.

On this occasion, my lords, it may be useful to remark the apparent partiality of this gentleman's vindicators, who declare, that measures are not to be censured as imprudent, only because they are unsuccessful, and yet when other instances of his conduct fall under our examination, think it a sufficient defence to exclaim against the unreasonableness of judging before the event.

To deny that, in the conduct both of civil and military affairs, he has obtained, I know not by what means, an authority superiour to that of any other man, an authority irresistible, uncontroulable, and regal, is to oppose not only common fame, but daily experience. If as commissioner of the treasury he has no more power than any of his associates, whence is it, that to oppose or censure him, to doubt of his infallibility, to suspect his integrity, or to obstruct his influence, is a crime punished with no lighter penalty than forfeiture of employment, as appears, my lords, from the late dismission of a gentleman, against whom nothing can be alleged but an obstinate independence and open disregard of this arbitrary minister.

But happy would it be, my lords, for this nation, if he endeavoured not to extend his authority beyond the treasury or the court; if he would content himself with tyrannising over those whose acceptance of salaries and preferments has already subjected them to his command, without attempting to influence elections, or to direct the members of the other house.

How much the influence of the crown has operated upon all publick councils since the advancement of this gentleman, how zealously it has been supported, and how industriously extended, is unnecessary to explain, since what is seen or felt by almost every man in the kingdom cannot reasonably be supposed unknown to your lordships.

Nothing can be more contrary to the true notion of the British constitution, than to imagine, that by such measures his majesty's real interest is advanced. The true interest, my lords, of every monarch, is to please the people, and the only way of pleasing Britons, is to preserve their liberties, their reputation, and their commerce. Every attempt to extend the power of the crown beyond the limits prescribed by our laws, must in effect make it weaker, by diverting the only source of its strength, the affection of his subjects.

It is, therefore, my opinion, my lords, that we ought to agree to this motion, as a standing memorial not only of our regard for the nation, but of our adherence to our sovereign; that his councils may be no longer influenced by that man whose pernicious advice, and unjustifiable conduct, has added new hopes and new strength to his enemies, impoverished and exasperated his subjects, inflamed the discontent of the seditious, and almost alienated the affection of the loyal.

The bishop of SALISBURY spoke next, to the following purport:—My lords, after all the exaggerations of the errours, and all the representations of the malconduct of the right honourable gentleman; after the most affecting rhetorick, and the most acute inquiries, nothing has appeared of weight sufficient to prevail with me to agree to the present motion; a motion, if not of an unprecedented, yet of a very extraordinary kind, which may extend in its consequences to futurity, and be, perhaps, more dangerous to innocence than guilt.

I cannot yet discover any proof sufficient to convict him of having usurped the authority of first minister, or any other power than that accidental influence which every man has, whose address or services have procured him the favour of his sovereign.

The usurpation, my lords, of regal power must be made evident by somewhat more than general assertions, must appear from some publick act like that of one of the prelates left regent of the kingdom by Richard the first, who, as soon as the king was gone too far to return, in the first elevations of his heart, began his new authority by imprisoning his colleague.

To charge this gentleman with the dismission of any of his colleagues, can, after the strongest aggravations, rise no higher than to an accusation of having advised his majesty to dismiss him, and even that, my lords, stands, at present, unsupported by evidence; nor could it, however uncontestably proved, discover either wickedness or weakness, or show any other authority than every man would exercise, if he were able to attain it.

If he had discharged this gentleman by his own authority, if he had transacted singly any great affair to the disadvantage of the publick, if he had imposed either upon the king or the senate by false representations, if he had set the laws at defiance, and openly trampled on our constitution, and if by these practices he had exalted himself above the reach of a legal prosecution, it had been worthy of the dignity of this house, to have overleaped the common boundaries of custom, to have neglected the standing rules of procedure, and to have brought so contemptuous and powerful an offender to a level with the rest of his fellow-subjects by expeditious and vigorous methods, to have repressed his arrogance, broken his power, and overwhelmed him at once by the resistless weight of an unanimous censure.

But, my lords, we have in the present case no provocations from crimes either openly avowed, or evidently proved; and certainly no incitement from necessity to exert the power of the house in any extraordinary method of prosecution. We may punish whenever we can convict, and convict whenever we can obtain evidence; let us not, therefore, condemn any man unheard, nor punish any man uncondemned.

The duke of BEDFORD spoke next, in substance as follows:—My lords, it is easy to charge the most blameless and gentle procedure with injustice and severity, but it is not easy to support such an accusation without confounding measures widely different, and disguising the nature of things with fallacious misrepresentations.

Nothing is more evident than that neither condemnation nor punishment is intended by the motion before us, which is only to remove from power a man who has no other claim to it than the will of his master, and who, as he had not been injured by never obtaining it, cannot justly complain that it is taken from him.

The motion, my lords, is so far from inflicting punishment, that it confers rewards, it leaves him in the possession of immense wealth, however accumulated, and enables him to leave that office in security, from which most of his predecessors have been precipitated by national resentment, or senatorial prosecution.

There is no censure, my lords, made of his conduct, no charge of weakness, or suspicion of dishonesty, nor can any thing be equitably inferred from it, than that in the opinion of this house his majesty may probably be served by some other person, more to the satisfaction of the British nation.

Though it is not just to punish any man without examination, or to censure his conduct merely because it has been unpleasing or unsuccessful; though it is not reasonable that any man should forfeit what he possesses in his own right, without a crime, yet it is just to withdraw favours only to confer them on another more deserving; it is just in any man to withhold his own, only to preserve his right, or obviate an injurious prescription, and it is, therefore, just to advise such a conduct whenever it appears necessary to those who have the right of offering advice.

To advise his majesty, my lords, is not only our right but our duty; we are not only justifiable in practising, but criminal in neglecting it. That we should declare our apprehensions of any impending danger, and our disapprobation of publick misconduct, is expected both by our sovereign and the people, and let us not, by omitting such warnings, lull the nation and our sovereign into a dangerous security, and, from tenderness to one man, prolong or increase the miseries of our country, and endanger or destroy the honour of our sovereign.

Lord HERVEY spoke next, in effect as follows:—My lords, this is surely a day destined by the noble lords who defend the motion, for the support of paradoxical assertions, for the exercise of their penetration, and ostentation of their rhetorick; they have attempted to maintain the certainty of common fame in opposition to daily observation; the existence of a sole minister in contradiction to the strongest evidence; and having by these gradations arrived at the highest degree of controversial temerity, are endeavouring to make it appear that the publick censure of the house of lords is no punishment.

If we take the liberty, my lords, of using known words in a new sense, in a meaning reserved to ourselves only, it will, indeed, be difficult to confute, as it will be impossible to understand us; but if punishment be now to be understood as implying the same idea which has hitherto been conveyed by it, it will not be easy to show that a man thus publickly censured is not severely punished, and, if his crimes are not clearly proved, punished in opposition to law, to reason, and to justice.

It has been hitherto imagined, my lords, that no punishment is heavier than that of infamy; and shame has, by generous minds, been avoided at the hazard of every other misery. That such a censure as is proposed by the motion, must irreparably destroy the reputation of the person against whom it is directed, that it must confirm the reports of his enemies, impair the esteem of his friends, mark him out to all Europe as unworthy of his sovereign's favour, and represent him to latest posterity as an enemy to his country, is indisputably certain.

These, my lords, are the evident consequences of the address moved for by the noble lord; and, if such consequences are not penal, it will be no longer in our power to enforce our laws by sanctions of terrour.

To condemn a man unheard, is an open and flagrant violation of the first law of justice, but it is still a wider deviation from it to punish a man unaccused; no crime has been charged upon this gentleman proportioned to the penalty proposed by the motion, and the charge that has been produced is destitute of proof.

Let us, therefore, my lords, reverence the great laws of reason and justice, let us preserve our high character and prerogative of judges, without descending to the low province of accusers and executioners; let us so far regard our reputation, our liberty, and our posterity, as to reject the motion.

[Several other lords spoke in this debate, which lasted eleven hours; at length the question was put, and, on a division, carried in the negative. Content, 59. Not content, 108.]

After the determination of the foregoing question, the duke of MARLBOROUGH rose up, and spoke as follows:—My lords, though your patience must undoubtedly be wearied by the unusual length of this day's debate, a debate protracted, in my opinion, not by the difficulty of the question, but by the obstinacy of prejudice, the ardour of passion, and the desire of victory; yet, I doubt not but the regard which this assembly has always paid to the safety and happiness of the state, will incline you to support the fatigue of attention a little longer, and to hear with your usual impartiality another motion.

The proposition which I am about to lay down, my lords, is not such as can admit of controversy; it is such a standing principle as was always acknowledged, even by those who have deviated from it. Such a known truth as never was denied, though it appears sometimes to have been forgotten.

But, my lords, as it never can be forgotten, without injury to particular persons, and danger to the state in general, it cannot be too frequently recollected, or too firmly established; it ought not only to be tacitly admitted, but publickly declared, since no man's fortune, liberty, or life, can be safe, where his judges shall think themselves at liberty to act upon any other principle. I therefore move, "That any attempt to inflict any kind of punishment on any person without allowing him an opportunity to make his defence, or without any proof of any crime or misdemeanour committed by him, is contrary to natural justice, the fundamental laws of this realm, and the ancient established usage of the senate, and is a high infringement of the liberties of the subject."

He was seconded by the duke of DEVONSHIRE:—My lords, though the motion made by the noble duke is of such a kind, that no opposition can be expected or feared, yet I rise up to second it, lest it should be imagined that what cannot be rejected is yet unwillingly admitted.

That where this maxim is not allowed and adhered to, rights and liberties are empty sounds, is uncontestably evident; if this principle be forsaken, guilt and innocence are equally secure, all caution is vain, and all testimony useless. Caprice will, in our courts, supply the place of reason, and all evidence must give way to malice, or to favour.

I hope, therefore, my lords, that your regard to justice, to truth, and to your own safety, will influence you to confirm this great and self-evident principle by a standing resolution, that may not only restrain oppression in the present age, but direct the judiciary proceedings of our successors.

Lord LOVEL rose next, and spoke as follows:—My lords, liberty and justice must always support each other, they can never long flourish apart; every temporary expedient that can be contrived to preserve or enlarge liberty by means arbitrary and oppressive, forms a precedent which may, in time, be made use of to violate or destroy it. Liberty is in effect suspended whenever injustice is practised; for what is liberty, my lords, but the power of doing right without fear, without control, and without danger.

But, my lords, if any man may be condemned unheard, if judgment may precede evidence, what safety or what confidence can integrity afford? It is in vain that any man means well, and acts prudently; it is even in vain that he can prove the justice and prudence of his conduct.

By liberty, my lords, can never be meant the privilege of doing wrong without being accountable, because liberty is always spoken of as happiness, or one of the means to happiness, and happiness and virtue cannot be separated. The great use of liberty must, therefore, be to preserve justice from violation; justice, the great publick virtue, by which a kind of equality is diffused over the whole society, by which wealth is restrained from oppression, and inferiority preserved from servitude.

Liberty, general liberty, must imply general justice; for wherever any part of a state can be unjust with impunity, the rest are slaves. That to condemn any man unheard is oppressive and unjust, is beyond controversy demonstrable, and that no such power is claimed by your lordships will, I hope, appear from your resolutions.

Lord GOWER spoke next:—My lords, to the principle laid down by those noble lords, I have no objection, and concur with them in hoping that all our proceedings will contribute to establish it; but why it should be confirmed by a formal resolution, why the house should solemnly declare their assent to a maxim which it would be madness to deny, it is beyond my penetration to discover.

Though the noble lord's position cannot be controverted, yet his motion, if it is designed to imply any censure of the proceedings of this day, may reasonably be rejected, and that some censure is intended we may conjecture, because no other reason can be given why it was not made at some other time.

Lord HALIFAX then rose:—My lords, that a censure is intended, will, I suppose, not be denied, and that such a censure is unjust must doubtless be the opinion of all those who are supposed to have incurred it, and it will, therefore, not be wondered that the motion is opposed by them, as indecent and calumnious: late as it is, my lords, I will not, for my part, suffer such an indignity without opposition, and shall think my conscience and my honour require, that I should not be overborne by perseverance or by numbers, but that I should, if I cannot convince the noble lords by argument, of the impropriety of the motion, record my reasons against it, which may, perhaps, be more candidly received by posterity.

Lord TALBOT spoke to this effect:—My lords, it is not without indignation that I hear a motion so injurious to my own honour, and to that of the noble lords who have concurred with me in the last debate, nor without contempt that I observed the motion confounded with the positions contained in it; the low subtilty of such conduct is no less to be despised than the malice to be abhorred.

Fifty-nine lords are here branded as strangers, or enemies to the first principle of judicial equity, for doing what will entitle them to the general applause of every man in the kingdom that has the full possession of his understanding, or the free use of his senses; of every man that can distinguish truth, or feel oppression.

They have endeavoured to rescue their country from the rapine of pensioners and the tyranny of an army, from perpetual taxes, and useless expenses; they have attempted to expose the errours of arrogant ignorance, and to depress the power of greatness, founded on corruption, and swelling beyond legal restraints.

That for such attempts they are vilified and reproached, is not to be observed without indignation and astonishment; astonishment which nothing could abate but the recollection of the situation of those lords who have united to promote so unjust a censure.

Let us, my lords, consider the circumstances of the three noble lords by whom this motion has been made and supported, let us take a view of their conduct, and consider the visible motives to which it may be ascribed, their places, their dependence—

Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke next, in substance as follows:—My lords, I rise thus abruptly to preserve that order and decency which is essential to publick councils, and particularly suitable to the dignity of this assembly, which can only become a scene of tumult and confusion by such methods of debate, and lose that respect which it has hitherto preserved, not only by the justice of its determinations, but by the solemn grandeur of its procedure.

The motion, my lords, is allowed to contain nothing but what every man avows in speculation, and observes, or ought to observe, in publick transactions, and yet those that offer and support it are represented as abettors of oppression, and instruments of tyranny.

It is surely wonderful, my lords, that those who are solicitous for the preservation of their own honour, and so diligent to obviate the most remote reflection that may glance upon it, should not remember, that the same delicacy may raise in others the same resentment, when their reputation is openly attacked; and that while they are asserting the right of the minority to an exemption from censure, they shall not allow the greater number at least an equal claim to the same privilege.

Lord TALBOT then resumed:—My lords, whether any thing has escaped from me that deserves such severe animadversions, your lordships must decide. For what I might intend to say, since by the interruption of that noble lord I was hindered from proceeding, I hope I shall not be accountable.

Not that I acknowledge myself to have asserted any thing either contrary to law, or to the privileges of the house, or inconsistent with the character of an independent lord, a character which I shall always endeavour to preserve, and which I will not forfeit for the smiles of a court, the dignity of high employment, or the affluence of a pension.

Nor, my lords, whenever the necessities of my country require that I should speak my sentiments with freedom, will I be awed into silence and submission, but will set any power at defiance that shall dare to restrain me.

I pretend not, my lords, to be always in the right, I claim no other merit than that of meaning well; and when I am convinced, after proper examination, that I am engaged on the side of truth, I will trample on that insolence that shall command me to suppress my sentiments.

When I reflect, my lords, on the distresses of my country, when I observe the security and arrogance of those whom I consider as the authors of the publick miseries, I cannot always contain my resentment; I may, perhaps, sometimes start out into unbecoming transports, and speak in terms not very ceremonious of such abandoned, such detestable— But as this is, perhaps, not the language of the house, I shall endeavour to repress it, and hope that the bounds of decency have never been so far transgressed by me that I should be exposed to the censure of your lordships.

Lord ABINGDON next rose, and said:—My lords, the present motion is undoubtedly just, but by no means necessary, or particularly adapted to the present time. It contains a general principle, uncontested, and established; a principle which this assembly has never denied, and from which I know not that it has ever departed.

As there is, therefore, no particular necessity of confirming it by a new resolution, and as the present time seems less proper than any other, I cannot but declare my opinion, that to resume it at some other time will be more prudent, than to give the lords, who think their conduct censured, any occasion of resentment or discontent.

Lord CARTERET spoke to the following effect:—My lords, the maxim laid down in the present motion, is in itself incontestable, and so far from any inconsistency with the former, that as there was no reason for making, there is, in my opinion, none for opposing it; as it may at any time be made, it may at any time be properly passed. And I hope that our unanimity on this occasion will show that truth, however unseasonably advanced, will, in this house, be always received.

But, lest the noble lords who have opposed the motion, should think their honour engaged in continuing the opposition, I take the liberty, my lords, to move that the previous question may be put.

[Other lords spoke on each side; at last the previous question was put by the president, who demanded, "Is it your lordships' pleasure, that the question be now put? Those lords who are for it, say, Content: those who are against it, say, Not content." There was, accordingly, a cry of both; after which the president declared, "the contents have it;" and some lords replying, "the non-contents have it," his lordship said, "the non-contents must go below the bar:" which is the manner of dividing the house. Those who remained being told in their seats, and those who went out being told at coming in again, there were Content, 81; Not content, 54: so that the resolution moved for, passed without a division.]



HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEB. 24, 1740-1.

[DEBATE ON CLEANSING THE CITY OF WESTMINSTER.]

Lord TYRCONNEL made a motion for bringing in a bill for the better cleansing and paving the streets of Westminster, and the liberties thereof; in support of which motion he spoke to the following purpose:—

Sir, though the grievance which I am about to lay before the house is not of the most formidable or dangerous kind, yet as it is such as grows every day greater, and such as every day endangers the lives of thousands, I hope it will not be thought useless or improper to propose it to the consideration of this assembly, to offer my thoughts on the methods by which it may be most easily removed, and to endeavour to incite others to the same considerations.

It is impossible, sir, to come to this assembly, or to return from it without observations on the present condition of the streets of Westminster; observations forced upon every man, however inattentive, or however engrossed by reflections of a different kind.

The warmest zeal for publick happiness, the most anxious vigilance against general dangers, must, I believe, sometimes give way to objects of immediate, though of less importance, nor will the most publick-spirited senators deny, that they have often been in the streets alarmed with obstructions, or shocked with nuisances.

The filth, sir, of some parts of the town, and the inequality and ruggedness of others, cannot but in the eyes of foreigners disgrace our nation, and incline them to imagine us a people, not only without delicacy, but without government, a herd of barbarians, or a colony of hottentots.

The most disgusting part of the character given by travellers, of the most savage nations, is their neglect of cleanliness, of which, perhaps, no part of the world affords more proofs, than the streets of the British capital; a city famous for wealth, and commerce, and plenty, and for every other kind of civility and politeness, but which abounds with such heaps of filth, as a savage would look on with amazement.

If that be allowed which is generally believed, that putrefaction and stench are the causes of pestilential distempers, the removal of this grievance may be pressed from motives of far greater weight than those of delicacy and pleasure; and I might solicit the timely care of this assembly for the preservation of inuumerable multitudes, and intreat those, who are watching against slight misfortunes, to unite their endeavours with mine, to avert the greatest and most dreadful of calamities.

Not to dwell, sir, upon dangers, which may, perhaps, be thought only imaginary, I hope that it will be at least considered, how much the present neglect of the pavement is detrimental to every carriage, whether of trade, or pleasure, or convenience, and that those who have allowed so much of their attention to petitions, relating to the roads of the kingdom, the repair of some of which is almost every session thought of importance sufficient to produce debates in this house, will not think the streets of the capital alone unworthy of their regard.

That the present neglect of cleansing and paving the streets is such as ought not to be borne, that the passenger is every where either surprised and endangered by unexpected chasms, or offended or obstructed by mountains of filth, is well known to every one that has passed a single day in this great city; and that this grievance is without remedy is a sufficient proof that no magistrate has, at present power to remove it; for every man's private regard to his own ease and safety, would incite him to exert his authority on this occasion.

I humbly propose, therefore, that a bill may be brought into the house, to enable his majesty's justices of peace for the liberties of Westminster, to inspect the publick ways of this city, and punish the neglect of cleansing and paving them; or that a new officer be appointed, and vested with full authority for the same purpose.

Mr. SANDYS spoke next, to this effect:—Sir, I believe the grievance, so much complained of by the right honourable member, is not difficult to be removed without a new act of the legislature, being, perhaps, more properly to be imputed to the negligence of the justices, than a defect of their authority; for they have already sufficient power to regulate this disorder: and I may be allowed to hope, sir, that they do not want leisure to observe it, for their number is so great, that if we suppose them to be wholly engaged by the common business of their office, a foreigner would have occasion of reproaching us with defects more important than want of delicacy, and might justly censure us as a people corrupt beyond the common rate of human wickedness, a nation divided only into two classes, magistrates and criminals.

But they, in reality, abound so much among us, that most of them are only nominal magistrates, vested with authority which they never exert, or exert to bad purposes, and which it were well if they were obliged to employ in the real service of their country, by superintending the paviers and the scavengers.

For this reason it is unnecessary to erect a new officer, as an inspector of our streets, since every office that is not necessary is pernicious. Were the consequences of this grievance such as they have been represented, I should, perhaps, willingly erect a new office, though I should not be surprised to hear the wisest man declare rather for a pestilence than an increase of officers.

As I neither think the grievance insupportable, nor the methods proposed for removing it necessary or proper, I declare myself against the motion.

Lord GAGE spoke in the following manner:—Sir, as the grievance cannot be denied to be real, and the motion, therefore, may reasonably be imagined to have been made without any other intention than of benefiting the publick by an useful law, I cannot discover any sufficient reason for a rejection so peremptory and contemptuous.

That every man is disgusted, and almost every man daily endangered in our streets, has not been denied; nor will any man, I suppose, question what, if he has not yet experienced it, he may, perhaps, be fully convinced of, in his next visit or excursion.

Those evils, which every man feels, though slight, are worthy of the attention of the legislature; and that danger that threatens multitudes, though distant, ought to be averted: for a small disorder, like a small expense, when it extends to multitudes, becomes a national affair.

But though this motion may, perhaps, be liable to some objections, there is, certainly, no such absurdity to be found in it, as may justify us in rejecting it without examination; to reject a motion when it is first offered, is a proof of prejudice, next to that of rejecting it unheard; it is to determine a question, before it is discussed, or can be fully understood.

Mr. SANDYS replied, in substance as follows:—Sir, I cannot but differ very widely in opinion from the right honourable member that spoke last, with regard to the propriety of opposing a motion when it is first made; a practice, which I can by no means think inconsistent with either decency or prudence, and which would, perhaps, be of use to the publick, if it was more frequent.

When any motion is made, it is subjected to the consideration of this assembly, and every member is at full liberty to examine and discuss it. If it appears to deserve farther attention, it may be admitted, but if the subject be either improper or unseasonable, or the measures proposed injudicious or dangerous, it is then to be rejected; and if it is at last to be rejected, it is apparent that no time ought to be thrown away upon it.

The hours, and days, and weeks, that have been improfitably spent upon bills which after all our endeavours could not be passed; the delays of real benefits to the publick, which have been produced by long pursuits of shadowy advantages, have inclined me to a more expeditious method of proceeding, and determined me speedily to reject what I cannot hope to amend.

[The question being put, passed in the negative, 142 against 109.]



HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEB. 27, 1740-1.

DEBATE ON THE SECOND READING OF A BILL TO PREVENT INCONVENIENCIES ARISING FROM INSURANCE OF SHIPS.

The bill being read, sir John BARNARD spoke thus:—Sir, there cannot be brought before this house any questions more difficult in themselves, more entangled with a multiplicity of relations, or more perplexed with an endless diversity of circumstances, than those which relate to commercial affairs; affairs on which the most experienced often disagree, and on which the most sagacious may deceive themselves with erroneous conjectures.

There are no questions, sir, which require so much personal knowledge of the subject to which they relate, nor is there any subject with which so few gentlemen in this house have had opportunities of being acquainted. There are no questions, sir, which their variety of relations to different persons exposes to be so easily misrepresented without detection, nor any in which the opposition of particular interests so much incites a false representation. In all these cases, deceit is easy, and there is a strong temptation to deceive.

Nor are these questions, sir, always perplexed by intentional fraud, or false assertions, of which they that utter them are themselves conscious.

Those who deceive us, do not always suppress any truth of which they are convinced, nor set facts before us in any other light, than that in which themselves behold them; they for the most part err with an honest intention, and propagate no mistakes but those which they have themselves admitted.

Of this kind, sir, are, doubtless, the measures proposed in the bill before us, which those by whom they are promoted may easily think to be of benefit to the publick, but which, I believe, will appear the result of imperfect views, and partial consideration.

The great and fundamental errour, sir, of the patrons of this bill, seems to be an opinion that the practice of insuring is not known to other nations, nor can be carried on in any other place; and from this principle they deduce consequences, which, if they were inevitably certain, might easily influence us to an immediate approbation of the bill, as necessary to secure our commerce, and distress our enemies.

They conclude, sir, with sufficient justness, that very few merchants would hazard their fortunes in long voyages or distant commerce, or expose themselves to the dangers of war, without the security which insurances afford them; and having persuaded themselves that such security is to be obtained from no other nation, they imagine that we might, by prohibiting it, confine all the foreign vessels in their ports, and destroy, by one resolution, the trade of both our rivals and our enemies.

That our East India company may desire the ratification of this bill, I cannot deny, because they might, perhaps, receive from it some temporary advantage by the short inconveniencies which those whom they consider as the enemies of their commerce would feel from it. They may desire it, because the experiment, if it fails, as it must, cannot injure them; and if it succeeds, may produce great advantages to them: they may wish it, because they will feel the immediate benefit, and the detriment will fall upon others.

I shall not inquire whether our merchants are inclined to look with malevolence on all those who cultivate the same branches of commerce with themselves, though they have neither the violation of natural rights, nor the infringement of national treaties, to complain of. I should be unwilling to suspect a British merchant, whose acquaintance with the constitution of his own country ought to show him the value of liberty, who ought to be above narrow schemes, by the knowledge which his profession enables him to gain, of a desire to encroach upon the rights of others, or to engross the general benefits of nature; and shall only observe, that several other nations can plead a claim to the East India trade, a claim of equal validity with our own; that the Danes have their settlement there, and that the Portuguese discovered the way to those regions of wealth, from which some, perhaps, are inclined to exclude them.

But nothing is more vain than to attempt to exclude them by refusing to ensure their ships, because the opinion that they can be insured by no other nation is entirely without foundation. There are at this time offices of insurance along the whole coasts of the midland sea, among the Dutch, and even among the French. Nothing can debar any nation from the trade of insurance but the want of money; and that money is not wanted by foreigners for this purpose, appears from the great sums which they have deposited in our funds.

That this trade is now carried on chiefly by this nation, though not solely, is incontestable; but what can be inferred from that, but that we ought not to obstruct our own gain; that we ought not to make a law to deprive ourselves of that advantage of which either favourable accidents or our own sagacity have put us in possession.

For this reason it appears that it would not contribute to the wealth of the publick to debar us from insuring the ships even of those with whom we are at war, for it is always to be remembered that they will receive no detriment from such prohibitions, nor will feel any other consequence from them than a necessity of transferring to some other nation the profit which we receive from it.

What the profit is which arises to the nation from the trade of insurance it is not possible exactly to determine, but that the trade is really advantageous may be reasonably conceived, because after many years' experience it is diligently followed, and a law was never necessary to prohibit the pursuit of a business by which nothing was to be gained. But could the gain of the insurer be a doubtful point, there is a certain advantage to the nation by the money paid for commission, brokerage, stamps, and the credit of the premium deposited here.

I might add, sir, another considerable sum yearly arising to the government from the additional letters, occasioned by this trade, which increase the revenues of the post-office, without any deduction for additional charge.

That the loss of this profit, and the gain of insuring, will ensue upon the ratification of this bill, cannot be denied; nor does it appear, that this loss will be counterbalanced by any advantage that will be gained over our rivals or our enemies.

Whether this bill, sir, would produce to the merchants of that city by which it is promoted, the advantages which they expect from it, or remove any of the grievances of which they complain, I am not able positively to determine; but know, that it is not uncommon for merchants, as well as other men, to confound private with publick grievances, and to imagine their own interest the interest of the nation.

With regard, sir, to the practice of insuring, interest or no interest, as the term is, when an imaginary value is put upon the ship or cargo, often much above its real worth, it cannot be denied, that some opportunities may be given by it for wicked practices. But there will always be circumstances in which there can be no security against frauds, but common faith; nor do I see how we can secure the insurers against the possibility of being defrauded.

I cannot, indeed, discover, sir, how this method of insuring can be prevented; for how can the value of a cargo be estimated, which is to be collected in a long voyage, at different ports, and where the success of the adventurers often depends upon lucky accidents, which are, indeed, always hoped for, but seldom happen. An imaginary value must, therefore, be fixed upon, when the ship leaves the port; because the success of that voyage cannot be foreknown, and the contracting parties may be safely trusted to set that value, without any law to direct or restrain them.

If the merchants are oppressed by any peculiar inconveniencies, and can find means of redressing them without injuring the publick commerce, any proposal for that purpose ought to be favourably received; but as the bill now before us proposes general restraints, and proposes to remove grievances which are not felt, by remedies, which those upon whom they are to operate, do not approve, I think it ought not to be referred to a committee, but rejected.

Mr. SOUTHWELL spoke next, in terms to this purpose:—Sir, when I first proposed this bill to the house, I lamented the absence of that honourable gentleman, from whose discussions and arguments I expected great information; and for whose judgment, in all commercial questions, I have the highest esteem, as his penetration not only enables him to discover the consequences of methods which have not yet been tried, but as his extensive acquaintance with many branches of trade, cannot but have informed him of the success of many expedients tried, as well in other nations as our own, for the advancement of it.

Trade, sir, is a subject, of which it has been justly observed, that very few gentlemen have attained knowledge sufficient to qualify themselves to judge of the propriety of any new regulation; and I cannot but confess, that I have no uncommon skill in these questions. What I have to offer on this occasion, has been suggested to me, not so much by my own observations, as by the intelligence which I have very industriously sought, and by which, as I endeavoured to inquire of those whose opinion was least likely to be perverted by their interest, I hope I have not been misled.

The merchants, sir, to whom it has been my fortune to apply, have generally concurred in the opinion that the present practice of insuring is prejudicial to our commerce, nor have I found any disagreement between my constituents and the traders of this great metropolis.

I am unwilling to imagine that there can be any evil for which the wisdom of this assembly cannot discover a remedy, and am, therefore, of opinion, that if the grievance is real, some expedient may be discovered for removing it; and that it is real, I cannot but be convinced by the declarations of so many men, who can have no interest in complaining when they suffer nothing, and whose known abilities exempt them from the suspicion of imputing any part of their uneasiness to a cause which cannot produce it.

The bill before us, sir, requires, in my opinion, some amendments, and in its present state might, perhaps, produce more detriment than advantage; but since it is necessary at least to attempt something for the relief of men so useful to this nation, it appears to me necessary to form a committee, and to deliberate on this subject with more attention.

Mr. LOCKWOOD spoke next, to the following effect:—Sir, though I am not of opinion that the bill in its present state ought to be passed into a law, yet I am far from thinking it so imperfect as not easily to be amended, and, therefore, am desirous that it should be considered in a committee.

I have not, indeed, sir, often observed, that bills injudiciously drawn up at first have received great improvements from a second consideration, and have found it more easy to form a new bill, than to make alterations in one that is laid before us; for some original errour will commonly remain, and the sentiments of different men, pursuing different views, can seldom be modelled into one consistent scheme. But I am far from considering this bill as one of those that cannot be amended, for I can discover but few objections to the regulations proposed in it, and those not relating to any of the essential parts, but slight and circumstantial, such as will easily be removed, or, perhaps, answered.

The grievance, sir, for which this bill proposes a remedy, is so generally known, and so universally lamented, that, I believe, there is not any thing more worthy of the attention of the legislature than an inquiry into the cause of it, and the proper method of redressing it.

In our inquiry into the causes of this obstruction of trade, I am of opinion, sir, that the practice of insuring, interest or no interest, will appear to be the foundation of this general uneasiness; it will be found a practice of so natural a tendency to fraud, and so easily susceptible of dishonest artifices, that I believe every member of this house will desire its suppression.

To confirm my assertion, sir, and illustrate the question before us, I shall mention some particular instances of fraud to which this custom has given occasion; of fraud so evident and so detestable that it cannot be related without indignation.

The Royal George was a large ship belonging to the South sea company, which, having been a voyage to Vera Cruz, put in at Jamaica in her return; and being there refitted to proceed on her voyage homewards, set sail, and came within a week's sailing of the port, when, upon a sudden, the officers entered into a consultation, and determined to go back a month's voyage to Antigua; for what reason, sir, may easily be guessed, when it was told that a ship was insured upon a supposed value of sixty thousand pounds.

This resolution, sir, was no sooner formed, than orders were given to change the course and steer to Antigua, in opposition to all the remonstrances of the carpenter, who is the proper judge of the condition of a vessel, and who declared, with honesty and resolution, against their whole procedure. But they pursued their new scheme without any regard to his murmurs or assertions; and when they arrived at Antigua, found some method of influencing the officers of that island to declare the ship unfit for the prosecution of the voyage.

Their design, sir, was now happily completed. To confirm the determination which had been pronounced in their favour, they stranded the ship upon a bank of sand, forced out the iron that grapples the timber together, and having first taken away the masts and rigging, and whatever else could be used or sold, threw the ballast to each end, and so broke the vessel in the middle.

By this well-contrived shipwreck, having, as they imagined, raised their fortunes, they came home triumphantly from their prosperous voyage, and claimed the money for which the ship was insured. The insurers, startled at a demand so unexpected, inquired into the affair with all the industry which its importance might naturally incite, and, after some consultation, determined to try whether the ship might not be refitted and brought to Britain.

In pursuance of this resolution, they sent workmen and materials, and, without much expense, or any difficulty, brought it hither.

I believe, sir, this relation is sufficient at once to prove the practice, and explain the nature of the frauds to which this method of insurance gives occasion; but as the frequency of them is such, that many instances may be produced, I shall offer another short narrative of the same kind.

A ship that belonged to the East India company, insured after this method, was run ashore by the captain, in such a manner that he imagined none but himself able to recover it, and therefore, though it cost five thousand pounds, sold it for five hundred; but the purchaser, no less expert than the captain, found means very speedily to disengage it, to restore it to a proper condition with little expense, and was much enriched by his fortunate bargain.

I cannot but observe, sir, that this kind of fraud is more formidable, as it may be practised without a possibility of detection: had the captain, instead of stranding, destroyed his vessel, how could his wickedness ever have been discovered; or how could the South sea company's ship have been brought home, had it been sunk in some distant corner of the world.

This practice, sir, and the frauds which it has occasioned, and the suspicions which the easy practice of frauds always creates, have produced so many trials, and filled the courts of justice with such intricate contentions, that the judges, who know, perhaps, nothing of this practice but from its effects, have often declared it to be so pregnant with contests and cheats, that it ought not to be suffered, and that a law for suppressing it would much contribute to the establishment of peace, and the security of property.

I am not insensible, sir, of the force of the argument made use of by the honourable gentleman who spoke in favour of this practice, and cannot but allow it that regard which his reasonings always deserve; it is the strongest, and perhaps the only argument that can be produced. His assertion of the impossibility of estimating the real value of a ship, or of foreknowing the success of a voyage, is incontestable: but perhaps it will follow from thence, not that an imaginary value ought to be admitted, but that no insurance ought to be allowed, where there is no rational method of ascertaining it; or, at least, that all such insurance ought to be rather below the probable value than above it.

If the grievance complained of has been proved not to be imaginary, we ought, doubtless, to consult how it may be remedied; nor do I believe that our consultations will be ineffectual, if we engage in them, not with an intention to perplex, but to inform each other. I am of opinion, sir, that the importance of the question requires a committee; nor can I discover any essential defect in the bill, which should hinder it from passing into a law.

Mr. BURRELL spoke to this effect:—Sir, I am convinced by experience, as well as reason, that so many inconveniencies arise from this method of insurance, that it affords so many opportunities of fraud, and gives such encouragement to negligence, that I shall willingly concur in any measures that may effectually suppress it.

It is, sir, too well known to require proof, that interest is the parent of diligence, and that men attend to the performance of their duty, in proportion as they must suffer by the neglect of it; and, therefore, every practice that deprives honesty of its reward is injurious to the publick.

But that this is the consequence of estimating ships at an imaginary value in the offices of insurance, is, to the highest degree, evident. When a ship is estimated above its real value, how will the commander suffer by a wreck, or what shall restrain him from destroying his vessel, when it may be done with security to himself, except that integrity, which, indeed, ought to be generally diffused, but which is not always to be found, and to which few men think it safe to trust upon occasions of far less importance.

To show, sir, that I do not indulge groundless suspicions, or magnify the bare possibility of fraud into reality; that I do not blacken human nature, or propose laws against wickedness that has not yet existed; it may be proper to mention some letters, in which I have been informed, by my correspondent at Leghorn, of the state of the ships which have arrived there; ships so weakly manned, and so penuriously or negligently stored, so much decayed in the bottoms, and so ill fitted with rigging, that he declares his astonishment at their arrival.

It may deserve our consideration, sir, whether the success of the Spanish privateers may not be, in great part, attributed to this pernicious practice; whether captains, when their vessels are insured for more than their value, do not rashly venture into known danger? whether they do not wilfully miss the security of convoys? whether they do not direct their courses where privateers may most securely cruise? whether they do not surrender with less resistance than interest would excite? and whether they do not raise clamours against the government for their ill success, to avoid the suspicion of negligence or fraud?

That other frauds are committed in the practice of insuring, is well known to the honourable gentleman: it is a common practice to take money upon bottomry, by way of pledge, for the captain's fidelity, and to destroy this security by insuring above the real value; so that the captain may gain by neglecting the care of his vessel, or, at least, secure himself from loss, and indulge his ease or his pleasure without any interruption from the fear of diminishing his fortune.

The whole practice of insurance, sir, is, in its present state, I believe, so perplexed with frauds, and of such manifest tendency to the obstruction of commerce, that it absolutely requires some legal regulations.

Sir John BARNARD then spoke to this purpose:—Of frauds in the practice of insurance, with regard to which the honourable gentleman has appealed to me, I can confidently affirm that I am totally ignorant: I know not of any fraudulent practices openly carried on, or established by custom, which I suppose are meant: for with regard to single acts of fraud, committed by particular men, it is not to be supposed but that they have been detected in this, as in all other branches of traffick: nor can I conceive that any argument can be drawn from them against the practice; for if every part of commerce is to be prohibited, which has furnished villains with opportunities of deceit, we shall contract trade into a narrow compass.

With regard, sir, to the instance of the Royal George, though the proceedings of the officers are not wholly to be vindicated, yet part of their conduct is less inexplicable than it has been represented. Their return to Antigua, when they were bound for Britain, and were within a week's sailing of their port, is easily to be defended, if the wind was contrary to their intended course; for it is not difficult to conceive that they might reach a distant port, with a favourable wind, much sooner than one much nearer, with the wind against them.

I have always observed, sir, that the gentlemen engaged in the trade to the East Indies, assume an air of superiority, to which I know not what claim they can produce, and seem to imagine, that their charter gives them more extensive knowledge, and more acute sagacity, than falls to the lot of men not combined in their association.

But however these gentlemen may disapprove my arguments, and however they may misrepresent them, I shall be satisfied, that they will have, with the disinterested and impartial, their just weight, and that this affair will not be hastily determined upon an imperfect examination.

Sir Robert WALPOLE replied to this effect:—Whether the merchants are satisfied with the present methods of insuring, or what is the opinion of any separate body of men, I think it absolutely unnecessary to inquire. We are constituted for the publick advantage, and are engaged by our senatorial character to consider, not the private interest of particular men, but the general advantage of our country.

In our pursuit, sir, of national interest, we shall be obliged frequently to oppose the schemes which private men or separate fraternities, have formed for their own advantage, and which they may be expected to defend with all their art; both because every man is unwilling to imagine that the publick interest and his own are opposite, and because it is to be feared, that many may consider the publick only in subordination to themselves, and be very little solicitous about the general prosperity of their country, provided none of the calamities which afflict it extend their influence to themselves.

We are in the discussion of this question, sir, to consider that we are engaged in a war against a nation from which insults, depredations, oppressions, and cruelties, have been long complained of, and against which we are, therefore, to act with a resolution proportioned to the injuries which we have suffered, and to our desire of vengeance. We are to practice every method of distressing them, and to promote the success of our arms even at the expense of present gain, and the interest of private men.

It is well known, sir, to all who have either heard or read of the Spaniards, that they live in carelessness and indolence, neglect all the natural advantages of their own country, despise the gain of foreign commerce, and depend wholly on their American settlements, for all the conveniences, and, perhaps, for most of the necessaries of life.

This is the particular circumstance that makes a war with Britain so much to be dreaded by them. A nation superiour to them by sea holds them besieged, like a garrison surrounded by an army, precludes them from supplies, intercepts their succours, and if it cannot force their walls by attack, can, at least, by a blockade, starve them to a capitulation.

Thus, sir, by a naval war with an enemy of superiour strength, they must at length be subdued, and subdued, perhaps, without a battle, and without the possibility of resistance; against such an enemy their courage or their discipline is of no use; they may form armies, indeed, but which can only stand upon the shore, to defend what their enemies have no intention of invading, and see those ships seized in which their pay is treasured, or their provisions are stored.

Such, sir, is our natural superiority over the Spaniards, a species of superiority that must inevitably prevail, if it be not defeated by our own folly; and surely a more effectual method of defeating it, the Spaniards themselves could not have discovered, than that of insuring, their ships among our merchants.

When a ship thus insured is taken, which, notwithstanding all precautions, must sometimes happen, we examine the cargo, find it extremely valuable, and triumph in our success; we not only count the gain to ourselves, but the loss to our enemies, and determine that a small number of such captures will reduce them to offer us peace upon our own terms.

Such are the conclusions which are made, and made with reason, by men unacquainted with the secret practices of our merchants, and who do not suspect us to be stupid enough to secure our enemies against ourselves; but it is often found, upon a more close examination, that our ships of war have only plundered our merchants, and that our privateers may, indeed, have enriched themselves, but impoverished their country. It is discovered that the loss of the Spaniards is to be repaid, and, perhaps, sometimes with interest, by the British insurers.

If it be urged, that we ought not to enact any laws which may obstruct the gain of our fellow-subjects, may it not be asked, why all trade with Spain is prohibited; may not the trade be equally gainful with the insurance, and may not the gain be more generally distributed, and, therefore, be more properly national?

But this trade was prohibited, because it was more necessary to our enemies than to ourselves; it was prohibited, because the laws of war require, that a less evil should be suffered to inflict a greater; it is upon this principle that every battle is fought, and that we fire our own ships to consume the navies of the enemy.

For this reason, sir, it appears to me evident beyond contradiction, that the insurance of Spanish ships ought to be prohibited: we shall, indeed, lose the profit of the insurance, but we shall be reimbursed by the captures, which is an argument that cannot be produced for the prohibition of commerce.

It is urged, sir, that they may insure their ships in other countries; an assertion, of which, whether it be true or not, I am not able to decide; but it is acknowledged, that the necessity of establishing new correspondence will be at least a temporary obstruction of their trade, and an obstruction of even a short continuance may lay them at our mercy.

But let us, sir, reflect upon the weakness of this argument,—they must be allowed to insure here, because they may insure in other places; will it not be equally just to urge, that they must trade with us, because they may trade with other nations? And may it not be answered, that though we cannot wholly suspend their commerce, it is yet our business to obstruct it as far as we are able?

May it-not, sir, be farther affirmed, that by insuring in other nations, they may injure their allies by falling into our hands, but do not the less benefit us? that if they do not grow weaker, we at least are strengthened; but that by insuring among us, whatever steps are taken, the equilibrium of the war is preserved always the same?

It is asserted, and I suppose with truth, that we insure at a lower rate than others, and it will, therefore, follow, that the Spaniards, whenever their ships shall escape us, will suffer more by having-insured amongst foreigners, than if they had contracted with our merchants.

Thus it appears, sir, that there are stronger reasons for prohibiting the insurance of Spanish ships, than for putting a stop to our commerce with them; and that whether their ships are taken by us, or escape us, it is the general interest of the nation, that they shall be insured by foreign merchants.

With respect, sir, to the East India company, I have no regard to their interest, considered as distinct from that of the rest of the nation; nor have received any solicitations from them to promote this bill, or to espouse their interest; but cannot, without concealing my real sentiments, deny, that as they have the grant of an exclusive trade to the East Indies, to insure the ships that are sent thither without their permission, is to invade their rights, and to infringe their charter; and that the practice, if the validity of their charter be admitted, is illegal, and ought to be discountenanced.

The practice, sir, of insuring, interest or no interest, or of assigning to ships an imaginary value, is nothing more than a particular game, a mere solemn species of hazard, and ought, therefore, to be prohibited, for every reason that can be urged against games of chance.

With regard to this bill in general, it is, in my opinion, highly necessary, nor can I discover any important objection that can be made against it. Some law of this kind, and to this purpose, I have long intended to offer to the consideration of this assembly, and since it is now before us, I think we ought to consider it with the attention which may be justly expected from us.

Lord BALTIMORE spoke thus:—Sir, I know not how properly the practice of insuring may be termed a species of hazard, nor do I think any thing more is to be considered, than whether the game be gainful to the nation, or not, for I cannot discover that there is any absurdity in enriching ourselves at the expense of other nations, whether enemies or allies. That we ought to prefer the general good to the advantage of individuals, is undoubted, but I cannot conceive that in this case there can be any opposition between private and publick interest. If our insurers gain by securing the ships of our enemies, the nation is benefited, for all national gain must circulate through the hands of individuals.

No man will assert that we ought to assist our enemies, nor will any man imagine that we assist them by impoverishing them, and if our insurers gain by their practice, the Spaniards must undoubtedly be losers.

Mr. WILLIMOT spoke next, to the following purpose:—Sir, I have conversed on the question to which this bill relates, with men engaged in various kinds of traffick, and who have no common interest but that of their country. I have dispersed among the merchants, most eminent for their acquaintance with the whole extent of commerce, and for their knowledge of the true interest of the nation, copies of this bill, and cannot find any of them so sensible of the grievance of which we have so loud complaints, as to desire that it should be redressed by the measures now proposed.

That frauds are practised on every side, in this, as well as in other trades, the general corruption of our age gives us sufficient reason to suspect; but what is common to every sort of traffick, cannot be produced as an argument for the prohibition of any.

That the practice of insuring an imaginary value may give opportunity for greater frauds than can be practised in common dealings, is likewise evident, but I cannot discover such frauds to require the interposition of the legislature.

If they are practised only by those of our own nation, the publick does not suffer; for property is only transferred from one subject to another: the fraud ought, indeed, to be severely punished in the courts of criminal justice, but the custom which gave the opportunity of practising it, ought not to be restrained, any more than any other profession not criminal in itself, but liable to accidental abuses.

If our insurers are defrauded by foreigners, the nation is then, indeed, more nearly affected, but even in that case, it is to be remembered, that the private interest of the insurers, who must be immediately ruined, is a sufficient security for the publick. For it cannot, sir, be conceived that any man will obstinately carry on a business, by which he becomes every day poorer, or, that when he desists he will be succeeded by another, who cannot but know that he engages in that traffick to his certain ruin.

The true state of this affair is, that frauds are, indeed, often committed, and are for that reason always suspected, and that the insurers, when they insure the ship and cargo against accidents, reckon, among other chances, the probability of being cheated, and proportion their demands, not only to the length and danger of the voyage, but to the character, likewise, of the man with whom they contract.

This, sir, is always the practice of those whom experience has made acquainted with the danger of implicit confidence and unsuspecting credulity, nor do any but the young and unskilful suffer themselves to be so exposed to frauds, as that their fortunes should be injured, or the general gain of their business overbalanced, by a few deceits.

Thus it appears, that notwithstanding the ease and safety with which the present methods of insurance admit fraud to be practised, the insurers, by a proportionate degree of caution, secure themselves from being injured, and, by consequence, the nation.

The insurance of foreign ships is now to be considered, by which great profit arises to the nation. We insure, sir, as it has been observed, at lower rates than other nations, because we have more business of this kind, and the smallness of our profit is compensated by the frequency; the cheapness of insurances, and eagerness of foreigners to insure here, reciprocally contribute to each other; we are often applied to, because we insure at an easy rate, and we can insure at an easy rate, because we are often applied to.

Nor is the cheapness of British insurance the only motive to the preference which it preserves among foreigners, who are induced to apply to this nation, by the reputation which our merchants have deservedly gained for probity and punctuality superiour to that of any other traders. Our merchants, sir, bargain without artifice, pay without subterfuges, and are ready on all occasions to preserve their character at the hazard of their profit.

From these two considerations we may draw unanswerable arguments against any restraints upon the practice of insuring: if foreigners are once disappointed in their applications to us, our business will in a great part cease, and as we shall not then be able to insure at lower rates than other nations, we shall never recover that branch of our trade. And as the character of the British merchants exempts them from any suspicion of practices pernicious to the publick, why should they be restrained? Why, sir, should they appear to be suspected by the legislature of their own country, whom foreigners trust without hesitation.

It has been objected to them with great warmth, and urged with much rhetorical exaggeration, that they assist the enemies of their country, that they prolong the war, and defeat those advantages which our situation and commerce have given us; imputations sufficiently atrocious, if they were founded upon truth.

But let us, sir, examine the arguments by which this accusation has been supported, and inquire whether this triumph of eloquence has been occasioned by any real superiority of evidence or reason; it is urged, that we have already prohibited commerce with the Spaniards, and that, therefore, we ought, likewise, to prohibit the insurance of their ships.

It will not require, sir, an imagination very fertile, or a knowledge very extensive, to supply arguments sufficient to refute the supposed demonstration; in opposition to which it may be urged, that this kind of commerce is of a peculiar nature, that it subsists upon opinion, and is preserved by the reputation of our insurers; a reputation that the insurers of other nations may obtain by the same means, and from whom we shall, therefore, never recover it.

It may be observed, sir, that other commodities are the peculiar product of different countries, and that there is no danger of losing our other trade by suspending it, because it depends upon the excellence of our manufactures; but that insurance may be the commodity of any country, where money and common honesty are to be found.

This argument may, perhaps, be yet more effectually invalidated, or, perhaps, entirely subverted, by denying the expedience of that prohibition which is produced as a precedent for another restraint. Nor, indeed, does it appear why we should preclude ourselves from a gainful trade, because the money is drawn by it out of the hands of our enemies; or why the product of our lands should lie unconsumed, or our manufactures stand unemployed, rather than we should sell to our enemies what they will purchase at another place, or by the intervention of a neutral power.

To sell to an enemy that which may enable him to injure us, that which he must necessarily obtain, and which he could buy from no other, would, indeed, be to the last degree, absurd; but that may surely be sold them without any breach of morality or policy, which they can want with less inconvenience than we can keep. If we were besieging a town, I should not advise our soldiers to sell to the inhabitants ammunition or provisions, but cannot discover the folly of admitting them to purchase ornaments for their houses, or brocades for their ladies.

But, without examining with the utmost accuracy, whether the late prohibition was rational or not, I have, I hope, suggested objections sufficient to make the question doubtful, and to incline us to try the success of one experiment, before we venture upon another more hazardous.

I am never willing, sir, to load trade with restraints; trade is, in its own nature, so fugitive and variable, that no constant course can be prescribed to it; and those regulations which were proper when they were made, may, in a few months, become difficulties and obstructions. We well know, that many of the measures which our ancestors pursued for the encouragement of commerce, have been found of pernicious consequence; and even in this age, which, perhaps, experience, more than wisdom, has enlightened, I have known few attempts of that kind which have not defeated the end for which they were made.