That the army is filled with gentlemen, is so far, my lords, from proving that there is nothing to be feared from it, that it is the only foundation of all our solicitude. For none but gentlemen can injure our liberties, and while the posts of the army are bestowed as rewards of senatorial slavery, gentlemen will always be found who will be corrupted themselves, and can corrupt a borough; who will purchase a vote in the house, and sell it for military preferments. By the posts of the army the senate may be corrupted, and by the corruption of the senate the army be perpetuated.

Those, my lords, who are the warmest opponents of the army, apprehend not any danger from their swords, but from their votes. As they have been of late regulated without discipline or subordination, I should not feel such anxiety at seeing them led on by their new commanders against a body of honest ploughmen, united in the cause of virtue and of liberty; I should, with great alacrity, draw my sword against them, and should not doubt of seeing them in a short time heaped upon our fields.

But, my lords, they are employed to ruin us by a more slow and silent method; they are directed to influence their relations in the senate, and to suborn the voters in our small towns; they are dispersed over the nation to instil dependence, and being enslaved themselves, willingly undertake the propagation of slavery.

That the army is instrumental in extending the influence of the ministry to the senate, cannot be denied, when military preferments are held no longer than while he that possesses them gives a sanction, by his vote, to the measures of the court; when no degree of merit is sufficient to balance a single act of senatorial opposition, and when the nation is rather to be left to the defence of boys, than the minister be suspected of misconduct.

Could either bravery or knowledge, reputation, or past services, known fidelity to his majesty, or the most conspicuous capacity for high trust, have secured any man in the enjoyment of his post, the noble duke who made the motion, had carried his command to his grave, nor had the nation now been deprived either of his arms, or of his counsels.

But, as he has now offered his advice to his country, and supported his opinion with proofs from reason and experience, which even those who oppose them have confessed themselves unable to answer; as the justness of his reasoning, and the extent of his knowledge, have silenced those whose prejudices will not suffer them to own themselves convinced; let us not, my lords, reject what we cannot condemn, nor suffer our country to be defrauded of the advantage of this resolution, by that low senatorial craft, the previous question.

Then the CHANCELLOR spoke to the following purpose:—My lords, I am far from suspecting that an open profession of my inability to examine the question before us, in its full extent, will be imputed to an affectation of modesty, since any knowledge of military affairs could not be acquired in those stations in which I have been placed, or by those studies, in which the greatest part of my life is known to have been spent.

It will not be expected, my lords, that I should attempt a formal confutation of the noble duke's positions, or that I should be able to defend my own opinion against his knowledge and experience; nor would I, my lords, expose myself to the censure of having harangued upon war in the presence of Hannibal.

The noble duke has explained his sentiments to your lordships with the utmost accuracy of method, and the most instructive perspicuity of language; he has enforced them with a strength of reasoning rarely to be found, and with an extent of knowledge peculiar to himself. Yet, my lords, as his arguments, however powerful in themselves, do not strike me with the same force with which others may be affected, who are more capable of receiving them, I hope that your lordships will allow me to mention such objections as occur to me, that in voting on this question I may, at least, preserve my conscience from violation, and neither adopt the opinion of another, however great, without examination, nor obstinately reject the means of conviction.

Every lord who has spoken either in support of the noble duke's opinion, or in opposition to it, has confessed that he is very little acquainted with the subject of our debate; and it may not, therefore, be an improper or useless attempt, if I endeavour by objections, however injudicious, or by arguments, however inconclusive, to procure some illustration of a question so important, and, at the same time, so little understood.

The objections, my lords, which I shall produce, are such as I have heard in conversation with those whose long acquaintance with military employments give them a just claim to authority in all questions which relate to the art of war; among whom I find no uniformity of opinion with regard to the most proper method of augmenting our forces. And, my lords, when we observe those to differ in their sentiments, whose education, experience, and opportunities of knowledge have been nearly the same, and who have all obtained a very great degree of reputation in their profession, what can be inferred, but that the question is in its own nature obscure and difficult? That it involves a multitude of relations, and is diffused through a great variety of circumstances? And that, therefore, it is prudent for every man, who can judge only upon the authority of others, to suspend his opinion?

The chief argument, or that, at least, which impressed itself most strongly on my mind, against any innovation in our military constitution, was drawn from the success of our armies in their present form, with that proportion of soldiers and officers, which the present motion tends to abolish. Our forces, say the advocates for the present establishment, have afforded us a sufficient testimony of the propriety of their regulation, by their frequent victories over troops, whose discipline has been studied with the utmost vigilance, and which have been trained up to war with a degree of attention not disproportioned to the mighty design for which they were raised, the subjection of the world, and attainment of universal monarchy. These troops, who have been taught, almost from their infancy, that cowardice and flight are the greatest crimes, and persuaded, by national prejudices, and principles studiously instilled, that no foreign forces could withstand them, have fled before equal numbers of Britons, and been driven from one province to another, till, instead of grasping at general dominion, they were reduced to defend their wives and children.

How much of this success was to be ascribed to that part of the regulation which this motion proposes to be changed, it is not, my lords, within my province to determine; the great commander whom I have the honour to oppose, can best explain to your lordships the province of every officer in the field, and how far the number of inferiour officers may influence the success of a battle and the fate of a kingdom.

But to me, my lords, the establishment of our armies, comprising different views, and connecting various subordinate regulations, may be compared to a medicine composed of different ingredients, and found infallibly efficacious in a dangerous disease, in which, though some of the parts may seem to physicians of the profoundest learning, superfluous or improper, it would be no less than the folly of preferring experiments to life, to make any alteration.

The wantonness of innovation, my lords, is a dangerous disease of the mind; in a private station, it prompts men to be always discontented with what they find, and to lose the enjoyment of good in search of something better; it incites them to leave the safe and beaten tracks of life, in search of those which they imagine nearer, but, which are, at best, less secure, and which generally lead them to points far different from that to which they originally intended to direct their course.

It is dangerous, my lords, to admit any alteration which is not absolutely necessary, for one innovation makes way for another. The parts of a constitution, like a complicated machine, are fitted to each other, nor can one be changed without changing that which corresponds to it. This necessity is not always foreseen, but when discovered by experience is generally complied with; for every man is more inclined to hazard farther changes, than to confess himself mistaken by retracting his scheme. Thus, my lords, one change introduces another, till the original constitution is entirely destroyed.

By the ambition of innovation, my lords, have almost all those empires been destroyed, of which nothing now is left but the memory. Every human establishment has its advantages and its inconveniencies, and by weak attempts to remedy these defects, which, notwithstanding the utmost attention, will embarrass the machine of government, alterations have been introduced which have been quickly followed by a total dissolution.

There seem, my lords, to be few regulations on which it is more dangerous to make experiments than on that of the armies of a nation. We are sufficiently convinced how much of success is the consequence of courage, and that courage is only an opinion of our own superiority, arising from certain circumstances, either imaginary or real.

The courage which at present animates our forces, arises, my lords, from a very proper ground, their former victories over the enemies which they are now to combat, and will, therefore, doubtless, continue while they can consider themselves as enjoying the same advantage with those particular men by whom the victories were obtained. But, my lords, if any essential part of their establishment be changed, they will be considered, both by themselves and their enemies, as a different army; they will then charge with less alacrity, and be opposed with less dejection; they will consider themselves as fighting without that certainty of success which arises from experience, and their enemies will resolve to try, by an obstinate resistance, whether they are now equally formidable as in their former state.

Thus, my lords, I have attempted, however weakly, to represent the arguments which I have heard for the continuance of the establishment, of which your lordships will examine the validity, and shall now proceed to consider the noble duke's system of a military subordination in time of peace.

Whether a standing army in time of peace is made necessary to the change of conduct in foreign courts, it is now useless to inquire; but it will be easily granted by your lordships, that no motive but necessity, necessity absolute and inevitable, ought to influence us to support a standing body of regular forces, which have always been accounted dangerous, and generally found destructive to a free people.

The chief reason, my lords, of the danger arising from a standing army, may be ascribed to the circumstances by which men, subject to military laws, are distinguished from other members of the same community; they are, by the nature of martial government, exposed to punishment which other men never incur, and tried by forms of a different and more rigorous kind than those which are practised by the civil power. They are, if not exempted from the jurisdiction of a magistrate, yet subject to another authority which they see more frequently and more severely exerted, and which, therefore, they fear and reverence in a higher degree. They, by entering into the army, lay aside, for the most part, all prospect of advantage from commerce or civil employments, and, in a few years, neither fear nor hope any thing but from the favour or displeasure of their own officers.

For these, my lords, or for other reasons, the soldiers have always been inclined to consider themselves as a body distinct from the rest of the community, and independent on it, a government regulated by their own laws, without regard to the general constitution of their country; they have, therefore, been ready to subvert the constitution, from which they received little advantage, and to oppress the civil magistrates, for whom they had lost their reverence.

And how soon, my lords, might such outrages be expected from an army formed after the model of the noble duke, released from the common obligations of society, disunited from the bulk of the nation, directed solely by their own officers, and ultimately commanded by a man who had the right of commanding no other? Would they not soon consider themselves as a separate community, whose interests were, no less than their laws, peculiar to themselves? Would they not consider him, from whom they received all their rewards, and all their punishments, as the proper object of their supreme regard, and endeavour to exalt him to the same dominion over others, which he enjoyed in regard to themselves, that they might share in his superiority?

A body of men, my lords, thus separated from the rest of the people, must consider themselves as either ennobled or degraded by such distinction, and would soon find themselves inclined to use the power of their arms, either in the exertion of their privileges, or the revenge of their disgrace. Then, my lords, would they set at defiance the laws of the nation, nor would one of these noble lords be able to disband, nor the other to resist them.

The army, my lords, is, in time of peace, then best regulated when it is kept under the strictest subordination to the civil power, that power which it is instituted to protect and to preserve.

Thus, my lords, have I examined the proposal and reasons of the noble duke, perhaps not much to the information of your lordships; but it cannot be expected that any capacity should be able, in an unexpected and sudden debate, to dispute on a subject, which the noble duke's education gave him particular opportunities of understanding far beyond almost every other man, and which he has had time to consider with respect to this present motion.

For this reason, my lords, I cannot but think the previous question highly expedient, but not for this reason alone; for as the state of the army, and the proper methods of augmenting it, are soon to be examined by the other house, to prejudice their determinations, may raise a contest about privileges, and oblige us either to persist, for our own honour, in opposition to measures necessary to the security of the publick, or, in compliance with the present exigence, accept their scheme, however opposite to our own resolution.

Lord CARTERET spoke in substance as follows:—My lords, the known abilities of that noble lord incline me always to hear him with uncommon expectation and attention, which seldom fail to be rewarded by such pleasure and information as few other men are able to afford. But his observations on the question before us, my lords, have only convinced me, that the greatest abilities may be sometimes betrayed into errour, and the most candid disposition be vitiated by accidental prejudices. For his own arguments neither appear just, nor his representation impartial, of those advanced in favour of the motion.

With regard to the number of officers necessary in time of war, his lordship asserted nothing from his own knowledge, nor do I believe that any other lord will imagine himself qualified to dispute with the noble duke upon questions purely military. His experience entitles him to the highest authority, in debates of this kind; and if every man has a claim to credit in his own profession, surely, he who has given evidence of his proficiency in the art of war in the eyes of the whole world, will not be denied, in this house, that superiority which would readily be allowed him in any other part of the universe.

And yet less, my lords, can it be suspected, that he intends to deceive us, than that he can be deceived himself; for not only his probity, his love of his country, and his fidelity to the crown, concur to secure him from any temptations to make an ill use of his credit, but his own interest obliges him to offer that scheme for the regulation of our forces, which, in his own opinion, will most certainly contribute to their success. For it is not to be doubted, my lords, that when we shall be engaged in war too far for negotiations and conventions, when we shall be surrounded by enemies, and terrified at the near approach of danger, he will be called upon to lead our armies to battle, and attack, once more, those enemies that have fled so often before him.

Then, my lords, if he has contributed to form a weak plan of our military constitution, must he atone for it with the loss of his reputation; that reputation, for which he has undergone so many fatigues, and been exposed to so many dangers.

But, my lords, it is ridiculous to suspect where nothing appears to provoke suspicion, and I am very far from imagining that the dangers of innovation, however artfully magnified, or the apprehensions of the soldiers, however rhetorically represented, will be thought of any weight.

The establishment of the army, my lords, is an innovation, and, as the noble lord has justly represented it, an innovation that threatens nothing less than the destruction of our liberties, and the dissolution of our government. Our vigilance ought, therefore, to be very anxiously employed in regulating this new part of our government, and adapting it, in such a manner, to the national constitution, that no detriment may arise from it, and that our civil rights may be protected, not oppressed, by the military power.

To this purpose, says the noble lord, the soldiers are to be restrained by a due subordination to the magistrate, a position undoubtedly true, but now superfluously urged: for it was never controverted by the noble person whose opinion he intended to oppose.

Should any man assert, my lords, that the army ought to be formed into a distinct and independent society, which should receive laws only from a council of war, and have no other governour than their officers, none should oppose such an assertion with more ardour or constancy than myself, but what was never advanced it is unnecessary to confute.

Yet, my lords, to obviate those dangers from the army which have been so strongly and justly represented, it is necessary, not only that a legal subordination to the civil authority be firmly established, but that a personal dependence on the ministry be taken away.

How readily men learn to reverence and obey those on whom their fortunes depend, has been already shown by the noble lord, and therefore it will follow, that a minister who distributes preferments at his pleasure, may acquire such an influence in the army, as may be employed to secure himself from justice by the destruction of liberty. And unless it can be proved, that no such minister can ever exist; that corruption, ambition, and perfidy, have place only in the military race; every argument that shows the danger of an army, dependent only on the general, will show the danger, likewise, of one dependent only on the minister.

The influence of the minister, my lords, is known to arise from the number of the officers, and to be proportioned to the value of the preferment, which it is in his power to bestow; it is, therefore, evident, by adding new officers to our army, we shall throw weight into the scale, which already is, at least, an equal balance to our constitution, and enable the ministry either to employ an army in defence of their measures, or to obtain such an influence in the senate, as shall make any other security superfluous.

Such, my lords, is the danger of a multitude of officers, a danger which surely deserves more attention than the imaginary prejudice of the soldiers in favour of the present establishment; a prejudice represented so powerful, both in our own forces, and those of our enemies, that the future success of our arms may probably depend upon it.

Surely, my lords, that cause may be allowed indefensible, which such a patron defends so weakly. What can be more chimerical than to imagine that men would lay down their arms, and forsake their standards, because there are twenty more in a company than have formerly been? That such a panick, from such a cause, was never found, I need not prove; and I scarce think it necessary to assert, that, without supposing a universal depravity of reason, it never can be found.

The establishment proposed by the noble duke, is the same with that of most foreign troops, and particularly with that of his majesty's forces in his foreign dominions, and, therefore, cannot but be approved by him, if it should be proposed by your lordships. For why should he imagine a greater number of officers necessary to the troops of Britain, than to those of any other nation.

The expediency of the motion, my lords, is, in my opinion, so obvious and incontestable, as to require no farther consideration, and, therefore, it is no argument against it, that we were not previously informed of the question.

Much less, my lords, can I discover the force of the assertion, that by such a resolution we shall excite the displeasure of the other house; we have, my lords, at least, an equal right with them to examine any position relating to the publick security, a right which we may exert with less danger of disgusting them, while they have yet formed no determination, and with less danger to the nation, than when their opinion, whatever it may be, cannot be controverted without retarding the important bill against mutiny.

We are never offended, my lords, at receiving the opinions of the other house, which we often adopt without any alteration, and often make use of for our own instruction, and now are become so contemptible as that no regard should be paid by them to our resolutions.

It is well known, my lords, that this assembly is an essential and constituent part of the legislature of this kingdom, and that we received from our ancestors a great extent of power, which it ought to be our care not to suffer to be contracted by degrees, till this assembly shall become merely formal, and sit only to ratify implicitly the determinations of the other house.

[Several other lords spoke in the debate, and the president having put the previous question, "Whether the question should be then put?" upon a division, it passed in the negative. Content, 42. Not content, 59.]



HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 12, 1740.

RESPECTING OFFICERS ON HALF-PAY.

Mr. SANDYS this day moved for an humble address to his majesty, that, for the future ease of his majesty's subjects, all officers now subsisting upon half-pay, etc. might be employed in the army, and supported it to the following effect:

Sir, though I have often known motions opposed without any just objections, or at least without any proof of such inconveniencies likely to arise from them, as were equivalent to the advantages which they would have produced, yet I cannot but confess, that any opposition to this will be unexpected and surprising; for it is, in my opinion, supported by every law of justice and humanity. If we regard the publick in general, it cannot but produce some alleviation of the national expense; and if we consider the particular persons to whom it immediately relates, they have certainly a just claim to that regard which it is the tendency of this motion to procure them.

To burden with superfluous officers, and unnecessary expenses, a people already overwhelmed with taxes, and overrun with the dependents on the crown, is, surely, to the highest degree cruel and absurd. And to condemn those men to contempt and penury, who have served their country with bravery and fidelity, to prefer unexperienced striplings to those commissions, which would gladly be accepted by men who have already tried their courage in the battle, and borne the fatigues of marches, and the change of climates, is surely not only to oppress the deserving, and scatter promotion without just distinction; but, what is yet more enormous, it is to wanton with the publick safety, and expose us to our enemies.

Nor does it appear to me sufficient, that the veteran officers be restored to the commissions which they formerly enjoyed; they ought, upon an augmentation of our troops, to be recompensed by some advancement for their services and their sufferings; the ensign ought to become a lieutenant, and the lieutenant be exalted to a captain; stations which they will surely fill with more dignity and greater abilities, than boys newly discharged from school, and intrusted with unexpected authority.

If it be reasonable, sir, that expense should be spared in a time of general poverty, if it be politick to carry on war in the manner most likely to produce success, if it be just, that those who have served their country should be preferred to those who have no merit to boast, this motion cannot be rejected.

Sir William YONGE answered to this purpose:—Sir, to the motion now made, it will not, I believe, be objected, that it is unreasonable, or unjust, but that it is unnecessary, and that it is not drawn up with sufficient consideration.

It is unnecessary, because his majesty is advised by it to no other measures than those which he has already determined to pursue; for he has declared to me, sir, his intention of conferring the new commissions upon the officers who receive half-pay, before any other officers shall be promoted.

The motion appears to me not to be very attentively considered, or drawn up with great propriety of expression; for it supposes all the half-pay officers fit for the service, which cannot be imagined by any man, who considers that there has been peace for almost thirty years; a space of time, in which many vigorous constitutions must have declined, and many, who were once well qualified for command, must be disabled by the infirmities of age. Nor is the promotion of one of these gentlemen considered always by him as an act of favour; many of them have, in this long interval of peace, engaged in methods of life very little consistent with military employments, many of them have families which demand their care, and which they would not forsake for any advantages which a new commission could afford them, and therefore it would not be very consistent with humanity to force them into new dangers and fatigues which they are now unable to support.

With regard to these men, compassion and kindness seem to require that they should be suffered to spend their few remaining days without interruption, and that the dangers and toils of their youth should be requited in their age with ease and retirement.

There are others who have less claim to the regard of the publick, and who may be passed by in the distribution of new preferments without the imputation of neglecting merit. These are they who have voluntarily resigned their commissions for the sake of half-pay, and have preferred indolence and retreat to the service of their country.

So that it appears, that of those who subsist upon half-pay, some are unable to execute a commission, some do not desire, and some do not deserve it; and with regard to the remaining part, which can be no great number, I have already stated the intention of his majesty, and therefore cannot but conclude that the motion is needless.

Mr. PULTENEY spoke as follows:—Sir, I know not by what fatality it is, that all the motions made by one party are reasonable and necessary, and all that are unhappily offered by the other, are discovered either to be needless, or of pernicious tendency. Whenever a question can be clouded and perplexed, the opponents of the ministry are always mistaken, confuted, and, in consequence of the confutations, defeated by the majority of votes. When truth is too notorious to be denied, and too obvious to be contested, the administration claim the honour of the first discovery, and will never own that they were incited to their duty by the remonstrances of their opponents, though they never, before those remonstrances, had discovered the least intention of performing it.

But that the motion is allowed to be just and proper, is sufficient; the importance of it will be easily discovered. For my part I shall always consider that motion as important, which tends to contract the expenses of the publick, to rescue merit from neglect, and to hinder the increase of the dependents on the ministry.

Sir Robert WALPOLE answered:—Sir, there is no temper more opposite to that incessant attention to the welfare of the publick, which is the perpetual boast of those who have signalized themselves by opposing the measures of the administration, than a lust of contradiction, and a disposition to disturb this assembly with superfluous debates.

Whether this disposition is not discovered in the reply made to the declaration of his majesty's intentions, and the confession of the propriety of the motion, let the house determine. It must surely be confessed, that it is not necessary to advise what is already determined.

Nor is it less evident, that many of the officers whose interest is now so warmly solicited, must be incapacitated by their age for service, and unable to receive any benefit from the offer of new commissions. To deny this, is to question the flux of time, or to imagine that the constitution of a soldier is exempt from its injuries.

Mr. SANDYS explained himself to this effect:—Sir, I am far from intending by this motion to fill the army with decrepit officers, or to obstruct in any manner the service of the publick; nor have I any other intention, than to secure to those whose years permit, and whose inclinations incite them to enter once more into the army, that preferment to which they have a claim, not only from their past services, but from the state of penury and obscurity in which they have languished.

I desire to preserve those, whose valour has heretofore made our nation the terrour of the world, from the mortification of seeing themselves insulted by childhood, and commanded by ignorance; by ignorance exalted to authority by the countenance of some rhetorician of the senate, or some mayor of a borough.

Whoever has observed the late distribution of military honours, will easily discover that they have been attained by qualifications very different from bravery, or knowledge of the art of war; he will find that regiments and companies are the rewards of a seasonable vote, and that no man can preserve his post in the army, whether given him as the reward of acknowledged merit, or sold him for the full value, any longer than he employs all his influence in favour of the ministry.

Sir Robert WALPOLE then said:—Sir, it has been already admitted, that the motion can only be objected to as superfluous, and, therefore, all farther debate is mere waste of time, without any prospect of advantage; nor is any thing now necessary, but to review the motion, and correct such expressions as may be thought inaccurate or improper.

That all the half-pay officers are not able to enter into the service, has been already shown, and, therefore, I should imagine, that, instead of all the officers, we might very justly substitute officers properly qualified.

Sir John BARNARD replied:—Sir, though I cannot discover the necessity of any alteration, since it cannot be conceived that the senate can advise impossibilities, yet since so much accuracy is affected, it may be allowed that the word all shall be left out, as seeming to imply more than can be intended.

But the honourable gentleman is not, in my opinion, so happy in his amendment, as in his objection; for the words properly qualified convey to me no distinct idea. He that is qualified is, I suppose, properly qualified, for I never heard of improper qualifications; but if the word properly be omitted, I have no objection to the amendment.

This motion was agreed to.



HOUSE OF COMMONS, JAN. 24, 1740-1.

[DEBATE ON AN ADDRESS FOR PAPERS RELATING TO ADMIRAL HADDOCK.]

Mr. WALLER this day offered the following motion in writing, That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions that there may be laid before this house copies of two particular letters written by his majesty's secretary of state to admiral Haddock, which had been addressed for before, and of the letters received from admiral Ogle mentioned therein; together with all letters written by admiral Haddock to either of his majesty's secretaries of state, concerning the said letters, and the execution of the orders contained therein.

This motion he supported by arguments to the following effect:—Sir, no man who considers the present situation of our foreign affairs, the expense and inefficacy of our military preparations, the appearance of negligence in our naval expeditions, and the general disappointment of the hopes which the nation had conceived of victories, vengeance, and reparations, can, in my opinion, doubt the expediency of the motion which I have taken the liberty to make.

When the expectations of the nation are deceived, it certainly becomes those who are deputed to watch over the prosperity of the publick, to inquire whence the disappointment proceeds, and either to inform their constituents that their uneasiness arises from their own errour, and that their hopes are destroyed because they had no rational foundation; or to detect the weak management of those by whom the publick measures have been ill-conducted, or the national treasure has been misapplied.

With regard, sir, to the present war, I know not how the nation can be charged with having formed unreasonable expectations. If they considered the speech from the throne, the most authentick declaration of the intentions of the government, they found there the warmest resentments of the injuries which they had sustained, and the strongest assurances of a vigorous prosecution of all those measures which might produce speedy recompense, and inviolable security.

If they reflect, sir, on the preparations for war, on the multitude of ships, the demand of materials for naval equipments, and the high prices at which workmen were retained, they could not but imagine that either some mighty attempt was designed, or some formidable enemy dreaded, and as they know not whom they had to fear, they ascribed the vigour of our proceedings to a resolution of humbling our enemies by one fatal blow, and re-establishing our naval dominion by a single effort.

And justly, sir, might they indulge this pleasing imagination; with reason might they anticipate a triumph over an enemy whose strength bears no proportion to the force that was fitted out against them, and expect that in a few months they should see the ambassadors of Spain supplicating for peace.

To raise their expectations yet higher, their trade was suspended by an embargo, long continued, and in the strictest manner enforced, and the impresses were let loose upon the sailors; they saw nothing omitted, however grievous to the nation, that could contribute to make it formidable, and bore part of the miseries of war without impatience, in hopes of being rewarded by military glory, and repaid by the plunder of Spain.

But, sir, when so long a time has elapsed, and no account is brought of either a victory or a battle, when they hear nothing but that our fleets have visited several neutral ports, and those of the enemy sailed unmolested from coast to coast, and when they are every day told of the losses of our merchants, are insulted in our own channel by the Spanish privateers, and receive no relations of our success upon the shores of our enemies, can it be wondered that they suspect the reality of our designs, or inquire whence it proceeds that their money has been wasted, their trade interrupted, and the liberty of their fellow-subjects invaded to no purpose?

But how much more justly, sir, are they inflamed when they hear of the lucky stratagems, or daring enterprises of those enemies, which a just sense of their own superiority, had induced them to consider as vanquished before the battle, and of whom they had no apprehensions but that their cowardice would always secure them from vengeance? How justly may they murmur when they read, that our fleets leave every part of the enemy's coast where their presence is necessary, and have afforded the Spaniards an opportunity of changing one port for another, as it is most convenient, and at length of joining the French squadrons, and sailing to the defence of their American dominions?

May they not justly, sir, require of their representatives some reason for such inexplicable conduct? May they not reasonably demand an account of the arguments which procured their approbation of measures, which, so far as they can be examined by those who have no opportunity of perusing the necessary papers, appear either cowardly or treacherous?

And what answer, sir, can we return to such remonstrances, unless this motion be agreed to? How can we appease the discontents of our constituents, or discharge the trust reposed in us, without a very minute and attentive inquiry into questions thus obscure and thus important?

Are we to tell our constituents, that we absolutely rely upon the prudence and fidelity of the ministry and admirals, and recommend to them the same implicit dependence? Are we to confess that we have now for two sessions voted in the dark, and approved what we were not suffered to examine and understand?

Such answers, sir, to questions so reasonable, will not contribute to increase the veneration of the people either for ourselves, or our constitution; and yet this answer, and this only, they can receive from us, if the papers mentioned in the motion I have made are denied.

Mr. CLUTTERBUCK replied in the following manner:—Sir, this motion, though so warmly urged, and so artfully supported, I can consider only as a repetition of a former motion which was approved by the assembly, so far as it could properly be complied with, nor was any paper then concealed which it would not have been an injury to the nation to have divulged.

If the design of this motion be to promote the success of the present war, and the zeal with which it has been pressed, be incited only by the ardour of true patriotism, I doubt not but it will easily be withdrawn by those who are now most inclined to support it, when they shall reflect that it tends to the discovery of our schemes, and to the overthrow of our designs, that it will expose all our consultations to our enemies, and instruct them how to annoy us with most success, and how to shelter themselves from our intended attacks.

It is the first care, sir, of every administration, that their military designs should only be discovered by the execution of them, and that their enemies, by being obliged to guard all parts, should be weak in all. If, by laying our papers before this house, the Spaniards should come to be informed against what part of their dominions our expeditions are designed, will they not increase their strength, improve their fortifications, and double their vigilance? And if we are thus obliged to form new schemes, must we not impute the defeat of the former to our own imprudent zeal, or unseasonable curiosity?

Mr. SANDYS spoke to this effect:—Sir, that we should demand the schemes laid for the future conduct of the war with Spain was never proposed, nor, as it may reasonably be concluded, ever imagined; for what is mentioned in the motion but the papers relating to the transactions of the two last years.

That it should be necessary to remind gentlemen of the difference between the future and the past, would hardly be suspected by any man not accustomed to senatorial controversies and artifices of state; and yet in the argument which has been offered against the motion, nothing has been asserted but that the orders relating to past transactions are not to be laid before us, lest the enemy should thereby gain intelligence of what we now design against them.

The necessity of secrecy in war needs not be urged, because it will not be denied; but when designs have been laid, and miscarried, the reasons of that miscarriage may surely be inquired, without danger of betraying the councils of our country.

If the negligence of our councils, and the misconduct of our commanders, has been such, that no designs have been premeditated; if a war has been carried on by chance, and nothing has succeeded, because nothing has been attempted; if our commanders have not done ill, and have only done nothing; if they have avoided loss by avoiding danger; we may surely inquire to whom such proceedings are to be imputed, whether the defeat of our designs is to be charged upon the strength of our enemy, or the cowardice of our officers; or whether the inactivity and apparent neutrality of our forces is occasioned by the negligence of our admirals, or the irresolution of our own ministry.

There have been, sir, many incidents in these two last years, of which the examination can be of very little advantage to the Spaniards. I do not know what pernicious intelligence they can glean from an inquiry into the reasons for which Haddock's fleet was divided, and Ogle sent to the defence of Minorca, or for which he afterwards returned.

Nor can I conceive that any advantage, except that of merriment and diversion, can be thrown into the hands of our enemies, though we should seriously inquire into what no man has yet pretended to understand, the wonderful escape of the Spanish squadron. A transaction on which we had dwelt long enough with that admiration which ignorance produces, and on which it may not be improper at length to enable us to reason.

This is an affair, perhaps, much better understood by our enemies than by ourselves, and surely we cannot, therefore, be afraid of informing them of it; at least since the fleet has long since sailed out, and left their coast, we can hardly be restrained in our inquiries by the fear of discovering our future designs.

If, therefore, it be the incontestable right of the senate to examine the conduct of publick affairs, which I suppose will scarcely be denied, this motion cannot be rejected as unseasonable, nor can the papers be refused, without increasing those suspicions which are already too prevalent throughout the nation.

Nor, indeed, for our own sakes, ought we to delay this inquiry any longer, lest by having long acted without being accountable, the minister should form a prescription against our privilege, and, in time, tell us in plain terms that we are his slaves, and that we are not to presume to carry our examinations, however solemn and important they may continue to appear, farther than he shall be pleased to permit; and that, whatever may be the opinion of the people that deputes us, or, whatever ancient claims we may plead to authority, we are now to consider ourselves only as the oppressors of the nation, and the panegyrists of the court.

Mr. WALPOLE next rose, and spoke to this purpose:—Sir, it cannot be denied to be reasonable that all those papers should be laid before the senate, which can be communicated without injury to the publick. Of this number we may justly imagine the orders sent to the admirals, in which the time of their departure is fixed, and many others which may be of use to inform the house, but cannot enable the enemy to judge either of our force or our designs.

But it is evident, that there must be others included in this motion, which our regard for the success of the war, and the prosperity of our country, ought to determine us to conceal, and such as are never exposed by any administration; it is, therefore, proper to limit the address to papers of a certain kind, or a certain date, which may be considered by the house without benefit to our enemies, and for the examination of which a day or two will be more than sufficient.

Mr. PULTENEY spoke in substance as follows:—Sir, I know not what number of papers the wisdom of the administration will allow us, but, if we judge by the time proposed to be spent in examination, we shall not be distracted with a great diversity of subjects; intelligence will be very penuriously dealt out, and if we submit to their choice of the writings which shall be laid before us, our inquiry will probably end without any discoveries made either by our enemies or ourselves.

But I hope, sir, we shall not be so cheaply satisfied, nor exposed by the fear of one enemy, to the insolence of another. I hope we shall resolutely continue our demands of information, while a single line is concealed, from which any light can be expected.

There may, indeed, be circumstances in which our demands, however loud, will necessarily be vain. It is not impossible that we may suspect those transactions of deep art, and secret contrivance, which have been the consequences of mere indolence, and want of consideration. Our great ministers have been, perhaps, only doing nothing, while we have imagined that they were working out of sight.

Misled, sir, by this notion, we may call for the orders that have been despatched in these two last years, when, perhaps, our secretaries of state have been fattening on their salaries without employment, and have slept without care, and without curiosity, while we have been congratulating ourselves upon their vigilance for our preservation.

Or if orders have been given, it is to be considered, that the end of inspecting orders is to compare them with the conduct of the admirals to whom they were directed: from this comparison, I doubt not but many gentlemen expect uncommon discoveries; but to check all unreasonable hopes before they have taken possession of their hearts, for unreasonable hopes are the parent of disappointment, I think it proper to remind them, that to draw any conclusions from the orders, it is necessary to understand them.

This consideration alone is sufficient to redress the ardour of inquiry, for every man that has had opportunities of knowing the wonderful accomplishments of our ministry, the depth of their designs, the subtilty of their stratagems, and the closeness of their reasoning, will easily conceive it probable that they might send such orders as none but themselves could understand; and what then will be the consequence of our idle curiosity, but that we be led into a labyrinth of endless conjectures? For we have long ago found that no explanations are to be expected, and that our ministry are too wise to discover their secrets to their enemies.

Let us, therefore, examine the naked facts which have fallen within our observation, and endeavour to inform ourselves of the meaning of these secret orders by the execution of them.

Admiral Ogle was despatched from Haddock's fleet to protect Minorca, and, in his absence, the Spanish squadron sailed away. Perhaps he was ordered to watch Ferrol and Minorca at the same time, and not understanding how that was to be done, neglected one part of his charge, by an attention to the other: as a watchman who should be employed to guard at once the bank in London, and the treasury in Westminster.

Admiral NORRIS, sir, sailed lately forth, I suppose, in pursuance of orders, with a very formidable fleet, and after having lost sight for some days of the British coast, sailed back again with great precipitation. Whether his orders were only to sail forth, or whether, when he examined them farther, he could not understand them, I pretend not to determine; but it may reasonably be imagined that his orders were of the same kind with those of our other admirals, because they produced the same consequences.

I have been told, that formerly our commanders were ordered to burn, sink, and destroy; and that in those times it was not uncommon for a British admiral to do much mischief with a strong fleet; but it is evident that the style is since changed, for our admirals are now very inoffensive, and go out only to come back. I, therefore, think the motion highly necessary, and such as ought to be complied with.

Admiral NORRIS here rose up, and spoke thus:—Sir, I am not conscious that my conduct in any part of my life has exposed me to be justly treated with contempt and ridicule, and what I have not deserved I will not bear.

If any gentleman in this house can accuse me of having neglected my duty, or deserted it, let him not spare insults or invectives, let him now expose my cowardice or my carelessness, let him prove me unworthy of trust or of command.

But my own conscience acquits me, and I defy any man to produce and support his accusation; nor can you, sir, [Footnote: Addressing himself to Mr. PULTENEY.] who have thus contemptuously treated me, allege any thing against me that may justify your neglect of decency: that you have transgressed the rules of decency is the softest censure that your behaviour admits, and I think it may with equal propriety be asserted, that you have broken the laws of justice.

Mr. PULTENEY replied in this manner:—Sir, I shall submit to you and all who hear me, whether I have treated the honourable gentleman's name with any contemptuous freedom of speech. The usual method of mentioning an expedition is that of naming the commander, who is not thereby necessarily included in the censure of an unsuccessful attempt, and I am very far from calling his courage and capacity into question.

Not that I shall ever think it necessary to make an apology for expressing my sentiments with freedom as a member of this house, in which I shall always speak what I think, and in what manner it shall appear to me most proper, nor shall I fear to repeat without doors what I say here.

Sir Robert WALPOLE next rose up, and spoke to this purpose:—Sir, as I am not acquainted with any measures pursued by the administration, which it is their particular interest to conceal, I am desirous that all papers should be laid before the house which will not afford our enemies any opportunity of obviating our designs.

What necessity there is for this address I cannot, indeed, discover, because I know not any foundation for suspicion of either negligence or treachery, which have been both insinuated in this debate.

Nor are the ministry, however ludicrously their abilities have been treated, afraid of discovering their ignorance, by laying before the house the orders which they have given to our admirals; orders of which they are far from doubting that they will appear, upon a candid examination, rational and proper.

The chief objection to this motion arises from its unreasonableness, and the necessity which it will produce of assigning to a fruitless inquiry those hours that may be more usefully employed.

Mr. PITT replied in terms to the effect following:—Sir, it is my opinion, that our time cannot be more usefully employed during a war, than in examining how it has been conducted, and settling the degree of confidence that may be reposed in those to whose care are intrusted our reputations, our fortunes, and our lives.

There is not any inquiry, sir, of more importance than this; it is not a question about an uncertain privilege, or a law, which, if found inconvenient, may hereafter be repealed; we are now to examine whether it is probable that we shall preserve our commerce and our independence, or whether we are sinking into subjection to a foreign power.

But this inquiry, sir, will produce no great information, if those, whose conduct is examined, are allowed to select the evidence. For what accounts will they exhibit but such as have often already been laid before us, and such as they now offer without concern: accounts obscure and fallacious, imperfect and confused, from which nothing can be learned, and which can never entitle the minister to praise, though they may screen him from punishment.

Mr. PELHAM spoke as follows:—Sir, I am confident that no man engaged in the administration desires to be screened from the most rigorous inquiry, or would defer to exhibit the papers a moment for any other reason than his regard for the publick.

I am confident, that nothing could so much contribute to advance the particular and distinct interest of the ministry as the publication of all the writings that relate to the present war, by which it would incontestably appear that nothing has been omitted that could promote our success, that our commanders have been sent out with orders to act with the utmost vigour, and that our preparations have been not disproportioned to the importance of our design.

It will appear that no former ministry have given greater proofs of their zeal for the publick interest, or have more steadily pursued the most proper measures by which it might be advanced.

I am not, indeed, certain that those who now call so loudly for information would be prevailed on by any degree of evidence to suspend their censures. Them, who are now dissatisfied, I shall despair of influencing by reason or testimony; for they seem to inquire only to condemn; nor is this motion, perhaps, made so much for the sake of obtaining information, as of harassing the ministry with delays, and suspending affairs of greater importance.

This motion was agreed to, and upon another motion made by Mr. SANDYS, it was resolved,

"That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there may be laid before this house a copy of the reasons sent by admiral Cavendish, in pursuance of an order from the commissioners of the admiralty, which had retarded the sailing of admiral Ogle's squadron, so much beyond expectation."

Likewise,

"That an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there may be laid before this house a copy of the reasons transmitted by admiral Ogle, that did prevent him from sailing, pursuant to his repeated orders for that purpose, and particularly to those sent him by the commissioners of the admiralty."



HOUSE OF COMMONS, FEB. 3, 1740-1.

[DEBATE REGARDING THE DEPARTURE OF THE FRENCH AND SPANISH SQUADRONS.]

Mr. SANDYS this day presented a motion in writing, for petitioning his majesty to inform them when the regency received intelligence that the French and Spanish squadrons sailed, which was seconded, as follows, by Mr. WALLER:—

Sir, the information now moved for, appears to me so necessary in their deliberations on the conduct of the war, that without it we can only conjecture in the dark, and entangle ourselves in an inextricable labyrinth.

It is well known, that in war all motions are, in a great degree, to be regulated by those of the enemy, and that, therefore, no vigilance is to be spared by which any knowledge can be gained of their designs, nor any methods omitted of communicating them to those who have the direction of the war.

A ministry may, in conducting military operations, disappoint the expectations of their country, either by neglecting to procure intelligence, or by failing to make use of those opportunities which seasonable information puts into their power, and they may, when their designs fail of success, justify themselves, by proving that they were deceived by intelligence which it was reasonable to believe, or that better intelligence was not attainable, or that they made use, however unsuccessfully, of all the forces that could then be employed, and of all the advantages that were then in their possession.

But how shall we judge of our administration, how shall we know what confidence we ought to repose in their prudence and fidelity, and what miscarriages are to be attributed to the chance of war or superiour force of our enemies, if we cannot be informed with what diligence they endeavour at information, and how early they have notice of the motions of the enemy?

The sailing, or rather escape of the Ferrol squadron, and departure of the French fleet, are the most important events of the present war; events that threaten very dangerous consequences, no less than descents upon our American colonies, the conquest of our dominions, the slavery of our fellow-subjects, and perhaps the destruction of the brave Vernon, who is secure in the imagined vigilance of the other commanders, and may, perhaps, in a few days see himself surrounded by formidable squadrons of different nations, and exposed to the attack of forces to which his little fleet bears no proportion.

Nothing appears more evident, than that we had opportunities of observing, at least, all the preparations of the French, and of watching the moment of their departure, and that our force on the coast of Spain was sufficient to have confined their fleets for ever in their harbours, or to have destroyed them at their first entrance into the open seas, of which we may justly inquire, why it was not attempted, but shall inquire to no purpose till we know when they departed, that we may consider the state of our own forces, and whether our enemies escaped by our negligence, cowardice, or weakness.

Mr. WINNINGTON then spoke to the following purpose:—Sir, that we cannot deliberate upon subjects which we do not understand, and that, therefore, no necessary or useful information ought to be denied to the house, I shall readily admit; but must observe, at the same time, that the reputation of the house would be very little consulted, in demanding information which cannot be given.

To address his majesty to inform us of the time at which the squadrons of our enemies sailed, is to inquire of him what it ought to be the highest care of those princes to conceal from him, and which he can only know by having spies in their privy councils.

And of what importance is it to inquire what intelligence was brought him, or when he received it, if it appears that his intelligence must be in its own nature uncertain and dubitable?

That they have left their ports is now certain, because they have been twice discovered in different parts of the world; but, as we can now only form conjectures on their designs and courses, so, before they sailed, it was impossible to know when they were fully equipped, or what time was fixed for their departure. It is to be remembered, that they form their measures, and make their preparations in their own dominions, and therefore, have more advantages of concealing their schemes than we of discovering them.

Mr. Advocate CAMPBELL then spoke thus:—Sir, this motion, which has been represented as unreasonable and absurd, is, in my opinion, not only proper, but important.

It is important, because it will enable us to judge, upon sufficient foundations, of the conduct of the ministry, who are censured by the voice of the nation, for having been either defective in vigilance or in activity, for having been either ignorant by their own fault of the designs of the enemy, or perfidiously passive in permitting the execution of them.

I am far from believing that such intelligence as our ministry is expected to procure, requires any uncommon subtilty, or any other agents than are always employed by every minister, to transmit to them informations from foreign courts. Such, I am afraid, are always hovering about our consultations, and I know not why our ministers should be less diligent or less successful than those of other princes.

If, therefore, such intelligence might have been obtained, it was criminal not to obtain it; and if the departure of the Spanish squadron was foreseen, it ought to be inquired, why it was not prevented; and if it was only known when it was too late to hinder it from sailing, why it was not pursued, or why succours were not immediately despatched to admiral Vernon.

All these questions can only be resolved, in consequence of the information which his majesty shall give us; and for which it is, therefore, in my opinion, necessary to petition.

Mr. Henry PELHAM spoke next, to this purpose:—Sir, how the regency could be informed of the intention of the Spaniards to leave their ports till it appeared by their departure, or by what means it can be expected that his majesty should be now acquainted with their particular course, or farther designs, I confess myself unable to conceive.

With regard, sir, to the intelligence transmitted from foreign courts by agents and spies, a little consideration will easily discover that it is not to be trusted. For what can be generally expected from them, but that they should catch flying reports, or by chance intercept uncertain whispers, that they should inquire timorously, and, therefore, for the greatest part, of those from whom no satisfactory accounts can be received, and that they should often endeavour to deserve their salaries by such information as is rather pleasing than true.

All the knowledge that can be obtained of an enemy's designs, must arise from a diligent comparison of one circumstance with another, and from a general view of his force, his interest, and his opportunities. And that such conjectures will be often erroneous, needs not be told.

Probability, therefore, is, in such inquiries, all that can be attained, and he that sits idle in the time of war, expecting certain intelligence, will see his enemies enjoying the advantages of his folly, and laying hold on a thousand opportunities which he has neglected to improve.

The war in which we are now engaged, has been carried on by the administration with the utmost diligence and vigour; nor have any measures been omitted that could probably produce success, and the success of the wisest measures is only probable.

Should the great admiral, who is now present in the house, have met the French and Spaniards in the open seas, by what art could he arrive at a certain knowledge of their designs? He might by his acquaintance with the situation and state of neighbouring countries, the observation of their course, the periods of particular winds, and other hints of observation, form probable conjectures, but could never reach to certainty or confidence.

It seems to me, therefore, highly improper, to petition his majesty for intelligence which he cannot be imagined to have received, and I cannot agree to any motion for that purpose.

Mr. SANDYS then made another motion, to address his majesty, that there may be laid before the house copies of all letters received from, or written to, admiral Vernon since his going to the West Indies. Which being seconded,

Mr. PELHAM spoke to this effect:—Sir, this motion, if the intention of it be limited by proper restrictions, is doubtless reasonable and just; for the right of this house to examine into the conduct of publick affairs, and, consequently, for calling for the papers necessary to enlighten their inquiries, is not to be disputed.

But, as the end of all such inquiries is the promotion of the publick welfare, so they are not to be made in a manner by which that end may be defeated. Papers are not to be demanded, which cannot be produced without discovering our own secrets, and acquainting our enemies either with that weakness which we ought carefully to conceal, or that force which will be most effectually employed if it is not known, and, therefore, no preparations are made to oppose it.

It cannot be imagined, but that many of the papers which have passed between the admiralty and the commander in America, contain plans for the prosecution of the war, observations on the conditions of our own colonies, and, perhaps, intelligence of the estate of the Spanish fortresses and towns. Many informations of the utmost consequence to our enemies may be collected from those papers, but nothing can be expected from them, that will enable us to prosecute a senatorial inquiry with more success, that will put it in our power to discover frauds, negligence, or treachery.

There are, sir, other papers which may, indeed, be laid before us, without any benefit to our enemies, and, perhaps, with some advantage to ourselves; the papers which contain the accompts of our preparations and stores, the lists of our forces, and the calculation of our expenses, are the proper subjects of senatorial inquiries; and if the motion be restrained to those, I believe it will not be opposed by any gentleman engaged in the administration of our affairs. I shall beg leave to propose these words may be added, "So far as the same relates to a supply of ships, marines, or land forces."

The motion, thus amended, was agreed to.



HOUSE OF LORDS, FEB. 13, 1740-1.

DEBATE ON ADDRESSING HIS MAJESTY FOR REMOVING SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

The opposition which for a long time had been made in the commons, to the measures of the administration, was on this day pushed to a crisis, and produced a motion in both houses. In the house of lords it occasioned the following debate:

Lord CARTERET began in this manner:—My lords, as the motion which I am about to make is of the highest importance, and of the most extensive consequences; as it cannot but meet with all the opposition which the prejudices of some, and the interest of others, can raise against it; as it must have the whole force of ministerial influence to encounter, without any assistance but from justice and reason; I hope to be excused by your lordships for spending some time in endeavouring to show, that it wants no other support, that it is not founded upon doubtful suspicions, but upon uncontestable facts; that it is not dictated by private interest, but by the sincerest regard to publick happiness; not abetted by the personal malevolence of particular men, but enforced by the voice of the people; a voice which ought always to be attended to, and, generally, to be obeyed.

To endeavour, my lords, to remove from places of publick trust all those who appear to want either the virtues or abilities necessary for executing their offices, is the interest of every member of a community. And it is not only the interest but the duty of all those who are, either by the choice of the people, or by the right of birth, invested with the power of inspecting publick affairs, and intrusted with the general happiness of their country. That, therefore, every motive combines to make it the duty, and every argument concurs to prove it the privilege of your lordships, is too evident to be doubted.

How often this privilege has been exerted by this house, and how often it has rescued our country from oppression, insolence, and rapine; how often our constitution has been reanimated, and impending ruin been averted by it, a superficial acquaintance with history may inform us. And we are now called upon by the universal cry of the nation, and urged by the perplexed and uncertain state of our foreign affairs, and declension of our wealth, and attacks upon our liberties at home, to recollect these precedents of magnanimity and justice, and to make another effort for the relief of our country.

This house, my lords, has proceeded against ministers, whose conduct they disapproved, by methods of greater or less severity, according to the necessity of affairs, or the supposed malignity of the crimes alleged against them; and, therefore, have sometimes thought it necessary to deter posterity from imitating them by rigorous censures, and exemplary punishments, and sometimes have thought it sufficient to set the nation free from its distresses, without inflicting any penalties on those by whose misconduct they imagined them produced.

What were the more violent and vindictive methods of proceeding, it is not necessary, with regard to this motion, to examine; since I shall only propose, that we should, in imitation of our predecessors, in cases of this nature, humbly address his majesty to remove the minister from his presence and councils.

Nothing, my lords, can be more moderate or tender than such an address, by which no punishment is inflicted, nor any forfeiture exacted. The minister, if he be innocent, if his misconduct be only the consequence of his ignorance or incapacity, may lay down in peace an office for which nature has not designed him, enjoy the vast profits of long employment in tranquillity, and escape the resentment of an unhappy people; who, when irritated to the highest degree, by a continuation of the same miscarriages, may, perhaps, in the heat of a more malevolent prosecution, not sufficiently distinguish between inability and guilt.

Those, therefore, among your lordships, that think him honest but mistaken, must willingly agree to a motion like this, as the best expedient to appease the people without the ruin of the minister. For surely no man who has read the history, or is acquainted with the temper of this nation, can expect that the people will always bear to see honours, favours, and preferments, distributed by the direction of one universally suspected of corruption, and arbitrary measures; or will look only with silent envy upon the affluence of those whom they believe to be made great by fraud and plunder, swelled to insolence by the prosperity of guilt, and advanced to wealth and luxury by publick miseries.

Such of your lordships who join with the people in ascribing our present unhappy state not to the errours, but to the crimes of the minister, and who, therefore, think a bare removal not sufficient to satisfy the demands of justice, must, doubtless, give their consent to the motion, for the sake of obtaining proper evidence of his wickedness, which cannot be expected while he stands exalted in prosperity, and distributes the riches of the nation, and the gifts of his sovereign at his own choice; while he is in possession of every motive that can influence the mind, enforce secrecy, and confirm fidelity; while he can bribe the avaricious, and intimidate the fearful; while he can increase the gratification of luxury, and enlarge the prospects of ambition. For, my lords, if it be considered from whom this evidence must be drawn, it will soon appear that no very important discoveries can be made, but by those whom he has intrusted with his secrets, men whose disregard of virtue recommended them to his favour, and who, as they are moved only by interest, will continue faithful while they can hope for recompense; but may, perhaps, be willing to buy their own security by sacrificing their master, when they shall see no farther prospect of advantage from serving him, or any other method of escaping punishment.

But, my lords, all must allow this motion to be reasonable, whatever they think of the minister's conduct, who are of opinion that a free people have a right of complaining when they feel oppression, and of addressing the crown to remove a minister that has incurred their universal detestation. That such is the condition of the present minister, I believe, will scarcely be denied, or may be discovered by those who find themselves inclined to doubt it, by asking any man whom they shall accidentally meet, what are his sentiments on the situation of national affairs, and of the hands by which they are administered. What answer he will receive is well known to most of your lordships. Let him not be satisfied with a single suffrage, let him repeat the question to ten thousand persons, different in their ages, their conditions, and religious opinions, in every thing that produces contrariety of dispositions and affections, he will yet find them unanimous in complaining of publick misconduct, and in censuring one gentleman as the author of it.

Let us not imagine, my lords, that these accusations and murmurs are confined to the lowest class of the people, to men whose constant attention to more immediate distresses, hinder them from making excursions beyond their own employments. For though, perhaps, it might be made evident from the accounts of past times, that no general dissatisfaction, even among men of this rank, was ever groundless; though it might be urged that those who see little can only clamour, because they feel themselves oppressed; and though it might not unseasonably be hinted that they are at least formidable for their numbers, and have, sometimes, executed that justice which they had not interest to procure, and trampled upon that insolence that has dared to defy them; yet I shall not insist upon such motives, because it is notorious that discontent is epidemical in all ranks, and that condition and observation are far from appeasing it.

Whether the discontent, thus general, is groundless, whether it is raised only by the false insinuations of the disappointed, and the wicked arts of the envious, whether it is, in exception to all the maxims of government, the first dislike of an administration that ever overspread a nation without just reasons, deserves to be inquired into.

In this inquiry, my lords, it will be necessary to consider not only the state of domestick affairs, increase or diminution of our debts, the security or violation of our liberties, the freedom or dependence of our senates, and the prosperity or declension of our trade, but to examine the state of this nation, with regard to foreign powers; to inquire, whether we are equally feared and equally trusted now as in former administrations; whether our alliances have contributed to secure us from our inveterate and habitual enemies, or to expose us to them; whether the balance of Europe be still in our hands; and whether, during this long interval of peace, our power has increased in the same proportion with that of our neighbours. France, my lords, is the constant and hereditary enemy of Britons, so much divided from her in religion, government, and interest, that they cannot both be prosperous together; as the influence of one rises, that of the other must, by consequence, decline. Alliances may form a temporal show of friendship, but it cannot continue; for their situation produces a natural rivalship, which every accidental circumstance has contributed to increase. Long wars, for many reigns after the conquest, established a radical and insuperable hatred between us, nor did those wars cease till the reformation produced new occasions of jealousy and aversion. France was, by these reasons, obliged for many ages to employ all her influence and policy in strengthening herself against us, by treaties and alliances; and in our times, has given us a new reason for jealousy by extending her commerce, and improving her manufactures.

It has been, therefore, my lords, the settled principle of every wise administration, of every Briton, whose opinions were not regulated by some other motives than those of reason, to attend, with the highest degree of vigilance, to all the designs of the French, and oppose, with incessant diligence, every attempt to increase their force, or extend their influence, and to check their conquests, obstruct their alliances, and forestal their trade.

For this great end it has been our constant endeavour to support the Austrian family, whose large dominions and numerous forces make a counterbalance on the continent to the power of France. For this end we entered into a long war, of which we still languish under the consequences, squandered the lives of our countrymen, and mortgaged the possessions of our posterity. For failing in the prosecution of this purpose, for leaving France too formidable, and neglecting the interests of the emperour, was the treaty of Utrecht censured, and the authors of it prosecuted by the present minister; but how much he has improved the errours of his predecessors to his own advantage, how diligent he has been to rectify the miscarriages of their conduct, and supply the defect, I shall endeavour to explain.

It is well known, my lords, that during the regency of the duke of Orleans, we had nothing to apprehend from French machinations; his interest, a tie which that nation is seldom found to break, held him steady to his engagements with us; nor is it less known how much he distrusted Spain, and how little, by consequence, he favoured her. We had, at that time, no necessity of anxiously attending to every whisper of the French court, which was sufficiently engaged in regulating their domestick affairs, and repairing the ruins of a destructive war; but, my lords, we ought to observe, that it had been happy for us had our minister laboured with equal address at the same employment.

After the death of this duke, the affairs of France were restored to their former situation, her old schemes were revived, her ancient alliances cultivated, and her general interest pursued. Spain was again considered as the power which had the same views with her, and which could never rival, but might always assist her.

This alliance, my lords, was intended to have been unalterably confirmed by a marriage, but as no human policy can form measures certain of success, an irreconcilable hatred was nearly produced by the measure intended to confirm a settled and indissoluble friendship. The infanta was sent back after her arrival in France, an affront which no nation would soon have forgot, but which the general character and habitual sentiments of the Spaniards inclined them to resent beyond any other people. To any one acquainted with their character in this respect, it will readily appear, that no other insult or injury could so sensibly affect them, or excite so eager a desire of revenge, This, my lords, the sagacity of our minister should have discovered, this opportunity should have been improved with the utmost care, by which Spain and France might possibly have been disunited for ages, and Britain have gained such advantages as would have made her the sole arbitress of Europe.

The Spaniards were not deficient on their side, nor did they neglect to court our friendship, but gave us the highest proof of their confidence by offering us the sole mediation of their differences with the emperour of Germany: but at this time it was, that the gentleman whose conduct I am examining, obtained the chief influence in our councils, and by his peculiar penetration discovered, that nothing was to be done which might give the least offence to the French. We, therefore, refused to mediate, unless French ministers might be associated with ours, which the Spaniards had too much spirit to consent to.

Thus, my lords, was neglected the first opportunity of forming against the French an alliance by which they might have been awed in all their designs, and by which the peace of Europe might have been long preserved.

The Spaniards, finding that we would not undertake to reconcile their differences with the emperour of Germany, and continuing their abhorrence of French mediators, concluded, without the intervention of any other power, a treaty both of peace and alliance with his imperial majesty.

This, my lords, was the famous treaty of Vienna, the source of so many projects and expedients, of so much terrour and solicitude, of such immense expenses, and perplexed negotiations. This treaty, a paper innocent and well-meaning, which related only to the contracting parties, kept, for some time, this nation in alarms, in apprehensions of conspiracies, and expectations of invasions.

To this treaty, had we singly regarded our own affairs, without applying to France for instructions, we ought to have acceded, by which we should have divided the interest of the house of Bourbon, broken the combination of these pontifical powers, and, by improving one lucky incident, obtained what our arms and our politicks had never, hitherto, been able to accomplish.

But the French, sensible of their danger, and well acquainted with our minister, contrived an expedient which, indeed, would not often have succeeded, but which was so well adapted to the intellects of this gentleman, that it extricated them from all their difficulties.

They told us, my lords, and, what is yet more wonderful, they prevailed upon us to believe, that in this dreadful treaty of Vienna, it was stipulated between the German emperour and Spain, that they should employ their joint forces against Britain, that they should exalt the pretender to the throne, take immediate possession of Gibraltar, and, without mercy, debar us for ever from our trade both in Spain and in the Western Indies. This his late majesty was advised to assert in his speech from the throne, which I desire may be read.

Of which the following clauses were read:

"My lords and gentlemen,

"The distressed condition of some of our religious brethren abroad, and the negotiations and engagements entered into by some foreign powers, which seem to have laid the foundation of new troubles and disturbances in Europe, and to threaten my subjects with the loss of several of the most advantageous branches of their trade, obliged me, without any loss of time, to concert with other powers such measures as might give a check to the ambitious views of those who are endeavouring to render themselves formidable, and put a stop to the farther progress of such dangerous designs. For these ends I have entered into a defensive alliance with the French king, and the king of Prussia, to which several other powers, and particularly the Dutch, have been invited to accede, and I have not the least reason to doubt of their concurrence. This treaty shall, in a short time, be laid before you.

"By these means, and by your support and assistance, I trust in God, I shall be able not only to secure to my own subjects the enjoyment of many valuable rights and privileges, long since acquired for them by the most solemn treaties, but effectually to preserve the peace and balance of Europe, the only view and end of all my endeavours.

"It is not to be doubted, but the enemies to my government will conceive hopes, that some favourable opportunity for renewing their attempts may offer, from the prospect of new troubles and commotions: they are already very busy by their instruments and emissaries in those courts whose measures seem most to favour their purposes, in soliciting and promoting the cause of the pretender; but I persuade myself, notwithstanding the countenance and encouragement they may have received, or flatter themselves with, the provision you shall make for the safety and defence of the empire, will effectually secure me from any attempts from abroad, and render all such projects vain and abortive.

"When the world shall see that you will not suffer the British crown and nation to be menaced and insulted, those who most envy the present happiness and tranquillity of this empire, and are endeavouring to make us subservient to their ambition, will consider their own interest and circumstances before they make any attempt upon so brave a people, strengthened and supported by prudent and powerful alliances, and though desirous to preserve the peace, able and ready to defend themselves against the efforts of all aggressors. Such resolutions and such measures, timely taken, I am satisfied, are the most effectual means of preventing a war, and continuing to us the blessings of peace and prosperity."

Who would not have been terrified, my lords, at a treaty like this? Our religion was to be destroyed, our government subverted, and our trade reduced to nothing. What could a ministry, thus intimidated, do, but resign themselves implicitly to the direction of a kind neighbour, that promised to shelter them from the storm?

There have been ministers, my lords, in former times, who, upon hearing such a representation, would have considered, that Britain was an island, that the pretender could not be forced upon us without an army, and that an army could not be transported without ships, that the emperour of Germany had neither navies nor ports, that Gibraltar might be easily supplied with every thing requisite for its defence, and that any attempt made by Spain to injure our trade, might easily be punished by intercepting their Plate fleets.

They would then have considered whether attempts so improbable, and stipulations so absurd and ridiculous, ought to be credited upon the information of an ambassadour's secretary, who, as he proposed to reveal his master's secrets for a bribe, might as probably take another reward for imposing upon those whom he pretended to inform. Those, therefore, who advised his majesty to assert to the senate what they knew from no better authority, those whose daring insolence could make their sovereign instrumental in alarming the people with false terrours, and oppressing them with unnecessary burdens, well deserve to feel a senatorial censure.

But our ministers, my lords, were too much frighted to make such reflections: they imagined that destruction was hanging over us, and, in a dread of arbitrary government, oppression, and persecution, concluded at Hanover a treaty with the French.

Thus the French gained our confidence, and raised in us a distrust of both the powers with whom it was our interest to be united: but the alliance of the emperour of Germany with Spain made them still uneasy; and, therefore, they determined, once more, to make our credulity instrumental in procuring a reconciliation between them and the Spaniards.

To effect this, they kindly gave us intelligence, that when the Spaniards should receive their treasures from the Western Indies, they designed to employ it in favour of the pretender, and that, therefore, it was necessary to intercept it. This advice was thankfully listened to, a fleet was fitted out, and thousands were sacrificed without any advantage; for the French not only forbore to assist us in the expedition, but forbade us to seize the treasure when we had found it.

The Spaniards, apprehending themselves attacked, omitted no opportunity of showing their resentment; they seized our ships, and laid siege to Gibraltar, while our new allies looked quietly on, and expected the event of their own scheme, which was far from being defeated by our policy; for the Spaniards, finding the return of their American revenues insuperably obstructed, and knowing that the emperour of Germany, that emperour who was to invade Britain, had not any power even to assist them, were obliged to have recourse to the nation which they then hated, and to forgive the past affront, that they might obtain their good offices in this exigence.

But, my lords, it was not sufficient for the designs of the French, that they had recovered their ancient allies the Spaniards, unless they could disunite them from the emperour of Germany: this it was, likewise, our interest to prevent, and yet this, likewise, we enabled them to effect; for they prevailed upon us to promise, in our stipulations with the Spaniards, what they had not the least claim to demand, that Spain, instead of neutral troops, should be introduced into Italy, to secure certain successions there to a son of the queen of Spain.

With what reluctance the emperour of Germany would consent to see troops placed in the provinces bordering upon his dominions, which would certainly, on the first occasion, be employed to invade them, it was easy to foresee, and with what degree of good-will he would regard those by whom they were introduced; yet, my lords, such was the influence of France, and so ardent our desire of diverting Spain from setting the pretender upon the throne of Britain, that we complied at all events, without any prospect or promise of advantage.

Thus were the Spaniards, by being persuaded to make this demand, and we, by granting it, brought equally to ill terms with the emperour of Germany; and France was, by procuring such agreeable conditions to the Spaniards, again considered as their most useful ally.

That nation, my lords, is in a very unhappy state, which is reduced to admit such terms as mediators are pleased to prescribe. We durst not refuse the introduction of Spanish troops, nor durst we introduce them without the emperour of Germany's consent, which, however, he granted at an easy rate, for he demanded only that we should become guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction. This we gladly agreed to, and thought ourselves so happy in purchasing, so cheaply, an opportunity of ingratiating ourselves with Spain, that we desired no other recompense.

This treaty with the emperour of Germany, was, however, by no means improper, nor could we, after the errours which had been committed, do any thing more effectual to preserve the balance of Europe, and reestablish our credit.

But, my lords, this only treaty, which it was for our interest to make, seems to have been made without any intention of observing it; for about this time all the northern powers were alarmed by the approaching election of Poland, and every nation that had any thing either to hope or fear from the event of it, endeavoured to influence it.

How this election was determined, my lords, and by what means, it is unnecessary to relate; but it may not be improper to remark, that whatever cause we may have to congratulate ourselves upon the choice, it does not appear that we had any part in promoting it. Nay, as it is not common for ministers to keep the best part of their conduct secret, there is reason for suspecting that they were not altogether without foundation reported to have favoured France.

The emperour of Germany, sensible of his own interest, promoted the election with vigour and resolution, proportioned to the greatness of the danger that might have arisen from neglecting it. By this conduct he drew upon himself the resentment of the French, who had now a pretence for taking measures which might effectually reunite them to Spain, and, as the event showed, alienate us from the emperour, and, therefore, in vindication of the claim of Stanislaus, declared war upon Germany, in conjunction with Spain.

Now, my lords, the emperour learned to set the true value upon his alliance with Britain, and all Europe had an opportunity of remarking our spirit, our power, and our vigilance. The troops which we prevailed upon his imperial majesty to admit into Italy, were now drawn out of the garrisons against him, his dominions were attacked on each side, by formidable enemies, and his British allies looked with tranquillity and unconcern upon the difficulties into which they had betrayed him. The liberties of Europe were endangered by a new combination of the houses of Bourbon; and Britain, the great protectress of the rights of mankind, the great arbitress of the balance of power, either neglected or feared to interpose.

Of the event of the war, my lords, I need only observe, that it added new strength to France, and contributed to such an union between her and Spain, as the most artful politician cannot hope to dissolve.

Thus, my lords, whether by negligence, ignorance, cowardice, or treachery, it is not easy to determine, we were made the instruments of the French policy. Thus was that power enabled by our assistance to retrieve all that she had lost by the ill success of her arms, and by her indecent and contemptuous treatment of Spain. Thus was the German emperour dispirited and weakened; thus were we deprived at once of our allies and our reputation.

Our loss of reputation, the greatest loss that bad measures can bring upon a nation, is made evident beyond controversy, by the insolence with which the Spaniards have treated us while we were flattering, enriching, and supporting them. While we were fitting out squadrons to convey their princes to Italy, and increasing their dominions at our own expense, they seem to have considered our good offices, not as the benefits of friends, but the drudgery of slaves, and, therefore, could scarcely refrain from insults while they employed us, at least when they no longer wanted our immediate assistance. They renewed their contempt and cruelty, their robberies and oppressions; they prescribed laws to our navigation, and laid claim to our colonies.

To these ravages and injuries what did we oppose? What but humble intreaties, pacifick negotiations, and idle remonstrances? Instead of asserting our just claims, and incontestable possessions, instead of preventing war by threatening it, and securing ourselves from a second injury by punishing the first, we amused ourselves with inquiries, demands, representations, and disputes, till we became the jest of that nation which it was in our power to distress, by intercepting their treasure, and to reduce to terms almost without bloodshed.

Thus, my lords, did we proceed, new questions ever arose, and the controversy became more intricate; commissaries were despatched to Spain, who returned without obtaining either restitution or security, and in the mean time no opportunity was neglected of plundering our merchants, and insulting our flag: accounts of new confiscations and of new cruelties daily arrived, the nation was enraged, and the senate itself alarmed, and our ministers, at length awakened from their tranquillity, sent orders to the envoy at the Spanish court to expedite an accommodation; these directions were immediately obeyed, and produced the celebrated convention.

What was given up, or what was endangered by this detestable treaty, your lordships have often had occasion to observe, and the consequences of it were so obvious, that the nation was astonished. Every man saw that we were either treacherously betrayed by our own ministry, or that the ministers were almost the only men in the kingdom utterly unacquainted with our claims, our injuries, and our danger.

A war could now no longer be avoided, it was not in the power of the ministry any longer to refuse to send out our fleets, and make an appearance of hostile measures; but they had still some expedients remaining to shelter the Spaniards from our resentment, and to make their country yet more contemptible: they could contrive such orders for their admirals as should prevent them from destroying their enemies with too little mercy; and if any one was suspected of intentions less pacifick, there were methods of equipping his fleet in such a manner as would effectually frustrate his schemes of revenge, reprisals, and destruction.

These, my lords, are not the murmurs of the disappointed, nor the insinuations of the factious; it is well known to our countrymen and to our enemies, how ill admiral Vernon was furnished with naval and military stores, and how little his importunate demands of a supply were regarded. What opportunities were lost, and what advantages neglected, may be conjectured from the success of his inconsiderable force. A very little reflection on the situation and state of those countries will easily satisfy your lordships, how far a small body of land-forces might have penetrated, what treasures they might have gained, and what consternation they might have spread over the whole Spanish America.

That our squadrons in the Mediterranean have been, at least, useless, that they have sailed from point to point, and from one coast to another, only to display the bulk of our ships, and to show the opulence of our nation, can require no proof: I wish, my lords, there was less reason for suspecting that they acted in concert with our enemies, that they retired from before their ports only to give them an opportunity of escaping, and that they, in reality, connived at some attempts which they were, in appearance, sent to prevent.

There are some miscarriages in war, my lords, which every reasonable man imputes to chance, or to causes of which the influence could not be foreseen; there are others that may justly be termed the consequences of misconduct, but of misconduct involuntary and pardonable, of a disregard, perhaps, of some circumstances of an affair produced by too close an attention to others. But there are miscarriages, too, for which candour itself can find no excuses, and of which no other causes can be assigned than cowardice or treachery. From the suspicion of one, the past actions of the admiral who commands our fleet in those seas will secure him, but I know not whether there are now any that will attempt to clear the minister's character from the imputation of the other.

All the insolence of the Spaniards, a nation by no means formidable, is the consequence of the reunion of the houses of Bourbon; a reunion which could not easily have been accomplished, but by the instrumental offices of our ministry, whom, therefore, the nation has a right to charge with the diminution of its honour, and the decay of its trade.

Nor has our trade, my lords, been only contracted and obstructed by the piracies of Spain, but has been suffered to languish and decline at home, either by criminal negligence, or by their complaisance for France, which has given rise to our other calamities. The state of our woollen manufactures is well known, and those whose indolence or love of pleasure keeps them strangers to the other misfortunes of their country, must yet have been acquainted with this, by the daily accounts of riots and insurrections, raised by those who, having been employed in that manufacture, can provide for their families by no other business, and are made desperate by the want of bread.