Since, then, such things as are not mere circumstances of worship can neither be many nor various (as I said before), it is manifest that all such things were easily determinable in Scripture.

3. Our ceremonial laws are not backed with such grounds and reasons as might be for the satisfying and quieting of tender consciences, but we are borne down with Will and authority; whereof I have said enough elsewhere.(898)

Sect. 9. 2d. If the ceremonies be lawful to us because the law and ordinance of the church prescribes them, then either the bare and naked prescription of the church, having no other warrant than the church's own authority, makes them to be thus lawful; or else the law of the church, as grounded upon and warranted by the law of God and nature. Not the first; for divines hold,(899) legem humanum ferri ab hominibus, cum ratione procedunt ab illis aliis antegressis legibus. Nam legis humanae regula proxima est duplex. Una innata quam legem naturalem dicimus, altera inspirata, quam divinam, &c. Ex his ergo fontibus lex humana procedit: hoec incunabila illius a quibus si aberrat, lex degener est, indigna legis nomine. We have also the testimony of an adversary; for saith not Paybody himself,(900) "I grant it is unlawful to do in God's worship anything upon the mere pleasure of man?"

If they take them (as needs they must) to the latter part, then let them either say that the ceremonies are lawful unto us, because the church judgeth them to be agreeable to the law of God and nature, or because the church proveth unto us, by evident reasons, that they are indeed agreeable to these laws. If they yield us the latter, then it is not the church's law, but the church's reasons given for her law, which can warrant the lawfulness of them unto us, which doth elude and elide all that which they allege for the lawfulness of them from the power and authority of the church.

And further, if any such reasons be to be given forth for the ceremonies, why are they so long kept up from us? But if they hold them at the former, thereupon it will follow, that it shall be lawful for us to do every thing which the church shall judge to be agreeable to the law of God and nature, and consequently to all the Jewish, popish, and heathenish ceremonies, yea, to worship images, if it happen that the church judge these things to be agreeable to the law of God and nature.

It will be answered (I know), that if the church command anything repugnant to God's word we are not bound to do it, nor to receive it as lawful, though the church judge so of it; but otherwise, if that which the church judgeth to be agreeable to the law of God and nature (and in that respect prescribeth) be not repugnant to the word of God, but in itself indifferent, then are we to embrace it as convenient, and consonant to the law of God and nature, neither ought we to call in question the lawfulness of it.

But I reply, that either we must judge a thing to be repugnant or not repugnant to the word, to be indifferent or not indifferent in itself, because the church judgeth so of it, or else because the church proveth unto us by an evident reason that it is so. If the latter, we have what we would; if the former, we are just where we were: the argument is still set afoot; then we must receive everything (be it ever so bad) as indifferent, if only the church happen so to judge of it; for quod competit alicui qua tale, &c. So that if we receive anything as indifferent, for this respect, because the church judgeth it to be so, then shall we receive everything for indifferent which the church shall so judge of.

Sect. 10. 3d. The church is forbidden to add anything to the commandments of God which he hath given unto us, concerning his worship and service, Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32; Prov. xxx. 6; therefore she may not lawfully prescribe anything in the works of divine worship, if it be not a mere circumstance belonging to that kind of things which were not determinate by Scripture.

Our opposites have no other distinctions which they make any use of against this argument, but the very same which Papists use in defence of their unwritten dogmatical traditions, namely, that additio corrumpens is forbidden, but not additio perficiens: that there is not alike reason of the Christian church and of the Jewish; that the church may not add to the essential parts of God's worship, but to the accidentary she may add.

To the first of those distinctions, we answer, 1. That the distinction itself is an addition to the word, and so doth but beg the question.

2. It is blasphemous; for it argueth that the commandments of God are imperfect, and that by addition they are made perfect.

3. Since our opposites will speak in this dialect, let them resolve us whether the washings of the Pharisees, condemned by Christ, were corrupting or perfecting additions. They cannot say they were corrupting, for there was no commandment of God which those washings did corrupt or destroy, except that commandment which forbiddeth men's additions. But for this respect our opposites dare not call them corrupting additions, for so they should condemn all additions whatsoever. Except, therefore, they can show us that those washings were not added by the Pharisees for perfecting, but for corrupting the law of God, let them consider how they rank their own ceremonial additions with those of the Pharisees. We read of no other reason wherefore Christ condemned them but because they were doctrines which had no other warrant than the commandments of men, Matt. xv. 9; for as the law ordained divers washings, for teaching and signifying that true holiness and cleanness which ought to be among God's people, so the Pharisees would have perfected the law by adding other washings (and more than God had commanded) for the same end and purpose.

Sect. 11. To the second distinction, we say that the Christian church hath no more liberty to add to the commandments of God than the Jewish church had; for the second commandment is moral and perpetual, and forbiddeth to us as well as to them the additions and inventions of men in the worship of God. Nay, as Calvin noteth,(901) much more are we forbidden to add unto God's word than they were. "Before the coming of his well-beloved Son in the flesh (saith John Knox),(902) severely he punished all such as durst enterprise to alter or change his ceremonies and statutes,—as in Saul, (1 Kings xiii.; xv.) Uzziah, Nadab, Abihu, (Lev. x.) is to be read. And will he now, after that he hath opened his counsel to the world by his only Son, whom he commandeth to be heard, Matt, xvii.; and alter that, by his holy Spirit speaking by his apostles, he hath established the religion in which he will his true worshippers abide to the end,—will he now, I say, admit men's inventions in the matter of religion? &c., 2 Cor. xi.; Col. i.; ii. For this sentence he pronounceth: 'Not that which seemeth good in thy eyes shalt thou do to the Lord thy God, but that which the Lord thy God commanded thee, that do thou: Add nothing unto it, diminish nothing from it,' Deut. iv. 12. Which, sealing up his New Testament, he repeateth in these words: 'That which ye have, hold till I come,' " &c., Rev. ii.

Wherefore, whilst Hooker saith,(903) that Christ hath not, by positive laws, so far descended into particularities with us as Moses with the Jews; whilst Camero saith,(904) Non esse disputandum ita, ut quoniam in vetere Testamento, de rebus alioqui adiaphoris certa fuit lex, &c., id in novo Testamento habere locum; and whilst Bishop Lindsey saith,(905) that in the particular circumstances of persons by whom, place where, time when, and of the form and order how, the worship and work of the ministry should be performed, the church hath power to define whatsoever is most expedient, and that this is a prerogative wherein the Christian church differeth from the Jewish synagogue, they do but speak their pleasure in vain, and cannot make it appear that the Christian church hath any more power to add to the commandments of God than the synagogue had of old.

It is well said by one:(906) "There were many points of service, as sacrifices, washings, anniversary days, &c., which we have not; but the determination of such as we have is as particular as theirs, except wherein the national circumstances make impediment." For one place not to be appointed for the worship of God, nor one tribe for the work of the ministry among us, as among them, not because more power was left to the Christian church for determining things that pertain to the worship of God than was to the Jewish, but because the Christian church was to spread itself over the whole earth, and not to be confined within the bounds of one nation as the synagogue was.

Sect. 12. Let us then here call to mind the distinction which hath been showed betwixt religious ceremonies and moral circumstances; for as touching moral circumstances, which serve for common order and decency in the worship of God, they being so many and so alterable, that they could not be particularly determined in Scripture, for all the different and almost infinite cases which might occur, the Jewish synagogue had the same power for determining things of this nature which the church of Christ now hath. For the law did not define, but left to be defined by the synagogue, the set hours for all public divine service,—when it should begin, how long it should last, the order that should be kept in the reading and expounding of the law, praying, singing, catechising, excommunicating, censuring, absolving of delinquents, &c., the circumstances of the celebration of marriage, of the education of youth in schools and colleges, &c.

But as for ceremonies which are proper to God's holy worship, shall we say that the fidelity of Christ, the Son, hath been less than the fidelity of Moses, the servant? Heb. iii. 2, which were to be said, if Christ had not, by as plain, plentiful, and particular directions and ordinances, provided for all the necessities of the Christian church in the matter of religion, as Moses for the Jewish; or if the least pin, and the meanest appurtenance of the tabernacle, and all the service thereof, behooved to be ordered according to the express commandment of God by the hand of Moses, how shall we think, that in the rearing, framing, ordering, and beautifying of the church, the house of the living God, he would have less honour and prerogative given than to his own well-beloved Son, by whom he hath spoken to us in these last days, and whom he hath commanded us to hear in all things? Or that he will accept, at our hands, any sacred ceremony which men have presumed to bring into his holy and pure worship, without the appointment of his own word and will revealed unto us? Albeit the worship of God and religion, in the church of the New Testament, be accompanied without ceremonies, numero paucissimis, observatione facillimis, significatione proestantissimis (as Augustine speaketh of our sacraments,(907)) yet we have in Scripture, Eph. i. 18, no less particular determination and distinct direction for our few, easy, and plain ceremonies, than the Jews had for their many heavy and obscure ones.

Sect. 13. As for the third distinction, of adding to the accidentary parts of it, I remember that I heard in the logics, of pars essentialis or physica, and pars integralis or mathematica; of pars similaris and pars dissimilaris; of pars continua and pars discreta; but of para accidentaria heard I never till now. There is (I know) such a distinction of pars integralis, that it is either principalis and necessaria, or minus principalis and non necessaria; but we cannot understand their pars cultus accidentaria to be pars integralis non necessaria, because, then, their distribution of worship into essential and accidentary parts could not answer to the rules of a just distribution, of which one is, that distributio debet exhaurire totum distributum. Now, there are some parts of worship which cannot be comprehended in the foresaid distribution, namely, partes integrales necessarioe. What then? Shall we let this wild distinction pass, because it cannot be well nor formally interpreted? Nay, but we will observe their meaning who make use of it; for unto all such parts of worship as are not essential (and which they are pleased to call accidentary), they hold the church may make addition, whereunto I answer, 1. Let them make us understand what they mean by those essential parts to which the church may add nothing, and let them beware lest they give us an identical description of the same.

2. That there are many parts of God's worship which are not essential, yet such as will not suffer any addition of the church: for proof whereof I demand, Were all the ceremonies commanded to be used in the legal sacraments and sacrifices essential parts of those worships? No man will say so. Yet the synagogue was tied to observe those (and no other than those) ceremonies which the word prescribed. When Israel was again to keep the passover, it was said, Num. ix. 3, "In the fourteenth day of this month at even, ye shall keep it in his appointed season, according to all the rites of it, and according to all the ceremonies of it, shall ye keep it." And again, ver. 5, "According to all that the Lord commanded Moses, so did the children of Israel." Ritibus et ceremoniis divinitus institutis, non licuit homini suo arbitrio aliquid adjicere aut detrahere, saith P. Martyr.(908)

Sect. 14. 3. If those accidentary parts of worship, which are commanded in the word, be both necessary to be used necessitate praecepti, and likewise sufficient means fully adequate and proportioned to that end, for which God hath destinated such parts of his worship as are not essential (which must be granted by every one who will not accuse the Scripture of some defect and imperfection), then it followeth that other accidentary parts of worship, which the church addeth thereto, are but superfluous and superstitious.

4. I call to mind another logical maxim: Sublata una parte, tolitur totum. An essential part being taken away, totum essentiale is taken away also. In like manner, an integrant part being taken away, totum integrum cannot remain behind. When a man hath lost his hand or his foot, though he be still a man physically, totum essentiale, yet he is not a man mathematically, he is no longer totum integrale. Just so if we reckon any additions (as the cross, kneeling, holidays, &c.) among the parts of God's worship, then put the case, that those additions were taken away, it followeth that all the worship which remaineth still will not be the whole and entire worship of God, but only a part of it, or at the best, a defective, wanting, lame, and maimed worship.

5. I have made it evident that our opposites make the controverted ceremonies to be worship,(909) in as proper and peculiar sense as anything can be, and that they are equalled to the chief and principal parts of worship, not ranked among the secondary or less principal parts of it.

6. Do not our divines condemn the addition of rites and ceremonies to that worship which the word prescribeth, as well as the addition of other things which are thought more essential? We have heard Martyr's words to this purpose.

Zanchius will have us to learn from the second commandment,(910) in externo cultu qui Deo debetur, seu in ceremonus nihil nobis esse ex nostro capite comminiscendum, whether in sacraments or sacrifices, or other sacred things, such as temples, altars, clothes, and vessels, necessary for the external worship; but that we ought to be contented with those ceremonies which God hath prescribed.

And in another place,(911) he condemneth the addition of any other rite whatsoever, to those rites of every sacrament which have been ordained of Christ, Si ceremoniis cujusvis sacramenti, alios addas ritus, &c. Dr Fulk pronounceth,(912) even of signs and rites, that "we must do in religion and God's service, not that which seemeth good to us, but that only which he commandeth," Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32.

And Calvin pronounceth generally,(913) Caenam domini rem adeo sacrosanctam esse, ut ullis hominum additamentis eam conspurcare sit nefas.

Sect. 15. And thus have we made good our argument, that the lawfulness of the ceremonies cannot be warranted by any ecclesiastical law. If we had no more against them this were enough, that they are but human additions, and want the warrant of the word. When Nadab and Abihu offered strange fire before the Lord, and when the Jews burnt their sons and their daughters in the valley of the son of Hinnon, howsoever manifold wickedness might have been challenged in that which they did, yet if any would dispute with God upon the matter, he stoppeth their mouths with this one answer: "I commanded it not, neither came it into my heart," Lev. x. 1; Jer. vii. 31. May we, last of all, hear what the canon law itself decreeth:(914) Is qui praeest, si praeter voluntatem Dei, vel praeter quod in sanctis Scripturis evidenter praecipitur, vel dicit aliquid, vel imperat, tanquam falsus testis Dei, aut sacrilegus habeatur.



CHAPTER VIII.

THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY ANY ORDINANCE OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE; WHOSE POWER IN THINGS SPIRITUAL OR ECCLESIASTICAL IS EXPLAINED.

Sect. 1. Now are we fallen upon the stronghold of our opposites, which is the king's majesty's supremacy in things ecclesiastical. If they did mean, in good earnest, to qualify the lawfulness of the ceremonies from holy Scripture, why have they not taken more pains and travail to debate the matter from thence? And if they meant to justify them by the laws and constitutions of the church, why did they not study to an orderly peaceable proceeding, and to have things concluded in a lawful national synod, after free reasoning and mature advisement? Why did they carry matters so factiously and violently? The truth is, they would have us to acquiesce, and to say no more against the ceremonies, when once we hear that they are enjoined by his Majesty, our only supreme governor. What I am here to say shall not derogate anything from his Highness's supremacy, because it includeth no such thing as a nomothetical power to prescribe and appoint such sacred and significant ceremonies as he shall think good.

The Archbishop of Armagh, in his speech which he delivered concerning the King's supremacy (for which king James returned him, in a letter, his princely and gracious thanks, for that he had defended his just and lawful power with so much learning and reason), whilst he treateth of the supremacy, and expoundeth that title of "the only supreme governor of all his Highness's dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal," mentioneth no such thing as any power to dispose, by his laws and ordinances, of things external in the worship of God. Neither yet shall this following discourse tend to the cooling and abating of that care and zeal which princes owe to the oversight and promotion of religion. For alas! the corruptions which have stept into religion, and the decays which it hath felt since princes began to take small thought of it, and to leave the care of it to popes, bishops, monks, &c., can never be enough bewailed. Nihil enim, &c. "For there is nothing (saith Zanchius(915)) more pernicious, either to the commonwealth or to the church, than if a prince do all things by the judgment of others, and he himself understand not those things which are propounded to be done."

Nor, lastly, are we to sound an alarm of rebellion; for to say that subjects are not bound to obey such laws and statutes of their prince, as impose upon them a yoke of ceremonies which he hath no power to impose, is one thing, and to say that they are not bound to subject themselves unto him faithfully and loyally, is another thing. Recte Gerson: Qui abusui potestatis resistit, non resistit divinae ordinationi, saith the Bishop of Salisbury.(916) "Subjection (saith Dr Field(917)) is required generally and absolutely, where obedience is not." If we have leave to speak with divines,(918) the bond and sign of subjection is only homage, or the oath of fidelity, whereby subjects bind themselves to be faithful to their prince; and we take the Judge of all flesh to witness, before whose dreadful tribunal we must stand at that great day, how free we are of thoughts of rebellion, and how uprightly we mean to be his Majesty's most true and loyal subjects to the end of our lives, and to devote ourselves, our bodies, lives, goods, and estates, and all that we have in the world, to his Highness's service, and to the honour of his royal crown.

Sect. 2. Now, for the purpose in hand, we will first examine what the Archbishop of Spalato saith; for he discourseth much of the jurisdiction and office of princes, in things and causes ecclesiastical. The title of the first chapter of his sixth book, de Rep. Eccl., holdeth, that it is the duty of princes super ecclesiastica invigilare; but in the body of the chapter he laboureth to prove that the power of governing ecclesiastical things belongeth to princes (which is far more than to watch carefully over them). This the reader will easily perceive. Nay, he himself, num. 115 and 174, professeth he hath been proving, that divine and ecclesiastical things are to be ruled and governed by the authority and laws of princes. The title prefixed to the sixth chapter of that same book is this, Legibus et edictis principum laicorum, et ecclesiastica et ecclesiasticos gubernari. So that in both chapters he treateth of one and the same office of princes about things ecclesiastical.

Now, if we would learn what he means by those ecclesiastica which he will have to be governed by princes, he resolves us(919) that he means not things internal, such as the deciding of controversies in matters of faith, feeding with the word of God, binding and loosing, and ministering of the sacraments (for in pure spiritualibus, as he speaketh in Summa, cap. 5,) he yieldeth them not the power of judging and defining, but only things external, which pertain to the external worship of God, or concern external ecclesiastical discipline; such things he acknowledged to be res spirituales;(920) but vera spiritualia he will have to comprehend only things internal, which he removeth from the power of princes. Thus we have his judgment as plain as himself hath delivered it unto us.

Sect. 3. But I demand, 1. Why yieldeth he the same power to princes in governing ecclesiastica which he yieldeth them in governing ecclesiasticos? For ecclesiastical persons, being members of the commonwealth no less than laics, have the same king and governor with them, for which reason it is (as the Bishop himself showeth out of Molina(921)) that they are bound to be subject to their prince's laws, which pertain to the whole commonwealth. But the like cannot be alleged, for the power of princes to govern ecclesiastica, for the Bishop, I trust, would not have said that things ecclesiastical and things civil do equally and alike belong to their power and jurisdiction.

2. Why confoundeth he the governing of things and causes ecclesiastical with watching over and taking care for the same? Let us only call to mind the native signification of the word Κυβεριάω, guberno signifieth properly to rule or govern the course of a ship; and in a ship there may be many watchful and careful eyes over her course, and yet but one governor directing the same.

3. Why holdeth he that things external in the worship of God are not vera spiritualia? For if they be ecclesiastical and sacred ceremonies (not fleshly and worldly), why will he not also acknowledge them for true spiritual things? And if they be not vera spiritualia, why calls he them res spirituales? for are not res and verum reciprocal as well as ens and verum.

4. Even as a prince in his sea voyage is supreme governor of all which are in the ship with him, and, by consequence, of the governor who directs her course, yet doth he not govern the actions of governing or directing the course of a ship, so, though a prince be the only supreme governor of all his dominions, and, by consequence, of ecclesiastical persons in his dominions, yet he cannot be said to govern all their ecclesiastical actions and causes. And as the governor of a ship acknowledgeth his prince for his only supreme governor even then whilst he is governing and directing the course of the ship (otherwise whilst he is governing her course he should not be his prince's subject), yet he doth not thereby acknowledge that his prince governeth his action of directing the course of the ship (for then should the prince be the pilot); so when one hath acknowledged the prince to be the only supreme governor upon earth of all ecclesiastical persons in his dominions, even whilst they are ordering and determining ecclesiastical causes, yet he hath not thereby acknowledged that the prince governeth the ecclesiastical causes. Wherefore, whilst the Bishop(922) taketh the English oath of supremacy to acknowledge the same which he teacheth touching the prince's power, he giveth it another sense than the words of it can bear; for it saith not that the king's majesty is the only supreme governor of all his Highness's dominions, and of all things and causes therein, as well ecclesiastical or spiritual as temporal,—but it saith that he is the only supreme governor of all his Highness's dominions in all things or causes, &c. Now, the spiritual guides of the church, substituted by Christ as deputies in his stead, who is the most supreme Governor of his own church, and on whose shoulder the government resteth, Isa. ix. 6, as his royal prerogative, even then, whilst they are governing and putting order to ecclesiastical or spiritual causes, they acknowledge their prince to be their only supreme governor upon earth, yet hereby they imply not that he governeth their governing of ecclesiastical causes, as hath been shown by that simile of governing a ship.

Sect. 4. 5. Whereas the Bishop leaveth all things external, which pertain to the worship of God, to be governed by princes, I object, that the version of the holy Scripture out of Hebrew and Greek into the vulgar tongue is an external thing, belonging to the worship of God, yet it cannot be governed by a prince who is not learned in the original tongues.

6. Whereas he yieldeth to princes the power of governing in spiritualibus, but not in pure spiritualibus, I cannot comprehend this distinction. All sacred and ecclesiastical things belonging to the worship of God are spiritual things.

What, then, understands he by things purely spiritual? If he mean things which are in such sort spiritual, that they have nothing earthly nor external in them,—in this sense the sacraments are not purely spiritual, because they consist of two parts; one earthly, and another heavenly, as Rheneus saith of the eucharist;—and so the sacraments, not being things purely spiritual, shall be left to the power and government of princes. If it be said that by things purely spiritual he means things which concern our spirits only, and not the outward man, I still urge the same instance; for the sacraments are not in this sense spiritual, because a part of the sacraments, to wit, the sacramental signs or elements, concern our external and bodily senses of seeing, touching, and tasting.

7. The Bishop also contradicteth himself unawares; for in one place(923) he reserveth and excepteth from the power of princes the judging and deciding of controversies and questions of faith. Yet in another place(924) he exhorteth kings, and princes to compel the divines of both sides (of the Roman and reformed churches) to come to a free conference, and to debate the matters controverted betwixt them; in which conference he requireth the princes themselves to be judges.

Sect. 5. It remaineth to try what force of reason the Bishop hath to back his opinion. As for the ragged rabble of human testimonies which he raketh together, I should but weary my reader, and spend paper and ink in vain, if I should insist to answer them one by one. Only thus much I say of all those sentences of the fathers and constitutions of princes and emperors about things ecclesiastical, together with the histories of the submission of some ecclesiastical causes to emperors,—let him who pleaseth read them; and it shall appear,

1. That some of those things whereunto the power of princes was applied were unlawful.

2. There were many of them things temporal or civil, not ecclesiastical or spiritual, nor such as pertain to the worship of God.

3. There were some of them ecclesiastical or spiritual things, but then princes did only ratify that which had been determined by councils, and punish with the civil sword such as did stubbornly disobey the church's lawful constitutions. Neither were princes allowed to do any more.

4. Sometimes they interposed their authority, and meddled in causes spiritual or ecclesiastical, even before the definition of councils; yet did they not judge nor decide those matters, but did only convocate councils, and urge the clergy to see to the mis-ordered and troubled state of the church, and by their wholesome laws and ordinances, to provide the best remedies for the same which they could.

5. At other times princes have done somewhat more in ecclesiastical matters; but this was only in extraordinary cases, when the clergy were so corrupted, that either through ignorance they were unable, or through malice and perverseness unwilling, to do their duty in deciding of controversies, making of canons, using the keys, and managing of other ecclesiastical matters, in which case princes might and did, by their coactive temporal jurisdiction, avoid disorder, error, and superstition, and cause a reformation of the church.

6. Princes have likewise, in rightly constituted and well reformed churches, by their own regal authority, straitly enjoined things pertaining to the worship of God, but those things were the very same which God's own written word had expressly commanded.

7. When princes went beyond those limits and bounds, they took upon them to judge and command more than God hath put within the compass of their power.

Sect. 6. But as touching the passages of holy Scripture which the Bishop allegeth, I will answer thereto particularly. And first, he produceth that place, Deut. xvii. 19, where the king was appointed to have the book of the law of God with him, that he might learn to fear the Lord his God, and to keep all the words of this law and these statutes to do them. What logic, I pray, can from this place infer that princes have the supreme power of governing all ecclesiastical causes? Next, the Bishop tells us of David's appointing of the offices of the Levites, and dividing of their courses, 1 Chron. xxiii and his commending of the same to Solomon, 1 Chron. xxviii.; but he might have observed that David did not this as a king, but as a prophet, or man of God, 2 Chron. viii. 14, yea, those orders and courses of the Levites were also commanded by other prophets of the Lord, 2 Chron. xxix. 25. As touching Solomon's appointing of the courses and charges of the priests, Levites, and porters, he did not of himself, nor by his own princely authority, but because David, the man of God, had so commanded, 2 Chron. viii. 24. For Solomon received from David a pattern for all that which he was to do in the work of the house of the Lord, and also for the courses of the priests and Levites, 1 Chron. xxviii. 11-13.

Sect. 7. The Bishop comes on and tells us that Hezekiah did apply his regal power to the reformation of the Levites, and of the worship of God in their hands, saying, "Hear me, ye Levites, sanctify now yourselves, and sanctify the house of the Lord God of your fathers, and carry forth the filthiness out of the holy place."

Ans. He exhorted them to no more than God's law required of them, for the law ordained them to sanctify themselves, and to do the service of the house of the Lord, Num. viii. 6, 11, 15; xviii. 32; so that Hezekiah did here constitute nothing by his own arbitration and authority, but plainly showeth his warrant, ver. 11, "The Lord hath chosen you to stand before him, to serve him, and that you should minister unto him."

But the Bishop further allegeth out of 2 Chron. xxxi. that Hezekiah appointed the courses of the priests and Levites, every man according to his service.

Ans. He might have read 2 Chron. xxix., 25, that Hezekiah did all this according to the commandment of David, and of Gad, the king's seer, and Nathan the prophet, "For so was the commandment of the Lord by his prophets." And who doubteth but kings may command such things as God hath commanded before them?

Sect. 8. The next example which the Bishop allegeth is out of 2 Chron. xxxv. where we read that Josias did set the priests and Levites again in their charges, which example cannot prove that kings have the supreme power of governing ecclesiastical causes, unless it be evinced that Josias changed those orders and courses of the Levites and priests which the Lord had commanded by his prophets, 2 Chron. xxix. 25, and that he did institute other orders by his own regal authority, whereas the contrary is manifest from the text; for Josias did only set the priests and Levites those charges and courses which had been assigned unto them after the writing of David and Solomon, ver. 4, and by the commandment of David, and Asaph, and Heman, and Jeduthun, the king's seer, ver. 15. Neither did Josias command the priests and Levites any other service than that which was written in the book of Moses, ver. 12; so that, from his example, it only followeth, that when princes see the state of ecclesiastical persons corrupted, they ought to interpose their authority for reducing them to those orders and functions which God's word commandeth.

Sect. 9. Moreover, the Bishop objecteth the example of Joash, who, while he yet did right in the days of Jehoiada the priest, 2 Chron. xxiv. sent the priests and Levites to gather from all Israel money for repairing the house of the Lord, and when they dealt negligently in this business, he transferred the charge of the same unto others, and, making himself the keeper of the holy money, did both prescribe how it was to be disbursed, and likewise take from good Jehoiada the priest the administration of the same. Now, where he hath read that Joash made himself the keeper of the money, and prescribed how it should be disbursed, also that he took the administration from Jehoiada, I cannot guess; for the text hath no such thing in it, but the contrary, viz. that the king's scribe, and the high priest's officer, kept the money, and disbursed the same, as the king and Jehoiada prescribed unto them. As to that which he truly allegeth out of the holy text, I answer, 1. The collection for repairing the house of the Lord was no human ordinance, for Joash showeth the commandment of Moses for it, ver. 6, having reference to Exod. xxx. 12-14. No other collections did Joash impose but those quae divino jure debebantur.(925) 2. As for the taking of the charge of this collection from the priests, he behooved to do so, because they had still neglected the work, when the twenty-third year of his reign was come. And so say we, that when the ministers of the church fail to do their duty, in providing that which is necessary for the service of God, princes ought by some other means to cause these things be redressed. 3. Joash did nothing with these monies without Jehoiada, but Pontifex eas primum laborantibus tribuit, tum in aedis sacrae restaurationem maxime convertit.(926) 4. And what if he had done this by himself? I suppose no man will reckon the hiring of masons and carpenters with such as wrought iron and brass, or the gathering of money for this purpose, among spiritual things or causes. 5. And if these employments about Solomon's temple were not to be called spiritual or ecclesiastical, far less about our material churches, which are not holy nor consecrated as Solomon's was for a typical use. Wherefore, without all prejudice to our cause, we may and do commend the building and repairing of churches by Christian princes.

Sect. 10. But the Bishop returneth to another example in Solomon, which is the putting of Abiathar, the chief priest, from his office, and surrogating of another in his place. Ans. Abiathar was civilly dead, as the lawyers used to speak, and it was only by accident or by consequent that Solomon put him from his office: he sent him away to Anathoth, because of his treasonable following and aiding of Adonijah, whereupon necessarily followed his falling away from the honour, dignity, and office of the high priest, whence it only followeth, that if a minister be found guilty of laese majesty, the king may punish him either with banishment or proscription, or some such civil punishment, whereupon by consequence will follow his falling from his ecclesiastical office and dignity. 2. As for Solomon's putting of Zadok in the room of Abiathar, it maketh as little against us, for Zadok did fall to the place jure divino.

The honour and office of the high-priesthood was given to Eleazar, the elder son of Aaron, and was to remain in his family. How it came to pass that it was transferred to Eli, who was of the family of Ithmar, we read not. Always after that Abiathar, who was of the family of Ithamar and descended of Eli, had by a capital crime fallen from it, it did of very right belong to Zadok, who was chief of the family of Eleazar. And so all this flowed, not from Solomon's, but from God's own authority.

Sect. 11. The Bishop remembereth another example in Hezekiah too, telling us that he removed the high places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves, and brake in pieces the brazen serpent, when the children of Israel did burn incense unto it. Now, we wish from our hearts that from this example all Christian kings may learn to remove and destroy the monuments of idolatry out of their dominions. And if it be said that in so doing kings take upon them to govern by their princely authority an ecclesiastical or spiritual cause, it is easily answered, that when they destroy idolatrous monuments, they do nothing by their own authority, but by the authority of God's law, which commanded to abolish such monuments, and to root out the very names of idols; which commandment is to be executed by the action of temporal power.

Sect. 12. Finally, saith the Bishop, the kings of the Jews, 1 Kings xxiii.; 2 Chron. xix.; have in the temple propounded the law of the Lord to the people, renewed the covenant of religion, pulled down profane altars, broken down idols, slain idolatrous priests, liberated their kingdom from abomination, purged the temple, 2 Chron. xxxiv., xxxv.; 1 Maccab. iv. 59; proclaimed the keeping of the passover, and of the feast of dedication, Esth. ix. 26 ; and have also instituted new feasts. For all which things they are in the Scriptures much praised by the Holy Spirit, 2 Chron. xxix. 2; xxxiv. 2, &c.

Ans. True it is, Josias did read the law of the Lord to the people in the temple, and made a covenant before the Lord; but, 1. he prescribed nothing at his own pleasure; only he required of the people to walk after the Lord, and to keep his commandments. 2. Neither did he this work by himself, but did convocate a council of the prophets, priests and elders of Israel, for the advancing of that reformation, 2 Kings xxiii. 1. 3. And if he had done it by himself, yet we are to remember that the reformation of a church generally and greatly corrupted, craveth the more immediate intermeddling of princes, and a great deal more than can be ordinarily and orderly done by them in a church already reformed. The slaying of the idolatrous priests had also the warrant and authority of the law of God, which appointed a capital punishment for blasphemers,(927) or such as, in contempt of God and to rub some ignominy upon his name, did traduce his doctrine and religion, and either detract from him, and attribute to idols that which appertained properly unto him, or else attributed unto him either by enunciation or imprecation, such things as could not stand with the glory of the Godhead. Concerning the abolishing of idolatry and all the relics thereof, we have answered that it was commanded by God. The keeping of the passover was also commanded in the law; but publish God's own express ordinance.

Last of all, touching two remaining examples: 1. The feast of the dedication was not ordained by the sole authority of Judas, but by his brethren and by the whole congregation of Israel;(928) and the days of Purim were established by Mordecai, a prophet. Esth. ix. 20, 21. 2. We have elsewhere made it evident, that the days of Purim, by their first institution, were only days of civil joy and solemnity, and that the feast of the dedication was not lawfully instituted.

Sect. 13. Thus having dismissed the Bishop, we will make us for clearing the purpose in hand. But before we come to show particularly what princes may do, and what they may not do, in making laws about things ecclesiastical, we will first of all lay down these propositions following:—

1. Whatsoever the power of princes be in things and causes ecclesiastical, it is not, sure, absolute nor unbounded. Solius Dei est (saith Stapleton),(929) juxta suam sanctissimam voluntatem, uctiunes suas omnes dirigere, et omniafacere quaecunquc voluit. And again, Vis tuam voluntatem esse regulam rerum omnium, ut omnia fiant pro uuo beneplacito? Whether we respect the persons or the places of princes, their power is confined within certain limits, so that they may not enjoin whatsoever they list. As touching their poisons, Bishop Spotswood would do no less than warrant the articles of Perth by king James's personal qualities: "His person (saith he(930)), were he not our sovereign, gives them sufficient authority, being recommended by him; for he knows the nature of things, and the consequences of them, what is fit for a church to have, and what not, better than we do all."

I mean not to derogate anything from king James's duly-deserved praise, nor to obscure his never-dying memory; only I say, that such a prince as the Bishop speaketh of, who knoweth what is fit for a church to have, and what not, better than many learned and godly pastors assembled in a synod, is rara avis in terris nigroque simillima Cygno. For a prince being but a man, and so subject to error, being but one man, and so in the greater hazard of error; for plus videns oculi, quam oculus; and, "woe to him that is alone when he falleth, for he hath not another to help him up," saith the wisest of mortal kings, Eccl. iv. 10; being also compassed or assailed with so many tentations which other men are free of; and lastly, being so taken up and distracted with secular affairs and cares, that very seldom is he found well versed or singularly learned in the controversies of religion; may not such a one, in the common sense of Christians, be thought more like to fail and miscarry in his judgment about things ecclesiastical, than a whole synod, wherein there are many of the learned, judicious, and godly ministers of the church. Papists tell us, that they will not defend the personal actions of the Pope, quasi ipse solus omnibus horis sapere potuerit, id quod recte nemini concessum perhibetur.(931) Their own records let the world know the abominable vices and impieties of popes. Witness Platina, in the life of John X., Benedict IV., John XIII., Boniface VII., John XX., John XXII., Paul II., &c. And further, when our adversaries dispute of the Pope's infallibility, they grant, for his own person, he may be an heretic, only they hold that he cannot err e cathedra.

And shall we now idolise the persons of princes more than Papists do the persons of popes? Or shall Papists object to us, that we extol the judgment of our princes to a higher degree of authority and infallibility than they yield to the judgment of their popes? Alas, why would we put the weapons in the hands of our adversaries!

Sect. 14. But what say we of princes in respect of their place and calling? Is not their power absolute in that respect? Recte quidam (saith Saravia),(932) illiberalis et inverecundi censet esse ingenii, de prencipum potestate et rebus gestis questionem movere, quando et imperator sacrilegium este scribit, de eo quod a principe factum est disputare. Camero holdeth,(933) that in things pertaining to external order in religion, kings may command what they will pro authoritate, and forbid to seek another reason beside the majesty of their authority; yea, that when they command frivola, dura, et iniqua respectu nostri, our consciences are bound by those their frivolous and unjust commandments, not only in respect of the end, because scandal should possibly follow in case we obey them not, but also jubentis respectu, because the Apostle biddeth us obey the magistrate for conscience' sake. At the reading of these passages in Saravia and Camero, horror and amazement have taken hold on me. O wisdom of God, by whom kings do reign and princes decree justice, upon whose thigh and vesture is written, "King of kings and Lord of lords," make the kings of the earth to know that their laws are but regulae regulatae, and mensurae mensuratae! Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings, be instructed ye judges of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, and lay down your crowns at the feet of the Lamb that sits upon the throne,(934) discite justitiam moniti, and remember that this is the beginning of wisdom, by casting pride away, to addict yourselves to the dominion of Christ, who, albeit he hath given the kingdoms of this world unto your hands, and non auferet mortalia, qui regna datio caelestia, yet hath he kept the government of his church upon his own shoulder, Psalm ix. 6, xxii. 21. So that rex non est propie rector ecclesiae sed reipublicae, ecclesiae vero defensor est. O all ye subjects of kings and princes, understand that in things pertaining to the church and kingdom of Christ, ye are not the servants of men, to do what they list, and that for their listing, 1 Cor. vii. 23. The Apostle, Rom. xiii. urgeth, not obedience to magistrates for conscience' sake, but only subjection for conscience' sake, for he concludeth his whole purpose,(935) ver. 7, "Render therefore to all their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour."(936) There is not in all that chapter one word of obedience to magistrates.

And as touching the binding power of their laws, be they never so just, they cannot bind you any other way, nor in respect of the general end of them. For, per se, they cannot bind more than the church's laws can. Which things Dr Forbesse(937) hath also told you out of Calvin.

And hence it followeth, that whensoever you may omit that which princes enjoin, without violating the law of charity, you are not holden to obey them for the majesty of princely authority. Be ashamed, O ye Formalists, of your ascribing to princes a jurisdiction so absolute! Bury it in the grave of eternal silence. Tell it not in Rome; publish it not among the vassals of antichrist, lest the daughters of Babylon rejoice, lest the worshippers of the Beast triumph! O how small confidence have the cardinals, I say not now into the Pope's person, but even into his chair, when being entered in the conclave for the election of a new pope, they spend the whole day following in the making of laws belonging to the administration and handling of all things by him who shall be advanced to the popedom; which laws every one of them subscribeth, and sweareth to observe, if he be made pope, as Onephrius writeth. Though the Pope's own creatures, the Jesuits, in their schools and books, must dispute for his infallibility e cathedra, yet we see what trust the wise cardinals, shut up in the conclave, do put in him, with what bond they tie him, and within what bounds they confine his power. Albeit the Pope, after he is created, observeth not strictly this oath, as that wise writer of the History of the Council of Trent noteth,(938) yet let me say once again, Shall we set up the power of princes higher, or make their power less limited than Papists do the power of popes? or shall they set bounds to popes and we set none to princes?

Sect. 15. But I find myself a little digressed after the roving absurdities of some opposites. Now, therefore, to return,—the second proposition which I am here to lay down, before I speak particularly of the power of princes, is this: Whatsoever princes can commendably either do by themselves, or command to be done by others, in such matters as any way appertain to the external worship of God, must be both lawful in the nature of it, and expedient in the use of it; which conditions, if they be wanting, their commandments cannot bind to obedience.

For, 1. The very ground and reason wherefore we ought to obey the magistrate(939) is, for that he is the minister of God, or a deputy set in God's stead to us. Now, he is the minister of God only for our good, Rom. xiii. 4. Neither were he God's minister, but his own master, if he should rule at his pleasure, and command things which serve not for the good of the subjects. Since, therefore, the commandments of princes bind only so far as they are the ministers of God for our good,—and God's ministers they are not in commanding such things as are either in their nature unlawful, or in their use inconvenient,—it followeth that such commandments of theirs cannot bind.

2. Princes cannot claim any greater power in matters ecclesiastical than the apostle Paul had, or the church herself yet hath; that is to say, princes may not by any temporal or regal jurisdiction, urge any ceremony or form of ecclesiastical policy which the Apostle once might not, and the church yet may not, urge by a spiritual jurisdiction. But neither had the Apostle of old, nor hath the church now, power to urge either a ceremony or anything else which is not profitable for edifying. Paul could do nothing against the truth, but for the truth; and his power was given to him to edification, and not to destruction, 2 Cor. xiii. 8, 10; neither shall ecclesiastical persons, to the world's end, receive any other power beside that which is for the perfecting of the saints, and for the edifying of the body of Christ, Eph. iv. 12. Therefore, as the church's power(940) is only to prescribe that which may edify, so the power of princes is in like sort given to them for edification, and not for destruction; neither can they do aught against the truth, but only for the truth.

3. We are bound by the law of God to do nothing which is not good and profitable, or edifying, 1 Cor. vi. 12; xiv. 26. This law of charity is of a higher and straiter bond than the law of any prince in the world:—

"The general rule of all indifferent things, is, Let all things be done to edification; and, Rom. xv. 1, 2, 'Let every man please his neighbour to edification, even as Christ pleased not himself but others.' Whatsoever, then, is of this rank, which either would weaken or not edify our brother, be it ever so lawful, ever so profitable to ourselves, ever so powerfully by earthly authority enjoined,—Christians, who are not born unto themselves, but unto Christ, unto his church, and fellow-members, must not dare to meddle with it," saith one(941) well to our well to our purpose.

Sect. 16. A third proposition I promit, which is this, Since the power of princes to make laws about things ecclesiastical is not absolute, but bound and adstricted unto things lawful and expedient, which sort of things, and no other, we are allowed to do for their commandments; and since princes many times may, and do, not only transgress those bounds and limits, but likewise pretend that they are within the same, when indeed they are without them, and enjoin things unlawful and inconvenient, under the name, title, and show of things lawful and convenient; therefore it is most necessary as well for princes to permit, as for subjects to take liberty to try and examine by the judgment of discretion, everything which authority enjoineth, whether it be agreeable or repugnant to the rules of the word; and if, after trial, it be found repugnant, to abstain from the doing of the same.

For, 1. The word teacheth us, that the spiritual man judgeth all things, 1 Cor. ii. 15; trieth the things that are different, Phil. i. 10; hath his senses exercised to discern both good and evil, Heb. v. 14; and that every one who would hold fast that which is good, and abstain from all appearance of evil, must first prove all things, 1 Thess. v. 21.

2. Whatsoever is not of faith is sin, Rom. xiv. 23. But whatsoever a man doth without the trial, knowledge, and persuasion of the lawfulness of it by the word of God, that is not of faith; therefore a sin. It is the word of God, and not the arbitration of princes whereupon faith is grounded. And though the word may be without faith, yet faith cannot be without the word. By it therefore must a man try and know assuredly the lawfulness of that which he doth.

3. "Every one of us shall give account of himself to God." But as we cannot give an account to God of those actions which we have done in obedience to our prince, except we have examined, considered, and understood the lawfulness of the same; so an account could not be required of us for them, if we were bound to obey and to keep all his ordinances in such sort that we might not try and examine them, with full liberty to refuse those which we judge out of the word to be unlawful or inconvenient; for then princes' ordinances were a most sufficient warrant to us: we needed try no more. Let him make an account to God of his command; we have account to make of our obedience.

4. If we be bound to receive and obey the laws of princes, without making a free trial and examining of the equity of the same, then we could not be punished for doing, unwillingly and in ignorance, things unlawful prescribed by them. Whereas every soul that sinneth shall die; and when the blind leads the blind, he who is lead falls in the ditch as well as his leader.

5. No man is permitted to do everything which seemeth right in his eyes, and to follow every conceit which takes him in the head; but every man is bound to walk by rule, Gal. vi. 6. But the law of a prince cannot be a rule, except it be examined whether it be consonant to the word of God, index secundum legem, and his law is only such a rule as is ruled by a higher rule. In so far as it is ruled by the own rule of it, in as far it is a rule to us; and in so far as it is not ruled by the own rule of it, in as far it is not a rule to us. Quid ergo? an non licebit Christiano cuique convenientiam regulae et regulati (ut vocant) observare? saith Junius.(942)

6. The rule whereby we ought to walk in all our ways, and according to which we ought to frame all our actions, is provided of God a stable and sure rule, that it being observed and taken heed unto, may guide and direct our practice aright about all those things which it prescribeth. But the law of a prince (if we should, without trial and examination, take it for our rule) cannot be such a stable and sure rule. For put the case that a prince enjoin two things which sometimes fall out to be incompatible and cannot stand together, in that case his law cannot direct our practice, nor resolve us what to do; whereas God hath so provided for us, that the case can never occur wherein we may not be resolved what to do if we observe the rule which he hath appointed us to walk by.

7. Except this judgment of discretion which we plead for be permitted unto us, it will follow that in point of obedience we ought to give no less, but as much honour unto princes as unto God himself. For when God publisheth his commandments unto us, what greater honour could we give him by our obedience than to do that which he commandeth, for his own sole will and authority, without making further inquiry for any other reason?

8. The Apostle, 1 Cor. vii. 23, forbiddeth us to be the servants of men, that is, to do things for which we have no other warrant beside the pleasure and will of men. Which interpretation is grounded upon other places of Scripture, that teach us we are not bound to obey men in anything which we know not to be according to the will of God, Eph. vi. 6, 7; that we ought not to live to the lusts of men, but to the will of God, 1 Pet. iv. 2, and that, therefore, we ought in everything to prove what is acceptable to the Lord, Eph. v. 20.

9. They who cleanse their way must take heed thereto according to the word, Psal. cxix. 9; therefore, if we take not heed to our way, according to the word, we do not cleanse it. They who would walk as the children of light, must have the word for a lamp unto their feet, and a light unto their path, Psal. cxix. 105; therefore, if we go in any path without the light of the word to direct us, we walk in darkness and stumble, because we see not where we go. They who would not be unwise, but walk circumspectly, must understand what the will of Lord is, Eph. v. 17; therefore, if we understand not what the will of the Lord is concerning that which we do, we are unwise, and walk not circumspectly.

10. Dona Dei in sanctis non sunt otiosa.(943) Whatsoever grace God giveth us, it ought to be used and exercised, and not to lie idle in us; but God giveth us actionem cognoscendi, τα διαφεροντα discernendi,(944) &c. a certain measure of the spirit of discretion, to teach us what to choose as good, and what to refuse as evil, 1 John ii. 27, "The same anointing teacheth you of all things;" 1 Cor. ii. 15, "He that is spiritual judgeth all things." Therefore God would have us to exercise that measure of the gift of discretion which he hath bestowed on us, in discerning of things which are propounded to us, whether they ought to be done or not.

11. Do not our divines plead for this judgment of private discretion which ought to be permitted to Christians, when anything is propounded to be believed or done by them? And this their judgment is to be seen in their writings against Papists about the controversies de interpretatione Scripturae, de fide implicita, &c.

12. The Bishop of Salisbury, in his prelections de Judice Controversiarum, doth often and in many places commend unto Christians the same judgment of discretion which we stand upon, and holdeth it necessary for them to try and examine whatsoever either princes or prelates command them to do. Coactiva, &c. "The coactive power of a prince (saith he(945)), doth not absolutely bind the subject, but only with this condition, except he would compel him to that which is unlawful. Therefore there is ever left unto subjects a power of proving and judging in their own mind, whether that which is propounded be ungodly and unlawful or not; and if it be ungodly, that which the king threateneth should be suffered, rather than that which he commandeth be done. This Augustine hath taught," &c. And whereas it may be objected, that this maketh a subject to be his prince's judge, he answereth thus.(946) Non se, &c. He maketh not himself another's judge, who pondereth and examineth a sentence published by another, in so far as it containeth something either to be done or to be believed by him; but only he maketh himself the judge of his own actions. For howsoever he who playeth the judge is truly said to judge, yet every one who judgeth is not properly said to play the judge. He playeth the judge who, in an external court pronounceth a sentence, which by force of jurisdiction toucheth another; but he judgeth, who in the inferior court of his own private conscience, conceiveth such a sentence of the things to be believed or done, as pertaineth to himself alone. This latter way private men both may and ought to judge of the sentences and decrees of magistrates, neither by so doing do they constitute themselves judges of the magistrates, but judges of their own actions.

Sect. 17. Finally, there is none of our opposites but saith so much as inferreth the necessity of this judgment of private and practical discretion; for every smatterer among them hath this much in his mouth, that if the king or the church command anything unlawful, then we ought to obey God rather than men; but when they command things indifferent and lawful, then their ordinance ought to be our rule. But (good men) will they tell us how we shall know whether the things which the king or the church (as they speak) do enjoin are lawful or unlawful, indifferent or not indifferent? and so we shall be at a point. Dare they say, that they may judge those things indifferent which our superiors judge to be such? and those unlawful which our superiors so judge of? Nay, then, they should deliver their distinction in other terms, and say thus: If our superiors enjoin anything which they judge to be unlawful, and which they command us so to account of, then we ought to obey God rather than men; but if they enjoin such things as they judge to be indifferent, and which they command us so to account of, then we ought to obey their ordinance. Which distinction, methinks, would have made Heraclitus himself to fall a laughing with Democritus. What then remaineth? Surely our opposites must either say nothing, or else say with us, that it is not only a liberty but a duty of inferiors, not to receive for a thing lawful that which is enjoined by superiors, because they account it and call it such, but by the judgment of their own discretion following the rules of the word, to try and examine whether the same be lawful or unlawful.

Sect.. 18. These praecognita being now made good, come we to speak more particularly of the power of princes to make laws and ordinances about things which concern the worship of God. The purpose we will unfold in three distinctions: 1. Of things; 2. Of times; 3. Of ties. First, Let us distinguish two sorts of things in the worship of God, viz., things substantial, and things circumstantial. To things substantial we refer as well sacred and significant ceremonies as the more necessary and essential parts of worship, and, in a word, all things which are not mere external circumstances, such as were not particularly determinable within those bounds which it pleased God to set to his written word, and the right ordering whereof, as it is common to all human societies, whether civil or sacred, so it is investigable by the very light and guidance of natural reason. That among this kind of mere circumstances sacred significant ceremonies cannot be reckoned, we have otherwhere made it evident. Now, therefore, of things pertaining to the substance of God's worship, whether they be sacred ceremonies, or greater and more necessary duties, we say that princes have not power to enjoin anything of this kind which hath not the plain and particular institution of God himself in Scripture. They may indeed, and ought to publish God's own ordinances and commandments, and, by their coactive temporal power, urge and enforce the observation of the same. Notwithstanding, it is a prince's duty, "that in the worship of God, whether internal or external, he move nothing, he prescribe nothing, except that which is expressly delivered in God's own written word."(947) We must beware we confound not things which have the plain warrant of God's word with things devised by the will of man. David, Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, Josiah, and other kings among the people of God, did, as well laudably as lawfully, enjoin and command that worship and form of religion which God, in his law and by his prophets, commanded; and forbid, avoid, and abolish such corruptions as God had forbidden before them, and appointed to be abolished; whence it followeth not that kings may enjoin things which want the warrant of the word, but only this much, which all of us commend, viz., "That a Christian prince's office in religion,(948) is diligently to take care that, in his dominion or kingdom, religion out of the pure word of God, expounded by the word of God itself, and understood according to the first principles of faith (which others call the analogy of faith), either be instituted, or, being instituted, be kept pure, or, being corrupted, be restored and reformed, that false doctrines, abuses, idols, and superstitions, be taken away, to the glory of God, and to his own and his subjects' salvation."

Sect. 19. But in all the Scripture princes have neither a commendable example, nor any other warrant, for the making of any innovation in religion, or for the prescribing of sacred significant ceremonies of men's devising. Jeroboam caused a change to be made in the ceremonies and form of God's worship, whereas God ordained the ark of the covenant to be the sign of his presence, and that his glory should dwell between the cherubims. Jeroboam set up two calves to be the signs representative of that God who brought "Israel out of Egypt;" and this he means while he saith, "Behold thy gods," &c., 1 Kings xii. 28, giving to the signs the thing signified; whereas God ordained Jerusalem to be the place of worship, and all the sacrifices to be brought to the temple of Solomon, Jeroboam made Dan and Bethel to be places of worship, and built there altars and high places for the sacrifices; whereas God ordained the sons of Aaron only to be his priests, Jeroboam made priests of the lowest of the people, which were not of the sons of Levi; whereas God ordained the feast of tabernacles to be kept on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, Jeroboam appointed it on the fifteenth day of the eighth month. Now, if any prince in the world might have fair pretences for the making of such innovations in religion, Jeroboam much more. He might allege for his changing of the signs of God's presence, and of the place of worship, that since Rehoboam's wrath was incensed against him, and against the ten tribes which adhered unto him (as appeareth by the accounting of them to be rebels, 2 Chron. xiii. 6, and by the gathering of a huge army for bringing the kingdom again to Rehoboam, 2 Chron. xi. 1), it was no longer safe for his subjects to go up to Jerusalem to worship, in which case God, who required mercy more than sacrifice, would bear with their changing of a few ceremonies for the safety of men's lives. For his putting down of the priests and Levites, and his ordaining of other priests which were not of the sons of Levi, he might pretend that they were rebellious to him, in that they would not assent unto his new ordinances,(949) which he had enacted for the safety and security of his subjects, and that they did not only simply refuse obedience to these his ordinances, but in their refusal show themselves so stedfastly minded, that they would refuse and withstand even to the suffering of deprivation and deposition; and not only so, but likewise drew after them many others of the rest of the tribes to be of their judgment, 2 Chron. xi. 16, and to adhere to that manner of worship which was retained in Jerusalem. Lastly, For the change which he made about the season of the feast of tabernacles, he might have this pretence, that as it was expedient for the strengthening of his kingdom(950) to draw and allure as many as could be had to associate and join themselves with him in his form of worship (which could not be done if he should keep that feast at the same time when it was kept at Jerusalem); so there was no less (if not more) order and decency in keeping it in the eighth month, when the fruits of the ground were perfectly gathered in(951) (for thankful remembrance whereof that feast was celebrated) than in the seventh, when they were not so fully collected.

These pretences he might have made yet more plausible, by professing and avouching that he intended to worship no idols, but the Lord only; that he had not fallen from anything which was fundamental and essential in divine faith and religion, that the changes which he had made were only about some alterable ceremonies which were not essential to the worship of God, and that even in these ceremonies he had not made any change for his own will and pleasure, but for important reasons which concerned the good of his kingdom and safety of his subjects. Notwithstanding of all this, the innovations which he made about these ceremonies of sacred signs, sacred places, sacred persons, sacred times, are condemned for this very reason, because he devised them of his own heart, 1 Kings xii. 33, which was enough to convince him of horrible impiety in making Israel to sin. Moreover, when king Ahaz took a pattern of the altar of Damascus, and sent it to Urijah the priest, though we cannot gather from the text that he either intended or pretended any other respect beside the honouring and pleasuring of his patron and protector, the king of Assyria, 2 Kings xvi. 10, 18 (for of his appointing that new altar for his own and all the people's sacrifices, there was nothing heard till after his return from Damascus, at which time he began to fall back from one degree of defection to a greater), yet this very innovation of taking the pattern of an altar from idolaters is marked as a sin and a snare. Last of all, whereas many of the kings of Judah and Israel did either themselves worship in the groves and the high places, or else, at least, suffer the people to do so, howsoever they might have alleged(952) specious reasons for excusing themselves,—as namely, that they gave not this honour to any strange gods, but to the Lord only; that they chose these places only to worship in wherein God was of old seen and worshipped by the patriarchs, that the groves and the high places added a most amiable splendour and beauty to the worship of God, and that they did consecrate these places for divine worship in a good meaning, and with minds wholly devoted to God's honour,—yet notwithstanding, because this thing was not commanded of God, neither came it into his heart, he would admit no excuses, but ever challengeth it as a grievous fault in the government of those kings, that those high places were not taken away, and that the people still sacrificed in the high places; from all which examples we learn how highly God was and is displeased with men for adding any other sacred ceremonies to those which he himself hath appointed.(953)

Sect. 20. Now as touching the other sort of things which we consider in the worship of God, namely, things merely circumstantial, and such as have the very same use and respect in civil which they have in sacred actions, we hold that whensoever it happeneth to be the duty and part of a prince to institute and enjoin any order or policy in these circumstances of God's worship, then he may only enjoin such an order as may stand with the observing and following of the rules of the word, whereunto we are tied in the use and practice of things which are in their general nature indifferent.

Of these rules I am to speak in the fourth part of the dispute. And here I say no more but this: Since the word commandeth us to do all things to the glory of God, 1 Cor. x. 31; to do all things to edifying, 1 Cor. xiv. 29; and to do all things in faith, and full persuasion of the lawfulness of that which we do, Rom. xiv. 5, 23, therefore there is no prince in the world who hath power to command his subjects to do that which should either dishonour God, or not honour him; or that which should either offend their brother, or not edify him; or, lastly, that which their conscience either condemneth or doubteth of. For how may a prince command that which his subjects may not do? But a wonder it were if any man should so far refuse to be ashamed that he would dare to say we are not bound to order whatsoever we do according to these rules of the word, but only such matters of private action wherein we are left at full liberty, there being no ordinance of superiors to determine our practice, and that if such an ordinance be published and propounded unto us, we should take it alone for our rule, and no longer think to examine and order our practice by the rules of the word;

For, 1. This were as much as to say, that in the circumstances of God's worship we are bound to take heed unto God's rules, then only and in that case when men give us none of their rules, which, if they do, God's rules must give place to men's rules, and not theirs to his.

2. If it were so, then we should never make reckoning to God, whether that which we had done in obedience to superiors was right or wrong, good or bad, and we should only make reckoning of such things done by us as were not determined by a human law.

3. The law of superiors is never the supreme but ever a subordinate rule, and (as we said before) it can never be a rule to us, except in so far only as it is ruled by a higher rule. Therefore we have ever another rule to take heed unto beside their law.

4. The Scripture speaketh most generally, and admitteth no exception from the rules which it giveth: "Whatsoever ye do (though commanded by superiors) do all to the glory of God. Let all things (though commanded by superiors) be done to edifying. Whatsoever is not of faith (though commanded by superiors) is sin."

5. We may do nothing for the sole will and pleasure of men, for this were to be the servants of men, as hath been shown. The Bishop of Salisbury also assenteth hereunto.(954) Non enim (saith he) Deus vult, ut hominis alicujus voluntatem regulam nostrae voluntatis atque vitae faciamus: sed hoc privilegium sibi ac verbo suo reservatum voluit. And again,(955) Pio itaque animo haec consideratio semper adesse debet, utrum id quod praecipitur sit divino mandato contrarium necne: atque ne ex hac parte fallantur, adhibendum est illud judicium discretionis, quod nos tantopere urgemus.

Sect. 21. These things if Saravia had considered,(956) he had not so absolutely pronounced that the power of the kings may make constitutions of the places and times, when and where the exercises of piety may be conveniently had, also with what order, what rite, what gesture, what habit, the mysteries shall be more decently celebrated. But what! thought he this power of kings is not astricted to the rules of the word? Have they any power which is to destruction and not to edification? Can they command their subjects to do anything in the circumstances of divine worship which is not for the glory of God, which is not profitable for edifying, and which they cannot do in faith? Nay, that all the princes in the world have not such power as this, will easily appear to him who attendeth unto the reasons which we have propounded. And because men do easily and ordinarily pretend that their constitutions are according to the rules of the word, when they are indeed repugnant to the same, therefore we have also proved that inferiors may and must try and examine every ordinance of their superiors, and that by the judgment of private discretion, following the rules of the word. I say following the rules of the word, because we will never allow a man to follow Anabaptistical or Swenckfeldian-like enthusiasms and inspirations.

Sect. 22. Touching the application of what hath been said unto the controverted ceremonies, there needs nothing now to be added. For that they belong not to that sort of things which may be applied to civil uses, with the same respect and account which they have being applied to religious uses, the account I mean of mere circumstances serving only for that common order and decency which is and should be observed in civil no less than in sacred actions, but that they belong to the substance of worship, as being sacred significant ceremonies, wherein both holiness and necessity are placed, and which may not without his sacrilege be used out of the compass of worship, we have elsewhere plainly evinced. And this kind of things, whensover they are men's devices, and not God's ordinances, cannot be lawfully enjoined by princes, as hath been showed.

But if any man will needs have these ceremonies in question to go under the name of mere circumstances, let us put the case they were no other, yet our conforming unto them, which is urged, cannot stand with the rules of the word.

It could not be for the glory of God, not only for that it is offensive to many of Christ's little ones, but likewise for that it ministereth occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme; to atheists, because by these naughty observances they see the commandments of God made of little or no effect, and many godly both persons and purposes despised and depressed, whereat they laugh in their sleeve and say, Aha! so would we have it; to Papists, because as by this our conformity they confirm themselves in sundry of their errors and superstitions, so perceiving us so little to abhor the pomp and bravery of their mother of harlots, that we care not to borrow from her some of her meretricious trinkets, they promise to themselves that in the end we shall take as great a draught of the cup of the wine of her fornications as they themselves.

Neither yet can our conforming unto the ceremonies pressed upon us be profitable for edifying, for we have given sufficient demonstration of manifold hurts and inconveniences ensuing thereon.

Nor, lastly, can we conform to them in faith; for as our consciences cannot find, so the word cannot afford, any warrant for them. Of all which things now I only make mention, because I have spoken of them enough otherwhere.

Sect. 23. The second distinction which may help our light in this question about the power of princes, is of times; for when the church and ministers thereof are corrupted and must be reformed, princes may do much more in making laws about things ecclesiastical than regularly they may, when ecclesiastical persons are both able and willing to do their duty, in rightly taking care of all things which ought to be provided for the good of the church, and conservation or purgation of religion. "For (saith Junuis(957)) both the church, when the joining of the magistrate faileth, may extraordinarily do something which ordinarily she cannot; and again, when the church faileth of her duty, the magistrate may extraordinarily procure that the church return to her duty; that is, in such a case extraordinarily happening, these (ecclesiastical persons) and those (magistrates) may extraordinarily do something which ordinarily they cannot. For this belongeth to common law and equity, that unto extraordinary evils, extraordinary remedies must also be applied." We acknowledge that it belongeth to princes(958) "to reform things in the church, as often as the ecclesiastical persons shall, either through ignorance, disorder of the affection of covetousness, or ambition, defile the Lord's sanctuary." At such extraordinary times, princes, by their coactive temporal power, ought to procure and cause a reformation of abuses, and the avoiding of misorders in the church, though with the discontent of the clergy, for which end and purpose they may not only enjoin and command the profession of that faith, and the practice of that religion which God's word appointeth, but also prescribe such an order and policy in the circumstances of divine worship as they in their judgment of Christian discretion, observing and following the rules of the word, shall judge and try to be convenient for the present time and case, and all this under the commination of such temporal losses, pains, or punishments as they shall deprehend to be reasonable. But at other ordinary times, when ecclesiastical persons are neither through ignorance unable, nor through malice and perverseness of affection unwilling, to put order to whatsoever requireth any mutation to be made in the church and service of God, in that case, without their advice and consent, princes may not make an innovation of any ecclesiastical rite, nor publish any ecclesiastical law.

Sect. 24. When Dr Field(959) speaketh of the power of princes to prescribe and make laws about things spiritual or ecclesiastical, he saith, That the prince may, with the advice and direction of his clergy, command things pertaining to God's worship and service, both for profession of faith, ministration of the sacraments, and conversation fitting to Christians in general, or men of ecclesiastical order in particular, under the pains of death, imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of goods, and the like; and by his princely power establish things formerly defined and decreed, against whatsoever error and contrary ill custom and observation. In all this the Doctor saith very right; but I demand, further, these two things: 1. What if the thing have not been decreed before? and what if the free assent of the clergy be not had for it? Would the Doctor have said that in such a case the prince hath not power by himself, and by his own sole authority, to enjoin it, and to establish a law concerning it? For example, that king James had not power by himself to impose the controverted ceremonies upon the church of Scotland at that time when as no free assent (much less the direction) of the clergy was had for them, so neither had they been formerly decreed, but laws and decrees were formerly made against them. If the Doctor would have answered affirmatively that he had this power, then why did he, in a scornful dissimulation, so circumscribe and limit the power of princes, by requiring a former decree, and the free assent of the clergy? If he would have answered negatively, that he had no such power, we should have rendered him thanks for his answer. 2. Whether may the clergy make any laws about things pertaining to the service of God which the prince may not as well by himself, and without them, constitute and authorise? If the affirmative part be granted unto us, we gladly take it. But we suppose Dr Field did, and our opposites yet do, hold the negative. Whereupon it followeth that the prince hath as much, yea, the very same power, of making laws in all ecclesiastical things which the clergy themselves have when they are convened in a lawful and free assembly, yet I guess from the Doctor's words that he would have replied, namely, that the difference is great betwixt the power of making laws about things ecclesiastical in the prince, and the same power in the clergy assembled together; for he describeth the making of a law to be the prescribing of something, under some pain or punishment, which he that so prescribeth hath power to inflict. Whereby he would make it appear that he yieldeth not unto princes the same power of spiritual jurisdiction, in making of ecclesiastical laws, which agreeth to the clergy; because, whereas a council of the clergy may frame canons about things which concern the worship of God, and prescribe them under the pain of excommunication, and other ecclesiastical censures, the ordinance of princes about such matters is only under the pain of some external or bodily punishment. But I answer, potestas διατακτικὴ is one thing, and potestas κειτικὴ is another thing. When the making of a law is joined either with the intention, or with the commination of a punishment, in case of transgression, this is but accidental and adventitious to the law, not naturally nor necessarily belonging to the essence of the same; for many laws there hath been, and may be, which prescribe not that which they contain under the same pain or punishment. Gratian distinguisheth three sorts of laws: Omnis, &c. "Every law (saith he(960)) either permits something; for example, let a valorous man seek a reward: or forbids; for example, let it be lawful to no man to seek the marriage of holy virgins: or punisheth; for example, he who committeth murder let him be capitally punished." And in this third kind only there is something prescribed under a pain or punishment. It is likewise holden by schoolmen,(961) that it is a law which permitteth something indifferent, as well as it which commandeth some virtue, or forbiddeth some vice. When a prince doth statute and ordain, that whosoever, out of a generous and magnanimous spirit, will adventure to embark and hazard in a certain military exploit against a foreign enemy, whom he intendeth to subdue, shall be allowed to take for himself in propriety all the rich spoil which he can lay hold on,—there is nothing here prescribed under some pain or punishment, yet it is a law, and properly so termed. And might not the name of a law be given unto that edict of King Darius, whereby he decreed that all they in his dominions should fear the God of Daniel, forasmuch as he is the living and eternal God, who reigneth for ever, Dan. vi.; yet it prescribed nothing under some pain or punishment to be inflicted by him who so prescribed. Wherefore, though the prince publisheth ecclesiastical laws under other pains and punishments than the clergy doth, this showeth only that potestas κειτικὴ is not the same, but different, in the one and in the other; yet if it be granted that whatsoever ecclesiastical law a synod of the clergy hath power to make and publish, the prince hath power to make and publish without them, by his own sole authority, it followeth, that the power of the church to make laws which is called potestas διατακτικὴ, doth agree as much, as properly, and as directly to the prince, as to a whole synod of the church.