Upon this string they harp over and over again, in books, in sermons, in private discourses. Mr G. Powell (in his book De Adiaphoris), and Tilen (in the 12th and 17th chapters of his Paraenesis), condemn those who make aught ado about the controverted English ceremonies, for so much as they are things indifferent. Paybody, in his Apology for kneeling at the communion, standeth much upon the indifferency of this gesture, both in every worship of God, and in that sacrament namely. The Archbishop of St. Andrews, in his sermon at Perth Assembly, because he could not prove this indifferency, he chose to suppose it. "Of the indifferency of these articles (saith he) I think there is little or no question amongst us." Whether he spake this of ignorance or of policy, I leave it to be guessed at. Howsoever, if we should thus compose our controversy about the ceremonies, embrace them, and practise them, so being that they be only called things indifferent, this were to cure our church, as L. Sylla cured his country, durioribus remediis quam pericula erant, saith Seneca.(1169) Wherefore we will debate this question of indifferency also.



CHAPTER II.

OF THE NATURE OF THINGS INDIFFERENT.

Sect. 1. To say nothing here of the homonymy of the word indifferent, but to take it in that signification which concerneth our present purpose, it signifieth such a mean betwixt good and evil in human actions, as is alike distant from both these extremes, and yet susceptive of either of them. Indifferens, saith Calepin, is that quod sua natura neque bonum est neque malum. Aquinas(1170) calleth that an indifferent action which is neither good nor evil. Rem indifferentem voco quae neque bona neque mala in se est, saith a later writer.(1171)

But Dr Forbesse(1172) liketh to speak in another language. He will have that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary; and a thing indifferent he taketh to be such a thing as is neither necessarily to be done, nor yet necessarily to be omitted, in respect of any necessity of the commandment of God; or such a thing as is neither remunerable with eternal life, and commendeth a man unto the reward of God, nor yet is punishable with eternal death, and polluteth a man with guiltiness. Now, because he knew that divines define a thing indifferent to be that which is neither good nor evil, he therefore distinguisheth a twofold goodness of an individual action.(1173) The one he calleth bonitas generalis, concomitans, et sine qua non; by which goodness is meant the doing of an action in faith, and the doing of it for the right end, as he expoundeth himself. This goodness, he saith, is necessary to every human action, and hindereth not an action to be indifferent. The other he calleth bonitas specialis, causans, et propter quam. This goodness he calleth legal, and saith that it maketh an action necessary; in which respect indifferent actions are not good, but those only which God in his law hath commanded, and which are remunerable with eternal life.

Sect. 2. But that we may have the vanity of these quiddities discovered to us, let us only consider how falsely he supposeth that there are some things which we do neither laudably nor culpably, and for which we shall neither be rewarded (it is his own phrase which I use) nor yet punished by God. I thought we had learned from Scripture that we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to give an account of every word which we speak, and of every deed which we do in the flesh, and accordingly to receive either a reward or a punishment. What! Could the Doctor say that these good actions which he calleth indifferent, and of which he saith that they are done in faith, and for the right end, are not laudable nor remunerable? Nay, but he saith(1174) that the general goodness which accompanieth the action is remunerable, because it is necessary, but the action itself is not necessary, because that general goodness may be had as well in the omission of it, or in the doing of the contrary, as in the doing of it, whereupon he would have it to follow that the action itself is not remunerable.

Ans. 1. The Doctor had done well to have remembered that he is speaking only of individual actions, and that actus individuatur a circumstantus et adjecto modo, so that whilst all that he saith turneth to this, that one action considered in itself, without the circumstances and concomitant goodness, is not remunerable, he maketh not out his point; for he saith no more in effect, but that actus quo ad speciem is not remunerable, which none of us denieth.

2. An individual good action of that kind which the Doctor calleth necessary, is no otherwise remunerable and laudable than an individual good action of that kind which he calleth indifferent, for example, when I go to hear God's word upon the Lord's day, let this action of mine be considered quo ad individuum, is it any otherwise remunerable than in respect of the goodness which accompanieth it? Whence it is that the hearing of hypocrites, not being accompanied with such goodness, is not remunerable, yet the hearing of the word is an action necessary, because commanded? Now may we know wherein standeth the difference betwixt the remunerable good of this action of hearing, and remunerable good of one of those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, for example, a woman's action of marrying.

I perceive what the Doctor would answer, for he saith,(1175) if a woman marry in the Lord, this action is good respectu adjecti modi, quamvis in se sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum, implying that if, on the other part, an individual action be necessary (as for example the action of hearing the word), then it is in itself good, etiam quo ad individuum.

But, I reply, what means he by these words, in se? Means he the individual nature of the action? Nay, then the sense shall be no other than this, quo ad individuum, etiam quo ad individuum. And, besides, the Doctor cannot define to us any other nature in an individual thing than the nature of the species or kind.

Is it not holden individuum non posse definiri, nisi definitione specici?(1176) Sure a perfect definition, expressing the nature of the thing defined, cannot be given to any individual thing other than the definition of the species, needs, therefore, must the Doctor, by in se, understand the specifical nature, and, indeed, when divines speak of things indifferent, in se, per se, or sua natura, they mean only things indifferent quo ad speciem. Yet thus also the Doctor hath said nonsense, for so we should take his words, quamvis quoad speciem sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum.

Sect. 3. But to let his manner of speaking pass, we will consider what he would or could have said. There is no difference which can here be imagined except this: That the individual action of hearing the word (when one heareth aright) is good and remunerable in a double respect, namely, because it is both good in itself, or quo ad speciem, and likewise respectu adjecti modi, whereas a woman's action of marrying (when she marrieth in the Lord) is only good and remunerable in the last respect, namely, respectu modi, for, in se, or, quo ad speciem, it hath no remunerable goodness in it.

Ans. What do we hear of any difference betwixt these actions quo ad speciem? That which we crave is, that a difference may be showed betwixt the remunerable goodness of the one and of the other, both being considered quo ad individuum.

That whereby the Doctor either was deceived, or would deceive, appeareth to be this: That he taketh everything which agreeth to an individual thing to agree to it quo ad individuum, as if to speak of Peter quatenus est homo, and to speak of him quatenus est individuum signatum, or res singularis sub specie hominis, were all one thing. Even so, to say of my individual action of hearing the word, that it is necessary because of the commandment of God (and in that respect remunerable), is not to speak of it quo ad individuum, but as the specifical nature of that action of hearing the word (which God hath commanded) is found in it; for if we speak of this individual action, quo ad individuum, we cannot consider it otherwise than respectu adjecti modi, because, in moral actions, modus adjectus is principium individuationis, and nothing else doth individualise a moral action.

Sect. 4. Thus shall my position stand good, namely, that those individual actions which the Doctor calleth necessary, because their species is commanded of God, and those individual actions which he calleth indifferent, because their species is not commanded, both being considered quo ad individuum, the former hath no other remunerable good in them than the latter, and the whole remunerable good which is in either of them standeth only in objecto modo; which being so, it is all one when we speak of any individual moral action quo ad individuum, whether we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are one. For, as is well said by Aquinas,(1177) Necessarium est omnem actum hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere. And again: Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus; wherefore that distinction of a twofold goodness, causans and concomitans, which the Doctor hath given us, hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and remunerable which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now moral goodness, saith Scalliger,(1178) est perfectio actus cum recta ratione. Human moral actions are called good or evil, in ordine ad rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, saith Aquinas,(1179) thereupon inferring that illis mores dicuntur boni, qui rationi congruunt; mali autem, qui a ratione discordant. Dr Forbesse doth therefore pervert the question whilst he saith,(1180) in hac cum fratribus quaestione, hoc bonum est quod necessarium. Nay, those actions we call morally good which are agreeable to right reason, whether they be necessary or not. Since, then, those actions are laudable and remunerable which are morally good, and those are morally good which are agreeable to right reason, it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are, therefore, not only morally good, but also laudable and remunerable, and so not indifferent. Yea, those actions which he calleth necessary, being considered quo ad individuum, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable than those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner quo ad individuum, as hath been showed.

Sect. 5. And besides all this, we have somewhat more to say of the Doctor's speculation about the nature of things indifferent.

For, 1. The Doctor maketh that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary, and yet he maketh both these to be morally good. Now albeit in natural things one good is opponed to another good, as that which is hot to that which is cold, yet bonum bona non contrariatur in moralibus.(1181) The reason of the difference is, because bonitas physica, or relativa est congruentia naturae quaedem, saith Scalliger;(1182) and because two natures may be contrary one to another, therefore the good which is congruous to the one may be contrary to the good which is congruous to the other; but bonum virtutis, saith Aquinas(1183) non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum, scilicet rationem; so that it is impossible for one moral good to be opponed to another.

2. Since divines take a thing indifferent to be medium inter bonum et malum morale; and since (as the very notation of the word showeth) it is such a means as cometh not nearer to the one extreme than to the other, but is alike distant from both, how comes it that the Doctor so far departeth both from the tenet of divines and from the notation of the word, as to call some such actions indifferent as have a moral remunerable goodness, and yet not evil in them? or where learned he such a dialect as giveth to some good things the name of the things indifferent?

3. Why doth he also waver from himself; for he citeth(1184) out of the Helvetic Confessor Jerome's definition of a thing indifferent, and approveth it. Indifferens, saith he, illud est quod nec bonum nec malum est, ut sive feceris sive non feceris, nec justitiam habeas nec injustitiam. Behold the goodness which is excluded from the nature of a thing indifferent is not only necessity but righteousness also, yet hath the Doctor excluded only the good of necessity from things indifferent, making the other good of righteousness to stand with them; for things which are done in faith, and done for the right end (such as he acknowledgeth these things to be which he calleth indifferent), have righteousness in them, as all men know.



CHAPTER III.

WHETHER THERE BE ANYTHING INDIFFERENT IN ACTU EXERCITO.

Sect. 1. For our better light in this question I will premit these considerations, 1. When we measure the goodness or the badness of a human action, we must not only measure it by the object and the end, but by all the circumstances which accompany it. Fed. Morellus,(1185) upon those words of Seneca, Refert quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi, &c., saith, that without those circumstances of things, persons, times, places, facti ratio non constat. Circumstances sometimes constituunt rerum earum quae aguntur speciem, say our divines,(1186) meaning that circumstances do make an action good or bad. Humani actus, say the schoolmen,(1187) non solum ex objectis, verum ex circumstantiis boni vel mali esse dicuntur. It is not every man's part, saith one of our opposites,(1188) to judge de circumstantia, quae reddit actionem vel bonam vel malam. "Some circumstances, saith another of them,(1189) are intrinsical and essential to actions, and specially making up their nature." The principal circumstances which here we speak of, are comprehended in this versicle:—

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur quomodo, quando.

The first circumstance which maketh an action good or bad is quis, which designeth the person: If a magistrate put to death a malefactor, the action is good; but if a private person put him to death, it is evil.

The second is quid, which noteth the quality or condition of the object: If a man take sua, the action is good; if aliena, it is evil.

The third is ubi: If men banquet in their own houses, the action is good; if in the church, it is evil.

The fourth is quibus auxiliis: If men seek health by lawful means, the action is good; if by the devil, or his instruments, it is evil.

The fifth is cur: If I rebuke my brother for his fault, out of my love to him, and desire to reclaim him, the action is good; if out of hatred and spleen, the action is evil.

The sixth is quomodo: For he who doth the work of the Lord carefully doth well; but he who doth it negligently doth evil.

The seventh is quando: To do servile work upon the six days of labour, is good; but to do it upon the Lord's Sabbath, is evil.

2. There is another consideration which followeth upon the former; and it is this: The goodness or badness of a human action may be considered two ways, viz., either in actu signato, and quo ad speciem; or in actu exercito, and quo ad individuum; for an action is said to be specificated by its object, and individuated by its circumstances; so that, when an action is good or evil in respect of the object of it, then it is called good or evil quo ad speciem: when it is good or evil in respect of the circumstances of it, then it is said to be good or evil quo ad individuum.

3. Human actions, whether considered quo ad speciem, or quo ad individuum, are either such as proceed from the deliberation of reason, or from bare imagination only. To this latter kind we refer such actions as are done through incogitancy, while the mind is taken up with other thoughts; for example, to scratch the head, to handle the beard, to move the foot, &c.; which sort of things proceed only from a certain stirring or fleeting of the imagination.

4. Let it be remembered, that those things we call morally good, which agree to right reason; those morally evil which disagree from right reason; and those indifferent which include nothing belonging to the order of reason, and so are neither consonant unto nor dissonant from the same.

5. When we speak of the indifferency of an individual action, it may be conceived two ways: either absolute et sine respectu ad aliud; or comparate et cum respectu ad aliud. In the free-will offerings, if so be a man offered according as God had blessed and prospered his estate, it was indifferent to offer either a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat; but if he chose to offer any of them, his action of offering could not be indifferent, but either good or evil. When we speak of the indifferency of an action comparate, the sense is only this, that it is neither better nor worse than another action, and that there is no reason to make us choose to do it more than another thing; but when we speak of the indifferency of an action considered absolutely and by itself, the simple meaning is, whether it be either good or evil, and whether the doing of the same must needs be either sin or evil doing.

6. Every thing which is indifferent in the nature of it, is not by and by indifferent in the use of it. But the use of a thing indifferent ought evermore to be either chosen or refused, followed or forsaken, according to these three rules delivered to us in God's word: 1. The rule of piety; 2. The rule of charity; 3. The rule of purity.

The first of these rules we find, 1 Cor. x. 31, "Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God;" and Rom. xiv. 7, 8, "For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord, and whether we die, we die unto the Lord:" where the Apostle, as Calvin noteth,(1190) reasoneth from the whole to the part. Our whole life, and, by consequence, all the particular actions of it, ought to be referred to God's glory, and ordered according to his will. Again, Col. iii. 17, "And whatsoever ye do, in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus." In the expounding of which words Dr Davenant saith well, that Etiam ille actiones quae sunt sua natura adiaphorae, debent tamen a Christianis fieri in nomine Christi, hoc est, juxta voluntatem Christi, et ad gloriam Christi.

The second rule is the rule of charity; which teacheth us not to use anything indifferent when scandal riseth out of it: Rom. xiv. 21, "It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak;" yea, though it do not weaken, if it be not expedient for edifying our brother, be it never so lawful or indifferent in its own nature, the law of charity bindeth us to abstain from it: Rom. xiv. 19, "Let us therefore follow after the things which make for peace, and the things wherewith one may edify another;" Rom. xv. 2, "Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification;" 1 Cor. x. 23, "All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient: all things are lawful for me, but all things edify not:" where the Apostle teacheth, that in cibo, &c.,(1191) "In meat, drink, and the whole kind of things indifferent, it is not enough to look whether they be lawful, but that, farther, we are to look whether to do or omit the same be expedient, and may edify." The Bishop of Winchester, preaching upon John xvi. 7, "I tell you the truth: it is expedient for you that I go away," &c., marketh, that Christ would not go away without acquainting his disciples with the reason of it; and that reason was, because it was for their good: whereupon he inferreth, 1. That we should avoid Hophni's non vult enim, and make our vult our enim, 1 Sam. ii. 15; that is, that we should not give our will for a reason, but a reason for our will; 2. That we should not, with the Corinthians, stand upon licet,—it is lawful, but frame our rule by expedit,—it is expedient, 1 Cor. vi. 13; x. 23; 3. That our rule should not be Caiaphas' expedit nobis, but Christ's expedit vobis,—for you it is good, you, the disciples, John xi. 50; and make that the rule of our going out and our coming in. The heathens themselves could say that we are born, partly for God, partly for our country, partly for our friends, &c. How much more ought Christians to understand that we are not born for ourselves, but for Christ and his church. And as in the whole course of our life, so especially in the policy of the church, we may do nothing (be it never so indifferent in itself) which is not profitable for edification: 1 Cor. xiii. 26, "Let all things be done to edifying." From which precept Pareus inferreth, that nothing ought to be done in the church which doth not manifestly make for the utility of all and every one; and that therefore not only unknown tongues, but cold ceremonies and idle gestures should be exploded out of the church.

The third rule is the rule of purity, which respecteth our peace and plerophory of conscience, without which anything is unclean to us, though it be clean and lawful in its own nature: Rom xiv. 14, "To him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean," therefore si quis aliquam in cibo immunditiem imagineter, eo libere uti non potest.(1192) Whatsoever indifferent thing a man in his conscience judgeth to be unlawful, he may not lawfully do it: Rom xiv. 5, "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind;" and verse 23, "He that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin." Nefas est omnino, saith Calvin,(1193) quippiam aggredi quod putes illi (domino) displicere, imo quod non persuasus sis illi placere. Now if a thing indifferent be used according to these three rules, the use of it is not only lawful but expedient also; but if it be not used according to these rules, the use of it is altogether unlawful.

Sect. 3. And since a thing indifferent in the nature of it can never be lawfully used, except according to these rules, hence it followeth, that the use of a thing indifferent is never lawful to us when we have no other warrant for using the same beside our own will and arbitrement.

Dr Forbesse speaks unadvisedly whilst he saith,(1194) _Evenit nonnunquam_, &c.: "It falleth out sometimes that that which was expedient for thee to do yesterday, and to omit this day, thou mayest, notwithstanding, afterward either do it, or not do it, according to thy arbitrement:" As if, forsooth, our using of things indifferent should not evermore be determined by the rule of expediency which God's word giveth us, but sometimes by our own will. Dr Davenant(1195) could not dream that any, except the ignorant common people, could be of this opinion which Dr Forbesse holdeth _Fallitur vulgus_, saith he, _dum judicat licere _ sibi, uti victu, vestitu, sermone, aut quacunque re adiaphora pro arbitrio suo; nam haec omnia ad regulam adhibenda sunt_.

Moreover, as we may not use any indifferent thing at our own pleasure; so neither may the church, at her will and pleasure, command the use of it: but as our practice, so the church's injunction must be determined and squared according to the former rules. And if any man think that, in the using of things indifferent, he may be led and ruled by the church's determination, without examining any further, let him understand that the church's determination is but a subordinate rule, or a rule ruled by higher rules.

Dr Forbesse, perceiving how these rules of Scripture may subvert his cause, desireth to subject them to the church's determination, and to make it our highest rule. Jam autem, saith he,(1196) in talium rerum usu, id edificat, quod pacificum; illud est pacificum quod est ordinatum; is autem decens ordo est in ecclesia ab ipso Christo constitutus, ut in talibus non suo quisque se gerat arbitratu, sed audiatur ecclesia, et exhibeatur praepositis obedientia.

He hath been speaking of the rules which God's word giveth us concerning the use of things indifferent; and all of them he comprehendeth under this rule, that we should hear the church, and obey them who are set over us, as if God's rules were subordinate to men's rules, and not theirs to his. We say not that every man may use things indifferent sua arbitratu, but we say withal, that neither may the church command the use of things indifferent suo arbitratu. Both she in commanding and we in obeying must be guided by the rules of Scripture.

They who are set over us in the church have no power given them of Christ which is not for edifying, Eph. iv. 12. The counsel of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem (which is a lively pattern of a lawful synod to the world's end) professed they would lay no other burden upon the disciples except such things as the law of charity made necessary for shunning of scandal, Acts xv. 28; and so that which they decreed had force and strength to bind a charitate propter scandalum, saith Sanctius;(1197) but suo arbitratu they enjoined nothing. Cartwright saith, "It appeareth by this place that there may be no abridgement of liberty simply decreed, but in regard of circumstance, according to the rule of edification."(1198) And if the church's decrees and canons be not according to the rules of the word; yet, forasmuch as every one of us shall give account of himself and his own deeds, we must look that whatsoever the church decree, yet our practice, in the use or omission of a thing indifferent, be according to the foresaid rules.

We may not, for the commandment of men, transgress the rule of piety, by doing anything which is not for God's glory, and ordered according to his will; neither ought any of us to obey men, except "for the Lord's sake," 1 Pet. ii. 13, and "as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God," Eph. vi. 6; which teacheth us the manner how we ought to obey men, namely, propter Christum et sicut Christus praecipit;(1199) for if we should know no more but the will of man for that which we do, then we should be the "servants of men," not the servants of Christ. Neither yet may we for any human ordinance break the rule of charity; "But whatsoever either would weaken, or not edify our brother, be it never so lawful, never so profitable to ourselves, never so powerfully by earthly authority enjoined, Christians, who are not born unto themselves, but unto Christ, unto his church, and unto the fellow-members, must not dare to meddle with it."(1200)

Nor, lastly, may we obey men, so as to break the law of purity, and "perform any action with a doubtful conscience; that is, whereof either the world hath not,(1201) nor we out of it have no warrant, in which case tender consciences must be tendered rather than be racked by authority, for be the things in themselves never so lawful, &c., they are utterly unlawful to me without such information." Whereas, therefore, some say, that in the use of matters indifferent, the laws of those who are set over us ought to rule us; we still answer that our practice may not be ruled by any law of man, except it be according to the rules of the word, whereof one is this, Tantum oportere esse obedientiae studium in Christianis,(1202) ut nihil agant, quod non existiment vel potius certi sint placere Deo.

Sect. 4. These considerations being permitted, for resolution of the question in hand, we say, 1. As touching those actions which proceed from bare imagination, whether they be evil and inordinate quo ad speciem, forsomuch as the imagination from which they have their original doth not in those actions subject itself to the conduct and moderation of reason, but is like Gehazi, running away without his master's leave, let the learned give their judgment. Howsoever, it cannot be denied, that such actions may be and are of a civil quo ad individuum,(1203) or in respect of the circumstances, which show forth in them reprovable temerity, incogitancy, levity, and indecency. But such actions belong not to our purpose. 2. As for those actions which proceed from the deliberation of reason, howbeit many of them be indifferent, quo ad speciem, yet none of them are, nor can be indifferent, quo ad individuum. The reason of this difference and distinction is, because every action hath its species or kind,(1204) from the object, and a human moral action hath its species or kind from the object referred to the original of human actions, which is reason. Whereupon it cometh, that if the object of the action include something that agreeth to the order of reason, it shall be a good action, according to its kind; for example, to give alms to an indigent man. But if it include something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it shall be an evil action according to its kind; as to steal or take away another man's goods. Now sometimes it happeneth that the object of an action doth not include something that belongeth to the order of reason; as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, &c., such actions are indifferent, according to their kind. But we must pronounce far otherwise of them when we speak of them quo ad individuum, because as they are individuated by their circumstances, so in their individual being, they have their goodness or badness from the same circumstances, as hath been showed. So that no such action as is deliberated upon can be indifferent, quo ad individuum; because oportet (saith Thomas(1205)) quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam, per quam trahetur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis. Friar Ambrosius Catarinus, following the doctrine of Thomas, maintained in the Council of Trent,(1206) that to do good was a work, the concurrences of all circumstances is necessary, but the want of one only is sufficient for an evil, so that howsoever among the works considered in general, some are indifferent, yet in the singular there is no medium between having all the circumstances and wanting some; therefore every particular action is good or evil; and because among the circumstances the end is one, all works referred to a bad end are infected. He further alleged St. Augustine, that it is sin not only to refer the action to a bad end, but also not to refer it to a good end. Thus spake the learned friar very appositely; and the same is the judgment of our own divines. De bis rebus indifferentibus (saith Martyr(1207)) statuendum est, quod tantummodo ex genere atque natura sua indifferentiam habeant, sed quando ad electionem descenditur nihil est indifferens; and so saith Pareus likewise.(1208)

Sect. 5. These things are so plain and undeniable, that Dr Forbesse(1209) himself acknowledged no less than that every individual human action is either good or bad morally; and that there is a goodness which is necessary to every action, namely, the referring of it to the last end, and the doing of it in faith; which goodness, if it be wanting, the action is evil. Notwithstanding, he will have some actions, even quo ad individuum, called indifferent, for this respect, because they are neither commanded of God, and so necessary to be done, nor yet forbidden, and so necessary to be omitted.

Of an individual action of this kind, he saith: Manet homini respectu istius actus plena arbitrii libertas moralis; tum ea quae exercitii seu contradictionis dicitur, tum etiam ea quae specificationis seu contrarietatis libertas appellatur. He holdeth, that though such an action be done in faith, and for the right end (which general goodness, he saith, is necessary to the action, and commendeth a man to God), yet the action itself is indifferent, because it is not necessary; for a man hath liberty to omit the same, or to do another thing; which he illustrateth by this example:—

If the widow Sempronia marry at all, it is faith, because, as the Apostle teacheth, whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Now whilst everything is condemned which is not of faith, two sorts of actions are rejected, as Calvin observeth:(1210) 1. Such actions as are not grounded upon, nor approven by the word of God. 2. Such actions, as though they be approven by the word of God, yet the mind, wanting this persuasion, doth not cheerfully address itself to the doing of them. But, I pray, doth the word underprop or approve the use of anything indifferent, if it be not used according to the foresaid rules, and, by consequence, conveniently and profitably?

Sect. 9. The Doctor thinks it enough that, in the use of a thing indifferent, I believe it is lawful for me to do this thing, albeit I believe and certainly know that it is lawful to me to omit it, or do the contrary; so that the doing of a thing in faith inferreth not the necessity of doing it: but for answer hereunto we say,

1. We have sufficiently proven that it is never lawful for us to do anything which is in the nature of it indifferent, except we be persuaded not only of the lawfulness of the thing, but of the expediency of doing it.

2. Of his comparing of things indifferent together, and not considering them positively and by themselves, we have also said enough before.

3. The doing of a thing in faith inferreth the expediency and profit of doing it, and that is enough to take away the indifferency of doing it; for since every indifferent thing is either expedient to be done, or else unlawful to be done (as hath been showed), it followeth that either it ought to be done, or else it ought to be left undone; therefore it is never indifferent nor free to us to do it, or leave it undone, at our pleasure.

4. Because the Doctor (I perceive) sticketh upon the term of necessity, and will have everything which is not necessary to be indifferent; therefore, to remove this scruple, beside that Chrysostom and the author of the interlineary gloss upon Matt. xviii. 7, take the meaning of those words, "It must needs be that offences come," to be this, it is profitable that offences come. Which gloss, though it be not to be received, yet as Camero noteth,(1211) it is ordinary to call that necessary which is very profitable and expedient. Besides this, I say, we further maintain, that in the use of things indifferent, that which we deliberate upon to do is never lawful to be done except it be also necessary, though not necessitate absoluta seu consequentis, yet necessitate consequentiae seu ex suppositione. Paul's circumcising of Timothy was lawful only because it was necessary, for he behoved by this means to win the good will of the people of Lystra who had once stoned him,(1212) otherwise he could not safely have preached the gospel among them. Therefore he had done wrong if he had not circumcised Timothy, since the circumcising of him was according to the rules of the word, and it was expedient to circumcise him, and unexpedient to do otherwise. And (because de partibus idem est judicium) whensoever the use of any indifferent thing is according to the rules of the word, that is, when it is profitable for God's glory, and man's edification, and the doer is persuaded of so much, I say, putting this case, then (forsomuch as not only it may, but ought to be done) the use of it is not only lawful but necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but ought not to be admitted) the omission of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful.

Again, put the case, that the use of a thing indifferent be either against or not according to the said rules, then (forsomuch as not only it may, but ought to be admitted) the omission of it is not only lawful but necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but may not, neither ought to be done) the doing of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful. For which it maketh, that the apostles in their decree, allege no other ground for abstinence from blood and things strangled (which were in their nature indifferent), but the necessity of abstaining caused and induced by the foresaid rules, Acts xv. 28.

The Apostle showeth that that measure of liberality whereunto he exhorted the Corinthians was not by any divine commandment necessary, yet he adviseth it as a thing expedient, 2 Cor. viii. 8, 10. And were not the Corinthians thereunto bound, because of this expediency of the matter, though it was not necessary? Juxta verbum, &c.: "According to God's word (saith the Bishop of Salisbury(1213)) we are obliged to glorify God by our good works, not only when necessity requireth, but also when ability furnisheth, and opportunity occurreth," Gal. vi. 10; Tit. ii. 14.

Sect. 10. As touching the scope of all this dispute, which is the indifferency of the controverted ceremonies, we shall hear sundry reasons against it afterward. For the present, I say no more but this: As in every case, so most especially when we meddle with the worship of God, or any appurtenance thereof, the rules of the word tie us so straitly, that that which is in its own nature indifferent ought either to be done, or to be left undone, according as it is either agreeable or not agreeable to these rules; and so is never left free to us to be done or omitted at our pleasure: for if at all we be (as certainly we are) abridged of our liberty, chiefly it is in things pertaining to divine worship.

But I marvel why Dr Forbesse discourseth so much for the indifferency of the ceremonies; for, lib. 1, cap. 7, he holdeth, that there were just reasons in the things themselves why the pretended Assembly of Perth should enjoin the five articles; some of which he calleth very convenient and profitable, and others of them necessary in themselves. Sure, if he stand to that which he hath there written, he cannot choose but say that it is unlawful, both for us and for all Christians anywhere, to omit the controverted ceremonies; and that all such as have at any time omitted them, have thereby sinned, in leaving that undone which they ought to have done—for the conveniency and necessity of them which he pretendeth is perpetual and universal.



CHAPTER IV.

OF THE RULE BY WHICH WE ARE TO MEASURE AND TRY WHAT THINGS ARE INDIFFERENT.

Sect. 1. That the word of God is the only rule whereby we must judge of the indifferency of things, none of our opposites, we hope, will deny. "Of things indifferent (saith Paybody(1214)) I lay down this ground, that they be such, and they only, which God's word hath left free unto us."

Now these things which God's word leaveth free and indifferent (in respect of their nature and kind) are such things as it neither showeth to be good nor evil. Where we are further to consider, that the word of God showeth unto us the lawfulness or unlawfulness, goodness or badness of things, not only by precepts and prohibitions, but sometimes also, and more plainly, by examples. So that, not only from the precepts and prohibitions of the word, but likewise from the examples recorded in the same, we may find out that goodness or badness of human actions which taketh away the indifferency of them.

And as for those who will have such things called indifferent as are neither commanded nor forbidden in the word of God, I ask of them whether they speak of plain and particular precepts and prohibitions, or of general only? If they speak of particular precepts and prohibitions, then, by their rule, the baptising of young children, the taking of water for the element of baptism; a lecturer's public reading of Scripture in the church upon the Sabbath day; the assembling of synods for putting order to the confusions of the church; the writing and publication of the decrees of the same; and sundry other things which the word hath commended unto us by examples,—should all be things indifferent, because there are not in the word of God either particular precepts for them, or particular prohibitions against them. But if they speak of general precepts and prohibitions, then are those things commanded in the word of God for which we have the allowed and commended examples of such as we ought to follow (for, in the general, we are commanded to be followers of such examples, Phil. iv. 8, 9; 1 Cor. xi. 1; Eph. v. 1), though there be no particular precept for the things themselves thus exemplified.

Sect. 2. To come, therefore, to the ground which shall give us here some footing, and whereupon we mind to rear up certain superstructions, we hold, that not only we ought to obey the particular precepts of the word of God, but that also "we are bound to imitate Christ, and the commendable example of his apostles, in all things wherein it is not evident they had special reasons moving them thereto, which do not concern us:" which ground, as it hath been of a long time holden and confirmed by them of our side, so never could, nor ever shall, our opposites subvert it. It is long since the Abridgement confirmed and strengthened it, out of those places of Scripture: Eph. v. 1, "Be ye therefore followers of God, as dear children;" 1 Cor. xi. 1, "Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ;" 1 Thess. i. 6, "And ye became followers of us and of the Lord;" Phil. iii. 17, "Brethren, be followers together of me."

This ground is also at length pressed by Cyprian, who showeth(1215) that, in the holy supper of the Lord, Christ alone is to be followed by us; that we are to do what he did; and that we ought not to take heed what any man hath done before us, but what Christ did, who is before all.

Sect. 3. But Bishop Lindsey(1216) asketh of us, if we hold this rule, what is the cause why, at the celebration of the sacrament, we bless not the bread severally by itself, and the cup severally by itself, seeing Christ did so, yet having no cause to move him which concerns not us.

Ans. 1. Beside the common blessing of the elements, in the beginning of the action, we give thanks also in the several actions of distribution, saying after this or the like manner: "The Lord Jesus, the same night he was betrayed, took bread, and when he had given thanks (as we also give thanks to God who gave his Son to die for us) he brake it," &c. "In like manner also, after supper, he took the cup, and, when he had given thanks (as we also give thanks to God who gave his Son to shed his blood for us), he gave it," &c. Which form (we conceive) may be construed to be an imitation of the example of Christ.

2. Though we did not observe such a form; yet there were two reasons to move Christ to give thanks severally, both at the giving of the bread, and at the giving of the cup, neither of which concerneth us: 1. The eucharistical supper was one continued action with the other supper which went before it; for it is said, "That whilst they did eat, he took bread," &c. Wherefore, for more distinction of it from that supper which immediately proceeded, it was fit that he should give thanks severally at the giving of each element. 2. He had to do with the twelve apostles, whose hearts being so greatly troubled with sorrow, John xvi. 6, and whose minds not well comprehending that which they heard concerning the death of Christ, John xvi. 12, much less those mystical symbols of it, especially at the first hearing, seeing, and using of the same, it was needful for their cause distinctly and severally to bless those elements, thereby to help the weakness of their understanding, and to make them the more capable of so heavenly mysteries.

Sect. 4. Now, having heard that which the Bishop had to say against our rule, let us examine his own. He holdeth,(1217) That in the actions of Christ's apostles, or the customs of the church, there is nothing exemplary and left to be imitated of us, but that which either being moral, is generally commanded in the decalogue, or being ceremonial and circumstantial, is particularly commanded by some constant precept in the gospel.

Ans. 1. This rule is most false; for it followeth from it that the example of the apostles' making choice of the element of water in baptism, and requiring a confession of faith from the person who was to be baptised; the example also both of Christ and his apostles using the elements of bread and wine in the holy supper, a table at which they did communicate, and the breaking of the bread, are not left to be imitated of us; because these things are ceremonial, but not particularly commanded in the gospel. So that according to the rule which the Bishop holdeth, we sin in imitating Christ and his apostles in those things, forasmuch as they are not exemplary, nor left to be imitated of us.

2. His weapons fight against his own fellows, who allege (as we have showed elsewhere) the custom of the church(1218) is a sufficient warrant for certain ceremonies questioned betwixt them and us, which are not particularly commanded by any precept in the gospel. These the Bishop doth unwittingly strike at it whilst he holdeth that such customs of the church are not exemplary, nor left to be imitated of us.

Sect. 5. Wherefore we hold still our own rule for sure and certain. Christ's actions are either amanda, as the works of redemption; or admiranda, as his miracles; or notanda, as many things done by him for some particular reason proper to that time and case, and not belonging to us, which things, notwithstanding, are well worthy of our observation; or imitanda, and such are all his actions which had no such special reason moving him thereto as do not concern us.

Calvin, upon 1 Cor. xi. 1, saith well, that the Apostle there calls back both himself and others to Christ, Tanquam unicum recte agendi exemplar; and Polycarpus Lycerus, upon Matt. xvi. 24, under that command of following Christ, comprehendeth the imitations of Christ's actions.

Most certainly it is inexcusable presumption to leave the example of Christ, and to do that which seemeth right in our own eyes, as if we were wiser than he. And now, having laid down this ground, we are to build certain positions upon it, us follows.



CHAPTER V.

THE FIRST POSITION WHICH WE BUILD UPON THE GROUND CONFIRMED IN THE FORMER CHAPTER.

Sect. 1. From that which hath been said of following Christ, and the commendable example of his apostles, in all things wherein it is not evident that they had some such special reason moving them to do that which they did, as doth not concern us, our first inference is this: That it is not indifferent for a minister to give the sacramental elements of bread and wine out of his own hand to every communicant; forasmuch as our Lord commanded his apostles to divide the cup among them, that is, to reach it one to another, Luke xxii. 17. Some of the interpreters are of opinion, that the cup spoken of by the Evangelist in that place is not the same whereof he speaketh after, ver. 20; but they are greatly mistaken; for if it were as they think, then Christ did again drink before his death of that fruit of the vine whereof we read ver. 18, which is manifestly repugnant to his own words. Wherefore, as Maldonat observeth(1219) out of Augustine and Euthimius, there was but one cup; whereof Luke speaketh, first, by anticipation, and, afterward, in its own proper place.

Sect. 2. But Bishop Lindsey(1220) falleth here upon a very strange speculation; and tells us, that if all the disciples did drink, howbeit they did not deliver the cup one to another, but received it severally from Christ's own hand, they divided the same among them; because every one takes his part of that which is parted, they divide the whole among them. Alas! that I should blot paper with the confutation of such fooleries. I believe, when his Majesty hath distributed and divided so many lands and revenues among the prelates of Scotland, every one of them takes his part, but dare not say, though, that they have divided these lands and revenues among themselves. Can twenty or forty beggars, when an alms is distributed among them, because every one of them getteth his part, say, therefore, that they themselves have parted it among them? What, then, shall be said of the distributor who giveth to every one his part severally, and by himself? That man who required that his brother should divide the inheritance with him, did not, I trow, desire Christ to cause his brother to take his own part of the inheritance (there was no fear that he would not take his part); but he desired that his brother might give to him his part. So that, to divide anything among men, is not to take it, but to give it. And who did ever confound parting and partaking, dividing a cup and drinking a cup, which differ as much as giving and receiving. Thus we conclude, that when Christ commanded the apostles to divide the cup among them, the meaning of the words can be no other than this, that they should give the cup one to another; which is so plain that a Jesuit(1221) also maketh it to follow upon this command, that Christ did reach the cup non singulis sed uni, qui proximo, proximus sequenti, et deinceps daret. Hence it is that Hospinian(1222) thinks it most likely that Christ brake the bread into two parts, earumque alteram dederit illi qui proximus ei ad dextram accumbebat, alteram vero ei qui ad sinistram, ut isti deinceps proxime accumbentibus porrigerent, donec singuli particulam sibi decerpsissent.



CHAPTER VI.

ANOTHER POSITION BUILT UPON THE SAME GROUND.

Sect. 1. Our next position which we infer, is this: That it is not indifferent to sit, stand, pass, or kneel, in the act of receiving the sacramental elements of the Lord's supper, because we are bound to follow the example of Christ and his apostles, who used the gesture of sitting in this holy action, as we prove from John xiii. 12; from Matt. xxvi. 20, with 26; Mark xiv. 18, with 22.

Our opposites here bestir themselves, and move every stone against us. Three answers they give us, which we will now consider.

First, They tell us that it is not certain that the apostles were sitting when they received this sacrament from Christ, and that adhuc sub judice lis est. Yet let us see what they have to say against the certainty hereof.

Bishop Lindsey objecteth, that, between their eating of the paschal supper and the administration of the sacrament to the disciples, five acts intervened: 1. The taking of the bread; 2. The thanksgiving; 3. The breaking; 4. The precept, "Take ye, eat ye;" 5. The word, whereby the element was made the sacrament. In which time, saith he, the gesture of sitting might have been changed.

Ans. It is first of all to be noted, that the apostles were sitting at the instant when Christ took the bread, for it is said that he took bread whilst they did eat; that is (as Maldonat(1223) rightly expoundeth it), Antequam surgerent, antequam mensae et ciborum reliquiae removerentur; and so we use to say that men are dining or supping so long as they sit at table and the meat is not removed from before them. To Christ's ministering of the eucharistical supper together with the preceding supper, Christians had respect when they celebrated the Lord's supper together with the love-feasts. Probabile est eos ad Christi exemplum respexisse, qui eucharistiam inter coenandum instituit, saith Pareus.(1224) But of this we need say no more; for the Bishop himself hath here acknowledged no less than that they were sitting at that time when Christ took the bread. Only he saith, that there were five acts which intervened before the administration of the sacrament to the disciples (whereof the taking of the bread was the first), and that in this while the gesture of sitting might have been changed; which is as much as to say, when he took the bread they were sitting, but they might have changed this gesture, either in the time of taking the bread, or in the time of thanksgiving, or in the time of breaking the bread, or whilst he said, "Take ye, eat ye," or lastly, in the time of pronouncing those words, "This is my body" (for this is the word whereby, in the Bishop's judgment, the element was made the sacrament, as we shall see afterward).

Now but, by his leave, we will reduce his five acts to three; for thus speaketh the text, "And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed it and break it, and gave it to the disciples, and said, Take, eat, this is my body," Matt. xxvi. 26; Mark xiv. 22. Whence it is manifest, that the giving of the bread to the disciples, which no man, I suppose, will deny to have been the administration of it, went before the two last acts which the Bishop reckoneth out. Nothing, therefore, is left to him but to say, that their gesture of sitting might have been changed, either in the taking or in the blessing, or in the breaking, or else between the taking and the blessing, or between the blessing and the breaking; yet doth the text knit all the three together by such a contiguity and connection as showeth unto us that they did all make up but one continued action, which could not admit any interruption.

Sect. 2. I saw a prelate sit down to his breakfast, and, as he did eat, he took some cups, and, having called for more, he said, he thanked God that he was never given to his belly; and with that he made a promise to one in the company, which he brake within two days after. Would any man question whether or not the prelate was sitting when he made this promise, forasmuch as between his sitting down to meat and the making of the promise there intervened his taking of some cups, his calling for more, and his pronouncing of these words, I thank God that I was never given to my belly? Yet might one far more easily imagine a change of the prelate's gesture than any such change of the apostles' gesture in that holy action whereof we speak. Because the text setteth down such a continued, entire, unbroken, and uninterrupted action, therefore Calvin gathereth out of the text that the apostles did both take and eat the sacramental bread whilst they were sitting. Non legimus, saith he,(1225) prostratos adorasse, sed ut erant discumbentes accepisse et manducasse. Christus, saith Martyr,(1226) eucharistiam apostolis una secum sedentibus aut discumbentibus distribuit. G. J. Vossius(1227) puts it out of doubt that Christ was still sitting at the giving of the bread to the apostles. And that the apostles were still sitting when they received the bread, Hospinian(1228) thinks it no less certain. They made no doubt of the certainty hereof who composed that old verse which we find in Aquinas:(1229)—

Rex sedet in coena, turba cinctus duodena; Se tenet in manibus; se cibat ipse cibus.

Papists also put it out of controversy; for Bellarmine acknowledgeth(1230) that the apostles could not externally adore Christ by prostrating themselves in the last supper, quando recumbere cum eo illis necesse erat; where we see he could guess nothing of the change of their gesture. Intelligendum est, saith Jansenius,(1231) dominum in novissima hac coena, discubuisse et sedisse ante et post comestum agnum. Dr Stella sticketh not to say,(1232) distribuit salvator mundi panem discumbentibus.

Sect. 3. But now having heard Bishop Lindsey, let us hear what Paybody(1233) will say. He taketh him to another subterfuge, and tells us, that though we read that Christ took bread whilst they did eat, yet can it not be concluded hence that he took bread whilst they did sit; because, saith he, "as they did eat," is expounded by Luke (chap. xxii. 20) and Paul (1 Cor. xi. 25) to be after they had done eating, or after supper. Thus is their languages divided. Bishop Lindsey did yield to us, that when Christ took bread they were sitting; and his conjecture was, that this gesture of sitting might have been changed after the taking of the bread. Paybody saw that he had done with the argument if he should grant that they were sitting when Christ took bread, therefore he calleth that in question. Vulcan's own gimmers could not make his answer and the Bishop's to stick together.

But let us examine the ground which Paybody takes for his opinion. He would prove from Luke and Paul, that when Matthew and Mark say, "As they were eating, Jesus took bread," the meaning is only this, After supper, Jesus took bread; importing, that Christ's taking of bread did not make up one continued action with their eating, and that therefore their gesture of sitting might have been changed between their eating of the preceding supper and his taking of the sacramental bread.

Whereunto we answer, that there are two opinions touching the suppers which Christ did eat with his disciples that night wherein he was betrayed. And whichsoever the reader please to follow, it shall be most easy to break all the strength of the argument which Paybody opposeth unto us.

Sect. 4. First, then, some do think that Christ, having kept the passover according to the law (which is not particularly related, but supposed, by the evangelists), sat down to a common or ordinary supper, at which he told the disciples that one of them should betray him. And of this judgment are Calvin and Beza, upon Matt. xxvi. 21; Pareus, upon Matt. xxvi. 21; Fulk and Cartwright, against the Rhemists, upon 1 Cor. xi. 23; Tolet and Maldonat, upon John xiii. 2; Cornelius Jansenius, Conc. Evang., cap. 131; Balthazar Meisnerus, Tract, die Fest. Virid., p. 256; Johannes Forsterus, Conc. 4, de Pass., p. 538; Christophorus Pelargus, in John xiii., quest. 2, and others. The reasons whereby their judgment is confirmed are these:—

1. Many societies convened to the eating of the paschal supper by twenties.(1234) And if twenty was often the number of them who convened to the eating of the same (which also confirmeth their opinion who think that other men and women in the inn did eat both the paschal and evangelical supper together with the apostles in Christ's company), it is not very likely (say some) that all those were sufficiently satisfied and fed with one lamb, which, after it was eight days old, was allowed to be offered for the passover, as Godwin noteth.(1235) Neque esus umus agni, saith Pareus, toti familiae sedandae fami sufficere poterat.(1236)

2. The paschal supper was not for banquetting or filling of the belly, as Josephus also writeth.(1237) Non tam exsatiendae nutriendaeque naturae, saith Maldonat, quam servandae legalis ceremoniae causa sumebatur.(1238) Non ventri, saith Pareus, sed religionis causa fiebat.(1239) But as for that supper which Christ and his apostles did eat immediately before the eucharistical, Cartwright doubts not to call it a carnal supper,(1240) an earthly repast, a feast for the belly, which lets us know, that the sacramental bread and wine was ordained, not for feeding their bodies, which were already satisfied by the ordinary and daily supper, but for the nourishment of the soul.

3. That beside the paschal and evangelical suppers, Christ and his apostles had also that night another ordinary supper, Fulk proveth by the broth wherein the sop was dipped,(1241) John xiii. 26. Whereas there was no such broth ordained by the divine institution to be used in the paschal supper.

4. That there were two suppers before the eucharistical they gather from John xiii. For, first, the paschal supper was ended, ver. 2, after which Christ washed his disciples' feet. And thereafter we read, ver. 12, resumptis vestibus rursum ad caenam ordinariam consedisse.(1242) The dividing of the passover into two services or two suppers had no warrant at all from the first institution of that sacrament, for which cause they think it not likely that Christ would have thus divided it according to the device and custom of the Jews in latter times, for so much as in marriage (and much more in the passover) he did not allow of that which from the beginning was not so. Neither seemeth it to them any way probable, that Christ would have interrupted the eating of the passover with the washing of his disciples' feet before the whole paschal supper was ended, and they had done eating of it.

Sect. 5. But others (and those very judicious too) are of opinion, that that second course whereunto Christ sat down after the washing of his disciples' feet, and at which he told them that one of them should betray him, was not an ordinary or common supper (because the paschal supper was enough of itself to satisfy them), but a part of the paschal supper. And from the Jewish writers they prove that so the custom was to divide the passover into two courses or services. As for that wherein Christ dipped the sop, they take it to have been the sauce which was used in the paschal supper, called charoseth, of which the Hebrews write, that it was made of the palm tree branches, or of dry figs, or of raisins, which they stamped and mixed with vinegar till it was thick as mustard, and made like clay, in memory of the clay wherein they wrought in Egypt, and that they used to dip both the unleavened bread and the bitter herbs into this sauce. And as touching that place, John xiii., they expound it by the custom of the Jews, which was to have two services or two suppers in the passover; and take those words, ver. 2, "Supper being ended," to be meant of the first service, and sitting down again to supper, ver. 12, to be meant of the second service.

Sect. 6. If those two opinions could be reconciled and drawn together into one, by holding that that second course whereunto Christ sat down after the washing of his disciples' feet, was (for the substance of it) a common supper, but yet it hath been and may be rightly called the second service of the paschal supper, for that it was eaten the same night wherein the paschal lamb was eaten, so should all the difference be taken away; but if the maintainers of these opinions will not be thus agreed, let the reader consider to which of them he will adhere.

If the first opinion be followed, then it will be most easily answered to Paybody, that inter coenandum instituta fuit eucharistia, cum jam rursum mensoe accubuissent. Sed post coenam paschalem, et usum agni legalis.(1243) When Matthew and Mark say, As they did eat, Jesus took bread, they speak of the common or ordinary supper; but when Luke and Paul say, that he took the cup after supper, they speak of the paschal supper, which was eaten before the common supper.

Again, if the reader follow the other opinion, which holdeth that Christ had no other supper that night before the evangelical except the paschal only, yet still the answer to Paybody shall be easy; for whereas he would prove from those words of Luke and Paul, "Likewise also the cup after supper," that when Matthew and Mark say, "As they did eat, Jesus took bread," their meaning is only this, "After supper Jesus took bread," he reasoneth very inconsiderately, forasmuch as Luke and Paul say not of the bread, but of the cup only, that Jesus took it after supper. And will Paybody say, that he took the cup so soon as he took the bread? If we will speak with Scripture, we must say, that as they did eat the preceding supper (to which we read they sat down) Jesus took bread; for nothing at all intervened betwixt their eating of that other preceding supper, and his taking of the eucharistical cup, there intervened the taking, blessing, breaking, distributing, and eating of the bread.

Now, therefore, from that which hath been said, we may well conclude that our opposites have no reason which they do or can object against the certainty of that received tenet, that the apostles received from Christ the sacramental bread and wine whilst they were sitting. Dr Forbesse himself(1244) setteth down some testimonies of Musculus, Chamier, and the professors of Leyden, all acknowledging that the apostles, when they received the Lord's supper, were still sitting.

Sect. 7. The second answer that our opposites hath given us, followeth: They say, that though the apostles did not change their gesture of sitting which they used in the former supper, when all this is granted to us, yet there is as great difference betwixt our form of sitting and that form of the Jews which the apostles used as there is betwixt sedere and jacere.

Ans. 1. Put the case it were so, yet it hath been often answered them, that the apostles kept the table-gesture used in that nation, and so are we bound herein to follow their example, by keeping the table-gesture used in this nation. For this keeping of the usual table gesture of the nation wherein we live is not a forsaking but a following of the commendable example of the apostles, even as whereas they drank the wine which was drunk in that place, and we drink the wine which is drunk in this place, yet do we not hereby differ from that which they did.

2. The words used by the evangelists signify our form of sitting no less than the Jewish, Calepine, Scapula, and Thomasius, in their dictionaries, take ἀναπίπτω, ἀνακλίνω, ἀνακλίνομαι, ἀνάκειμαι, ποράκειμαι, κατάκειμαι, and the Latin words discumbo, recumbo, accumbo (used by Arias, Montanus, Beza, Marlorat, Tremellius, &c., in their versions), not only for lying, but also for such sitting as is opposed to lying, even for sitting upright at table after our custom.

3. There is not so great a difference betwixt our form of sitting and that which the Jews used as our opposites allege. For as Didoclavius showeth out of Casaubon;(1245) their sitting at banquets was only with a leaning upon the left arm, and so not lying, but sitting with a certain inclination. When, therefore, we read of lecti discubitorii tricliniares, in quibus inter coenandum discumbebant,(1246) we must understand them to have been seats which compassed three sides of the table (the fourth side being left open and void for them who served), and wherein they did sit with some sort of inclination.

Yet Bishop Lindsey is bold to aver,(1247) that the usual table gesture of the Jews was lying along, and this he would prove from Amos vi. 4, "They lie upon beds of ivory, they stretch themselves out upon their couches."

Ans. 1. If we should yield to this prelate his own meaning wherein he taketh these words, yet how thinks he that the gesture of drunkards and gluttons, which they used when they were pampering themselves in all excess of riot, and for which also they are upbraided by the Spirit of God, was either the ordinary table-gesture of the Jews, or the gesture used by Christ and his apostles in their last supper?

2. If any gesture at all be touched in those words which the prelate citeth, it was the gesture they used when they lay down to sleep, and not their table-gesture when they did eat; for mitta and ngheres (the two words which Amos useth) signify a bed or a couch wherein a man useth to lay himself down to sleep. And in this sense we find both these words, Psal. vi. 7, "All the night make I my bed (mittathi) to swim: I water my couch (ngharsi) with my tears." The Shunnamite prepared for Elisha a chamber, and therein set for him a bed (mitta), and a table, and a stool, and a candlestick, 2 Kings iv. 10. The stool or chair was for sitting at table, but mitta, the bed, was for lying down to sleep. Now, the prelate, I hope, will not say, that the lecti tricliniares, wherein the Jews used to sit at table, and which compassed three sides of the same (as hath been said), were their beds wherein they did lie and sleep all night.

But, 3. The place must be yet more exactly opened up. That word which is turned in our English books, they lie, cometh from the radix schachav, which in Pagnin's lexicon is turned dormire. We find, Ruth iii. 7, lischcav, which Arias Montanus turned ad dormiendum, to sleep. Our own English translation, 2 Sam. xi. 9, saith, "Uriah slept," where the original hath vauschcav; and the very same word is put most frequently in the books of the Kings and the Chronicles, where they speak of the death of the kings of Judah and Israel. Pagnin turneth it et dormivit; and our English translators everywhere, "And he slept with his fathers," &c. These things being considered, we must, with Calvin, read the place of Amos thus: Qui decumbunt vel dormiunt in lectis. The other word which the prophet useth is seruchim. Our English version turneth it, "They stretch themselves out;" but Pagnin, Buxtorff, Tremellius, and Tarnovius, come nearer the sense, who read redundantes, superfluentes, or luxuriantes; which sense the English translation also hath in the margin. The Septuagints followed the same sense, for they read, κατασπαταλὼντες, i.e., living in pleasure. So, 1 Tim. v. 6, she that lived in pleasure, σπαταλῶσοι; and, James v. 5, Ye have lived in pleasure, ἐσπαταλησατε. The radix is sarach, redundavit, or luxuriavit. So, Exod. xxvi. 12, sarach, and, verse 13, saruach, is put for a surplusage or superfluous remainder, redundans superfluum, as Tremellius readeth. Now, then, it is evident that the thing which Amos layeth to the charge of those who were at ease in Zion, in the words which the prelate citeth against us, is, that they slept upon beds of ivory (such was their softness and superfluity), and swimmed in excessive pleasures upon their couches; and, incontinent, their filthy and muddy stream of carnal delicacy and excessive voluptuousness which defiled their beds, led him back to the unclean fountain out of which it issued, even their riotous pampering of themselves at table; therefore he subjoineth, "And eat the lambs out of the flock," &c. For ex mensis itur ad cubilia, ex gula in venerem, saith Cornelius a Lapide, commenting upon the same text. Thus have I cleared the place in such sort, that the Bishop cannot but shoot short of his aims; wherefore I go on to other replies.

4. If the apostles, when they received the Lord's supper, or the Jews, when they did eat at table, were lying all along, how could their mouths receive drink unspilt? or how could they have the use of both their arms? which the Bishop himself would not, I am sure, gainsay, if he would once try the matter in his own person, and essay to eat and drink whilst lying along.

5. The words used by Matthew, chap. xxvi. 10, and by Mark, chap. xiv. 18, where they speak of Christ sitting down with the twelve, is also used by John, chap. vi. 11, where he speaketh of the peoples' sitting down upon the grass to eat the loaves and fishes: and will any man think that the people did eat lying along upon the grass, where they might far better sit upright?

6. If our opposites like to speak with others, then let them look back upon the testimonies which I have alleged before. Jansenius putteth discubuisse et sedisse; Martyr, sedentibus aut discumbentibus. Pareus useth the word consedisse; Meisnerus,(1248) consedendo; Evangelista, saith Dr Stella,(1249) dicit dominum discubuisse, id est sedisse ad mensam.

7. If they like to speak to themselves: Camero,(1250) speaking of John's leaning on Christ's bosom at supper, saith, Christus autem sedebat medius; Dr Morton saith,(1251) it cannot be denied that the gesture of Christ and his apostles at the last supper was sitting,—only, saith he, the evangelists leave it uncertain whether this sitting was upright, or somewhat leaning.

Sect. 8. Their third answer is, that Christ's sitting at the last supper is no more exemplary and imitable than the upper chamber, or the night season, or the sex and number of communicants, &c.

Ans. 1. As for the sex and number of communicants, Dr Fulk(1252) rightly observeth, that it is not certain from Scripture that twelve men only, and no women, did communicate (as Bishop Lindsey(1253) would have us certainly to believe); but suppose it were certain,(1254) yet for this, and all the other circumstances, which are not exemplary, there were special reasons either in the urgency of the legal necessity, or in the exigency of present and accidental occasions, which do not concern us: whereas the gesture of sitting was freely and purposely chosen, and so intended to be exemplary, especially since there was no such reason moving Christ to use this gesture of sitting as doth not concern us.

The Bishop saith,(1255) that his sitting at the former supper might have been the reason which moved him to sit at the eucharistical supper; but if Christ had not purposely made choice of the gesture of sitting as the fittest and most convenient for the eucharistical supper, his sitting at the former supper could be no reason to move him, as may appear by this example: There are some gentlemen standing in a nobleman's waiting-room; and after they have stood there a while, the nobleman cometh forth; they begin to speak to him, and, as they speak, still they stand. Now, can any man say that the reason which moveth them to stand when they speak to the nobleman, is, because they were standing before he came to them? So doth the Bishop come short of giving any special reason for Christ's sitting which concerneth not us. He can allege no more but Christ's sitting at the former supper, which could be no reason, else he should have also risen from the eucharistical supper to wash the disciples' feet, even as he rose from the former supper for that effect. Wherefore, we conclude, that Christ did voluntarily, and of set purpose, choose sitting as the fittest and best beseeming gesture for that holy banquet.

Finally, Hooker's(1256) verdict of the gesture of Christ and his apostles in this holy supper is, "That our Lord himself did that which custom and long usage had made fit; we, that which fitness and great decency hath made usual." In which words, because cause he importeth that they have better warrants for their kneeling than Christ had for his sitting (which is blasphemy), I leave them as not worthy of an answer. Howsoever, let it be noted that he acknowledged, by kneeling they depart from the example of Christ.



CHAPTER VII.

OTHER POSITIONS BUILT UPON THE FORMER GROUND.

Sect. 1. The third consequence which we infer upon our former rule of following the example of Christ is, that it is not a thing indifferent to omit the repetition of those words, "This is my body," enunciatively and demonstratively in the act of distributing the eucharistical bread; and far less is it indifferent so to omit this demonstrative speech in the distribution, as in place of it to surrogate a prayer to preserve the soul and body of the communicant unto everlasting life. Our reason is, because Christ (whose example herein we ought to follow) used no prayer in the distribution, but that demonstrative enunciation, "This is my body." But we go forward.

Sect. 2. The fourth position we draw from the same rule is, that it is not indifferent for a minister to omit the breaking of the bread at the Lord's table after the consecration and in the distribution of it, because he ought to follow the example of Christ, who, after he had blessed the bread, and when he was distributing it to them who were at table, brake it,(1257) manibus comminuendo panem acceptum in partes, but had it not carved in small pieces before it was brought to the table. Hence G. J. Vossius(1258) doth rightly condemn those who, though they break the bread in multas minutias, yet they break it not in actu sacramentali. Such a breaking as this (he saith well) is not mystica, but coquinaria.

Sect. 3. The fifth position, drawn from the very same ground is, that it is not indifferent for a minister, in the act of distribution, to speak in the singular number, Take thou, eat thou, drink thou; because he should follow the example of Christ, who, in the distribution, spake in the plural number, Take ye, eat ye, drink ye; and he who followeth not Christ's example herein, by his speaking in the singular to one, he maketh that to be a private action betwixt himself and the communicant, which Christ made public and common by his speaking to all at one time.

Sect. 4. How idly Bishop Lindsey(1259) answereth to these things, it cannot but appear to every one who considereth that we do not challenge them for not breaking the bread at all,—for not pronouncing at all these words, "This is my body," or for never pronouncing at all these speeches in the plural, Take ye, eat ye, drink ye,—but for not breaking the bread in the very act of distribution,—for not pronouncing demonstratively those words, "This is my body," in the very act of distribution,—for not speaking in the plural number, "Take ye," &c.—in the very act of distribution, as Christ did, having no other reasons to move him than such as concern us. Why, then, did not the Bishop say something to the point which we press him with? or shall we excuse him because he had nothing to say to it?

Sect. 5. Now, last of all, we find yet another point, whereby the Bishop(1260) departeth from the example and mind of Christ. He saith that, by the sacramental word, "This is my body," the bread is made the sacrament, &c.; and that without this word, &c., all our prayers and wishes should serve to no use. Where he will have the bread to be otherwise consecrated by us than it was consecrated by Christ; for that Christ did not consecrate the bread to be the sacrament of his body by those words, "This is my body," it is manifest, because the bread was consecrated before his pronouncing of those words; or else what meaneth the blessing of it before he brake it? It was both blessed and broken, and he was also distributing it to the disciples, before ever he said, "This is my body." Beza saith, Benedictionem expresse ad panis consecrationem et quidem singularem, refert; et omnes nostri referunt, consecrationem intelligentes, &c. Pareus saith,(1261) Qua ex communi cibo, in spiritualis alimoniae sacramentum transmutetur. Wherefore we must not think to sanctify the bread by this prescript word, "This is my body," but by prayer and thanksgiving, as Christ did. Our divines hold against the Papists,(1262) Verba illa quoe in sacramento sunt consecrata, non esse paucula quoedam proscripta; sed praecipue verba orationis, quoe non sunt proescripta; and that, "through use of the prayers of the church, there is a change in the elements."(1263) Dr Fulk objecteth(1264) against Gregory Martin, "Your popish church doth not either as the Greek liturgies, or as the churches in Ambrose and Augustine's time, for they hold that the elements are consecrated by prayer and thanksgiving." I know none who will speak with Bishop Lindsey in this point except Papists: yet Cornelius a Lapide could also say, Eucharistia conficitur et conditur sacris precibus.(1265)

Sect. 6. I say not that these words, "This is my body," have no use at all in making the bread to be a sacrament; but that which giveth us dislike is,

1. That the Bishop maketh not the word and prayer together, but the word alone, to sanctify the bread and wine. Now, if both the word and prayer be necessary to sanctify the creatures for the food of our bodies, 1 Tim. iv. 5, much more are they necessary to sanctify them for the food of our souls. Neque enim solis domini verbis consecratio sit, sed etiam precibus.(1266) The fathers, saith Trelcatius,(1267) had not only respect to those five words, "For this is my body," dum eucharistiam fieri dixerunt mystica precc, invocatione nominis divini, solemni benedictione, gratiarum actione. 2. That he makes not the whole word of the institution to sanctify the bread, but only that one sentence, "This is my body;" whereas Christ's will is declared, and, consequently, the elements sanctified by the whole words of the institution,(1268) "Jesus took the bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat, this is my body which is broken for you, this do in remembrance of me," &c.

That he acknowledged not the bread, though sanctified by prayer, to be the sacrament, except that very word be pronounced, "This is my body." Now, when a minister hath, from Christ's will and institution, declared that he hath appointed bread and wine to be the elements of his body and blood, when he hath also declared the essential rites of this sacrament.

And, lastly, when, by the prayer of consecration, he hath sanctified the bread and wine which are present, put the case, that all this while those prescript sentences, "This is my body," "This cup is the New Testament in my blood," have not been pronounced, yet what hindereth the bread and wine from being the sacramental elements of the Lord's body and blood? It is sounder divinity to say, that the consecration of a sacrament doth not depend ex certa aliqua formula verborum.(1269) For it is evident that, in baptism, there is not a certain form of words prescribed, as Bellarmine also proveth;(1270) because Christ saith not, "Say, I baptise thee in the name," &c.: so that he prescribeth not what should be done. Aquinas likewise holdeth,(1271) that the consecration of a sacrament is not absolutely tied to a certain form of words. And so saith Conradus Vorstius,(1272) speaking of the eucharist. Wherefore Vossius(1273) doth rightly condemn the Papists, quod consecrationem non aliis verbis fieri putant, quam istis, hoc est corpus meum, et hic est sanguis meus.



CHAPTER VIII.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE NOT THINGS INDIFFERENT TO THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND; BECAUSE SHE DID ABJURE AND REPUDIATE THEM BY A MOST SOLEMN AND GENERAL OATH.

Sect. 1. Having spoken of the nature of things indifferent, and showed which things be such; also of the rule whereby to try the indifferency of things: which rule we have applied to certain particular cases;—it remaineth to say somewhat of the main and general purpose, which is principally questioned in this last part of our dispute, viz., whether cross, kneeling, holidays, bishopping, and the other controverted ceremonies wherewith our church is pressed this day, be such things as we may use freely and indifferently? The negative (which we hold) is strongly confirmed by those arguments which, in the third part of this our dispute, we have put in order against the lawfulness of those ceremonies. Notwithstanding we have thought fit to add somewhat more in this place. And, first, we say, whatsoever be the condition of the ceremonies in their own nature, they cannot be indifferently embraced and used by the church of Scotland, which hath not only once cast them forth, but also given her great oath solemnly to the God of heaven, both witnessing her detestation of the Roman Antichrist's "five bastard sacraments, with all his rites, ceremonies, and false doctrine, added to the ministration of the true sacraments, without the word of God; all his vain allegories, rites, signs, and traditions, brought in the kirk, without or against the word of God;" and likewise "promising, and swearing to continue," as well "in the discipline and use of the holy sacraments," as "in the doctrine," of this reformed church of Scotland, which then first she embraced and used after she was truly reformed from Popery and popish abuses. And this which I say may be seen in the general Confession of Faith, sworn and subscribed by his Majesty's father, of everlasting memory, anno 1580, and by the several parochines in the land, at his Majesty's strait command; which also was renewed and sworn again, anno 1596, by the General Assembly, by provincial assemblies, by presbyteries and particular parish churches.

Sect. 2. No reformed church in Europe is so strictly tied by the bond of an oath and subscription, to hold fast her first discipline and use of the sacraments, and to hold out popish rites, as is the church of Scotland. And who knoweth not that an oath doth always oblige and bind, quando est factum de rebus certis et possibilibus, vere ac sine dolo praemeditate, ac cum judicio, juste, ad gloriam Dei, et bonum proximi?(1274) What one of all those conditions was here wanting? Can we then say any less than a pope said before us:(1275) Non est tutum quemlibet contra juramentum suum venire, nisi tale sit, quod servatum vergat in interitum salutis aeternae? O damnable impiety, which maketh so small account of the violation of the aforesaid oath, which hath as great power to bind us as that oath of the princes of Israel made to the Gibeonites, had to bind their posterity, 2 Sam. xxi. 1, 2; for it was made by the whole incorporation of this land, and hath no term at which it may cease to bind. Nay (in some respects) it bindeth more straitly than that oath of the princes of Israel. For, 1. That was made by the princes only; this by prince, pastors, and people: 2. That was made rashly (for the text showeth that they asked not counsel from the mouth of the Lord); this with most religious and due deliberation: 3. That was made to men; this to the great God: 4. That sworn but once; this once and again.

Sect. 3. Some of our opposites go about to derogate somewhat from the binding power of that oath of the princes of Israel. They are so nettled therewith that they fitch hither and thither. Dr Forbesse(1276) speaketh to the purpose thus: Juramentum Gibeonitis praestitum contra ipsius Dei mandatum, et inconsulta Deo, non potuissent Josuae et Israelitae opere perficere nisi Deus, extraordinarie de suo mandato dispensasset, compassione poenitentis illius populi Gibeonitei, et propter honorem sui nominis, ut neque foedifragorum fautor, neque supplicium paenitentium aspernator esse videretur.

Ans. 1. If the oath was against the commandment of God, what dishonour had come to the name of God though he had not patronised the swearers of it, but hindered them from fulfilling their oath? If a Christian swear to kill a pagan, and hereafter repent of his oath, and not perform it, can there any dishonour redound thereby to the name of Christ? The Doctor, forsooth, must say so.

2. Where hath he read of the repentance of the Gibeonites, which God would not despise?

3. If an oath made against the commandment of God (the breach of the commandment being dispensed with) bindeth so strictly and inviolably as that oath of the princes of Israel did, how much more ought we to think ourselves strictly and inviolably bound, by the solemn oath of the church of Scotland, which was not repugnant but most consonant to the word of God, even our adversaries themselves being judges? for thus speaketh one of them: _Quod antem jurarunt nostrates, _ non erat illicitum, sed a nobis omnibus jure praesture potest ac debet_;(1277) so that the Doctor hath gained nothing, but loosed much, by that which he saith of the Israelites' oath: he hath even fanged himself faster in the snare which he thought to escape.

O but, saith the Doctor, that which they did, either in swearing or in performing their oath, against the express commandment of God, we may not draw into an ordinary example.

Ans. It was against the commandment of God; no man will say that we should follow either their swearing or their performing of their oath. Yet, in the meantime, the Doctor is pressed with this argument, that if their unlawful oath (in the case of God's dispensation) did bind their posterity, much more doth that oath of the church of Scotland (which the Doctor hath acknowledged lawful and commendable) bind us this day.

Sect. 4. But, 4. Albeit the Doctor hath hereby given us scope and advantage enough against himself; nevertheless, for the truth's sake, I add, that it cannot be showed how that oath of the princes of Israel was against the express commandment of God; but it rather appeareth that it was agreeable to the same. For, as Tremellius(1278) hath it noted, that commandment, Deut. xx., whereby the Israelites were commanded to save alive nothing in the cities of the Canaanites, was to be only understood of such cities among them as should make war with them, and be besieged by them. But the Gibeonites were not of this sort; for they sought their lives before the Israelites came to them. And by the same means Rahab and her father's house got their life, because they sought it, Josh. ii. Calvin also serveth:(1279) Jussos fuisse Israelitas pacem omnibus offere. And Junius, upon Deut. xx., distinguisheth well two laws of war given to Israel.

The first law is concerning offering peace to all; which law is general and common as well to the Canaanites as to foreign nations: "When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, then it shall be that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee." Which commandment was afterward observed by Israel; of whom we read, "That when Israel was strong, they put the Canaanites to tribute, and did not utterly drive them out," Josh. xvii. 13; Judges i. 28: by Solomon also, who did not cut off the people that were left of the Hittites and the Amorites, but only made them to pay tribute, 2 Chron. viii. 7, 8. That which I say is further confirmed by another place, Josh. xi. 19, 20, where it is said, "There was not a city that made peace with the children of Israel save the Hivites, the inhabitants of Gibeon; all other they took in battle. For it was of the Lord to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favour; but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses." From which words it appeareth, that if the Canaanites had made peace with the children of Israel, they were to show them favour; and that they were bound by the commandment of the Lord to destroy them, then only, and in that case, if they would not accept peace, but make war; whence it cometh, that the cause of the destruction of the Canaanites is imputed to their own hardness and contumacy in not accepting of peace, and not to any commandment which God had given to Israel for destroying them. In a word, it was voluntas signi, which, in one place, Deut. xx. 10, showed the Israelites what was their duty, namely, to offer peace to all, even to the Canaanites, and not to cut them off if they should accept the peace; but it was voluntas beneplaciti, which, as we read in another place, Deut. vii. 2, decreed to deliver the Canaanites before the Israelites, that is, to harden their hearts to come against them in battle, and so to overrule the matter, by a secret and inscrutable providence, that the Israelites might lawfully and should certainly destroy them and show them no mercy. Even as that same God who, by one word, showed unto Abraham what was his duty, bidding him offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii. 2, by another word signified unto him what he had decreed to be done, forbidding him to lay his hand upon the lad, or to do anything unto him, ver. 12. But this, I know, will be very unsavoury language to many Arminianised conformitants.

The other law of war which Junius, upon Deut. xx., observeth, prescribed to the Israelites how they should deal with them who refused their peace. And here only was the difference made betwixt the cities which were very far off and the cities of the Canaanites, Deut. xx. 15, 16; but the first law was common, as hath been proven.

Joseph Hall seemeth to deny that the oath of the princes of Israel had any power to bind, but upon another ground than Dr Forbesse took to himself. "It would seem very questionable (saith Hall(1280)) whether Joshua needed to hold himself bound to this oath; for fraudulent conventions oblige not; and Israel had put in a direct caveat of their vicinity."

Ans. I marvel how it could enter in his mind to think this matter questionable, since the violation of that oath was afterwards punished with three years' famine, 2 Sam. xxi. 1, 2. Yet let us hearken to his reasons. One of them is forged; for the princes of Israel who sware unto them put in no caveat at all. The text saith only in the general, that they sware unto them, Josh. ix. 15. As touching his other reason, it is answered by Calvin,(1281) Juris jurandi religio, saith he, eousque sancta apud nos esse debet, ne erroris praetextu a pactis discedemus, etiam in quibus fuimus decepti. Which, that it may be made more plain unto us, let us, with the Casuists, distinguish a twofold error in swearing.(1282) For if the error be about the very substance of the thing (as when a man contracts marriage with one particular person, taking her to be another person) the oath bindeth not; but if the error be only about some extrinsical or accidental circumstance (such as was the error of the Israelites' taking the Gibeonites to dwell afar off when they dwelt at hand), the oath ceaseth not to bind.

Sect. 6. This much being said for the binding power of that oath of the church of Scotland, let us now consider what shifts our opposites use to elude our argument which we draw from the same; where, first, there occurreth to us one ground which the Bishop of Edinburgh doth everywhere beat upon in the trace of this argument, taken out of the 21st article of the Confession of Faith, wherein we find these words: "Not that we think that any policy and an order in ceremonies can be appointed for all ages, times, and places; for as ceremonies, such as men have devised, are but temporal, so may and ought they to be changed when they foster rather superstition than that they edify the kirk using the same: 'whereupon the Bishop concludeth,(1283) that none who sware the aforesaid article could, without breach of this oath, swear that the ceremony of sitting at the receiving of the sacrament could be appointed for all ages, times, and places.' "

Ans. None of us denieth that article: we all stand to it. For that which it pronounceth of ceremonies must be understood of alterable circumstances, unto which the name of ceremonies is but generally and improperly applied, as we have showed elsewhere;(1284) neither can we, for professing ourselves bound by an oath ever to retain sitting at the receiving of the sacrament in this national church of Scotland, be therefore thought to transgress the said article.

For, 1. The article speaketh of ceremonies devised by men, whereof sitting at the sacrament is none, being warranted (as hath been showed) by Christ's own example, and not by man's device.

2. The article speaketh of such ceremonies as rather foster superstition than edify the church using the same; whereas it is well known that sitting at the communion did never yet foster superstition in this church; so that the Bishop did very unadvisedly reckon sitting at the communion among those ceremonies whereof the article speaketh.

Sect. 7. But the Bishop hath a further aim, and attempteth no less than both to put the blot of perjury off himself and his fellows, and likewise to rub it upon us, telling us,(1285) "That no man did by the oath oblige himself to obey and defend that part of discipline which concerneth these alterable things all the days of his life, but only that discipline which is unchangeable and commanded in the word. Yea (saith he), we further affirm, that every man who sware to the discipline of the church in general, by virtue of the oath standeth obliged, not only to obey and defend the constitution of the church that was in force at the time of making his oath, but also to obey and defend whatsoever the church thereafter hath ordained, or shall ordain, &c., whether thereby the former constitution be established or altered," &c. The same answer doth Dr Forbesse also return us.(1286)