As for the right of presidency and moderation, we distinguish, with Junius,(1054) two sorts of it, both which have place in councils, viz., the moderation of the ecclesiastical action, and the moderation of the human order; and with him we say, that in councils, the whole ecclesiastical action ought to be moderated by such a president as is elected for the purpose; even as Hosius, bishop of Corduba, was chosen to preside in the first council of Nice: which office agreeth not with princes; for in the point of propounding rightly the state of questions and things to be handled, and of containing the disputation in good order, certe praesidere debet persona ecclesiastica, in sacris literis erudita, saith the Archbishop of Spalato.(1055) The presiding and moderating in the human order, that is, by a coactive power to compass the turbulent, to avoid all confusion and contention, and to cause a peaceable proceeding and free deliberation, pertaineth indeed to princes, and so did Constantine preside in the same council of Nice.



DIGRESSION III.

OF THE JUDGING OF CONTROVERSIES AND QUESTIONS OF FAITH.

There is a twofold judgment which discerneth and judgeth of faith. The one absolute, whereby the Most High God, whose supreme authority alone bindeth us to believe whatsoever he propoundeth to be believed by us, hath in his written word pronounced, declared, and established, what he would have us to believe concerning himself or his worship; the other limited and subordinate, which is either public or private. That which is public is either ordinary or extraordinary. The ministerial or subordinate public judgment, which I call ordinary, is the judgment of every pastor or doctor, who, by reason of his public vocation and office, ought by his public ministry to direct and instruct the judgments of other men in matters of faith, which judgment of pastors and doctors is limited and restricted to the plain warrants and testimonies of Holy Scripture, they themselves being only the ambassadors(1056) of the Judge to preach and publish the sentence which he hath established, so that a pastor is not properly judex but index. The subordinate public judgment, which is extraordinary, is the judgment of a council assembled for the more public and effectual establishment and declaration of one or more points of faith and heads of Christian doctrine, and that in opposition to all contrary heresy or error, which is broached and set a-foot in the church. From which council,(1057) no Christian man who is learned in the Scriptures may be excluded, but ought to be admitted to utter his judgment in the same; for in the indagation or searching out of a matter of faith, they are not the persons of men which give authority to their sayings, but the reasons and documents which every one bringeth for his judgment. The subordinate judgment, which I call private, is the judgment of discretion whereby every Christian,(1058) for the certain information of his own mind, and the satisfaction of his own conscience, may and ought to try and examine, as well the decrees of councils as the doctrines of particular pastors, and in so far to receive and believe the same, as he understandeth them to agree with the Scriptures.

Besides these, there is no other kind of judgment which God hath allowed to men in matters of faith, which being first observed, we say next, concerning the part of princes, that when questions and controversies of faith are tossed in the church, that which pertaineth to them is, to convocate a council for the decision of the matter, civilly to moderate the same, by causing such an orderly and peaceable proceeding as is alike necessary in every grave assembly, whether of the church or of the commonwealth; and, finally, by their coactive temporal power to urge and procure that the decrees of the council be received, and the faith therein contained professed, by their subjects.

But neither may they, by their own authority and without a council, decide any controverted matter of faith, nor yet having convocated a council, may they take upon them to command, rule, order, and dispose the disputes and deliberations according to their arbitrement; nor, lastly, may they, by virtue of their regal dignity, claim any power to examine the decrees concluded in the council, otherwise than by the judgment of private discretion which is common to every Christian.

First, I say, they may not by themselves presume, publicly and judicially, to decide and define any matter of faith, which is questioned in the church; but this definition they ought to remit unto a lawful and free council. Ambrose would not come to the court to be questioned and judged by the emperor Valentinian in a matter of faith, whenever he heard that emperors judged bishops in matters of faith, seeing, if that were granted, it would follow that laymen should dispute and debate matters, and bishops hear, yea, that bishops should learn of laymen.

The true ground of which refusal (clear enough in itself) is darkened by Dr Field,(1059) who allegeth, 1. That the thing which Valentinian took on him was, to judge of a thing already resolved in a general council called by Constantine, as if it had been free, and not yet judged of at all. 2. That Valentinian was known to be partial; that he was but a novice; and the other judges which he meant to associate himself suspected; but howsoever these circumstances might serve the more to justify Ambrose's not compearing to be judged in a matter of faith by Valentinian, yet the Doctor toucheth not that which is most considerable, namely, the reason which he alleged for his not compearing, because it hath been at no time heard of that emperors judged bishops in matters of faith, and if that were granted, it would follow that bishops should learn of laymen; which reason holdeth ever good, even though the thing hath not been formerly judged by a council.

And, furthermore, if those (which the Doctor mentioneth) were the true reasons of his refusing to be judged by Valentinian, then why did he pretend another reason (whereof we have heard), and not rather defend himself with the real and true reason? Wherefore we gather, that the reason which made Ambrose refuse to be judged by him was no other than this, because he considered that princes, neither by themselves, nor by any whom they please to choose, may, without a lawfully assembled and free council, usurp a public judgment and decisive sentence in controversies of faith, which, if they arrogate to themselves, they far exceed the bounds of their vocation; for it is not said of princes, but of priests, that their lips should preserve knowledge, and that they should seek the law from their mouths, Mal. ii. 7. And the priests did Jehoshaphat set in "Jerusalem, for the judgment of the Lord, and for controversies," 2 Chron. xix. 8, 10, and for judging betwixt law and commandment, statutes and judgments.

In the meanwhile we deny not but that in extraordinary cases, when lawful councils cannot be had, and when the clergy is universally corrupted through gross ignorance, perverse affections, and incorrigible negligence, in such a case the prince, notwithstanding the defect of the ordinary and regular judges, may yet, by the power of the civil sword, repress and punish so many as publish and spread such doctrines as both he and other Christians, by the judgment of discretion, plainly understand from Scripture to be heretical.

Next, I say, that the prince, having assembled a council, may not take so much upon him as imperiously to command what he thinketh good in the disputes and deliberations, and to have everything ordered, disposed, and handled according to his mind. "To debate and define theological controversies, and to teach what is orthodoxal, what heretical, is the office of divines, yet, by a coactive authority, to judge this orthodox faith to be received by all, and heretical pravity to be rejected, is the office of kings, or the supreme magistrates, in every commonwealth," saith the Bishop of Salisbury.(1060) And, again,(1061) "In searching, directing, teaching, divines ordinarily, and by reason of their calling, ought to go before kings themselves; but in commanding, establishing, compelling, kings do far excel:" where he showeth how, in defining of the controversies of religion, in one respect ecclesiastical persons, and in another respect kings, have the first place.

In the debating of a question of faith, kings have not, by virtue of their princely vocation, any precedency or chief place, the action being merely ecclesiastical. For howbeit kings may convocate a council, preside also and govern the same as concerning the human and political order, yet, saith Junius,(1062) Actiones, deliberationes, et definitiones, ad substantiam rei ecclesiasticae pertinentes, a sacerdotio sunt, a caetu servoram Dei, quibus rei suoe administrationem mandavit Deus. And, with him, the Archbishop of Spalato saith, in like manner,(1063) that howbeit Christian princes have convocated councils, and civilly governed the same, yet they had no power nor authority in the very discussing, handling and deciding of matters of faith.

What then? In the handling of controversies of faith, have princes no place nor power at all beside that of political government only? Surely, by virtue of their princely authority, they have no other place in the handling of these matters. Yet, what if they be men of singular learning and understanding in the Scriptures? Then let them propound their own suffrage, with the grounds and reasons of it, even as other learned men in the council do. But neither as princes, nor as men singularly learned, may they require that others in the council shall dispute and debate matters, and that they themselves shall sit as judges having judicial power of a negative voice; for in a council no man's voice hath any greater strength than his reasons and probation have. Non enim admitto, &c: "For I admit not in a council (saith the same prelate(1064)) some as judges, others as disputators, for I have showed that a conciliary judgment consisteth in the approbation of that sentence which, above others, hath been showed to have most weight, and to which no man could enough oppose. Wherefore no man in the council ought to have a judiciary voice, unless he be withal a disputator, and assigns a reason wherefore he assigns to that judgment and repels another, and that reason such a one as is drawn from the Scripture only, and from antiquity."

Lastly, I hold, that, after the definition and decision of a council, princes may not take upon them, by any judicial power or public vocation, to examine the same, as if they had authority to pronounce yet another decisive sentence, either ratifying or reversing what the council hath decreed. Most certain it is, that, before princes give their royal assent unto the decrees of any council whatsoever, and compel men to receive and acknowledge the same, they ought, first of all, carefully to try and examine them whether they agree with the Scriptures or not; and, if they find them not to agree with the Scriptures, then to deny their assent and authority thereto. But all the princes do not by any judicial power or public authority, but only by the judgment of private discretion, which they have as Christians, and which, together with them, is common also to their subjects; for neither may a master of a family commend to his children and servants the profession of that faith which is published by the decrees of a council, except, in like manner, he examine the same by the Scriptures.



DIGRESSION IV.

OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS, AND ECCLESIASTICAL CENSURES.

Ecclesiastical censures and punishments, wherewith delinquents are bound, and from which, when they turn penitents, they are loosed, are of two sorts: either such as are common, and agree unto all, as excommunication and absolution; or such as are peculiar, and agree only to men of ecclesiastical order, as suspension, deprivation, &c.

As touching the power of the keys, to bind and loose, excommunicate and absolve; first of all, princes are to remember, that neither they may, by themselves, exercise this power (for regum est corporalem irrogare paenam; sacerdotum spiritualem inferre vindictam(1065)), nor yet by their deputies or commissioners in their name, and with authority from them; because, as they have not themselves the power of the keys, so neither can they communicate the same unto others. Secondly, Forasmuch as princes are the wardens, defenders, and revengers of both the Tables, they ought, therefore, to provide and take course that neither laymen be permitted to have and exercise, the power of excommunication, nor yet that the prelates themselves be suffered, in their particular dioceses, to appropriate this power and external jurisdiction, as peculiar to themselves; but that it remain in their hands to whom it pertaineth by divine institution. What a woeful abuse is it, that, in our neighbour churches of England and Ireland, the bishop's vicar-general, or official, or commissary, being oftentimes such a one as hath never entered into any holy orders, shall sit in his courts to use (I should have said abuse) the power of excommunication and absolution? And what though some silly presbyter be present in the court? Doth not the bishop's substitute, being a layman, examine and judge the whole matter, decree, and give sentence what is to be done? Hath he not the presbyter's tongue tied to his belt? And what doth the presbyter more but only pronounce the sentence according to that which he who sitteth judge in the court hath decreed and decerned? As touching the prelates themselves, I pray, by what warrant have they appropriated to themselves the whole external jurisdiction of binding and loosing, excommunicating and absolving? But that we may a little scan this their usurpation, and discover the iniquity thereof to the view of the princes, whose part it is to cause the same to be reformed, let us consider to whom Christ himself, who hath the key of David (Rev. iii. 7), who openeth and no man shutteth, and shutteth and no man openeth, hath committed this power of the keys to be used on earth. And, first, Let us distinguish betwixt the power itself, and the execution of it.

The power and authority of binding and loosing Christ hath delivered to the whole church, that is, to every particular church collectively taken. "The authority of excommunication pertaineth to the whole church," saith Dr Fulk.(1066) Jus excommunicandi, saith Balduine,(1067) non est penes quamvis privatum, sive ex ordine sit ecclesiastico, sive politico, &c. Sed hoc jus pertiner ad totam ecclesiam. So say Zanchius (in 4 Praec., col. 756), Polanus (Synt., lib. 7, cap. 18), Pareus (in 1 Cor. v., De Excom.), Cartwright (on 1 Cor. v. 4), Perkins (on Jude 3): and, generally, all our sound writers. The Magdeburgians(1068) cite, for the same judgment, Augustine and Primatius. Gerhard(1069) citeth also some popish writers assenting hereunto. The reasons which we give for confirmation hereof are these:—

1. It pertaineth to the whole church, collectively taken, to deny her Christian communion to such wicked persons as add contumacy to their disobedience: therefore, it pertaineth to the whole church to excommunicate them. Again, it pertaineth to the whole church to admit and receive one into her communion and familiar fellowship: therefore, to the whole church it likewise pertaineth to cast one out of her communion. Sure, the sentence of excommunication is pronounced in vain, except the whole church cut off the person thus judged from all communion with her: and the sentence of absolution is to as little purpose pronounced, except the whole church admit one again to have communion with her. Shortly, the whole church hath the power of punishing a man, by denying her communion unto him: therefore, the whole church hath the power of judging that he ought to be so punished. The whole church hath the power of remitting this punishment again: therefore, the whole church hath the power of judging that it ought to be remitted.

2. The Apostle, in 1 Cor. v., showeth that the Israelites' purging away of leaven out of their dwellings in the time of the passover, was a figure of excommunication, whereby disobedient and obstinate sinners, who are as leaven to infect other men, are to be avoided and thrust out of the church. Now, as the purging away of the leaven did not peculiarly belong unto any one, or some few, among the Israelites, but unto the whole congregation of Israel; so the Apostle, writing to the whole church of Corinth, even to as many as should take care to have the whole lump kept unleavened, saith to them all, "Know ye not that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump? Purge out, therefore, the old leaven. Put away from among yourselves that wicked person," 1 Cor. v. 6, 7, 13.

3. Christ hath delivered the power of binding and loosing to every particular church or congregation, collectively taken, which thus we demonstrate:—If our brother who trespasseth against us will neither be reclaimed by private admonition, nor yet by a rebuke given him before some more witnesses, then, saith Christ, "Tell it unto the church; but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. Verily, I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven," Matt. xviii. 17, 18: where he showeth, that, in the Christian church (which he was to plant by the ministry of the apostles), excommunication was to be used as the last remedy for curing of the most deadly and desperate evils; which excommunication he setteth forth by allusion unto the order and custom of the Jews in his time, among whom they who were cast out, and excommunicate from the synagogue, were accounted as heathens and publicans. And so when he saith, "Let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican," he presupposeth that the church hath excommunicated him for his contumacy, which he hath added to his disobedience. For, as Pareus saith,(1070) "If by me, and thee, and every one, he is to be accounted for such a man, it must needs be that the judgment of the church be, by public declaration, made known to me, and thee, and every one. And this meaning is thoroughly drawn out of the following verse—'For whatsoever ye shall bind on earth,' &c.; therefore, the church ought first to bind him before he ought to be accounted by me or thee for one bound, that is, excommunicate." Now, what meaneth Christ by the church, to which he giveth the power of binding and loosing? Not the church universal, sure; for I cannot tell the church universal (whether it be understood collective or representative) whensoever my brother trespasseth against me, and will not be reformed. He meaneth, therefore, the particular church, whereof, for the time, it shall happen one to be a member. "The power of the keys (saith Perkins(1071)) is given to all ministers, churches, and congregations." Neither could there, otherwise, an ordinary, perpetual, and ready course be had, for the correcting of all public contumacy and scandal, by the means of ecclesiastical discipline. But it will be said, when he biddeth us tell that particular church whereof we are members, he meaneth not that we should tell the whole body of that church collective, but that we should tell the governors of the church, who are the church representative.

How, then, is this place alleged to prove that the whole church collective hath power and authority to bind and loose?

Ans. Christ meaneth, indeed, that we should tell those governors who represent the church; but whilst he calleth them by the name of the church, and sendeth us to them as to those who represent the church, he plainly insinuateth that they exercise the power of the keys (as in his name, so) in the name of the church, and that this power and authority pertaineth to the whole church, even as when one man representeth another man's person, whatsoever power he exerciseth eo nomine, doth first of all agree to the man who is represented.

4. The Apostle, in his own proper person, writing to the whole church at Corinth, 1 Cor. v. 4, 5, will have them (being gathered together) to deliver that incestuous person to Satan; therefore, every particular church or congregation hath power to excommunicate such a contumacious sinner as that incestuous person was. It is the common answer of Papists, that albeit the Apostle commanded the act should be done in face of the church, yet the judgment and authority of giving sentence was in himself alone, and not in the church of Corinth, whereupon they would make it to follow, that the power of excommunication pertaineth to the bishop alone, and not the church. And the same answer doth Saravia return to Beza;(1072) but, howsoever, the Apostle saith, that he had already judged concerning the incestuous person, yet he did not hereby seclude the church of Corinth from the authority of excommunicating him. "It is to be observed (saith Calvin(1073)) that Paul, albeit he was an apostle, doth not for his own will excommunicate alone, but communicateth his council with the church, that the thing may be done by common authority. Himself, indeed, goeth before and showeth the way, but whilst he adjoineth to himself other partakers, he signifieth sufficiently that it is not the private power of one man." Nay, let us farther observe with Junius,(1074) that the apostles hath a twofold power: one common to them with other presbyters, 1 Pet. v. 1; another, singular, proper, and extraordinary, which they had as apostles. By this singular power Paul saith, "What will ye? shall I come unto you with a rod?" 1 Cor. iv. 21; but by the common power it was that he said, "When ye are gathered together, and my spirit," &c., 1 Cor. v. 4. By no other power than that which was common to him with the rest of the presbyters or bishops in Corinth did he judge the incestuous person to be excommunicated; and thus, as though he had been present in body among the other presbyters of that church, and assembled together with them in their ordinary council or consistory (in which fuerunt liberi apostoli, alii vero presbyteri ex vocatione propria, et necessitate officii(1075)), so he both pronounceth(1076) his own judgment, and likewise goeth before, by pronouncing that judgment which was to be in common by them pronounced. Furthermore, that the Apostle would not have that incestuous man to be excommunicate by his own authority alone, but by the authority of the church of Corinth, thus it appeareth:

1. The Apostle challengeth and condemneth the Corinthians, 1 Cor. v. 2, 6, 9, because they had not excommunicate him before his writing unto them, which he would never have done if that church had not had power and authority of excommunication.

2. Howbeit the Apostle gave his judgment, that he should be excommunicate, because he ought not to have been tolerated in the church, yet, for all that, he should not have been indeed excommunicate and thrust out of the church of Corinth, except the ministers and elders of that church had, in name of the whole body of the same, judicially cast him forth and delivered him to Satan, which plainly argueth that he should not have been excommunicate by the Apostle's authority alone, but by the authority of the church of Corinth.

3. The Apostle only showeth that he should be excommunicate, but referreth the giving of sentence and judgment upon him to the Corinthians; for he saith not that the Corinthians, being gathered together, should declare or witness that such an one was delivered to Satan by Paul's own power and authority, but that they themselves should deliver him to Satan, ver. 4, 5. And again, "Purge out, therefore, the old leaven; put away from among yourselves that wicked person," ver. 7, 13. But, saith Saravia,(1077) partes apostoli in illa actione fuerunt authoritatis, ecclesiae vero Corinthiacae, obedientiae. Ans. That the action was done by the authority of the church of Corinth, it is manifest both from that which hath been said, and likewise if further we consider that the Apostle ascribeth to the Corinthians as much authority in this action as he assumeth to himself. For he saith of himself, that he had judged concerning him that had done this deed, ver. 3; and so he saith of them, "Do not ye judge them that are within?" ver. 12. Where he speaketh not of the judgment of private discretion (for so they might have judged them that were without also), but even of the external and authoritative judgment of ecclesiastical discipline. The Apostle, indeed, saith, 2 Cor. ii. 9, that he wrote to the Corinthians to excommunicate that person, that he might know them, whether they were obedient in all things; but this proveth not that the authority of the excommunication was not theirs; for their part in this action proceeded both from authority and from obedience: from authority, absolutely; from obedience in, in some respect. De jure they had no liberty nor power not to excommunicate him, but were bound to do that which Paul pointed out to be their duty, and in that respect he calleth them obedient; yet absolutely and de facto it was free to them (notwithstanding of Paul's writing to them) either to excommunicate him or not to excommunicate him, and if they had not by their authority excommunicate him, he had not been at all excommunicate by any virtue of Paul's adjudging of him.

4. When the Corinthians proceeded to excommunicate him, the Apostle calleth this a censure which was inflicted of many, ver. 6, which could not be said if he was to be excommunicate by the Apostle's authority alone.

5. The Apostle, ver. 7, writeth again to the Corinthians, to forgive the incestuous man, to receive him into their communion, and to remit the punishment of his excommunication, because he was won to repentance. And he addeth, ver. 10, "To whom ye forgive anything, I forgive also." Now, who can remit the punishment and save one from underlying the censure, except such as have the power and authority of judgment?

Hitherto we have proven that the power of binding and loosing pertaineth to every particular church collectively taken; but the execution and judicial exercising of this power pertaineth to that company and assembly of elders in every church which the Apostle, 1 Tim. iv. 14, calleth a presbytery. In Scotland we call it a session; in France it is called a consistory; in Germany and Belgia, according to the Scripture phrase, it is termed a presbytery. It is made up of the pastor or pastors of every congregation, together with those governing elders which labour there (not in doctrine, but) in discipline only, of which things we have spoken before.(1078) That unto this company or consistory of elders pertaineth the power of binding and loosing, it is averred by the best divines: Calvin (on Matt. viii. 17, 18, et Lib. Epist., col. 168, 169), Beza (Contra Saraviam de Divers. Minist. Grad.), Zanchius (in 4 Praec., col. 756), Junius (Animad. in Bell., cont. 5, lib. 1, cap. 14, nota 28), Polanus (Synt., lib. 7, cap. 18), Tilen (Synt., part 2, disp. 28), the Professors of Leyden (Syn. Pur. Theol., disp. 48), Gerhard (Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 137, 138), Balduine (de Cas. Cons., lib. 4, cap. 11, cas. 11), Pareus (in Matt, xviii. 17, 18; and in 1 Cor. v.), Cartwright (in Matt. xviii., sect. 7), Fennerus (Theol., lib. 7, cap. 7, p. 152, 153), Alstedius (Theol. Casuum, cap. 27), Danaeus (Pol. Christ., lib. 6, p. 452, 464), Hemmingius (Enchirid., class. 3, cap. 11, p. 388), Martyr (in 1 Cor. v.), and sundry others. Bullinger recordeth(1079) that this was the manner of the particular churches in Helvetia, to choose unto themselves a certain senate of elders, or company of the best men in the church, which might, according to the canon of holy Scripture, exercise the discipline of excommunication, which form is well warranted by the Scriptures; for when Christ committeth the authority of binding and loosing unto the church, Matt. viii. 17, 18, however the power and authority itself pertain to any particular church collectively taken, as hath been said, yet the execution of the same is committed to the consistory or senate of elders which representeth that church, and which Paul calleth a presbytery. Zanchius saith that Chrysostom,(1080) Bullinger, and all good interpreters, understand the presbytery to be there meant by Christ when he saith, "Tell the church." Chrysostom saith προίδροις καὶ προεστῶσι, that is, saith Junius,(1081) the ecclesiastical sanhedrim made up of pastors and elders. Thus Camero likewise expoundeth the place.(1082) Ecclesiae nomine, saith he, videtur Christus significasse collegium presbyterorum qui ecelesiae Christianae erant praefuturi, cujus presbyterii mentio fit, 1 Tim. iv. Now if Christ hath committed the power of excommunication unto the church, what have bishops to say for themselves who appropriate this power unto themselves, each one in his diocese? For when we cannot give the name of the church unto a bishop,(1083) because he is but one man, and the church is a company of many men; nay, nor yet can we give the name of the church unto a company of bishops, for if they might be called the church, it should be for this respect alone, because they represent the church: but soli episcopi, &c., "Bishops alone (saith Gerhard(1084)), or they who teach, cannot represent the church, since hearers also pertain to the definition thereof, but the presbytery can represent the church, whereunto not only they pertain who labour in the word, but also elders or governors put in authority for expeding of ecclesiastical matters in name of the whole church:" we grant, then, that by the church, Christ meaneth that company of church governors whereby a certain particular church is represented;(1085) but forasmuch as the church consisteth of two integrant parts, viz., pastors and sheep, teachers and hearers, we therefore deny that the representative church whereof Christ speaketh, can be any other than that ecclesiastical consistory whereof we have spoken.

Moreover, albeit the Apostle wrote to the whole church of Corinth to deliver the incestuous man to Satan, because the matter could not be otherwise done, but only in the name and with the consent of that whole church; yet he never meant that the common promiscuous multitude should, by their suffrages and voices, examine and judge that cause. But, saith Calvin,(1086) "Because the multitude, unless it be governed by council, never doth anything moderately nor gravely, there was ordained in the ancient church (meaning the apostolic church) a presbytery; that is, a company of elders which, by the consent of all, had the first judgment and examination of things; from it the matter was carried to the people, but being already determined before." Again, when the Apostle writeth to them in his second epistle that they should forgive him, because he hath repented, thus he reasoneth: "Sufficient to such a man is this censure which was inflicted of many," 2 Cor. ii. 6. Which words, that we may the better understand, it is worthy of observation (which not Calvin only,(1087) but Saravia also noteth(1088)), that it appeareth from this place, he was not to excommunicate, but, by sharp rebukes, timeously win to repentance, whereby the Apostle showeth it to be needless, yea, most inconvenient, to proceed against him to the extremity of discipline. The word ἐπιτιμία, there used by the Apostle, signifieth rebuke, reprehension, or chiding, saith Dr Fulk;(1089) and so Scapula taketh it to be the same with ἐπιτίμησις and to signify another thing than ἐπιτίμιον or ἐπιτιμημα. Beza and Tremellius turn ἐπιπμία by increpatio; Ar. Montanus readeth objurgatio. This chiding or threatening of the man proceeded not from the whole church of Corinth, but only from many therein, as is plain from the text, and as Saravia also granteth.(1090) And who were the πλέιοιες, those many of whom the Apostle speaketh? Not such as, from Christian and brotherly charity, did privately chide and rebuke him, for the matter was not then depending in private rebukes, but by the Apostle's direction it was brought to the church's part and to public discipline, the scandal itself being so public and notoriously manifest; they were, therefore, such as had public office and authority to chide him. And who were those but the consistory of pastors and elders which represented the whole church, and were set in authority for judging and managing of things pertaining to ecclesiastical discipline? They (no doubt) being met together, called the man before them, and did most sharply rebuke him and chide with him, and threatened that they would not only debar him from the Lord's table (which is called lesser excommunication, but more properly a step or degree tending next to excommunication), but also wholly cast him out of the church and deliver him to Satan. Whereupon the man being made to see the grievousness of his sin, and the terrible punishment which was to follow upon it, becometh most sorrowful, humble, and penitent. And this moved the Apostle to say, "Sufficient to such a man," &c., as if he would say, What needeth him now to be excommunicate, and so to be corrected and put to shame by you all, when every one of you shall deny to him your Christian communion, as one wholly cast out of the church? Is it not enough that many among you, even your whole presbytery, hath put him to such public shame by their sharp reprehensions, and to so great fear by their dreadful threatenings? And since, through the blessing of God upon these means, he is already win to repentance, why would you have him yet more publicly corrected and rejected by all and every one.

And further, the Apostle addeth, that now they should not only forgive and comfort him, ver. 7, but also confirm (κυρῶσαι) their love towards him, ver. 8. Now κύροω signifieth to confirm or ratify by authority; and so Chemnitius,(1091) Bullinger,(1092) and Cartwright,(1093) expoundeth it in this place. It cometh from κῦρος, authority, whence cometh also κύριος, a lord, or one having authority. As, therefore, the presbytery, or company of pastors and elders, had, by their authority, established that he was to be excommunicate, and determined to proceed to the execution of extreme discipline against him, so now the Apostle would have them, by the same authority, to ratify and establish the remission of this punishment unto him, and to decree that the church should not deny her communion unto him. For this authority of binding and loosing, though it pertained to the whole church, in actu primo sive in esse, yet it pertained to the presbytery alone, in actu secundo sive in operara; and even as the act of speaking pertaineth to a man, as principium quod, but to the tongue alone, as principium quo; so albeit the power of the keys doth primarily and principally belong to the church, collectively taken, yet the actual execution of this power belongeth only to the presbytery which representeth the church, and unto which the church hath committed her authority to bind and loose. Wherefore, since the Apostle writeth to the whole church of Corinth to confirm, by their authority, their love to the penitent man; and since this authority, in the actual execution of it (which the Apostle craveth) did not agree to that whole church, collectively taken, we must needs understand his meaning to be, that their love towards that man, and their forgiving of him, should be ratified and confirmed by the authority of those church governors, qui ecclesiae nomen ad coetum repraesentant, totius nimirum presbyterii authoritate atque consensu.

Thus have we showed that the actual use of the keys, or the execution of the authority of binding and loosing, pertaineth to that ecclesiastical senate in every particular church, which the Apostle calleth a presbytery. For further illustration of the truth whereof, I add these four observations:—

1. We must distinguish(1094) a twofold power of the keys: the one is executed in doctrine; the other in discipline: the one concionalis; the other judicialis. Touching the former, we grant it is proper for pastors alone, whose office and vocation it is, by the preaching and publishing of God's word, to shut the kingdom of heaven against impenitent and disobedient men, and to open it unto penitent sinners; to bind God's heavy wrath upon the former, and (by application of the promises of mercy) to loose the latter from the sentence and fear of condemnation. When we ascribe the power of binding and loosing to that whole consistory, wherein governing elders are joined together with pastors, we mean only of the keys of external discipline, which are used in ecclesiastical courts and judicatories.

2. When we teach that the pastor or pastors of every particular church and congregation, with the elders of the same, being met together, have power to bind and loose, we understand this only of such places wherein a competent number of understanding and qualified men may be had to make up an eldership; otherwise let there be one eldership made up of two or three of the next adjacent parishes, according as was ordained by the Church of Scotland, in the 7th chapter of the Second Book of Discipline. Sine totius &c.: "Without the consent of some whole church (saith Zanchius(1095)) no man ought to be excommunicate. Yea, I add, if it be a small church, and not consisting of many learned and skilful men, excommunication ought not to be done, except the neighbour churches be asked counsel of." And, as touching the pastor's part, Calvin saith well, Nunquam, &c.:(1096) "I never thought it expedient the liberty of excommunicating should be permitted to every pastor." The fear of great inconveniences, which he thought likely to follow upon such a custom, if once it were permitted, makes him confess, in that epistle, that he durst not advise Liserus to excommunicate any man without taking counsel of other pastors. Now, I much marvel what butt Dr Forbesse(1097) shot at when he entitleth one of his chapters De Potestate Excommunicandi, and then, in the body of the chapter, doth no more at all but only quote those two testimonies of Zanchius and Calvin; both of which do utterly condemn the usurpation of bishops who appropriate to themselves the power of excommunication, and ascribe this power to the consistory of pastors and elders in every particular church; and, in the forequoted places, do only (for preventing of abuses) set some bounds to the execution of their power; which bounds we also think good to be kept, viz., that if a church be so small that it hath not so many well-qualified men as may be sufficient to assist the pastor in the government thereof, then let one common eldership be made up out of it and some other neighbour churches: by which means it shall moreover come to pass (which is the other caution to be given), that not every pastor (no not with the elders of his congregation) shall be permitted to have full liberty of binding and loosing, but shall, in those matters, receive counsel and advice from other pastors. Howbeit, for this latter purpose, the church of Scotland hath profitably provided another remedy also, namely, that, in certain chief places, all the pastors in the adjacent bounds shall, at set and ordinary times, assemble themselves (which assemblies, in this nation, we call presbyteries), that so the churches may be governed communi presbyterorum consilio, as Jerome speaketh of the primitive times of the church.

3. Though the execution of the discipline of excommunication and absolution pertain to the consistory of the pastor and elders in every church, yet this discipline is to be by them executed in name of the whole church.(1098) Saravia is bold to affirm,(1099) that he who receiveth a sinner, or casteth him out of the church, doeth this in the name and authority of God alone. We have proven, by strong arguments, that the authority of excommunication pertaineth to the whole church; which, though he contradicteth, yet, in one place,(1100) forgetting himself, he acknowledges that the authority of the church of Corinth was to intervene in the excommunication of the incestuous man. Wherefore, as in the name of God, so in the name and authority of the whole church, must one be cast out or received.

4. To the right execution of this discipline the manifest consent of the whole church is also necessary:(1101) the truth whereof, beside that it appeareth from that which hath been said concerning the church's authority, it is further confirmed, if we consider either the importance of the thing, or the good of the person. Touching the importance of the thing, Gravissima, &c.: "Most weighty matters in the church," saith Gerhard,(1102) and the same saith Zanchius also,(1103) "ought not to be undertaken without the consent of the whole ecclesiastical body;" and, as Pope Leo writeth, "Such things as pertain unto all ought to be done with the consent of all. But what can be more weighty, and what doth more pertain to the body of the church, than to cut off some member from the body?" And, touching the good of the person, Augustine showeth(1104) that then only a sinner is both stricken with fear and healed with shame, when, seeing himself anathematised by the whole church, he cannot find a fellow multitude together wherewith he may rejoice in his sin and insult upon good men. And that otherwise, if the tares grow so rank that they cannot be pulled up, and if the same evil disease take hold of so very many that the consent of the church cannot be had to the excommunication of a wicked person, then good men must grieve and groan, and endure what they cannot help. Therefore that excommunication may fruitfully succeed, the consent of the people is necessary: Frustra enim ejicitur ex ecclesia, et consortio fidelium privatur, quem populus, abigere, et a quo abstinere recuset.(1105) Howbeit, even in such cases, when the consent of the church cannot be had to the execution of this discipline, faithful pastors and professors must, every one for his own part, take heed that he have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but even reprove them; yea, they ought, in. sensu negativo, excommunicate those who should be (but are not) excommunicate positively, which negative excommunication is not an ecclesiastical censure, but either a bare punishment, or a cautel and animadversion; and so saith the Archbishop of Spalato,(1106) not only one brother may refuse to communicate with another, but a people, also, may refuse to communicate with their pastor, which he confirmeth by certain examples. But the public censure of positive excommunication should not be inflicted without the church's consent, for the reasons foresaid. Cyprian writeth to Cornelius, bishop of Rome, that he had much laboured with the people that peace might be given to them who had fallen; that is, that they might be again received into the communion of the church; which, if he might have done by himself, why did he labour and deal so much with the people in that business? And as they were not received into the church's communion without the people's consent, so neither were they without their consent excommunicate. Chrysostom showeth,(1107) concerning his time, that when one was to be excommunicate, the whole church was humbled in prayer to God for him; and, when he was again released, they did all kindly salute him, and wish him peace. Tertullian also writeth,(1108) that he who was to be excommunicate in the public assembly of the church, was, by the common consent of all, stricken with judgment, and that all the approven and well-liked elders had the precedence or direction of the rest of the church in these matters.

Now, from all this which hath been said of the power and authority to excommunicate and absolve, it is manifest how unjustly usurping prelates do arrogate and appropriate to themselves this power, which Christ hath committed to every particular church or congregation, and ordained to be execute by the ecclesiastical consistory within the same. Which episcopal usurpation, as it hath been showed to be most contrary to divine institution, so doth it also depart from the manner of the ancient church: for it may be seen, in Cyprian,(1109) that the authority of reconciling and receiving into the church such as had fallen, was not proper to the bishop, but, with him, common to his clergy and presbytery, and that jus communicationis was given them by the clergy as well as by the bishop. We have heard, out of Jerome,(1110) that a bishop did nothing which a presbyter did not also, except only that he gave rite or sign of ordination, that is, imposition of hands. Whereby we understand that as all other things, beside ordination, so the power of excommunication, among the rest, was alike common to bishops and presbyters. Whence it is, that the same Jerome, writing to Demetriades, calleth excommunication Episcoporum et Presbyterorum censura. And elsewhere, Alligat vel solvit Episcopus et Presbyter.(1111) Justinian (Novel. 123, cap. 11) saith, Omnibus autem Episcopis et Presbyteris interdicimus segregare aliquem a sacra communione, antequam causa monstretur, &c., certifying them, if they do otherwise, that he whom they excommunicate should be loosed from excommunication a majore sacerdota. Whence we see, that presbyters also were wont to excommunicate, and that this power was common to them with the bishops. The First Council of Carthage, can. 23, decreeth that a bishop hear no man's cause without the presence of his clergy; and that otherwise his sentence shall be void, except it be confirmed by the presence of his clergy. The canon law itself hath some vestiges of the ancient order: it ordaineth,(1112) that when a bishop either excommunicateth or absolveth any man, twelve of the clergy be present, and concur with him. Dr Forbesse now also acknowledgeth,(1113) that it is not lawful for a bishop to exercise the power of public jurisdiction by himself, and without the presbytery; and, under this power of jurisdiction, whereof he speaketh,(1114) he comprehendeth the visitation of churches, ordination, suspension, and deposition of ministers, the excommunicating of contumacious persons, and the reconciling of them when they become penitent, the calling of the fellow-presbyters to a synod, the making of ecclesiastical canons, &c.; which power of jurisdiction, saith he,(1115) remaineth one and the same, whole and entire, both in the bishop, and in the presbytery: in him personally; in it collegially. His confession of the presbytery's power and authority, we catch and lay hold on; but whereas he would have this power any way proper and personal to bishops, he is confuted by our former arguments.

And thus far have we demonstrated to princes, who be they to whom Christ hath committed the power of excommunication, that with them they may cause it to remain, and correct the usurpation of prelates, who bereave them of it. Let us next consider what princes may, or should do, after that the sentence of any man's excommunication or reconciliation is given forth by them to whom the power of this discipline pertaineth. The Archbishop of Spalato is of opinion,(1116) that not only it is free to princes to communicate with excommunicate persons, but also, that if they shall happen to communicate with them, the church (for the reverence she oweth to princes) should straight absolve them, and that her sentence of excommunication should no longer have any strength. What! Shall the church draw and put up again the spiritual sword at the pleasure of princes? Or because princes will perhaps cast holy things to dogs, must others do so likewise? O prodigious licentiousness, and hellish misorder, worthy to be drowned in the lake of Lethe! But what, then, is the part of the prince, after that the church hath given judgment? Surely, whensoever need is, he ought, by the private judgment of Christian discretion, to try and examine whether this discipline be rightly executed or not. If he find the execution thereof to be unreprovable, and that yet the sinner goeth on in his contumacy, then, by his civil power,(1117) he ought further to punish him in his person or worldly estate, that he may either reform or repress such an one as hath not been terrified by the church's censures. But if, after trial, he understand that the sentence given forth is unjust and erroneous, either through the ignorance or the malice of the ecclesiastical and regular judges, then he ought to interpone his authority, and cause a due proceeding; for, in such extraordinary cases of the failing of ecclesiastical persons, princes may do much in things spiritual, which, ordinarily, they cannot.

It remaineth to show who have the power of those censures and punishments which are proper to ecclesiastical persons. Where, first, we are to consider, that there are two sorts of faults which make ecclesiastical men worthy to be punished, viz., either such as violate sacred, or such as violate civil and human duties: the one is to be judged by ecclesiastical judges alone, and that according to the laws of God and the church; the other by civil judges alone, and that according to the civil and municipal laws of the commonwealth. This latter form, again, is twofold; for either the fault is such, that, though a man be condignly punished for it by the civil magistrate, yet he doth not, therefore, fall from his ecclesiastical office or dignity; of which sort experience showeth many; or else such as being punished according to their quality and demerit, a man, by necessary consequence, falleth from the ecclesiastical function and dignity which before he had: this was Abiathar's case, and the case of so many as, being justly punished by proscription, incarceration, or banishment, are secundario et ex consequenti shut from their bearing office in the church. "If Abiathar had sinned in a sacred matter, the cognition thereof (saith Junius(1118)) had pertained to the priests; but because he sinned against the commonwealth and the king's majesty, it was necessary to deal with him civilly, and not ecclesiastically. What! Are no ecclesiastical men in this time also thought to be lawfully judged by the civil magistrate, if, at any time, they be found guilty of appaired majesty?" As for the other sorts of faults, whereby (as we have said) sacred and ecclesiastical duties are violate, such as the teaching of false and heretical doctrine, neglecting of discipline, unbeseeming and scandalous conversation, &c. which things (if they be not mended) they who have the execution of ecclesiastical jurisdiction committed to them ought to punish by suspension, deposition, &c. Now, as when one is called to the work of the ministry, his fitness and qualification for that work should be tried and judged by the clergy of the adjacent bounds assembled in their classical presbytery, to whom it also appertaineth (after that he is by them tried and approved, and after that he is elected by the church where he is to serve) to send him out from them with power to exercise the office of a pastor; so when there is just cause of suspending and depriving him, it belongeth to the same presbytery to consider and judge hereof; and, according to his offence, to give judgment against him. For who should recal him but they that sent him? Or who should discharge him his ministerial function, except they who ordained him to exercise the same? And who may take the power from him but they who gave the power unto him? That ordination pertaineth to the whole presbytery, and not to the bishop alone, we have showed before, and now, by the same reason, we say suspension and deposition pertaineth to the presbytery also, and are not in the power of the bishop. And that, in the ancient church, as bishops gave not ordination, so neither did they suspend nor depose any man without the common counsel, advice, and concurrence of the presbytery, yea, and sometimes of a synod, it is clear from Cypr. (lib. 1, epist. 9; lib. 3, epist. 2, 10), Council Carthag. 3 (can. 8), Council Carthag. 4 (can. 22, 23), Council African. (can. 20), Council Hispan. 2 (can. 6), Justin. (Novel. 42, cap. 1), Jerome (Comment. ad Isa 3), Siricius (Epist ad Ambros. inter Ambr. Epist.) So, touching the suspension and deposition of ministers, the Assembly at Glasgow, anno 1610, ordained that the bishop should associate to himself the ministry of those bounds where the delinquent served, that is, the presbytery whereof he hath been a member, and, together with them, there take trial of the fact, and, upon just cause found, to deprive or suspend: which Act was ratified in the 12th parliament of king James, anno 1612. Nevertheless, if any man think the sentence of the bishop and the presbytery, given forth against him, to be unjust, he ought to have liberty of recourse to the synod, and there to be heard, according as it was decreed by the Fourth Council of Carthage, can. 66. But oftimes the matter is of such difficulty or importance that the bishop and the presbytery may not give out any peremptory sentence of suspension or deprivation till the matter be brought to the synod of the province,(1119) where, according to the ancient order, the matter is to be handled,(1120) not "by the censure of one bishop, but by the judgment of the whole clergy gathered together."

Princes, therefore, may not suffer bishops to usurp the power of suspending and depriving at their pleasure, and whensoever they commit any such tyranny in smiting of their fellow-servants, it is the part of princes to cause these things to be redressed, and for this end graciously to receive the grievances of oppressed ministers. The Arians of old, being assembled in a council at Antioch, decreed, that if any ecclesiastical person should, without the advice and the letters of the bishops(1121) of the province, and chiefly of the metropolitan, go to the emperor to put up any grievance unto him, he should be cast out, not only from the holy communion, but from his proper dignity which he had in the church. Whereupon Osiander hath this observation:(1122) "This canon also was composed against holy Athanasius; for Athanasius being expelled by the Arians, had fled to the emperor Constantine the younger, and had from him obtained a return to his own church. Now this canon is very unjust, which forbids that a bishop, or any other minister of the church, being unjustly oppressed, flee to his godly civil magistrate; since it was lawful to the apostle Paul to appeal to the Roman emperor wicked Nero, as the Acts of the Apostles witness. But it may be seen in this place, that bishops were very soon seeking dominion, yea, tyranny over the church, and over their colleges." Besides all this, there is yet another thing which ought to have a very principal consideration in the deposition of a minister, and that is, the consent of the church and congregation where he hath served. Let the magistrate know, saith Gerhard,(1123) "that as the vocation of ministers pertaineth to the whole church, so to the same also pertaineth the removing of ministers; therefore, as a minister ought not to be obtruded upon an unwilling church, so the hearers, being unwilling and striving against it, a fit minister ought not to be plucked away from them." The deposing of a minister, whom the church loves and willingly hears, Balduine accounteth to be high sacrilege,(1124) and holdeth that, as the calling, so the dismissing of ministers pertaineth to the whole church; and so teacheth Junius.(1125) Shortly, as a man is rightly called to the ministerial office and dignity when he is elected by the church and ordained by the presbytery, so is he rightly deposed and put from the same when he is rejected by the church and discharged by the presbytery.

How there was brought forth in Scotland, anno 1610, a certain amphibian brood, sprung out of the stem of Neronian tyranny, and in manners like to his nearest kinsman, the Spanish Inquisition. It is armed with a transcendant power, and called by the dreadful name of the High Commission. Among other things, it arrogateth to itself the power of deposing ministers; but how unjustly, thus it appeareth:

1. If those commissioners have any power at all to depose ministers, they have it from the king, whose commissioners they are: but from him they have it not; therefore they have none at all. The proposition is most certain; for they sit not in that commission to judge in their own name, nor by their own authority, (quum nihil exerceat delegatus nomine proprio, as Panormitan saith,(1126)) but by virtue only of the commission and delegation which they have of the king. Yea, bishops themselves exercise not any jurisdiction in the High Commission as bishops, but only as the king's commissioners, as Dr Downame acknowledgeth.(1127) The assumption is grounded upon this reason: The king hath not power to depose ministers; therefore he cannot give this power to others. For nemo potest plus juris transferre in alium quam sibi competere dignoscatur,(1128) the king may sometimes inflict such a civil punishment upon ministers, whereupon, secondarily and accidentally, will follow their falling away from their ecclesiastical office and function (in which sense it is said that Solomon deposed Abiathar, as we heard before), but to depose them directly and formally (which the High Commission usurped to do) he hath no power, and that because this deposition is an act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; whereas the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction doth no more agree to the king than the power of ecclesiastical order: his power is civil and temporal, not spiritual and ecclesiastical. Dr Field also confesseth,(1129) that none may judicially degrade, or put any one, lawfully admitted, from his degree and order, but the spiritual guides of the church alone.

2. The deposing of ministers pertaineth to classical presbyteries, or (if the matter be doubtful and difficult) to synods, as hath been showed. And who, then, can give the High Commission such authority as to take this power from them and assume it unto itself. These commissioners profess that they have authority to discharge other ecclesiastical judicatories within the kingdom from meddling with the judging of anything which they shall think impertinent for them, and which they shall think good to judge and decide by themselves in their commission: which, if it be so, then, when it pleaseth them, they may make other ecclesiastical judicatories to be altogether useless and of no effect in the church.

3. In this commission ecclesiastical and temporal men are joined together, and both armed with the same power; therefore it is not right nor regular, nor in any ways allowable. For even, as when a minister hath offended in a civil matter, his fault is to be judged by civil judges according to the civil laws, and by no other; so, when he offendeth in an ecclesiastical matter, his fault is to be judged only by ecclesiastical persons according to ecclesiastical laws; and, in such case, Justinian forbiddeth(1130) civil men to be joined with ecclesiastical men in judgment. They are ecclesiastical things or causes which are handled and examined by the High Commission in the process of deposing ministers; and a shame it is to ecclesiastical men, if they cannot, without the help and joining of temporal men, judge and decide things of this quality.

4. As in the matters to be judged, so in the censures and punishments to be inflicted, ecclesiastical and civil men have, in this commission, alike power and authority; for ecclesiastical men therein have power of fining, confining, warding, &c., common to them with the temporal men; and, again, the temporal men have power of excommunication, suspension, deprivation, &c., common to them with the ecclesiastical men. For they all sit there as the king's commissioners, and eo nomine, they exercise this jurisdiction; which commission being alike discharged by them all, it is manifest that both temporal men take hold of the keys and ecclesiastical men take hold of the civil sword. And this monstrous confusion and mixture giveth sufficient demonstration that such a form of judgment is not from the God of order.

Of the abuses and irregularities of the High Commission we may not now speak at greater length, but are hasted to make forward.



CHAPTER IX.

THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY THE LAW OF NATURE.

Sect. 1. What our opposites have alleged for the ceremonies, either from the law of God, or the law of man, we have hitherto answered; but we heard the law of nature also alleged(1131) for holidays, and for kneeling at the communion. And when Hooker(1132) goeth about to commend and defend such visible signs, "which, being used in performance of holy actions, are undoubtedly most effectual to open such matter, as men, when they know and remember carefully, must needs be a great deal the better informed to what effect such duties serve," he subjoineth: "We must not think but that there is some ground of reason even in nature," &c. This is a smoke to blind the eyes of the unlearned. Our opposites have taken no pains nor travail to make us see any deduction of those ceremonies from the law of nature: we desire proofs, not words. In the meanwhile, for giving further evidence to the truth, we will express our own mind touching things warranted by the law of nature.

Sect. 2. And, first, we must understand aright what is meant by the law of nature: to wit, that law which God writeth and imprinteth in the nature of man,(1133) so that it is as it were co-natural and born together with man. Now, if we consider what law was written in the nature of man in his first creation, it was no other than the decalogue, or the moral law.(1134) But the law which we are here to inquire of is that law which, after the fall, God still writeth in the heart of every man; which (we all know) cometh far short, and wanteth much of that which was written in the heart of man before his fall. That we may understand what this law of nature is which is written in all men's hearts since the fall, we must distinguish jus naturale from jus divinum naturale. For that law which is simply called jus naturale is innatum, and layeth before the minds of men that way wherein, by the guidance and conduct of nature,(1135) they may be led to that good which is, in the end, proportionate to nature; whereas jus divinum is inspiratum, and layeth before us another way, wherein, by a supernatural guidance,(1136) we may be led to a supernatural good, which is an end exceeding the proportion of nature. As for that part of the law of God which is called jus divinum naturale, it is so called in opposition to jus divinum positivum.

Sect. 3. Jus naturale, saith Justinian,(1137) est quod naturo omnia animalia docuit. This the lawyers take to be the law of nature, which nature, by its sole instinct, teacheth as well to other living creatures as to men; for nature teacheth all living creatures to save and preserve their own being, to decline things hurtful, to seek things necessary for their life, to procreate their like, to care for that which is procreated by them, &c. The Archbishop of Spalato(1138) liketh to speak with the lawyers. Jus naturale, saith he, simpliciter ponitur in omnibus animalibus. Videntur autem, saith Joachinus Mynsingerus,(1139) juris consulti, valde in hoc abuti vocabulo juris, cum exemplae praedicta sint potius affectus et inclinationes naturales, quae cum quibusque animantibus enascuntur; quas philosophi στοργὰς φυσικὰς appellant. In brutis enim cum nulla sit ratio, igitur nec ullum jus esse potest.

Aquinas also showeth(1140) that beasts are not properly governed by the law of nature, because lex is aliquid rationis. Wherefore they err who would make the law of nature to differ in kind from jus gentium, which natural reason hath taught to all nations. For this law of nations per se speciem non facit, as saith Mynsingerus.(1141) And the law of nature is also, by the heathen writers, often called jus gentium, as Rosinus noteth.(1142) If any will needs have the law of nature distinguished from the law of nations, let them either take Aquinas' distinction,(1143) who maketh the law of nature to contain certain principles, having the same place in practical reason which the principles of scientific demonstrations have in speculative reason; and the law of nations to contain certain conclusions drawn from the said principles: or, otherwise, embrace the difference which is put betwixt those laws by Mattheus Wesenbecius:(1144) Quae bestiae naturali concitatione; ea, saith he, homines ex eodem sensu ac affectione, cum moderatione tamen ratione si faciunt, jure naturae faciunt. Quae bruta non faciunt, sed sola ratione hominis propria, non affectione communis naturae, omnes homines faciunt, fierique opportere intelligunt hoc fit jure gentium.

Sect. 4. For my part, I take the law of nature and the law of nations to be one and the same. For what is the law of nations but that which nature's light and reason hath taught so to all nations? Now this is no other than the law of nature. We think, therefore, they have well said,(1145) who comprehend under the law of nature both the common principles of good and evil, virtue and vice, right and wrong, things beseeming and things not beseeming, and likewise the general conclusions which, by necessary consequences, are drawn from the said principles. To come to the particulars, there are three sort of things which the law of nature requireth of man, as both schoolmen(1146) and modern doctors(1147) have rightly taught. The first, it requireth as he is ens; the second, as he is animal; and the third, as he is homo ratione praeditus. First, As he is ens, the law of nature requireth him to seek the conservation of his own being, and to shun or repel such things as may destroy the same. For so hath nature framed not only all living creatures, but other things also which are without life, that they seek their own conservation, and flee (if they can) from apparent destruction. Let us take one example out of subtle Scalliger,(1148) which is this: If a small quantity of oil be poured upon a sound board, let a burning coal be put in the midst of it, and the oil will quickly flee back from its enemy, and seek the conservation of itself. This is, therefore, the first precept of the law of nature, that man seek his own conservation, and avoid his own destruction. Whereupon this conclusion necessarily followeth, that he may repel violence with violence. Secondly, As man is a living creature, the law of nature teacheth him to propagate and conserve his kind. Whereupon these conclusions do follow, viz., the commixion of male and female, the procreation of children, the educating of them, and providing for them. This nature hath taught to man, as a thing common to him with other living creatures.

Sect. 5. Thirdly, As a man is a creature endowed with reason, the law of nature teacheth him, 1. Something concerning God; 2. Something concerning his neighbour; 3. Something concerning himself. I mean some general notions concerning good and evil, in respect of each of these; whereof the Apostle meaneth whilst he saith that the Gentiles "show the work of the law written in their hearts," Rom. ii. 15. First, then, the law of nature teacheth man to know that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped; whereupon it followeth that man should seek to know God and the manner of his worship. Now that which may be known of God is showed even unto the Gentiles. The Apostle saith signanter, το λυωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ, Rom. i. 19, meaning those few and small sparkles of the knowledge of God which nature's inbred light discovered unto the Gentiles, for making them inexcusable, namely, that there is an eternal power and Godhead, which men ought to reverence and to worship. 2. The law of nature teacheth man to hold fast friendship and amity with his neighbours, forasmuch as he is animal sociale. Violare alterum, saith Cicero, naturae legae prohibemur.(1149) For the law of nature biddeth us do to others as we would have others to do unto us, Luke vi. 31. And from these precepts it followeth, that we should not offend other men; that we should keep promises; stand to bargains; give to every man his own, &c. 3. As touching a man's self, the law of nature teacheth him that he should not live as a reasonless creature, but that all his actions should be such as may be congruous and beseeming for a creature endued with reason: Whereupon it followeth, that he should live honestly and virtuously, that he should observe order and decency in all his actions, &c. Hence the Apostle saith, that nature itself teacheth that it is a shame for a man to have long hair, 1 Cor. xi. 14, because it is repugnant to that decency and comeliness which the law of nature requireth. For, among other differences(1150) which nature hath put betwixt men and women, this is one, that it hath given to women thicker and longer hair than to men, that it might be as a veil, to adorn and cover them. The reason whereof nature hath hid in the complexion of a woman, which is more humid than the complexion of a man; so that, if a man should take him to this womanish ornament, he should but against nature transform himself (in so far) into a woman.

Sect. 6. These things being permitted, I will add four reasons to prove that neither sacred significant ceremonies in general, nor kneeling, holidays, &c., in particular, can be warranted unto us by the law of nature. 1. The law of nature cannot direct us unto a supernatural end, as is acknowledged not only by our divines,(1151) but by Aquinas also.(1152) It only teacheth us to seek and to do bonum, velut finem naturae,(1153) such a good as is an end proportioned to nature. All these precepts of the law of nature which we have spoken of could never lead men to a supernatural good. It is only the divine law,(1154) revealed from God, which informeth the minds of men with such notions as are supra naturam, and which may guide them ad finem supernaturalem. But all sacred significant ceremonies which, by their holy and spiritual significations, express to us some mysteries of grace, and of the kingdom of God, must be thought to direct us unto a supernatural good; therefore they are not of that sort of things which the law of nature requireth; for this law goeth no higher than to teach men that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped, the knowledge of which things is not a good exceeding the proportion of nature: for it was found in the Gentiles themselves, who knew no other spiritual and supernatural good than that which was proportioned to nature. Let me now conclude this reason with Scalliger's words, Neque enim quae supra naturae leges sunt, ex naturae legibus judicanda censeo.(1155)

Sect. 7. 2. As the ceremonies, by their sacred, spiritual, and mystical significations, direct us unto a supernatural good, so they are thought to guide us unto the same by a way which nature's light could never discover unto men. But, in the law of nature, as we are directed unto no other good than such as is proportioned to nature, so are we guided unto the same natura duce,(1156) that is to say, by such common notions as God hath imprinted in the nature of all men. Now, I suppose our opposites will not unwillingly reckon their sacred significant ceremonies among those things of the Spirit of God which a natural man cannot receive, because they are spiritually decerned, 1 Cor. ii. 14. What then have they to do with the law of nature? If it be said, that they necessarily follow upon those first principles and conclusions which a natural man receiveth, I answer, This shall never be proved. They will say, perhaps, that nature teacheth us to use certain rites in the worship of God, to observe set times for his worship, also to kneel down in reverence of God whom we worship. Ans. Be it so: but how make they up a necessary connection betwixt certain rites and significant ceremonies of human institution; betwixt set times, and some more days than one of seven; betwixt kneeling in the worship of God in genere, and kneeling at the sacrament in specie, unless they say that nature requireth us to kneel in every act of worship, and never to worship God without kneeling on our knees?

Sect. 8. 3. Jus naturae is ubique idem, as Rosinus:(1157) it is approved communi omnium gentium judicio atque assensu, as the Professors of Leyden:(1158) it is one and the same among all nations, in respect of the principles of it, as Aquinas(1159) and Zanchius:(1160) the law of nature fixa est cordibus nostris, as Stella:(1161) yea, it is "so written in our hearts that iniquity itself cannot blot it out," as Augustine saith;(1162) and we learn from the Apostle, that the law of nature is manifest in the Gentiles, for God hath showed it unto them, Rom. i. 19; therefore there is none ignorant, saith Pareus.(1163) Whatsoever, then, the law of nature requireth, it doth clearly and necessarily follow upon those principles which are written in every man's conscience, unless we set up new divinity, and either say that the principles of the law of nature are not written in every man's conscience, or else that they may be at some time abolished and rased out of the consciences of men; which were to leave men without a witness. Nay, saith Augustine,(1164) the heaven and the earth, and all that is in them, on every side, cease not to bid all men love God, that they be made inexcusable. Now if all the principles of the law of nature be firmly and clearly written in every man's conscience, and cannot but be known to every man who has the use of natural judgment and reason, it followeth, that they who will prove or warrant anything by the law of nature, must only take their premises from every man's conscience, and say, as the Apostle saith, "Judge in yourselves," &c., "doth not even nature itself teach you," &c., 1 Cor. xi. 13, 14; as if the Apostle said, This principle of nature is fixed in all your hearts, that men should affect honesty and comeliness. Go to reason in yourselves, from the judgment of nature, whether it follow not, upon this principle, that a man should not wear long hair, forasmuch as his wearing of long hair is repugnant to the principle of nature. Committit ipsis judicium, saith Pareus; ipsos testes, imo judices appellat,(1165) so that, if the ceremonies be warranted unto us by the law of nature, the judgment must be committed to every man's conscience, and so should every man be convinced in himself, by such a principle of nature, from which the ceremonies have a necessary and manifest deduction. Yet we attest the Searcher of all hearts, that we have never been convinced in ourselves, by such a principle of nature, no, not after diligent search and inquiry.

Sect. 9. 4. Let our opposites say to us, once for all, upon what precept of the law of nature do they ground the ceremonies; for I have before opened up all sorts of things which the law of nature requireth of man as he is ens; and as he is animal belongeth not to our purpose. As for that which it requireth of him as he is a creature endued with reason, there is one part of it that concerneth ourselves, viz., that we should live honestly, and secundum modum rationis, that we should observe order and decency in all our actions. This order and decency do not respect our holy duties to God, nor comprehend any sacred ceremony in his worship; but they look to usward, and are referred only to such beseeming qualities as are congruous and convenient to a reasonable nature in all its actions. Yea, even generally, we may say with Scalliger,(1166) Ordinem dico sine quo natura constare non potest. Nihil enim absque ordine vel med tata est vel effecit illa. Another part of that which nature requireth of man, as he is a creature endued with reason, concerneth (as we showed) our neighbours, whom it teacheth us not to harm nor offend, &c. And if our opposites would reckon with us here, their ceremonies will appear repugnant to nature, because of the detriment and offence which they offer unto us, whereof we have spoken in our argument of scandal. But there was a third part, concerning God and his worship; and here must our opposites seek a warrant for the ceremonies. Now, albeit nature (as was said) teaches all men that there is an eternal and mighty God, who should be worshipped and honoured by them, yet it descendeth not unto such particular precepts as can have any show of making aught for significant ceremonies. Omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos; but yet quales sint, saith Cicero, varium est.(1167) And as nature hath not taught men to know the nature and attributes of the Godhead, together with the sacred Trinity of persons in the same; so neither hath it taught what sort or manner of worship should be given unto God. Lex naturalis rerum communium est,(1168) and doth only inform us with those common notions called κοιναὶ εννοιαὶ. Concerning the worship of God, it speaks only de genere, not de specie: wherefore there can be no inference from that worship which the law of nature requireth, either of any distinct kind of worship or of any ceremony in that kind, no more than it followeth, Si est animal, est Asinus; for a genere ad speciem non valet consequentia affirmando.



THE FOURTH PART.

AGAINST THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.



CHAPTER I.

OF OUR OPPOSITES' PLEADING FOR THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.

If it seem to any that it is a strange method to speak now of indifferency, in the end of this dispute, which ought rather to have been handled in the beginning of it, they may consider, that the method is not ours, but our opposites'; for they have been fleeing upon Icarus' wings, and soaring so high that their wings could not but melt from them: so have they, from necessity fallen down to expediency; from it to lawfulness; and from thence to indifferency.

I knew certain of them, who, after reasoning about the ceremonies with some of our side, required, in the end, no more but that they would only acknowledge the indifferency of the things in themselves. And so being wooed and solicitously importuned by our former arguments against the ceremonies, they take them to the weaving of Penelope's web, thereby to suspend us, and to gain time against us: this indifferency, I mean, which they shall never make out, and which themselves, otherwhiles, unweave again. Always, so long as they think to get any place for higher notions about the ceremonies, they speak not so meanly of them as of things indifferent; but when all their forces of arguments and answers are spent in vain, then are our ears filled with uncouth outcries and declamations, which tend to make themselves appear blameless for receiving, and us blameworthy for refusing matters of rite and indifferency.