By the middle of the summer, however, the British were ready to lay a heavy hand on the United States and punish the insolent country for its annoying attack in the rear. New England was now subjected to the blockade, and troops from Wellington's irresistible army were sent across, some to the squadron in the Chesapeake, others to Canada, and later still others in a well-equipped expedition to New Orleans to conquer the mouth of the Mississippi.

The Chesapeake squadron, after raiding and provisioning itself at the expense of the Virginia and Maryland farmers, made a dash at Washington, sending boats up the Patuxent and Potomac rivers, and landing a body of about 2,000 men. On August 24, with absurd {230} ease, this force scattered in swift panic a hasty collection of militia, and entered Washington, sending the President and Cabinet flying into the country. In retaliation for the damage done at York, the British officers set fire to the capital and other public buildings, before retreating swiftly to their ships. A similar attack on Baltimore, September 11, was better met, and, although the British routed a force of militia, the attempt to take the city was abandoned. The humiliation of the capture of Washington led to the downfall of Armstrong as Secretary of State, although not until after he had almost ruined another campaign.

While the British were threatening Washington, another force was gathering north of Lake Champlain, and a large frigate was being built to secure command of that lake. By the end of August, nearly 16,000 men, most of them from Wellington's regiments, were assembled to invade New York, probably with the intention of securing the permanent occupation of the northern part. In the face of this, Armstrong sent most of the American troops at Plattsburg on a useless march across New York State, leaving a bare handful under General McComb to meet the invasion. When Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Canada, advanced to Plattsburg on September 6, he found nothing {231} but militia and volunteers before him. Fortunately for the United States, Prevost was no fighter, and he declined to advance or attack unless he had a naval control of the lake. On September 11 the decisive contest took place. McDonough, the American commander, with a small squadron, entirely defeated and captured the British flotilla under Downie. It was Lake Erie over again, with the difference that in this battle the American fleet was not superior to the British. It was a victory due to better planning and better gunnery, and it led to the immediate retreat of Prevost, who tamely abandoned the whole campaign, to the intense mortification of his officers and men. The remaining expedition, under General Pakenham, comprising 16,000 Peninsular veterans, under convoy of a strong fleet, sailed to the Gulf of Mexico and advanced to capture New Orleans. General Andrew Jackson was at hand, and with him a mass of militia and frontiersmen. Driven by the furious energy of the Indian fighter, the Americans showed aggressiveness and courage in skirmishes and night attacks, and finally won an astounding victory on January 8, 1815. On that day the British force tried to storm, by frontal attack, a line of intrenchments armed with cannon and packed with riflemen. In twenty-five minutes their columns were so badly cut up by {232} grapeshot and musketry that the whole attack was abandoned, after Pakenham himself had been killed. The expedition withdrew, and sailing to Mobile, a town in Spanish territory, occupied by the Americans, retook it on February 11; but the main purpose of their invasion was foiled.

In this year, while American land forces struggled to escape destruction, the naval vessels were for the most part shut in by the blockade. Occasional captures were still made in single combat; but British frigates were now under orders to refuse battle with the larger American vessels, and the captures by sloops were counterbalanced by the British capture of the frigate Essex by two antagonists in March, 1814. Practically the only extensive operations carried on were by American privateers, who now haunted the British Channel and captured merchantmen within sight of the English coasts. The irritation caused by these privateers was excessive, and made British shipowners and merchants anxious for peace; but it had no effect on the military situation. England was not to be subdued by mere annoyance.

By the end of 1814, the time seemed to be at hand when the United States must submit to peace on such terms as England chose to dictate, or risk disruption and ruin. The administrative weaknesses of the country {233} culminated in actual financial bankruptcy, which was due in no small part to the fact that Federalist financiers and bankers, determining to do all the damage possible, steadily refused to subscribe to the loans or to give any assistance. The powerful New England capital was entirely withheld. The result was that the strain on the rest of the banks became too great; and after the capture of Washington they all suspended specie payment, leaving the Government only the notes of suspended banks, or its own depreciated treasury notes for currency. All the coin in the country steadily flowed into the vaults of New England banks, while the Federal Treasury was compelled, on November 9, 1814, to admit its inability to pay interest on its loans. Congress met in the autumn and endeavoured to remedy the situation by chartering a bank; but under the general suspension of specie payments it was impossible to start one solvent from the beginning. When Congress authorized one without power to suspend specie payments, Madison vetoed it as useless. All that could be done was to issue more treasury notes. As for the army, a Bill for compulsory service was brought in, showing the enormous change in Republican ideals; but it failed to pass. Congress seemed helpless. The American people would neither enlist for the war nor {234} authorize their representatives to pass genuine war measures.

The Federalists, controlling most of the New England States, now felt that the time had come to insist on a termination of their grievances. Their governors had refused to allow militia to assist, their legislatures had done nothing to aid the war; their capitalists had declined to subscribe, and their farmers habitually sold provisions to the British over the Canadian boundary, actually supplying Sir George Prevost's army by contract. There met, at Hartford, on December 14, 1814, a convention of leading men, officially or unofficially representing the five New England States, who agreed upon a document which was intended to secure the special rights of their region. They demanded amendments to the Constitution abolishing the reckoning of slaves as basis for congressional representation, providing for the partial distribution of government revenues among the States, prohibiting embargoes or commercial warfare, or the election of successive Presidents from the same State, and requiring a two-thirds vote of Congress to admit new States or declare war. This was meant for an ultimatum; and it was generally understood that, if the Federal government did not submit to these terms, the New England States would secede to {235} rid themselves of what they considered the intolerable oppression of Virginian misgovernment.

Such was the state of things in the winter of 1815. The administration of Madison had utterly failed to secure any of the ends of the war, to inflict punishment on Great Britain, or to conquer Canada. It had also utterly failed to maintain financial solvency, to enlist an army, to create a navy capable of keeping the sea, or to prevent a movement in New England which seemed to be on the verge of breaking the country into pieces. But to lay this miserable failure—for such only can it be called—to the personal discredit of Jefferson and Madison is unfair, for it was only the repetition under new governmental conditions of the old traditional colonial method of carrying on war as a local matter. The French and Indian War, the Revolution, and the War of 1812, repeated in different generations the same tale of amateur warfare, of the occasional success and usual worthlessness of the militia, the same administrative inefficiency, and the same financial breakdown. Without authority and obedience, there can be carried on no real war; and authority and obedience were no more known and no better appreciated in 1812 than they had been in the days of Washington. Jefferson, Madison, {236} and their party had gone with the current of American tradition; that was their only fault.



CHAPTER XII

END OF THE ANTAGONISM: A CENTURY OF PEACE

When the American war began, the English showed a tendency to blame the Tory administration for permitting it to take place; but the chief feeling, after all, was one of annoyance at Madison and his party for having decided to give their assistance to Napoleon at the crisis of his career. The intercourse between Englishmen and New England Federalists had given British society its understanding of American politics and coloured its natural irritation toward the Republican administration with something of the deeper venom of the outraged New Englanders, who saw in Jefferson and his successors a race of half-Jacobins. During 1812 and 1813, accordingly, newspapers and ministerial speakers, when they referred to the contest, generally spoke of the necessity of {237} chastising an impudent and presumptuous antagonist. A friendly party such as had defended the colonists during the Revolution no longer existed, for the Whigs, however antagonistic to the Liverpool Ministry, were fully as firmly committed to maintaining British naval and commercial supremacy.

England's chief continental ally, however, the Tsar Alexander, considered the American war an unfortunate blunder; and, as early as September, 1812, he offered his mediation through young John Quincy Adams, Minister at St. Petersburg. The news reached America in March, 1813, and Madison revealed his willingness to withdraw from a contest already shown to be unprofitable by immediately accepting and nominating Adams, with Bayard and Gallatin, to serve as peace commissioners. Without waiting to hear from England, these envoys started for Russia, but reached there only to meet an official refusal on the part of England, dated July 5, 1813. The Liverpool Ministry did not wish to have the American war brought within the range of European consideration, since its settlement under such circumstances might raise questions of neutral rights which would be safer out of the hands of a Tsar whose predecessors had framed armed neutralities in 1780 and 1801. Accordingly, the British government intimated politely that {238} it would be willing to deal directly with the United States, and thus waved the unwelcome Russian mediation aside. Madison accepted this offer in March, 1814; but, although the American commissioners endeavoured through Alexander Baring, their friend and defender in Parliament, to get the British government to appoint a time and place for meeting, they encountered continued delays.

A considerable element in the Tory party felt that the time had come to inflict a severe punishment upon the United States, and newspapers and speakers of that connection announced freely that only by large concessions of territory could the contemptible republic purchase peace. When the Ministry finally sent commissioners to Ghent, on August 8, 1814, it was not with any expectation of coming to a prompt agreement, but merely to engage the Americans while the various expeditions then under way took Washington and Baltimore, occupied northern New York, and captured New Orleans. It was generally expected that a few months would find large portions of the United States in British possession, as was in fact the sea-coast of Maine, east of Penobscot Bay, after September first.

The instructions to the British peace commissioners were based on the uti possedetis, {239} as the British government intended it to be by the end of the year, when they expected to hold half of Maine, the northern parts of New York, New Hampshire and Vermont, the north-western post of Mackinnac, and possibly New Orleans and Mobile. In addition, there was to be an Indian territory established under British guarantee west of the old treaty line of 1795, and all American fishing rights were to be terminated. On the other side, the American instructions, while hinting that England would do well to cede Canada, made the abandonment of the alleged right of impressments by England a sine qua non. Clearly no agreement between such points of view was possible; and the outcome of the negotiation was bound to depend on the course of events in the United States. The first interviews resulted in revealing that part of the British instructions related to the Indian territory with intimations of coming demands for territorial cessions. This the Americans instantly rejected on August 25, and the negotiation came to a standstill for several weeks.

The three British negotiators, Admiral Gambier, Henry Goulburn, and Doctor Adams were men of slight political or personal authority, and their part consisted chiefly in repeating their instructions and referring American replies back to Lord Castlereagh, {240} the Foreign Secretary, or to Lord Bathurst, who acted as his substitute while he attended the Congress of Vienna. The American commissioners, including the three original ones, Adams, Bayard, and Gallatin, to whom Clay and Russell of Massachusetts were now added, clearly understood the situation, and had already warned Madison that an insistence on the abandonment of impressments would result in the failure to secure any treaty. In October, 1814, a despatch yielded this point and left the negotiators to make the best fight they could, unhampered by positive instructions. Undoubtedly they would have been compelled to submit to hard terms, in spite of their personal ability, which stood exceedingly high, had not news of the repulse at Baltimore, of the treaty of July, 1814, by which the north-western Indians agreed to fight the English, and, on October 17, of the retreat of Sir George Prevost after the defeat of Plattsburg, come in to change the situation.

Between August and October little had been accomplished, during a slow interchange of notes, beyond a withdrawal by the British of their demand for an Indian territory, and an acceptance in its place of an agreement to include the Indians in a general peace. Then the Cabinet, seeing that after Prevost's retreat they could no longer claim the {241} territory outlined in the first instructions, authorized the negotiators to demand only Mackinac and Niagara, with a right of way across Maine. The Americans, encouraged by the news from Plattsburg, replied on October 23, refusing to treat on the uti possedetis, or on any terms but the status quo ante. This brought the Tory government face to face with the question whether the war was to be continued for another year for the purpose of conquering a frontier for Canada; and, before the prospect of continued war taxation, annoyance from privateers, and a doubtful outcome, they hesitated. Turning to Wellington for a decision, they asked him whether he would accept the command in America for the purpose of conquering a peace. His reply showed little interest or desire to go, although he seemed confident of success; but he observed that, on the basis of the military situation, they had no right to demand any territorial cession.

The Ministry then, on November 18, definitely abandoned the claim for compensation, and accepted as a basis for discussion a plan submitted by the American commissioners. In the preparation of this a sharp quarrel had broken out between Clay, who insisted on terminating the British right to navigate the Mississippi, and Adams, who {242} demanded the retention of the American right to fish in Canadian waters. Gallatin pointed out that the two privileges stood together, and with great difficulty he induced the two men to agree to the omission of both matters from the treaty, although Clay refused until the last to sign. So the commission presented a united front in offering to renew both rights or postpone them for discussion; and the British commissioners finally accepted the latter alternative. The treaty was then signed in the old Carthusian Convent at Ghent, on December 24, 1814, as a simple cessation of hostilities and return to the status quo ante as regards conquests. Not a word related to any of the numerous causes of the war. Impressments, blockades, Orders in Council, the Indian relations, the West Indian trade rights,—all were abandoned. So far as the United States was concerned the treaty was an acknowledgment of defeat, a recognition that the war was a failure.

In view of the hopes of Canadian gains, the treaty was denounced in England by the Opposition journals and many of those most antagonistic to America as a cowardly surrender. But it was none the less heartily accepted by both peoples and both governments. It reached the United States on February 11, was sent to the Senate on February 15, and ratified unanimously the next day. There {243} still remained various vessels at sea, and so the winter of 1815 saw not only the amazing victory of Jackson at New Orleans, but also several naval actions, in which the United States frigate President was taken by a squadron of British blockades, two American sloops in duels took two British smaller vessels, and the American Constitution, in a night action, captured, together, two British sloops. Then the news spread, and peace finally arrived in fact.

In England, the whole affair was quickly forgotten in the tremendous excitement caused by the return of Napoleon from Elba, the uprising of Europe, and the dramatic meeting of the two great captains, Wellington and Napoleon, in the Waterloo campaign. By the time the Napoleonic Empire had finally collapsed, the story of the American war, with its maritime losses and scanty land triumphs, was an old one, and the British exporters, rushing to regain their former markets, were happy in the prospect of the reopening of American ports. By October, trade relations were re-established and the solid intercourse of the two countries was under way.

In America all disgraces and defeats were forgotten in the memories of New Orleans, Plattsburg, and Chippawa, and the people at large, willing to forgive all its failures to the {244} Republican administration, resumed with entire contentment the occupations of peace. The war fabric melted like a cloud; armies were disbanded, vessels were called home, credit rose, prices sprang upward, importations swelled, exportation began.

In truth, the time of antagonism was at an end, for, with the European peace of 1814, the immediate cause for irritation was removed, never to return. The whole structure of blockades, Orders in Council, seizures, and restrictions upon neutrals vanished; the necessity for British impressments ceased to exist; and, since France never again came into hostility with England, none of these grievances were revived. But in a broader way the year 1815 and the decades following marked the end of national hostility, for the fundamental antagonisms which, since 1763, had repeatedly brought about irritation and conflict, began after this time to die out.

In the first place, the defeat of the Indians in the war allowed the people of the United States to advance unchecked into the north-west and south-west, filling the old Indian lands, and rendering any continuation of the restrictive diplomacy on the part of England for the benefit of Canadian fur traders patently futile. The war was no sooner ended than roads, trails, and rivers swarmed {245} with westward-moving emigrants; and within a year the territory of Indiana, which the British commissioners at Ghent had wished to establish as an Indian reserve, was framing a State constitution. In 1819 Illinois followed.

The revulsion of temper was illustrated in the commencement at this time of the organized movement for settled international peace, which may be dated from the establishment of the New York and Massachusetts Peace Societies in 1815, and the London Peace Society in the following year. But its most signal expression came in the remarkable agreement by which the Canadian-American frontier has been, for nearly a century, unfortified, and yet completely peaceful. On November 16, 1815, State Secretary Monroe instructed Adams to propose to the British Government that—as, "if each party augments its force there with a view to obtaining the ascendancy over the other, vast expense will be incurred and the danger of collision augmented in like degree"—such military preparations should be suspended on both sides. The smaller the number of the armed forces agreed upon, he said, the better; "or to abstain altogether from an armed force beyond that used for the revenue." After some suspicious hesitation, Lord Castlereagh accepted this novel proposal; and it was {246} given effect to by an exchange of notes, signed by Mr. Bagot, British Minister at Washington, and Mr. Rush (Monroe's successor) on April 28 and 29, 1817, approved by the Senate a year later, and proclaimed by the President on April 28, 1818. By Rush-Bagot Agreement, the naval force of each Government was limited to one small gun-boat of each power on Champlain and Ontario, and two on the upper lakes, an arrangement of immense value to both Canada and the United States.

The old-time commercial antagonism was also destined to disappear in a few years after the close of the war. At first England clung to the time-honoured West Indian policy, and, when in 1815 the two countries adjusted their commercial relations, American vessels were still excluded, although given the right to trade directly with the East Indies. But already the new economic thought, which regarded competition and reciprocal trade as the ideal, instead of legal discriminations and universal protectionism, was gaining ground, as England became more and more the manufacturing centre of the world. Under Huskisson, in 1825, reciprocity was definitely substituted for exclusion; and a few years later, under Peel and Russell, and within the lifetime of men who had maintained the Orders in Council, the whole {247} elaborate system of laws backed by the logic of Lord Sheffield and James Stephen was cast away and fell into disrepute and oblivion.

In America, it should be added, the rush of settlers into the West and the starting of manufactures served, within a few years from the end of the War of 1812, to alter largely the former dependence of the United States upon foreign commerce. By the time that England was ready to abandon its restrictive policy, the United States was beginning to be a manufacturing nation with its chief wealth in its great internal trade, and the ancient interest in the West Indies was fast falling into insignificance. The same men who raged against the Jay treaty and the Orders in Council lived to forget that they had ever considered the West India trade important. So, on both sides, the end of commercial antagonism was soon to follow on the Treaty of Ghent.

Finally, and more slowly, the original political and social antagonism ceased to be active, and ultimately died out. So far as the United States was concerned, the change was scarcely visible until three-quarters of a century after the Treaty of Ghent. The temper of the American people, formed by Revolutionary traditions and nourished on memories of battle and injuries, remained {248} steadily antagonistic toward England; and the triumph of western social ideals served to emphasize the distinction between the American democrat and the British aristocrat, until dislike became a tradition and a political and literary convention. But the emptiness of this normal national hatred of John Bull was shown in 1898, when, at the first distinct sign of friendliness on the part of the British government and people, the whole American anglophobia vanished, and the people of the continent realized that the time had come for a recognition of the essential and normal harmony of the ancient enemies.

In England, the change began somewhat earlier, for within less than a generation after the Treaty of Ghent the exclusive Tory control collapsed, and the Revolution of 1832 gave the middle classes a share of political power. A few years later the Radicals, representing the working-men, became a distinct force in Parliament, and to middle class and Radicals there was nothing abhorrent in the American Republic. Aristocratic society continued, of course, as in the eighteenth century, to regard the United States with scant respect, and those members of the upper middle classes who took their social tone from the aristocracy commonly reflected their prejudices. But the masses of {249} the British people—whose relatives emigrated steadily to the western land of promise—felt a genuine sympathy and interest in the success of the great democratic experiment, a sympathy which was far deeper and more effective than had been that of the eighteenth-century Whigs. From the moment that these classes made their weight felt in government, the time was at hand when the old social antagonism was to die out, and with it the deep political antipathy which, since the days of 1793, had tinged the official British opinion of a democratic state. The last evidence of the Tory point of view came when, in 1861, the American Civil War brought out the unconcealed aversion of the British nobility and aristocracy for the northern democracy; but on the occasion the equally unconcealed sense of political and social sympathy manifested by the British middle and working classes served to prevent any danger to the United States, and to keep England from aiding in the disruption of the Union.

Thus the Treaty of Ghent, marking the removal of immediate causes of irritation, was the beginning of a period in which the under-lying elements of antagonism between England and the United States were definitely to cease. When every discount is made, the celebration, heartily supported by the national leaders on {250} both sides, of a century of peace between the British, Canadian, and American peoples, does exhibit, in Sir Wilfred Laurier's words, "a spectacle to astound the world by its novelty and grandeur."



{251}

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The references to the epoch covered in this volume may be rather sharply divided into those which deal with the years before 1783, and those which relate to the subsequent period. In the first group, there are both British and American works of high excellence, but in the second there are practically none but American authorities, owing to the preoccupation of British writers with the more dramatic and important French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, of the events of parliamentary politics.

For the years 1763-1783 the best American history is E. CHANNING, History of the United States, vol. iii (1912), distinctly independent, thorough, and impartial. S. G. FISHER, The Struggle for American Independence, 2 vols. (1908), is cynically critical and unconventional. Three volumes of the American Nation series,—G. E. HOWARD, Preliminaries of the Revolution; C. H. VAN TYNE, The American Revolution; and A. C. McLAUGHLIN, The Confederation and the Constitution (1905), are equally scholarly and less detailed. The older American works, exhibiting the traditional "patriotic" view, are best represented by J. FISKE, American Revolution, 2 vols. (1891); and G. BANCROFT, History of the United States, 6 vols. (ed. 1883-1885).

On the English side the most valuable study is in W. E. H. LECKY, England in the Eighteenth Century, vols. iii, iv (1878), a penetrating and impartial analysis. The Whig view appears in SIR G. O. TREVELYAN, The American Revolution, 3 vols. (1899-1907); LORD MAHON, England in the Eighteenth Century, vols. v-vii (1853-1854); and M. MARKS, England and America, 2 vols. (1907), while W. HUNT, Political History, 1760-1801 (1905), alone of recent writers, presents a Tory version of events.

Special works of value are C. STEDMAN, The American War, 2 vols. (1794), the authoritative English contemporary account of military events, and, among recent studies, J. W. FORTESCUE, History of the British Army, vol. iii (1902), which should be compared with H. B. CARRINGTON, Battles of the Revolution (1876); E. MCCRADY, South Carolina in the Revolution, 2 vols. (1901-2); E. J. LOWELL, The Hessians in the {252} Revolution (1884); J. B. PERKINS, France in the American Revolution (1911); C. H. VAN TYNE, The Loyalists (1902), and W. HERTZ, The Old Colonial System (1905). Of especial value are the destructive criticisms in C. F. ADAMS, Studies Military and Diplomatic (1911). The authoritative treatment of naval history is found in A. T. MAHAN, Influence of Sea Power (1890), and in the chapter by the same writer in W. L. CLOWES, History of the Royal Navy, vols. iii, iv (1898-1899).

Among leading biographies are those of Washington by H. C. LODGE (2 vols. 1890), by W. C. FORD (2 vols. 1900), and by GEN. B. T. JOHNSON (1894); of Franklin by J. PARTON (2 vols. 1864), by J. BIGELOW (3 vols. 1874), and by J. T. MORSE (1889); of Henry by M. C. TYLER (1887); of Samuel Adams by J. K. HOSMER (1885); of Robert Morris by E. P. OBERHOLZER (1903), and of Steuben by F. KAPP (1869). On the English side the Memoirs of Horace Walpole (1848); the Correspondence of George III with Lord North, ed. by W. B. DONNE (1867), are valuable and interesting, and some material may be found in the lives of Burke by T. McNIGHT (2 vols. 1858); of Shelburne by E. G. FITZMAURICE (2 vols. 1875); of Chatham by F. HARRISON (1905) and A. VON RUVILLE (3 vols. 1907); and of Fox by LORD JOHN RUSSELL (3 vols. 1859). The biographies of two governors of Massachusetts, C. A. POWNALL, Thomas Pownall (1908), and J. K. HOSMER, Thomas Hutchinson (1896), are of value as presenting the colonial Tory point of view.

For the period after 1783, the best reference book and the only one which attempts to trace in detail the motives of British as well as American statesmen is HENRY ADAMS, History of the United States, 9 vols. (1891). It is impartially critical, in a style of sustained and caustic vivacity. Almost equally valuable is A. T. MAHAN, Sea Power in Relation to the War of 1812, 2 vols. (1905), which contains the only sympathetic analysis of British naval and commercial policy, 1783-1812, beside being the authoritative work on naval events. The standard American works are J. SCHOULER, History of the United States, vols. i, ii (1882); J. B. MCMASTER, History of the People of the United States, vols. i-iv (1883-1895); R. HILDRETH, History of the United States, vols. ii-vi (1849-1862), and three volumes of the American Nation Series, J. S. BASSETT, The Federalist System; E. CHANNING, The Jeffersonian System, and K. C. BABCOCK, Rise of American Nationality (1906). On the English side there is little in the general histories beyond a chapter on American relations in A. ALISON, Modern Europe, vol. iv (1848), which accurately represents the extreme Tory contempt for the United States, but has no other merit. Works on Canadian history fill this {253} gap to a certain extent, such as W. KINGSFORD, History of Canada, vol. viii (1895).

Beside the work of Mahan (as above) the War of 1812 is dealt with by W. JAMES, Naval History of Great Britain, vols. v-vi (1823), a work of accuracy as to British facts, but of violent anti-American temper; and on the other side by J. F. COOPER, Naval History (1856), and T. ROOSEVELT, Naval War of 1812 (1883). Sundry special works dealing with economic and social questions involved in international relations are T. ROOSEVELT, Winning of the West, 4 vols. (1899-1902); W. CUNNINGHAM, Growth of English Industry and Commerce, vol. iii (1893), and W. SMART, Economic Annals of the Nineteenth Century (1910). Biographical material is to be found, in the lives of Washington (as above); of Jefferson by J. SCHOULER, (1897), and by J. T. MORSE (1883); of Hamilton by J. T. MORSE (1882), and F. S. OLIVER (1907); of Gallatin by H. ADAMS (1879); of Madison by G. HUNT (1903); of Josiah Quincy by E. QUINCY (1869). There is some biographical material to be found in BROUGHAM'S Life and Times of Lord Brougham, vol. iii (1872), and in S. WALPOLE, Life of Spencer Perceval, 2 vols. (1874), but for the most part the British version of relations with America after 1783 is still to be discovered only in the contemporary sources such as the Parliamentary History and Debates, the Annual Register, and the partly published papers of such leaders as Pitt, Fox, Grenville, Canning, Castlereagh and Perceval.

A useful sketch, giving prominence to the Treaty of Ghent and the Rush-Bagot Agreement, and summarizing earlier and later events, is A Short History of Anglo-American Relations and of the Hundred Years' Peace, by H. S. PERRIS.

Documents and other contemporary material for the whole period may be conveniently found in W. MACDONALD, Select Charters (1904) and Select Documents (1898); in G. CALLENDER, Economic History of the United States (1909), and A. B. HART, American History told by Contemporaries, vols. ii, iii (1898, 1901).



{254}

INDEX

Adams, John, in Revolution, 48, 57, 63, 71, 118-125; after 1783, 142, 147, 155, 173-180 Adams, John Quincy, 237-241 Adams, Samuel, 32, 42, 50, 57, 63, 78, 131, 144 Adet, P. A., 172, 173 Alexander I, 190, 237 Alien and Sedition Acts, 176-180 Anti-Federalists, 143, 147 Armstrong, John, 223-230 Arnold, Benedict, 67, 81, 85, 104

Baltimore, 84, 230, 238, 240 Bank of the United States, 145, 146, 183, 218 Banks, State, 218, 233 Baring, Alexander, 212, 238 Bayard, James A., 237, 240 Beaumarchais, Caron de, 94 Bedford, Duke of, 40 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 179, 184-186, 189-198, 202-208, 213-216, 227, 236, 243 Brock, General Isaac, 220, 221 Brougham, Henry, 212 Brown, General Jacob, 228, 229 Bunker Hill, Battle of, 65, 66, 78, 83 Burgoyne, General John, 89-95, 113, 114 Burke, Edmund, 52, 60, 68, 73, 74, 96, 115, 116, 161, 165 Burr, Aaron, 179, 180

Camden, Battle of, 103 Canada, British policy in, 29, 54, 67, 73, 81, 85, 100, 119, 122, 127, 155, 158, 200, 210, 211; defence of, 214-229, 239, 241, 244, 245 Canning, George, 197, 202, 204, 205, 207, 212 Carleton, General Guy, 81, 85, 158 Chauncey, Commodore Isaac, 225, 228 Clark, George Rogers, 101, 105 Clay, Henry, 211, 214, 240, 241 Clinton, De Witt, 214 Clinton, George, 147, 169 Clinton, Sir Henry, 82, 100-103, 109-113 Concord, Battle of, 62, 78 Confederation, Articles of, 105, 129-136 Congress, Continental, 56, 57, 60, 63, 64, 71, 79, 80, 84, 88-93, 98, 105, 118, 130 Congress of the Confederation, 107, 124, 125, 127, 130-138, 142, 157 Congress, United States, under Federalists, 140-146, 155, 164, 173, 175, 177; under Republicans, 182, 186, 187, 195, 199-209, 211, 213, 220, 223, 228, 233, 234 Constitution, United States, 139-141, 159, 180, 183, 234 Cornwallis, Lord, 86, 103-114

Dartmouth, Earl of, 47, 50 Declaration of Independence, 71, 98 De Grasse, Admiral, 110-112, 125 D'Estaing, Admiral, 100-102 Dickinson, John, 42, 50, 57, 64, 105

Elections, Presidential, 142, 147, 178, 178-180, 187, 201, 214 Erie, Lake, Battle of, 225 Erskine, David M., 204, 205

Fauchet, J. A., 163, 172 Finances, of Revolution, 16, 64, 106, 123, 124, 133-135, 144-146, 182, 191, 218-220, 228, 233 Fox, Charles James, 96, 115-121, 152, 153, 165, 193 Franklin, Benjamin, in England, 38, 44, 51, 52, 64; in France, 71, 83, 93-95, 107, 118-124

Cage, General Thomas, 58, 61, 65 Gallatin, Albert, 182, 237, 240, 242 Gates, General Horatio, 79, 90, 91, 93, 103 Genet, Edmond C., 161-163 Germaine, Lord George, 53, 76, 77, 88, 115 Governors, Colonial, 15-17, 26, 27, 44, 62, 72 Grafton, Duke of, 39, 40, 47 Greene, General Nathaniel, 79, 84, 104, 109 Grenville, George, 28, 30, 31, 35, 45, 53 Grenville, William, Lord, 165, 166, 171, 193, 194, 198, 203

Hamilton, Alexander, 132, 135, 144-148, 162, 164, 168, 177, 179, 180, 188 Harrison, General W. H., 210, 211, 221-225 Hartford Convention, 234 Henry, Patrick, 32, 42, 50, 57, 78, 131, 144 Hillsborough, Lord, 43-53 Howe, Admiral, 82, 83, 100, 114 Howe, General Sir William, 82-92, 95, 113, 114 Hull, General William, 220 Hutchinson, Governor Thomas, 49, 52

Indians, of Northwest, 29, 100, 157-159, 164, 168, 209-213, 218-225, 239, 244, 245 Indians, Southwestern, 157, 210, 224, 229

Jackson, Andrew, 224, 228, 229, 231, 243 Jay, John, 42, 57, 118, 120-125, 156, 157, 165-167, 171 Jefferson, Thomas, 71, 78, 144, 146, 147, 156, 161, 169, 172, 178, 180, 181-188, 193-196, 199-203, 209, 213, 215, 217, 235, 236

King's Mountain, Battle of, 104

Lafayette, Marquis de, 102 Lee, General Charles, 79, 84, 99 Lee, Richard Henry, 57, 144 Livingston, Robert R., 125, 186 Long Island, Battle of, 83 Louis XVI, 93, 95, 156

Madison, James, 132, 135, 142, 144, 146, 147, 163, 164, 172, 178, 193, 201-208, 213-215, 230, 233-238, 240 Ministries, British, Bute, 35, 40; Grenville, 28, 35, 43; First Rockingham, 36, 39; Grafton, 39-45, North, 47-56, 60, 68-77, 88, 95-98, 114-117, 151; Second Rockingham, 117, 120; Shelburne, 120-123, 126, 152-154; Coalition, 126, 153, 154; Pitt, 152-154, 159, 162-167, 171; Addington, 171; Second Pitt, 171, 192, 193; Lord Grenville, 193, 196, 197; Portland, 197, 202, 207; Perceval, 207, 211-215; Liverpool, 212, 213, 237-241 Monroe, James, 172, 173, 186, 196 Montgomery, General Richard, 67, 79 Morgan, Daniel, 67, 68, 90, 104 Morris, Robert, 78, 107, 134

Navigation Acts, 22-25, 29, 38, 55, 72, 132, 150, 155 Non-importation Act, 196-200 Non-intercourse Act, 202, 206, 213 North, Lord, Tory leader, 43-56, 60, 61, 73-76; in Revolutionary war, 77, 97, 115-117, 153

Oswald, Richard, 119-121 Otis, James, 27, 32

Perceval, Spencer, 197, 207, 212 Perry, Commander O. H., 225 Pinckney, C. C., 173, 174 Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 9, 36, 38-40, 53, 60, 96-98 Pitt, William, 144, 148, 152-154, 171, 176, 189, 192 Pownall, Thomas, 41, 47, 53 Prevost, Sir George, 230, 231, 234 Proclamation of 1763, 29, 122 Proctor, Colonel Henry, 221, 225

Quebec Act, 54, 56

Randolph, Edmund, 163, 164, 172 Representatives, House of, 164, 180, 211 Rochambeau, Comte de, 102, 110, 113 Rockingham, Marquis of, 117, 120 Rutledge, John, 57, 78, 83

St. Clair, General Arthur, 159 St. Leger, Colonel B., 90 Sandwich, Earl of, 53, 68, 76, 77, 99, 115 Saratoga, Surrender at, 92 Scott, Sir William, 193 Secession, 188, 201, 234, 235 Sedition Act, 176-178, 180 Shays' Rebellion, 137 Sheffield, Lord, 150, 151, 154, 192, 197, 247 Shelburne, Earl of, 117, 119-123, 152-154 Sherman, Roger, 78, 135 Stamp Act, 30-33, 200 States Rights, 146, 178, 234 Stephen, James, 192, 197, 207, 247 Sugar Act, 25, 29, 31

Talleyrand, 175, 177 Tarleton, Colonel B., 103, 110 Tecumseh, 210, 211, 220, 221, 224, 225 Townshend, Charles, 40-43 Townshend Duties, 40-47, 210 Treaties, 1763, 9, 28; 1778, 95, 98; 1783, 117-127, 149-152, 158; 1794, 165-172, 193, 196; 1795, 168, 184; 1803, 186; 1814, 242; 1818, 244 Trenton, Battle of, 86, 112

Vergennes, Comte de, 93-96, 119-125

Washington, George, Commander, 42, 57, 64, 66, 79, 83-93, 99, 100, 107-112, 126; in retirement, 132, 134; President, 142, 144, 146, 147, 159, 162, 164, 167, 172-174, 178 Wayne, General Anthony, 79, 159, 164 Wellington, Duke of, 241, 243 West Indies, British, before 1783, 9, 21-27, 99, 102, 108, 110, 112, 125; after 1783, 132, 149-151, 166, 167, 246, 247 West Indies, French, trade with, 25, 27, 31, 156, 163, 167, 191-193, 196 Wilkes, John, 44, 45 Wilkinson, General James, 226

X. Y. Z. affair, 174, 175

Yorktown, Surrender at, 112, 160, 160

THE END