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There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual divinities, because without such the sacrificer could not represent Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to it. So Scripture also says, 'Of that divinity for which the offering is taken he is to think when about to say vausha/t/' (Ai. Br. III, 8, 1). Nor is it possible to consider the essential form (or character) of a thing to consist in the word only[217]; for word (denoting) and thing (denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authoritativeness of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and arthavadas.—Moreover, itihasas and pura/n/as also—because based on mantra and arthavada which possess authoritative power in the manner described—are capable of setting forth the personality, &c. of the devas. Itihasa and pura/n/a can, besides, be considered as based on perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times. Sm/ri/ti also declares that Vyasa and others conversed with the gods face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would thereby deny the (incontestable) variety of the world. He might as well maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the whole earth, there were no such princes in former times; a position by which the scriptural injunction of the rajasuya-sacrifice[218] would be stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes and a/s/ramas were as generally unsettled as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is therefore altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in consequence of their eminent religious merit, conversed with the gods face to face. Sm/ri/ti also declares that 'from the reading of the Veda there results intercourse with the favourite divinity' (Yoga Sutra II, 44). And that Yoga does, as Sm/ri/ti declares, lead to the acquirement of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also proclaims the greatness of Yoga, 'When, as earth, water, light, heat, and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body produced by the fire of Yoga' (/S/vet. Up. II, 12). Nor have we the right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the /ri/shis who see the mantras and brahma/n/a passages (i.e. the Veda).—From all this it appears that the itihasas and pura/n/as have an adequate basis.—And the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.
The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, pura/n/as, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods may thus be in the condition of having desires and so on, they must be considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation[219] agree with this latter supposition only.
34. Grief of him (i.e. of Jana/s/ruti) (arose) on account of his hearing a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of that (grief) (Raikva called him /S/udra); for it (the grief) is pointed at (by Raikva).
(In the preceding adhikara/n/a) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c. also possess such a claim. The present adhikara/n/a is entered on for the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the /S/udras also possess such a claim.
The purvapakshin maintains that the /S/udras also have such a claim, because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and because they are capable of it; and because there is no scriptural prohibition (excluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text, 'Therefore[220] the /S/udra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taitt. Sa/m/h. VII, 1, 1, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the /S/udras for sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not invalidate their qualification for knowledge, as knowledge can be apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an inferential mark supporting the claim of the /S/udras; for in the so-called sa/m/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Jana/s/ruti Pautraya/n/a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of /S/udra 'Fie, necklace and carnage be thine, O /S/udra, together with the cows' (Ch. Up. IV, 2, 3). Sm/ri/ti moreover speaks of Vidura and others who were born from /S/udra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge.—Hence the /S/udra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.
To this we reply that the /S/udras have no such claim, on account of their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters; but a /S/udra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the /S/udras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the Veda.—The Vedic statement, moreover, that the /S/udra is unfit for sacrifices intimates, because founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for knowledge also; for the argumentation is the same in both cases[221].—With reference to the purvapakshin's opinion that the fact of the word '/S/udra' being enounced in the sa/m/varga-knowledge constitutes an inferential mark (of the /S/udra's qualification for knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments being adduced; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage quoted.[222] Besides, the word '/S/udra' which occurs in the sa/m/varga-vidya would establish a claim on the part of the /S/udras to that one vidya only, not to all vidyas. In reality, however, it is powerless, because occurring in an arthavada, to establish the /S/udras' claim to anything.—The word '/S/udra' can moreover be made to agree with the context in which it occurs in the following manner. When Jana/s/ruti Pautraya/n/a heard himself spoken of with disrespect by the flamingo ('How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were like Raikva with the car?' IV, 1, 3), grief (su/k/) arose in his mind, and to that grief the /ri/shi Raikva alludes with the word /S/udra, in order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation must be accepted because a (real) born /S/udra is not qualified (for the sa/m/varga-vidya). If it be asked how the grief (su/k/) which had arisen in Janasruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word /S/udra, we reply: On account of the rushing on (adrava/n/a) of the grief. For we may etymologise the word /S/udra by dividing it into its parts, either as 'he rushed into grief (/S/u/k/am abhidudrava) or as 'grief rushed on him,' or as 'he in his grief rushed to Raikva;' while on the other hand it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense. The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover expressly touched upon in the legend[223].
35. And because the kshattriyahood (of Jana/s/ruti) is understood from the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with /K/aitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).
Jana/s/ruti cannot have been a /S/udra by birth for that reason also that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz. his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya /K/aitraratha Abhipratarin. For, later on, i.e. in the passage complementary to the sa/m/varga-vidya, a kshattriya /K/aitrarathi Abhipratarin is glorified, 'Once while /S/aunaka Kapeya and Abhipratarin Kakshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged of them' (Ch. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratarin was a /K/aitrarathi (i.e. a descendant of /K/itraratha) we have to infer from his connexion with a Kapeya. For we know (from /S/ruti) about the connexion of /K/itraratha himself with the Kapeyas ('the Kapeyas made /K/itraratha perform that sacrifice;' Ta/nd/ya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture ('from him a /K/aitrarathi descended who was a prince[224]') that he (/K/aitraratha) was a prince, we must understand him to have been a kshattriya. The fact now of Jana/s/ruti being praised in the same vidya with the kshattriya Abhipratarin intimates that the former also was a kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals. That Jana/s/ruti was a kshattriya we moreover conclude from his sending his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the text).—Hence the /S/udras are not qualified (for the knowledge of Brahman).
36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in the case of the /S/udras).
That the /S/udras are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also that in different places of the vidyas such ceremonies as the upanayana and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, /S/at. Br. XI, 5, 3, 13, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' Ch. Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir! thus he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their hands, approached the venerable Pippalada, thinking that he would teach them all that.'—Thus the following passage also, 'He without having made them undergo the upanayana (said) to them' (Ch. Up. V, 11, 7), shows that the upanayana is a well-established ceremony[225].—With reference to the /S/udras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are spoken of as 'once born' only ('the /S/udra is the fourth caste, once-born'), and Manu X, 126, 'In the /S/udra there is not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony.'
37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate Jabala) on the ascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a /S/udra).
The /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having ascertained Jabala not to be a /S/udra from his speaking the truth, proceeded to initiate and instruct him. 'None who is not a Brahma/n/a would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you. You have not swerved from the truth' (Ch. Up. IV, 4, 5); which scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the /S/udras not being capable of initiation).
38. And on account of the prohibition, in Sm/ri/ti, of (the /S/udras') hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic) matters.
The /S/udras are not qualified for that reason also that Sm/ri/ti prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing the Veda is conveyed by the following passages: 'The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,' and 'For a /S/udra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in the vicinity of a /S/udra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of studying the Veda results at once; for how should he study Scripture in whose vicinity it is not even to be read? There is, moreover, an express prohibition (of the /S/udras studying the Veda). 'His tongue is to be slit if he pronounces it; his body is to be cut through if he preserves it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters; there are, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart knowledge to the /S/udra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study, sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.'—From those /S/udras, however, who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter,' acquire knowledge in consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their knowledge cannot be withheld, since knowledge in all cases brings about its fruit. Sm/ri/ti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihasas and pura/n/as; compare the passage, 'He is to teach the four castes' (Mahabh.).—It remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such qualification with regard to the Veda.
39. (The pra/n/a is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of the whole world).
The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge—on which we entered as an opportunity offered—being finished we return to our chief topic, i.e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedanta-texts.—We read (Ka. Up. II, 6, 2), 'Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth trembles in the pra/n/a. It (the pra/n/a) is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal[226].'—This passage declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in pra/n/a, and that there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not immediately clear what the pra/n/a is, and what that terrible thunderbolt, a discussion arises.
The purvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term, pra/n/a denotes the air with its five modifications, that the word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and that thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five forms—which is here called pra/n/a—and the terrible thunderbolts also spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say, when it manifests itself in the form of Parjanya, lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves.—Through the knowledge of that air immortality also can be obtained; for another scriptural passage says, 'Air is everything by itself, and air is all things together. He who knows this conquers death.'—We therefore conclude that the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.
To this we make the following reply.—Brahman only can be meant, on account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of; how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once the air should be referred to? The immediately preceding passage runs as follows, 'That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from the circumstance that in the clause, 'The whole world trembles in pra/n/a' we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the abode of the whole world. That the word pra/n/a can denote the highest Self also, appears from such passages as 'the pra/n/a of pra/n/a' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 18). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a quality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere air. Thus Scripture says, 'No mortal lives by the pra/n/a and the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5 5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under discussion, ('From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns, from terror Indra and Vayu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman, and not the air, must be supposed to be spoken of, since the subject of that passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the ground of proximity; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, 'A great terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word 'thunderbolt' is here used to denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man strictly carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in his mind, 'A thunderbolt (i.e. the king's wrath, or threatened punishment) is hanging over my head; it might fall if I did not carry out his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire, air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from fear of Brahman; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is Brahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.'—That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further follows from the declaration that the fruit of its cognition is immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, 'A man who knows him only passes over death, there is no other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 15).—That immortality which the purvapakshin asserts to be sometimes represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely relative one; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic being started (B/ri/. Up. III, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of the air and so on is referred to. ('Everything else is evil.')—That in the passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally from the general subject-matter; for the question (asked by Na/k/iketas in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that') refers to the highest Self.
40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural passage).
We read in Scripture, 'Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word 'light' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and dispels darkness, or the highest Brahman.
The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'light' denotes the well-known (physical) light, because that is the conventional sense of the word. For while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the na/d/is of the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun ('When he departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays;' Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our passage, the ordinary light.
To this we make the following reply.—The word 'light' can denote the highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general subject-matter in VIII, 7, 1 ('the Self which is free from sin'); it is thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.); after that freedom from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light ('when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,' VIII, 12, 1)—and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman—and it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person' (VIII, 12, 3).—Against the statement, made by the purvapakshin, that Scripture speaks of a man going to release as reaching the sun, we remark, that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one, since it is said to be connected with going and departing upwards. That the ultimate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards we shall show later on.
41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something different, &c. (from name and form).
Scripture says, 'He who is called ether, (aka/s/a) is the revealer of all forms and names. That within which these forms and names are contained is the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1).
There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the purvapakshin declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because it is founded on the conventional meaning of the word 'ether;' and, secondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room (for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.
To this we reply, that the word 'ether' can here denote the highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the clause, 'That within which these two are contained is Brahman,' designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But, excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be accomplished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which declares Brahman's creative agency, 'Let me enter (into those beings) with this living Self (jiva atman), and evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). But—it may be said—from this very passage it is apparent that the living Self also (i.e. the individual soul) possesses revealing power with regard to names and forms.—True, we reply, but what the passage really wishes to intimate, is the non-difference (of the individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the like.—Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self' (VIII, 14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.
42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and departing.
In the sixth prapa/th/aka of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka there is given, in reply to the question, 'Who is that Self?' a lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self, 'He who is within the heart, among the pra/n/as, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an additional statement about the nature of the transmigrating soul (known already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.
The purvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and concluding statements. For the introductory statement, 'He among the pra/n/as who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, 'And that great unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must therefore adhere to the same subject-matter in the intermediate passages also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self, represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.
In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements about the embodied soul.—Why?—On account of the highest Lord being designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage, 'This person embraced by the intelligent (praj/n/a) Self knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, 'the person,' must mean the embodied soul; for of him it is possible to deny that he knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and without. The 'intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord, because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i.e.—in his case—all-embracing knowledge.—Similarly, the passage treating of departure, i.e. death ('this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self moves along groaning'), refers to the highest Lord as different from the individual Self. There also we have to understand by the 'embodied one' the individual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the 'intelligent one' is again the Lord. We thus understand that 'on account of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep sleep and departure,' the highest Lord forms the subject of the passage.—With reference to the purvapakshin's assertion that the entire chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in the first place the introductory passage ('He among the pra/n/as who consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that the immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving'[227], aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The concluding passage again is analogous to the initial one; for the words, 'And that great unborn Self is he who,' &c., mean: We have shown that that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the pra/n/as, is the great unborn Self, i.e. the highest Lord—He, again, who imagines that the passages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth the nature of the transmigrating Self by representing it in the waking state, and so on, is like a man who setting out towards the east, wants to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as free from all particular conditions and transmigration. This is evident from the circumstance that on Janaka's question, which is repeated in every section, 'Speak on for the sake of emancipation,' Yaj/n/avalkya replies each time, 'By all that he is not affected, for that person is not attached to anything' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he says (IV, 3, 22), 'He is not followed by good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore, to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.
43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.
That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature of the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance, 'He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things.' To the latter class belongs the passage, 'He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.'—From all which we conclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.
Notes:
[Footnote 164: From passages of which nature we may infer that in the passage under discussion also the 'abode' is Brahman.]
[Footnote 165: From which circumstance we may conclude that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman.]
[Footnote 166: Yat sarvam avidyaropita/m/ tat sarva/m/ paramarthato brahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity artha/h/. Bhamati.]
[Footnote 167: So that the passage would have to be translated, 'That, viz. knowledge, &c. is the bridge of the Immortal.']
[Footnote 168: Bhogyasya bhokt/ris/eshatvat tasyayatanatvam uktam a/s/a@nkyaha na /k/eti, jivasyad/ri/sh/t/advara dyubhvadinimittatvezpi na sakshat tadayatanatvam aupadhikatvenavibhutvad ity artha/h/. Ananda Giri.]
[Footnote 169: It would not have been requisite to introduce a special Sutra for the individual soul—which, like the air, is already excluded by the preceding Sutra—if it were not for the new argument brought forward in the following Sutra which applies to the individual soul only.]
[Footnote 170: If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven, earth, &c., the statement regarding I/s/vara made in the passage about the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with regard to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well known to everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may be made.—I subjoin Ananda Giri's commentary on the entire passage: Jivasyopadhyaikyenavivakshitatvat tadj/n/anezpi sarvaj/n/anasiddhes tasyayatanatvadyabhave hetvantara/m/ va/k/yam ity a/s/a@nkya sutre/n/a pariharati kuta/sk/etyadina. Tad vya/k/ash/t/e dyubhvaditi. Nirde/s/am eva dar/s/ayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham aha tabhya/m/ /k/eti. Sthitye/s/varasyadanaj jivasa/m/grahezpi katham i/s/varasyaiva vi/s/vayatanatva/m/ tadaha yaditi. I/s/varasyayanatvenaprak/ri/tatve jivap/ri/thakkathananupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvaraha anyatheti. Jivasyayatanatvenaprak/ri/tatve tulyanupapattir iti /s/a@nkate nanviti. Tasyaikyartha/m/ lokasiddhasyanuvadatvan naivam ity aha neti. Jivasyapurvatvabhavenapratipadyatvam eva praka/t/ayati kshetraj/n/o hiti. I/s/varasyapi lokavadisiddhatvad apratipadyatety a/s/a@nkyaha i/s/varas tv iti.]
[Footnote 171: As might be the prima facie conclusion from the particle 'but' introducing the sentence 'but he in reality,' &c.]
[Footnote 172: It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be viewed in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding past of the chapter.]
[Footnote 173: And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental principle of the Mima/m/sa.]
[Footnote 174: A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.]
[Footnote 175: Pi/nd/a/h/ sthulo deha/h/, pra/n/a/h/ sutratma. Ananda Giri.-The lower Brahman (hira/n/yagarbha on sutratman) is the vital principle (pra/n/a) in all creatures.]
[Footnote 176: Sa/m/yagdar/s/ana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the same term which in other places—where it is not requisite to insist on the idea of 'seeing' in contradistinction from 'reflecting' or 'meditating'—is rendered by perfect knowledge.]
[Footnote 177: Translated above by 'of the shape of the individual soul.']
[Footnote 178: Pa/n/ini III, 3, 77, 'murtta/m/ ghana/h/.']
[Footnote 179: So that the interpretation of the purvapakshin cannot be objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a thing to itself.]
[Footnote 180: So that no objection can be raised on the ground that heaven and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.]
[Footnote 181: Viz. of that which is within it. Ananda Giri proposes two explanations: na /k/eti, paravi/s/esha/n/atvenety atra paro daharaka/s/a upadanat tasminn iti saptamyanta-ta/kkh/abdasyeti /s/esha/h/. Yadva para/s/abdo s nta/h/sthavastuvishayas tadvi/s/esha/n/alvena tasminn iti daharaka/s/asyokter ity artha/h/. Ta/kkh/abdasya samnik/ri/sh/t/anvayayoge viprak/ri/sh/t/anvayasya jaghanyatvad aka/s/antargata/m/ dhyeyam iti bhava/h/.]
[Footnote 182: A vakyabheda—split of the sentence—takes place according to the Mimam/s/a when one and the same sentence contains two new statements which are different.]
[Footnote 183: While the explanation of Brahman by jiva would compel us to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual soul.]
[Footnote 184: Upalabdher adhish/th/anam brahma/n/a deha ishyate. Tenasadhara/n/atvena deho brahmapuram bhavet. Bhamati.]
[Footnote 185: I.e. Brahma, the lower Brahman.]
[Footnote 186: The masculine 'avirbhutasvarupa/h/' qualifies the substantive jiva/h/ which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the jiva whose true nature has become manifest, i.e. which has become Brahman, is no longer jiva; hence the explanatory statement that the term jiva is used with reference to what the jiva was before it became Brahman.]
[Footnote 187: To state another reason showing that the first and second chapters of Prajapati's instruction refer to the same subject.]
[Footnote 188: I.e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.]
[Footnote 189: Although in reality there is no such thing as an individual soul.]
[Footnote 190: Nanu jivabrahma/n/or aikyam na kvapi sutrakaro mukhato vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ish/t/am tatraha pratipadyam tv iti.]
[Footnote 191: This last sentence is directed against the possible objection that '/s/abda,' which the Sutra brings forward as an argument in favour of the highest Lord being meant, has the sense of 'sentence' (vakya), and is therefore of less force than li@nga, i.e. indicatory or inferential mark which is represented in our passage by the a@ngush/th/amatrata of the purusha, and favours the jiva interpretation. /S/abda, the text remarks, here means /s/ruti, i.e. direct enunciation, and /s/ruti ranks, as a means of proof, higher than li@nga.]
[Footnote 192: I.e. men belonging to the three upper castes.]
[Footnote 193: The first reason excludes animals, gods, and /ri/shis. Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering meant for the gods. /Ri/shis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of whose performance the ancestral /ri/shis of the sacrificer are invoked.—The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of sacrifices.—The third and fourth reasons exclude the /S/udras who are indirectly disqualified for /s/astric works because the Veda in different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for whom the ceremony of the upanayana—indispensable for all who wish to study the Veda—is not prescribed.—Cp. Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras VI, 1.]
[Footnote 194: The reference is to Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).]
[Footnote 195: In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.]
[Footnote 196: Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.]
[Footnote 197: Ak/ri/ti, best translated by [Greek: eidos].]
[Footnote 198: The purvapakshin, i.e. here the grammarian maintains, for the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words a supersensuous entity called spho/t/a which is manifested by the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests the sense of the word. The term spho/t/a may, according as it is viewed in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which is manifested.—The spho/t/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole. That we cannot identify it with the 'notion' (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called va/k/aka or abhidhayaka, and its being represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word (arthadhihetu).]
[Footnote 199: For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to be declared useless.]
[Footnote 200: In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the smoke. But that actual consciousness does not take place because the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.]
[Footnote 201: 'How should it be so?' i.e. it cannot be so; and on that account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.]
[Footnote 202: With 'or else' begins the exposition of the finally accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as different. Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the upadhis of the letters. Now a new distinction is made between articulated letters and non-articulated tone.]
[Footnote 203: I.e. it is not directly one idea, for it has for its object more than one letter; but it may be called one in a secondary sense because it is based on the determinative knowledge that the letters, although more than one, express one sense only.]
[Footnote 204: Which circumstance proves that exalted knowledge appertains not only to Hira/n/yagarbha, but to many beings.]
[Footnote 205: Viz. naraka, the commentaries say.]
[Footnote 206: Asmin kalpe sarvesham pra/n/inam dahapakapraka/s/akari yozyam agnir d/ris/yate sozyam agni/h/ purvasmin kalpe manushya/h/ san devatvapadaprapaka/m/ karmanush/th/ayasmin kalpa etaj janma labdhavan ata/h/ purvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhavini/m/ sa/m/j/n/am a/sri/tyagnir iti vyapadi/s/yate.—Saya/n/a on the quoted passage.]
[Footnote 207: As, for instance, 'So long as Aditya rises in the east and sets in the west' (Ch. Up. III, 6, 4).]
[Footnote 208: Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings, and therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.]
[Footnote 209: Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a person with a staff in his hand, Varu/n/a with a noose, Indra with a thunderbolt, &c. &c.]
[Footnote 210: On the proper function of arthavada and mantra according to the Mima/m/sa, cp. Arthasa/m/graha, Introduction.]
[Footnote 211: See above, p. 197.]
[Footnote 212: Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.]
[Footnote 213: /S/rautali@ngenanumanabadha/m/ dar/s/ayitva smartenapi tadbadha/m/ dar/s/ayati smartam iti. Ki/m/ atra brahma am/ri/tam ki/m/ svid vedyam anuttamam, /k/intayet tatra vai gatva gandharvo mam ap/rikkh/ata, Vi/s/vavasus tato rajan vedantaj/n/anakovida iti mokshadharme janakayaj/n/avalkyasa/m/vadat prahladajagarasa/m/vada/k/ /k/oktanumanasiddhir ity artha/h/.]
[Footnote 214: As opposed to an action to be accomplished.]
[Footnote 215: Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavada, 'Fire is a remedy for cold.']
[Footnote 216: Of this nature is, for instance, the passage 'the sacrificial post is the sun' (i.e. possesses the qualities of the sun, luminousness, &c.; a statement contradicted by perception).]
[Footnote 217: And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a certain word forming part of a mantra.]
[Footnote 218: The rajasuya-sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.]
[Footnote 219: In one of whose stages the being desirous of final emancipation becomes a deva.]
[Footnote 220: The commentaries explain 'therefore' by 'on account of his being devoid of the three sacred fires.' This explanation does not, however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sa/m/h.]
[Footnote 221: The /S/udra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic matters in the legitimate way, i.e. through the study of the Veda under the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidya.]
[Footnote 222: The li@nga contained in the word '/S/udra' has no proving power as it occurs in an arthavada-passage which has no authority if not connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the li@nga in the arthavada-passage is even directly contradicted by those injunctions which militate against the /S/udras' qualification for Vedic matters.]
[Footnote 223: Ha/m/savakyad atmanoznadara/m/ /s/rutva jana/s/rute/h/ /s/ug utpannety etad eva katha/m/ gamyate yenasau /s/udra/s/abdena sa/k/yate tatraha sp/ris/yate /k/eti. Ananda Giri.]
[Footnote 224: I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of /S/a@nkara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read /k/aitrarathinamaika/h/). Ananda Giri expressly explains tasmad by /k/aitrarathad ity artha/h/.—The text of the Ta/nd/ya Br. runs: tasma/k/ /k/aitrarathinam eka/h/ kshatrapatir gayate, and the commentary explains: tasmat kara/n/ad adyapi /k/itrava/ms/otpannana/m/ madhye eka eva raja kshatrapatir baladhipatir bhavati.—Grammar does not authorise the form /k/ahraratha used in the Sutra.]
[Footnote 225: The king A/s/vapati receives some Brahma/n/as as his pupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the general rule.]
[Footnote 226: As the words stand in the original they might be translated as follows (and are so translated by the purvapakshin), 'Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the pra/n/a, there goes forth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.']
[Footnote 227: The stress lies here on the 'as if.' which intimate that the Self does not really think or move.]
FOURTH PADA.
REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!
1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference (i.e. the pradhana); we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers to what is contained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself); and (that the text) shows.
In the preceding part of this work—as whose topic there has been set forth an enquiry into Brahman—we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1, 2); we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies to the pradhana also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority for the latter (I, 1, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common purport of all Vedanta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman, and not the pradha/n/a, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the Sa@nkhya again raises an objection which he considers not to have been finally disposed of.
It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no scriptural authority for the pradhana; for some /s/akhas contain expressions which seem to convey the idea of the pradhana. From this it follows that Kapila and other supreme /ri/shis maintain the doctrine of the pradhana being the general cause only because it is based on the Veda.—As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages to which the Sa@nkhyas refer have a different meaning (i.e. do not allude to the pradhana), all our previous argumentation as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as unsettled. We therefore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving that those passages actually have a different meaning.
The Sa@nkhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i.e. the pradhana, is perceived in the text of some /s/akhas. We read, for instance, they say, in the Ka/th/aka (I, 3, 11), 'Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order, the three entities with which we are acquainted from the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, viz. the great principle, the Undeveloped (the pradhana), and the soul[228]. That by the Undeveloped is meant the pradhana is to be concluded from the common use of Sm/ri/ti and from the etymological interpretation of which the word admits, the pradhana being called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It cannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for the pradhana. And this pradhana vouched for by Scripture we declare to be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Sm/ri/ti, and ratiocination.
Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the Ka/th/aka quoted by you intimates by no means the existence of that great principle and that Undeveloped which are known from the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti. We do not recognise there the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas, i.e. an independent general cause consisting of three constituting elements; we merely recognise the word 'Undeveloped,' which does not denote any particular determined thing, but may—owing to its etymological meaning, 'that which is not developed, not manifest'—denote anything subtle and difficult to distinguish. The Sa@nkhyas indeed give to the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to the pradhana; but then that meaning is valid for their system only, and has no force in the determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does mere equality of position prove equality of being, unless the latter be recognised independently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a horse because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We, moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject-matter, that the passage does not refer to the pradhana the fiction of the Sa@nkhyas, 'on account of there being referred to that which is contained in the simile of the body.' This means that the body which is mentioned in the simile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We infer this from the general subject-matter of the passage and from the circumstance of nothing else remaining.—The immediately preceding part of the chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so on, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, &c., 'Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Self) is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer.' The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c. are not well controlled enters into sa/m/sara, while he who has them under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest place of Vish/n/u. The question then arises: What is the end of the journey, the highest place of Vish/n/u? Whereupon the text explains that the highest Self which is higher than the senses, &c., spoken of is the end of the journey, the highest place of Vish/n/u. 'Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great Self is beyond the intellect. Beyond the great there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person. Beyond the Person there is nothing—this is the goal, the highest Road.' In this passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus avoid the mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject. The senses, the intellect, and the mind are referred to in both passages under the same names. The objects (in the second passage) are the objects which are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the senses; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known from the scriptural passage representing the senses as grahas, i.e. graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i.e. superior to the grahas (B/ri/ Up. III, 2). The mind (manas) again is superior to the objects, because the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the mind. The intellect (buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects of enjoyment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect. Higher than the intellect is the great Self which was represented as the lord of the chariot in the passage, 'Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot.' That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest from the repeated use of the word 'Self;' that the Self is superior to intelligence is owing to the circumstance that the enjoyer is naturally superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately called great as it is the master.—Or else the phrase 'the great Self' may here denote the intellect of the first-born Hira/n/yagarbha which is the basis of all intellects; in accordance with the following Sm/ri/ti-passage it is called mind, the great one; reflection, Brahman; the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest knowledge, consciousness; thought, remembrance[229], and likewise with the following scriptural passage, 'He (Hira/n/ya-garbha) who first creates Brahman and delivers the Vedas to him' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18). The intellect, which in the former passage had been referred to under its common name buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be represented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter explanation of the term 'the great Self,' we must assume that the personal Self which in the simile had been compared to the charioteer is, in the latter passage, included in the highest person (mentioned last); to which there is no objection, since in reality the personal Self and the highest Self are identical.—Thus there remains now the body only which had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore conclude that the text after having enumerated the senses and all the other things mentioned before, in order to point out the highest place, points out by means of the one remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only thing remaining out of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the body. The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the soul's passing through sa/m/sara and release under the form of a simile in which the body, &c. of the soul—which is affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a body, senses, mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c.—are compared to a chariot, and so on.—In accordance with this the subsequent verse states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vish/n/u ('the Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect'), and after that the next verse declares Yoga to be the means of attaining that cognition. 'A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should keep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet Self.'—That means: The wise man should restrain the activity of the outer organs such as speech, &c., and abide within the mind only; he should further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external objects within intelligence, whose characteristic mark is decision, recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain intelligence within the great Self, i.e. the individual soul or else the fundamental intellect; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm Self, i.e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole chapter treats.—If we in this manner review the general context, we perceive that there is no room for the pradhana imagined by the Sankhyas.
2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so designated).
It has been asserted, under the preceding Sutra, that the term 'the Undeveloped' signifies, on account of the general subject-matter and because the body only remains, the body and not the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas.—But here the following doubt arises: How can the word 'undeveloped' appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i.e. that which is developed or manifested?
To this doubt the Sutra replies that what the term avyakta denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped. The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed 'undeveloped,' but the subtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be called so, and that the term denoting the causal substance is applied to the effect also is a matter of common occurrence; compare, for instance, the phrase 'mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk' (/Ri/g-veda. S. IX, 46, 4). Another scriptural passage also—'now all this was then undeveloped' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7)—shows that this, i.e. this developed world with its distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely seminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of name and form.
3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on account of its dependency on him (the Lord); (for such an admission is) according to reason.
Here a new objection is raised.—If, the opponent says, in order to prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit that this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede the doctrine that the pradhana is the cause of the world. For we Sa@nkhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing but that antecedent condition of the world.
Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should indeed implicitly, admit the pradhana doctrine. What we admit is, however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the potentiality of action. The existence of such a causal potentiality renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For that causal potentiality is of the nature of Nescience; it is rightly denoted by the term 'undeveloped;' it has the highest Lord for its substratum; it is of the nature of an illusion; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character.[230] This undeveloped principle is sometimes denoted by the term aka/s/a, ether; so, for instance, in the passage, 'In that Imperishable then, O Gargi, the ether is woven like warp and woof' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11). Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'Higher, than the high Imperishable.' Sometimes it is spoken of as Maya, illusion; so, for instance (/S/ve. Up. IV, 10), 'Know then Prak/ri/ti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is affected with Maya.' For Maya is properly called undeveloped or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not.—The statement of the Ka/th/aka that 'the Undeveloped is beyond the Great one' is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hira/n/yagarbha. If, on the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul, the statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual soul depending on the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience. For the continued existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond the Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i.e. Nescience, is attributed to the body which is the product of Nescience, the cause and the effect being considered as identical. Although the senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term 'the Undeveloped' here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having already been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body alone being left.—Other interpreters of the two last Sutras give a somewhat different explanation[231].—There are, they say, two kinds of body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which is perceived; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on. (Ved. Su. III, 1, 1.) Both these bodies together were in the simile compared to the chariot; but here (in the passage under discussion) only the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i.e. just as the objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the latter depends on the objects.—But how—we ask interpreters—is it possible that the word 'Undeveloped' should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the passage under discussion)?—If you should rejoin that you are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body which is vyakta, i.e. developed or manifest; we invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determination of the sense depends on the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loathsomeness. For the passage does not by any means refer to such a distinction—as we conclude from the circumstance of there being no verb enjoining it—but has for its only subject the highest place of Vish/n/u, which had been mentioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is beyond the Person.—We might, however, accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging our general argumentation; for whichever explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the Ka/th/aka passage does not refer to the pradhana.
4. And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.
The Sa@nkhyas, moreover, represent the pradhana as something to be cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements of the pradhana and of the soul there results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise the difference of the soul from them. And somewhere they teach that the pradhana is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special powers.—Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge; we there meet with the mere word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage to man.—For this reason also we maintain that the word avyakta cannot denote the pradhana.—Our interpretation, on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of knowledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Vish/n/u, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.
5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradhana as an object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant, on account of the general subject-matter.
Here the Sa@nkhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since the text later on speaks of the pradhana—which had been referred to as the Undeveloped—as an object of knowledge. 'He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. Up. II, 3, 15). For here the text speaks of the pradhana, which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of perception. Hence we conclude that the pradhana is denoted by the term avyakta.
To this we reply that the passage last quoted does represent as the object of perception not the pradhana but the intelligent, i.e. the highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the following reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage, 'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest Road;' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the passage, 'The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,' because it is there spoken of as difficult to know; after that the restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the passage, 'A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and, finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sa@nkhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelligent Self.—The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta.
6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhana).
To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the circumstance that the Ka/th/avalli-upanishad brings forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions of Na/k/iketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is contained in the passage (Ka. Up. I, 1, 13), 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven; tell it to me, who am full of faith.' The question as to the individual soul is contained in I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' And the question about the highest Self is asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that.'—The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required for the altar, and how many;' in the passage met with considerably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work and according to their knowledge;' and in the passage (I, 2, 18), 'The knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c.; which latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no question relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.
Here the Sa@nkhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question relative to the Self which is asked in the passage, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead,' &c., again resumed in the passage, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c, or does the latter passage raise a distinct new question? If the former, the two questions about the Self coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the Self. In that case the Sutra has no right to speak of questions and explanations relating to three subjects.—If the latter, you do not consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an explanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions asked.
To this we make the following reply.—We by no means assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which constitutes the Ka/th/avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the Upanishad—which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and Na/k/iketas—carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to Na/k/iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first boon Na/k/iketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the third boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1, 20), 'There is that doubt—; this is the third of my boons.'—If we therefore supposed that the passage, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c., raises a new question, we should thereby assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the entire Upanishad.—But—the Sa@nkhya will perhaps interpose—it must needs be admitted that the passage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one. For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt expressed in the words, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead—some saying, he is; others, he is not.' Now this individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c., cannot constitute the object of a question expressed in such terms as, 'This which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c.; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ; for the former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter is concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume the subject of the former one.—All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, since we maintain the unity of the highest Self and the individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know from other scriptural passages, such as 'Thou art that.' And in the Upanishad under discussion also the answer to the question, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage, 'The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'—which answer is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the Self-clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self.—There is, moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, 'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.' This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is consequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised Vedanta tenet.—There is another passage also warning men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, 'What is here the same is there; and what is there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death to death.'—The following circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When Na/k/iketas has asked the question relating to the existence or non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of desire. But Na/k/iketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignorance, praises Na/k/iketas, 'I believe Na/k/iketas to be one who desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away' (I, 2, 4); and later on praises the question asked by Na/k/iketas, 'The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind' (I, 2, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if Na/k/iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly. Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 2, 14, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' merely resumes the topic to which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred.—Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c.; the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to sa/m/sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c.; but as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts as 'Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell him, 'Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake;' and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subsequent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in the passage, 'It is not born, it dies not,' is also to be considered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20.—The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which results from Nescience. Although the question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, 1, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific marks of the sa/m/sara-state, such as activity, &c. are not denied; while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest Self.—For these reasons the Sutra is right in assuming three topics of question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the pradhana constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own.
7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat.
While the Sa@nkhyas employ the term 'the Great one,' to denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence[232] (? viz. the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its being connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following, 'The great Self is beyond the Intellect' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10); 'The great omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); 'I know that great person' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradhana.—The pradhana is therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.
8. (It cannot be maintained that aja means the pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated; as in the case of the cup.
Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhana is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the following mantra (/S/ve. Up. IV, 5), 'There is one aja[233], red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one aja who loves her and lies by her; there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.'—In this mantra the words 'red,' 'white,' and 'black' denote the three constituent elements of the pradhana. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i.e. influencing property; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature of Light; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent elements, i.e. the pradhana, is denoted by the attributes of its parts, and is therefore called red-white-black. It is further called aja, i.e. unborn, because it is acknowledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything springs, not a mere effect.—But has not the word aja the settled meaning of she-goat?—True; but the ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter.—That pradhana produces many creatures participating in its three constituent elements. One unborn being loves her and lies by her, i.e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach her, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are in a state of dulness, pass through the course of transmigratory existence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative knowledge, lose their attachment to prak/ri/ti, and leave her after having enjoyed her, i.e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and release.—On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhana hypothesis.
To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means proves the Sa@nkhya doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra, taken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms aja, &c. can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the special assertion that the Sa@nkhya doctrine only is meant. The case is analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, 'There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above' (B/ri/. Up. II, 2, 3). Just as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by itself what special cup is meant—it being possible to ascribe, somehow or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup—so here also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible to decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhana is meant by the term aja, or something else.—But in connexion with the mantra about the cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup is meant, 'What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom above is this head.'—Whence, however, can we learn what special being is meant by the aja of the /S/veta/s/vatara-upanishad?—To this question the next Sutra replies.
9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term aja); for some read so in their text.
By the term aja we have to understand the causal matter of the four classes of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and begins with light, i.e. comprises fire, water, and earth.—The word 'but' (in the Sutra) gives emphasis to the assertion.—This aja is to be considered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting of three gu/n/as in the Sa@nkhya sense. We draw this conclusion from the fact that one /s/akha, after having related how fire, water, and earth sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on. 'The red colour of burning fire (agni) is the colour of the elementary fire (tejas), its white colour is the colour of water, its black colour the colour of earth,' &c. Now those three elements—fire, water, and earth—we recognise in the /S/veta/s/vatara passage, as the words red, white, and black are common to both passages, and as these words primarily denote special colours and can be applied to the Sa@nkhya gu/n/as in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense is beyond doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful passages, is a generally acknowledged rule. As we therefore find that in the /S/veta/s/vatara—after the general topic has been started in I, 1, 'The Brahman-students say, Is Brahman the cause?'—the text, previous to the passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which arranges the whole world ('the Sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden in its own qualities'); and as further that same power is referred to in two subsequent complementary passages ('Know then, Prak/ri/ti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is affected with Maya;' 'who being one only rules over every germ;' IV, 10, 11); it cannot possibly be asserted that the mantra treating of the aja refers to some independent causal matter called pradhana. We rather assert, on the ground of the general subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred to in the other passages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and which we assume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is represented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water, and earth, have three distinct colours.—But how can we maintain, on the ground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal matter is appropriately called a three-coloured aja? if we consider, on the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus aja (i.e. goat) does not inhere in fire, water, and earth; and, on the other hand, that Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been produced, so that the word aja cannot be taken in the sense 'non-produced[234].'—To this question the next Sutra replies.
10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing contrary to reason (in aja denoting the causal matter); just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.
The word aja neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning 'unborn;' it rather expresses an assumption, i.e. it intimates the assumption of the source of all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being compared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by her, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her; so the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience, while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true knowledge.—Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that reality of the multiplicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of other philosophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of the states of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with reference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived; that multiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is the unreal product of wrong knowledge merely; as we know from scriptural passages such as, 'He is the one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self in all beings,' &c.—The words 'like the honey' (in the Sutra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is represented as honey (Ch. Up. III, 1), and speech as a cow (B/ri/. Up. V, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (B/ri/. Up. VI, 2, 9), so here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is metaphorically represented as one. There is therefore nothing contrary to reason in the circumstance of the term aja being used to denote the aggregate of fire, water, and earth.
11. (The assertion that there is scriptural authority for the pradhana, &c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the Sankhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and on account of the excess (over the number of those categories).
The attempt to base the Sa@nkhya doctrine on the mantra speaking of the aja having failed, the Sa@nkhya again comes forward and points to another mantra: 'He in whom the five "five-people" and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which expresses the number five, viz. the five-people, and then another word, viz. five, which qualifies the former; these two words together therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many beings as the number twenty-five presupposes, just so many categories the Sankhya system counts. Cp. Sa@nkhya Karika, 3: 'The fundamental causal substance (i.e. the pradhana) is not an effect. Seven (substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal substances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect.' As therefore the number twenty-five, which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the twenty-five categories taught in the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, it follows that the doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.
To this reasoning we make the following reply.—It is impossible to base the assertion that the pradhana, &c. have Scripture in their favour on the reference to their number which you pretend to find in the text, 'on account of the diversity of the Sa@nkhya categories.' The Sa@nkhya categories have each their individual difference, and there are no attributes belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the number twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number of individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into smaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for such combination.—Here the Sa@nkhya will perhaps rejoin that the expression five (times) five is used only to denote the number twenty-five which has five pentads for its constituent parts; just as the poem says, 'five years and seven Indra did not rain,' meaning only that there was no rain for twelve years.—But this explanation also is not tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that it has recourse to indirect indication.[235] In the second place, the second 'five' constitutes a compound with the word 'people,' the Brahma/n/a-accent showing that the two form one word only.[236] To the same conclusion we are led by another passage also (Taitt. Sa/m/h. I, 6, 2, 2, pa/nk/ana/m/ tva pa/nk/ajananam, &c.) where the two terms constitute one word, have one accent and one case-termination. The word thus being a compound there is neither a repetition of the word 'five,' involving two pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified by another word.—But as the people are already denoted to be five by the compound 'five-people,' the effect of the other 'five' qualifying the compound will be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the expression 'five five-bundles' (pa/nk/a pa/nk/apulya/h/) conveys the idea of twenty-five bundles.—The instance is not an analogous one, we reply. The word 'pa/nk/apuli' denotes a unity (i.e. one bundle made up of five bundles) and hence when the question arises, 'How many such bundles are there?' it can be qualified by the word 'five,' indicating that there are five such bundles. The word pa/nk/ajana/h/, on the other hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct things), so that there is no room at all for a further desire to know how many people there are, and hence no room for a further qualification. And if the word 'five' be taken as a qualifying word it can only qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection against which assumption has already been stated.—For all these reasons the expression the five five-people cannot denote the twenty-five categories of the Sa@nkhyas.—This is further not possible 'on account of the excess.' For on the Sa@nkhya interpretation there would be an excess over the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as the abode in which the five five-people rest, the clause 'Him I believe to be the Self' being connected with the 'in whom' of the antecedent clause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the Sa@nkhyas which is already included in the twenty-five categories, and which therefore, on their interpretation of the passage, would here be mentioned once as constituting the abode and once as what rests in the abode! If, on the other hand, the soul were supposed not to be compiled in the twenty-five categories, the Sa@nkhya would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the categories being twenty-five. The same remarks apply to the separate mention made of the ether.—How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a certain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sa@nkhya categories of which Scripture speaks in no other place? especially if we consider that the word jana has not the settled meaning of category, and that the number may be satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of the passage. |
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