20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be understood by the internal ruler), for both also (i.e. both recensions of the B/ri/had Ara/n/yaka) speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).

The word 'not' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of both /s/akhas, i.e. the Ka/n/vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/n/vas read (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 22), 'He who dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, 'He who dwells in the Self.' If the latter reading is adopted, the word 'Self' denotes the individual soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word 'knowledge;' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term 'internal ruler.'—But how, it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul different from him?—Why—we ask in return—should that be impossible?—Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural passages, such as, 'There is no other seer but he,' &c., which deny that there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under discussion.—May, we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose of denying the existence of another ruler?—No, the opponent replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in general.)

We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's objection.—The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, presented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the Self within is one only; two internal Selfs are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if it were two; just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for perception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance with this, the scriptural passage, 'Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of Nescience; while the subsequent passage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.

21. That which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on (is Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.

Scripture says, 'The higher knowledge is this by which the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is imperishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 5; 6).—Here the doubt arises whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by invisibility, &c. be the pradhana or the embodied soul, or the highest Lord.

We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings the non-intelligent pradhana because (in the passage immediately subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned as parallel instances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the Indestructible.'—But, it may be objected, men and spiders which are here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature.—No, the purvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source of the threads; and so in the case of man also.—While, moreover, in the case of the preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as invisibility which agree with the pradhana, no attribute of a contrary nature being mentioned.—But the qualities mentioned in the complementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9), 'He who knows all and perceives all,' do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhana; how, then, can the source of all beings be interpreted to mean the pradhana?—To this the purvapakshin replies: The passage, 'The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot be seen,' &c., points, by means of the term 'the Indestructible,' to the source of all beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes. This same 'Indestructible' is again mentioned later on in the passage, 'It is higher than the high Imperishable.' Now that which in this latter passage is spoken of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the qualities of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradhana denoted by the term 'the Imperishable' is the source of all beings.—If, however, the word 'source' (yoni) be taken in the sense of operative cause, we may by 'the source of the beings' understand the embodied Self also, which, by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin of the complex of things.

To this we make the following reply.—That which here is spoken of as the source of all beings, distinguished by such qualities as invisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, nothing else.—Whereupon is this conclusion founded?—On the statement of attributes. For the clause, 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving,' clearly states an attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since the attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be predicated either of the non-intelligent pradhana or the embodied soul whose power of sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that the qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the source of all beings—which latter is denoted by the term 'the Imperishable'—not to the source itself, we reply that this explanation is inadmissible because the source of all beings, which—in the clause, 'From the Indestructible everything here arises'—is designated as the material cause of all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, 1, 9), 'From him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As therefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of discussion is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as being referred to in the later passage also), we understand that it is the same Indestructible to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all are ascribed.—We further maintain that also the passage, 'Higher than the high Imperishable,' does not refer to any being different from the imperishable source of all beings which is the general topic of discussion. We conclude this from the circumstance that the passage, 'He truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable true person,' (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,) merely declares that the imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by invisibility and the like—which formed the subject of the preceding chapter—will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable source is called higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the next Sutra.—Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined there (in the Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it is said that it comprises the /Ri/g-veda and so on, and then the text continues, 'The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended.' Here the Indestructible is declared to be the subject of the higher knowledge. If we now were to assume that the Indestructible distinguished by invisibility and like qualities is something different from the highest Lord, the knowledge referring to it would not be the higher one. For the distinction of lower and higher knowledge is made on account of the diversity of their results, the former leading to mere worldly exaltation, the latter to absolute bliss; and nobody would assume absolute bliss to result from the knowledge of the pradhana.—Moreover, as on the view we are controverting the highest Self would be assumed to be something higher than the imperishable source of all beings, three kinds of knowledge would have to be acknowledged, while the text expressly speaks of two kinds only.—Further, the reference to the knowledge of everything being implied in the knowledge of one thing—which is contained in the passage (I, 1, 3), 'Sir, what is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known?'—is possible only if the allusion is to Brahman the Self of all, and not either to the pradhana which comprises only what is non-intelligent or to the enjoyer viewed apart from the objects of enjoyment.—The text, moreover, by introducing the knowledge of Brahman as the chief subject—which it does in the passage (I, 1, 1), 'He told the knowledge of Brahman, the foundation of all knowledge, to his eldest son Atharvan'—and by afterwards declaring that out of the two kinds of knowledge, viz. the lower one and the higher one, the higher one leads to the comprehension of the Imperishable, shows that the knowledge of the Imperishable is the knowledge of Brahman. On the other hand, the term 'knowledge of Brahman' would become meaningless if that Imperishable which is to be comprehended by means of it were not Brahman. The lower knowledge of works which comprises the /Ri/g-veda, and so on, is mentioned preliminarily to the knowledge of Brahman for the mere purpose of glorifying the latter; as appears from the passages in which it (the lower knowledge) is spoken of slightingly, such as (I, 2, 7), 'But frail indeed are those boats, the sacrifices, the eighteen in which this lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who praise this as the highest good are subject again and again to old age and death.' After these slighting remarks the text declares that he who turns away from the lower knowledge is prepared for the highest one (I, 2, 12), 'Let a Brahama/n/a after he has examined all these worlds which are gained by works acquire freedom from all desires. Nothing that is eternal (not made) can be gained by what is not eternal (made). Let him in order to understand this take fuel in his hand and approach a guru who is learned and dwells entirely in Brahman.'—The remark that, because the earth and other non-intelligent things are adduced as parallel instances, that also which is compared to them, viz. the source of all beings must be non-intelligent, is without foundation, since it is not necessary that two things of which one is compared to the other should be of absolutely the same nature. The things, moreover, to which the source of all beings is compared, viz. the earth and the like, are material, while nobody would assume the source of all beings to be material.—For all these reasons the source of all beings, which possesses the attributes of invisibility and so on, is the highest Lord.

22. The two others (i.e. the individual soul and the pradhana) are not (the source of all beings) because there are stated distinctive attributes and difference.

The source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the two others, viz. the pradhana and the individual soul, on account of the following reason also. In the first place, the text distinguishes the source of all beings from the embodied soul, as something of a different nature; compare the passage (II, 1, 2), 'That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced, without breath and without mind, pure.' The distinctive attributes mentioned here, such as being of a heavenly nature, and so on, can in no way belong to the individual soul, which erroneously considers itself to be limited by name and form as presented by Nescience, and erroneously imputes their attributes to itself. Therefore the passage manifestly refers to the Person which is the subject of all the Upanishads.—In the second place, the source of all beings which forms the general topic is represented in the text as something different from the pradhana, viz. in the passage, 'Higher than the high Imperishable.' Here the term 'Imperishable' means that undeveloped entity which represents the seminal potentiality of names and forms, contains the fine parts of the material elements, abides in the Lord, forms his limiting adjunct, and being itself no effect is high in comparison to all effects; the whole phrase, 'Higher than the high Imperishable,' which expresses a difference then clearly shows that the highest Self is meant here.—We do not on that account assume an independent entity called pradhana and say that the source of all beings is stated separately therefrom; but if a pradhana is to be assumed at all (in agreement with the common opinion) and if being assumed it is assumed of such a nature as not to be opposed to the statements of Scripture, viz. as the subtle cause of all beings denoted by the terms 'the Undeveloped' and so on, we have no objection to such an assumption, and declare that, on account of the separate statement therefrom, i.e. from that pradhana, 'the source of all beings' must mean the highest Lord.—A further argument in favour of the same conclusion is supplied by the next Sutra.

23. And on account of its form being mentioned.

Subsequently to the passage, 'Higher than the high Imperishable,' we meet (in the passage, 'From him is born breath,' &c.) with a description of the creation of all things, from breath down to earth, and then with a statement of the form of this same source of beings as consisting of all created beings, 'Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the quarters his ears, his speech the Vedas disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the universe; from his feet came the earth; he is indeed the inner Self of all things.' This statement of form can refer only to the highest Lord, and not either to the embodied soul, which, on account of its small power, cannot be the cause of all effects, or to the pradhana, which cannot be the inner Self of all beings. We therefore conclude that the source of all beings is the highest Lord, not either of the other two.—But wherefrom do you conclude that the quoted declaration of form refers to the source of all beings?—From the general topic, we reply. The word 'he' (in the clause, 'He is indeed the inner Self of all things') connects the passage with the general topic. As the source of all beings constitutes the general topic, the whole passage, from 'From him is born breath,' up to, 'He is the inner Self of all beings,' refers to that same source. Similarly, when in ordinary conversation a certain teacher forms the general topic of the talk, the phrase, 'Study under him; he knows the Veda and the Veda@ngas thoroughly,' as a matter of course, refers to that same teacher.—But how can a bodily form be ascribed to the source of all beings which is characterised by invisibility and similar attributes?—The statement as to its nature, we reply, is made for the purpose of showing that the source of all beings is the Self of all beings, not of showing that it is of a bodily nature. The case is analogous to such passages as, 'I am food, I am food, I am the eater of food' (Taitt. Up. III, 10, 6).—Others, however, are of opinion[151] that the statement quoted does not refer to the source of all beings, because that to which it refers is spoken of as something produced. For, on the one hand, the immediately preceding passage ('From him is born health, mind, and all organs of sense, ether, air, light, water, and the earth, the support of all') speaks of the aggregate of beings from air down to earth as something produced, and, on the other hand, a passage met with later on ('From him comes Agni, the sun being his fuel,' up to 'All herbs and juices') expresses itself to the same purpose. How then should all at once, in the midst of these two passages (which refer to the creation), a statement be made about the nature of the source of all beings?—The attribute of being the Self of all beings, (which above was said to be mentioned in the passage about the creation, 'Fire is his head,' &c., is not mentioned there but) is stated only later on in a passage subsequent to that which refers to the creation, viz. 'The Person is all this, sacrifice,' &c. (II, 1, 10).—Now, we see that /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti speaks of the birth of Prajapati, whose body is this threefold world; compare /Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 121, 1, 'Hira/n/ya-garbha arose in the beginning; he was the one born Lord of things existing. He established the earth and this sky; to what God shall we offer our oblation?' where the expression 'arose' means 'he was born.' And in sm/ri/ti we read, 'He is the first embodied one, he is called the Person; as the primal creator of the beings Brahman was evolved in the beginning.' This Person which is (not the original Brahman but) an effect (like other created beings) may be called the internal Self of all beings (as it is called in II, 1, 4), because in the form of the Self of breath it abides in the Selfs of all beings.—On this latter explanation (according to which the passage, 'Fire is his head,' &c., does not describe the nature of the highest Lord, and can therefore not be referred to in the Sutra) the declaration as to the Lord being the 'nature' of all which is contained in the passage, 'The Person is all this, sacrifice,' &c., must be taken as the reason for establishing the highest Lord, (i.e. as the passage which, according to the Sutra, proves that the source of all beings is the highest Lord[152].)

24. Vai/s/vanara (is the highest Lord) on account of the distinction qualifying the common terms (Vai/s/vanara and Self).

(In Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.) a discussion begins with the words, 'What is our Self, what is Brahman?' and is carried on in the passage, 'You know at present that Vai/s/vanara Self, tell us that;' after that it is declared with reference to Heaven, sun, air, ether, water, and earth, that they are connected with the qualities of having good light, &c., and, in order to disparage devout meditation on them singly, that they stand to the Vai/s/vanara in the relation of being his head, &c., merely; and then finally (V, 18) it is said, 'But he who meditates on the Vai/s/vanara Self as measured by a span, as abhivimana[153], he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs. Of that Vai/s/vanara Self the head is Sutejas (having good light), the eye Vi/s/varupa (multiform), the breath P/ri/thagvartman (moving in various courses), the trunk Bahula (full), the bladder Rayi (wealth), the feet the earth, the chest the altar, the hairs the grass on the altar, the heart the Garhapatya fire, the mind the Anvaharya fire, the mouth the Ahavaniya fire.'—Here the doubt arises whether by the term 'Vai/s/vanara' we have to understand the gastric fire, or the elemental fire, or the divinity presiding over the latter, or the embodied soul, or the highest Lord.—But what, it may be asked, gives rise to this doubt?—The circumstance, we reply, of 'Vai/s/vanara' being employed as a common term for the gastric fire, the elemental fire, and the divinity of the latter, while 'Self' is a term applying to the embodied soul as well as to the highest Lord. Hence the doubt arises which meaning of the term is to be accepted and which to be set aside.

Which, then, is the alternative to be embraced?—Vai/s/vanara, the purvapakshin maintains, is the gastric fire, because we meet, in some passages, with the term used in that special sense; so, for instance (B/ri/. Up. V, 9), 'Agni Vai/s/vanara is the fire within man by which the food that is eaten is cooked.'—Or else the term may denote fire in general, as we see it used in that sense also; so, for instance (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 88, 12), 'For the whole world the gods have made the Agni Vai/s/vanara a sign of the days.' Or, in the third place, the word may denote that divinity whose body is fire. For passages in which the term has that sense are likewise met with; compare, for instance, /Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. I, 98, 1, 'May we be in the favour of Vai/s/vanara; for he is the king of the beings, giving pleasure, of ready grace;' this and similar passages properly applying to a divinity endowed with power and similar qualities. Perhaps it will be urged against the preceding explanations, that, as the word Vai/s/vanara is used in co-ordination with the term 'Self,' and as the term 'Self' alone is used in the introductory passage ('What is our Self, what is Brahman?'), Vai/s/vanara has to be understood in a modified sense, so as to be in harmony with the term Self. Well, then, the purvapakshin rejoins, let us suppose that Vai/s/vanara is the embodied Self which, as being an enjoyer, is in close vicinity to the Vai/s/vanara fire,[154] (i.e. the fire within the body,) and with which the qualification expressed by the term, 'Measured by a span,' well agrees, since it is restricted by its limiting condition (viz. the body and so on).—In any case it is evident that the term Vai/s/vanara does not denote the highest Lord.

To this we make the following reply.—The word Vai/s/vanara denotes the highest Self, on account of the distinction qualifying the two general terms.—Although the term 'Self,' as well as the term 'Vai/s/vanara,' has various meanings—the latter term denoting three beings while the former denotes two—yet we observe a distinction from which we conclude that both terms can here denote the highest Lord only; viz. in the passage, 'Of that Vai/s/vanara Self the head is Sutejas,' &c. For it is clear that that passage refers to the highest Lord in so far as he is distinguished by having heaven, and so on, for his head and limbs, and in so far as he has entered into a different state (viz. into the state of being the Self of the threefold world); represents him, in fact, for the purpose of meditation, as the internal Self of everything. As such the absolute Self may be represented, because it is the cause of everything; for as the cause virtually contains all the states belonging to its effects, the heavenly world, and so on, may be spoken of as the members of the highest Self.—Moreover, the result which Scripture declares to abide in all worlds—viz. in the passage, 'He eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all Selfs'—is possible only if we take the term Vai/s/vanara to denote the highest Self.—The same remark applies to the declaration that all the sins are burned of him who has that knowledge, 'Thus all his sins are burned,' &c. (Ch. Up. V, 24, 3).—Moreover, we meet at the beginning of the chapter with the words 'Self' and 'Brahman;' viz. in the passage, 'What is our Self, what is Brahman?' Now these are marks of Brahman, and indicate the highest Lord only. Hence he only can be meant by the term Vai/s/vanara.

25. (And) because that which is stated by Sm/ri/ti (i.e. the shape of the highest Lord as described by Sm/ri/ti) is an inference (i.e. an indicatory mark from which we infer the meaning of /S/ruti).

The highest Lord only is Vai/s/vanara, for that reason also that Sm/ri/ti ascribes to the highest Lord only a shape consisting of the threefold world, the fire constituting his mouth, the heavenly world his head, &c. So, for instance, in the following passage, 'He whose mouth is fire, whose head the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose feet the earth, whose eye the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence to him the Self of the world.' The shape described here in Sm/ri/ti allows us to infer a /S/ruti passage on which the Sm/ri/ti rests, and thus constitutes an inference, i.e. a sign indicatory of the word 'Vai/s/vanara' denoting the highest Lord. For, although the quoted Sm/ri/ti passage contains a glorification[155], still even a glorification in the form in which it there appears is not possible, unless it has a Vedic passage to rest on.—Other Sm/ri/ti passages also may be quoted in connexion with this Sutra, so, for instance, the following one, 'He whose head the wise declare to be the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose eyes sun and moon, whose ears the regions, and whose feet the earth, he is the inscrutable leader of all beings.'

26. If it be maintained that (Vai/s/vanara is) not (the highest Lord) on account of the term (viz. Vai/s/vanara, having a settled different meaning), &c., and on account of his abiding within (which is a characteristic of the gastric fire); (we say) no, on account of the perception (of the highest Lord), being taught thus (viz. in the gastric fire), and on account of the impossibility (of the heavenly world, &c. being the head, &c. of the gastric fire), and because they (the Vajasaneyins) read of him (viz. the Vai/s/vanara) as man (which term cannot apply to the gastric fire).

Here the following objection is raised.—Vai/s/vanara cannot be the highest Lord, on account of the term, &c., and on account of the abiding within. The term, viz. the term Vai/s/vanara, cannot be applied to the highest Lord, because the settled use of language assigns to it a different sense. Thus, also, with regard to the term Agni (fire) in the passage (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 1, 11), 'He is the Agni Vai/s/vanara.' The word '&c.' (in the Sutra) hints at the fiction concerning the three sacred fires, the garhapatya being represented as the heart, and so on, of the Vai/s/vanara Self (Ch. Up. V, 18, 2[156]).—Moreover, the passage, 'Therefore the first food which a man may take is in the place of homa' (Ch. Up. V, 19, 1), contains a glorification of (Vai/s/vanara) being the abode of the oblation to Pra/n/a[157]. For these reasons we have to understand by Vai/s/vanara the gastric fire.—Moreover, Scripture speaks of the Vai/s/vanara as abiding within. 'He knows him abiding within man;' which again applies to the gastric fire only.—With reference to the averment that on account of the specifications contained in the passage, 'His head is Sutejas,' &c., Vai/s/vanara is to be explained as the highest Self, we (the purvapakshin) ask: How do you reach the decision that those specifications, although agreeing with both interpretations, must be assumed to refer to the highest Lord only, and not to the gastric fire?—Or else we may assume that the passage speaks of the elemental fire which abides within and without; for that that fire is also connected with the heavenly world, and so on, we understand from the mantra, 'He who with his light has extended himself over earth and heaven, the two halves of the world, and the atmosphere' (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 88, 3).—Or else the attribute of having the heavenly world, and so on, for its members may, on account of its power, be attributed to that divinity which has the elemental fire for its body.—Therefore Vai/s/vanara is not the highest Lord.

To all this we reply as follows.—Your assertions are unfounded, 'because there is taught the perception in this manner.' The reasons (adduced in the former part of the Sutra), viz. the term, and so on, are not sufficient to make us abandon the interpretation according to which Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord.—Why?—On account of perception being taught in this manner, i.e. without the gastric fire being set aside. For the passages quoted teach the perception of the highest Lord in the gastric fire, analogously to such passages as 'Let a man meditate on the mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1).—Or else they teach that the object of perception is the highest Lord, in so far as he has the gastric fire called Vai/s/vanara for his limiting condition; analogously to such passages as 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath, whose form is light' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2[158]). If it were the aim of the passages about the Vai/s/vanara to make statements not concerning the highest Lord, but merely concerning the gastric fire, there would be no possibility of specifications such as contained in the passage 'His head is Sutejas,' &c. That also on the assumption of Vai/s/vanara being either the divinity of fire or the elemental fire no room is to be found for the said specifications, we shall show under the following Sutra.—Moreover, if the mere gastric fire were meant, there would be room only for a declaration that it abides within man, not that it is man. But, as a matter of fact, the Vajasaneyins speak of him—in their sacred text—as man, 'This Agni Vai/s/vanara is man; he who knows this Agni Vai/s/vanara as man-like, as abiding within man,' &c. (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 1, 11). The highest Lord, on the other hand, who is the Self of everything, may be spoken of as well as man, as abiding within man.—Those who, in the latter part of the Sutra, read 'man-like' (puru-shavidham) instead of 'man' (purusham), wish to express the following meaning: If Vai/s/vanara were assumed to be the gastric fire only, he might be spoken of as abiding within man indeed, but not as man-like. But the Vajasaneyins do speak of him as man-like, 'He who knows him as man-like, as abiding within man.'—The meaning of the term man-like is to be concluded from the context, whence it will be seen that, with reference to nature, it means that the highest Lord has the heaven for his head, &c., and is based on the earth; and with reference to man, that he forms the head, &c., and is based on the chin (of the devout worshipper[159]).

27. For the same reasons (the Vai/s/vanara) cannot be the divinity (of fire), or the element (of fire).

The averment that the fanciful attribution of members contained in the passage 'His head is Sutejas,' &c. may apply to the elemental fire also which from the mantras is seen to be connected with the heavenly world, &c., or else to the divinity whose body is fire, on account of its power, is refuted by the following remark: For the reasons already stated Vai/s/vanara is neither the divinity nor the element. For to the elemental fire which is mere heat and light the heavenly world and so on cannot properly be ascribed as head and so on, because an effect cannot be the Self of another effect.—Again, the heavenly world cannot be ascribed as head, &c. to the divinity of fire, in spite of the power of the latter; for, on the one hand, it is not a cause (but a mere effect), and on the other hand its power depends on the highest Lord. Against all these interpretations there lies moreover the objection founded on the inapplicability of the term 'Self.'

28. Jaimini (declares that there is) no contradiction even on the assumption of a direct (worship of the highest Lord as Vai/s/vanara).

Above (Sutra 26) it has been said that Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord, to be meditated upon as having the gastric fire either for his outward manifestation or for his limiting condition; which interpretation was accepted in deference to the circumstance that he is spoken of as abiding within—and so on.—The teacher Jaimini however is of opinion that it is not necessary to have recourse to the assumption of an outward manifestation or limiting condition, and that there is no objection to refer the passage about Vai/s/vanara to the direct worship of the highest Lord.—But, if you reject the interpretation based on the gastric fire, you place yourself in opposition to the statement that Vai/s/vanara abides within, and to the reasons founded on the term, &c. (Su. 26).—To this we reply that we in no way place ourselves in opposition to the statement that Vai/s/vanara abides within. For the passage, 'He knows him as man-like, as abiding within man,' does not by any means refer to the gastric fire, the latter being neither the general topic of discussion nor having been mentioned by name before.—What then does it refer to?—It refers to that which forms the subject of discussion, viz. that similarity to man (of the highest Self) which is fancifully found in the members of man from the upper part of the head down to the chin; the text therefore says, 'He knows him as man-like, as abiding within man,' just as we say of a branch that it abides within the tree[160].—Or else we may adopt another interpretation and say that after the highest Self has been represented as having the likeness to man as a limiting condition, with regard to nature as well as to man, the passage last quoted ('He knows him as abiding within man') speaks of the same highest Self as the mere witness (sakshin; i.e. as the pure Self, non-related to the limiting conditions).—The consideration of the context having thus shown that the highest Self has to be resorted to for the interpretation of the passage, the term 'Vai/s/vanara' must denote the highest Self in some way or other. The word 'Vi/s/vanara' is to be explained either as 'he who is all and man (i.e. the individual soul),' or 'he to whom souls belong' (in so far as he is their maker or ruler), and thus denotes the highest Self which is the Self of all. And the form 'Vai/s/vanara' has the same meaning as 'Vi/s/vanara,' the taddhita-suffix, by which the former word is derived from the latter, not changing the meaning; just as in the case of rakshasa (derived from rakshas), and vayasa (derived from vayas).—The word 'Agni' also may denote the highest Self if we adopt the etymology agni=agra/n/i, i.e. he who leads in front.—As the Garhapatya-fire finally, and as the abode of the oblation to breath the highest Self may be represented because it is the Self of all.

But, if it is assumed that Vai/s/vanara denotes the highest Self, how can Scripture declare that he is measured by a span?—On the explanation of this difficulty we now enter.

29. On account of the manifestation, so A/s/marathya opines.

The circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends all measure being spoken of as measured by a span has for its reason 'manifestation.' The highest Lord manifests himself as measured by a span, i.e. he specially manifests himself for the benefit of his worshippers in some special places, such as the heart and the like, where he may be perceived. Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher A/s/marathya, the scriptural passage which speaks of him who is measured by a span may refer to the highest Lord.

30. On account of remembrance; so Badari opines.

Or else the highest Lord may be called 'measured by a span' because he is remembered by means of the mind which is seated in the heart which is measured by a span. Similarly, barley-corns which are measured by means of prasthas are themselves called prasthas. It must be admitted that barley-grains themselves have a certain size which is merely rendered manifest through their being connected with a prastha measure; while the highest Lord himself does not possess a size to be rendered manifest by his connexion with the heart. Still the remembrance (of the Lord by means of the mind) may be accepted as offering a certain foundation for the /S/ruti passage concerning him who is measured by a span.—Or else[161] the Sutra may be interpreted to mean that the Lord, although not really measured by a span, is to be remembered (meditated upon) as being of the measure of a span; whereby the passage is furnished with an appropriate sense.—Thus the passage about him who is measured by a span may, according to the opinion of the teacher Badari, be referred to the highest Lord, on account of remembrance.

31. On the ground of imaginative identification (the highest Lord may be called prade/s/amatra), Jaimini thinks; for thus (Scripture) declares.

Or else the passage about him who is measured by a span may be considered to rest on imaginative combination.—Why?—Because the passage of the Vajasaneyibrahma/n/a which treats of the same topic identifies heaven, earth, and so on—which are the members of Vai/s/vanara viewed as the Self of the threefold world—with certain parts of the human frame, viz. the parts comprised between the upper part of the head and the chin, and thus declares the imaginative identity of Vai/s/vanara with something whose measure is a span. There we read, 'The Gods indeed reached him, knowing him as measured by a span as it were. Now I will declare them (his members) to you so as to identify him (the Vai/s/vanara) with that whose measure is a span; thus he said. Pointing to the upper part of the head he said: This is what stands above (i.e. the heavenly world) as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the head of Vai/s/vanara[162]). Pointing to the eyes he said: This is he with good light (i.e. the sun) as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the eye of V.). Pointing to the nose he said: This is he who moves on manifold paths (i.e. the air) as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the breath of V.). Pointing to the space (ether) within his mouth he said: This is the full one (i.e. the ether) as Vai/s/vanara. Pointing to the saliva within his mouth he said: This is wealth as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the water in the bladder of V.). Pointing to the chin he said: This is the base as Vai/s/vanara (i.e. the feet of V.).'—Although in the Vajasaneyi-brahma/n/a the heaven is denoted as that which has the attribute of standing above and the sun as that which has the attribute of good light, while in the Chandogya the heaven is spoken of as having good light and the sun as being multiform; still this difference does not interfere (with the unity of the vidya)[163], because both texts equally use the term 'measured by a span,' and because all /s/akhas intimate the same.—The above explanation of the term 'measured by a span,' which rests on imaginative identification, the teacher Jaimini considers the most appropriate one.

32. Moreover they (the Jabalas) speak of him (the highest Lord) in that (i.e. the interstice between the top of the head and the chin which is measured by a span).

Moreover the Jabalas speak in their text of the highest Lord as being in the interstice between the top of the head and the chin. 'The unevolved infinite Self abides in the avimukta (i.e. the non-released soul). Where does that avimukta abide? It abides in the Vara/n/a and the Nasi, in the middle. What is that Vara/n/a, what is that Nasi?' The text thereupon etymologises the term Vara/n/a as that which wards off (varayati) all evil done by the senses, and the term Nasi as that which destroys (na/s/ayati) all evil done by the senses; and then continues, 'And what is its place?—The place where the eyebrows and the nose join. That is the joining place of the heavenly world (represented by the upper part of the head) and of the other (i.e. the earthly world represented by the chin).' (Jabala Up. I.)—Thus it appears that the scriptural statement which ascribes to the highest Lord the measure of a span is appropriate. That the highest Lord is called abhivimana refers to his being the inward Self of all. As such he is directly measured, i.e. known by all animate beings. Or else the word may be explained as 'he who is near everywhere—as the inward Self—and who at the same time is measureless' (as being infinite). Or else it may denote the highest Lord as him who, as the cause of the world, measures it out, i.e. creates it. By all this it is proved that Vai/s/vanara is the highest Lord.

Notes:

[Footnote 136: The clause 'he is to meditate with a calm mind' if taken as a gu/n/avidhi, i.e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin meditation; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence (vakyabheda).]

[Footnote 137: Jivezpi dehadib/rim/hanaj jyastvanyayad va brahmatety artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 138: The discussion is brought on by the term 'vivakshita' in the Sutra whose meaning is 'expressed, aimed at,' but more literally 'desired to be expressed.']

[Footnote 139: Because he is vyapin.]

[Footnote 140: Another interpretation of the later part of Sutra.]

[Footnote 141: Cp. Ka/th/a Up, I, 1, 13; 20; I, 2, 14.]

[Footnote 142: Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge that the individual soul is in reality Brahman. The commentators explain rajas by avidya.]

[Footnote 143: Tadartham iti, jivasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yavat, /k/aitanya/kh/ayapanna dhi/h/sukhadina pari/n/amata iti, tatra purushozpi bhakt/ri/tvam ivanubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum adhyaropayati. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 144: Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here, because immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow only, but in their true sense.]

[Footnote 145: The /t/ikas say that the contents of this last sentence are hinted at by the word 'and' in the Sutra.]

[Footnote 146: I.e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred fires give to Upako/s/ala, Ch. Up. IV, 10 ff.]

[Footnote 147: Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires, and introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage 'the person that is seen in the eye,' &c. forms a part.]

[Footnote 148: A/s/rayantarapratyayasya/s/rayantare kshepa/h/ pratika/h/, yatha brahma/s/abda/h/ paramatmavishayo namadishu kshipyate. Bha.]

[Footnote 149: The following sentences give the reason why, although there is only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.]

[Footnote 150: According to Scripture, Nira@nku/s/a/m/ sarvaniyantritva/m/ /s/rauta/m/ na /k/a tadri/s/e sarvaniyantari bhedo na /k/anumana/m/ /s/rutibhaditam uttish/th/ati. Ananda Giri. Or else, as Go. An. remarks, we may explain: as the highest Self is not really different from the individual soul. So also Bhamati: Na /h/anavastha, na hi niyantrantara/m/ tena niyamyate ki/m/ tu yo jivo niyanta lokasiddha/h/ sa paramatmevopadhyava/kkh/edakalpitabheda/h/.]

[Footnote 151: V/ri/ttik/ri/dvyakhyam dushayati, Go. An.; ekade/s/ina/m/ dushayati, Ananda Giri; tad etat paramatenakshepasamadhanabhya/m/ vyakhyaya svamatena vya/k/ash/t/e, puna/h/ /s/abdozpi purvasmad vi/s/esha/m/ dyotayann asyesh/t/ata/m/ su/k/ayati, Bhamati.—The statement of the two former commentators must be understood to mean—in agreement with the Bhamati—that /S/a@nkara is now going to refute the preceding explanation by the statement of his own view. Thus Go. An. later on explains 'asmin pakshe' by 'svapakshe.']

[Footnote 152: The question is to what passage the 'rupopanyasat' of the Sutra refers.—According to the opinion set forth first it refers to Mu. Up. II, 1, 4 ff.—But, according to the second view, II, 1, 4 to II, 1, 9, cannot refer to the source of all beings, i.e. the highest Self, because that entire passage describes the creation, the inner Self of which is not the highest Self but Prajapati, i.e. the Hira/n/yagarbha or Sutratman of the later Vedanta, who is himself an 'effect,' and who is called the inner Self, because he is the breath of life (pra/n/a) in everything.—Hence the Sutra must be connected with another passage, and that passage is found in II, 1, 10, where it is said that the Person (i.e. the highest Self) is all this, &c.]

[Footnote 153: About which term see later on.]

[Footnote 154: Sarire laksha/n/aya vai/s/vanara/s/abdopapattim aha tasyeti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 155: And as such might be said not to require a basis for its statements.]

[Footnote 156: Na /k/a garhapatyadih/ri/dayadita brahma/n/a/h/ sambhavini. Bhamati.]

[Footnote 157: Na /k/a pra/n/ahutyadhikara/n/ata z nyatra ja/th/aragner yujyate. Bhamati.]

[Footnote 158: According to the former explanation the gastric fire is to be looked on as the outward manifestation (pratika) of the highest Lord; according to the latter as his limiting condition.]

[Footnote 159: I.e. that he may be fancifully identified with the head and so on of the devout worshipper.]

[Footnote 160: Whereby we mean not that it is inside the tree, but that it forms a part of the tree.—The Vai/s/vanara Self is identified with the different members of the body, and these members abide within, i.e. form parts of the body.]

[Footnote 161: Parima/n/asya h/ri/da/y/advararopitasya smaryama/n/e katham aropo vishayavishayitvena bhedad ity a/s/a@nkya vyakhyantaram aha prade/s/eti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 162: Atra sarvatra vai/s/vanara/s/abdas tada@ngapara/h/. Go. An.]

[Footnote 163: Which unity entitles us to use the passage from the /S/at. Bra. for the explanation of the passage from the Ch. Up.]



THIRD PADA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. The abode of heaven, earth, and so on (is Brahman), on account of the term 'own,' i.e. Self.

We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5), 'He in whom the heaven, the earth, and the sky are woven, the mind also with all the vital airs, know him alone as the Self, and leave off other words! He is the bridge of the Immortal.'—Here the doubt arises whether the abode which is intimated by the statement of the heaven and so on being woven in it is the highest Brahman or something else.

The purvapakshin maintains that the abode is something else, on account of the expression, 'It is the bridge of the Immortal.' For, he says, it is known from every-day experience that a bridge presupposes some further bank to which it leads, while it is impossible to assume something further beyond the highest Brahman, which in Scripture is called 'endless, without a further shore' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12). Now if the abode is supposed to be something different from Brahman, it must be supposed to be either the pradhana known from Sm/ri/ti, which, as being the (general) cause, may be called the (general) abode; or the air known from /S/ruti, of which it is said (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 2, 'Air is that thread, O Gautama. By air as by a thread, O Gautama, this world and the other world and all beings are strung together'), that it supports all things; or else the embodied soul which, as being the enjoyer, may be considered as an abode with reference to the objects of its fruition.

Against this view we argue with the sutrakara as follows:—'Of the world consisting of heaven, earth, and so on, which in the quoted passage is spoken of as woven (upon something), the highest Brahman must be the abode.'—Why?—On account of the word 'own,' i.e. on account of the word 'Self.' For we meet with the word 'Self' in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self.' This term 'Self' is thoroughly appropriate only if we understand the highest Self and not anything else.—(To propound another interpretation of the phrase 'sva/s/abdat' employed in the Sutra.) Sometimes also Brahman is spoken of in /S/ruti as the general abode by its own terms (i.e. by terms properly designating Brahman), as, for instance (Ch. Up. VI. 8, 4), 'All these creatures, my dear, have their root in the being, their abode in the being, their rest in the being[164].'—(Or else we have to explain 'sva/s/abdena' as follows), In the passages preceding and following the passage under discussion Brahman is glorified with its own names[165]; cp. Mu. Up. II, 1, 10, 'The Person is all this, sacrifice, penance, Brahman, the highest Immortal,' and II, 2, 11, 'That immortal Brahman is before, is behind, Brahman is to the right and left.' Here, on account of mention being made of an abode and that which abides, and on account of the co-ordination expressed in the passage, 'Brahman is all' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11), a suspicion might arise that Brahman is of a manifold variegated nature, just as in the case of a tree consisting of different parts we distinguish branches, stem, and root. In order to remove this suspicion the text declares (in the passage under discussion), 'Know him alone as the Self.' The sense of which is: The Self is not to be known as manifold, qualified by the universe of effects; you are rather to dissolve by true knowledge the universe of effects, which is the mere product of Nescience, and to know that one Self, which is the general abode, as uniform. Just as when somebody says, 'Bring that on which Devadatta sits,' the person addressed brings the chair only (the abode of Devadatta), not Devadatta himself; so the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self,' teaches that the object to be known is the one uniform Self which constitutes the general abode. Similarly another scriptural passage reproves him who believes in the unreal world of effects, 'From death to death goes he who sees any difference here' (Ka. Up. II, 4, 11). The statement of co-ordination made in the clause 'All is Brahman' aims at dissolving (the wrong conception of the reality of) the world, and not in any way at intimating that Brahman is multiform in nature[166]; for the uniformity (of Brahman's nature) is expressly stated in other passages such as the following one, 'As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has that Self neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 13).—For all these reasons the abode of heaven, earth, &c. is the highest Brahman.—Against the objection that on account of the text speaking of a 'bridge,' and a bridge requiring a further bank, we have to understand by the abode of heaven and earth something different from Brahman, we remark that the word 'bridge' is meant to intimate only that that which is called a bridge supports, not that it has a further bank. We need not assume by any means that the bridge meant is like an ordinary bridge made of clay and wood. For as the word setu (bridge) is derived from the root si, which means 'to bind,' the idea of holding together, supporting is rather implied in it than the idea of being connected with something beyond (a further bank).

According to the opinion of another (commentator) the word 'bridge' does not glorify the abode of heaven, earth, &c., but rather the knowledge of the Self which is glorified in the preceding clause, 'Know him alone as the Self,' and the abandonment of speech advised in the clause, 'leave off other words;' to them, as being the means of obtaining immortality, the expression 'the bridge of the immortal' applies[167]. On that account we have to set aside the assertion that, on account of the word 'bridge,' something different from Brahman is to be understood by the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

2. And on account of its being designated as that to which the Released have to resort.

By the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, we have to understand the highest Brahman for that reason also that we find it denoted as that to which the Released have to resort.—The conception that the body and other things contained in the sphere of the Not-self are our Self, constitutes Nescience; from it there spring desires with regard to whatever promotes the well-being of the body and so on, and aversions with regard to whatever tends to injure it; there further arise fear and confusion when we observe anything threatening to destroy it. All this constitutes an endless series of the most manifold evils with which we all are acquainted. Regarding those on the other hand who have freed themselves from the stains of Nescience desire aversion and so on, it is said that they have to resort to that, viz. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. which forms the topic of discussion. For the text, after having said, 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all his works perish when He has been beheld who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8), later on remarks, 'The wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8). That Brahman is that which is to be resorted to by the released, is known from other scriptural passages, such as 'When all desires which once entered his heart are undone then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 7). Of the pradhana and similar entities, on the other hand, it is not known from any source that they are to be resorted to by the released. Moreover, the text (in the passage, 'Know him alone as the Self and leave off other words') declares that the knowledge of the abode of heaven and earth, &c. is connected with the leaving off of all speech; a condition which, according to another scriptural passage, attaches to (the knowledge of) Brahman; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 21, 'Let a wise Brahma/n/a, after he has discovered him, practise wisdom. Let him not seek after many words, for that is mere weariness of the tongue.'—For that reason also the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, is the highest Brahman.

3. Not (i.e. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. cannot be) that which is inferred, (i.e. the pradhana), on account of the terms not denoting it.

While there has been shown a special reason in favour of Brahman (being the abode), there is no such special reason in favour of anything else. Hence he (the sutrakara) says that that which is inferred, i.e. the pradhana assumed by the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, is not to be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.—Why?—On account of the terms not denoting it. For the sacred text does not contain any term intimating the non-intelligent pradhana, on the ground of which we might understand the latter to be the general cause or abode; while such terms as 'he who perceives all and knows all' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9) intimate an intelligent being opposed to the pradhana in nature.—For the same reason the air also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.

4. (Nor) also the individual soul (pra/n/abh/ri/t).

Although to the cognitional (individual) Self the qualities of Selfhood and intelligence do belong, still omniscience and similar qualities do not belong to it as its knowledge is limited by its adjuncts; thus the individual soul also cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c., for the same reason, i.e. on account of the terms not denoting it.—Moreover, the attribute of forming the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, cannot properly be given to the individual soul because the latter is limited by certain adjuncts and therefore non-pervading (not omnipresent)[168].—The special enunciation (of the individual soul) is caused by what follows[169].—The individual soul is not to be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the following reason also.

5. On account of the declaration of difference.

The passage 'Know him alone as the Self' moreover implies a declaration of difference, viz. of the difference of the object of knowledge and the knower. Here the individual soul as being that which is desirous of release is the knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by the word 'self' and represented as the object of knowledge, is understood to be the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.—For the following reason also the individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.

6. On account of the subject-matter.

The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the entire chapter), as we see from the passage, 'Sir, what is that through which, when it is known, everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3) in which the knowledge of everything is declared to be dependent on the knowledge of one thing. For all this (i.e. the entire world) becomes known if Brahman the Self of all is known, not if only the individual soul is known.—Another reason against the individual soul follows.

7. And on account of the two conditions of standing and eating (of which the former is characteristic of the highest Lord, the latter of the individual soul).

With reference to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, the text says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). This passage describes the two states of mere standing, i.e. mere presence, and of eating, the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' referring to the eating, i.e. the fruition of the results of works, and the clause, 'The other one looks on without eating,' describing the condition of mere inactive presence. The two states described, viz. of mere presence on the one hand and of enjoyment on the other hand, show that the Lord and the individual soul are referred to. Now there is room for this statement which represents the Lord as separate from the individual soul, only if the passage about the abode of heaven and earth likewise refers to the Lord; for in that case only there exists a continuity of topic. On any other supposition the second passage would contain a statement about something not connected with the general topic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled for.—But, it may be objected, on your interpretation also the second passage makes an uncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as it represents the individual soul as separate from the Lord.—Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the purpose of Scripture to make statements regarding the individual soul. From ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different individual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other limiting adjuncts, is known to every one as agent and enjoyer, and we therefore must not assume that it is that which Scripture aims at setting forth. The Lord, on the other hand, about whom ordinary experience tells us nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all scriptural passages, and we therefore cannot assume that any passage should refer to him merely casually[170].—That the mantra 'two birds,' &c. speaks of the Lord—and the individual soul we have already shown under I, 2, 11.—And if, according to the interpretation given in the Pai@ngi-upanishad (and quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is understood to refer to the internal organ (sattva) and the individual soul (not to the individual soul and the Lord), even then there is no contradiction (between that interpretation and our present averment that the individual soul is not the abode of heaven and earth).—How so?—Here (i.e. in the present Sutra and the Sutras immediately preceding) it is denied that the individual soul which, owing to its imagined connexion with the internal organ and other limiting adjuncts, has a separate existence in separate bodies—its division being analogous to the division of universal space into limited spaces such as the spaces within jars and the like—is that which is called the abode of heaven and earth. That same soul, on the other hand, which exists in all bodies, if considered apart from the limiting adjuncts, is nothing else but the highest Self. Just as the spaces within jars, if considered apart from their limiting conditions, are merged in universal space, so the individual soul also is incontestably that which is denoted as the abode of heaven and earth, since it (the soul) cannot really be separate from the highest Self. That it is not the abode of heaven and earth, is therefore said of the individual soul in so far only as it imagines itself to be connected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it follows that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on.—The same conclusion has already been arrived at under I, 2, 21; for in the passage concerning the source of all beings (which passage is discussed under the Sutra quoted) we meet with the clause, 'In which heaven and earth and the sky are woven.' In the present adhikara/n/a the subject is resumed for the sake of further elucidation.

8. The bhuman (is Brahman), as the instruction about it is additional to that about the state of deep sleep (i.e. the vital air which remains awake even in the state of deep sleep).

We read (Ch. Up. VII, 23; 24), 'That which is much (bhuman) we must desire to understand.—Sir, I desire to understand it.—Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is what is much (bhuman). Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else, that is the Little.'—Here the doubt arises whether that which is much is the vital air (pra/n/a) or the highest Self.—Whence the doubt?—The word 'bhuman,' taken by itself, means the state of being much, according to its derivation as taught by Pa/n/ani, VI, 4, 158. Hence there is felt the want of a specification showing what constitutes the Self of that muchness. Here there presents itself at first the approximate passage, 'The vital air is more than hope' (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1), from which we may conclude that the vital air is bhuman.—On the other hand, we meet at the beginning of the chapter, where the general topic is stated, with the following passage, 'I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine;' from which passage it would appear that the bhuman is the highest Self.—Hence there arises a doubt as to which of the two alternatives is to be embraced, and which is to be set aside.

The purvapakshin maintains that the bhuman is the vital air, since there is found no further series of questions and answers as to what is more. For while we meet with a series of questions and answers (such as, 'Sir, is there something which is more than a name?'—'Speech is more than name.'—'Is there something which is more than speech?'—'Mind is more than speech'), which extends from name up to vital air, we do not meet with a similar question and answer as to what might be more than vital air (such as, 'Is there something which is more than vital air?'—'Such and such a thing is more than vital air'). The text rather at first declares at length (in the passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,' &c.) that the vital air is more than all the members of the series from name up to hope; it then acknowledges him who knows the vital air to be an ativadin, i.e. one who makes a statement surpassing the preceding statements (in the passage, 'Thou art an ativadin. He may say I am an ativadin; he need not deny it'); and it thereupon (in the passage, 'But he in reality is an ativadin who declares something beyond by means of the True'[171]),—not leaving off, but rather continuing to refer to the quality of an ativadin which is founded on the vital air,—proceeds, by means of the series beginning with the True, to lead over to the bhuman; so that we conclude the meaning to be that the vital air is the bhuman.—But, if the bhuman is interpreted to mean the vital air, how have we to explain the passage in which the bhuman is characterised. 'Where one sees nothing else?' &c.—As, the purvapakshin replies, in the state of deep sleep we observe a cessation of all activity, such as seeing, &c., on the part of the organs merged in the vital air, the vital air itself may be characterised by a passage such as, 'Where one sees nothing else.' Similarly, another scriptural passage (Pra. Up. IV, 2; 3) describes at first (in the words, 'He does not hear, he does not see,' &c.) the state of deep sleep as characterised by the cessation of the activity of all bodily organs, and then by declaring that in that state the vital air, with its five modifications, remains awake ('The fires of the pra/n/as are awake in that town'), shows the vital air to occupy the principal position in the state of deep sleep.—That passage also, which speaks of the bliss of the bhuman ('The bhuman is bliss,' Ch. Up. VII, 23), can be reconciled with our explanation, because Pra. Up. IV, 6 declares bliss to attach to the state of deep sleep ('Then that god sees no dreams and at that time that happiness arises in his body').—Again, the statement, 'The bhuman is immortality' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1), may likewise refer to the vital air; for another scriptural passage says, 'Pra/n/a is immortality' (Kau. Up. III, 2).—But how can the view according to which the bhuman is the vital air be reconciled with the fact that in the beginning of the chapter the knowledge of the Self is represented as the general topic ('He who knows the Self overcomes grief,' &c.)?—By the Self there referred to, the purvapakshin replies, nothing else is meant but the vital air. For the passage, 'The vital air is father, the vital air is mother, the vital air is brother, the vital air is sister, the vital air is teacher, the vital air is Brahma/n/a' (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1), represents the vital air as the Self of everything. As, moreover, the passage, 'As the spokes of a wheel rest in the nave, so all this rests in pra/n/a,' declares the pra/n/a to be the Self of all—by means of a comparison with the spokes and the nave of a wheel—the pra/n/a may be conceived under the form of bhuman, i.e. plenitude.—Bhuman, therefore, means the vital air.

To this we make the following reply.—Bhuman can mean the highest Self only, not the vital air.—Why?—'On account of information being given about it, subsequent to bliss.' The word 'bliss' (samprasada) means the state of deep sleep, as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of the word ('In it he, i.e. man, is altogether pleased—samprasidati')—and, secondly, from the fact of samprasada being mentioned in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka together with the state of dream and the waking state. And as in the state of deep sleep the vital air remains awake, the word 'samprasada' is employed in the Sutra to denote the vital air; so that the Sutra means, 'on account of information being given about the bhuman, subsequently to (the information given about) the vital air.' If the bhuman were the vital air itself, it would be a strange proceeding to make statements about the bhuman in addition to the statements about the vital air. For in the preceding passages also we do not meet, for instance, with a statement about name subsequent to the previous statement about name (i.e. the text does not say 'name is more than name'), but after something has been said about name, a new statement is made about speech, which is something different from name (i.e. the text says, 'Speech is more than name'), and so on up to the statement about vital air, each subsequent statement referring to something other than the topic of the preceding one. We therefore conclude that the bhuman also, the statement about which follows on the statement about the vital air, is something other than the vital air. But—it may be objected—we meet here neither with a question, such as, 'Is there something more than vital air?' nor with an answer, such as, 'That and that is more than vital air.' How, then, can it be said that the information about the bhuman is given subsequently to the information about the vital air?—Moreover, we see that the circumstance of being an ativadin, which is exclusively connected with the vital air, is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. 'But in reality he is an ativadin who makes a statement surpassing (the preceding statements) by means of the True'). There is thus no information additional to the information about the vital air.—To this objection we reply that it is impossible to maintain that the passage last quoted merely continues the discussion of the quality of being an ativadin, as connected with the knowledge of the vital air; since the clause, 'He who makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of the True,' states a specification.—But, the objector resumes, this very statement of a specification may be explained as referring to the vital air. If you ask how, we refer you to an analogous case. If somebody says, 'This Agnihotrin speaks the truth,' the meaning is not that the quality of being an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the truth; that quality rather depends on the (regular performance of the) agnihotra only, and speaking the truth is mentioned merely as a special attribute of that special Agnihotrin. So our passage also ('But in reality he is an ativadin who makes a statement, &c. by means of the True') does not intimate that the quality of being an ativadin depends on speaking the truth, but merely expresses that speaking the truth is a special attribute of him who knows the vital air; while the quality of being an ativadin must be considered to depend on the knowledge of the vital air.—This objection we rebut by the remark that it involves an abandonment of the direct meaning of the sacred text. For from the text, as it stands, we understand that the quality of being an ativadin depends on speaking the truth; the sense being: An ativadin is he who is an ativadin by means of the True. The passage does not in anyway contain a eulogisation of the knowledge of the vital air. It could be connected with the latter only on the ground of general subject-matter (prakara/n/a)[172]; which would involve an abandonment of the direct meaning of the text in favour of prakara/n/a[173].—Moreover, the particle but ('But in reality he is,' &c.), whose purport is to separate (what follows) from the subject-matter of what precedes, would not agree (with the pra/n/a explanation). The following passage also, 'But we must desire to know the True' (VII, 16), which presupposes a new effort, shows that a new topic is going to be entered upon.—For these reasons we have to consider the statement about the ativadin in the same light as we should consider the remark—made in a conversation which previously had turned on the praise of those who study one Veda—that he who studies the four Vedas is a great Brahma/n/a; a remark which we should understand to be laudatory of persons different from those who study one Veda, i.e. of those who study all the four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume that a new topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer only; for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is sufficiently clear from the circumstance that no connexion can be established between it and the preceding topic. The succession of topics in the chapter under discussion is as follows: Narada at first listens to the instruction which Sanatkumara gives him about various matters, the last of which is Pra/n/a, and then becomes silent. Thereupon Sanatkumara explains to him spontaneously (without being asked) that the quality of being an ativadin, if merely based on the knowledge of the vital air—which knowledge has for its object an unreal product,—is devoid of substance, and that he only is an ativadin who is such by means of the True. By the term 'the True' there is meant the highest Brahman; for Brahman is the Real, and it is called the 'True' in another scriptural passage also, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Narada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry ('Might I, Sir, become an ativadin by the True?') and Sanatkumara then leads him, by a series of instrumental steps, beginning with understanding, up to the knowledge of bhuman. We therefrom conclude that the bhuman is that very True whose explanation had been promised in addition to the (knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see that the instruction about the bhuman is additional to the instruction about the vital air, and bhuman must therefore mean the highest Self, which is different from the vital air. With this interpretation the initial statement, according to which the enquiry into the Self forms the general subject-matter, agrees perfectly well. The assumption, on the other hand (made by the purvapakshin), that by the Self we have here to understand the vital air is indefensible. For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to the vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place, cessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge of the highest Self; for, as another scriptural passage declares, 'There is no other path to go' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 15). Moreover, after we have read at the outset, 'Do, Sir, lead me over to the other side of grief' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3), we meet with the following concluding words (VII, 26, 2), 'To him, after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness.' The term 'darkness' here denotes Nescience, the cause of grief, and so on.—Moreover, if the instruction terminated with the vital air, it would not be said of the latter that it rests on something else. But the brahma/n/a (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 1) does say, 'The vital air springs from the Self.' Nor can it be objected against this last argument that the concluding part of the chapter may refer to the highest Self, while, all the same, the bhuman (mentioned in an earlier part of the chapter) may be the vital air. For, from the passage (VII, 24, 1), ('Sir, in what does the bhuman rest? In its own greatness,' &c.), it appears that the bhuman forms the continuous topic up to the end of the chapter.—The quality of being the bhuman—which quality is plenitude—agrees, moreover, best with the highest Self, which is the cause of everything.

9. And on account of the agreement of the attributes (mentioned in the text).

The attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes to the bhuman agree well with the highest Self. The passage, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the bhuman,' gives us to understand that in the bhuman the ordinary activities of seeing and so on are absent; and that this is characteristic of the highest Self, we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' &c. (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15). What is said about the absence of the activities of seeing and so on in the state of deep sleep (Pra. Up. IV, 2) is said with the intention of declaring the non-attachedness of the Self, not of describing the nature of the pra/n/a; for the highest Self (not the vital air) is the topic of that passage. The bliss also of which Scripture speaks as connected with that state is mentioned only in order to show that bliss constitutes the nature of the Self. For Scripture says (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 32), 'This is his highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss.'—The passage under discussion also ('The bhuman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which is little (limited). The bhuman only is bliss') by denying the reality of bliss on the part of whatever is perishable shows that Brahman only is bliss as bhuman, i.e. in its plenitude,—Again, the passage, 'The bhuman is immortality,' shows that the highest cause is meant; for the immortality of all effected things is a merely relative one, and another scriptural passage says that 'whatever is different from that (Brahman) is perishable' (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2).—Similarly, the qualities of being the True, and of resting in its own greatness, and of being omnipresent, and of being the Self of everything which the text mentions (as belonging to the bhuman) can belong to the highest Self only, not to anything else.—By all this it is proved that the bhuman is the highest Self.

10. The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of (its) supporting (all things) up to ether.

We read (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 7; 8). 'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?—He said: O Gargi, the Brahma/n/as call this the akshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on.—Here the doubt arises whether the word 'akshara' means 'syllable' or 'the highest Lord.'

The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'akshara' means 'syllable' merely, because it has, in such terms as akshara-samamnaya, the meaning of 'syllable;' because we have no right to disregard the settled meaning of a word; and because another scriptural passage also ('The syllable Om is all this,' Ch. Up. II, 23, 4) declares a syllable, represented as the object of devotion, to be the Self of all.

To this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by the word 'akshara.'—Why?—Because it (the akshara) is said to support the entire aggregate of effects, from earth up to ether. For the sacred text declares at first that the entire aggregate of effects beginning with earth and differentiated by threefold time is based on ether, in which it is 'woven like warp and woof;' leads then (by means of the question, 'In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof?') over to the akshara, and, finally, concludes with the words, 'In that akshara then, O Gargi, the ether is woven, like warp and woof.'—Now the attribute of supporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being but Brahman. The text (quoted from the Ch. Up.) says indeed that the syllable Om is all this, but that statement is to be understood as a mere glorification of the syllable Om considered as a means to obtain Brahman.—Therefore we take akshara to mean either 'the Imperishable' or 'that which pervades;' on the ground of either of which explanations it must be identified with the highest Brahman.

But—our opponent resumes—while we must admit that the above reasoning holds good so far that the circumstance of the akshara supporting all things up to ether is to be accepted as a proof of all effects depending on a cause, we point out that it may be employed by those also who declare the pradhana to be the general cause. How then does the previous argumentation specially establish Brahman (to the exclusion of the pradhana)?—The reply to this is given in the next Sutra.

11. This (supporting can), on account of the command (attributed to the Imperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only).

The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the highest Lord only.—Why?—On account of the command.—For the sacred text speaks of a command ('By the command of that akshara, O Gargi, sun and moon stand apart!' III, 8, 9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord only, not of the non-intelligent pradhana. For non-intelligent causes such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to their effects, such as jars and the like.

12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the akshara) from that whose nature is different (from Brahman).

Also on account of the reason stated in this Sutra Brahman only is to be considered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of all things up to ether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything else. The meaning of the Sutra is as follows. Whatever things other than Brahman might possibly be thought to be denoted by the term 'akshara,' from the nature of all those things Scripture separates the akshara spoken of as the support of all things up to ether. The scriptural passage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, O Gargi, is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the pradhana also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c., as the pradhana is non-intelligent.—Nor can the word akshara denote the embodied soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following on the one quoted declares that there is nothing different from the Self ('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it'); and, moreover, limiting conditions are expressly denied (of the akshara) in the passage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind,' &c. (III, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting conditions does not exist[174].—It is therefore certain beyond doubt that the Imperishable is nothing else but the highest Brahman.

13. On account of his being designated as the object of sight (the highest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage speaking of the meditation on the highest person by means of the syllable Om).

(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth in the words, 'O Satyakama, the syllable Om is the highest and also the other Brahman; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two.' The text then goes on, 'Again, he who meditates with this syllable Om of three matras on the highest Person,' &c.—Here the doubt presents itself, whether the object of meditation referred to in the latter passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman; a doubt based on the former passage, according to which both are under discussion.

The purvapakshin maintains that the other, i.e. the lower Brahman, is referred to, because the text promises only a reward limited by a certain locality for him who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is omnipresent, it would be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it obtains a fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the qualification, 'the highest person,' is not valid, because the vital principal (pra/n/a) may be called 'higher' with reference to the body[175].

To this we make the following reply: What is here taught as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only.—Why?—On account of its being spoken of as the object of sight. For the person to be meditated upon is, in a complementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act of seeing, 'He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body; purusham puri/s/ayam), higher than that one who is of the shape of the individual soul, and who is himself higher (than the senses and their objects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal thing also can be the object, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of the act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know from experience; we therefore conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the highest (only real) Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete intuition[176] is spoken of as the object of sight. This same highest Self we recognise in the passage under discussion as the object of meditation, in consequence of the term, 'the highest person.'—But—an objection will be raised—as the object of meditation we have the highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that one who is himself higher, &c.; how, then, are we to know that those two are identical?—The two passages, we reply, have in common the terms 'highest' (or 'higher,' para) and 'person.' And it must not by any means be supposed that the term jivaghana[177] refers to that highest person which, considered as the object of meditation, had previously been introduced as the general topic. For the consequence of that supposition would be that that highest person which is the object of sight would be different from that highest person which is represented as the object of meditation. We rather have to explain the word jivaghana as 'He whose shape[178] is characterised by the jivas;' so that what is really meant by that term is that limited condition of the highest Self which is owing to its adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of jivas, i.e. individual souls; a condition analogous to the limitation of salt (in general) by means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. That limited condition of the Self may itself be called 'higher,' if viewed with regard to the senses and their objects.