If, now, the purvapakshin maintains that the term pra/n/a here denotes the well-known modification of air, i.e. breath, we, on our side, assert that the word pra/n/a must be understood to denote Brahman.—For what reason?—On account of such being the consecutive meaning of the passages. For if we examine the connexion of the entire section which treats of the pra/n/a, we observe that all the single passages can be construed into a whole only if they are viewed as referring to Brahman. At the beginning of the legend Pratardana, having been allowed by Indra to choose a boon, mentions the highest good of man, which he selects for his boon, in the following words, 'Do you yourself choose that boon for me which you deem most beneficial for a man.' Now, as later on pra/n/a is declared to be what is most beneficial for man, what should pra/n/a denote but the highest Self? For apart from the cognition of that Self a man cannot possibly attain what is most beneficial for him, as many scriptural passages declare. Compare, for instance, /S/ve. Up. III, 8, 'A man who knows him passes over death; there is no other path to go.' Again, the further passage, 'He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed, not by theft, not by bhru/n/ahatya' (III, 1), has a meaning only if Brahman is supposed to be the object of knowledge. For, that subsequently to the cognition of Brahman all works and their effects entirely cease, is well known from scriptural passages, such as the following, 'All works perish when he has been beheld who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8). Moreover, pra/n/a can be identified with the intelligent Self only if it is Brahman. For the air which is non-intelligent can clearly not be the intelligent Self. Those characteristic marks, again, which are mentioned in the concluding passage (viz. those intimated by the words 'bliss,' 'imperishable,' 'immortal') can, if taken in their full sense, not be reconciled with any being except Brahman. There are, moreover, the following passages, 'He does not increase by a good action, nor decrease by a bad action. For he makes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad deed;' and, 'He is the guardian of the world, he is the king of the world, he is the Lord of the world' (Kau. Up. III, 8). All this can be properly understood only if the highest Brahman is acknowledged to be the subject-matter of the whole chapter, not if the vital air is substituted in its place. Hence the word pra/n/a denotes Brahman.

29. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the speaker denoting himself; (we reply that this objection is not valid) because there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the interior Self.

An objection is raised against the assertion that pra/n/a denotes Brahman. The word pra/n/a, it is said, does not denote the highest Brahman, because the speaker designates himself. The speaker, who is a certain powerful god called Indra, at first says, in order to reveal himself to Pratardana, 'Know me only,' and later on, 'I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self.' How, it is asked, can the pra/n/a, which this latter passage, expressive of personality as it is, represents as the Self of the speaker, be Brahman to which, as we know from Scripture, the attribute of being a speaker cannot be ascribed; compare, for instance, B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8, 'It is without speech, without mind.' Further on, also, the speaker, i.e. Indra, glorifies himself by enumerating a number of attributes, all of which depend on personal existence and can in no way belong to Brahman, 'I slew the three-headed son of Tvash/tri/; I delivered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves,' and so on. Indra may be called pra/n/a on account of his strength. Scripture says, 'Strength indeed is pra/n/a,' and Indra is known as the god of strength; and of any deed of strength people say, 'It is Indra's work.' The personal Self of a deity may, moreover, be called an intelligent Self; for the gods, people say, possess unobstructed knowledge. It thus being a settled matter that some passages convey information about the personal Self of some deity, the other passages also—as, for instance, the one about what is most beneficial for man—must be interpreted as well as they may with reference to the same deity. Hence pra/n/a does not denote Brahman.

This objection we refute by the remark that in that chapter there are found a multitude of references to the interior Self. For the passage, 'As long as pra/n/a dwells in this body so long surely there is life,' declares that that pra/n/a only which is the intelligent interior Self—and not some particular outward deity—has power to bestow and to take back life. And where the text speaks of the eminence of the pra/n/as as founded on the existence of the pra/n/a, it shows that that pra/n/a is meant which has reference to the Self and is the abode of the sense-organs.[129]

Of the same tendency is the passage, 'Pra/n/a, the intelligent Self, alone having laid hold of this body makes it rise up;' and the passage (which occurs in the passus, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is,' &c.), 'For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects (the senses) and the subjects on the pra/n/a. And that pra/n/a indeed is the Self of pra/n/a, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' So also the following passage which, referring to this interior Self, forming as it were the centre of the peripherical interaction of the objects and senses, sums up as follows, 'He is my Self, thus let it be known;' a summing up which is appropriate only if pra/n/a is meant to denote not some outward existence, but the interior Self. And another scriptural passage declares 'this Self is Brahman, omniscient'[130] (B/ri/. Up. II, 5, 19). We therefore arrive at the conclusion that, on account of the multitude of references to the interior Self, the chapter contains information regarding Brahman, not regarding the Self of some deity.—How then can the circumstance of the speaker (Indra) referring to himself be explained?

30. The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture, as in the case of Vamadeva.

The individual divine Self called Indra perceiving by means of /ri/shi-like intuition[131]—the existence of which is vouched for by Scripture—its own Self to be identical with the supreme Self, instructs Pratardana (about the highest Self) by means of the words 'Know me only.'

By intuition of the same kind the /ri/shi Vamadeva reached the knowledge expressed in the words, 'I was Manu and Surya;' in accordance with the passage, 'Whatever deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10). The assertion made above (in the purvapaksha of the preceding Sutra) that Indra after saying, 'Know me only,' glorifies himself by enumerating the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and other deeds of strength, we refute as follows. The death of Tvash/tri/'s son and similar deeds are referred to, not to the end of glorifying Indra as the object of knowledge—in which case the sense of the passage would be, 'Because I accomplished such and such deeds, therefore know me'—but to the end of glorifying the cognition of the highest Self. For this reason the text, after having referred to the slaying of Tvash/tri/'s son and the like, goes on in the clause next following to exalt knowledge, 'And not one hair of me is harmed there. He who knows me thus by no deed of his is his life harmed.'—(But how does this passage convey praise of knowledge?)—Because, we reply, its meaning is as follows: 'Although I do such cruel deeds, yet not even a hair of mine is harmed because I am one with Brahman; therefore the life of any other person also who knows me thus is not harmed by any deed of his.' And the object of the knowledge (praised by Indra) is nothing else but Brahman which is set forth in a subsequent passage, 'I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self.' Therefore the entire chapter refers to Brahman.

31. If it be said (that Brahman is) not (meant), on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air (being mentioned); we say no, on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation (which would result from your interpretation); on account of (the meaning advocated by us) being accepted (elsewhere); and on account of (characteristic marks of Brahman) being connected (with the passage under discussion).

Although we admit, the purvapakshin resumes, that the chapter about the pra/n/a does not furnish any instruction regarding some outward deity, since it contains a multitude of references to the interior Self; still we deny that it is concerned with Brahman.—For what reason?—Because it mentions characteristic marks of the individual soul on the one hand, and of the chief vital air on the other hand. The passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' mentions a characteristic mark of the individual soul, and must therefore be held to point out as the object of knowledge the individual soul which rules and employs the different organs of action such as speech and so on. On the other hand, we have the passage, 'But pra/n/a alone, the intelligent Self, having laid hold of this body makes it rise up,' which points to the chief vital air; for the chief attribute of the vital air is that it sustains the body. Similarly, we read in the colloquy of the vital airs (Pra. Up. II, 3), concerning speech and the other vital airs, 'Then pra/n/a (the chief vital air) as the best said to them: Be not deceived; I alone dividing myself fivefold support this body and keep it.' Those, again, who in the passage quoted above read 'this one (masc.), the body[132]' must give the following explanation, Pra/n/a having laid hold of this one, viz. either the individual soul or the aggregate of the sense organs, makes the body rise up. The individual soul as well as the chief vital air may justly be designated as the intelligent Self; for the former is of the nature of intelligence, and the latter (although non-intelligent in itself) is the abode of other pra/n/as, viz. the sense organs, which are the instruments of intelligence. Moreover, if the word pra/n/a be taken to denote the individual soul as well as the chief vital air, the pra/n/a and the intelligent Self may be spoken of in two ways, either as being non-different on account of their mutual concomitance, or as being different on account of their (essentially different) individual character; and in these two different ways they are actually spoken of in the two following passages, 'What is pra/n/a that is praj/n/a, what is praj/n/a that is pra/n/a;' and, 'For together do these two live in the body and together do they depart.' If, on the other hand, pra/n/a denoted Brahman, what then could be different from what? For these reasons pra/n/a does not denote Brahman, but either the individual soul or the chief vital air or both.

All this argumentation, we reply, is wrong, 'on account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' Your interpretation would involve the assumption of devout meditation of three different kinds, viz. on the individual soul, on the chief vital air, and on Brahman. But it is inappropriate to assume that a single sentence should enjoin three kinds of devout meditation; and that all the passages about the pra/n/a really constitute one single sentence (one syntactical whole) appears from the beginning and the concluding part. In the beginning we have the clause 'Know me only,' followed by 'I am pra/n/a, the intelligent Self, meditate on me as Life, as Immortality;' and in the end we read, 'And that pra/n/a indeed is the intelligent Self, blessed, imperishable, immortal.' The beginning and the concluding part are thus seen to be similar, and we therefore must conclude that they refer to one and the same matter. Nor can the characteristic mark of Brahman be so turned as to be applied to something else; for the ten objects and the ten subjects (subjective powers)[133] cannot rest on anything but Brahman. Moreover, pra/n/a must denote Brahman 'on account of (that meaning) being accepted,' i.e. because in the case of other passages where characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned the word pra/n/a is taken in the sense of 'Brahman.' And another reason for assuming the passage to refer to Brahman is that here also, i.e. in the passage itself there is 'connexion' with characteristic marks of Brahman, as, for instance, the reference to what is most beneficial for man. The assertion that the passage, 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up,' contains a characteristic mark of the chief vital air, is untrue; for as the function of the vital air also ultimately rests on Brahman it can figuratively be ascribed to the latter. So Scripture also declares, 'No mortal lives by the breath that goes up and by the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5). Nor does the indication of the individual soul which you allege to occur in the passage, 'Let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,' preclude the view of pra/n/a denoting Brahman. For, as the passages, 'I am Brahman,' 'That art thou,' and others, prove, there is in reality no such thing as an individual soul absolutely different from Brahman, but Brahman, in so far as it differentiates itself through the mind (buddhi) and other limiting conditions, is called individual soul, agent, enjoyer. Such passages therefore as the one alluded to, (viz. 'let no man try to find out what speech is, let him know the speaker,') which, by setting aside all the differences due to limiting conditions, aim at directing the mind on the internal Self and thus showing that the individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, 'That which is not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the statement about the difference of pra/n/a and praj/n/a (contained in the passage, 'Together they dwell in this body, together they depart') does not agree with that interpretation according to which pra/n/a is Brahman, is without force; for the mind and the vital air which are the respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by those two adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may be identified, as is done in the passage 'pra/n/a is praj/n/a.'

The second part of the Sutra is explained in a different manner also[134], as follows: Characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman. How so? 'On account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect of pra/n/a, under the aspect of praj/n/a, and in itself. The passages, 'Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is pra/n/a,' and 'Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it alone as uktha,' refer to the pra/n/a aspect. The introductory passage, 'Now we shall explain how all things become one in that praj/n/a,' and the subsequent passages, 'Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the word is its object placed outside;' and, 'Having by praj/n/a taken possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c.,' refer to the praj/n/a aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the following passage, 'These ten objects have reference to praj/n/a, the ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no objects. For on either side alone nothing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects and the subjects on the pra/n/a.' Thus we see that the one meditation on Brahman is here represented as threefold, according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts; so, for instance (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2), 'He who consists of mind, whose body is pra/n/a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three aspects perfectly agrees with the pra/n/a chapter[135]; as, on the one hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of pra/n/a, praj/n/a, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.

Notes:

[Footnote 32: The subject is the universal Self whose nature is intelligence (/k/u); the object comprises whatever is of a non-intelligent nature, viz. bodies with their sense organs, internal organs, and the objects of the senses, i.e. the external material world.]

[Footnote 33: The object is said to have for its sphere the notion of the 'thou' (yushmat), not the notion of the 'this' or 'that' (idam), in order better to mark its absolute opposition to the subject or Ego. Language allows of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and the third person ('It is I,' 'I am he who,' &c.; ete vayam, ame vayam asmahe), but not of the co-ordination of the pronouns of the first and second person.]

[Footnote 34: Adhyasa, literally 'superimposition' in the sense of (mistaken) ascription or imputation, to something, of an essential nature or attributes not belonging to it. See later on.]

[Footnote 35: Natural, i.e. original, beginningless; for the modes of speech and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.]

[Footnote 36: I.e. the intelligent Self which is the only reality and the non-real objects, viz. body and so on, which are the product of wrong knowledge.]

[Footnote 37: 'The body, &c. is my Self;' 'sickness, death, children, wealth, &c., belong to my Self.']

[Footnote 38: Literally 'in some other place.' The clause 'in the form of remembrance' is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in Pa/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mahishmati. These are cases of recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses. Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only.]

[Footnote 39: The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver). The atmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.]

[Footnote 40: This is the definition of the akhyativadins.]

[Footnote 41: Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 42: The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayampraka/s/a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all cognition. But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i.e. in so far as it is jiva, individual or personal soul. Cp. Bhamati, pp. 22, 23: '/k/idatmaiva svayampraka/s/oszpi buddhyadivishayavi/kkh/ura/n/at katha/mk/id asm upratyayavishayoszha/m/karaspada/m/ jiva iti /k/a jantur iti /k/a ksheuajna iti /k/akhyayate.']

[Footnote 43: Translated according to the Bhamati. We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by itself or by anything else.—It is known or manifest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i.e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it. Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different way: asmatpratyayavishayatveszpy aparokshatvad ekantenavishayatvabbavat tasminn aha@nkaradyadhyasa ity artha/h/. Aparokshatvam api kai/sk/id atmano nesh/t/am ity asa@nkyaha pratyagatmeti.]

[Footnote 44: Tatraiva/m/ sati evambhutavastutattvavadhara/n/e sati. Bha. Tasminn adhyase uktarityazvidyavmake sati. Go. Yatratmani buddhyadau va yasya buddhyader atmano vadhyasa/h/ tena buddhyadi-nasztmana va k/ri/tenasz/s/anayadidoshe/n/a /k/aitanyagu/n/ena /k/atmanatma va vastuto na svalpenapi yujyate. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 45: Whether they belong to the karmaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the j/n/anaka/nd/a, i.e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.]

[Footnote 46: It being of course the function of the means of right knowledge to determine Truth and Reality.]

[Footnote 47: The Bhamati takes adhish/th/anam in the sense of superintendence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a superintending principle, i.e. the individual soul.]

[Footnote 48: If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.]

[Footnote 49: I.e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.]

[Footnote 50: The Mima/m/sa, i.e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show that the embodied Self, i.e. the individual or personal soul is one with Brahman. This Mima/m/sa being an enquiry into the meaning of the Vedanta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedanta mima/m/sa.]

[Footnote 51: Nadhikarartha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyartha/h/, kam ayam atha/s/abdo brahmaj/n/ane/kkh/ya/h/ kim vantar/n/itavi/k/arasya athave/kkh/avi/s/esha/n/aj/n/anasyarambhartha/h/. Nadya/h/ tasya mima/m/sapravartikayas tadapravartyatvad anarabhyatvat tasya/s/ /k/ottaratra pratyadhikara/n/am apratipadanat. Na dvitiyoztha/s/abdenanantaryoktidvara vi/s/ish/t/adhikaryasamarpa/n/e sadhana/k/atush/t/ayasampannana/m/ brahmadhitadvi/k/arayor anarthitvad vi/k/aranarambhan na /k/a vi/k/aravidhiva/s/ad adhikari kalpya/h/ prarambhasyapi tulyatvad adhikari/n/a/s/ /k/a vidhyapekshitopadhitvan na t/ri/tiya/h/ brahmaj/n/anasyanandasakshatkaratvenadhikaryatve z pyapradhanyad atha/s/abdasambandhat tasman narambharthateti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 52: Any relation in which the result, i.e. here the enquiry into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may be comprised under the relation of anantarya.]

[Footnote 53: He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from the breast.]

[Footnote 54: Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the offering of the prayajas is to the dar/s/apur/n/amasa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the offering of the dar/s/apur/n/amasa qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there is unity of the agent, and consequently an intimation of the order of succession of the actions is in its right place.]

[Footnote 55: The 'means' in addition to /s/ama and dama are discontinuance of religious ceremonies (uparati), patience in suffering (titiksha), attention and concentration of the mind (samadhana), and faith (/s/raddha).]

[Footnote 56: According to Pa/n/ini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case expresses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or connected with, some other thing.]

[Footnote 57: In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be separate; so, for instance, when it is said 'grama/m/ ga/kkh/ati,' the village is the object of the action of going, and the arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring object and result coincide.]

[Footnote 58: That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the Brahma-mima/m/sa, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c., and from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief attributes.]

[Footnote 59: The three last opinions are those of the followers of the Nyaya, the Sa@nkhya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools; the two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philosophers.]

[Footnote 60: As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of the essence of food;' 'the eye, &c. spoke;' 'non-existing this was in the beginning,' &c.]

[Footnote 61: So the compound is to be divided according to An. Gi. and Go.; the Bha. proposes another less plausible division.]

[Footnote 62: According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhavavikara/h/ are: origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.]

[Footnote 63: The pradhana, called also prak/ri/ti, is the primal causal matter of the world in the /S/a@nkhya-system. It will be fully discussed in later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhana has been left untranslated. Cp. Sa@nkhya Karika 3.]

[Footnote 64: Ke/k/it tu hira/n/yagaroha/m/ sa/m/sari/n/am evagamaj jagaddhetum a/k/akshate. Ananada Giri.]

[Footnote 65: Viz. the Vai/s/eshikas.]

[Footnote 66: Atmana/h/ /s/ruter ity artha/h/. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 67: Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), syntactical connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use of in the Purva Mima/m/sa.]

[Footnote 68: The so-called sakshatkara of Brahman. The &c. comprises inference and so on.]

[Footnote 69: So, for instance, the passage 'he carves the sacrificial post and makes it eight-cornered,' has a purpose only as being supplementary to the injunction 'he ties the victim to the sacrificial post.']

[Footnote 70: If the fruits of the two /s/astras were not of a different nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two /s/astras; if they are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the like.]

[Footnote 71: The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the gross body; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body; the third that is independent of either.]

[Footnote 72: Ananda Giri omits 'ata/h/.' His comment is: p/ri/thagjij/n/asavishayatva/k/ /k/a dharmadyasp/ri/sh/t/atva/m/ brahma/n/o yuktam ityaha; tad iti; ata/h/ /s/abdapa/th/e dharmadyasparse karmaphalavailaksba/n/ya/m/ hetuk/ri/tam.—The above translation follows Govindananda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva karmaphalavilaksha/n/atvad ity artha/h/.]

[Footnote 73: Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena kena/k/in mahato vastuna/h/ sampadanam. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 74: In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is identified with the Vi/s/vedevas, which thereby constitute the chief object of the meditation; the fruit of the meditation being immortality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence being common to both.]

[Footnote 75: Adhyasa/h/ /s/astratoitasmi/m/s taddhi/h/. Sampadi sampadyamanasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti vi/s/esha/h/. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 76: Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, designated by the same term 'absorber.' Seya/m/ sa/m/vargad/ri/sh/t/ir vayau pra/n/e /k/a da/s/a/s/agata/m/ jagad dar/s/ayati yatha jivatmani b/rim/ha/n/akriyaya brahmad/ri/sh/t/iram/ri/tatvayaphalayakalpata iti. Bhamati.]

[Footnote 77: The butter used in the upa/ms/uyaja is ceremonially purified by the wife of the sacrificer looking at it; so, it might be said, the Self of him who meditates on Brahman (and who as kart/ri/—agent—stands in a subordinate anga-relation to the karman of meditation) is merely purified by the cognition of its being one with Brahman.]

[Footnote 78: An hypothesis which might be proposed for the purpose of obviating the imputation to moksha of non-eternality which results from the two preceding hypotheses.]

[Footnote 79: Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/t/a/m/ karoti), things to be obtained (grama/m/ ga/kkh/ati), things to be modified (suvar/n/a/m/ ku/nd/ala/m/ karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati).]

[Footnote 80: Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things.]

[Footnote 81: That, for instance, in the passage 'he is to sacrifice with Soma,' the word 'soma,' which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.]

[Footnote 82: I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying information about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established?]

[Footnote 83: It is 'naturally established' because it has natural motives—not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and the like.]

[Footnote 84: Elsewhere, i.e. outside the Veda.]

[Footnote 85: The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently interpreted by the different commentators. /S/a@nkara endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for instance, 'a Brahma/n/a is not to be killed,') can be explained as enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean 'a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahma/n/a is to be formed;' just as we understand something positive by the expression 'a non-Brahma/n/a,' viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must attribute to the word 'not' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to which it is joined; so that passages where it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain prohibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as intimating the performance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed in all treatises on the Purva Mima/m/sa; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 ff.]

[Footnote 86: The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.]

[Footnote 87: The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife, children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i.e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.]

[Footnote 88: I.e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.]

[Footnote 89: The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.]

[Footnote 90: The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.]

[Footnote 91: Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one another.]

[Footnote 92: The excess of Sattva in the Yogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle independent of Sattva.]

[Footnote 93: Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapatlim nirasitum p/rikkh/ati idam iti. Prak/ri/tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad va brahma/n/o sarvaj/n/ateti pra/s/nam eva praka/t/ayati katham iti. Prathama/m/ pratyaha yasyeti. Ukta/m/ vyatirckadvara viyz/rin/oti anityatve hiti. Dvitiya/m/ /s/a@nkate j/n/aneti. Svato nityasyapi j/n/anasya tattadarthava/kkh/innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam pratyayartho brahma/n/a/h/ sidhyatity aha.—The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is independent with regard to each particular act of knowledge; the verbal affix in 'janati' indicating the particularity of the act.]

[Footnote 94: In the second Kha/nd/a of the sixth Prapa/th/aka of the Ch. Up. 'aikshata' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.]

[Footnote 95: So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word 'thinking' in any of the three passages.]

[Footnote 96: A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c., through which the ox drags him.]

[Footnote 97: Cp. above, p. 30.]

[Footnote 98: So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.]

[Footnote 99: With reference to Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2.]

[Footnote 100: The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as jivatman is conversant with the names and forms of individual things.]

[Footnote 101: I.e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the individual souls; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are one.]

[Footnote 102: Qualities, i.e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated on; limiting conditions, i.e. the localities—such as the heart and the like—which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.]

[Footnote 103: Ananda Giri reads avish/t/asya for avishk/ri/tasya.]

[Footnote 104: Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying different places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones, &c. only the satta, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants, animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap; in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.]

[Footnote 105: Ananda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus here also:' na kevala/m/ dvaividhyam brahma/n/a/h/ /s/rutism/ri/tyor eva siddha/m/ ki/m/ tu sutrak/ri/to api matam ity aha, evam iti, /s/rutism/ri/tyor iva prak/ri/te pi /s/astre dvairupyam brahma/n/o bhavati; tatra sopadhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmadhikara/n/am udaharati adityeti; uktanyaya/m/ tulyade/s/eshu prasarayati evam iti; sopadhikopade/s/avan nirupadhikopade/s/a/m/ dar/s/ayati evam ityadina, atmaj/n/@ana/m/ nir/n/etavyam iti sambandha/h/; ayaprasa@ngam aha pareti; annamayadyupadhidvarokasya katham paravidyavishayatva/m/ tatraha upadhiti; nir/n/ayakramam aha vakyeti, uktartham adhikara/n/a/m/ kvastity asa@nkyokta/m/ yatheti.]

[Footnote 106: After which no other Self is mentioned.]

[Footnote 107: The previous proofs were founded on li@nga; the argument which is now propounded is founded on prakara/n/a.]

[Footnote 108: While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, therefore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c., are likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.]

[Footnote 109: Yadi labdha na labdhavya/h/ katha/m/ tarhi paramatmano vastutobhinnena jivatmana paramatma labhyata ity artha/h/. Bhamati.]

[Footnote 110: Yatha paramesvarad bhinno jivatma drash/t/a na bhavaty evam givatmanozpi drash/t/ur na bhinna/h/ parame/s/vara iti, jivasyanirva/k/yarve parame/s/varozpy anirva/k/ya/h/ syad ity ata aha parame/s/varas tv avidyakalpitad iti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 111: The explanation of the anandamaya given hitherto is here recalled, and a different one given. The previous explanation is attributed by Go. An. to the v/ri/ttikara.]

[Footnote 112: In which sense, as shown above, the word anandamaya must be taken if understood to denote Brahman.]

[Footnote 113: I.e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.]

[Footnote 114: See I, 1, 15-19. ]

[Footnote 115: The preceding adhikara/n/a had shown that the five Selfs (consisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates, are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities; while that Brahman itself is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara/n/a undertakes to show that the passage about the golden person represents the savi/s/esha Brahman as the object of devout meditation.]

[Footnote 116: So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes on poets and singers is Brahman.]

[Footnote 117: Or else 'that which is within forms and names.']

[Footnote 118: Viz. as intimating it. Thus An. Gi. and Go. An. against the accent of /rik/a/h/. Saya/n/a explains /rik/a/h/ as genitive.]

[Footnote 119: O/m/karasya pratikatvena va/k/akatvena lakshakatvena va brahmatvam uktam, om iti, ka/m/ sukha/m/ tasyarthendriyayogajatva/m/ varayitu/m/ kham iti, tasya bhutaka/s/atva/m/ vyaseddhum pura/n/am ity uktam. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 120: The doubt about the meaning of a word is preferably to be decided by means of a reference to preceding passages; where that is not possible (the doubtful word occurring at the beginning of some new chapter) complementary, i.e. subsequent passages have to be taken into consideration.]

[Footnote 121: The v/ri/ttikara, the commentators say.]

[Footnote 122: I.e. which has not been mixed with water and earth, according to Ch. Up. VI, 3, 3. Before that mixture took place light was entriely separated from the other elements, and therefore bounded by the latter.]

[Footnote 123: So as to justify the assumption that such a thing as non-tripartite light exists at all.]

[Footnote 124: Brahma/n/o vyava/kkh/idya teja/h/samarpakatva/m/ vi/s/eshakatvam, tadabhavozvi/s/eshakatvam. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 125: If we strictly follow the order of words in the original.]

[Footnote 126: Svasamarthyena sarvanamna/h/ sannihitaparamar/s/itvava/s/ena.]

[Footnote 127: The v/ri/ttikara according to Go. An. in his /t/ika on the bhashya to the next Sutra.]

[Footnote 128: Concerning the difficulty involved in this interpretation, cp. Deussen, p. 183, note.]

[Footnote 129: The text runs, 'astitve /k/a pra/n/ana/m/ ni/hs/reyasam,' and Go. An. explains 'astitve pra/n/asthitau pra/n/ana/m/ indriya/n/am sthitir ity arthata/h/ /s/rutim aha.' He as well as An. Gi. quotes as the text of the scriptural passage referred to 'athato ni/hs/reyasadanam ity adi.' But if instead of 'astitve /k/a' we read 'asti tv eva,' we get the concluding clause of Kau. Up. III, 2, as given in Cowell's edition.].

[Footnote 130: Whence we know that the interior Self referred to in the Kau. Up. is Brahman.]

[Footnote 131: I.e. spontaneous intuition of supersensible truth, rendered possible through the knowledge acquired in former existences.]

[Footnote 132: Ima/m/ /s/ariram instead of ida/m/ /s/ariram.]

[Footnote 133: Pa/nk/a /s/abdadaya/h/ pa/nk/a p/ri/thivyadaya/s/ /k/a da/s/a bhutamatra/h/ pa/nk/a buddhindriya/n/i pa/nk/a buddhaya iti da/s/a praj/n/amatra/h/. Yadva j/n/anendriyartha/h/ pa/nk/a karzmendriyartha/s/ /ka/ pa/nk/eti da/s/a bhutamatra/h/ dvividhanindriya/n/i praj/n/amatra da/s/eti bhava/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 134: Viz. by the v/ri/ttikara.]

[Footnote 135: Ihapi tad yujyate explaining the 'iha tadyogat' of the Sutra.]



SECOND PADA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

In the first pada Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether and the other elements. Moreover, of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared, such as all-pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words which are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we have been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present themselves which because containing only obscure indications of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to something else. We therefore begin the second and third padas in order to settle those doubtful points.

1. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) because there is taught what is known from everywhere.

Scripture says, 'All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and breathing in it; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man is made of determination (kratu); according to what his determination is in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him therefore form this determination: he who consists of mind, whose body is breath (the subtle body),' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 14). Concerning this passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, &c., is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman.

The embodied Self, the purvapakshin says.—Why?—Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'He is without breath, without mind, pure.'—But, it may be objected, the passage, 'All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions Brahman directly; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the object of meditation?—This objection does not apply, the purvapakshin rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being: because Brahman is all this, tajjalan, let a man meditate with a calm mind. That is to say: because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it; and because, as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion; therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman[136]; but meditation is separately enjoined in the clause, 'Let him form the determination, i.e. reflection.' And thereupon the subsequent passage, 'He who consists of mind, whose body is breath,' &c. states the object of the meditation in words indicatory of the individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently stated in the text, 'He to whom all works, all desires belong,' &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being extremely minute which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman. If it be objected that the immediately following passage, 'greater than the earth,' &c., cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the same thing; and that, if one attribute only is to be ascribed to the subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned first; while the greatness mentioned later on may be attributed to the soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, 'That is Brahman' (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul[137], as it is clearly connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so on.

To all this we reply: The highest Brahman only is what is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind and so on.—Why?—'On account of there being taught here what is known from everywhere.' What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, ('all this indeed is Brahman,') the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly introducing a new topic.—But, it may be said, it has been shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunction of calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating Brahman itself.—True, we reply; but the fact nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i.e. mentioned not far off so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal.

2. And because the qualities desired to be expressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict sense can be expressed[138], there being no speaker, still such phrases as 'desired to be expressed,' may be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as 'desired to be expressed;' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to be received is 'desired to be expressed,' everything else 'not desired to be expressed.' What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i.e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman; for the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1). The clause, 'He whose Self is the ether,' means 'he whose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, 'Greater than the earth.' And the other explanation also, according to which the passage means 'he whose Self is the ether' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the same reasons he is called 'he to whom all works belong, and so on.' Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms 'consisting of mind,' and 'having breath for its body,' which the purvapakshin asserts cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti say of Brahman, 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere' (/S/ve. Up. IV, 3), and 'its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the world' (Bha. Gita III, 13).

The passage (quoted above against our view), 'Without breath, without mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms 'consisting of mind; having breath for its body,' on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is represented as the object of meditation.

3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).

The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman; the present Sutra states that they are not possible in the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the embodied individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, 'He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth,' cannot easily be attributed to the embodied Self. By the term 'embodied' (/s/arira) we have to understand 'residing' in a body. If it be objected that the Lord also resides in the body[139], we reply, True, he does reside in the body, but not in the body only; for /s/ruti declares him to be all-pervading; compare, 'He is greater than the earth; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul, on the other hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of fruition it does not exist.

4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent.

The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage, 'When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4), the word 'him' refers to that which is the topic of discussion, viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as something to be obtained; while the words, 'I shall obtain,' represent the meditating individual Self as the agent, i.e. the obtainer. Now, wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the same time. The relation existing between a person meditating and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.—And thus for the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.

5. On account of the difference of words.

That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a difference of words.

That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter (/S/at. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), 'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self.' There one word, i.e. the locative 'in the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative 'person,' denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different.

6. And on account of Sm/ri/ti.

Sm/ri/ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self and the highest Self, viz. Bha. Gita XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.'

But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different from the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the preceding Sutras? /S/ruti passages, as well as Sm/ri/ti, expressly deny that there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for instance, B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23, 'There is no other seer but he; there is no other hearer but he;' and Bha. Gita XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O Bharata, to be the kshetiaj/n/a in all kshetras.'

True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body, the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. Similarly the ether, although in reality unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically assumed, as long as we have not learned—from the passage, 'That art thou'—that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final release, and the like.

7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the denotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and because the case is analogous to that of ether.

On account of the limitation of its abode, which is mentioned in the clause, 'He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, 'He is smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.; the embodied soul only, which is of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under discussion, and not the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the purvapaksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the present Sutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of Ayodhya although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole earth.—But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to occupy a limited space and to be minute?—He may, we reply, be spoken of thus, 'because he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under discussion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar qualities—which apprehension of the Lord is rendered possible through a modification of the mind—just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred stone called /S/alagram. Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is, moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether, although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also. But it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special forms of contemplation, and are not real. The latter consideration disposes also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would follow that it is affected by all the imperfections which attach to beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and so on.

8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the two).

But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the nature of intelligence and therefore not different from the individual soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure, pain, and so on (as the individual soul). The same result follows from its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different from the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no other knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), and similar passages. Hence the highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory existence.

This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is the difference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of more than one omnipresent Self. In reply to the assertion, that because Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside it, Brahman must be subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as, 'That art thou,' 'I am Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but he,' and so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.

Scriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that Brahman which is free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel even the opinion that the embodied soul is subject to fruition; how then should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the part of Brahman?—Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.—In that case, we reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in consequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason the Sutrakara says[140] 'no, on account of the difference.' In spite of their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition on the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of fruition on Brahman's part.

9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is immovable is mentioned (as his food).

We read in the Ka/th/avalli (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where He is, He to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment?' This passage intimates, by means of the words 'food' and 'condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that Upanishad, the subjects of questions[141].

The purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from Scripture as well (cp. B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater, according to the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu. Up.), 'The other looks on without eating.'

The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is mentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things movable and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self, however, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of effects may be said to eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being the condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self cannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted ('the other looks on without eating'), we remark that that passage aims at denying the fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it is well established by all the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. Therefore the eater can here be Brahman only.

10. And on account of the topic under discussion. That the highest Self only can be the eater referred to is moreover evident from the passage (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), ('The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'), which shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then knows where he is,' shows that the cognition is connected with difficulties; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.

11. The 'two entered into the cave' (are the individual soul and the highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same nature).

In the same Ka/th/avalli we read (I, 3, 1), 'There are the two drinking the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the Tri/n/a/k/iketa sacrifice.'

Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i.e. the body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead—some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand, the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul; and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as different from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the past and the future, tell me that.'

The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus been stated, a caviller starts the following objection: neither of the stated views can be maintained.—Why?—On account of the characteristic mark implied in the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i.e. to enjoy, the fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual soul and the highest Self, cannot be maintained; for drinking (i.e. the fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account of the mantra (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'

These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that in phrases such as 'the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men) are walking,' the attribute of being furnished with an umbrella which properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that, while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument being figuratively spoken of as the agent—a figure of speech exemplified by phrases such as 'the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the individual soul and the highest Self.

Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as 'entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another interpretation is possible, to assume that a special place is here ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world of their good deeds' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the scriptural passage, 'It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed to each other like light and shade. Hence we conclude that the buddhi and the individual soul are spoken of.

To this we make the following reply:—In the passage under discussion the individual soul (vij/n/anatman) and the highest Self are spoken of, because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature. For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for instance, the order is given, 'Look out for a second (i.e. a fellow) for this bull,' people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the soul.—But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the cave?—Well, we reply, /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti speaks of the highest Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12), 'The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt. Up. II, 1, 'He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;' and, 'Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not contrary to reason to assign to the omnipresent Brahman a special locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works, which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light and shade also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like light and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience, and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore understand by the two 'entered into the cave,' the individual soul and the highest Self.—Another reason for this interpretation follows.

12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).

Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent passage (I, 3, 3), 'Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be the chariot,' which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory existence and final release, while the passage (9), 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/n/u,' represents the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding passage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And further, the clause, 'Those who know Brahman call them,' &c., which brings forward a special class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted (as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest Self.

The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is meant, and from the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and of intelligence, implied in the words, 'The other looks on without eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 'Merged into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own impotence (ani/s/a), bewildered; but when he sees the other Lord (i/s/a.) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away.'

Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra, 'Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is differently interpreted in the Pai@ngi-rahasya Brahma/n/a. According to the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other being which looks on without eating, the individual soul (j/n/a); so that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetraj/n/a). The objection that the word sattva might denote the individual soul, and the word kshetraj/n/a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in the first place, the words sattva and kshetraj/n/a have the settled meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are in the second place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Pai@ngi-rahasya,) 'The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams; the embodied one, the seer, is the kshetraj/n/a; the two are therefore the internal organ and the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under discussion fall under the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting and enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes connected with the sa/m/sara and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is pure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on without eating.' That agrees, moreover, with /s/ruti and sm/ri/ti passages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also to be the individual soul' (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in the concluding passage of the section, 'These two are the sattva and the kshetraj/n/a; to him indeed who knows this no impurity attaches[142].'—But how can, on the above interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit?'—The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of Brahman. To that end[143] the passage under discussion metaphorically ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul: while in reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere presentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here maintained, Scripture ('For where there is as it were duality there one sees the other,' &c.; B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical assumption of agents, and so on—comparable to the assumption of the existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream—holds good in the sphere of Nescience only; while the passage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that all that practically postulated existence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative knowledge.

13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement (of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).

Scripture says, 'He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even though they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on both sides,' &c. (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1).

The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.

With reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as follows: What is meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i.e. the image of a person (reflected in the eye of another): for of that it is well known that it is seen, and the clause, 'The person that is seen in the eye,' refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual Self (cognitional Self, vij/n/anatman) which perceives the colours by means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and, moreover, the word 'Self' (which occurs in the passage) favours this interpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to the soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare the passage (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 2), 'He (the person in the sun) rests with his rays in him (the person in the right eye).' Moreover, qualities such as immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the scriptural passage) may somehow belong to individual deities. The Lord, on the other hand[144], cannot be meant, because a particular locality is spoken of.

Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by the person within the eye.—Why?—'On account of the agreement.' For the qualities mentioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we know from such texts as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou.' Immortality and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scripture declares to be free from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the passage, 'Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs away on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the qualities of sa/m/yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord only (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 2, 'They call him Sa/m/yadvama, for all blessings (vama) go towards him (sa/m/yanti). He is also vamani, for he leads (nayati) all blessings (vama). He is also Bhamani, for he shines (bhati) in all worlds'). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within the eye is the highest Lord.

14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.

But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which is omnipresent like the ether?—To this question we reply that there would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so on, are attributed to him in the passage, 'He who dwells in the earth,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned, viz. in the clause, 'He who dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase 'and so on,' which forms part of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that also such things as name and form, although not appropriate to Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it. That, in such passages as 'His name is ut, he with the golden beard' (Ch. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of, for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to attribute to Brahman a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence, subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not contrary to reason[145]; no more than to contemplate Vish/n/u in the sacred /s/alagram.

15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brahman).

There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman being meant is established 'by the reference to that which is distinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is spoken of as characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter[146], viz. in the clauses, 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' that same Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present passage also, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion; the clause, 'The teacher will tell you the way[147],' merely announcing that the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject will be started].—How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman, as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the passage?—We reply: On hearing the speech of the fires, viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upako/s/ala says, 'I understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is Brahman.' Thereupon the fires reply, 'What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is Ka.' Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether. If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to qualify the sense of 'Kha,' we should conclude that the name Brahman is here symbolically[148] given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in other places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to the word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure. If[149] in the passage referred to (viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman') the second Brahman (i.e. the word Brahman in the clause 'Ka is Brahman') were not added, and if the sentence would run 'Ka, Kha is Brahman,' the word Ka would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being a mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To prevent this, both words—Ka as well as Kha—are joined with the word Brahman ('Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brahman'). For the passage wishes to intimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated upon as something in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is spoken of. After that the Garhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words, 'This is our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;' wherein they point back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words, 'The teacher will tell you the way' (which form the last clause of the concluding passage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude the idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying, 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it' (which words intervene between the concluding speech of the fires and the information given by the teacher about the person within the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person within the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus appears that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of Sa/m/yadvama and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus knows passes on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, 'That person that is seen in the eye that is the Self.'

16. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the Upanishads.

The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following reason also. From /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti we are acquainted with the way of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i.e. who knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is described (Pra. Up. I, 10), 'Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This is the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest. From thence they do not return;' and also (Bha. Gita VIII, 24), 'Fire, light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to Brahman.' Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for him who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 5), 'Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to light;' and later on, 'From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon to lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman. This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brahman. Those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man.' From this description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows Brahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.

17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self; on account of the non-permanency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the impossibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed to the other Selfs).

To the assertion made in the purvapaksha that the person in the eye is either the reflected Self or the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the Self of some deity the following answer is given.—No other Self such as, for instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on account of non-permanency.—The reflected Self, in the first place, does not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage 'That person within the eye' must, moreover, be held, on the ground of proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man's own eye is the object of (that man's) devout meditation (and not the reflected image of his own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then, another man approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we reply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) assumption that the devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye another man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye. Scripture, moreover, (viz. Ch. Up. VIII, 9, 1, 'It (the reflected Self) perishes as soon as the body perishes,') declares the non-permanency of the reflected Self.—And, further, 'on account of impossibility' (the person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be perceived in the reflected Self.—Of the cognitional Self, in the second place, which is in general connexion with the whole body and all the senses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading may, for the purpose of contemplation, be spoken of as connected with particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already. The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility of having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it. Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed to it (adhyaropita) the effects of nescience, desire and works, viz, mortality and fear; so that neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities of being the sa/m/yadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power (ai/s/varya).—In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz. the sun) has its station in the eye—according to the scriptural passage, 'He rests with his rays in him'—still Selfhood cannot be ascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (paragrupatva). Immortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks of his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of the gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally belong to them; as the mantra declares, 'From terror of it (Brahman) the wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.'—Hence the person in the eye must be viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known and established, which is contained in the words 'is seen' (in the phrase 'the person that is seen in the eye'), has to be taken as referring to (the mental perception founded on) the /s/astra which belongs to those who know; and the glorification (of devout meditation) has to be understood as its purpose.

18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on (is Brahman), because the attributes of that (Brahman) are designated.

In B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 1 ff. we read, 'He who within rules this world and the other world and all beings,' and later on, 'He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of a being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling within, rules with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the sacrifice, the beings, the Self.—Here now, owing to the unusualness of the term (antaryamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self of some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or some Yogin who has acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for instance, the capability of making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being. What alternative then does recommend itself?

As the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says, we must assume that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all those mentioned above.—Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we have no right to assume something of an altogether indefinite character, and that, on the other hand, the term antaryamin—which is derived from antaryamana (ruling within)—cannot be called altogether unknown, that therefore antaryamin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 16), 'He whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light,' &c. A god of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on, dwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action; rulership is therefore rightly ascribed to him.—Or else the rulership spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable to enter within all things.—The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot be meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are required for ruling).

To this we make the following reply.—The internal ruler, of whom Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the highest Self, cannot be anything else.—Why so?—Because its qualities are designated in the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things.—The qualities of Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage, 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their primary sense to the highest Self.—Further, the passage, 'He whom the earth does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity; for the deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth.—The attributes 'unseen,' 'unheard,' also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of shape and other sensible qualities.—The objection that the highest Self is destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to the organs of action of those whom he rules.—If it should be objected that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual soul] we are driven to assume again another and another ruler ad infinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no other ruler (but the highest Self[150]). The objection would be valid only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing.—For all these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self.

19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Sm/ri/ti assumes, (viz. the pradhana,) on account of the statement of qualities not belonging to it.

Good so far, a Sa@nkhya opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of not being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhana assumed by the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other sensible qualities. For their Sm/ri/ti says, 'Undiscoverable, unknowable, as if wholly in sleep' (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects. Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana. The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sutra I, 1, 5, but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.

To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies that the word 'internal ruler' cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as not being seen, &c, it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the Sa@nkhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23) says expressly, 'Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.'—And Selfhood also cannot belong to the pradhana.

Well, then, if the term 'internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (individual) soul, which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; which is internal (pratya/nk/), and therefore of the nature of Self; and which is immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2), 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.' The individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler is the embodied soul.—To this reasoning the following Sutra replies.