Adhik. VI (14-20) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedanta doctrine which is defended by its adherents against the Vai/s/eshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause.—The divergent views of /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.

Adhik. VII (21-23) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutrakira remarks, the creative principle of the world is additional to, i.e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture.—The way in which the three Sutras constituting this adhikara/n/a are treated by /S/a@nkara on the one hand and Ramanuja on the other is characteristic. Ramanuja throughout simply follows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formulates the objection based on such texts as 'Thou art that,' while Sutra 22 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scripture. /S/a@nkara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sutra 22, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts.

Adhik. VIII (24, 25) shows that Brahman, although destitute of material and instruments of action, may yet produce the world, just as gods by their mere power create palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.

Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, according to /S/a@nkara, because the world is unreal; according to Ramanuja, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brahman in a subtle imperceptible condition.

Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although destitute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.

Adhik. XI (32, 33) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.

Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.

Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman—omniscience and so on—are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.

PADA II.

The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philosophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view.—The first adhikara/n/a (1-10) is directed against the Sa@nkhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas, is unable to create and dispose.—The second adhikara/n/a (11-17) refutes the Vai/s/eshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the ad/ri/sh/t/a.—The third and fourth adhikara/n/as are directed against various schools of Bauddha philosophers. Adhik. III (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvastitvavadins, or bahyarthavadins, who maintain the reality of an external as well as an internal world; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vij/n/anavadins, according to whom ideas are the only reality.—The last Sutra of this adhikara/n/a is treated by Ramanuja as a separate adhikara/n/a refuting the view of the Madhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing whatever is real.—Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doctrine of the Jainas; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philosophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

The last adhikara/n/a of the pada (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or Pa/nk/aratras. But /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja totally disagree as to the drift of the Sutrakara's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to; according to the latter it is approved of.—Sutras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sutra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vasudeva, there is originated Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the jiva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity; and Sutra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sa@nkarsha/n/a there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas.—The Sutra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally translated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.'—This means, according to /S/a@nkara, 'Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sa@nkarsha/n/a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c.), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sutra 42 against the Bhagavata doctrine).'—According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the Sutra has to be explained as follows: 'Or, rather there is noncontradiction of that (i.e. the Pa/nk/aratra doctrine) on account of their being knowledge and so on (i.e. on account of their being Brahman).' Which means: Since Sa@nkarsha/n/a and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pa/nk/aratra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted.—The form of the Sutra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'va' and of the 'tat,' implied in Ramanuja's comment, are more natural than those resulting from /S/a@nkara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pada with a defence of that doctrine which—in spite of objections—has to be viewed as the true one.

PADA III.

The third pada discusses the question whether the different forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co-eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

The first seven adhikara/n/as treat of the five elementary substances.—Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect.—Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11; 12) that fire springs from air, water from fire, earth from water.—Adhik. III (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else.

Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.

Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.

Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary substances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted together with the elements of which they consist.

The remainder of the pada is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the jiva.—Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as 'Devadatta is born,' 'Devadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, according to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation.—This Sutra is of course commented on in a very different manner by /S/a@nkara on the one hand and Ramanuja on the other. According to the former, the jiva is in reality identical—and as such co-eternal—with Brahman; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that connexion is moreover illusory.—According to Ramanuja, the jiva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prakara) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (vikasa); contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (sanko/k/a) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svarupanyathabhava) and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.

Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra declares that the soul is 'j/n/a.' This means, according to /S/a@nkara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.—Ramanuja, on the other hand, explains 'j/n/a' by 'j/n/at/ri/,' i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the Vai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who—like the Sa@nkhyas and the Vedantins of /S/a@nkara's school—maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure /k/aitanya.—The wording of the Sutra certainly seems to favour Ramanuja's interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of /S/a@nkara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term j/n/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/n/at/ri/, not j/n/anam.

Adhik. XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (sarvagata, vyapin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.—In /S/a@nkara's opinion the Sutras 19-38 represent the purvapaksha view, according to which the jiva is a/n/u, while Sutra 29 formulates the siddhanta, viz. that the jiva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ—which itself is a/n/u—constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sa/m/sara.—According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the siddhanta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sutra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/n/at/ri/) stands to knowledge (j/n/ana).—In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.—/S/a@nkara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima facie view is carried; in no other place the Sutras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with /S/a@nkara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that /S/a@nkara's interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word 'praj/n/avat') the Sutra runs as follows: 'But on account of that quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality—or qualities—of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or "the designation of that").' This /S/a@nkara maintains to mean, 'Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sara state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first 'tat' by buddhi. And—which is more important—in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/a@nkara's own system the qualities of the buddhi—such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c.—can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the sa/m/sara state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to /S/a@nkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false.

There are no similar difficulties in the way of Ramanuja's interpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees with /S/a@nkara in the explanation of Sutras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddhanta. Sutras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from /S/a@nkara's, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vij/n/ana when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sutra which, according to /S/a@nkara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha, serves on Ramanuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an altogether legitimate assumption.

Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains, according to /S/a@nkara, that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as long as it exists in the sa/m/sara condition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to Ramanuja the Sutra teaches that the soul may be called vij/n/ana because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists.—Sutra 31 intimates, according to /S/a@nkara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same Sutra, according to Ramanuja, teaches that j/n/at/ri/tva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only.—In Sutra 32, finally, /S/a@nkara sees a statement of the doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while, according to Ramanuja, the Sutra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being /jn/at/ri/ and a/n/u, as it is in reality).—The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39; 40) refer to the kart/ri/tva of the jiva, i.e. the question whether the soul is an agent. Sutras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according to /S/a@nkara's system, this cannot be the final view,—the soul being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the world of upadhis,—he looks upon the next following Sutra (40) as constituting an adhikara/n/a by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action, buddhi, &c., while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just as the carpenter acts in both ways,' i.e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside.—Ramanuja, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sutra 40 from the preceding Sutras, but interprets it as follows: Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as he pleases.

Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.

Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Sutra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and the following Sutras show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman. According to Ramanuja the souls are in reality parts of Brahman[14]; according to Sa@nkara the 'a/ms/a' of the Sutra must be understood to mean 'a/ms/a iva,' 'a part as it were;' the one universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts.—One Sutra (50) in this adhikara/n/a calls for special notice. According to Sa@nkara the words 'abhasa eva /k/a' mean '(the soul is) a mere reflection,' which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the so-called pratibimbavada, i.e. the doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in the buddhi; while Sutra 43 had propounded the so-called ava/kkh/edavada, i.e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts.—According to Ramanuja the abhasa of the Sutra has to be taken in the sense of hetvabhasa, a fallacious argument, and the Sutra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those Vedantins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by non-real adjuncts[15].

PADA IV.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-4; 5-6; 7) teach that the pra/n/as (by which generic name are denoted the buddhindriyas, karmen-driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman; are eleven in number; and are of minute size (a/n/u).

Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya pra/n/a, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the pra/n/as discussed above; and that it is minute (a/n/u).

Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the pra/n/as are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the mukhya pra/n/a.

Adhik. IX (20-22) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the namarupavyakara/n/a) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the Lord.

Notes:

[Footnote 13: Lokavat, Yatha loke raja/s/asananuvartina/m/ /k/a rajanugrahanigrahak/ri/takhadukhayoges'pi na sa/s/ariraivamatre/n/a sasake rajany api /s/asananuv/ri/ttyauv/ri/ttinimittasukhadukhayor bhokt/ri/vaprasa@nga/h/. Yathaha Drami/d/abhashyakara/h/ yatha loke raja pra/k/uradanda/s/uke ghores'narthasa/m/ka/t/es'pi prade/s/e vartamanoszpi vyajanadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprisyate abhipreta/ms/ /k/a lokan paripipalayishati bhoga/ms/ /k/a gandhadin avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayati tathasau loke/s/varo bhramatsvasamait/h/ya/k/amato doshair na sp/ris/yate rakshati /k/a lokan brahmalokadi/ms/ /k/avi/s/vajanopabhogyan dharayatiti.]

[Footnote 14: Givasya kart/ri/tva/m/ paramapurushayattam ity uktam. Idanim kim aya/m/ giva/h/ parasmad atyantabhinna/h/ uta param eva brahma bhrantam uta brahmaivopadhyava/kkh/innam atha brahma/ms/a iti sa/m/sayyate /s/rutivipraticpatte/h/ sa/m/saya/h/. Nanu tadananyam arambha/n/a/s/abdadibhya/h/ adhika/m/ tu bhedanirdesad ity atraivayam aitho nir/n/ita/h/ Satya/m/ sa eva nanatvaikatva/s/rutivipratipattya skshipya jivasya brahma/ms/atvopapadanena vi/s/eshato nir/n/iyate. Yavad dhi jivasya brahma/m/satva/m/ na nir/n/itam tavaj jivasya brahmanosnanyatva/m/ brahma/n/as tasmad adhikatva/m/ /k/a na pratitish/th/ati. Ki/m/ tavat praptam. Atyanta/m/ bhinna iti. Kuta/h/. J/n/aj/n/nau dvav ityadibhedanirde/s/at. J/n/aj/n/ayor abheda/s/rutayas tv agnina si/nk/ed itivad viruddharthapratipadanad aupa/k/arikya/h/, Brahma/n/os/ms/o jiva ity api na sadhiya/h/, ekavastvekade/s/ava/k/i hy a/ms/a/s/sabda/h/, jivasya brahmaikade/s/atve tadgata dosha brahma/n/i bhaveyu/h/. Na /k/a brahmakha/nd/o jiva ity a/ms/atvopapatti/h/ kha/nd/ananarhatvad brahma/n/a/h/ praguktadoshaprasa@nga/k/ /k/a, tasmad atyantabhinnasya tada/ms/atva/m/ durupapadam. Yadva bhranta/m/ brahmaiva jiva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tat tvam asi ayam atma brahmetyadibrahmatmabhavopade/s/at, nanatmatvavadinyas tu pratyakshadisiddharthanuvaditvad ananyathasiddhadvaitopade/s/aparabhi/h/ /s/rutibhi/h/ pratyakshadaya/s/ /k/a avidyantargata/h/ khyapyante.—Athava brahmaivanadyupadhyava/kkh/inna/m/ jiva/h/. Kuta/h/. Tata eva brahmatmabhavopade/s/at. Na /k/ayam upadhir bhrantiparikalpita ita vaktu/m/ sakya/m/ bandhamokshadivyavasthanupapatter. Ity eva/m/ pratptesbhidhiyate. Brahma/ms/a iti. Kuta/h/. Nanavyapade/s/ad anyatha /k/aikatvena vyapade/s/ad ubhayatha hi vyapade/s/o d/ris/yate. Navavyapade/s/as tavat srash/tri/tva/rig/yatva—niyant/ri/tvaniyamyatva—sarvaj/n/atvaj/n/atva— svadhinatvaparadhinatva—/s/uddhatva/s/uddhatva— kalya/n/agu/n/akaratvaviparitatva—patitva/s/eshatvadibhir d/ris/yate. Anyatha /k/abhedena vyapade/s/os pi tat tvam asi ayam atma brahmetyadibhir d/ris/yate. Api da/s/akitavaditvam apy adhiyate eke, brahma dasa brahma dasa brahmeme kitava ity atharva/n/ika brahma/n/o da/s/akitavaditvam apy adhiyate, tata/s/ /k/a sarvajivavyapitvena abhedo vyapadi/s/yata it artha/h/. Evam ubhayavyapade/s/amukhyatvasiddhaye jivosya/m/ brahma/n/os/ms/a ity abhyupagantavya/h/.]

[Footnote 15: Nanu bhrantabrahmajivavadeszpy avidyak/ri/topadhibhedad bhogavyavasthadaya upapadyanta ata aha, abhasa eva /k/a. Akha/nd/aikarasapraka/s/amatratvarupasya svarupatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva. Praka/s/aikasvarupasya praka/s/atirodhana/m/ praka/s/ana/s/a eveti prag evopapaditam. Abhasa eveti va pa/th/a/h/, tatha sati hetava abhasa/h/.]

THIRD ADHYAYA. PADA I.

Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements (bhutasukshma) which serve as an abode to the pra/n/as attached to the soul.

Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to undergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anu/s/aya) of their former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.

Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their good works do not entitle to pass up to the moon.

Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls finally enter into plants and so on, they do not participate in the life of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.

PADA II.

Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to /S/a@nkara the three first Sutras discuss the question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sutra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere 'Maya,' since they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Sutra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Maya, yet have a prophetic quality. Sutras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.

The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara/n/a by Ramanuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sutras with each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the individual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sutras 1 and 2 set forth the purvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of some /s/akas declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sutra states the siddhanta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Maya, i.e. are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not fully manifested.' Concerning the word 'maya,' Ramanuja remarks, 'maya/s/abdo hy a/sk/aryava/k/i janaka/s/ya kule jata devamayeva nirmita ityadishu tatha dar/s/anat.' The three remaining Sutras are exhibited in the /S/ri-bhashya in a different order, the fourth Sutra, according to /S/a@nkara, being the sixth according to Ramanuja. Sutras 4 and 5 (according to Ramanuja's numeration) are explained by Ramanuja very much in the same way as by /S/a@nkara; but owing to the former's statement of the subject-matter of the whole adhikara/n/a they connect themselves more intimately with the preceding Sutras than is possible on /S/a@nkara's interpretation. In Sutra 6 (su/k/aka/s/ /k/a hi) Ramanuja sees a deduction from the siddhanta of the adhikara/n/a, 'Because the images of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore they have prophetic significance.'

Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul abides within Brahman in the heart.

Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.—Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of a swoon.

Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to /S/a@nkara, taken up with the question as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is merged in the state of deep sleep. Sutra 11 declares that twofold characteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes, nirvi/s/eshatva and savi/s/eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman even through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be destitute of all distinctive attributes.—The fact, Sutra 12 continues, that in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially stated that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and—Sutra 13 adds—in some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected to.—That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sutra 14), is the pre-eminent meaning of all Vedanta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.—That Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature of the things he illuminates (15).—The B/ri/hadara/n/yaka expressly declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the same is taught in other scriptural passages and in Sm/ri/ti (l7).—At the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is compared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the surface of the water are many (18).—Nor must the objection be raised that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material like the sun, and there are no real upadhis separate from it as the water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that, as the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes, increase, decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes of the upadhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is affected by them as it were (19, 20).—That the Self is within the upadhis, Scripture declares (21).

From the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given in the Sri-bhashya differs totally. According to Ramanuja the adhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end) affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the soul as antaryamin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections) because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil, apahatapapman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious qualities, satyakama, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.) (11).—Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially free from evil—according to the Prajapativakya in the Chandogya—yet is liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies, so the antaryamin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny this because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryamin (in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the jiva (12).—Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord (dva supar/n/a sayuja sakhaya) (13).—Should it be said that, according to the Chandogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sara; we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is in itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent; pradhana) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to 'aka/s/o ha vai namarupayor nirvahita') (14).—But does not the passage 'satya/m/ j/n/anam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage 'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?—As in order, we reply, not to deprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittiriya of their purport, we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that Brahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which those qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).—Moreover the Taittiriya passage only asserts so much, viz. the praka/s/arupata of Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).—And the passage 'neti neti' will be discussed later on.—The ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the sense assigned above is asserted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti (17).—Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).—Should it be said that the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryamin really abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both similes are appropriate (20).—Analogous similes we observe to be employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).

Sutras 22-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti neti; B/ri/hadar) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sutras 23-26 further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive attributes which are altogether due to the upadhis. The last four Sutras return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.

According to Ramanuja, Sutras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in Sutra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes (prakara), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmatra)?—The reply given in Sutra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them again[16]), but merely denies the prak/ri/taitavattva, the previously stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further qualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sutra 23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'—And the intuition (sakshatkkara) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/radhana, i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as Scripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).—That this interpretation of 'neti' is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as praka/s/a, luminousness, j/n/ana, intelligence, &c., so also the quality of being differentiated by the world (prapa/nk/avsish/t/ata) is intuited as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that praka/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated practice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vamadeva) in the work of sa/m/radhana mentioned before (25).—For all these reasons Brahman is connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious qualities; for thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in Scripture are fully justified (26).—In what relation, then, does the a/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the b/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the latter?—Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as special arrangements (sa/m/sthanavisesha/h/) of Brahman, as the coils are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e. sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).—Or, in the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both being fire (28).—Or, in the third place, the relation is like that stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls (whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part—a/ms/a—of Brahman (29, 30).

Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be truly understood.

Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called apurva, but is allotted by the Lord.

PADA III.

With the third pada of the second adhyaya a new section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different /s/akhas contain many chapters of similar, often nearly identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the same /s/akha exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some particular /s/akha were found described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other /s/akhas also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long before the composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one /s/akha may indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/akhas; that, however, all texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The latter is the special task of the present pada.

Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those vidyas, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyas, or one vidya only. /S/a@nkara remarks that the question affects only those vidyas whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/a/nd/ilyavidya which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again—in an abridged form—in B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the /S/atapathabrahma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bharupatva), while others are peculiar to each separate passage (pra/n/a/s/ariratva and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chandogya Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedantin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on the other hand, the vidya is one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one meditation.—The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three texts.

Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyas being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgithavidyas of the Chandogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities—such as bearing the same name and the udgitha being in both identified with pra/n/a—yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the Chandogya vidya is not the whole udgitha but only the sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad represents the whole udgitha as the object of meditation.

Sutra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV), proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the O/m/kara and the udgitha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kara which,' &c.—According to Ramanuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sutra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikara/n/a.—Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called pra/n/a-vidyas and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the pra/n/a, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation.

Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sutras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidya. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special meditations.—Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to /S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidya only.—Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to /S/a@nkara, that the Self spoken of in Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called sutratman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.

According to Ramanuja the Sutras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/n/a whose subject is the same as that of /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikar/n/a. Sutras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/a@nkara; Sutra 12, however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sutras 14-17 continue the discussion of the passage about the priya/s/irastva.—If priya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them?—'Because,' Sutra 14 replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious meditation.'—But how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)—'Because,' Sutra 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (atma anandamaya) is applied to it.'—But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in atma pra/n/amaya, &c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in atma anandamaya it denotes the real Self?—'The term Self,' Sutra 16 replies, 'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages (atmaa va idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I be many.'—But, an objection is raised, does not the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding clauses about the pra/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in anandamaya atman, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent passage?—To this question asked in the former half of 17 (anvayad iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz. II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'

Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the pra/n/asa/m/vada.—The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I.—Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate vidyas.—Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Ra/n/ayaniya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding Chandogya vidya, because the stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidya.—Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brahma/n/a passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads—as, for instance, a brahma/n/a about the mahavrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-ara/n/yaka—do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidya, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.

Sutras 27-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, two adhikara/n/as of which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place—not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's world—but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken literally.—The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any other place.

The /S/ri-bhashya treats the four Sutras as one adhikara/n/a whose two first Sutras are explained as by /S/a@nkara, while Sutra 29 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death, partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the gods). To this Sutra 30 replies, 'The complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible, since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'para/m/ jyotir upasampadya svena rupe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti kri/d/an ramamana/h/ sa svara/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kama/k/aro bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's vidyamahatmya.—That the explanation of the /S/ri-bhashya agrees with the text as well as /S/a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show; especially forced is /S/a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam ubhayatha,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case, and non-arthavattva in the other case.

The next Sutra (31) constitutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyas which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are acquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyas of Brahman.—The explanation given in the /S/ri-bhashya (in which Sutras 31 and 32 have exchanged places) is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on Brahman—without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and sagu/n/a—proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The /S/ri-bhashya reads 'sarvesham,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvasam,' all sagu/n/a-vidyas.)

Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices.—In the /S/ri-bhashya, where the Sutra follows immediately on Sutra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule divest themselves of the gross body—there remaining only a subtle body which enables them to move—and no longer experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain until they have fully performed certain duties.

Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in some vidyas—such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.—are to be included in all meditations on Brahman.—Adhik. XXI (34) determines that Ka/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidya only, because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to Ramanuja the Sutra contains a reply to an objection raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sutra.—Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that the two passages, B/ri/. Up. III, 4 and III, 5, constitute one vidya only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.—Adhik. XXIII (37) on the contrary decides that the passage Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not one but two meditations.—Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the vidya of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only—According to Ramanuja, Sutras 35-38 constitute one adhikara/n/a only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/a@nkara.

Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidya, since the former refers to Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with Brahman as destitute of qualities.—Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.—According to the /S/ri-bhashya, Sutras 39-41 form one adhikara/n/a whose first Sutra reaches essentially the same conclusion as /S/a@nkara under 39. Sutras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two passages discussed are predicated of Brahman—such as va/s/itva, satyakamatva, &c.—cannot be considered real (paramarthika), since other passages (sa esha neti neti, and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final release.—To this objection Sutra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not to be left off (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passage under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with emphasis[17].'—But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he who meditates on Brahman as satyakama, &c. obtains a mere perishable reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in Ch. Up. VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.—To this objection Sutra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom (i.e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous of release, may include satyakamatva, &c. in his meditations.)

Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected with certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions, are not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the latter.—Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a B/ri/. Up. passage and a similar Ch. Up. passage, Vayu and Pra/n/a are not to be identified, but to be held apart.—Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the firealtars made of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya, do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of the altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but merely subjects of meditations.

Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, in the way of digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent of the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists maintain).—According to the /S/ri-bhashya the adhikara/n/a does not refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sutras then have to be translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which belong to it in its embodied state, such as j/n/at/ri/tva and the like), because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'—The next Sutra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.e. the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to the meditating Self), because that will be[18] the state (of the Self in the condition of final release).'

Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of difference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not only for that /s/akha in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all /s/akhas.—Adhik. XXXII (57) decides that the Vai/s/vanara Agni of Ch. Up. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single parts.—Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidya, /S/a/nd/ilyavidya, &c. remain separate.

Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no reason for their being cumulated.—Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.—Adhik. XXXVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with constituent elements of action, such as the udgitha.

PADA IV.

Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha, i.e. subordinate to action, but independent.—Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion by showing that the state of the pravrajins is enjoined by the sacred law, and that for them vidya only is prescribed, not action.—Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part of vidyas are not mere stutis (arthavadas), but themselves enjoin the meditation.—The legends recorded in the Vedanta-texts are not to be used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of glorifying—as arthavadas—the injunctions with which they are connected (Adhik. IV, 23, 24).—For all these reasons the urdhvaretasa/h/ require no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).—Nevertheless the actions enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, &c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidya in the mind (Adhik. VI, 26, 27).—Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII, 28-3l).—The a/s/ramakarma/n/i are obligatory on him also who does not strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).—Those also who, owing to poverty and so on, are ana/s/rama have claims to vidya (Adhik. IX, 36-39).—An urdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).—Expiation of the fall of an urdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).—Exclusion of the fallen urdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).—Those meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yajamana (Adhik. XIII, 44-46).—B/ri/. Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to balya and pa/nd/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).—By balya is to be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).

Sutras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Ramanuja, the question when the vidya, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises. Sutra 51 treats of that vidya whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmantara (in which latter case the vidya arises later only), on account of Scripture declaring this (in various passages).'—Sutra 52, 'Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an obstacle, sometimes not).'—/S/a@nkara, who treats the two Sutras as two adhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyas.

Notes:

[Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them 'anuvadena,' and finally negative them.]

[Footnote 17: Ramanuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: 'Na /k/a matapit/ri/sahasrebhyo-pi vatsalatara/m/ sastra/m/ pratarakavad aparamarthikau nirasaniyau gu/n/au prama/n/antarapratipannau adare/n/opadi/s/ya sa/m/sara/k/akraparivartanena purvam eva bambhramyamanan mumukshun bhuyo-pi bhramayitum alam.']

[Footnote 18: The /S/ri-bh-ashya as well as several other commentaries reads tadbhavabhavitvat for /S/an@kara's tadbhavabhavitvat.]

FOURTH ADHYAYA. PADA I.

Adhikara/n/a I (1, 2).—The meditation on the Atman enjoined by Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be repeated again and again.

Adhik. II (3).—The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view it as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. III (4).—To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara/n/a the so-called pratikopasanas, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is viewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano brahmety upasita) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to consider the pratika as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. IV (5).—In the pratikopasanas the pratika is to be meditatively viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the pratika.—Ramanuja takes Sutra 5 as simply giving a reason for the decision arrived at under Sutra 4, and therefore as not constituting a new adhikara/n/a.

Adhik. V (6).—In meditations connected with constitutives of sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evasau tapati tam udgitham upasita) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance, the udgitha is to be viewed as Aditya, not Aditya as the udgitha.

Adhik. VI (7-10).—The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a sitting posture.—/S/a@nkara maintains that this rule does not apply to those meditations whose result is sa/m/yagdar/s/ana; but the Sutra gives no hint to that effect.

Adhik. VII (11).—The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind.

Adhik. VIII (12).—The meditations are to be continued until death.—/S/a@nkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to sa/m/yagdar/s/ana are excepted.

Adhik. IX (13).—When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman has been reached, the vidvan is no longer affected by the consequences of either past or future evil deeds.

Adhik. X (14).—Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.—The literal translation of the Sutra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the vidvan) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e. of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes place).' The last words of the Sutra, 'but on the fall,' are separated by /S/a@nkara from the preceding part of the Sutra and interpreted to mean, 'when death takes place (there results mukti of the vidvan, who through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of works).'—According to Ramanuja the whole Sutra simply means, 'There is likewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is reached), but on the death of the vidvan[19].'

Adhik. XI (15).—The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding adhikara/n/as holds good only in the case of anarabdhakarya works, i.e. those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it does not extend to the arabdhakarya works on which the present existence of the devotee depends.

Adhik. XII (16, 17).—From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya): so, for instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of knowledge.

Adhik. XIII (18).—The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the upasanas referring to the different members of those works.

Adhik. XIV (19).—The arabdhakarya works have to be worked out fully by the fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvan becomes united with Brahman.—The 'bhoga' of the Sutra is, according to /S/a@nkara, restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete knowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would lead to future embodiments. According to Ramanuja a number of embodied existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the arabdhakarya works are exhausted.

PADA II.

This and the two remaining padas of the fourth adhyaya describe the fate of the vidvan after death. According to /S/a@nkara we have to distinguish the vidvan who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he is one with the highest Brahman, and the vidvan who knows only the lower Brahman, and have to refer certain Sutras to the former and others to the latter. According to Ramanuja the vidvan is one only.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).—On the death of the vidvan (i.e. of him who possesses the lower knowledge, according to /S/a@nkara) his senses are merged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (pra/n/a), the vital air in the individual soul (jiva), the soul in the subtle elements.—According to Ramanuja the combination (sampatti) of the senses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa/m/yoga), not a merging (laya).

Adhik. IV (7).—The vidvan (i.e. according to /S/a@nkara, he who possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidvan, i.e. he who does not possess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e. those described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with the subtle elements, and so on into the na/d/is.—The vidvan also remains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet completely destroyed avidya, so that the immortality which Scripture ascribes to him (am/ri/tatva/m/ hi vidvan abhya/s/nute) is only a relative one.—Ramanuja quotes the following text regarding the immortality of the vidvan:

'Yada sarve pramu/k/yante kama yessya h/ri/di sthita/h/ atha martyosm/ri/to bhavaty atra brahma sama/s/nute,'

and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvan as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the destruction—mentioned in the preceding pada—of all the effects of good and evil works, while the 'reaching of Brahman' can only refer to the intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.

Adhik. V (8-11) raises; according to /S/a@nkara, the question whether the subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with the highest deity (teja/h/ parasya/m/ devatayam) are completely merged in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; that, on the other hand, as long as the sa/m/sara state lasts, the elements, although somehow combined with Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new bodies for the soul.

According to Ramanuja the Sutras 8-11 do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7. The immortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul from the body, 'because Scripture declares sa/m/sara, i.e. embodiedness up to the reaching of Brahman' (tasya tavad eva /k/ira/m/ yavan na vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).—That the soul after having departed from the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from authority[20] (9).—Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the body (10).

Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.—According to /S/a@nkara the Sutras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who possesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes of him who has reached the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught that in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidya) the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the body of the dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do not depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one with Brahman.—Against this latter implied doctrine Sutra 12 is supposed to formulate an objection. 'If it be said that the departure of the pra/n/as from the body of the dying sage is denied (viz. in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, na tasya pra/n/a utkramanti, of him the pra/n/as do not pass out); we reply that in that passage the genitive "tasya" has the sense of the ablative "tasmat," so that the sense of the passage is, "from him, i.e. from the jiva of the dying sage, the pra/n/as do not depart, but remain with it."'—This objection /S/a@nkara supposes to be disposed of in Sutra 13. 'By some there is given a clear denial of the departure of the pra/n/as in the case of the dying sage,' viz. in the passage B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 11, where Yaj/n/avalkya instructs Artabhaga that, when this man dies, the pra/n/as do not depart from it (asmat; the context showing that asmat means 'from it,' viz. from the body, and not 'from him,' viz. the jiva).—The same view is, moreover, confirmed by Sm/ri/ti passages.

According to Ramanuja the three Sutras forming /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikara/n/a do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a at all, and, moreover, have to be combined into two Sutras. The topic continuing to be discussed is the utkranti of the vidvan. If, Sutra 12 says, the utkranti of the pra/n/as is not admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to be contained in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5; the reply is that the sense of the tasya there is '/s/arirat' (so that the passage means, 'from him, i.e. the jiva, the pra/n/as do not depart'); for this is clearly shown by the reading of some, viz. the Madhyandinas, who, in their text of the passage, do not read 'tasya' but 'tasmat.'—With reference to the instruction given by Yaj/n/avalkya to Artabhaga, it is to be remarked that nothing there shows the 'ayam purusha' to be the sage who knows Brahman.—And, finally, there are Sm/ri/ti passages declaring that the sage also when dying departs from the body.

Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to /S/a@nkara, that, on the death of him who possesses the higher knowledge, his pra/n/as, elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from it in any way.

According to Ramanuja the two Sutras continue the teaching about the pra/n/as, bhutas, &c. of the vidvan in general, and declare that they are finally merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction (sa/m/yoga), but completely.[21]

Adhik. IX (17).—/S/a@nkara here returns to the owner of the apara vidya, while Ramanuja continues the description of the utkranti of his vidvan.—The jiva of the dying man passes into the heart, and thence departs out of the body by means of the na/d/is; the vidvan by means of the na/d/i called sushum/n/a, the avidvan by means of some other na/d/i.

Adhik. X (18, 19).—The departing soul passes up to the sun by means of a ray of light which exists at night as well as during day.

Adhik. XI (20, 21).—Also that vidvan who dies during the dakshi/n/ayana reaches Brahman.

PADA III.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the Upanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the vidvan up to Brahman.

Adhik. IV (4-6)—By the 'stations' we have, however, to understand not only the subdivisions of the way but also the divine beings which lead the soul on.

The remaining part of the pada is by /S/a@nkara divided into two adhikara/n/as. Of these the former one (7-14) teaches that the Brahman to which the departed soul is led by the guardians of the path of the gods is not the highest Brahman, but the effected (karya) or qualified (/s/agu/n/a) Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sutras 7-11 by Badari, and, finally, accepted by /S/a@nkara in his commentary on Sutra 14. In Sutras 12-14 Jaimini defends the opposite view, according to which the soul of the vidvan goes to the highest Brahman, not to the karyam brahma. But Jaimini's view, although set forth in the latter part of the adhikara/n/a, is, according to /S/a@nkara, a mere purvapaksha, while Badari's opinion represents the siddhanta.—The latter of the two adhikara/n/as (VI of the whole pada; 15, 16) records the opinion of Badaraya/n/a on a collateral question, viz. whether, or not, all those who worship the effected Brahman are led to it. The decision is that those only are guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a pratika form.

According to Ramanuja, Sutras 7-16 form one adhikara/n/a only, in which the views of Badari and of Jaimini represent two purvapakshas, while Badaraya/n/a's opinion is adopted as the siddhanta. The question is whether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship the effected Brahman, i.e. Hira/n/yagarbha, or those who worship the highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as free from Prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self (ye pratyagatmana/m/ prak/ri/tiviyukta/m/ brahmatmakam upasate).—The first view is maintained by Badari in Sutra 7, 'The guardians lead to Brahman those who worship the effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the latter only;' for no movement can take place towards the highest and as such omnipresent Brahman.—The explanation of Sutra 9 is similar to that of /S/a@nkara; but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if Hira/n/yagarbha were meant in the passage, 'purusho /s/a manava/h/ sa etan brahma gamayati,' the text would read 'sa etan brahma/n/am gamayati') that Hira/n/yagarbha is called Brahman on account of his nearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathamajatva.—The explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in /S/a@nkara; so also of l2-l4.—The siddhanta view is established in Sutra 13, 'It is the opinion of Badaraya/n/a that it, i.e. the ga/n/a of the guardians, leads to Brahman those who do not take their stand on what is pratika, i.e. those who worship the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the individual Self as dissociated from prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under pratikas. For both views—that of Jaimini as well as that of Badari—are faulty.' The karya view contradicts such passages as 'asma/k/ charirat samutthaya para/m/ jyotir upasampadya,' &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the pa/nk/agni-vidya, which declares that ya ittha/m/ vidu/h/, i.e. those who know the pa/nk/agni-vidya, are also led up to Brahman.

PADA IV.

Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the owner of the para vidya, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final release, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely manifests itself in its true nature.—The explanation given by Ramanuja is essentially the same, but of course refers to that vidvan whose going to Brahman had been described in the preceding pada.

Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul stands to Brahman is that of avibhaga, non-separation. This, on /S/a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.—According to Ramanuja the question to be considered is whether the released soul views itself as separate (p/ri/thagbhuta) from Brahman, or as non-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is favoured by those /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti passages which speak of the soul as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such passages as tat tvam asi and the like.[22]

Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul (i.e. of the truly released soul, according to /S/a@nkara). According to Jaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature, possesses all those qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other places are ascribed to Brahman, such as apahatapapmatva, satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c., ai/s/varya.—According to Au/d/ulomi the only characteristic of the released soul is /k/aitanya.—According to Badarayana the two views can be combined (/S/a@nkara remarking that satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul vyavaharapekshaya).

Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the apara vidya, and discusses the question whether the soul of the pious effects its desires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former alternative is accepted—According to Ramanuja the adhikara/n/a simply continues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the preceding adhikara/n/a. Of the released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves about playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The question then arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa/m/kalpa (it having been shown in the preceding adhikara/n/a that the released soul is, like the Lord, satyasa/m/kalpa), or not. The answer is in favour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration made in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the fathers come to receive him.'

Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied according to their wish and will.

Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate several bodies at the same time.—Sutra 12 gives, according to /S/a@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to the soul in the state of deep sleep (svapyaya = sushupti), or to the fully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).—Ramanuja explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti = mata/n/am according to 'van manasi sampadyate,' &c.).

Adhik. VII (17-21).—The released jivas participate in all the perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of embodied existence.

After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the contents of the Brahma-sutras according to the views of /S/a@nkara as well as Ramanuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two modes of interpretation represents—or at any rate more closely approximates to the true meaning of the Sutras. That few of the Sutras are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above; but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.

We have to note in the first place that, in spite of very numerous discrepancies,—of which only the more important ones have been singled out in the conspectus of contents,—the two commentators are at one as to the general drift of the Sutras and the arrangement of topics. As a rule, the adhikara/n/as discuss one or several Vedic passages bearing upon a certain point of the system, and in the vast majority of cases the two commentators agree as to which are the special texts referred to. And, moreover, in a very large number of cases the agreement extends to the interpretation to be put on those passages and on the Sutras. This far-reaching agreement certainly tends to inspire us with a certain confidence as to the existence of an old tradition concerning the meaning of the Sutras on which the bulk of the interpretations of /S/a@nkara as well as of Ramanuja are based.

But at the same time we have seen that, in a not inconsiderable number of cases, the interpretations of /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja diverge more or less widely, and that the Sutras affected thereby are, most of them, especially important because bearing on fundamental points of the Vedanta system. The question then remains which of the two interpretations is entitled to preference.

Regarding a small number of Sutras I have already (in the conspectus of contents) given it as my opinion that Ramanuja's explanation appears to be more worthy of consideration. We meet, in the first place, with a number of cases in which the two commentators agree as to the literal meaning of a Sutra, but where /S/a@nkara sees himself reduced to the necessity of supplementing his interpretation by certain additions and reservations of his own for which the text gives no occasion, while Ramanuja is able to take the Sutra as it stands. To exemplify this remark, I again direct attention to all those Sutras which in clear terms represent the individual soul as something different from the highest soul, and concerning which /S/a@nkara is each time obliged to have recourse to the plea of the Sutra referring, not to what is true in the strict sense of the word, but only to what is conventionally looked upon as true. It is, I admit, not altogether impossible that /S/a@nkara's interpretation should represent the real meaning of the Sutras; that the latter, indeed, to use the terms employed by Dr. Deussen, should for the nonce set forth an exoteric doctrine adapted to the common notions of mankind, which, however, can be rightly understood by him only to whose mind the esoteric doctrine is all the while present. This is not impossible, I say; but it is a point which requires convincing proofs before it can be allowed.—We have had, in the second place, to note a certain number of adhikara/n/as and Sutras concerning whose interpretation /S/a@nkara and Ramanuja disagree altogether; and we have seen that not unfrequently the explanations given by the latter commentator appear to be preferable because falling in more easily with the words of the text. The most striking instance of this is afforded by the 13th adhikara/n/a of II, 3, which treats of the size of the jiva, and where Ramanuja's explanation seems to be decidedly superior to /S/a@nkara's, both if we look to the arrangement of the whole adhikara/n/a and to the wording of the single Sutras. The adhikara/n/a is, moreover, a specially important one, because the nature of the view held as to the size of the individual soul goes far to settle the question what kind of Vedanta is embodied in Badaraya/n/a's work.

But it will be requisite not only to dwell on the interpretations of a few detached Sutras, but to make the attempt at least of forming some opinion as to the relation of the Vedanta-sutras as a whole to the chief distinguishing doctrines of /S/a@nkara as well as Ramanuja. Such an attempt may possibly lead to very slender positive results; but in the present state of the enquiry even a merely negative result, viz. the conclusion that the Sutras do not teach particular doctrines found in them by certain commentators, will not be without its value.

The first question we wish to consider in some detail is whether the Sutras in any way favour /S/a@nkara's doctrine that we have to distinguish a twofold knowledge of Brahman, a higher knowledge which leads to the immediate absorption, on death, of the individual soul in Brahman, and a lower knowledge which raises its owner merely to an exalted form of individual existence. The adhyaya first to be considered in this connexion is the fourth one. According to /S/a@nkara the three latter padas of that adhyaya are chiefly engaged in describing the fate of him who dies in the possession of the lower knowledge, while two sections (IV, 2, 12-14; IV, 4, 1-7) tell us what happens to him who, before his death, had risen to the knowledge of the highest Brahman. According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the three padas, referring throughout to one subject only, give an uninterrupted account of the successive steps by which the soul of him who knows the Lord through the Upanishads passes, at the time of death, out of the gross body which it had tenanted, ascends to the world of Brahman, and lives there for ever without returning into the sa/m/sara.