[Footnote 325: Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence.—Sadhyapakshanikshiptatva/m/ sadhyavati pakshe pravish/t/atvam eva ta/k/ /k/a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyapy upalaksha/n/am, anpanyaso na vyabhi/k/arabhumin ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 326: It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bha.]

[Footnote 327: Anadheyati/s/ayasya sukhadukhapraptiparihararupati/s/aya/s/unyasyety artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 328: For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims—ex hypothesi—only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.]

[Footnote 329: I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.]

[Footnote 330: T/ri/tiyes'pi katipaya/s/abdadyupalabdhir va samastatadupalabdhir va bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva mukti/h/ syad iti manvano dvitiya/m/ pratyaha ubhayarthateti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 331: The MSS. of Ananda Giri omit sa/m/saranu/kkh/edat; the Bhamati's reading is: Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad d/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edat.]

[Footnote 332: On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhana's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.]

[Footnote 333: Anantaro dosho mahadadikaryotpadayoga/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 334: In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]

[Footnote 335: Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, aha@nkara, and manas.]

[Footnote 336: Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places.—The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.]

[Footnote 337: In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.]

[Footnote 338: 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.]

[Footnote 339: In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]

[Footnote 340: In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.]

[Footnote 341: And that would be against the Sa@nkhya dogma of the soul's essential purity.]

[Footnote 342: So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]

[Footnote 343: Atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti /s/a@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 344: For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.]

[Footnote 345: The Sa@nkhya Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.—The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sa@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.]

[Footnote 346: Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called above.]

[Footnote 347: For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which—according to the Sa@nkhya also—release depends.]

[Footnote 348: This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of soul and pradhana may come to an end when the influence of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.]

[Footnote 349: I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air.]

[Footnote 350: Parima/nd/ala, spherical is the technical term for the specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small spheres. Cp. Vi/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 20.]

[Footnote 351: Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the atoms are isolated and motionless.]

[Footnote 352: When the time for a new creation has come.]

[Footnote 353: The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.]

[Footnote 354: The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the constituent atoms, the non-inheient cause the conjunction of those atoms, the operative causes the ad/ri/sh/ta/ and the Lord's activity which make them enter into conjunction.]

[Footnote 355: I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).]

[Footnote 356: In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 357: I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.]

[Footnote 358: The first of the three Sutras quoted comprises, in the present text of the Vai/s/eshika-sutras, only the following words, 'Kara/n/abahutva/k/ /k/a;' the /k/a of the Sutra implying, according to the commentators, mahattva and pra/k/aya.—According to the Vai/s/eshikas the form of extension called a/n/u, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.—The form of extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting 'big' thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to pra/k/aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskara on Vai/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 9; 10.]

[Footnote 359: I.e. if the Vai/s/eshikas have to admit that it is the nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedantin also may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the non-intelligent world.]

[Footnote 360: Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of parts.]

[Footnote 361: Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.—Ad/ri/sh/t/apeksham ad/ri/sh/t/avatkshetraj/n/asa/my/ogapeksham iti yavat. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 362: According to the Vai/s/eshikas intelligence is not essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when the soul is joined to an internal organ.]

[Footnote 363: The soul being all-pervading.]

[Footnote 364: Which is inadmissible on Vai/s/eshika principles, because sa/m/yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by samavaya.]

[Footnote 365: Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each other in the way of conjunction.]

[Footnote 366: Viz. the absolute difference of samavaya and sa/m/yoga from the terms which they connect.]

[Footnote 367: Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavaya relation to their substrates.]

[Footnote 368: Our Vai/s/eshika-sutras read 'pratishedhabhava/h/;' but as all MSS. of Sa@nkara have 'pratishedhabhava/h/' I have kept the latter reading and translated according to Anandagiri's explanation: Karyam anityam iti karye vireshato nityatvanishedho na syad yadi kara/n/eszpy anityatvam atozs/n/una/m/ kara/n/ana/m/ nityateti sutrartha/h/.]

[Footnote 369: Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary aggregates, the so-called trasare/n/us, constituting the minima perceptibilia.]

[Footnote 370: As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated or destroyed.]

[Footnote 371: This according to the Vedanta view. If atoms existed they might have originated from avidya by a mere pari/n/ama and might again be dissolved into avidya, without either disintegration or destruction of their cause taking place.]

[Footnote 372: The Sa@nkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as being the pradhana in various forms.—There is no need of assuming with Govindananda that by the Sa@nkhya of the text we have to understand the Vedanta.]

[Footnote 373: Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina/s/yad apara/s/ritam evavatish/th/ate tav ayutasiddhau yathavayavavayavinau.]

[Footnote 374: The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavaya.]

[Footnote 375: If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer samavaya but sa/m/yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 376: This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered conjunctions.]

[Footnote 377: A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence of the connexion.]

[Footnote 378: It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into sa/m/yoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/m/yoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that sa/m/yoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.]

[Footnote 379: Ekasambandhyakarsha/n/e yatra sambandhyantarakarsha/n/a/m/ tatra sa/m/slesha/h/, sa tu savayavana/m/ jatukash/th/adina/m/ d/ri/sh/t/o na tu niravayavai/h/ savayavanam, ato dvya/n/ukasya savayavasya niravayavena parama/n/una sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyabh.]

[Footnote 380: In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and the effect is accounted for.]

[Footnote 381: For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern end, &c.]

[Footnote 382: And that on that account the atoms which he considers as the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.]

[Footnote 383: Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old and the continual origination of new substances.]

[Footnote 384: The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively from the commentaries on the /S/a@nkarabhashya, and no attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.—The Nihilists are the Madhyamikas; the Idealists are the Yoga/k/aras; the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhashikas together constitute the class of the Realists.—I subjoin the account given of those sects in the Brahmavidyabhara/n/a.—Buddhasya hi madhyamika-yoga/k/ara-sautrantika-vaibhashikasamj/n/akas /k/atvara/h/ /s/ishya/h/. Tatra buddhena prathama/m/ yan prati sarva/m/ /s/unyam ity upadish/t/a/m/ te madhyamikas te hi guru/n/a yathokta/m/ tathaiva /s/raddhaya g/ri/hitavanta iti k/ri/tva napak/ri/sh/t/a/h/ puna/s/ /k/a taduktasyarthasya buddhyanusare/n/akshepasyak/ri/tatvan notk/ri/sh/t/abuddhaya iti madhyamika/h/. Anyais tu /s/ishyair guru/n/a sarva/s/unyatva upadish/t/e j/n/anatiriktasya sarvasya /s/unyatvam astu nameti guruktir yoga iti bauddai/h/ paribhashitopeta/h/ tad upari /k/a j/n/anasya tu /s/unyatva/m/ na sa/m/bhavati tathatve jagadandhyaprasa@ngat sunyasiddher apy asa/m/bhava/k/ /k/eti buddhamate a/k/aratvena paribhashita akshepos'pi k/ri/ta iti yoga/k/ara/h/ vij/n/anamatrastitvavadina/h/. Tadanataram anyai/h/ /s/ishyai/h/ pratitisiddhasya katha/m/ /s/unyatva/m/ vaktu/m/ /s/akyam ato j/n/anavad vahyarthos'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu, para/m/ tu so s'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tatha@ngik/ri/tyaiva/m/ /s/ishyamatim anus/ri/tya kiyatparyanta/m/ sutra/m/ bhavishyatiti tai/h/ p/ri/sh/t/am atas te sautrantika/h/. Anye punar yady aya/m/ gha/t/a iti pratitibalad vahyos'rtha upeyate tarhi tasya eva pratiter aparokshatvat sa katha/m/ parokshos'to vahyos'rtho na pratyaksha iti bhasha viruddhety akshipann atas te vaibhashika/h/.]

[Footnote 385: The rupaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here re-appear as /k/aittika on account of their connexion with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as /k/aittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses.—The vij/n/anaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity alayavj/n/anapravaha/h/), according to all commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyabhara/n/a, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things (savikalpaka/m/ nirvikalpaka/m/ /k/a prav/ri/ttivij/n/anasamj/n/itam).— The vedanaskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.—The samj/n/askandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur a/s/va ityadi/s/abdasamjalpitapratyaya/h/, An. Gi.; gaur a/s/va ityeva/m/ namavi/s/ish/t/asavikalpaka/h/ pratyaya/h/, Go. An.; sa/m/j/n/a yaj/n/adattadipadatadullekhi savikalpapratyayo va, dvitiyapakshe vij/n/anapadena savikalpapratyayo na grahy/h/, Brahmavidyabh.). The sa/m/skaraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and adharma.—Compare also the Bhamati.—The vij/n/anaskandha is /k/itta, the other skandhas /k/aitta.]

[Footnote 386: It has to be kept in view that the sarvastitvavadins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (ksha/n/ikatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.]

[Footnote 387: Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.]

[Footnote 388: In consequence of which no release could take place.]

[Footnote 389: The Brahmavidyabhara/n/a explains the last clause—from ksha/n/ikatva/k/ /k/a—somewhat differently: Api /k/a parama/n/unam api ksha/n/ikatvabhyupagaman melana/m/ na sambhavati, parama/n/una/m/ melana/m/ parama/n/ukriyadhinam, tatha /k/a svakriya/m/ prati parama/n/una/m/ kara/n/atvat kriyapuraksha/n/e parama/n/ubhir bhavyam kriya /s/rayataya kriyaksha/n/eszpi tesham avasthanam apekshitam eva/m/ melanakshaneszpi, nahi melana/s/rayasyabhave melanarupa prav/ri/ttir upapadyate, tatha /k/a sthiraparama/n/usadhya melanarupa prav/ri/tti/h/ katha/m/ tesham ksha/n/ikatve bhavet.—Ananda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.]

[Footnote 390: The kara/n/atvat of /S/a@nkara explains the pratyayatvat of the Sutra; karya/m/ praty ayate janakatvena ga/kkh/ati.]

[Footnote 391: The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the terms of this series.—The following is the substance of the comment of the Brahmavidyabhara/n/a: Nescience is the error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure, &c.—Impression (affection, sa/m/skara) comprises desire, aversion, &c., and the activity caused by them.—Knowledge (vij/n/ana) is the self-consciousness (aham ity alayavij/n/anasya v/ri/ttilabha/h/) springing up in the embryo.—Name and form is the rudimentary flake—or bubble-like condition of the embryo.—The abode of the six (sha/d/ayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses.—Touch (spar/s/a) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.—Feeling (vedana) the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.—Desire (t/ri/sh/n/a) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones.—Activity (upadana) is the effort resulting from desire,—Birth is the passing out from the uterus.—Species (jati) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.—Decay (jara).—Death (mara/n/am) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (mumursha).—Grief (/s/oka) the frustration of wishes connected therewith.—Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that account.—Pain (du/h/kha) is such pain as caused by the five senses.—Durmanas is mental affliction.—The 'and the like' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.]

[Footnote 392: Ananda Giri and Go. Ananda explain: A/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv iti bhokt/ri/vi/s/esha/n/am ad/ri/sh/t/a/s/rayeshv ity artha/h/.—The Brahrma-vidyabhara/n/a says: Nityeshv a/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv a/n/ushv abhyupagamyamaneshu bhokt/ri/shu /k/a satsv ity anvaya/h/. A/s/raya/s/rayibhuteshv ity asyopakaryopakarakabhavaprapteshv ity artha/h/.—And with regard to the subsequent a/s/raya/s/rayi/s/unyeshu: a/s/raya/s/rayitva/s/unyeshu, aya/m/ bhava/h/, sthireshu parama/n/ushu yadanvaye parama/n/una/m/ sa/m/ghatapatti/h/ yadvyatireke /k/a na tad upakarakam upakarya/h/ parama/n/ava/h/ yena tatk/ri/to bhoga/h/ prarthyate sa tatra karteti grahitu/m/ /s/akyate, ksha/n/ikeshu tu param/n/ushu anvayavyatirekagrahasyanekaksha/n/asadhyasyasa/m/bhavan nopakaryopakarakabhavo nirdharayitu/m/ /s/akya/h/.—Ananda Giri remarks on the latter: Ad/ri/sh/t/a/s/rayakart/ri/rahityam aha/s/rayeti. Another reading appears to be a/s/aya/s/raya/s/unyeshu.]

[Footnote 393: Bauddhana/m/ ksha/n/apadena gha/t/adir eva padartho vyavahriyate na tu tadatinkta/h/ ka/sk/it ksha/n/o nama halosti. Brahmavidyabh.]

[Footnote 394: And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material causes such as clay, &c.?]

[Footnote 395: These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipati-pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (alambanapratyaya).—I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyabhara/n/a: Adhipatir indriya/m/ tad dhi /k/akshuradirupam utpannasya j/n/anasya rupadivishayata/m/ niya/kkh/ati niyamaka/s/ /k/a lokedhipatir ity u/k/yate. Sahakari aloka/h/. Samanantarapratyaya/h/purvaj/n/anam, bauddhamate hi ksha/n/ikaj/n/anasa/m/tatau purvaj/n/anam uttaraj/n/asya karana/m/ tad eva /k/a mana ity u/k/yate. Alambana/m/ gha/t/adi/h/. Etan hetun pratiya prapya /k/akshuradijanyam ity adi.]

[Footnote 396: Sa/m/skara iti, tanmate purvaksha/n/a eva hetubhuta/h/ sa/m/skaro vasaneti /k/a vyavahriyate karya/m/ tu tadvishayataya karmavyutpattya sa/m/skara/h/, tatha /k/a karyakara/n/atmaka/m/ sarva/m/ bhavarupa/m/ ksha/n/ikam iti pratij/n/artha/h/. Brahmavidyabhara/n/a.]

[Footnote 397: As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so.]

[Footnote 398: I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.—Viparita iti pratiksha/n/a/m/ gha/t/adina/m/ yuktya sadhyamanoku/s/alair avagantum a/s/akya/h/ sukshmo vina/s/opratisa/m/khyanirodha/h/. Brahmav.]

[Footnote 399: A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.]

[Footnote 400: Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground.—Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.]

[Footnote 401: The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.]

[Footnote 402: What does enable us to declare that there is avara/n/abhava in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore is something real.]

[Footnote 403: If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the effects of which it is capable.—Cp. on this point the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 404: This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.]

[Footnote 405: According to the vij/n/anavadin the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhasa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is power is mana, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is pramat/ri/, knowing subject.]

[Footnote 406: If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non-different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies.]

[Footnote 407: Avayavavayavirupo vahyosrtho nasti /k/en ma bhud jativyaktyadirupas tu syad ity a/s/rankyaha evam iti. Jatyadina/m/ vyaktyadinam /k/atyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasa@ngad atyantabhinnatve tadvadevatadbhavad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhedavaj gativyaktyadibhedosxpi nastity artha/h/.]

[Footnote 408: Vasana, above translated by mental impression, strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the present actual idea.]

[Footnote 409: For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in addition to the transitory ideas.]

[Footnote 410: The vij/n/anaskandha comprises vij/n/anas of two different kinds, the alayavij/n/ana and the prav/ri/ttivij/n/ana. The alayavij/n/ana comprises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego; the prav/ri/ttivij/n/ana comprises those ideas which refer to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent ideas of the former class.]

[Footnote 411: Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself to consciousness is not non-existent.]

[Footnote 412: Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of their enjoyment; asrava is the forward movement of the senses towards their objects; sa/m/vara is the restraint of the activity of the senses; nirjara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works constitute bondage; and release is the ascending of the soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest regions.—For the details, see Professor Cowell's translation of the Arhata chapter of the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 413: Cp. translation of Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha, p. 59.]

[Footnote 414: And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.]

[Footnote 415: Cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha translation, p. 58.]

[Footnote 416: The inference being that the initial and intervening sizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul, like its final size.]

[Footnote 417: The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and the pradhana and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world considered as the effect of the pradhana acted upon by the Lord; for that the world is the effect of the pradhana is a point which the Vedantins do not accept as proved.]

[Footnote 418: I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient Lord knows its measure.]

THE END