How, then, the Sa@nkhya will ask, do you interpret the phrase 'the five five-people?'—On the ground, we reply, of the rule Pa/n/ini II, 1, 50, according to which certain compounds formed with numerals are mere names. The word pa/nk/ajana/h/ thus is not meant to convey the idea of the number five, but merely to denote certain classes of beings. Hence the question may present itself, How many such classes are there? and to this question an answer is given by the added numeral 'five.' There are certain classes of beings called five-people, and these classes are five. Analogously we may speak of the seven seven-/ri/shis, where again the compound denotes a class of beings merely, not their number.—Who then are those five-people?—To this question the next Sutra replies.

12. (The pa/nk/ajana/h/ are) the breath and so on, (as is seen) from the complementary passage.

The mantra in which the pa/nk/ajana/h/ are mentioned is followed by another one in which breath and four other things are mentioned for the purpose of describing the nature of Brahman. 'They who know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind[237].' Hence we conclude, on the ground of proximity, that the five-people are the beings mentioned in this latter mantra.—But how, the Sa@nkhya asks, can the word 'people' be applied to the breath, the eye, the ear, and so on?—How, we ask in return, can it be applied to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the word 'people' has to be disregarded; but in favour of our explanation is the fact that the breath, the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a complementary passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the word 'people' because they are connected with people. Moreover, we find the word 'person,' which means as much as 'people,' applied to the pra/n/as in the passage, 'These are the five persons of Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 13, 6); and another passage runs, 'Breath is father, breath is mother,' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of composition, there is no objection to the compound being taken in its settled conventional meaning[238].—But how can the conventional meaning be had recourse to, if there is no previous use of the word in that meaning?—That may be done, we reply, just as in the case of udbhid and similar words[239]. We often infer that a word of unknown meaning refers to some known thing because it is used in connexion with the latter. So, for instance, in the case of the following words: 'He is to sacrifice with the udbhid; he cuts the yupa; he makes the vedi.' Analogously we conclude that the term pa/nk/ajana/h/, which, from the grammatical rule quoted, is known to be a name, and which therefore demands a thing of which it is the name, denotes the breath, the eye, and so on, which are connected with it through their being mentioned in a complementary passage.—Some commentators explain the word pa/nk/ajana/h/ to mean the Gods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others, again, think that the four castes together with the Nishadas are meant. Again, some scriptural passage (/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. VIII, 53, 7) speaks of the tribe of 'the five-people,' meaning thereby the created beings in general; and this latter explanation also might be applied to the passage under discussion. The teacher (the Sutrakara), on the other hand, aiming at showing that the passage does not refer to the twenty-five categories of the Sa@nkhyas, declares that on the ground of the complementary passage breath, &c. have to be understood.

Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned in the Madhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text mentions food also (and so makes up the number five). But how shall we interpret the Ka/n/va-text which does not mention food (and thus altogether speaks of four things only)?—To this question the next Sutra replies.

13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Ka/n/vas) where food is not mentioned, (the number five is made full) by the light (mentioned in the preceding mantra).

The Ka/n/va-text, although not mentioning food, makes up the full number five, by the light mentioned in the mantra preceding that in which the five-people are spoken of. That mantra describes the nature of Brahman by saying, 'Him the gods worship as the light of lights.'—If it be asked how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both texts equally is in one text to be employed for the explanation of the five-people, and not in the other text; we reply that the reason lies in the difference of the requirements. As the Madhyandinas meet in one and the same mantra with breath and four other entities enabling them to interpret the term, 'the five-people,' they are in no need of the light mentioned in another mantra. The Ka/n/vas, on the other hand, cannot do without the light. The case is analogous to that of the Sho/d/a/s/in-cup, which, according to different passages, is either to be offered or not to be offered at the atiratra-sacrifice.

We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the doctrine of the pradhana. That this doctrine cannot be proved either by Sm/ri/ti or by ratiocination will be shown later on.

14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta-passages with regard to the things created, such as) ether and so on; (there is no such conflict with regard to the Lord) on account of his being represented (in one passage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the world).

In the preceding part of the work the right definition of Brahman has been established; it has been shown that all the Vedanta-texts have Brahman for their common topic; and it has been proved that there is no scriptural authority for the doctrine of the pradhana.—But now a new objection presents itself.

It is not possible—our opponent says—to prove either that Brahman is the cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or that all Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman; because we observe that the Vedanta-texts contradict one another. All the Vedanta-passages which treat of the creation enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in reality speak of different creations. In one place it is said that from the Self there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, 1); in another place that the creation began with fire (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); in another place, again, that the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up. VI, 4); in another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water (above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below the earth) (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 2; 3). There no order is stated at all. Somewhere else it is said that the creation originated from the Non-existent. 'In the beginning this was non-existent; from it was born what exists' (Taitt. Up. II, 7); and, 'In the beginning this was non-existent; it became existent; it grew' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1). In another place, again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the antecedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent mentioned in its stead. 'Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not; but how could it be thus, my dear? How could that which is be born of that which is not?' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place, again, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken place spontaneously, 'Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7).—As therefore manifold discrepancies are observed, and as no option is possible in the case of an accomplished matter[240], the Vedanta-passages cannot be accepted as authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we must rather accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of Sm/ri/ti and Reasoning.

To this we make the following reply.—Although the Vedanta-passages may be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, such as ether and so on, they do not conflict with regard to the creator, 'on account of his being represented as described.' That means: such as the creator is described in any one Vedanta-passage, viz. as all-knowing, the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is represented in all other Vedanta-passages also. Let us consider, for instance, the description of Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, 1 ff.). There it is said at first, 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Here the word 'knowledge,' and so likewise the statement, made later on, that Brahman desired (II, 6), intimate that Brahman is of the nature of intelligence. Further, the text declares[241] that the cause of the world is the general Lord, by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It further applies to the cause of the world the term 'Self' (II, 1), and it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths beginning with the gross body; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within all beings. Again—in the passage, 'May I be many, may I grow forth'—it tells how the Self became many, and thereby declares that the creator is non-different from the created effects. And—in the passage, 'He created all this whatever there is'—it represents the creator as the Cause of the entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a second previously to the creation. The same characteristics which in the above passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we find to be predicated of it in other passages also, so, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1; 3), and 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds?' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1; 2.) The Vedanta-passages which are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are thus in harmony throughout.—On the other hand, there are found conflicting statements concerning the world, the creation being in some places said to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the first place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements concerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i.e. Brahman, in which all the Vedanta-texts are seen to agree—for that would be an altogether unfounded generalization;—and, in the second place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those conflicting passages also which refer to the world. And, to consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world would not even matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters in any way; nor have we the right to assume such a thing; because we conclude from the introductory and concluding clauses that the passages about the creation and the like form only subordinate members of passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages setting forth the creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture itself declares; compare Ch. Up. VI, 8, 4, 'As food too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. the True.' We, moreover, understand that by means of comparisons such as that of the clay (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4) the creation is described merely for the purpose of teaching us that the effect is not really different from the cause. Analogously it is said by those who know the sacred tradition, 'If creation is represented by means of (the similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things; that is only a means for making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference whatever' (Gau/d/ap. Ka. III, 15).—On the other hand, Scripture expressly states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, 'He who knows Brahman obtains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, 1); 'He who knows the Self overcomes grief' (Ch. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'A man who knows him passes over death' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). That fruit is, moreover, apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha), for as soon as, by means of the doctrine, 'That art thou,' a man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non-transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.

It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such as 'Non-being this was in the beginning' contain conflicting statements about the nature of the cause. This is done in the next Sutra.

15. On account of the connexion (with passages treating of Brahman, the passages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate absolute Non-existence).

The passage 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely Non-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the preceding sections of the Upanishad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is ('He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing. He who knows the Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing'); it is further, by means of the series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c., represented as the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again referred to in the clause, 'He wished, may I be many;' is declared to have originated the entire creation; and is finally referred to in the clause, 'Therefore the wise call it the true.' Thereupon the text goes on to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic of discussion, 'On this there is also this /s/loka, Non-being indeed was this in the beginning,' &c.—If here the term 'Non-being' denoted the absolutely Non-existent, the whole context would be broken; for while ostensibly referring to one matter the passage would in reality treat of a second altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude that, while the term 'Being' ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by names and forms, the term 'Non-being' denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation, i.e. that Brahman is, in a secondary sense of the word, called Non-being, previously to the origination of the world. The same interpretation has to be applied to the passage 'Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); for that passage also is connected with another passage which runs, 'It became being;' whence it is evident that the 'Non-being' of the former passage cannot mean absolute Non-existence. And in the passage, 'Others say, Non-being this was in the beginning' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1), the reference to the opinion of 'others' does not mean that the doctrine referred, to (according to which the world was originally absolutely non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda; for option is possible in the case of actions but not in the case of substances. The passage has therefore to be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of primitive absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some teachers of inferior intelligence; a refutation undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from that which is.—The following passage again, 'Now this was then undeveloped,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means assert that the evolution of the world took place without a ruler; as we conclude from the circumstance of its being connected with another passage in which the ruler is represented as entering into the evolved world of effects, 'He entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails' &c. If it were supposed that the evolution of the world takes place without a ruler, to whom could the subsequent pronoun 'he' refer (in the passage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected with something previously intimated? And as Scripture declares that the Self, after having entered into the body, is of the nature of intelligence ('when seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by name'), it follows that it is intelligent at the time of its entering also.—We, moreover, must assume that the world was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at present seen to develop itself by names and forms, viz. under the rulership of an intelligent creator; for we have no right to make assumptions contrary to what is at present actually observed. Another scriptural passage also declares that the evolution of the world took place under the superintendence of a ruler, 'Let me now enter these beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2). The intransitive expression 'It developed itself' (vyakriyata; it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to the ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought about that evolution. Analogously it is said, for instance, that 'the cornfield reaps itself' (i.e. is reaped with the greatest ease), although there is the reaper sufficient (to account for the work being done).—Or else we may look on the form vyakriyata as having reference to a necessarily implied agent; as is the case in such phrases as 'the village is being approached' (where we necessarily have to supply 'by Devadatta or somebody else').

16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the 'work') denotes the world.

In the Kaushitaki-brahma/n/a, in the dialogue of Balaki and Ajata/s/atru, we read, 'O Balaki, he who is the maker of those persons, he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). The question here arises whether what is here inculcated as the object of knowledge is the individual soul or the chief vital air or the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the vital air is meant. For, in the first place, he says, the clause 'of whom this is the work' points to the activity of motion, and that activity rests on the vital air. In the second place, we meet with the word 'pra/n/a' in a complementary passage ('Then he becomes one with that pra/n/a alone'), and that word is well known to denote the vital air. In the third place, pra/n/a is the maker of all the persons, the person in the sun, the person in the moon, &c., who in the preceding part of the dialogue had been enumerated by Balaki; for that the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of pra/n/a we know from another scriptural passage, viz. 'Who is that one god (in whom all the other gods are contained)? Pra/n/a and he is Brahman, and they call him That' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 9).—Or else, the purvapakshin continues, the passage under discussion represents the individual soul as the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can be said that 'this is the work,' if we understand by 'this' all meritorious and non-meritorious actions; and the soul also, in so far as it is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker of the persons enumerated in so far as they are instrumental to the soul's fruition. The complementary passage, moreover, contains an inferential mark of the individual soul. For Ajata/s/atru, in order to instruct Balaki about the 'maker of the persons' who had been proposed as the object of knowledge, calls a sleeping man by various names and convinces Balaki, by the circumstance that the sleeper does not hear his shouts, that the pra/n/a and so on are not the enjoyers; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by pushing him with his stick, and so makes Balaki comprehend that the being capable of fruition is the individual soul which is distinct from the pra/n/a. A subsequent passage also contains an inferential mark of the individual soul, viz. 'And as the master feeds with his people, nay, as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with the other Selfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious Self' (Kau. Up. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the support of the pra/n/a, it may itself be called pra/n/a.—We thus conclude that the passage under discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief vital air; but not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks whatever.

To this we make the following reply.—The Lord only can be the maker of the persons enumerated, on account of the force of the introductory part of the section. Balaki begins his colloquy with Ajata/s/atru with the offer, 'Shall I tell you Brahman?' Thereupon he enumerates some individual souls residing in the sun, the moon, and so on, which participate in the sight of the secondary Brahman, and in the end becomes silent. Ajata/s/atru then sets aside Balaki's doctrine as not referring to the chief Brahman—with the words, 'Vainly did you challenge me, saying, Shall I tell you Brahman,' &c.—and proposes the maker of all those individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If now that maker also were merely a soul participating in the sight of the secondary Brahman, the introductory statement which speaks of Brahman would be futile. Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is meant.—None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of being the maker of all those persons as he only is absolutely independent.—Further, the clause 'of whom this is the work' does not refer either to the activity of motion nor to meritorious and non-meritorious actions; for neither of those two is the topic of discussion or has been mentioned previously. Nor can the term 'work' denote the enumerated persons, since the latter are mentioned separately—in the clause, 'He who is the maker of those persons'—and as inferential marks (viz. the neuter gender and the singular number of the word karman, work) contradict that assumption. Nor, again, can the term 'work' denote either the activity whose object the persons are, or the result of that activity, since those two are already implied in the mention of the agent (in the clause, 'He who is the maker'). Thus there remains no other alternative than to take the pronoun 'this' (in 'He of whom this is the work') as denoting the perceptible world and to understand the same world—as that which is made—by the term 'work.'—We may indeed admit that the world also is not the previous topic of discussion and has not been mentioned before; still, as no specification is mentioned, we conclude that the term 'work' has to be understood in a general sense, and thus denotes what first presents itself to the mind, viz. everything which exists in general. It is, moreover, not true that the world is not the previous topic of discussion; we are rather entitled to conclude from the circumstance that the various persons (in the sun, the moon, &c.) which constitute a part of the world had been specially mentioned before, that the passage in question is concerned with the whole world in general. The conjunction 'or' (in 'or he of whom,' &c.) is meant to exclude the idea of limited makership; so that the whole passage has to be interpreted as follows, 'He who is the maker of those persons forming a part of the world, or rather—to do away with this limitation—he of whom this entire world without any exception is the work.' The special mention made of the persons having been created has for its purpose to show that those persons whom Balaki had proclaimed to be Brahman are not Brahman. The passage therefore sets forth the maker of the world in a double aspect, at first as the creator of a special part of the world and thereupon as the creator of the whole remaining part of the world; a way of speaking analogous to such every-day forms of expression as, 'The wandering mendicants are to be fed, and then the Brahma/n/as[242].' And that the maker of the world is the highest Lord is affirmed in all Vedanta-texts.

17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that that has already been explained.

It remains for us to refute the objection that on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air, which are met with in the complementary passage, either the one or the other must be meant in the passage under discussion, and not the highest Lord.—We therefore remark that that objection has already been disposed of under I, 1, 31. There it was shown that from an interpretation similar to the one here proposed by the purvapakshin there would result a threefold meditation one having Brahman for its object, a second one directed on the individual soul, and a third one connected with the chief vital air. Now the same result would present itself in our case, and that would be unacceptable as we must infer from the introductory as well as the concluding clauses, that the passage under discussion refers to Brahman. With reference to the introductory clause this has been already proved; that the concluding passage also refers to Brahman, we infer from the fact of there being stated in it a pre-eminently high reward, 'Warding off all evil he who knows this obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty, supremacy.'—But if this is so, the sense of the passage under discussion is already settled by the discussion of the passage about Pratarda/n/a (I, 1, 31); why, then, the present Sutra?—No, we reply; the sense of our passage is not yet settled, since under I, 1, 31 it has not been proved that the clause, 'Or he whose work is this,' refers to Brahman. Hence there arises again, in connexion with the present passage, a doubt whether the individual soul and the chief vital air may not be meant, and that doubt has again to be refuted.—The word pra/n/a occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in the passage, 'The mind settles down on pra/n/a' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 2).—The inferential marks of the individual soul also have, on account of the introductory and concluding clauses referring to Brahman, to be explained so as not to give rise to any discrepancy.

18. But Jaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has another purport, on account of the question and answer; and thus some also (read in their text).

Whether the passage under discussion is concerned with the individual soul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of the teacher Jaimini, no matter for dispute, since the reference to the individual soul has a different purport, i.e. aims at intimating Brahman. He founds this his opinion on a question and a reply met with in the text. After Ajata/s/atru has taught Balaki, by waking the sleeping man, that the soul is different from the vital air, he asks the following question, 'Balaki, where did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he thus back?' This question clearly refers to something different from the individual soul. And so likewise does the reply, 'When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one with that pra/n/a alone;' and, 'From that Self all pra/n/as proceed, each towards its place, from the pra/n/as the gods, from the gods the worlds.'—Now it is the general Vedanta doctrine that at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the highest Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman the whole world proceeds, inclusive of pra/n/a, and so on. When Scripture therefore represents as the object of knowledge that in which there takes place the deep sleep of the soul, characterised by absence of consciousness and utter tranquillity, i.e. a state devoid of all those specific cognitions which are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul, and from which the soul returns when the sleep is broken; we understand that the highest Self is meant.—Moreover, the Vajasaneyi/s/akha, which likewise contains the colloquy of Balaki and Ajata/s/atru, clearly refers to the individual soul by means of the term, 'the person consisting of cognition' (vij/n/anamaya), and distinguishes from it the highest Self ('Where was then the person consisting of cognition? and from whence did he thus come back?' B/ri/. Up. II, 1, 16); and later on, in the reply to the above question, declares that 'the person consisting of cognition lies in the ether within the heart.' Now we know that the word 'ether' may be used to denote the highest Self, as, for instance, in the passage about the small ether within the lotus of the heart (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 1). Further on the B/ri/. Up. says, 'All the Selfs came forth from that Self;' by which statement of the coming forth of all the conditioned Selfs it intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause.—The doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping person, viz. that the individual soul is different from the vital air, furnishes at the same time a further argument against the opinion that the passage under discussion refers to the vital air.

19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest Self) on account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

We read in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka, in the Maitreyi-brahma/n/a the following passage, 'Verily, a husband is not dear that you may love the husband, &c. &c.; verily, everything is not dear that you may love everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear. Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked, O Maitreyi! When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6).—Here the doubt arises whether that which is represented as the object to be seen, to be heard, and so on, is the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the highest Self.—But whence the doubt?—Because, we reply, the Self is, on the one hand, by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on, indicated as the enjoyer whence it appears that the passage refers to the individual soul; and because, on the other hand, the declaration that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points to the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the passage refers to the individual soul, on account of the strength of the initial statement. The text declares at the outset that all the objects of enjoyment found in this world, such as husband, wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of the Self, and thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i.e. the individual) Self is meant; if thereupon it refers to the Self as the object of sight and so on, what other Self should it mean than the same individual Self?—A subsequent passage also (viz. 'Thus does this great Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise from out of these elements, and vanish again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge'), which describes how the great Being under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge, from the elements, shows that the object of sight is no other than the cognitional Self, i.e. the individual soul. The concluding clause finally, 'How, O beloved, should he know the knower?' shows, by means of the term 'knower,' which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is meant. The declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything becomes known must therefore not be interpreted in the literal sense, but must be taken to mean that the world of objects of enjoyment is known through its relation to the enjoying soul.

To this we make the following reply.—The passage makes a statement about the highest Self, on account of the connected meaning of the entire section. If we consider the different passages in their mutual connexion, we find that they all refer to the highest Self. After Maitreyi has heard from Yaj/n/avalkya that there is no hope of immortality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in the words, 'What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal? What my Lord knoweth tell that to me;' and thereupon Yaj/n/avalkya expounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as Sm/ri/ti declares that immortality is not to be reached but through the knowledge of the highest Self.—The statement further that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known can be taken in its direct literal sense only if by the Self we understand the highest cause. And to take it in a non-literal sense (as the purvapakshin proposes) is inadmissible, on account of the explanation given of that statement in a subsequent passage, viz. 'Whosoever looks for the Brahman class elsewhere than in the Self, is abandoned by the Brahman class.' Here it is said that whoever erroneously views this world with its Brahmans and so on, as having an independent existence apart from the Self, is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an erroneous view; whereby the view that there exists any difference is refuted. And the immediately subsequent clause, 'This everything is the Self,' gives us to understand that the entire aggregate of existing things is non-different from the Self; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes of the drum and so on.—By explaining further that the Self about which he had been speaking is the cause of the universe of names, forms, and works ('There has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have as /Ri/gveda,' &c.) Yaj/n/avalkya again shows that it is the highest Self.—To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in the paragraph which treats of the natural centres of things, that the Self is the centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of knowledge.—From all this it follows that what the text represents as the object of sight and so on is the highest Self.

We now turn to the remark made by the purvapakshin that the passage teaches the individual soul to be the object of sight, because it is, in the early part of the chapter denoted as something dear.

20. (The circumstance of the soul being represented as the object of sight) indicates the fulfilment of the promissory statement; so A/s/marathya thinks.

The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight that Self which is denoted as something, dear indicates the fulfilment of the promise made in the passages, 'When the Self is known all this is known,' 'All this is that Self.' For if the individual soul were different from the highest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not imply the knowledge of the former, and thus the promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything is to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the initial statement aims at representing the individual Self and the highest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made.—This is the opinion of the teacher A/s/marathya[243].

21. (The initial statement identifies the individual soul and the highest Self) because the soul when it will depart (from the body) is such (i.e. one with the highest Self); thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.

The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and mind (mano-buddhi), attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on, a state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at some future time out of the body, to become one with the highest Self; hence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different from the highest Self. This is the opinion of the teacher Au/d/ulomi.—Thus Scripture says, 'That serene being arising from this body appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3).—In another place Scripture intimates, by means of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the individual soul, 'As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8). I.e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the latter half of the passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two members of the comparison[244].

22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in the condition (of the individual soul); so Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks.

Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual soul, therefore, the teacher Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna thinks, the initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is possible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the individual soul, is evident from the Brahma/n/a-passage, 'Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms,' and similar passages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, 'The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names' (Taitt. Ar. III, 12, 7)[245]. And where Scripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does not at the same time relate a separate creation of the individual soul; we have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self, different from the latter.—In the opinion of the teacher Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. A/s/marathya, although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression, 'On account of the fulfilment of the promise'—which declares a certain mutual dependence—that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul[246]. The opinion of Au/d/ulomi again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition[247]. Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all the Vedanta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, 'That art thou') aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its existence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.

The last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish replies to the second of the purvapakshin's arguments, viz. that the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka passage represents as the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements. 'There is an indication of the fulfilment of the promise; so A/s/marathya thinks.' The promise is made in the two passages, 'When the Self is known, all this is known,' and 'All this is that Self.' That the Self is everything, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is merged in one being[248]; and by its being demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is, then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements; thus the teacher A/s/marathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment.—'Because the soul when it will depart is such; thus Au/d/ulomi thinks.' The statement as to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the soul when—after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on—it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self. This is Au/d/ulomi's opinion.—'Because it exists in the condition of the soul; thus Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself is that which appears as the individual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the teacher Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna.

But, an objection may be raised, the passage, 'Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge,' intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its identity with the highest Self!—By no means, we reply. The passage means to say only that on the soul departing from the body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For an objection being raised—in the passage, 'Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when thou sayest that having departed there is no more knowledge'. Scripture itself explains that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self, 'I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place non-connexion with the matras.' That means: The eternally unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish; but by means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the matras, i.e. the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience. When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that 'When he has departed there is no more knowledge.'

The third argument also of the purvapakshin, viz. that the word 'knower'—which occurs in the concluding passage, 'How should he know the knower?'—denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual soul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna.—Moreover, the text after having enumerated—in the passage, 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other,' &c.—all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the sphere of Nescience declares—in the subsequent passage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?'—that in the sphere of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence of objects the knower might not know himself, Yaj/n/avalkya goes on, 'How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower?' As thus the latter passage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we have to conclude that the word 'knower' is here used to denote that being which is knowledge, i.e. the Self.—That the view of Ka/s/ak/ri/tsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is so, all the adherents of the Vedanta must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation from Scripture; compare, for instance, 'Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one, without a second' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1); 'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is no other seer but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23); 'There is nothing that sees but it' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 11).—It is likewise confirmed by Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, 'Vasudeva is all this' (Bha. Gi. VII, 19); 'Know me, O Bharata, to be the soul in all bodies' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 2); 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 27).—The same conclusion is supported by those passages which deny all difference; compare, for instance, 'If he thinks, that is one and I another; he does not know' (B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 10); 'From death to death he goes who sees here any diversity' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19). And, again, by those passages which negative all change on the part of the Self; compare, for instance, 'This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 24).—Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of irrefutable knowledge, and there would be no possibility of any matter being well settled; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and Scripture speaks of those, 'Who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the Vedanta' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 6). Compare also the passage, 'What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that unity?' (I/s/. Up. 7.)—And Sm/ri/ti also represents the mind of him who contemplates the Self as steady (Bha. Gi. II, 54).

As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect knowledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two; it is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and to maintain that the individual soul is different from the highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul)[249]. And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, viz. 'Having sent forth he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only entered into the created beings.—Those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the Vedanta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be something effected, and therefore non-eternal[250]. (And if they attempt to show that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve themselves in a conflict with sound logic.

23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances.

It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be enquired into because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, so Brahman has to be enquired into because it is the cause of absolute beatitude. And Brahman has been defined as that from which there proceed the origination, sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this definition comprises alike the relation of substantial causality in which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden ornaments and earthen pots, and the relation of operative causality in which the potter and the goldsmith stand to the things mentioned; a doubt arises to which of these two kinds the causality of Brahman belongs.

The purvapakshin maintains that Brahman evidently is the operative cause of the world only, because Scripture declares his creative energy to be preceded by reflection. Compare, for instance, Pra. Up. VI, 3; 4: 'He reflected, he created pra/n/a.' For observation shows that the action of operative causes only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, and moreover that the result of some activity is brought about by the concurrence of several factors[251]. It is therefore appropriate that we should view the prime creator in the same light. The circumstance of his being known as 'the Lord' furnishes another argument. For lords such as kings and the son of Vivasvat are known only as operative causes, and the highest Lord also must on that account be viewed as an operative cause only.—Further, the effect of the creator's activity, viz. this world, is seen to consist of parts, to be non-intelligent and impure; we therefore must assume that its cause also is of the same nature; for it is a matter of general observation that cause and effect are alike in kind. But that Brahman does not resemble the world in nature, we know from many scriptural passages, such as 'It is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19). Hence there remains no other alternative but to admit that in addition to Brahman there exists a material cause of the world of impure nature, such as is known from Sm/ri/ti[252], and to limit the causality of Brahman, as declared by Scripture, to operative causality.

To this we make the following reply.—Brahman is to be acknowledged as the material cause as well as the operative cause; because this latter view does not conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative instances. The promissory statement chiefly meant is the following one, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which that which is not heard becomes heard; that which is not perceived, perceived; that which is not known, known?' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3.) This passage intimates that through the cognition of one thing everything else, even if (previously) unknown, becomes known. Now the knowledge of everything is possible through the cognition of the material cause, since the effect is non-different from the material cause. On the other hand, effects are not non-different from their operative causes; for we know from ordinary experience that the carpenter, for instance, is different from the house he has built.—The illustrative example referred to is the one mentioned (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4), 'My dear, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely;' which passage again has reference to the material cause. The text adds a few more illustrative instances of similar nature, 'As by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known; as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known.'—Similar promissory statements are made in other places also, for instance, 'What is that through which if it is known everything else becomes known?' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 3.) An illustrative instance also is given in the same place, 'As plants grow on the earth' (I, 1, 7).—Compare also the promissory statement in B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 6, 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known;' and the illustrative instance quoted (IV, 5, 8), 'Now as the sounds of a drum if beaten cannot be seized externally, but the sound is seized when the drum is seized or the beater of the drum.'—Similar promissory statements and illustrative instances which are to be found in all Vedanta-texts are to be viewed as proving, more or less, that Brahman is also the material cause of the world. The ablative case also in the passage, 'That from whence (yata/h/) these beings are born,' has to be considered as indicating the material cause of the beings, according to the grammatical rule, Pa/n/. I, 4, 30.—That Brahman is at the same time the operative cause of the world, we have to conclude from the circumstance that there is no other guiding being. Ordinarily material causes, indeed, such as lumps of clay and pieces of gold, are dependent, in order to shape themselves into vessels and ornaments, on extraneous operative causes such as potters and goldsmiths; but outside Brahman as material cause there is no other operative cause to which the material cause could look; for Scripture says that previously to creation Brahman was one without a second.—The absence of a guiding principle other than the material cause can moreover be established by means of the argument made use of in the Sutra, viz. accordance with the promissory statements and the illustrative examples. If there were admitted a guiding principle different from the material cause, it would follow that everything cannot be known through one thing, and thereby the promissory statements as well as the illustrative instances would be stultified.—The Self is thus the operative cause, because there is no other ruling principle, and the material cause because there is no other substance from which the world could originate.

24. And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the Self).

The fact of the sacred texts declaring that the Self reflected likewise shows that it is the operative as well as the material cause. Passages like 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth,' and 'He thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' show, in the first place, that the Self is the agent in the independent activity which is preceded by the Self's reflection; and, in the second place, that it is the material cause also, since the words 'May I be many' intimate that the reflective desire of multiplying itself has the inward Self for its object.

25. And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the world) being directly declared (to have Brahman for their material cause).

This Sutra supplies a further argument for Brahman's being the general material cause.—Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also that the origination as well as the dissolution of the world is directly spoken of in the sacred texts as having Brahman for their material cause, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether and return into the ether' (Ch. Up. I, 9, 1). That that from which some other thing springs and into which it returns is the material cause of that other thing is well known. Thus the earth, for instance, is the material cause of rice, barley, and the like.—The word 'directly' (in the Sutra) notifies that there is no other material cause, but that all this sprang from the ether only.—Observation further teaches that effects are not re-absorbed into anything else but their material causes.

26. (Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that Scripture—in the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (Taitt. Up. II, 7)—represents the Self as the object of action as well as the agent.—But how can the Self which as agent was in full existence previously to the action be made out to be at the same time that which is effected by the action?—Owing to modification, we reply. The Self, although in full existence previously to the action, modifies itself into something special, viz. the Self of the effect. Thus we see that causal substances, such as clay and the like, are, by undergoing the process of modification, changed into their products.—The word 'itself' in the passage quoted intimates the absence of any other operative cause but the Self.

The word 'pari/n/amat' (in the Sutra) may also be taken as constituting a separate Sutra by itself, the sense of which would be: Brahman is the material cause of the world for that reason also, that the sacred text speaks of Brahman and its modification into the Self of its effect as co-ordinated, viz. in the passage, 'It became sat and tyat, defined and undefined' (Taitt. Up. II, 6).

27. And because Brahman is called the source.

Brahman is the material cause for that reason also that it is spoken of in the sacred texts as the source (yoni); compare, for instance, 'The maker, the Lord, the person who has his source in Brahman' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 3); and 'That which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). For that the word 'source' denotes the material cause is well known from the use of ordinary language; the earth, for instance, is called the yoni of trees and herbs. In some places indeed the word yoni means not source, but merely place; so, for instance, in the mantra, 'A yoni, O Indra, was made for you to sit down upon' (/Ri/k. Sa/m/h. I, 104, 1). But that in the passage quoted it means 'source' follows from a complementary passage, 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its threads,' &c.—It is thus proved that Brahman is the material cause of the world.—Of the objection, finally, that in ordinary life the activity of operative causal agents only, such as potters and the like, is preceded by reflection, we dispose by the remark that, as the matter in hand is not one which can be known through inferential reasoning, ordinary experience cannot be used to settle it. For the knowledge of that matter we rather depend on Scripture altogether, and hence Scripture only has to be appealed to. And that Scripture teaches that the Lord who reflects before creation is at the same time the material cause, we have already explained. The subject will, moreover, be discussed more fully later on.

28. Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta) are explained, are explained.

The doctrine according to which the pradhana is the cause of the world has, in the Sutras beginning with I, 1, 5, been again and again brought forward and refuted. The chief reason for the special attention given to that doctrine is that the Vedanta-texts contain some passages which, to people deficient in mental penetration, may appear to contain inferential marks pointing to it. The doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedanta doctrine since, like the latter, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma-sutras, such as Devala, and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhana doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they also are opposed to the doctrine of Brahman being the general cause, and as slow-minded people might think that they also are referred to in some Vedic passages. Hence the Sutrakara formally extends, in the above Sutra, the refutation already accomplished of the pradhana doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in detail after their great protagonist, the pradhana doctrine, has been so completely disposed of. They also are, firstly, not founded on any scriptural authority; and are, secondly, directly contradicted by various Vedic passages.—The repetition of the phrase 'are explained' is meant to intimate that the end of the adhyaya has been reached.

Notes:

[Footnote 228: The Great one is the technical Sa@nkhya-term for buddhi, avyakta is a common designation of pradhana or prak/ri/ti, and purusha is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, Sa@nkhya Kar. 2, 3.]

[Footnote 229: Sa/m/kalpavikalparupamanana/s/aktya haira/n/yagarbhi buddhir manas tasya/h/ vyash/t/imana/h/su samash/t/itaya vyaptim aha mahan iti. Sa/m/kalpadi/s/ktitaya tarhi sa/m/dehatmatva/m/ tatraha matir iti. Mahatvam upapadayati brahmeti. Bhogyajatadharatvam aha pur iti. Ni/sk/ayatmakatvam aha buddhir iti. Kirti/s/aktimattvam aha khyatir iti. Niyamana/s/aktimatvam aha i/s/vara iti. Loke yat prak/ri/sh/t/a/m/ j/n/anam tatosnatirekam aha praj/n/eti. Tatphalam api tato narthantaravishayam ity aha sa/m/vid iti. /K/itpradhanatvam aha /k/itir iti. J/n/atasarvartbanusa/m/dhana/s/aktim aha sm/ri/tis /k/eti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 230: Nanu na bija/s/aktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan nety aha avidyeti. Ke/k/it tu pratijivam avidya/s/aktibhedam i/kkh/anti tan na avyaktavyak/ri/tadi/s/abdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatvexpi sva/s/aktya vi/k/itrakaryakaratvad ity aha avyakteti. Na /k/a tasya jiva/s/rayatva/m/ jiva/s/abdava/k/yasya kalpitatvad avidyarupatvat ta/kkh/abdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity aha parame/s/vareti. Mayavidyayor bhedad i/s/varasya maya/s/rayatva/m/ jivanam avidya/s/rayateti vadanta/m/ pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino maya paratantra tathaishapity artha/h/. Pratitau tasya/s/ /k/etanapeksham aha mahasuptir iti. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 231: Sutradvayasya v/ri/ttik/ri/dvyakhyanam utthapayati. Go. An. A/k/aryade/s/iyamatam utthapayati. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 232: The commentators give different explanations of the Sattamatra of the text.—Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprak/ri/ter adyapari/n/ame. Go. An.—Bhogapavargapurusharthasya maha/kkh/abditabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakara/n/a/m/ sad u/k/yate tatra bhavapratyayos'pi svarupartho na samanyava/k/i karyanumeya/m/ mahan na pratyaksham iti matra/s/abda/h/. Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 233: As the meaning of the word aja is going to be discussed, and as the author of the Sutras and /S/a@nkara seem to disagree as to its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in this place.—/S/a@nkara reads—and explains,—in the mantra, sarupa/h/ (not sarupam) and bhuktabhogam, not bhuktabhogyam.]

[Footnote 234: Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the views of the Sutra writer and /S/a@nkara. Govindananda notes that according to the Bhashyak/ri/t aja means simply maya—which interpretation is based on prakara/n/a—while, according to the Sutra-k/ri/t, who explains aja on the ground of the Chandogya-passage treating of the three primary elements, aja denotes the aggregate of those three elements constituting an avantaraprak/ri/ti.—On /S/a@nkara's explanation the term aja presents no difficulties, for maya is aja, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sutra writer, however, aja cannot mean unborn, since the three primary elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the ru/dh/i signification of aja, according to which it means she-goat. But how can the avantara-prak/ri/ti be called a she-goat? To this question the next Sutra replies.]

[Footnote 235: Indication (laksha/n/a, which consists in this case in five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct meaning.]

[Footnote 236: That pa/nk/ajana/h/ is only one word appears from its having only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which udatta becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika Sutra for the accentuation of the /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a.]

[Footnote 237: So in the Madhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the Ka/n/va recension has not the clause 'the food of food.']

[Footnote 238: This in answer to the Sankhya who objects to jana when applied to the prana, &c. being interpreted with the help of laksha/n/a; while if referred to the pradhana, &c. it may be explained to have a direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhana being jana because it produces, the mahat &c. being jana because they are produced). The Vedantin points out that the compound pa/nk/ajana/h/ has its own ru/dh/i-meaning, just as a/s/vakar/n/a, literally horse-ear, which conventionally denotes a certain plant.]

[Footnote 239: We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that the yupa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.]

[Footnote 240: Option being possible only in the case of things to be accomplished, i.e. actions.]

[Footnote 241: According to Go. An. in the passage, 'That made itself its Self' (II, 7); according to An. Giri in the passage, 'He created all' (II, 6).]

[Footnote 242: By the Brahma/n/as being meant all those Brahma/n/as who are not at the same time wandering mendicants.]

[Footnote 243: The comment of the Bhamati on the Sutra runs as follows: As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other; so the individual souls also—which are effects of Brahman—are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and somehow non-different.—The technical name of the doctrine here represented by A/s/marathya is bhedabhedavada.]

[Footnote 244: Bhamati: The individual soul is absolutely different from the highest Self; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa/nk/aratrikas: 'Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference.'—The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au/d/ulomi is satyabhedavada.]

[Footnote 245: Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, 1, 11.]

[Footnote 246: And not the relation of absolute identity.]

[Footnote 247: I.e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.]

[Footnote 248: Upapadita/m/ /k/eti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti /s/esha/h/. Upapadanaprakara/m/ su/k/ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner ityadinaikaprasavatvam, yatha sarvasam apam ityadina /k/aikapralayatva/m/ sarvasyoktam. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 249: So according to Go. An. and An. Gi., although their interpretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekam of the text.—Ka/mk/id evaikam iti jivasthanad anyam ity artha/h/. Go. An.—Jivabhavena pratibimbadharatiriktam ity artha/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 250: While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.]

[Footnote 251: I.e. that the operative cause and the substantial cause are separate things.]

[Footnote 252: Viz. the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti.]



SECOND ADHYAYA.

FIRST PADA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. If it be objected that (from the doctrine expounded hitherto) there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis; we do not admit that objection, because (from the rejection of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other Sm/ri/tis.

It has been shown in the first adhyaya that the omniscient Lord of all is the cause of the origin of this world in the same way as clay is the material cause of jars and gold of golden ornaments; that by his rulership he is the cause of the subsistence of this world once originated, just as the magician is the cause of the subsistence of the magical illusion; and that he, lastly, is the cause of this emitted world being finally reabsorbed into his essence, just as the four classes of creatures are reabsorbed into the earth. It has further been proved, by a demonstration of the connected meaning of all the Vedanta-texts, that the Lord is the Self of all of us. Moreover, the doctrines of the pradhana, and so on, being the cause of this world have been refuted as not being scriptural.—The purport of the second adhyaya, which we now begin, is to refute the objections (to the doctrine established hitherto) which might be founded on Sm/ri/ti and Reasoning, and to show that the doctrines of the pradhana, &c. have only fallacious arguments to lean upon, and that the different Vedanta-texts do not contradict one another with regard to the mode of creation and similar topics.—The first point is to refute the objections based on Sm/ri/ti.

Your doctrine (the purvapakshin says) that the omniscient Brahman only is the cause of this world cannot be maintained, 'because there results from it the fault of there being no room for (certain) Sm/ri/tis.' Such Sm/ri/tis are the one called Tantra which was composed by a /ri/shi and is accepted by authoritative persons, and other Sm/ri/tis based on it[253]; for all of which there would be no room if your interpretation of the Veda were the true one. For they all teach that the non-intelligent pradhana is the independent cause of the world. There is indeed room (a raison d'etre) for Sm/ri/tis like the Manu-sm/ri/ti, which give information about matters connected with the whole body of religious duty, characterised by injunction[254] and comprising the agnihotra and similar performances. They tell us at what time and with what rites the members of the different castes are to be initiated; how the Veda has to be studied; in what way the cessation of study has to take place; how marriage has to be performed, and so on. They further lay down the manifold religious duties, beneficial to man, of the four castes and a/s/ramas[255]. The Kapila Sm/ri/ti, on the other hand, and similar books are not concerned with things to be done, but were composed with exclusive reference to perfect knowledge as the means of final release. If then no room were left for them in that connexion also, they would be altogether purposeless; and hence we must explain the Vedanta-texts in such a manner as not to bring them into conflict with the Sm/ri/tis mentioned[256].—But how, somebody may ask the purvapakshin, can the eventual fault of there being left no room for certain Sm/ri/tis be used as an objection against that sense of /S/ruti which—from various reasons as detailed under I, 1 and ff.—has been ascertained by us to be the true one, viz. that the omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the world?—Our objection, the purvapakshin replies, will perhaps not appear valid to persons of independent thought; but as most men depend in their reasonings on others, and are unable to ascertain by themselves the sense of /S/ruti, they naturally rely on Sm/ri/tis, composed by celebrated authorities, and try to arrive at the sense of /S/ruti with their assistance; while, owing to their esteem for the authors of the Sm/ri/tis, they have no trust in our explanations. The knowledge of men like Kapila Sm/ri/ti declares to have been /ri/shi-like and unobstructed, and moreover there is the following /S/ruti-passage, 'It is he who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the son, the /ri/shi, kapila[257], whom he wishes to look on while he is born' (/S/ve. Up. V, 2). Hence their opinion cannot be assumed to be erroneous, and as they moreover strengthen their position by argumentation, the objection remains valid, and we must therefore attempt to explain the Vedanta-texts in conformity with the Sm/ri/tis.

This objection we dispose of by the remark, 'It is not so because therefrom would result the fault of want of room for other Sm/ri/tis.'—If you object to the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world on the ground that it would render certain Sm/ri/tis purposeless, you thereby render purposeless other Sm/ri/tis which declare themselves in favour of the said doctrine. These latter Sm/ri/ti-texts we will quote in what follows. In one passage the highest Brahman is introduced as the subject of discussion, 'That which is subtle and not to be known;' the text then goes on, 'That is the internal Self of the creatures, their soul,' and after that remarks 'From that sprang the Unevolved, consisting of the three gu/n/as, O best of Brahma/n/as.' And in another place it is said that 'the Unevolved is dissolved in the Person devoid of qualities, O Brahma/n/a.'—Thus we read also in the Pura/n/a, 'Hear thence this short statement: The ancient Naraya/n/a is all this; he produces the creation at the due time, and at the time of reabsorption he consumes it again.' And so in the Bhagavadgita also (VII, 6), 'I am the origin and the place of reabsorption of the whole world.' And Apastamba too says with reference to the highest Self, 'From him spring all bodies; he is the primary cause, he is eternal, he is unchangeable' (Dharma Sutra I, 8, 23, 2). In this way Sm/ri/ti, in many places, declares the Lord to be the efficient as well as the material cause of the world. As the purvapakshin opposes us on the ground of Sm/ri/ti, we reply to him on the ground of Sm/ri/ti only; hence the line of defence taken up in the Sutra. Now it has been shown already that the /S/ruti-texts aim at conveying the doctrine that the Lord is the universal cause, and as wherever different Sm/ri/tis conflict those maintaining one view must be accepted, while those which maintain the opposite view must be set aside, those Sm/ri/tis which follow /S/ruti are to be considered as authoritative, while all others are to be disregarded; according to the Sutra met with in the chapter treating of the means of proof (Mim. Sutra I, 3, 3), 'Where there is contradiction (between /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti) (Sm/ri/ti) is to be disregarded; in case of there being no (contradiction) (Sm/ri/ti is to be recognised) as there is inference (of Sm/ri/ti being founded on /S/ruti).'—Nor can we assume that some persons are able to perceive supersensuous matters without /S/ruti, as there exists no efficient cause for such perception. Nor, again, can it be said that such perception may be assumed in the case of Kapila and others who possessed supernatural powers, and consequently unobstructed power of cognition. For the possession of supernatural powers itself depends on the performance of religious duty, and religious duty is that which is characterised by injunction[258]; hence the sense of injunctions (i.e. of the Veda) which is established first must not be fancifully interpreted in reference to the dicta of men 'established' (i.e. made perfect, and therefore possessing supernatural powers) afterwards only. Moreover, even if those 'perfect' men were accepted as authorities to be appealed to, still, as there are many such perfect men, we should have, in all those cases where the Sm/ri/tis contradict each other in the manner described, no other means of final decision than an appeal to /S/ruti.—As to men destitute of the power of independent judgment, we are not justified in assuming that they will without any reason attach themselves to some particular Sm/ri/ti; for if men's inclinations were so altogether unregulated, truth itself would, owing to the multiformity of human opinion, become unstable. We must therefore try to lead their judgment in the right way by pointing out to them the conflict of the Sm/ri/tis, and the distinction founded on some of them following /S/ruti and others not.—The scriptural passage which the purvapakshin has quoted as proving the eminence of Kapila's knowledge would not justify us in believing in such doctrines of Kapila (i.e. of some Kapila) as are contrary to Scripture; for that passage mentions the bare name of Kapila (without specifying which Kapila is meant), and we meet in tradition with another Kapila, viz. the one who burned the sons of Sagara and had the surname Vasudeva. That passage, moreover, serves another purpose, (viz. the establishment of the doctrine of the highest Self,) and has on that account no force to prove what is not proved by any other means, (viz. the supereminence of Kapila's knowledge.) On the other hand, we have a /S/ruti-passage which proclaims the excellence of Manu[259], viz. 'Whatever Manu said is medicine' (Taitt. Sa/m/h. II, 2, 10, 2). Manu himself, where he glorifies the seeing of the one Self in everything ('he who equally sees the Self in all beings and all beings in the Self, he as a sacrificer to the Self attains self-luminousness,' i.e. becomes Brahman, Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 91), implicitly blames the doctrine of Kapila. For Kapila, by acknowledging a plurality of Selfs, does not admit the doctrine of there being one universal Self. In the Mahabharata also the question is raised whether there are many persons (souls) or one; thereupon the opinion of others is mentioned, 'There are many persons, O King, according to the Sa@nkhya and Yoga philosophers;' that opinion is controverted 'just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities;' and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, 'He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one. He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will and liking.' And Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, 'When to a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity?' (I/s/. Up 7); and other similar passages. All which proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not only by the assumption of an independent pradhana. The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition.

Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room for certain Sm/ri/tis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection.—An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following Sutra.

2. And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according to the Sa@nkhya system).

The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sa@nkhya) Sm/ri/ti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience. Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Sm/ri/ti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila's great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience—no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense—Sm/ri/ti is altogether impossible. That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1. But if that part of Sm/ri/ti which is concerned with the effects (i.e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise. This is what the Sutra means to say.—We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Sm/ri/tis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.—The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sa@nkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.

3. Thereby the Yoga (Sm/ri/ti) is refuted.

This Sutra extends the application of the preceding argumentation, and remarks that by the refutation of the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti the Yoga-sm/ri/ti also is to be considered as refuted; for the latter also assumes, in opposition to Scripture, a pradhana as the independent cause of the world, and the 'great principle,' &c. as its effects, although neither the Veda nor common experience favour these views.—But, if the same reasoning applies to the Yoga also, the latter system is already disposed of by the previous arguments; of what use then is it formally to extend them to the Yoga? (as the Sutra does.)—We reply that here an additional cause of doubt presents itself, the practice of Yoga being enjoined in the Veda as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge; so, for instance, B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5, '(The Self) is to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated upon[260].' In the /S/veta/s/vatara Upanishad, moreover, we find various injunctions of Yoga-practice connected with the assumption of different positions of the body; &c.; so, for instance, 'Holding his body with its three erect parts even,' &c. (II, 8).

Further, we find very many passages in the Veda which (without expressly enjoining it) point to the Yoga, as, for instance, Ka. Up. II, 6, 11, 'This, the firm holding back of the senses, is what is called Yoga;' 'Having received this knowledge and the whole rule of Yoga' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 18); and so on. And in the Yoga-/s/astra itself the passage, 'Now then Yoga, the means of the knowledge of truth,' &c. defines the Yoga as a means of reaching perfect knowledge. As thus one topic of the /s/astra at least (viz. the practice of Yoga) is shown to be authoritative, the entire Yoga-sm/ri/ti will have to be accepted as unobjectionable, just as the Sm/ri/ti referring to the ash/t/akas[261].—To this we reply that the formal extension (to the Yoga, of the arguments primarily directed against the Sa@nkhya) has the purpose of removing the additional doubt stated in the above lines; for in spite of a part of the Yoga-sm/ri/ti being authoritative, the disagreement (between Sm/ri/ti and /S/ruti) on other topics remains as shown above.—Although[262] there are many Sm/ri/tis treating of the soul, we have singled out for refutation the Sa@nkhya and Yoga because they are widely known as offering the means for accomplishing the highest end of man and have found favour with many competent persons. Moreover, their position is strengthened by a Vedic passage referring to them, 'He who has known that cause which is to be apprehended by Sa@nkhya and Yoga he is freed from all fetters' (/S/ve. Up. VI, 13). (The claims which on the ground of this last passage might be set up for the Sa@nkhya and Yoga-sm/ri/tis in their entirety) we refute by the remark that the highest beatitude (the highest aim of man) is not to be attained by the knowledge of the Sa@nkhya-sm/ri/ti irrespective of the Veda, nor by the road of Yoga-practice. For Scripture itself declares that there is no other means of obtaining the highest beatitude but the knowledge of the unity of the Self which is conveyed by the Veda, 'Over death passes only the man who knows him; there is no other path to go' (/S/ve. Up. III, 8). And the Sa@nkhya and Yoga-systems maintain duality, do not discern the unity of the Self. In the passage quoted ('That cause which is to be apprehended by Sa@nkhya and Yoga') the terms 'Sa@nkhya' and 'Yoga' denote Vedic knowledge and meditation, as we infer from proximity[263]. We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems which do not contradict the Veda. In their description of the soul, for instance, as free from all qualities the Sa@nkhyas are in harmony with the Veda which teaches that the person (purusha) is essentially pure; cp. B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 16. 'For that person is not attached to anything.' The Yoga again in giving rules for the condition of the wandering religious mendicant admits that state of retirement from the concerns of life which is known from scriptural passages such as the following one, 'Then the parivrajaka with discoloured (yellow) dress, shaven, without any possessions,' &c. (Jabala Upan. IV).

The above remarks will serve as a reply to the claims of all argumentative Sm/ri/tis. If it be said that those Sm/ri/tis also assist, by argumentation and proof, the cognition of truth, we do not object to so much, but we maintain all the same that the truth can be known from the Vedanta-texts only; as is stated by scriptural passages such as 'None who does not know the Veda perceives that great one' (Taitt. Br. III, 12, 9, 7); 'I now ask thee that person taught in the Upanishads' (B/ri/. Up, III, 9, 26); and others.

4. (Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (viz. the world); and its being such, (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from Scripture.

The objections, founded on Sm/ri/ti, against the doctrine of Brahman being the efficient and the material cause of this world have been refuted; we now proceed to refute those founded on Reasoning.—But (to raise an objection at the outset) how is there room for objections founded on Reasoning after the sense of the sacred texts has once been settled? The sacred texts are certainly to be considered absolutely authoritative with regard to Brahman as well as with regard to religious duty (dharma).—(To this the purvapakshin replies), The analogy between Brahman and dharma would hold good if the matter in hand were to be known through the holy texts only, and could not be approached by the other means of right knowledge also. In the case of religious duties, i.e. things to be done, we indeed entirely depend on Scripture. But now we are concerned with Brahman which is an accomplished existing thing, and in the case of accomplished things there is room for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other elements shows. And just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so /S/ruti, if in conflict with other means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter. Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than /S/ruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely. And the knowledge of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition—sakshatkara—of Brahman), and as such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like dharma)[264]. Moreover, the scriptural passage, 'He is to be heard, to be thought,' enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman. Hence an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, 'Not so, on account of the difference of nature of this (effect).'—The Vedantic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different character from the cause. For this world, which the Vedantin considers as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure, consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent and pure. But things of an altogether different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect. Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is gold the material cause of earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the nature of gold from gold. In the same manner this world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character. The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence. It is impure because being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on. It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity. For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).—But, it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.—This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master. For a being endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for nor against any other being. For the Sa@nkhyas are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking in or giving out anything[265], and are non-active. Hence that only which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument. Nor[266] is there anything to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent is well established. This world therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.—Here somebody might argue as follows. Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be intelligent. The absence of manifestation of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of the modification[267]. Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists). In consequence of this difference produced by the manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature. And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent).—This reasoning—the purvapakshin replies—if valid might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still remain that other difference which results from the fact that the one is pure and the other impure. But in reality the argumentation of the objector does not even remove the first-named difference; as is declared in the latter part of the Sutra, 'And its being such we learn from Scripture.' For the assumption of the intellectuality of the entire world—which is supported neither by perception nor by inference, &c.—must be considered as resting on Scripture only in so far as the latter speaks of the world as having originated from an intelligent cause; but that scriptural statement itself is contradicted by other texts which declare the world to be 'of such a nature,' i.e. of a nature different from that of its material cause. For the scriptural passage, 'It became that which is knowledge and that which is devoid of knowledge' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), which teaches that a certain class of beings is of a non-intelligent nature intimates thereby that the non-intelligent world is different from the intelligent Brahman.—But—somebody might again object—the sacred texts themselves sometimes speak of the elements and the bodily organs, which are generally considered to be devoid of intelligence, as intelligent beings. The following passages, for instance, attribute intelligence to the elements. 'The earth spoke;' 'The waters spoke' (/S/at. Br. VI, 1, 3, 2; 4); and, again, 'Fire thought;' 'Water thought' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3; 4). Other texts attribute intelligence to the bodily organs, 'These pra/n/as when quarrelling together as to who was the best went to Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. VI, 1, 7); and, again, 'They said to Speech: Do thou sing out for us' (B/ri/. Up. I, 3, 2).—To this objection the purvapakshin replies in the following Sutra.