24. This follows also from the textual connexion (of those stories with injunctions).

That those stories subserve injunctions of meditation is proved thereby also that they are exhibited in textual connexion with injunctions such as 'the Self is to be seen,' and so on. Their position therefore is analogous to that of other stories told in the texts, which somehow subserve injunctions of works, and are not merely meant for purposes of recitation.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the priplava.'



25. For this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire and so on.

The Stras return, from their digression into the discussion of two special points, to the question as to those whose condition of life involves chastity. The above Stra declares that as persons of that class are referred to by Scripture as specially concerned with meditation ('He who is founded on Brahman reaches immortality;' 'those who in the forest,' &c.), their meditation does not presuppose a knowledge of the kindling of fire and so on, i.e. a knowledge of the Agnihotra, the Darsaprnamsa, and all those other sacrifices which require the preliminary establishnlent of the sacred fires, but a knowledge of those works only which are enjoined for their special condition of life.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the kindling of the fire.'



26. And there is need of all (works), on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the rest; as in the case of the horse.

If knowledge (meditation), without any reference to sacrifices and the like, is able to bring about immortality, it must be capable of accomplishing this in the case of householders also; and the mention made of sacrifices and the rest in texts such as 'Brhmanas seek to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22), does not prove sacrifices and so on to be auxiliary to knowledge, since the stress there lies (not on the sacrifices and so on, but) on the desire of knowledge.—Of this view the Stra disposes. In the case of householders, for whom the Agnihotra and so on are obligatory, knowledge presupposes all those works, since scriptural texts such as the one quoted directly state that sacrifices and the like are auxiliary to knowledge. 'They seek to know by means of sacrifices' can be said only if sacrifices are understood to be a means through which knowledge is brought about; just as one can say 'he desires to slay with a sword,' because the sword is admitted to be an instrument wherewith one can kill. What we have to understand by knowledge in this connexion has been repeatedly explained, viz. a mental energy different in character from the mere cognition of the sense of texts, and more specifically denoted by such terms as dhyna or upsana, i.e. meditation; which is of the nature of remembrance (i.e. representative thought), but in intuitive clearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought (pratyaksha); which by constant daily practice becomes ever more perfect, and being duly continued up to death secures final Release. Such meditation is originated in the mind through the grace of the Supreme Person, who is pleased and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of sacrifice and worship duly performed by the Devotee day after day. This is what the text 'they seek to know through the sacrifice' really means. The conclusion therefore is that in the case of householders knowledge has for its pre-requisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent and occasional obligation. 'As a horse.' As the horse, which is a means of locomotion for man, requires attendants, grooming, &c., so knowledge, although itself the means of Release, demands the co-operation of the different works. Thus the Lord himself says, 'The work of sacrifice, giving, and austerities is not to be relinquished, but is indeed to be performed; for sacrifices, gifts, and austerities are purifying to the thoughtful.' 'He from whom all beings proceed and by whom all this is pervaded-worshipping Him with the proper works man attains to perfection' (Bha. G. XVIII, 5; 46).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the need of all.'



27. But all the same he must be possessed of calmness, subjection of the senses, &c., since those are enjoined as auxiliaries to that, and must necessarily be accomplished.

The question is whether the householder also must practise calmness and so on, or not. The Prvapakshin says he must not, since the performance of works implies the activity of the outer and inner organs of action, and since calmness and so on are of an exactly opposite nature.—This view the Stra sets aside. The householder also, although engaged in outward activity, must, in so far as he possesses knowledge, practise calmness of mind and the rest also; for these qualities or states are by Scripture enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge, 'Therefore he who knows this, having become calm, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, should see the Self in Self (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23). As calmness of mind and the rest are seen, in so far as implying composure and concentration of mind, to promote the origination of knowledge, they also must necessarily be aimed at and practised. Nor can it be said that between works on the one side and calmness and so on on the other, there is an absolute antagonism; for the two have different spheres of application. Activity of the organs of action is the proper thing in the case of works enjoined; quiescence in the case of works not enjoined and such as have no definite purpose. Nor also can it be objected that in the case of works implying the activity of organs, calmness of mind and so on are impossible, the mind then being necessarily engrossed by the impressions of the present work and its surroundings; for works enjoined by Scripture have the power of pleasing the Supreme Person, and hence, through his grace, to cause the destruction of all mental impressions obstructive of calmness and concentration of mind. Hence calmness of mind and the rest are to be aimed at and practised by householders also.— Here terminates the adhikarana of 'calmness' and so on.



28. And there is permission of all food in the case of danger of life; on account of this being seen.

In the meditation on prna, according to the Vjasaneyins and the Chndogas, there is a statement as to all food being allowed to him who knows the prna. 'By him there is nothing eaten that is not food' (Bri. Up. VI, 1, 14; and so on). A doubt here arises whether this permission of all food is valid for him who possesses the knowledge of prna, in all circumstances, or only in the case of life being in danger.—The Prvapakshin holds the former view, on account of no special conditions being stated in the text.—This the Stra sets aside 'in the case of danger to life'; for the reason that, as the text shows, the eating of food of all kinds is permitted even for those who know Brahman itself— the knowledge of which of course is higher than that of prna—only when their life is in danger. The text alluded to is the one telling how Ushasta Kkryana, who was well versed in the knowledge of Brahman, once, when in great distress, ate unlawful food. We therefore conclude that what the text says as to all food being lawful for him who knows prna, can refer only to occasions when food of any kind must be eaten in order to preserve life.



29. And on account of non-sublation.

The conclusion above arrived at is confirmed by the consideration that thus only those texts are not stultified which enjoin, for those who know Brahman, purity in matters of food with a view to the origination of knowledge of Brahman. Cp.' when the food is pure the mind becomes pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2).



30. This is said in Smriti also.

That for those as well who know Brahman, as for others, the eating of food of any kind is lawful only in case of extreme need, Smriti also declares, 'He who being in danger of his life eats food from anywhere is stained by sin no more than the lotus leaf by water.'



31. And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-proceeding according to liking.

The above conclusion is further confirmed by a scriptural passage prohibiting licence of conduct on the part of any one. The text meant is a passage in the Samhit of the Kathas, 'Therefore a Brahmawa does not drink spirituous liquor, thinking "may I not be stained by sin."'—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the allowance of all food.'



32. The works of the sramas also, on account of their being enjoined.

It has been said that sacrifices and other works are auxiliary to the knowledge of Brahman. The doubt now arises whether those works are to be performed by him also who merely wishes to fulfil the duties of his srama, without aiming at final Release, or not. They are not, the Prvapakshin holds, for that things auxiliary to knowledge should stand in subordinate relation to a certain state of life would imply the contradiction of permanent and non-permanent obligation.—Of this view the Stra disposes, 'The works of the sramas also.' The works belonging to each srama have to be performed by those also who do not aim at more than to live according to the srama; for they are specifically enjoined by texts such as as long as life lasts he is to offer the Agnihotra'; this implies a permanent obligation dependent on life. And that the same works are also to be performed as being auxiliary to knowledge appears from the texts enjoining them in that aspect, 'Him they seek to know by the study of the Veda' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22); this the next Stra declares.



33. And on account of co-operativeness.

These works are to be performed also on account of their being co- operative towards knowledge in so far, namely, as they give rise to the desire of knowledge; and their thus being enjoined for a double purpose does not imply contradiction any more than the double injunctions of the Agnihotra, which one text connects with the life of the sacrificer and another text with his desire to reach the heavenly world.—Nor does this imply a difference of works—this the next Stra declares.



34. In any case they are the same, on account of twofold inferential signs.

There is no radical difference of works; but in any case, i.e. whether they be viewed as duties incumbent on the srama or as auxiliary to knowledge, sacrifices and other works are one and the same. For Scripture, in enjoining them in both these aspects, makes use of the same terms, so that we recognise the same acts, and there is no means of proof to establish difference of works.



35. And Scripture also declares (knowledge) not to be overpowered.

Texts such as 'By works of sacred duty he drives away evil' declare that sacrifices and similar works have the effect of knowledge 'not being overpowered,' i.e. of the origination of knowledge not being obstructed by evil works. Sacrifices and similar works being performed day after day have the effect of purifying the mind, and owing to this, knowledge arises in the mind with ever increasing brightness. This proves that the works are the same in either case.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the being enjoined' (of sacrifices, and so on).



36. Also in the case of those outside, as this is seen.

It has been declared that the members of the four sramas have a claim to the knowledge of Brahman, and that the duties connected with each srarna promote knowledge. A doubt now arises whether those men also who, on account of poverty and so on, stand outside the sramas are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman, or rtot.—They are not, the Prvapakshin holds, since such knowledge is to be attained in a way dependent on the special duties of each srama; while those who do not belong to an srama are not concerned with srama duties.—This view the Stra rejects. Those also who do not stand within any srama are qualified for knowledge, 'because that is seen,' i.e. because the texts declare that men such as Raikva, Bhshma, Samvarta and others who did not belong to srama were well grounded in the knowledge of Brahman. It can by no means be maintained that it is srama duties only that promote knowledge; for the text 'by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and so on' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 22) distinctly declares that charity also and other practices, which are not confined to the sramas, are helpful towards knowledge. In the same way as in the case of those bound to chastity—who, as the texts show, may possess the knowledge of Brahman—knowledge is promoted by practices other than the Agnihotra and the like, so—it is concluded—in the case of those also who do not belong to any abrama knowledge may be promoted by certain practices not exclusively connected with any srama, such as prayer, fasting, charity, propitiation of the divinity, and so on.



37. Smriti also states this.

Smriti also declares that men not belonging to an srama grow in knowledge through prayer and the like. 'Through prayer also a Brhmana may become perfect. May he perform other works or not, one who befriends all creatures is called a Brhmana' (Manu Smri. II, 17).



38. And there is the promotion (of knowledge) through special acts (of duty).

The above conclusion is founded not only on Reasoning and Smriti; but Scripture even directly states that knowledge is benefited by practices not exclusively prescribed for the sramas, 'By penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge he is to seek the Self (Pr. Up. I, 10).



39. But better than that is the other also on account of an inferential mark.

Better than to be outside the sramas is the condition of standing within an srama. The latter state may be due to misfortune; but he who can should be within an srama, which state is the more holy and beneficial one. This follows from inference only, i.e. Smriti; for Smriti says, 'A Brhmana is to remain outside the sramas not even for one day.' For one who has passed beyond the stage of Brahmakarya, or whose wife has died, the impossibility to procure a wife constitutes the misfortune (which prevents him from belonging to an srama).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'widowers.'



40. But of him who has become that there is no becoming not that, according to Jaimini also, on account of (Scripture) restraining from the absence of the forms of that.

The doubt here arises whether those also who have fallen from the state of life of a Naishthika, Vaikhnasa or Privrjaka are qualified for the knowledge of Brahman or not.—They are so, since in their case, no less than in that of widowers and the like, the growth of knowledge may be assisted by charity and other practices not confined to sramas.—This prim facie view the Stra sets aside. 'He who has become that,' i.e. he who has entered on the condition of a Naishthika or the like 'cannot become not that,' i.e. may not live in a non-srama condition; since scriptural texts restrain men who once have entered the Naishthika, &c., state 'from the absence of the forms of that,' i.e. from the discontinuance of the special duties of their srama. Compare texts such as 'He is to go into the forest, and is not to return from thence'; 'Having renounced the world he is not to return.' And hence persons who have lapsed from their srama are not qualified for meditation on Brahman. This view of his the Strakra strengthens by a reference to the opinion of Jaimini.—But cannot a Naishthika who, through some sin, has lapsed from his duties and position, make up for his transgression by some expiatory act and thus again become fit for meditation on Brahman?—To this point the next Stra refers.



41. Nor the (expiatory performance) described in the chapter treating of qualification; that being impossible on account of the Smriti referring to such lapse.

Those expiatory performances which are described in the chapter treating of qualification (P. M. S. VI) are not possible in the case of him who has lapsed from the condition of a Naishthika; since such expiations do not apply to him, as is shown by a Smriti text referring to such lapse, viz. 'He who having once entered on the duties of a Naishthika lapses from them, for such a slayer of the Self I do not see any expiatory work by which he might become clean.' The expiatory ceremony referred to in the Prva Mimms therefore applies to the case of other Brahmakrins only.



42. A minor one, thus some; (and hence they hold) the existence (of expiation), as in the case of eating. This has been explained.

Some teachers are of opinion that even on the part of Naishthikas and the rest the lapse from chastity constitutes only a minor offence which can be atoned for by expiatory observances; in the same way as in the case of the eating of forbidden food the same pryaskitta may be used by the ordinary Brahmakrin and by Naishthikas and the rest. This has been stated by the Smriti writer, 'For the others also (i.e. the Naishthikas and so on) the same (rules and practices as those for the Upakurvna) hold good, in so far as not opposed to their srama.'



43. But in either case (such men) stand outside; on account of Smriti and custom.

Whether the point under discussion constitutes a minor or a major offence, in any case those who have lapsed stand outside the category of those qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. For Smriti, i.e. the text quoted above, 'I see no expiatory performance by which he, a slayer of Brahman as he is, could become pure again,' declares that expiations are powerless to restore purity. And custom confirms the same conclusion; for good men shun those Naishthikas who have lapsed, even after they have performed pryaskittas, and do not impart to them the knowledge of Brahman, The conclusion, therefore, is that such men are not qualified for knowing Brahman.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'him who has become that.'



44. By the Lord (of the sacrifice), since Scripture declares a fruit— thus treya thinks.

A doubt arises whether the meditations on such constituent elements of the sacrifice as the Udgtha, and so on, are to be performed by the sacrificer (for whose benefit the sacrifice is offered), or by the officiating priests. treya advocates the former view; on the ground of Scripture showing that in the case of such meditations as the one on the small ether within the heart, fruit and meditation belong to the same person, and that in the case of such meditations as the one on the Udgtha the fruit belongs to the sacrificer (whence we conclude that the meditation also is his). Nor can it be said that the sacrificer is not competent for such meditation, for the reason that like the godohana vessel it is connected with an element of the sacrifice (which latter the priests only can perform). For the godohana vessel serves to bring water, and this of course none else can do but the Adhvaryu; while a meditation on the Udgtha as being the essence of all essences can very well be performed by the Sacrificer—true though it be that the Udgtha itself can be performed by the Udgtri priest only.—Against this view the next Stra declares itself.



45. (They are) the priest's work, Audulomi thinks; since for that he is engaged.

The teacher Audulomi is of opinion that the meditation on the Udgtha and the like is the work of the priest, since it is he who is engaged for the purpose of performing that which gives rise to the fruit, i.e. of the entire sacrifice with all its subordinate parts. Injunctions referring to the performance of the sacrifices such as 'he chooses the priests; he gives to the priests their fee' indicate that the entire sacrificial performance is the work of the priests, and that hence all activities comprised within it—mental as well as bodily—belong to the priests. Capability or non-capability does not constitute the criterion in this case. For although the meditations in question aim directly at the benefit of man (not at the greater perfection of the sacrifice), yet since they fall within the sphere of qualification of those who are qualified for the sacrifice, and since the sacrifice with all its subordinate elements has to be performed by the priests, and since the text 'whatever he does with knowledge that becomes more vigorous' declares knowledge to belong to the same agent as the works which are benefited by such knowledge, we conclude that those meditations also are the exclusive duty of the priests. In the case of the meditations on the small ether, &c., on the other hand, the text says nothing as to their having to be performed by priests, and we therefore assume in accordance with the general principle that 'the fruit belongs to the performer,' that the agent there is the person to whom Scripture assigns the fruit.— Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the lord (of the sacrifice).'



46. There is injunction of other auxiliary means for him who is such, as in the case of injunction and so on; (the term mauna denoting) according to an alternative meaning a third something.

'Therefore let a Brhmana after he has done with learning wish to stand by a childlike state; and after having done with the childlike state and learning (he is) a Muni' (Bri. Up. III, 5). A doubt arises whether this text enjoins Muni-hood in the same way as it enjoins learning and the childlike state, or merely refers to it as something already established.— The Purvapakshin holds the latter view on the ground that as 'Muni-hood' and 'learning' both connote knowledge, the word 'Muni' merely refers back to the knowledge already enjoined in the phrase 'after he has done with learning.' For the text presents no word of injunctive force with regard to Muni-hood.—This view the Stra controverts. 'For him who is such,' i.e. for those who possess knowledge, 'there is an injunction of a different co-operative factor' 'in the same way as injunctions and the rest.' By the injunctions in the last clause we have to understand the special duties of the different sramas, i.e. sacrifices and the like, and also such qualifications as quietness of mind and the like; and by the 'and the rest' is meant the learning of and pondering on the sacred texts. Stated at length, the meaning of the Stra then is as follows—in the same way as texts such as 'him Brhmanas seek to know through the reciting of the Veda, through sacrifices and charity, and so on,' and 'Quiet, subdued,' &c. (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23) enjoin sacrifices and so on, and quietness of mind and the like, as helpful towards knowledge; and as texts such as 'the Self is to be heard, to be pondered upon' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) mention hearing and pondering as helpful towards knowledge; thus the text under discussion enjoins learning, a childlike state of mind, and Muni-hood as three further different auxiliaries of knowledge.—'Muni-hood' does not denote the same thing as 'learning'—this the Stra intimates by the clause 'alternatively a third,' i.e. as the word muni is observed alternatively to denote persons such as Vysa distinguished by their power of profound reflection (manana), the abstract term munihood denotes a third thing different from learning and the 'childlike state.' Hence, although the phrase 'then a Muni' does not contain a word of directly injunctive power, we must all the same understand it in an injunctive sense, viz. 'then let him be or become a Muni'; for Muni-hood is not something previously established. Such munihood is also something different from mere reflection (manana); it is the reiterated representation before the mind of the object of meditation, the idea of that object thus becoming more and more vivid. The meaning of the entire text therefore is as follows. A Brhmana is at first fully to master knowledge, i.e. he is to attain, by means of hearing and pondering, to the knowledge of Brahman in all its fulness and perfection. This is to be effected through the growth of purity of mind and heart, due to the grace of the Lord; for this Smriti declares, 'Neither by the Vedas nor by austerities, and so on, can I be so seen—; but by devotion exclusive I may be known' (Bha. G. XI, 53-54); and Scripture also says, 'Who has the highest devotion for God' (Svet. Up. VI, 23), and 'That Self cannot be gained by the study of the Veda,' &c. 'He whom the Self chooses by him the Self is to be attained' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23). After that 'he is to stand by a childlike state'; what this means will be explained further on. And after that he is to be a Muni, i.e. he is to fix his thoughts so exclusively and persistently on Brahman as to attain to the mode of knowledge called meditation. Having by the employment of these three means reached true knowledge he—the text goes on to say—having done with amauna and mauna is a Brhmana. Amauna, i.e. non-mauna, denotes all the auxiliaries of knowledge different from mauna: employing these and mauna as well he reaches the highest goal of knowledge. And, the text further says, there is no other means but those stated whereby to become such, i.e. a true Brhmana. The entire text thus evidently means to enjoin on any one standing within any srama learning, a childlike state, and mauna as auxiliary means of knowledge, in addition to sacrifices and the other special duties of the sramas.—But, an objection is raised, if knowledge, aided by pnditya, and so on, and thus being auxiliary to the action of the special duties of the sramas, is thus declared to be the means of attaining to Brahman; how then are we to understand the Chndogya's declaring that a man, in order to attain to Brahman, is throughout his life to carry on the duties of a householder [FOOTNOTE 711: 1]?—To this the next Stra replies.

[FOOTNOTE 711:1. Ch. Up. VIII, 13.]



47. But on account of the existence (of knowledge) in all, there is winding up with the householder.

As knowledge belongs to the members of all sramas it belongs to the householder also, and for this reason the Upanishad winds up with the latter. This winding up therefore is meant to illustrate the duties (not of the householder only, but) of the members of all sramas. Analogously in the text under discussion (Bri. Up. III, 5) the clause 'A Brhmana having risen above the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds, wanders about as a mendicant,' intimates duties belonging exclusively to the condition of the wandering beggar, and then the subsequent clause 'therefore let a Brhmana having done with learning,' &c., enjoins pnditya, blya, and mauna (not as incumbent on the privrjaka only, but) as illustrating the duties of all sramas.— This the next Stra explicitly declares.



48. On account of the others also being taught, in the same way as the condition of the Muni.

The injunction, on him who has passed beyond all desire, of mauna preceded by privrjya (wandering about as a mendicant), is meant to illustrate the duties of all sramas. For the duties of the other sramas are taught by Scripture no less than those of the Muni (and the householder). Similarly it was shown above that in the text 'There are three branches of sacred duty—he who is founded on Brahman goes to immortality,' the term 'founded on Brahman' applies equally to members of all sramas.—It therefore remains a settled conclusion that the text under discussion enjoins pnditya, blya, and mauna as being auxiliaries to knowledge in the same way as the other duties of the sramas, such as sacrifices and the rest.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the injunction of other auxiliaries.'



49. Not manifesting itself; on account of the connexion.

In the text discussed above we meet with the word 'blya,' which may mean either 'being a child' or 'being and doing like a child.' The former meaning is excluded, as that particular age which is called childhood cannot be assumed at will. With regard to the latter meaning, however, a doubt arises, viz. whether the text means to say that he who aims at perfect knowledge is to assume all the ways of a child, as e.g. its wilful behaviour, or only its freedom from pride and the like.—The former, the Prvapakshin maintains. For the text gives no specification, and texts enjoining restraints of different kinds (on the man desirous of knowledge) are sublated by this specific text which enjoins him to be in all points like a child.—This view the Stra disposes of. 'Not manifesting itself.' That aspect of a child's nature which consists in the child not manifesting its nature (viz. in pride, arrogance, and so on), the man aiming at true knowledge is to make his own. 'On account of connexion,' i.e. because thus only the 'balya' of the text gives a possible sense. The other characteristic features of 'childhood' the texts declare to be opposed to knowledge, 'He who has not turned away from wicked conduct, who is not tranquil and attentive, or whose mind is not at peace, he can never attain the Self by knowledge' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24); 'When food is pure, the whole nature becomes pure' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), and so on.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-manifestation.'



50. What belongs to this world, there being no obstruction at hand; as this is seen.

Knowledge, as enjoined by Scripture, is twofold, having for its fruit either exaltation within the sphere of the Samsra, or final Release. With regard to the former the question arises whether it springs up only immediately subsequent to the good works which are the means to bring it about; or, indefinitely, either subsequent to such works or at some later time.—The Prvapakshin holds the former view. A man reaches knowledge through his good deeds only, as the Lord himself declares, 'Four kinds of men doing good works worship me,' &c.(Bha. G. VII, 16); and when those works have been accomplished there is no reason why the result, i.e. knowledge, should be delayed.—This view the Stra disposes of. 'What is comprised in this world,' i.e. meditation, the result of which is worldly exaltation, springs up immediately after the works to which it is due, in case of there being no other works of greater strength obstructing the rise of knowledge; but if there is an obstruction of the latter kind, knowledge springs up later on only. 'For this is seen,' i.e. Scripture acknowledges the effects of such obstruction; for a statement such as 'what he does with knowledge, with faith, with the Upanishad that is more vigorous,' means that works joined with the knowledge of the Udgtha, and so on, produce their results without obstruction (which implies that the action of other works is liable to be obstructed).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what belongs to this world.'



51. In the same way there is non-determination with regard to what has Release for its result; that condition being ascertained, that condition being ascertained.

So likewise in the case of the origination, through works of very great merit, of such knowledge as has for its result final Release, the time is not definitely fixed; for here also there is ascertained the same condition, viz. the termination of the obstruction presented by other works. A further doubt might in this case be raised on the ground that such works as give rise to knowledge leading to final Release are stronger than all other works, and therefore not liable to obstruction. But this doubt is disposed of by the reflection that even in the case of a man knowing Brahman there may exist previous evil deeds of overpowering strength.—The repetition of the last words of the Stra indicates the completion of the adhyya.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'what has Release for its result.'



FOURTH ADHYYA

FIRST PDA.

1. Repetition, on account of the text teaching (what has to be done more than once).

The third adhyya was concerned with the consideration of meditation, together with its means. The Stras now enter on a consideration of the results of meditation, after a further preliminary clearing up of the nature of meditation. The question here arises whether the act of knowledge of Brahman inculcated in Vednta-texts, such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'Having known him thus he passes beyond death,' 'He knows Brahman, he becomes Brahman,' is, in the view of Scripture, to be performed once only, or to be repeated more than once.— Once suffices, the Prvapakshin maintains; for as the text enjoins nothing more than knowing there is no authority for a repetition of the act. Nor can it be said that the act of knowing, analogous to the act of beating the rice-grains until they are freed from the husks, is a visible means towards effecting the intuition of Brahman, and hence must, like the beating, be repeated until the effect is accomplished; for knowing is not a visible means towards anything. Such acts as the Jyotishtoma sacrifice and the knowledge inculcated in the Vednta-texts are alike of the nature of conciliation of the Supreme Person; through whom thus conciliated man obtains all that is beneficial to him, viz. religious duty, wealth, pleasure, and final Release. This has been shown under III, 2, 38. The meaning of Scripture therefore is accomplished by performing the act of knowledge once only, as the Jyotishtoma is performed once.—This view the Stra sets aside. The meaning of Scripture is fulfilled only by repeated acts of knowledge 'on account of teaching,' i.e. because the teaching of Scripture is conveyed by means of the term 'knowing' (vedana), which is synonymous with meditating (dhyna, upsana). That these terms are so synonymous appears from the fact that the verbs vid, ups, dhyi are in one and the same text used with reference to one and the same object of knowledge. A text begins, e. g. 'Let him meditate (upsta) on mind as Brahman,' and concludes 'he who knows (veda) this shines, warms,' &c. (Ch. Up. III, 18). In the same way the knowledge of Raikva is at first referred to by means of vid, 'He who knows (veda) what he knows is thus spoken of by me,' and further on by means of ups,'teach me the deity on which you meditate' (Ch. Up. IV, 1, 2). Similarly texts which have the same meaning as the text 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest'—viz. 'the Self should be seen, be heard, be reflected on, be meditated upon (nididhysitavya)'—'Then he sees him meditating (dhyyamna) on him as without parts' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8), and others—use the verb dhyi to express the meaning of vid. Now dhyi means to think of something not in the way of mere representation (smriti), but in the way of continued representation. And ups has the same meaning; for we see it used in the sense of thinking with uninterrupted concentration of the mind on one object. We therefore conclude that as the verb 'vid' is used interchangeably with dhyi and ups, the mental activity referred to in texts such as 'he knows Brahman' and the like is an often-repeated continuous representation.



2. And on account of an inferential mark.

Inferential mark here means Smriti. Smriti also declares that that knowledge which effects Release is of the nature of continued representation. Meditation therefore has to be repeated.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'repetition.'



3. But as the Self; this (the ancient Devotees) acknowledge (since the texts) make (them) apprehend (in that way).

The following point is now taken into consideration. Is Brahman to be meditated upon as something different from the meditating Devotee, or as the Self of the latter?—The Prvapakshin holds the former view. For, he says, the individual soul is something different from Brahman; as has been proved under II, 1, 22; III, 4, 8; I, 1, 15. And Brahman must be meditated upon as it truly is; for if it is meditated upon under an unreal aspect, the attaining to Brahman also will not be real, according to the principle expressed in the text, 'According as a man's thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 1). This view the Stra sets aside. Brahman is rather to be meditated upon as being the Self of the meditating Devotee. As the meditating individual soul is the Self of its own body, so the highest Brahman is the Self of the individual soul—this is the proper form of meditation.—Why? Because the great Devotees of olden times acknowledged this to be the true nature of meditation; compare the text 'Then I am indeed thou, holy divinity, and thou art me.'—But how can the Devotees claim that Brahman which is a different being is their 'Ego'?—Because the texts enable them to apprehend this relation as one free from contradiction. 'He who dwelling within the Self is different from the Self, whom the Self does not know, of whom the Self is the body, who rules the Self from within; he is thy Self, the inner ruler, the immortal one'(Bri. Up. III, 7, 3); 'In the True all these beings have their root, they dwell in the True, they rest in the True;—in that all that exists has its Self' (Kh. Up. VI, 8); 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Kh. Up. III, 14, 1)—all these texts teach that all sentient and non- sentient beings spring from Brahman, are merged in him, breathe through him, are ruled by him, constitute his body; so that he is the Self of all of them. In the same way therefore as, on the basis of the fact that the individual soul occupies with regard to the body the position of a Self, we form such judgments of co-ordination as 'I am a god—I am a man'; the fact of the individual Self being of the nature of Self justifies us in viewing our own Ego as belonging to the highest Self. On the presupposition of all ideas being finally based on Brahman and hence all words also finally denoting Brahman, the texts therefore make such statements of mutual implication as 'I am thou, O holy divinity, and thou art me.' On this view of the relation of individual soul and highest Self there is no real contradiction between two, apparently contradictory, sets of texts, viz. those on the one hand which negative the view of the soul being different from the highest Self, 'Now if a man meditates upon another divinity, thinking "the divinity is one and I another," he does not know'; 'He is incomplete, let him meditate upon Him as the Self'; 'Everything abandons him who views anything apart from the Self (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10; 7-II, 4, 6); and on the other hand those texts which set forth the view of the soul and the highest Self being different entities, 'Thinking of the (individual) Self and the Mover as different'(Svet. Up. I, 6). For our view implies a denial of difference in so far as the individual 'I' is of the nature of the Self; and it implies an acknowledgment of difference in so far as it allows the highest Self to differ from the individual soul in the same way as the latter differs from its body. The clause 'he is incomplete' (in one of the texts quoted above) refers to the fact that Brahman which is different from the soul constitutes the Self of the soul, while the soul constitutes the body of Brahman.—It thus remains a settled conclusion that Brahman is to be meditated upon as constituting the Self of the meditating Devotee.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'meditation under the aspect of Self.'



4. Not in the symbol; for (the symbol) is not that one (i.e. the Self of the Devotee).

'Let a man meditate on mind as Brahman' (Ch. Up. III, 18, 1); 'He who meditates on name as Brahman' (Ch. Up. VII, 15)—with regard to these and similar meditations on outward symbols (pratka) of Brahman there arises a doubt, viz. whether in them the symbols are to be thought of as of the nature of Self or not. The Prvapakshin holds the former view. For, he says, in form those injunctions do not differ from other injunctions of meditation on Brahman, and Brahman, as we have seen, constitutes the Self of the meditating Devotee.—This view the Stra sets aside. A pratka cannot be meditated on as being of the nature of Self; for the pratka is not the Self of the meditating Devotee. What, in those meditations, is to be meditated upon is the pratka only, not Brahman: the latter enters into the meditation only as qualifying its aspect. For by a meditation on a pratka we understand a meditation in which something that is not Brahman is viewed under the aspect of Brahman, and as the pratka—the object of meditation—is not the Self of the Devotee it cannot be viewed under that form.—But an objection is raised here also, it is Brahman which is the real object of meditation; for where Brahman may be viewed as the object of meditation, it is inappropriate to assume as objects non-sentient things of small power such as the mind, and so on. The object of meditation therefore is Brahman viewed under the aspect of mind, and so on.—This objection the next Stra disposes of.



5. The view of Brahman, on account of superiority.

The view of Brahman may appropriately be superimposed on mind and the like; but not the view of mind, and so on, on Brahman. For Brahman is something superior to mind, and so on; while the latter are inferior to Brahman. To view a superior person, a prince e.g., as a servant would be lowering; while, on the other hand, to view a servant as a prince is exalting.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'symbols.'



6. And the ideas of ditya and the rest on the member; on account of this being rational.

'He who shines up there let a man meditate on him as the Udgtha' (Ch. Up. I, 3, 1).—With regard to this and similar meditations connected with subordinate parts of sacrificial performances there arises the doubt whether the idea of ditya and so on has to be superimposed on the subordinate part of the sacrifice, such as the Udgtha, or vice vers (i. e. whether ditya should be meditated upon under the aspect of the Udgtha, or vice vers).—The Prvapakshin holds the former view. For the general principle is that the lower being should be viewed under the aspect of the higher, and the Udgtha and so on, which are parts of the sacrifices through which certain results are effected, are superior to the divinities who do not accomplish any result.—Of this view the Stra disposes. The ideas of ditya and so on are to be superimposed on the 'members,' i.e. the Udgtha and so on, which are constituent members of the sacrifices; because of the gods only superiority can be established. For it is only through the propitiation of the gods that sacrifices are capable of bringing about their results. The Udgtha and the rest therefore are to be viewed under the aspect of ditya and so on.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ideas of ditya and so on.'



7. Sitting; on account of possibility.

It has been shown that that special form of cognitional activity which the Vednta-texts set forth as the means of accomplishing final Release and which is called meditation (dhyna; upsana) has to be frequently repeated, and is of the nature of continued representation. A question now arises as to the way in which it has to be carried on.—There being no special restrictive rule, the Prvapakshin holds that the Devotee may carry it on either sitting or lying down or standing or walking.—This view the Stra sets aside. Meditation is to be carried on by the Devotee in a sitting posture, since in that posture only the needful concentration of mind can be reached. Standing and walking demand effort, and lying down is conducive to sleep. The proper posture is sitting on some support, so that no effort may be required for holding the body up.



8. And on account of meditation.

Since, as intimated by the text,'the Self is to be meditated upon,' the mental activity in question is of the nature of meditation, it requires as its necessary condition concentration of mind. For by meditation is understood thought directed upon one object and not disturbed by the ideas of other things.



9. And with reference to immobility.

And it is with reference to their immobility that the earth and other inanimate things—the air, the sky, the waters, the mountains—may be spoken of as thinking, 'the earth thinks (dhyyati) as it were,' and so on. Movelessness hence is characteristic of the intensely meditating person also, and such movelessness is to be realised in the sitting posture only.



10. And Smriti texts say the same.

Smriti texts also declare that he only who sits can meditate, 'Having placed his steady seat upon a pure spot, there seated upon that seat, concentrating his mind he should practise Yoga' (Bha. G. VI, 11-12).



11. Where concentration of mind (is possible), there; on account of there being no difference.

As the texts do not say anything as to special places and times, the only requisite of such places and times is that they should favour concentration of mind. This agrees with the declaration 'Let a man apply himself to meditation in a level and clean place, &c., favourable to the mind' (Svet. Up. II, 10).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the sitting one.'



12. Up to death; for there also it is seen.

The question now arises whether the meditation described which is the means of final Release is to be accomplished within one day, or to be continued day after day, until death.—The view that it is accomplished within one day, as this will satisfy the scriptural injunction, is disposed of by the Stra. Meditation is to be continued until death. For Scripture declares that meditation has to take place 'there,' i.e. in the whole period from the first effort after meditation up to death, 'Acting thus as long as life lasts he reaches the world of Brahman.'— Here terminates the adhikarana of 'up to death.'



13. On the attainment of this, there result the non-clinging and the destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared.

Having, so far, elucidated the nature of meditation, the Stras now begin to consider the result of meditation. Scripture declares that on the knowledge of Brahman being attained a man's later and earlier sins do not cling to him but pass away. 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to him who knows this' (Ch. Up. IV, 14, 3); 'Having known that he is not sullied by any evil deed' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 23); 'As the fibres of the Ishk reed when thrown into the fire are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt' (Ch. Up. V, 24, 3); 'All his works perish when He has been beheld who is high and low' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8).— The doubt here arises whether this non-clinging and destruction of all sins is possible as the result of mere meditation, or not.—It is not possible, the Prvapakshin maintains; for Scripture declares, 'no work the fruits of which have not been completely enjoyed perishes even in millions of aeons.' What the texts, quoted above, say as to the non- clinging and destruction of works occurs in sections complementary to passages inculcating knowledge as the means of final Release, and may therefore be understood as somehow meant to eulogize knowledge. Nor can it be said that knowledge is enjoined as an expiation of sins, so that the destruction of sins could be conceived as resulting from such expiation; for knowledge—as we see from texts such as 'He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest,' 'He knows Brahman and he becomes Brahman'— is enjoined as a means to reach Brahman. The texts as to the non- clinging and destruction of sins therefore can only be viewed as arthavda passages supplementary to the texts enjoining knowledge of Brahman.—This view the Stra sets aside. When a man reaches knowledge, the non-clinging and destruction of all sins may be effected through the power of knowledge. For Scripture declares the power of knowledge to be such that 'to him who knows this, no evil deed clings,' and so on. Nor is this in conflict with the text stating that no work not fully enjoyed perishes; for this latter text aims at confirming the power of works to produce their results; while the texts under discussion have for their aim to declare that knowledge when once sprung up possesses the power of destroying the capability of previously committed sins to produce their own evil results and the power of obstructing that capability on the part of future evil actions. The two sets of texts thus refer to different matters, and hence are not mutually contradictory. There is in fact no more contradiction between them than there is between the power of fire to produce heat and the power of water to subdue such heat. By knowledge effecting the non-clinging of sin we have to understand its obstructing the origination of the power, on the part of sin, to cause that disastrous disposition on the part of man which consists in unfitness for religious works; for sins committed tend to render man unfit for religious works and inclined to commit further sinful actions of the same kind. By knowledge effecting the destruction of sin, on the other hand, we understand its destroying that power of sin after it has once originated. That power consists, fundamentally, in displeasure on the part of the Lord. Knowledge of the Lord, which, owing to the supreme dearness of its object is itself supremely dear, possesses the characteristic power of propitiating the Lord—the object of knowledge— and thus destroys the displeasure of the Lord due to the previous commission of sins on the part of the knowing Devotee; and at the same time obstructs the origination of further displeasure on the Lord's part, which otherwise would be caused by sins committed subsequently to the origination of such knowledge. What Scripture says about sin not clinging to him who knows can however be understood only with regard to such sins as spring from thoughtlessness; for texts such as 'he who has not turned away from evil conduct' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 24) teach that meditation, becoming more perfect day after day, cannot be accomplished without the Devotee having previously broken himself off from all evil conduct.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the reaching of that.'



14. Of the other also there is thus non-clinging; but at death.

It has been said that, owing to knowledge, earlier and subsequent sins do not cling and are destroyed. The same holds good also with regard to the other, i.e. to good works—they also, owing to knowledge, do not cling and are destroyed; for there is the same antagonism between knowledge and the fruit of those works, and Scripture moreover expressly declares this. Thus we read, 'Day and night do not pass that bank— neither good nor evil deeds. All sins turn back from it' (Ch. Up. VIII, 4, 1); 'He shakes off his good and evil deeds' (Kau. Up. I, 4). In the former of these texts good works are expressly designated as 'sin' because their fruits also are something not desirable for him who aims at Release; there is some reason for doing this because after all good works are enjoined by Scripture and their fruits are desired by men, and they hence might be thought not to be opposed to knowledge.—But even to him who possesses the knowledge of Brahman, the fruits of good deeds— such as seasonable rain, good crops, &c.—are desirable because they enable him to perform his meditations in due form; how then can it be said that knowledge is antagonistic to them and destroys them?—Of this point the Stra disposes by means of the clause 'but on death.' Good works which produce results favourable to knowledge and meditation perish only on the death of the body (not during the lifetime of the Devotee).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the other.'



15. But only those former works the effects of which have not yet begun; on account of that being the term.

A new doubt arises here, viz. whether all previous good and evil works are destroyed by the origination of knowledge, or only those the effects of which have not yet begun to operate.—All works alike, the Prvapakshin says; for the texts-as e.g. 'all sins are burned'—declare the fruits of knowledge to be the same in all cases; and the fact of the body continuing to exist subsequently to the rise of knowledge may be accounted for by the force of an impulse once imparted, just as in the case of the revolution of a potter's wheel.—This view the Stra sets aside. Only those previous works perish the effects of which have not yet begun to operate; for the text 'For him there is delay as long as he is not delivered from the body' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2) expressly states when the delay of the body's death will come to an end (the body meanwhile continuing to exist through the influence of the anrabdhakrya works). There is no proof for the existence of an impetus accounting for the continuance of the body's life, other than the Lord's pleasure or displeasure caused by—good or evil deeds.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the works the operation of which has not yet begun.'



16. But the Agnihotra and the rest, (because they tend) to that effect only; this being seen.

It might here be said that special works incumbent on the several sramas, as e. g. the Agnihotra, need not be undertaken by those who are not desirous of their results, since these works also fall under the category of good works the result of which does not 'cling.'—This view the Stra sets aside. Such works as the Agnihotra must be performed, since there is no possibility of their results not clinging; for him who knows, those works have knowledge for their exclusive effect. This we learn from Scripture itself: 'Him Brhmanas seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, gifts, austerities, and fasting.' This passage shows that works such as the Agnihotra give rise to knowledge, and as knowledge in order to grow and become more perfect has to be practised day after day until death, the special duties of the srama also, which assist the rise of knowledge, have daily to be performed. Otherwise, those duties being omitted, the mind would lose its clearness and knowledge would not arise.—But if good works such as the Agnihotra only serve the purpose of giving rise to knowledge, and if good works previous to the rise of knowledge perish, according to the texts 'Having dwelt there till their works are consumed' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 5) and 'having obtained the end of his deeds' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6), to what then applies the text 'His sons enter upon his inheritance, his friends upon his good works'?—This point is taken up by the next Stra.



17. According to some (a class of good works) other than these, of both kinds.

The text quoted above from one skh ('His friends enter upon his good deeds') refers to good works other than the Agnihotra and the rest, the only object of which is to give rise to knowledge, viz. to all those manifold good works, previous or subsequent to the attaining to knowledge, the results of which are obstructed by other works of greater strength. Those texts also which declare works not to cling or to be destroyed through knowledge refer to this same class of works.—The next Stra recalls the fact, already previously established, that the results of works actually performed may somehow be obstructed.



18. For (there is the text) 'whatever he does with knowledge.'

The declaration made in the text 'whatever he does with knowledge that is more vigorous,' viz. that the knowledge of the Udgtha has for its result non-obstruction of the result of the sacrifice, implies that the result of works actually performed may be obstructed. We thus arrive at the conclusion that the text of the Styyanins,' his friends enter upon his good works,' refers to those good works of the man possessing knowledge the results of which were somehow obstructed (and hence did not act themselves out during his lifetime, so that on his death they may be transferred to others).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Agnihotra and the rest.'



19. But having destroyed by fruition the other two sets he becomes one with Brahman.

There now arises the doubt whether the good and evil works other than those the non-clinging and destruction of which have been declared, that is to say those works the results of which have begun to act, come to an end together with that bodily existence in which knowledge of Brahman originates, or with the last body due to the action of the works last mentioned, or with another body due to the action of the anrabdhakrya.— The second of these alternatives is the one to be accepted, for there is a text declaring that works come to an end with the deliverance of the Self from the current bodily existence: 'For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body), then he will become one with Brahman' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2).—This view the Stra sets aside. Having destroyed the other good and evil works the results of which had begun to operate by retributive experience he, subsequently to the termination of such retributive enjoyment, becomes one with Brahman. If those good and evil works are such that their fruits may be fully enjoyed within the term of one bodily existence, they come to an end together with the current bodily existence; if they require several bodily existences for the full experience of their results, they come to an end after several existences only. This being so, the deliverance spoken of in the text quoted by the Prvapakshin means deliverance from those works when completely destroyed by retributive enjoyment, not deliverance from bodily existence about which the text says nothing. All those works, on the other hand, good and evil, which were performed before the rise of knowledge and the results of which have not yet begun to operate—works which have gradually accumulated in the course of infinite time so as to constitute an infinite quantity—are at once destroyed by the might of the rising knowledge of Brahman. And works performed subsequently to the rise of such knowledge do not 'cling.' And, as Scripture teaches, the friends of the man possessing true knowledge take over, on his death, his good works, and his enemies his evil deeds. Thus there remains no contradiction.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the destruction of the others.'



SECOND PDA.

1. Speech with mind, on account of this being seen and of scriptural statement.

The Stras now begin an enquiry into the mode of the going to Brahman of him who knows. At first the soul's departure from the body is considered. On this point we have the text, 'When a man departs from hence his speech is combined (sampadyate) with his mind, his mind with his breath, his breath with fire, fire with the highest deity' (Ch. Up. VI, 6, 1). The doubt here arises whether the speech's being combined with the mind, referred to in the text, means that the function of speech only is merged in mind, or the organ of speech itself.—The Prvapakshin holds the former view; for, he says, as mind is not the causal substance of speech, the latter cannot be merged in it; while the scriptural statement is not altogether irrational in so far as the functions of speech and other organs are controlled by the mind, and therefore may be conceived as being withdrawn into it.—This view the Stra sets aside. Speech itself becomes combined with mind; since that is seen. For the activity of mind is observed to go on even when the organ of speech has ceased to act.—But is this not sufficiently accounted for by the assumption of the mere function of speech being merged in mind?—To this the Stra replies 'and on account of the scriptural word.' The text says distinctly that speech itself, not merely the function of speech, becomes one with the mind. And when the function of speech comes to an end, there is no other means of knowledge to assure us that the function only has come to an end and that the organ itself continues to have an independent existence. The objection that speech cannot become one with mind because the latter is not the causal substance of speech, we meet by pointing out that the purport of the text is not that speech is merged in mind, but only that it is combined or connected with it.



2. And for the same reason all follow after.

Because speech's becoming one with mind means only conjunction with the latter, not merging within it; there is also no objection to what Scripture says as to all other organs that follow speech being united with mind.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'speech.'



3. That mind in breath, owing to the subsequent clause.

That mind, i.e. mind united with all the organs unites itself with breath; not merely the function of mind. This appears from the clause following upon the text quoted above, 'mind (unites itself) with breath.' Here, however, a further doubt suggests itself. The text 'Mind is made of earth' declares earth to be the causal substance of mind, and the text 'that (viz. water) sent forth earth' declares water to be the causal substance of earth; while the further text 'breath is made of water' shows water to be the causal substance of breath. Considering therefore that in the text 'mind becomes united with breath' the term breath is naturally understood to denote the causal substance of breath, i.e. water, the appropriate sense to be given to the statement that mind is united with water is that mind is completely refunded into its own causal substance—so that the 'being united' would throughout be understood 'as being completely merged.'—The reply to this, however, is, that the clauses 'Mind is made of food, breath is made of water,' only mean that mind and breath are nourished and sustained by food and water, not that food and water are the causal substances of mind and breath. The latter indeed is impossible; for mind consists of ahamkra, and as breath is a modification of ether and other elements, the word breath may suggest water.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'mind.'



4. That (is united) with the ruler, on account of the going to it, and so on.

As from the statements that speech becomes united with mind and mind with breath it follows that speech and mind are united with mind and breath only; so we conclude from the subsequent clause 'breath with fire' that breath becomes united with fire only.—Against this prim facie view the Stra declares 'that breath becomes united with the ruler of the organs, i.e. the individual soul, on account of the going to it, and so on.' That breath goes to the individual soul, the following text declares, 'At the time of death all the prnas go to the Self of a man about to expire' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 38), Similarly Scripture mentions the departure of prna together with the soul, 'after him thus departing the prawa departs'; and again its staying together with the soul, 'What is that by whose departure I shall depart, and by whose staying I shall stay?' (Pr. Up. VI, 3). We therefore conclude that the text 'breath with fire' means that breath joined with the individual soul becomes united with fire. Analogously we may say in ordinary life that the Yamuna is flowing towards the sea, while in reality it is the Yamuna joined with the Gang which flows on.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the ruler.'



5. With the elements, this being stated by Scripture.

There arises the further question whether breath joined with the soul unites itself with fire only or with all the elements combined.—With fire, so much only being declared by Scripture!—This view the Stra sets aside. Breath and soul unite themselves with all the elements; for Scripture declares the soul, when moving out, to consist of all the elements—'Consisting of earth, consisting of water, consisting of fire. '—But this latter text explains itself also on the assumption of breath and soul unitrng themselves in succession with fire and the rest, one at a time!—This the next Stra negatives.



6. Not with one; for both declare this.

Not with one; because each element by itself is incapable of producing an effect. Such incapability is declared by Scripture and tradition alike. The text 'Having entered these beings with this jva soul let me reveal names and forms—let me make each of these three tripartite' (Ch. Up. VI, 3) teaches that the elements were rendered tripartite in order to be capable of evolving names and forms; and of similar import is the following Smriti text, 'Possessing various powers these (elements), being separate from one another, were unable to produce creatures without combining. But having entered into mutual conjunction they, from the Mahat down to individual beings, produce the Brahma egg.' From this it follows that in the clause 'breath is united with fire' the word fire denotes fire mixed with the other elements. Breath and soul therefore are united with the aggregate of the elements.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the elements.'



7. And it is common up to the beginning of the way; and the immortality (is that which is obtained), without having burned.

Is this departure of the soul common to him who knows and him who does not know?—It belongs to him only who does not know, the Prvapakshin holds. For Scripture declares that for him who knows there is no departure, and that hence he becomes immortal then and there (irrespective of any departure of the soul to another place), 'when all desires which once dwelt in his heart are undone, then the mortal becomes immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7). This view the Stra sets aside. For him also who knows there is the same way of passing out up to the beginning of the path, i.e. previously to the soul's entering the veins. For another text expressly declares that the soul of him also who knows passes out by way of a particular vein: 'there are a hundred and one veins of the heart; one of them penetrates the crown of the head; moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality, the others serve for departing in different directions' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5). Scripture thus declaring that the soul of him who knows passes out by way of a particular vein, it must of course be admitted that it does pass out; and as up to the soul's entering the vein no difference is mentioned, we must assume that up to that moment the departure of him who knows does not differ from that of him who does not know. A difference however is stated with regard to the stage of the soul's entering the vein, viz. Bri. Up. IV, 4, 2, 'By that light the Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other parts of the body.' As this text must be interpreted in agreement with the text relative to the hundred and one veins, the departure by way of the head must be understood to belong to him who knows, while the other modes of departing belong to other persons. The last clause of the Stra 'and the immortality, without having burned' replies to what the Prvapakshin said as to the soul of him who knows being declared by Scripture to attain to immortality then and there. The immortality referred to in the text 'when all desires of his heart are undone' denotes that non-clinging and destruction of earlier and later sins which comes to him who knows, together with the rise of knowledge, without the connexion of the soul with the body, and the sense-organs being burned, i.e. dissolved at the time.—'He reaches Brahman' in the same text means that in the act of devout meditation the devotee has an intuitive knowledge of Brahman.



8. Since, up to the union with that (i.e. Brahman) the texts describe the Samsra state.

The immortality referred to must necessarily be understood as not implying dissolution of the soul's connexion with the body, since up to the soul's attaining to Brahman the texts describe the Samsra state. That attaining to Brahman takes place, as will be shown further on, after the soul—moving on the path the first stage of which is light— has reached a certain place. Up to that the texts denote the Samsra state of which the connexion with a body is characteristic. 'For him there is delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be united' (Ch. Up. VI, 14, 2); 'Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes his hairs, and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Rhu; having shaken off the body I obtain self, made and satisfied, the uncreated world of Brahman' (VIII, 13).



9. And the subtle (body persists), on account of a means of knowledge, it being thus observed (in Scripture).

The bondage of him who knows is not, at that stage, dissolved, for this reason also that the subtle body continues to persist.—How is this known?—Through a means of knowledge, viz. because it is thus seen in Scripture. For Scripture states that he who knows, when on the path of the gods, enters into a colloquy with the moon and others, 'he is to reply,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3 ff.). This implies the existence of a body, and thence it follows that, at that stage, the subtle body persists. The state of bondage therefore is not yet dissolved.



10. Hence not in the way of destruction of bondage.

It thus appears that the text 'when all desires which once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 7), does not mean such immortality as would imply complete destruction of the state of bondage.



11. And to that very (subtle body) (there belongs) the warmth, this only being reasonable.

It is observed that when a man is about to die there is some warmth left in some part or parts of the gross body. Now this warmth cannot really belong to the gross body, for it is not observed in other parts of that body (while yet there is no reason why it should be limited to some part); but it may reasonably be attributed to the subtle body which may abide in some part of the gross body (and into which the warmth of the entire gross body has withdrawn itself). We therefore conclude that this partial perception of warmth is due to the departing subtle body. This confirms the view laid down in Stra 7.—The next Stra disposes of a further doubt raised as to the departure of the soul of him who knows.



12. If it be said that on account of the denial (it is not so); we deny this. From the embodied soul; for (that one is) clear, according to some.

The contention that the soul of him who knows departs from the body in the same way as other souls do cannot be upheld, since Scripture expressly negatives such departure. For Bri. Up. IV, 4, at first describes the mode of departure on the part of him who does not possess true knowledge ('He taking to himself those elements of light descends into the heart' up to 'after him thus departing the Prna departs'); then refers to his assuming another body ('he makes to himself another, newer and more beautiful shape'); then concludes the account of him who does not possess true knowledge ('having attained the end of these works whatever he does here, he again returns from that world to this world of action. So much for the man who desires'); and thereupon proceeds explicitly to deny the departure from the body of him who possesses true knowledge, 'But he who does not desire, who is without desire, free from desire, who has obtained his desire, who desires the Self only, of him (tasya) the prnas do not pass forth,—being Brahman only he goes into Brahman.' Similarly a previous section also, viz. the one containing the questions put by rtabhga, directly negatives the view of the soul of him who knows passing out of the body. There the clause 'he again conquers death' introduces him who knows as the subject-matter, and after that the text continues: 'Yjavalkya, he said, when that person dies, do the prnas pass out of him (asmt) or not?—No, said Yjavalkya, they are gathered up in him (atraiva), he swells, inflated the dead lies' (Bri. Up. III, 2, 10-11). From these texts it follows that he who knows attains to immortality here (without his soul passing out of the body and moving to another place).—This view the Stra rejects. 'Not so; from the embodied soul.' What those texts deny is the moving away of the prnas from the embodied individual soul, not from the body. 'Of him (tasya) the prnas do not pass forth'—here the 'of him' refers to the subject under discussion, i.e. the embodied soul which is introduced by the clause 'he who does not desire,' not to the body which the text had not previously mentioned. The sixth case (tasya) here denotes the embodied soul as that which is connected with the prnas ('the prnas belonging to that, i.e. the soul, do not pass out'), not as that from which the passing out takes its start.—But why should the 'tasya' not denote the body as the point of starting ('the prnas do not pass forth from that (tasya), viz. the body')?—Because, we reply, the soul which is actually mentioned in its relation of connexion with the prnas (as indicated by tasya) suggests itself to the mind more immediately than the body which is not mentioned at all; if therefore the question arises as to the starting-point of the passing forth of the prnas the soul is (on the basis of the text) apprehended as that starting-point also (i.e. the clause 'the prnas of him do not pass forth' implies at the same time 'the prnas do not pass forth from him, i.e. from the soul'). Moreover, as the prnas are well known to be connected with the soul and as hence it would serve no purpose to state that connexion, we conclude that the sixth case which expresses connexion in general is here meant to denote the starting-point in particular. And no dispute on this point is really possible; since 'according to some' it is 'clear' that what the text means to express is the embodied soul as the starting-point of the prnas. The some are the Mdhyandinas, who in their text of the Brihad-ranyaka read 'na tasmt prna utkrmanti'—'the prnas do not pass forth from him' (the 'tasya' thus being the reading of the Knva Skh only).—But, an objection is raised, there is no motive for explicitly negativing the passing away of the prnas from the soul; for there is no reason to assume that there should be such a passing away (and the general rule is that a denial is made of that only for which there is a presumption).— Not so, we reply. The Chndogya-text 'For him there is delay only as long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be united' declares that the soul becomes united with Brahman at the time of its separation from the body, and this suggests the idea of the soul of him who knows separating itself at that very time (i.e. the time of death) from the prnas also. But this would mean that the soul cannot reach union with Brahman by means of proceeding on the path of the gods, and for this reason the Brihad-ranyaka ('of him the prnas do not pass forth') explicitly declares that the prnas do not depart from the soul of him who knows, before that soul proceeding on the path of the gods attains to union with Brahman.

The same line of refutation would have to be applied to the arguments founded by our opponent on the question of rtabhga, if that question be viewed as referring to him who possesses true knowledge. The fact however is that that passage refers to him who does not possess that knowledge; for none of the questions and answers of which the section consists favours the presumption of the knowledge of Brahman being under discussion. The matters touched upon in those questions and answers are the nature of the senses and sense objects viewed as graha and atigraha; water being the food of fire; the non-separation of the prnas from the soul at the time of death; the continuance of the fame—there called name—of the dead man; and the attainment, on the part of the soul of the departed, to conditions of existence corresponding to his good or evil deeds. The passage immediately preceding the one referring to the non-departure of the prnas merely means that death is conquered in so far as it is a fire and fire is the food of water; this has nothing to do with the owner of true knowledge. The statement that the prnas of the ordinary man who does not possess true knowledge do not depart means that at the time of death the prnas do not, like the gross body, abandon the jva, but cling to it like the subtle body and accompany it.



13. Smriti also declares this.

Smriti also declares that the soul of him who knows departs by means of an artery of the head. 'Of those, one is situated above which pierces the disc of the sun and passes beyond the world of Brahman; by way of that the soul reaches the highest goal' (Yj. Smri. III, 167).—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'up to the beginning of the road.'



14. With the Highest; for thus it says.

It has been shown that at the time of departure from the body the soul together with the organs and prnas unites itself with the subtle elements, fire and the rest; and the notion that the soul of him who knows forms an exception has been disposed of. The further question now arises whether those subtle elements move on towards producing their appropriate effects, in accordance with the works or the nature of meditation (of some other soul with which those elements join themselves), or unite themselves with the highest Self.—The Prvapakshin holds that, as in the case of union with the highest Self, they could not give rise to their peculiar effects, i.e. the experience of pleasure and pain, they move towards some place where they can give rise to their appropriate effects.—Of this view the Stra disposes. They unite themselves with the highest Self; for Scripture declares 'warmth in the highest Being' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 6). And the doings of those elements must be viewed in such a way as to agree with Scripture. As in the states of deep sleep and a pralaya, there is, owing to union with the highest Self, a cessation of all experience of pain and pleasure; so it is in the case under question also.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'union with the Highest.'



15. Non-division, according to statement.

Is this union with the highest Self to be understood as ordinary 'merging,' i.e. a return on the part of the effected thing into the condition of the cause (as when the jar is reduced to the condition of a lump of clay), or as absolute non-division from the highest Self, such as is meant in the clauses preceding the text last quoted, 'Speech is merged in mind'? &c.—The former view is to be adopted; for as the highest Self is the causal substance of all, union with it means the return on the part of individual beings into the condition of that causal substance.—This view the Stra rejects. Union here means non- division, i.e. connexion of such kind that those subtle elements are altogether incapable of being thought and spoken of as separate from Brahman. This the text itself declares, since the clause 'warmth in the highest Being' is connected with and governed by the preceding clause 'Speech is merged in mind.' This preceding clause intimates a special kind of connexion, viz. absolute non-separation, and there is nothing to prove that the dependent clause means to express something different; nor is there any reason why at the time of the soul's departure those elements should enter into the causal condition; nor is there anything said about their again proceeding from the causal substance in a new creation.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'non-separation.'



16. A lighting up of the point of the abode of that; having the door illuminated by that (the soul), owing to the power of its knowledge and the application of remembrance of the way which is an element of that (viz. of knowledge), being assisted by him who abides within the heart, (passes out) by way of the hundred and first artery.

So far it has been shown that, up to the beginning of the journey, the souls of them as well who possess true knowledge as of those who do not, pass out of the body in the same way. Now a difference is stated in the case of those who have true knowledge. We have on this point the following text: 'There are a hundred and one arteries of the heart; one of them penetrates the crown of the head; moving upwards by that a man reaches immortality; the others serve for departing in different directions' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5). The doubt here arises whether he who knows departs by this hundred and first artery in the top of the head, while those who do not know depart by way of the other arteries; or whether there is no definite rule on this point.—There is no definite rule, the Prvapakshin holds. For as the arteries are many and exceedingly minute, they are difficult to distinguish, and the soul therefore is not able to follow any particular one. The text therefore (is not meant to make an original authoritative statement as to different arteries being followed by different souls, but) merely refers in an informal way to what is already settled (viz. by the reason of the thing), i.e. the casual departure of any soul by any artery.—This view the Stra rejects 'By way of the hundred and first.' The soul of him who possesses true knowledge departs only by way of the hundred and first artery in the crown of the head. Nor is that soul unable to distinguish that particular artcry. For, through the power of his supremely clear knowledge which has the effect of pleasing the Supreme Person, and through the application of remembrance of the way—which remembrance is a part of that knowledge—the soul of him who knows wins the favour of the Supreme Person who abides within the heart, and is assisted by him. Owing to this the abode of that, i.e. the heart which is the abode of the soul, is illuminated, lit up at its tip, and thus, through the grace of the Supreme Soul, the individual soul has the door (of egress from the body) lit up and is able to recognise that artery. There is thus no objection to the view that the soul of him who knows passes out by way of that particular artery only.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the abode of that.'



17. Following the rays.

Scripture teaches that the soul of him who knows, after having passed forth from the heart by way of the hundred and first artery, follows the rays of the sun and thus reaches the disc of the sun: 'when he departs from this body he goes upwards by these rays only' (eva) (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 5). The idea here suggests itself that the going of the soul cannot be exclusively bound' to those rays, since when a man dies during the night it cannot follow tae rays of the sun. Hence the text quoted above can refer only to a part of the actual cases.—This view the Stra rejects. The soul moves upwards, following the rays only; the text expressly asserting this by means of the 'eva'—which would be out of place were there any alternative. Nor is there any strength in the argument that the soul of him who dies at night cannot follow the rays as there are none. For in summer the experience of heat at night-time shows that there are present rays then also; while in winter, as generally in bad weather, that heat is overpowered by cold and hence is not perceived (although actually present). Scripture moreover states that the arteries and rays are at all times mutually connected: 'As a very long highway goes to two villages, so the rays of the sun go to both worlds, to this one and to the other. They stretch themselves forth from the sun and enter into these arteries'; they stretch themselves forth from these arteries and enter into yonder sun' (Ch. Up. VIII, 6, 2).—As thus there are rays at night also, the souls of those who know reach Brahman by way of the rays only.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the following up the rays.'



18. Should it be said, not in the night; we say, no; because the connexion persists as long as the body does. Scripture also declares this.

It is now enquired into whether the soul of him who, while having true knowledge, dies at night reaches Brahman or not. Although, as solar rays exist at night, the soul may move on at night also following those rays; yet, since dying at night is spoken of in the Stras as highly objectionable, we conclude that he who dies at night cannot accomplish the highest end of man, viz. attainment to Brahman. The Stras eulogize death occurring in daytime and object to death at night-time: 'Day-time, the bright half of the month and the northern progress of the sun are excellent for those about to die; the contrary times are unfavourable.' According to this, their different nature, dying in day-time may be assumed to lead to a superior state of existence, and dying at night to an inferior state. He who dies at night cannot therefore ascend to Brahman.—This view the Stra refutes: 'Because, in the case of him who knows, the connexion with works exists as long as the body does.' This is to say—since those works which have not yet begun to produce their results and which are the cause of future inferior states of existence are destroyed by the contact with knowledge, while at the same time later works do not 'cling' (also owing to the presence of true knowledge), and those works which have begun to act come to an end with the existence of the last body; there is no reason why he who knows should remain in bondage, and hence he reaches Brahman even if dying at night-time. Scripture also declares this, 'for him there is delay only as long as he is not freed from the body, then he will be united.' The text which praises the advantages of night-time, the light half of the month, &c., therefore must be understood as referring to those who do not possess true knowledge.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'night.'



19. For the same reason also during the southern progress of the sun.

The reasoning stated above also proves that the owner of true knowledge who may happen to die during the southern progress of the sun reaches Brahman. A further doubt, however, arises here. The text 'He who dies during the sun's southern progress reaches the greatness of the Fathers and union with the moon' (Mahnr. Up. 25) declares that he who dies during the southern progress reaches the moon; and the other text 'when this ceases they return again the same way' (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 16) states that he returns again to the earth. We further know that Bhshma and others, although fully possessing the knowledge of Brahman, put off their death until the beginning of the northern progress. All this seems to prove that he who dies during the southern progress does not reach Brahman.—This doubt we dispose of as follows. Those only who do not possess true knowledge return from the moon; while he who has such knowledge does not return even after he has gone to the moon. For a complementary clause in the Mahnryana Up., 'from there he reaches the greatness of Brahman,' shows that the abode in the moon forms for him, who having died during the southern progress wishes to reach Brahman, a mere stage of rest. And even if there were no such complementary passage, it would follow from the previously stated absence of any reason for bondage that the going of the wise man's soul to the moon in no way precludes his reaching Brahman. Bhshma and others who through the power of Yoga were able to choose the time of their death put it off until the beginning of the northern progress in order to proclaim before the world the excellence of that season and thus to promote pious faith and practice.—But we also meet with an authoritative statement made with reference to wise men about to die, as to difference of time of death being the cause of a man either returning or not returning to this world, 'I will declare at which time the Yogins departing return not, and also the time at which they return. The sire, the light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northern progress—the knowers of Brahman departing there go to Brahman. The smoke, the night, the dark fortnight, the six months of the southern progress—the Yogin departing there having reached the light of the moon returns again. These are held to be the perpetual paths of the world—the white and the black; by the one man goes not to return, by the other he returns again' (Bha. G. VIII, 23-26).—To this point the next Stra refers.



20. And those two (paths) are, with a view to the Yogins, mentioned as to be remembered.

The text quoted does not state an injunction for those about to die, of a special time of death; but there are rather mentioned in it those two matters belonging to Smriti and therefore to be remembered, viz. the two paths—the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers—with a view to those who know and practise Yoga; the text intimating that Yogins should daily think of those paths which are included in Yoga meditation. In agreement herewith the text concludes, 'Knowing these two paths no Yogin is ever deluded. Hence in all times, O Arjuna, be engaged in Yoga' (Bha. G. VIII, 27). Through the terms 'the fire, the light,' 'the smoke, the night,' &c. the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers are recognised. Where, in the beginning, the text refers to 'the time when,' the word 'time' must be understood to denote the divine beings ruling time, since Fire and the rest cannot be time. What the Bha. G. aims at therefore is to enjoin on men possessing true knowledge the remembrance of that path of the Gods originally enjoined in the text, 'they go to light' (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 10); not to determine the proper time of dying for those about to die.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the southern progress.'



THIRD PDA.

1. On the path beginning with light, that being known.

The Stras now go on to determine the road which the soul of the wise man follows, after having—assisted by the Person within the heart— passed out of the body by way of one particular artery. Now of that road various accounts are given in Scripture. There is a detailed account in the Chndogya. (IV, 15), 'now whether people perform obsequies for him or not,' &c. Another account is given in the eighth book of the same Upanishad, 'then he moves upwards by those very rays' (VIII, 6, 5).

The Kaushtakins again give a different account: 'He having reached the path of the Gods comes to the world of Agni,' &c. (Kau. Up. I, 3). Different again in the Brihad-ranyaka: 'Those who thus know this and those who in the forest meditate on faith and the True,' &c. (Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15). The same Upanishad, in another place (V, 10), gives a different account: 'When the person goes away from this world he comes to the wind,' &c.—A doubt here arises whether all these texts mean to give instruction as to one and the same road—the first stage of which is light—having to be followed by the soul of the wise man; or whether they describe different roads on any of which the soul may proceed.—The Prvapakshin holds the latter view; for he says the roads described differ in nature and are independent one of the other.—This view the Stra disposes of. All texts mean one and the same road only, viz. the one beginning with light, and the souls proceed on that road only. For that road is known, i.e. is recognised in all the various descriptions, although it is, in different texts, described with more or less fulness. We therefore have to proceed here as in the case of the details (guna) which are mentioned in different meditations referring to one and the same object, i.e. we have to combine the details mentioned in different places into one whole. The two Chandogya-texts—the one in the Upakosalavidy and the one in the Vidy of the five fires—describe exactly the same road. And in the Vidy of the five fires as given in the Brihad-ranyaka the same road, beginning with light, is also described, although there are differences in minor points; we therefore recognise the road described in the Chndogya. And in the other texts also we everywhere recognise the divinities of certain stages of the road, Agni, ditya, and so on.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which begins with light.'



2. From the year to Vyu; on account of non-specification and specification.

In their description of the path beginning with light the Chandogas mention the year between the months and the sun, 'from the months to the year, from the year to the sun' (Ch. Up. V, 10, 1); while the Vjasaneyins mention, in that very place, the world of the Gods,'from the months to the world of the Gods, from the world of the Gods to the sun' (Bri. Up. VI, 2. 15). Now, as the two paths are identical, we have to supplement each by the additional item given in the other (and the question then arises whether the order of the stages be 1. months, 2. year, 3. world of the Gods, 4. sun; or 1. months, 2. world of the Gods, 3. year, 4. sun). The year and the world of the Gods are equally entitled—to the place after the months in so far as textual declaration goes; for both texts say 'from the months.' But we observe that the advance is throughout from the shorter periods of time to the longer ones ('from the day to the bright fortnight, from the bright fortnight to the six months of the northern progress'), and as therefore the year naturally presents itself to the mind immediately after the six months, we decide that the order is—months, year, world of the Gods, sun.—In another place (Bri. Up. V, 10) the Vjasaneyins mention the wind as the stage preceding the sun ('the wind makes room for him—he mounts upwards; he comes to the sun'). The Kaushtakins, on the other hand, place the world of the wind subsequent to light, referred to by them as the world of Agni ('Having entered on the path of the Gods he comes to the world of Agni, to the world of the wind,' &c., Kau. Up. I, 3). Now in this latter text the fact of the world of the wind following upon light is to be inferred only from the succession of the clauses ('to the world of Agni'—'to the world of the wind'), while the 'upwards' in the text of the Vjasaneyins is a direct statement of succession given by the text itself; and as this latter order of succession has greater force than the former, we have to place, in the series of stages, the world of Vyu directly before the world of the sun. But above we have determined that the same place (after the year and before the sun) has to be assigned to the world of the Gods also; and hence a doubt arises whether the world of the Gods and Vyu are two different things—the soul of the wise man passing by them in optional succession—or one and the same thing—the soul coming, after the year, to Vyu who is the world of the Gods.—They are different things, the Prvapakshin says; for they are generally known to be so. And there are definite indications in the text that the world of the Gods as well as Vyu is to be placed immediately before the sun—this being indicated for Vyu by the 'upwards' referred to above, and for the world of the Gods by the ablative case (devalokt) in the Chnd. text, 'from the world of the Gods he goes to the sun'—and as thus there is no difference between the two, we conclude that the soul passes by them in either order it may choose.—This view the Stra negatives: 'From the year to Vyu.' The soul, having departed from the year, comes to Vyu. This is proved 'by non-specification and specification.' For the term 'the world of the Gods' is a term of general meaning, and hence can denote Vyu in so far as being the world of the Gods; while on the other hand the term Vyu specifically denotes that divine being only. The Kaushtakins speak of 'the world of Vyu'; but this only means 'Vyu who at the same time is a world.' That Vyu may be viewed as the world of the Gods is confirmed by another scriptural passage, viz. 'he who blows (Vyu) is the houses of the Gods. '—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'Vyu.'



3. Beyond lightning there is Varuna, on account of connexion.

According to the text of the Kaushtakins the soul goes on to the world of Vyu, to the world of Varuna, to the world of Indra, to the world of Prajpati, to the world of Brahman. The doubt here arises whether Varuna and the divinities of the following stages are to be inserted in the series after Vyu, in agreement with the order of enumeration in the text of the Kaushtakins; or at the end of the whole series as stated in the Chndogya. Up. (IV, 15, 5), Varuna thus coming after lightning.—The decision is in favour of the latter view because Varuna, the god of waters, is naturally connected with lightning which dwells within the clouds.—This terminates the adhikarana of 'Varuna.'



4. Conductors, this being indicated.

The decision here is that light, Vyu, and the rest mentioned in the texts as connected with the soul's progress on the path of the Gods are to be interpreted not as mere marks indicating the road, nor as places of enjoyment for the soul, but as divinities appointed by the Supreme Person to conduct the soul along the stages of the road; for this is indicated by what the Chandogya. says with regard to the last stage, viz. lightning, 'There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.' What here is said as to that person not human, viz. that he leads the soul, is to be extended to the other beings also, light and the rest.—But if that not human person leads the souls from lightning to Brahman, what then about Varuna, Indra, and Prajpati, who, as was decided above, are in charge of stages beyond lightning? Do they also lead the soul along their stages?



5. From thence by him only who belongs to lightning, the text stating that.

The only leader from lightning up to Brahman is the not-human person connected with lightning; for the text states this directly. Varuna, Indra, and Prajpati take part in the work in so far only as they may assist the person connected with lightning.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the conductors.'



6. (Him who meditates on) the effected Brahman, (thus opines) Bdari; because for him going is possible.

The following question now presents itself for consideration. Does the troop of conducting divinities, Agni and the rest, lead on those who meditate on the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha; or those only who meditate on the highest Brahman; or those who meditate on the highest Brahman and those who meditate on the individual Self as having Brahman for its Self?—The teacher Bdari is of opinion that the divinities lead on those only who meditate on the effected Brahman. For he only who meditates on Hiranyagarbha can move; while a person meditating on the highest Brahman which is absolutely complete, all-knowing, present everywhere, the Self of all, cannot possibly be conceived as moving to some other place in order to reach Brahman; for him Brahman rather is something already reached. For him the effect of true knowledge is only to put an end to that Nescience which has for its object Brahman, which, in reality, is eternally reached. He, on the other hand, who meditates on Hiranyagarbha may be conceived as moving in order to reach his object, which is something abiding within a special limited place. It is he therefore who is conducted on by Agni and the other escorting deities.