The anti-trust campaign is best followed in Theodore Roosevelt, Addresses and Presidential Messages, and in the Autobiography. The Northern Securities decision is in United States Reports, vol. 193, p. 197.

* * * * *

[1] In view of the later activities of President Roosevelt, there is point in the remark of a satirist that Roosevelt did carry out the policies of McKinley—and bury them. Atlantic Monthly, CIX, 164.

[2] Above, p. 257.

[3] It was later denied that Baer made the statement, but a photographic copy of the letter was printed in Lloyd, Henry D. Lloyd, II, 190. See also Mitchell, Organized Labor, 384; Peck, Twenty Years, 693-6.

[4] Rumor says that Roosevelt sent Elihu Root to the eminent financial magnate, J.P. Morgan, with information of his intent to appoint the Cleveland Commission, and that Morgan applied the pressure to the coal operators.

[5] In 1917, fourteen years after Loewe's first suit, he recovered damages from the Union.

[6] In 1918, 151 national forests aggregated 176,000,000 acres. Secretary of the Interior, Annual Report, 1918, 61.

[7] The territory of Alaska contains immense stores of natural resources which are being conserved with more wisdom than characterized the disposal of our continental supplies. The area of the territory, 586,400 square miles, constitutes a, kingdom. It has uncounted wealth in fish, furs, timber, coal and precious metals. At present the federal government is building a railroad which will tap some of the resources of the region. Enc. Brit., "Alaska."



CHAPTER XXI

POLITICS, 1908-1912

By 1908, the year of the presidential election, an influential portion of the Republican members of Congress, particularly in the Senate, were bitterly opposed to President Roosevelt. His attitude on the trusts and the railroads was offensive to many, and on several occasions he had gained the upper hand over Congress by means which were coming to be known as "big-stick" methods. The so-called "constructive recess" of 1903 was an example.

Under the provisions of the Constitution, the president appoints many officials with the advice and consent of the Senate, when it is in session, and fills vacancies that happen during a recess by granting commissions which expire at the end of the next session. On December 2, 1903, at noon, one session of Congress came to an end and another began. Precisely at 12 o'clock, according to the official statement, the President issued new commissions to W.D. Crum, a negro, to be collector of the port of Charleston, and also to 168 army officers, of whom the President's close friend Brigadier-General Leonard Wood was one. General Wood was to be promoted to a major-generalship and the remaining promotions were dependent upon his advance. The President's theory was that a "constructive recess" intervened between the two sessions, during which he could make recess appointments. Although the Senate was hostile to both Crum and Wood, it reluctantly succumbed to Roosevelt's wishes rather than withhold promotion from the 167 officers to whom it had no objection.

In 1908, Senator Tillman, an outspoken Democratic critic of the President, declared that senators vigorously denounced Roosevelt's radical ideas in private but that in public they opposed merely by inaction. Party loyalty was sufficient to keep these Republicans, in most cases, from open and continued rebellion. Hardly less hostile to the President were many of the business men of the country, who objected to his economic policies, but the only alternative to Roosevelt was Bryan, who, as one of the earliest proponents of radical legislation, was even more offensive. On the other hand, a large majority of the rank and file of the party, especially in the North and West, upheld the President with unfeigned enthusiasm and made his position in the party so strong that he could practically name his successor. Several candidates had more or less local support for the nomination—Senator Knox, of Pennsylvania, Governor Hughes, of New York, Speaker Cannon, of Illinois, Vice-President Fairbanks, of Indiana, Senator La Follette, of Wisconsin and Senator Foraker, of Ohio. The President's prestige and energy, however, were frankly behind the candidacy of his Secretary of War, William H. Taft.

The Republican convention of 1908 met in Chicago on June 16. Early in the proceedings the mention of Roosevelt's name brought an outburst of enthusiasm which indicated the possibility that he might be nominated for a third term, despite his expressed refusal to allow such a move to be made. In the platform the achievements of the retiring administration were recounted in glowing terms; tariff reform was promised; and a postal savings bank, the strengthening of the Interstate Commerce law and the Sherman Anti-trust act, the more accurate definition of the rules of procedure in the issuance of injunctions, good roads, conservation, pensions and the encouragement of shipping, received the stamp of party approval. Planks pledging the party to legislation requiring the publicity of campaign expenditures, the valuation of the physical property of railroads and the popular election of senators were uniformly rejected. The closing paragraph declared that the "trend of Democracy is toward Socialism, while the Republican party stands for wise and regulated individualism." The contest over the nomination was extremely brief, as Taft received 702 out of 979 votes on the first ballot. James S. Sherman of New York was nominated for the vice-presidency.

The Democrats, meanwhile, were in a quandary. A considerable fraction of the party desired the nomination of somebody other than Bryan, whose defeats in 1896 and 1900 had cast doubts upon the wisdom of a third trial. Nevertheless the failure of Parker in 1904 had been so overwhelming that the nomination of a conservative seemed undesirable and, moreover, no candidate appeared whose achievements or promise could overcome the prestige of Bryan. The national convention was held in Denver, July 7-10, and Bryan dominated all its activities. The platform welcomed the Republican promise to reform the tariff, but doubted its sincerity; promised changes in the Interstate Commerce law, a more elastic currency, improvements in the law of injunctions, generous pensions, good roads and the conservation of the national resources. In the main, however, the platform was an emphatic condemnation of the Republican party as the party of "privileges and private monopoly." It declared that the Republican speaker of the House of Representatives exercised such absolute domination as to stop the enactment of measures desired by the majority. It demanded the termination of the "partnership which has existed between corporations of the country and the Republican party," by which the business interests contributed great sums of money in elections in return for an unmolested opportunity to "encroach upon the rights of the people." It promised the enactment of laws preventing corporation contributions to campaign funds and providing for the publication before election of all contributions by individuals. Detailed and definite planks in relation to trusts indicated that the framers of the platform possessed at least the courage of their convictions. Three laws were promised: one preventing the duplication of directors among competing corporations; another establishing a license system which would place under federal authority those corporations engaged in interstate commerce which controlled as much as twenty-five per cent. of the product in which they dealt, and which should likewise protect the public from watered stock and prohibit any single corporation from controlling over fifty per cent. of the total amount of any commodity consumed in the United States; and, third, a law forcing corporations to sell to purchasers in all sections of the country on the same terms, after making due allowance for transportation costs.

As soon as the platform was out of the way, the convention turned to the nomination of the candidate. Only George Gray, of Delaware, and John A. Johnson, of Minnesota, contested the leadership of Bryan, but their support was so slight that he was chosen on the first ballot. John W. Kern, of Indiana, was nominated for the vice-presidency.

Of the smaller parties which shared in the election of 1908, the People's party and the Socialists should be mentioned. The Populists adopted a program of economic reforms many parts of which had been prominent in their platforms of 1892 and 1896. Both the Republicans and the Democrats, however, had adopted so many of these earlier demands that the Populists rapidly lost strength and disappeared after 1908. The Socialists likewise advocated economic reforms, together with government ownership of the railroads, and of such industries as were organized on a national scale. The candidate nominated was Eugene V. Debs, a labor leader who had gained prominence at the time of the Pullman strike.[1]

The only novelty in the campaign was Bryan's stand in regard to campaign funds. By calling upon his supporters for large numbers of small individual contributions, he drew attention to the fact that the corporations were helping generously to meet Taft's election expenses. At their leader's direction the Democratic committee announced that it would receive no contributions whatever from corporations, that it would accept no offering over $10,000 and that it would publish a list of contributors before the close of the campaign.

The result of the election was the triumph of Taft and his party. The Republican popular vote was 7,700,000; the Democratic, 6,500,000; the Socialist, 420,890. The election also gave the Republicans control of Congress, which was to be constituted as follows during 1909-1911: Senate, Democrats, 32, Republicans, 61; House of Representatives, Democrats, 172, Republicans, 219.

Few men in our history have had a wider judicial and administrative experience before coming to the presidency than that of William H. Taft. He was born in 1857 in Ohio, graduated from Yale University with high rank in the class of 1878 and later entered upon the study of law. A judicial temperament early manifested itself and Taft became successively judge of the Superior Court in Cincinnati and of a United States Circuit Court. From the latter post he was called to serve upon the Philippine Commission, was later Governor of the Philippines and Secretary of War in Roosevelt's cabinet. During the period of his connection with the Philippines and his membership in the Cabinet he visited Cuba, Panama, Porto Rico, Japan and the Papal Court at Rome in connection with matters of federal importance.

Personally Taft is kindly, unaffected, democratic, full of good humor, courageous. As a public officer he was slow and judicial, rather than quick and executive like his predecessor. Although in sympathy with the reforms instituted by Roosevelt, Taft was less the reformer and more conscious of considerations of constitutionality. Roosevelt thought of the domain of the executive as including all acts not specifically forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws of the nation; Taft thought of it as including only those which were specifically granted by the Constitution and laws. The one was voluble, a dynamo of energy, quick to seize and act upon any innovation that gave promise of being both useful and successful; the other thought and acted more slowly and was less sensitive to the feasibility of change. One possessed well-nigh all the attributes necessary for intense popularity; the other inspired admiration among a smaller group. Roosevelt had a peculiarly keen perception of the currents of public opinion, enjoyed publicity and knew how to achieve it; Taft was less quick at discovering the popular thing and less adept at those tricks of the trade that heightened the popularity of his predecessor.

Despite the patent differences of temperament and philosophy between Taft and Roosevelt, both expected that the new administration would be an extension of the old one. Roosevelt indicated this in his frank preference for Taft as his successor; Taft indicated it in his thorough acceptance of the policies of the preceding seven years and in his intention, expressed at the time of his inauguration, to maintain and further the reforms already initiated. His first act, however, the appointment of his official advisors, caused some surprise among the friends of his predecessor who expected that he would retain most if not all of the Roosevelt cabinet. When he did not do so, it seemed as if the attempt to further the Roosevelt policies would lack continuity.[2]

The immediate problem that faced the new executive was the revision of the tariff. The task was one which has frequently resulted in political disaster, but the platform left no choice to the President:

The Republican party declares unequivocally for a revision of the tariff by a special session of Congress immediately following the inauguration of the next President.... In all tariff legislation the true principle of protection is best maintained by the imposition of such duties as will equal the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad, together with a reasonable profit to American industries.

The precise meaning of this declaration will perhaps always remain a matter of dispute, although it is certain that the public in general understood it to mean a distinct lowering of the tariff wall, and Taft committed himself to downward revision in his inaugural address. Moreover, whether it was intended by the framers to commit the party to downward revision or not, the method of defining the amount of protection to be granted was both novel and unsatisfactory, as Professor Taussig has pointed out. How could the costs of production at home or abroad be determined? To what extent would the principle announced in the platform be carried? Almost any commodity can be produced almost anywhere if the producer is guaranteed the cost of production, together with a reasonable profit. The wise revision of the tariff is difficult enough under any circumstances; under so vague a theory as was proposed in 1908, the chances of success became remote.

The drafting of the tariff bill proceeded in the usual manner. The Ways and Means Committee of the House, the chairman of which was Sereno Payne, held preliminary public "hearings," which were open to any who desired to offer testimony or make requests. Naturally, however, the great body of the consuming public was little represented; most of those who appeared were manufacturers, importers and other interested parties. The bill drawn up by the Committee and passed by the House revised existing duties, on the whole, in the downward direction. The Senate Finance Committee, however, under the leadership of Nelson W. Aldrich, an experienced and able proponent of a high protective tariff, made 847 amendments, many of them important and generally in the direction of higher rates. The Senate, like the House, contained several Republicans, usually called "insurgents," who were inclined to break away from certain of the party doctrines. Senators Bristow, Cummins, Dolliver and La Follette were among them. This contingent had hoped for a genuine downward revision, and when they saw that the bill was not in accord with their expectations, they prepared to demand a thorough debate. Each of the insurgents made an especial study of some particular portion of the proposed measure so as to be well prepared to urge reductions. Their efforts were unavailing, however, and the bill passed—the insurgents voting with the great majority of the Democrats in the negative. The bill then went to a conference committee. Up to this point, the President had taken little share in the formation of the bill. Yet as leader of the party he had pledged himself to a downward revision and the result seemed likely not to be in the promised direction. He therefore exerted pressure on the conference committee and succeeded apparently in getting some reductions, chiefly the abolition of the duty on hides. The bill was then passed by both houses and signed by the President on August 5, 1909.

The question whether the Payne-Aldrich act redeemed the pledge embodied in the platform of 1908 will doubtless remain a debatable question. On the one hand, a prominent Republican member of the Committee on Ways and Means and of the Conference Committee, declared that the act represented the greatest reduction that had been made in the tariff at any single time since the first revenue law was signed by George Washington. Roosevelt also defended the act. Experts outside of Congress sharply differed. Professor Taussig analyzed the act in all its aspects and concluded that no essential change had been made in our tariff system. "It still left an extremely high scheme of rates, and still showed an extremely intolerant attitude on foreign trade." General public opinion was most affected by the fact that duties on cotton goods were raised, and those on woolen goods left at the high rates levied under the Dingley act. It also appeared that many silent influences had been at work—the duty on cheap cotton gloves, for example, being doubled through the efforts of an interested individual who procured the assistance of a New England senator.[3]

Not long after the passage of the act President Taft defended it in a speech at Winona, Minnesota, as the best tariff bill that the Republican party had ever passed. In regard to the woolen schedule he frankly said:

Mr. Payne in the House, and Mr. Aldrich, in the Senate, although both favored reduction in the schedule, found that in the Republican party the interests of the wool growers of the Far West and the interests of the woolen manufacturers in the East and in other States, reflected through their representatives in Congress, were sufficiently strong to defeat any attempt to change the woolen tariff and that, had it been attempted, it would have beaten the bill reported from either committee.... It is the one important defect in the present Payne tariff.

The response of the press and the insurgent Republicans to the passage of the bill and to the Winona speech were ominous for the future of the party. Although not unanimous, condemnation was common in the West, even in Republican papers. Particular objection was made to the high estimate which the President placed upon the act and to his defence of Senator Aldrich, who had come to be looked upon as the forefront of the "special interests"; and western state Republican platforms in 1910 declared that the act had not been in accord with the plank of 1908.[4]

Coincidently with the disagreement over the Payne-Aldrich act, there raged the unhappy Pinchot-Ballinger controversy. One of the last acts of President Roosevelt had been to withdraw from sale large tracts of public land which contained valuable water-power. The purpose and the effect of the order was to prevent these natural resources from falling into private hands and particularly into the hands of syndicates or corporations who would develop them mainly for individual interests. President Taft's Secretary of the Interior, Richard A. Ballinger, took the attitude that the withdrawals were without statutory justification and he therefore revoked the order for withdrawals immediately after coming into office. Upon further investigation, however, he re-withdrew a part of the land, although somewhat doubtful of his power to do so.

During the summer of 1909, Gifford Pinchot, the Chief Forester, addressed an irrigation Congress in Spokane and asserted that the water-power sites were being absorbed by a trust. Much interest was aroused by the charge, which was looked upon as an attack on the Secretary of the Interior and his policy. Within a short time the idea became widespread, through the press, that Ballinger was associated with interests which were desirous of seizing the public resources and that this fact lay back of his partial reversal of the policy of his predecessor. This impression was deepened by the charges of L.R. Glavis, an employee of the Department of the Interior, concerning the claims of a certain Clarence Cunningham, representing a group of investors, to some exceedingly valuable coal lands in Alaska. Glavis asserted that the Cunningham claims were fraudulent, that many of the Cunningham group were personal friends of Ballinger and that the latter had acted as attorney for them before becoming Secretary of the Interior. President Taft, with the backing of an opinion from Attorney-General Wickersham, upheld Ballinger and dismissed Glavis. The press again took the matter up and the controversy was carried into Congress, where an investigation was ordered. About the same time Pinchot was removed for insubordination, and additional heat entered into the disagreement. The majority of the congressional committee of investigation later made a report exonerating Ballinger, but his position had become intolerable and he resigned in March, 1911. The result of the quarrel was to weaken the President, for the idea became common that his administration had been friendly with interests that wished to seize the public lands.

Republican complaint in regard to the tariff and the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy were surface indications of a division in the party into conservative or "old-guard," and progressive or insurgent groups. The same line of demarcation appeared in a quarrel over the power of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Joseph G. Cannon. Cannon had served in the lower branch of Congress almost continuously for twenty-seven years, and in 1910 was filling the position of speaker for the fourth consecutive time. Much of his official influence rested on two powers: he appointed the committees of the House and their chairmen, a power which enabled him to punish opponents, reward friends and determine the character of legislation; and he was the chairman and dominant power of the Committee on Rules which determined the procedure under existing practice and made special orders whenever particular circumstances seemed to require them. It was widely believed that Cannon, like Aldrich in the Senate, effectually controlled the passage of legislation, with slender regard to the wishes or needs of the people. "Cannonism" and "Aldrichism" were considered synonymous. For several years an influential part of the Republican and Independent, as well as the Democratic press had attacked Speaker Cannon as the enemy of progressive legislation. Many of them laid much of the blame for the character of the Payne-Aldrich act at his door. The Outlook decried "government by oligarchy"; The Nation declared that he belonged to another political age; Bryan queried what Cannon was selling and how much he got; Gompers, the head of the American Federation of Labor, pointed him out as the enemy of all reforms.

The outcry against the Speaker in the House itself, reinforced by the gathering opposition outside, found effective voice in a coalition of the Democrats and the insurgent Republicans. In mid-March, 1910, an insurgent presented a resolution designed to replace the old Committee on Rules by a larger body which should be elected by the House, and on which the speaker would have no place. The friends of Cannon rallied to his defence; other business fell into the background; and debate became sharp and personal. One continuous session lasted twenty-six hours, parliamentary fencing mingling with horse-play while each side attempted to get a tactical advantage over the other.[5] Eventually about forty insurgent Republicans joined with the Democrats to pass the resolution. The result of the change was to compel the speaker to be a presiding officer rather than the determining factor in the passage of legislation. About the time that Cannon's domination in the House was being broken, the announcement that Senator Nelson W. Aldrich and his staunchly conservative associate, Eugene Hale, of Maine, were about to retire indicated a similar change in the Senate. These men had served for long periods in Congress and were looked upon as the ablest and most influential of the "reactionary" element in the upper house.

Coincidently with the partial disintegration of the conservative wing of the Republican party in Congress, there was passed a large volume of legislation of the type desired by the insurgents. The public land laws were improved; acts requiring the use of safety appliances on railroads were strengthened; a Bureau of Mines was established to study the welfare of the miners; a postal savings bank system was erected; and an Economy and Efficiency Commission appointed to examine the several administrative departments so as to discover wasteful methods of doing business. Of especial importance was the Mann-Elkins Act of June 18, 1910, which further extended the powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Experience had brought out serious defects in the rate-fixing procedure set up by the Hepburn Act. By that law, to be sure, a shipper could complain that the roads were charging him an unreasonable rate and the Commission might, in course of time, uphold him and order relief; but in the meantime the shipper, especially if he were a small one, might be crushed out of existence through the large rates, and the consuming public would have paid increased prices for commodities with no possibility of a remuneration to them, even if the Commission decided that the rates levied were unreasonably high. The Mann-Elkins law, therefore, provided that the Commission might suspend any proposed change in rates for a period not greater than ten months, and decide during that time whether it was reasonable and should go into effect or not. In this way the burden of proving the justice of a suggested change was placed upon the railroads.[6]

An act of June 25, 1910, which was amended a year later, required the publication of the names of persons contributing to the federal campaign funds of the political parties, and the amounts contributed, as well as a detailed account of the expenditures of the committees and the purposes for which the expenses were incurred. President Taft also urged the passage of an income tax amendment to the federal Constitution and indicated that he was in favor of an amendment providing for the popular election of senators. Amendments for both these purposes passed Congress; but they were not ratified and put into effect until 1913.

In June, 1910, Roosevelt returned from Africa whither he had gone for a hunting trip, after the inauguration of President Taft. Both elements in the Republican party were anxious for his sympathy and support. Roosevelt himself seems to have desired to remain outside the arena, at least for a time, but for many reasons permanent separation from politics was impossible. He became a candidate for the position of temporary chairman of the New York Republican State Convention against Vice-President James S. Sherman. The contest in the convention brought out opposition to him on the part of the old-guard, and his triumph left that wing of the party dissatisfied and disunited. During the summer and autumn of 1910 he made extensive political tours. At Ossawatomie, Kansas, he developed the platform of the "New Nationalism," which included more thorough control of corporations, and progressive legislation in regard to income taxes, conservation, the laboring classes, primary elections at which the people could nominate candidates for office, and the recall of elective officials before the close of their terms. He urged such vigorous use of the powers of the federal government that there should be no "neutral ground" between state and nation, to serve as a refuge for law-breakers. Critics pointed out that these proposals had been urged by the insurgents and the followers of Bryan, and there could be no doubt where the sympathies of Roosevelt lay in the factional dispute within the Republican party.

While conditions within the organization were such as were indicated by the hostile criticism of the Payne-Aldrich act, by the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy, the overturn of Speaker Cannon and the disintegration of the Aldrich-Hale group, the congressional election of 1910 took place. Signs of impending change had already become evident. Insurgent Republicans were carrying the party primaries; and the Democrats, who were plainly confident, emphasized strongly the tariff act, Cannonism and the high cost of living as reasons for the removal of the Republicans. The result was a greater upheaval than even the Democrats had prophesied. In nine states the Republicans were ousted from legislatures that would elect United States senators; the new Senate would contain forty-one Democrats and fifty-one Republicans—too narrow a Republican majority in view of the strength of the insurgents. In the choice of members of the lower branch of Congress there was a still greater revolution; the new House would contain 228 Democrats, 161 Republicans and one Socialist, while Cannon would be retired from the speakership. In eastern as well as western states, Democratic governors were elected in surprising numbers. Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Ohio and Oregon were among them. Of particular importance, as later events showed, was the success in New Jersey of Woodrow Wilson, former president of Princeton University.

Not long after the election of 1910 the President sent to Congress a special message urging the adoption of a reciprocal trade agreement with Canada. The arrangement provided for freedom of trade in many raw materials and food products, and for substantial reductions on some manufactured articles. He believed that the project would benefit both countries economically and improve the already friendly relations existing between them, and he set his heart upon its adoption. Opposition appeared at once: the farmers' organizations protested vigorously at the reduction of the tariff on agricultural products; the high protectionists were fearful of an entering wedge which might lead to further tariff reductions; and the paper and wood pulp interests also objected. Although the agreement eventually passed both houses of Congress by large majorities, the opposition was composed chiefly of Republicans. Objection to the arrangement in Canada turned out to be stronger than had been anticipated. The fear that commercial reciprocity might make the Dominion somewhat dependent on the United States seems to have caused a manifestation of national pride, and Sir Wilfred Laurier, who had led the forces in favor of the agreement, was driven out of power and reciprocity defeated. The result for the administration was failure and further division in the party.

Democratic control of the House during the second half of Taft's term effectually prevented the passage of any considerable amount of legislation. A parcel-post law, however, was passed, a Children's Bureau was established for the study of the welfare of children, and a Department of Labor provided for, whose secretary was to be a member of the cabinet. Aided by the insurgents, the Democrats attempted a small amount of tariff legislation. Although a general revision of the entire tariff structure would be a long and laborious task, specific schedules could be revised which would indicate what might be expected in case of Democratic success in 1912. The sugar, steel, woolen, chemical and cotton schedules were taken up in accord with this plan and bills were passed which were uniformly vetoed by the President.

In his attitude toward the regulation of big business, President Taft was in harmony with his predecessor and was in thorough sympathy, therefore, with suits brought under the Sherman law against the Standard Oil Company, and the American Tobacco Company. In May, 1911, the Supreme Court decided that both of these companies had been guilty of combining to restrain and to monopolize trade, and ordered a dissolution of the conspiring elements into separate, competing units. The Court also undertook to answer some of the knotty questions that had arisen in relation to section 1 of the act, which declares illegal "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." Did the prohibition against every contract or combination mean precisely every contract, whether important or not? Or did it refer merely to large and unreasonable restraints? The phraseology of the statute seems to prohibit restraints of all kinds, and the previous decisions of the Court had been in line with this view. When, then, the decisions in these two cases erected the "rule of reason" and declared that only those restraints were forbidden that were unreasonable, the attention of some opponents of the trusts was focussed on the obiter dictum, rather than upon the decisions themselves. In taking this position, they had the support of Mr. Justice Harlan who agreed to the decision but condemned the obiter dictum, asserted that the exact words of the law forbade every contract, and deprecated what he believed to be the amendment of statutes by the courts. The dissolution of the companies into competing units, however, had no apparent effect that was of benefit to the public. In fact, immediate increases in the value of Standard Oil stocks indicated that the decision was of slight consequence.

In the meantime the widening of the breach in the Republican party was indicated by the formation of the National Progressive Republican League on January 21, 1911. Its most prominent leaders were Senators Bourne, Bristow and La Follette; and leading progressives in different states were invited to join—among them ex-President Roosevelt. It was the hope that if the latter joined the League, the step might help to place him in more open opposition to the Taft administration. The purpose of the organization was the passage of progressive economic and political legislation, especially acts providing for the election of senators by vote of the people, direct primaries for the nomination of elective officers, direct election of delegates to national conventions, the initiative, referendum and recall in the states, and a thorough-going corrupt practices act.

Early in 1912 the factions in the Republican party began to consider the question of a leader for the coming presidential campaign, some of the progressive element looking to La Follette as the natural candidate, and others to Roosevelt when it was seen that he would not support Taft for a renomination. On February 21, Roosevelt addressed a constitutional convention in Columbus, Ohio, and expressed a political creed that closely resembled the program of the National Progressive Republican League. In the meantime the demand for Roosevelt as a candidate had been incessant on the part of numerous Republicans of insurgent sympathies, who realized how many more progressive principles he had accepted than Taft. Finally on February 24 he replied to an appeal from a group of his supporters, including seven state governors, that he would accept a nomination. Thereupon most of the progressives transferred their allegiance from La Follette to the ex-President. President Taft's fighting spirit had become aroused, in the meanwhile, and he had declared that only death would keep him out of the fight.

The call had already been issued for the Republican Nominating Convention to be held in Chicago, in June, and the contest began for the control of the 1,078 delegates who would compose its membership. The supporters of Taft, being in possession of the party machinery, were able to dictate the choice of many of these delegates, especially from the South, by means that had been usual in politics for many years. The friends of Roosevelt, in order to overcome this handicap, began to demand presidential preference primaries, in which the people might make known their wishes, and in which his personal popularity would make him a strong contender. During the pre-convention campaign, twelve states held primaries and the others held the usual party conventions. At first Taft did not actively enter the contest, but the efforts of Roosevelt were so successful and his charges against the President so numerous that he felt compelled to take the stump. The country was then treated to the spectacle of a President and an ex-President touring the country and acrimoniously attacking each other. The progressives, Taft asserted, were "political emotionalists" and "neurotics"; Roosevelt, he complained, had promised not to accept another nomination, had broken his agreement, and had not given a fair account of the policies which the administration had been following. Roosevelt charged Taft with being a reactionary, a friend of the "bosses" and with using the patronage in order to secure a renomination. And he grated on the sensibilities of the nation by referring to his influence in getting Taft elected in 1908 and remarking, "it is a bad trait to bite the hand that feeds you." The result of the presidential preference primaries in the few states that held them was overwhelmingly in favor of Roosevelt; in the states where conventions chose the delegates, Taft obtained a majority; in the case of over 200 delegates, there were disputes as to whether Taft or Roosevelt men were fairly chosen. These contests, as usual, were decided by the National Republican Committee, with the right of appeal to the Convention itself. The Committee decided nearly all the contests in favor of Taft's friends, and since all the delegates thus chosen would sit in the Convention and vote on one another's cases, the decision seemed likely to be final.

The scene of action then shifted to Chicago where the Convention assembled on June 18. Aroused by the action of the Committee in the contests, Roosevelt went thither to care for his interests.[7] The election of a temporary chairman resulted in the choice of Elihu Root, who was favorable to Taft. The Roosevelt delegates, declaring that the contests had been unfairly decided, enlivened the roll-call by shouts of "robbers," "thieves"; and when Root thanked the Convention for the confidence which it reposed in him, his words were greeted with groans. Upon the failure of an attempt to revise the decision of the National Committee in the cases of the contested delegates, Roosevelt announced that he was "through." One of his supporters read to the Convention a statement from him charging that the Committee, under the direction of Taft, had stolen eighty or ninety delegates, making the gathering no longer in any proper sense a Republican convention. Thereafter most of the Roosevelt delegates refused to share either in the nomination of the candidate or in the adoption of a platform. The choice of Taft as the candidate was then made without difficulty.

The platform contained the usual planks concerning the party's past, the protective tariff and the civil service; and it reflected something of the rising interest in economic and political reforms in its advocacy of laws limiting the hours of labor for women and children, workmen's compensation acts, reforms in legal procedure, a simpler process than impeachment for the removal of judges, additions to the anti-trust law, the revision of the currency system, publicity of campaign contributions and a parcel-post.

As the Republican convention was drawing its labors to a close, the dissatisfied adherents of Roosevelt met and invited him to become the candidate of a new organization. Upon his acceptance, a call was issued for a convention of the Progressive Party, to be held in Chicago on August 5. The discord among the Republicans was viewed with undisguised content by the Democratic leaders, for it seemed likely to open to them the doorway to power. Yet the same difference between liberals and conservatives that had been the outstanding feature of the Republican convention was evident among the Democrats, and nobody could be sure that a schism would not take place.

There was no lack of aspirants for the presidential nomination. J.B. ("Champ") Clark, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Governor Judson Harmon, of Ohio, O.W. Underwood, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means, and Governor Woodrow Wilson, of New Jersey, all had earnest supporters. In contests in the state conventions and primaries, Speaker Clark was most successful, although not enough delegates were pledged to him to secure the nomination.

The convention met in Baltimore on June 25, and for the most part centered about the activities of Bryan. On the third day he presented a resolution declaring the convention opposed to the nomination of any candidate who was under obligations to J.P. Morgan, T.F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any of the "privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class." An uproar ensued, but the resolution was overwhelmingly adopted. Balloting for the candidate then began. Speaker Clark had a majority, but was far from having the two-thirds majority which Democratic conventions require; Governor Wilson was more than a hundred votes behind him. While the fourteenth ballot was being taken, Bryan created a new sensation by announcing that he should transfer his vote from Clark to Wilson, on the ground that the New York delegates were in the hands of Charles F. Murphy, the leader of Tammany Hall, and that Murphy was for the Speaker. The relative positions of the two leading candidates remained unchanged, however, for five ballots more. Then the tide began to turn. At the thirtieth, Governor Wilson led for the first time, and on the forty-sixth Clark's support broke and Wilson was nominated.

The platform resembled that of 1908. It called for immediate downward revision of the tariff, the strengthening of the anti-trust laws, presidential preference primaries, prohibition of corporation contributions to campaign funds, a single term for the president and the revision of the banking and currency laws.

The organization of the Progressive party, in the meantime, was rapidly proceeding, and on August 5 the national convention was held. It was an unusual political gathering both in its personnel—for women delegates shared in its deliberations—and in the emotional fervor which dominated its sessions. At the Democratic convention the delegates had awakened the echoes with the familiar song "Hail! Hail! The gang's all here"; the Progressives expressed their convictions in "Onward, Christian Soldiers." Roosevelt's speech was called his "confession of faith"; his charge that both of the old parties were boss-ridden and privilege-controlled epitomized the prevailing sentiment among his hearers. Without a contest Roosevelt was nominated for the presidency and Hiram Johnson of California for the vice-presidency.

The platform adopted was distinctly a reform document. It advocated such political innovations as direct primaries, the direct election of senators, the initiative, referendum and recall, a more expeditious method of amending the Constitution, women's suffrage, and the limitation of campaign expenditures. A detailed program of social and economic legislation included laws for the prevention of accidents, the prohibition of child labor, a "living wage," the eight-hour day, a Department of Labor, the conservation of the nation's resources, and the development of the agricultural interests. The third portion of the platform dealt with "the unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics." It declared the test of corporate efficiency to be the ability "to serve the public"; it demanded the "strong national regulation of interstate corporations," a federal industrial commission comparable to the Interstate Commerce Commission and the protection of the people from concerns offering worthless investments under highly colored and specious appearances.

The results of the election indicated how complete the division in the Republican party had been. In the electoral college Wilson received 435 votes to Roosevelt's 88 and Taft's 8. Yet Wilson's popular vote—6,300,000—fell far short of the combined Roosevelt-Taft vote—7,500,000—and was less than that of Bryan in 1896, 1900, and 1908.[8] The fact that the combined Roosevelt-Taft vote was less than that received by Taft in 1908 seems to indicate that many Republicans refused to vote. The control of Congress, in both houses, went to the Democrats, even such a popular leader as Speaker Cannon failing of reelection. In twenty-one of the thirty-five states where governors were chosen, the Democrats were triumphant. Whether, then, the schism in the Republican party was responsible for the success of the opposition, or whether the electorate was determined upon a change regardless of conditions in the party which had hitherto controlled popular favor, the fact was that the overturn was complete. And circumstances that could not have been foreseen and that affected the entire world were destined to make the political revolution profoundly significant.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

In the main, periodical literature written with more or less partisan bias must be relied upon.

For the election of 1908, F.A. Ogg, National Progress (1918), and the better newspapers and periodicals. W.H. Taft may be studied in his Presidential Addresses and State Papers (1910), Present Day Problems (1908), and Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers (1916).

On the Payne-Aldrich tariff: S.W. McCall in Atlantic Monthly, vol. CIV, p. 562; G.M. Fisk in Political Science Quarterly, XXV, p. 35; H.P. Willis in Journal of Political Economy, XVII, pp. 1, 589, XVIII, 1; in addition to Tarbell and Taussig.

The documents in the Pinchot-Ballinger controversy are in Senate Documents, 61st Congress, 2nd session, vol. 44 (Serial Number 5643), and 3rd session, vol. 34 (Serial Numbers 5892-5903).

For other incidents: C.R. Atkinson, Committee on Rules and the Overthrow of Speaker Cannon (1911); Canadian reciprocity in Senate Documents, 61st Congress, 3rd session, vol. 84 (Serial Number 5942); Appleton's American Year Book (1911). The decisions in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases are in United States Reports, vol. 221, pp. 1, 106; a good discussion will be found in W.H. Taft, Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court (1914). For the rise of the insurgent movement and the election of 1912, F.E. Haynes, Third Party Movements (1916); R.M. La Follette, Autobiography; B.P. De Witt, Progressive Movement (1915); W.J. Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions (1912); besides Ogg, Beard and Stanwood.

The American Year Book (1910-), becomes serviceable in connection with major political events. Its articles are usually non-partisan and may be relied upon to bring continuing tendencies and practices up to date.

* * * * *

[1] Above, p. 322.

[2] The cabinet was composed of: P.C. Knox, Pa., Secretary of State; P. MacVeagh, III., Secretary of the Treasury; J.M. Dickinson, Tenn., Secretary of War; G.W. Wiekersham, N.Y., Attorney-General; F.H. Hitchcock, Mass., Postmaster-General; G.L. Meyer, Mass., Secretary of the Navy; R.A. Ballinger, Wash., Secretary of the Interior; J. Wilson, Ia., Secretary of Agriculture; C. Nagel, Mo., Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Meyer and Wilson had been in Roosevelt's cabinet.

[3] Other features of the act were the establishment of a Court for the settlement of tariff disputes, provisions for a tariff commission and a tax on corporation incomes.

[4] Mr. Dooley, who was well known as a humorous character created by F.P. Dunne, made merry with the claim that the tariff had been reduced, by reading to his friend Mr. Hennessy the "necessities of life" which had been placed on the free-list and which included curling stones, teeth, sea-moss, newspapers, nuts, nux vomica, Pulu, canary bird seed, divy divy and other commodities.

[5] A sample of the jocosity that partially relieved the tension is the following portion of the Congressional Record for March 18:

The Speaker pro tempore: The House will be in order. Gentlemen will understand the impropriety of singing on the floor, even though the House is not at this moment transacting any business. The House is not in recess.

Chorus. "There'll be a hot time in the old town to-night."

The Speaker pro tempore. That was last night, not to-night. (Laughter.) The House will be in order.

Mr. Shackleford. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the tap-tapping of the Chair's gavel interferes with the music. (Laughter.)

Cf. Atkinson, Committee on Rules, 115.

[6] A Commerce Court was also provided, so as to expedite the decision of appeals from orders of the Commission. Its career was brief, for Congress was not well-disposed toward the project, and the Court was abolished in 1913.

[7] When Roosevelt arrived in Chicago, he remarked that he felt like a "bull moose," an expression which later gave his party its popular name.

[8] Roosevelt, 4,000,000; Taft, 3,500,000.



CHAPTER XXII

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TENDENCIES SINCE 1896

During the four decades between the opening of the Civil War and the close of the nineteenth century, the United States became in many respects an economic unit. The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, for instance, was an early recognition of the fact that the transportation problem of the nation transcended state bounds; the Sherman Anti-trust law of 1890 arose from the realization that commercial and industrial unity were rapidly coming to pass; the American Federation of Labor brought workmen from all states and many trades into a single organization. The election of 1896 and the amazing consolidation of business enterprises at the close of the century were further proofs that the day had passed when any section of the United States could live an isolated economic life without relation to other parts of the country. Instead of remaining a federation of diverse economic sections, we became increasingly homogeneous. Much of the economic and political legislation enacted after 1896, and many of the practices and standards which were adopted by leaders in economic and political life were an outgrowth of the new conditions.

It will be remembered that the eighties and early nineties had been years of labor unrest. Costly and bitter strikes on the part of the workmen, and resolute and powerful resistance on the part of the employers were the commonplaces of the history of labor. The culmination was the Pullman strike of 1894.[1] Its cost in money and suffering was appalling; it placed the federal military power in the hands of the employers; and although it was a failure as far as the strikers were concerned, yet an impartial investigation after the struggle was over established the justice of much of which the men had complained. If discriminating justice were to be measured out to both sides, instead of victory to the side of the strongest battalions, and if intolerable waste and discomfort were to be avoided, some remedies for industrial unrest must be discovered which would replace strikes and violence. Happily, signs were not wanting that such a change was slowly taking place.

A combination of influences tended to place the labor problem on a new footing after 1896. One of the most important of these forces was the American Federation of Labor which greatly increased its size and activities, especially about the opening of the new century, growing from 950,000 members in 1901 to 4,302,148 in April, 1920. Its president, Samuel Gompers, is an able, resourceful leader, who has remained in control from 1882 to the present (1920), with the single exception of the year 1895, so that the organization has had the benefit of experienced leadership and continuity of purpose. Although a radical, socialistic element broke away in 1905 and formed the Industrial Workers of the World, yet the defection was not immediately serious and in general schisms have been avoided. Several other labor organizations, although unconnected with the Federation exerted a strong influence; in particular the brotherhoods of railway employees, by frequent threats to strike and thereby tie up the transportation system, aided in bringing the demands of labor to public notice.

Moreover, after 1896 and especially after the coal strike of 1902 there was an increasing recognition on the part of the public that a labor problem existed and that it must be solved in some way other than by force of arms. Physicians and scientific experts called attention to the lack of proper care for the health of workmen in dangerous industries; the movement for the preservation of the forests and mineral supplies emphasized the need of efforts for the conservation of human lives; social reformers, economists, writers and educators upheld the needs and rights of the neglected classes; and the press and the muck-rake periodicals found it profitable to expose extreme abuses. Distress that had hitherto been unnoticed or disregarded became important, and remedies were demanded. Change was in the air, and not alone in America, for England and France were experiencing the same problems, and attempting to devise new expedients to solve them. After the beginning of the new century, also, the employing class came to a better realization of the existence of the labor problem and sought solutions in ways that must be mentioned later.[2] There was a more widespread acceptance of the principle of trade agreements, whereby the employer and the men determined the conditions of labor by means of direct negotiations.

Although it had been the policy of the American Federation of Labor to keep out of politics, it was almost inevitable that the policy should receive some modifications. Organizations of employers were influential at Washington, and had long been so. Accordingly in 1908 the Democratic platform was endorsed on account of its labor planks, and again in 1910 and 1912. By the latter year all parties were earnestly striving to capture the labor vote, and in particular the Democratic and Progressive platforms embodied most of what the wage earner had been demanding for the previous generation.

The major demands in the labor program of earlier years—higher wages, shorter hours, settled conditions of employment, and the like—were not altered after 1896, but a few striking advances were made. The attempt to legislate concerning hours of employment, for example, had been continually obstructed by the clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbidding any legislation depriving the individual of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The courts had usually interpreted these phrases as prohibiting laws restricting hours of labor, on the ground that the liberty of the workman to contract freely regarding his own working hours was thereby infringed. A Massachusetts law of 1874, nevertheless, which limited a day's work for women and children to ten hours, had followed the long-continued assertion that regulatory legislation could be based on the "police power"—a somewhat indefinite authority which was gradually conceded by the courts to the states and the federal government, and under which it was possible to pass legislation concerning the conservation of the health and morals of the people without violating the Constitution. Not until 1908, however, was the constitutionality of such legislation finally settled by the Supreme Court, in upholding an Oregon ten-hour law. "As healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring," the decision asserted, "the physical well-being of women becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race." In other words, the Court was prepared to approve limitations on the freedom of contract in order to further the public interest. The Massachusetts law was imitated far and wide, so that at the present time an almost negligible number of states have failed to restrict the length of the working day for women.

Recently, also, substantial progress has been made in restricting working hours for children. As long ago as 1866 Massachusetts had restricted the employment of children, but neither this law nor similar laws passed by other states had been fully enforced. Greater progress has been made since 1903, when Illinois, followed by the majority of the important industrial states, established the eight-hour standard for children under sixteen. Impressed with the need of federal legislation to coerce backward states, the reformers took their case to Congress where a federal act was passed in 1916. On account of constitutional limitations, the measure was framed so as to forbid shipment, on interstate railways, of the products of factories employing children under fourteen years of age. It was estimated that 150,000 out of nearly 2,000,000 working children might be affected by the act. Its fate, however, was that of many another piece of economic legislation; by a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional on the ground that it was not an attempt to regulate commerce, but an attempt to regulate the conditions of manufacture. Early in 1919 the effort to regulate child labor was renewed through the imposition of a tax of ten per cent. on the net profits of factories employing children under fourteen years of age. The constitutionality of the law has not yet been tested (1920).

It will be noted that all the foregoing legislative attempts to reduce the working day affected women and children only; in general, little attempt has been made to limit the working day for men. Nevertheless, large numbers of cities, more than half the states, and the federal government provide for an eight-hour day on public work; and western states have followed the lead of Utah in passing eight-hour laws for miners. Hours of labor for railway employees have also been the subject of study and legislation. Cases had not been unknown where employees were kept at their posts for thirty, fifty and even one hundred hours; frequently such workmen fell asleep and disastrous accidents occurred. In 1907 this situation was met by a congressional act limiting the hours of railway engineers to sixteen and providing that periods of work must be followed by specified rest periods. Train-despatchers, telegraphers, and others were similarly protected. A majority of the states imitated these federal statutes. In a few cases, state laws have been passed which were intended to limit working hours in other especial industries. The most famous of these was one in New York, which restricted the working day in bakeries to ten hours. In the decision Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional.[3]

The early twentieth century also saw progress on the subject of compensation for industrial accidents. As far back as 1884 Germany had enacted a law which put the blame for all accidents on the employers, except when the victim was wilfully negligent; in 1897 England had passed the British Workmen's Compensation Act which virtually made the employer the insurer of his workmen against all accidents. The theory underlying these laws was that accidents were like wear and tear and should be made a charge on the industry, like the depreciation of buildings and machinery. The United States, however, lagged behind all other industrial nations, despite the astonishing number of accidents which yearly occurred. In 1908, for example, it was estimated that two million men were injured, of whom 200,000 were permanently disabled, and 30,000 died—a larger number than the federal killed, wounded and missing in the Gettysburg campaign. Under previous practice in this country compensation for industrial accidents had been awarded in accord with common law principles, under which the employer was not responsible for an employee who was injured through the negligence of a fellow servant. Any workman who entered hazardous employment was assumed under the common law to know the dangers and be ready to run the risks, and no compensation could be recovered unless it could be shown that the master had been negligent and the employee had not also been negligent. It came widely to be thought that the common law did not justly apply to the complex industrial system of modern times. It did not seem equitable, for example, that the fellow servant doctrine should hold in case of a railway employee killed through the negligence of a train despatcher many miles away, whom he did not know and had never even seen.

The first workmen's compensation act in the United States was passed in Maryland in 1902. Its scope was narrow and it came to nothing as it was declared unconstitutional. In course of time, however, legislation was framed in such language as to pass muster before the courts, and moreover judicial decisions changed, as time went on, in the direction desired by popular opinion. Beginning in 1911 there was an avalanche of liability and compensation laws and by 1920 forty-two states, together with Porto Rico, Alaska and Hawaii had passed acts that placed the burden more or less completely on the employer, and provided schemes of compensation. The federal government also took action. At the suggestion of President Roosevelt an act was passed in 1908 making interstate railroads responsible for injuries to employees and expressly doing away with former common law practices.[4] At the same time a similar liability was placed upon the United States for accidents occurring to certain classes of government employees and a plan of compensation was established. In 1916 another act brought all civil servants under the system.

Several other types of social legislation have made considerable progress in Europe, but have found little or no foot-hold in this country, such as minimum wage laws, health insurance, old age and widows' pensions, and unemployment insurance. The minimum wage law, establishing a level below which wages must not go, has been adopted by Massachusetts and a few other states in a restricted form. The unemployment problem has hardly been touched, although the federal Department of Labor since its establishment in 1913 has gathered and made public information in regard to opportunities for work.

Recent years have likewise seen a vast number of laws which together have made a new era in American industrial life, although separately no one of them was revolutionary. For example, matches containing white phosphorous were subjected to a prohibitive tax because of the harmful effect of the phosphorous on workmen in match factories; greater care was exercised in guarding dangerous machines, elevator wells and the like; fire protection, harmful or poisonous fumes and dust, ventilation and safety devices in mines, safety appliances on railway trains, together with numberless other accompaniments of modern industry were the subject of state legislation. Almost as important as legislative enactments were the changes in working conditions voluntarily made by the most progressive corporations. One who compares a factory built within twenty-five years of the close of the Civil War with a building erected since 1900 discovers revolutionary changes. Later buildings are constructed with much more care for ventilation, light and convenience; in some cases even the temperature of the work-rooms is a matter for painstaking attention; "welfare" work is now a commonplace, with rest rooms, lunch rooms, recreation fields and factory social activities. Factory or store committees that confer with higher officers in relation to hours and the needs and desires of the employees are by no means uncommon, and some of the large corporations even provide pension systems for their employees.

On the other hand, laws and statute books did not always guarantee performance. Laws were continually avoided both by the employers and the employees; workmen transgressed rules laid down for their welfare; the passage and execution of many laws were hampered to the last degree by short-sighted employers; the courts invalidated much legislation on the ground of unconstitutionality; and progress was frequently confined to leading states or corporations and was by no means universal. It nevertheless is true that the tendencies in social and economic legislation since 1896 have been widely different from those prevalent before that year.

In several cases the influence of the labor element in federal legislation has been decisive. The use of the injunction, it will be remembered, was one of the grievances most frequently mentioned at the time of the Pullman strike. In the campaign of 1908 both parties strove to attract the labor vote by proposals of reform, but not until 1914 was the issuance of injunctions forbidden "unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to prosperity ... for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law." At the same time the labor unions were exempted from the operation of the anti-trust laws.[5] The influence of the labor organizations was also a factor in the agitation for the restriction of immigration which continued from 1897 to 1917. In the former year a bill was passed which contained a literacy test—that is, a provision excluding persons who were unable to read or write English or some other language. President Cleveland exercised his veto, as did later presidents when similar measures were carried in 1913, 1915 and 1917, but in the latter year Congress was able to muster sufficient strength to pass the act over the President's veto. One of the main purposes of the measure seems to have been the restriction of the labor supply, and hence it enlisted the support of the American Federation of Labor and other similar organizations.[6]

The ameliorative measures already mentioned have by no means prevented the boycott and the strike. Indeed they have not, except in rare cases, directly affected the two great causes of industrial disputes—hours and wages for adult male laborers. Many formidable and violent strikes have occurred since 1896, such as those of the shirt-waist makers in New York in 1909, the textile operatives in Lawrence, Massachusetts, in 1912, and the Colorado coal miners in 1913. On the whole, however, it seems that the labor unions have developed somewhat greater conservatism and that their influence has been against violence in strikes.

Few aspects of the labor problem have been the cause of more earnest thought than the search for peaceful methods of settling industrial controversies. In 1898, by the Erdman Act, the federal government provided a means for arbitrating disputes on interstate railways. The Newlands Act of 1913 superseded this by the creation of a formal Board of Mediation and Conciliation, and many disputes were decided under the terms of these laws. The Department of Labor mediated in many industrial disputes, and in 1916 when the four railway brotherhoods threatened to strike for an eight-hour day, Congress itself intervened with a piece of special legislation, the Adamson law, which was framed to settle the questions under dispute.[7] In some cases, profit-sharing plans have been put into force; in others, disputes have been referred to impartial boards of outsiders; and in yet others, machinery has been established for continuous conference between representatives of the employees and employers. Neither federal and state boards and commissions, however, nor the efforts of individual employers have been sufficient fully to insure industrial peace.

The increased activity of the state and federal governments in the fields of economic legislation, as indicated in the passage of labor laws, was also illustrated in two important measures passed in 1906. The adulteration of foods had been brought to a state of dangerous perfection, and drugs had been commonly advertised and sold all over the country which had none of the powers ascribed to them by their makers. Since the eighties, many states had forbidden the sale of impure or tainted food, but the laws were varied and difficult to enforce, and it appeared that reliance must be placed on the federal government. As early as 1890 a federal law had provided for the inspection of meats which were to be exported, but otherwise little progress had been made. In 1906 Upton Sinclair published The Jungle, a novel which purported to describe the ghastly conditions under which the meat packers of Chicago conducted their business. Sinclair's book, together with a campaign of education conducted by the muckrake periodicals against harmful patent medicines aroused public interest to such a degree, that two important laws were passed. One provided for federal inspection of meats intended for interstate commerce, so as to make sure that they were obtained from healthy animals and slaughtered under sanitary conditions. The other act concerned foods and drugs, and prohibited the sale of these commodities if they contained any injurious drugs, chemicals or preservatives, while a later amendment forbade false statements on labels attached to medical compounds. As a result of the provisions of the law in regard to patent medicines, many concerns which had been selling drugs that were falsely advertised as having curative effects were compelled to retire from business.

Innovations in the field of politics and government since 1896 have been as marked as in the field of social and economic legislation. Possibly the most outstanding development has been the rapid expansion of the range and variety of the activities of the federal government. The unification of the economic life of the nation, as has been shown, compelled a program of federal economic legislation, and helped inculcate a feeling of greater political solidarity. When fires and floods and other disasters occurred which were too great for a single city or state to take care of, when state laws became confusing because of their variety, when railroads crossed a dozen states and corporations that were chartered in New Jersey did business in Maine, Florida and California, only at the federal capital could the requisite authority be found, which would give the needed relief. As the theory of laissez faire gradually broke down, moreover, giving way to the belief that the government ought to be the servant of the mass of the people, it was inevitable that the people should themselves turn more to legislation as a remedy for their grievances. To Washington, therefore, hurried the proponents of every reform.

This tendency was not only counter to the probable intention of the framers of the Constitution, but it trenched upon the powers specifically granted to the states. The tenth amendment stated in so many words that "The powers not delegated to the United States ... are reserved to the States." It was necessary for the federal government to act, however, or else to leave problems that had become national in character to the chaos that results from legislation in nearly fifty states. State laws concerning railroads, for example, as well as marriage and divorce, child labor and trusts are even now in a maze. No solution of the problem seemed possible other than constant stretching of the terms of the Constitution. In 1906, one of the most conservative statesmen in the country, Elihu Boot, even went so far as to utter a warning that if the states did not use their powers to better advantage a "construction of the Constitution will be found to vest the power where it will be exercised-in the National Government." The burden thus shifted from state to nation was somewhat lightened by the appointment of numerous commissions to which was entrusted the administration of specific laws or the accumulation of specific data. The earliest of these was the Interstate Commerce Commission; later, others were appointed to administer laws concerning banking, the tariff and the trusts.

With the expansion of the power of the federal government went the elevation of the office of chief executive. Cleveland's use of the veto power had given an indication of the possibilities of the presidential office in obstructing undesirable legislation; his action in bringing about the repeal of the purchase clause of the Sherman silver law in 1890 had shown the more positive force which a determined officer could exert. Roosevelt's activity in carrying his anti-trust program to the people, and his mediation in the coal strike carried the prestige of the presidency to greater heights. President Taft was by no means radical in his interpretation of the powers and possibilities of his office; nevertheless his conception of it was far removed from the conservative philosophy of President McKinley, and he even suggested in a message to Congress that the cabinet officers be given seats, although without votes, in the Senate and House. His successor augmented rather than diminished the powers of the presidential office.

The Senate, on the contrary, lost both in power and in prestige. Many reasons for the increasing popular distrust of the Senate after the middle nineties can be given. There was a widespread belief that a controlling fraction of the body had achieved membership through wealth, through the assistance of corporate interests and because of skill in the manipulation of political wires. The charge was common that a small coterie of powerful strategists held the Senate in their hands and with it the control of important legislation. Most of all, and especially in the West, many thoughtful people believed that the state legislatures were easily influenced to choose inferior or untrustworthy men as senators. Whatever the reasons, however, there grew increasingly after 1870 and particularly after 1893 a demand for the popular election of senators. Between the latter year and 1911, at six different times resolutions were presented to Congress proposing an amendment to the Constitution which should secure popular election. At length Congress gave way, adopted an amendment, and sent it to the states. Within ten months thirty-six states had agreed, and after May 31, 1913, senators were elected by the people.

The demand for greater popular control over the choice of senators was a part, merely, of a somewhat general political trend. Distrust of the state legislatures had long been observable, and new state constitutions had been notable for detailed prohibitions placed upon law-making bodies. The West, which had gone to greatest extremes in framing new state constitutions, was also the testing-ground for the initiative, referendum and recall. The first of these devices—the initiative—is a plan by which a specified percentage of the voters may initiate legislation—that is, propose a law and require the officials of the state to submit it to the electorate. If the people accept the proposal, it becomes law as if enacted by the legislature. Under the referendum system, any measure already accepted by the legislature is held in abeyance on petition of a specified number of voters, until presented to the people for approval or rejection. Both the initiative and the referendum had been commonly used in Switzerland before being adopted in South Dakota in 1898. In less than two decades they had been accepted in twenty-one states, all but four of which were west of the Mississippi, and in one of the four eastern states, Maryland, only the referendum was tried. In Oregon, which made the most complete trial of these methods of legislation, both the initiative and the referendum were extended to the municipalities. The reasons for the innovation were to be found in the determination to discover a means of compelling negligent or boss-controlled state legislatures to respond to public opinion.[8]

The recall is a process by which any public official may be withdrawn from his office by popular vote before the expiration of his term. Los Angeles adopted the plan in 1903 and was imitated by a small number of other western cities; Oregon in 1908 applied the device to all state officers, and in one form or another it has been adopted in ten states (1920). During the campaign of 1912 Roosevelt proposed that the voters be allowed to ratify or reject the decision of the courts on the constitutionality of legislation. The results of the suggestion were negligible.

More significant than the recall as an indication of the prevailing desire to increase popular control over the processes of government was the adoption of direct primaries. Under this expedient the nominees of a party for office are chosen directly by the party voters, rather than by a party convention. Wisconsin first used the system in 1903 and from that state it spread rapidly. At the present time most states have some form of direct nomination. The peculiar circumstances surrounding the campaign for the Republican nominations in 1912 gave force to the demand for presidential preference primaries which were held in about a fourth of the states. Only the future can tell with assurance whether the demand is more than temporary.

The agitation for women's suffrage was another example of the increasing desire for popular control of government. Suffrage for women was first granted by Wyoming in 1869 when its territorial government was organized, but the movement lagged thereafter until the early years of the twentieth century. At that time increasing numbers of states began to grant political privileges to women, and finally in 1919 Congress passed a proposed constitutional amendment expressly stating that sex should not be a bar to the suffrage.[9]

Accompanying the increased popular control of government after 1896 was a gradual demand for a higher level of political ethics. The revelations of the insurance investigations of 1905 were significant of this change. Early in that year certain newspapers made charges against the Equitable Life Assurance Company which were taken up by the New York legislature and referred to a committee for investigation. The committee's task was the examination of the affairs of life insurance companies doing business in the state of New York; its attorney was Charles E. Hughes. The results of the investigation amazed the country. The exorbitant salaries paid to officers, the unreasonable expenses incurred and the disregard of the rights of the policy holders were of concern chiefly to persons doing business with the companies. But it also appeared that several of the larger concerns had divided the country into districts, and had systematically influenced legislation affecting either insurance or financial interests to which they or their officers were related; enormous sums were expended and records not kept, or so kept as to conceal the real purposes of the expenditure. The report of the committee showed that Chauncey M. Depew, a member of the United States Senate, was paid $20,000 a year for legal services, without his rendering any return that seemed to warrant the payments made. The contributions of the companies to the Republican campaign funds were very heavy—$50,000 by one company in 1904. It appeared from testimony that Democrats also sought contributions from the companies but were refused. The final report of the committee unsparingly condemned these abuses and embodied a program of legislation for their reform, which was put into effect. The public received an education in the connection of corporations with politics, and Hughes himself at once became a figure of national importance, the favorite of the reform element, and was launched upon a career that made him governor of New York, a member of the United States Supreme Court and candidate for the presidency.[10]

Laws regulating campaign expenditures had long been on the statute books although they had been little heeded, but as the result of the insurance investigation, New York in 1906 forbade contributions by corporations for political purposes. In 1907 Congress passed a similar law concerning federal campaigns, and most of the states have since passed laws placing restrictions on the use of campaign funds. In the campaign of 1908 Bryan requested that the Democratic National Committee receive no contributions from corporations, that no sums in excess of $10,000 be received from any source and that a list of contributors be published in advance of the election. By a law enacted in 1911 Congress compelled a statement of the amounts of money spent by committees, and limited the amounts which might be spent by candidates for Congress. In 1919 the Chairman of the Republican National Committee announced that the party would raise funds for the next campaign in amounts from $1 to $1,000. Both parties were discovering that public sentiment opposed large contributions from individuals and corporations, because they expect a quid pro quo after the election.[11]

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The best brief general accounts of recent conditions are in F.A. Ogg, National Progress, with an excellent bibliography, which may be supplemented by the American Year Book. On hours and conditions of labor, J.R. Commons and J.B. Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (1916). The decision in Lochner v. New York is in United States Reports, vol. 198, p. 45. For the courts and economic legislation, C.G. Haines, American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy (1914), already referred to. An excellent historical account of the workmen's compensation idea is by A.F. Weber in Political Science Quarterly (June, 1902). Ida M. Tarbell, New Ideals in Business (1917), describes the accomplishments of the industrial leaders rather than of the rank and file.

Some of the political innovations are discussed in A.L. Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government (1913); Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, V, 37, "The Limitations of Federal Government"; Elihu Boot, Addresses on Government and Citizenship (1916), "How to Preserve the Local Self-Government of the State." The most complete account of the historical development of the power of the president is in Edward Stanwood, History of the Presidency, II (1916), Chap. V. The fullest account of the movement for popular election of senators is G.H. Haynes, The Election of Senators (1906). The initiative, referendum and recall have given rise to a literature of their own. Convenient volumes are: C.A. Beard and B.E. Shultz, Documents on the State-wide Initiative, Referendum and Recall (1912); W.B. Munro, The Initiative, Referendum and Recall (1912); J.D. Barnett, Operation of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall in Oregon (1915).

American Political Science Review (Aug., 1915), "Presidential Preference Primaries." The articles in A.C. McLaughlin and A.B. Hart, Cyclopaedia of American Government (3 vols., 1914), are a convenient source on most topics considered in this chapter.

On the use of money in politics: Report of the Legislative Insurance Investigating Committee (10 vols., 1905-1906), Armstrong-Hughes committee; Testimony before a Sub-committee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, United States Senate, 62d Congress, 2d session, pursuant to Senate Resolution 79 (Clapp Report).

* * * * *

[1] Above, pp. 320-323.

[2] Below, p. 508.

[3] Above, p, 442.

[4] An act of 1906 had been declared unconstitutional.

[5] It should be said, however, that the meaning of this law is far from clear and is yet (1920) to be interpreted by the courts.

[6] Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt also favored it. See Ogg, National Progress, 123-130.

[7] Below, p. 571.

[8] By 1920 twenty-three states had adopted the referendum or the initiative and referendum.

[9] The amendment reads: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of sex. Section 2. Congress shall have power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the provisions of this article. The amendment was ratified by the required number of states and proclaimed in force August 26, 1920.

[10] The election of Senator Isaac Stephenson of Wisconsin occasioned another outbreak of reform sentiment. Investigation betrayed the fact that he had expended $107,793.05 in his primary campaign. The salary of a senator at that time was $7,500 per annum.

[11] An investigation of federal campaign expenditures conducted in 1912-1913 by a committee headed by Senator Moses Clapp uncovered much that had hitherto been only the subject of rumor. The Standard Oil Company, for instance, contributed $125,000 in 1904. Archbold, the vice-president of the company, testified that he told Bliss, the Republican treasurer, "We do not want to make this contribution unless it is thoroughly acceptable and will be thoroughly appreciated by Mr. Roosevelt"; and that Bliss "smilingly said we need have no possible apprehension on that score." Archbold complained later when the administration attacked the company, but Roosevelt declared that he was unaware of the contribution at the time. The Republican fund in 1908 was $1,655,000. The testimony of Norman E. Mack, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, indicated his perfect willingness to accept money wherever he could get it, and that he refused to receive contributions from corporations only because of Bryan's scruples. Roosevelt declared, on the authority of an insurance officer, that the Democrats in the campaign of 1904 were after all the corporation funds they could get.



CHAPTER XXIII

LATER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS[1]

At the close of the war with Spain it was commonly remarked that the United States had become a world power; books and periodicals written on the history of the period were based upon the assumption that America had swung out into the current of international affairs and that the traditional isolation of this country had become a thing of the past. Time must be appealed to, however, for answers to fundamental questions concerning the character of this change. Did the United States become a world power in the sense that the majority of its people threw off that policy of steering clear of permanent alliances which had been expressed by Washington in his farewell address, in favor of the policy of participation in world affairs on a footing with the larger European states? Did the people of the United States after 1898 take a constant and informed interest in world politics and international relations? Or did the people, after a slight excursion into the West Indies and the Philippines, return to the traditional attitude of "splendid isolation"? Was the extent to which the United States became a world power sufficient to make probable its entry into a European war?