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Ann Smith, the wife of William Smith, says, "I was a servant with my husband to Mr. De Berenger, in February last, and had been so two years and a half. I saw my master at home on the 20th of February; he went out about nine o'clock in the morning, and came in again between ten and eleven; he did not stay at home long then, before he went out again. My husband and I went out between four and five, after my master was gone out; he went out about four o'clock. My husband and I returned home about eleven, a few minutes before my master; my husband got in a little before me. My master came in that evening; he was let in by my husband, and I heard him above stairs; he had a bit of bread and a glass of ale that night for supper. I did not see him that night; it was my business to make his bed. I got up on the Monday morning about seven, that was the Sunday and Monday before he finally went off, I am sure; I usually get up about seven. My master went out that morning before breakfast; my husband went out about eight, and my master went out a little before him; I did not see him go out nor hear him; I did not know he was out till I let him in; I made his bed on the Sunday morning; I was up stairs making his bed, and he went out, I looked out of the window and saw him go; I made his bed on Monday, but that was not till after he came home, which was about twelve o'clock; when I found he had been out, I went up stairs immediately to make his bed." You will consider whether there is any room for believing she might be correct, and that he might have lain down upon his bed before she made it. "The bed appeared as usual, as if it had been slept in on Sunday night; I and my husband slept in our bed, and I made his bed on Monday as well as on Sunday. I remember how my master was dressed on the Monday when he came home; he had a black coat on; he had a bundle in his hand; I saw a part of a coat where the bundle was open, a grey coat just where the knot was tied; my master continued to sleep regularly at home til he finally went away."
Upon her cross-examination she says, "my master had no other man servant but my husband; he used to wait upon him, and do any thing he was requested to do. I used to carry up breakfast when he rang, if my husband was out; he did not ring for my husband to attend him in the morning to dress. I supposed my master had breakfasted out when he came in; I was rather surprised that he had not rung. On the Sunday, when he went out, he had on his black coat and waistcoat, and grey overalls; I did not remark that the coat was too long for him; I do not know how he was dressed when he went out on the Monday; he came home in a black coat; I cannot tell whether it was the black coat in which he went out on Sunday. I never saw Lord Cochrane. I never observed the black coat at all in the bundle; I saw part of a grey coat, and the green uniform coat was in the bundle. There was nothing extraordinary in my master's going out in green, it was his drill dress; he was in the habit of going out in it, and returning in it; I never knew of his going out in a green drill dress, and returning with a black coat before. I made an affidavit; I saw nobody on the subject of that affidavit; I saw Mr. Tahourdin a few days after making the affidavit. Mr. De Berenger wore whiskers sometimes; I do not know whether he wore whiskers then or not, I did not see much of him. I had not seen the bed on Monday morning till after his return."
Then the ostler at Chelsea, and his wife, are called to prove, that he was at a late hour in town. John M'Guire says, "I am the ostler at Smith's livery-stables, at the Cross-keys yard, Chelsea. I am acquainted with the person of Mr. De Berenger; I remember seeing him on the 20th of February; it was on a Sunday. I remember it perfectly well, because I knew he was within the Rules of the King's Bench; and I determined to ask his servant, how he was out of the Rules. He had lived at Chelsea before. It was a quarter past six in the evening that I saw him at Smith's stable-yard gate; he asked me if the coach to London was gone; I told him the six o'clock coach was gone, but the seven would be ready in three quarters of an hour; he said, it would not do to wait for the seven o'clock coach, and he turned round and took his way to London. When I went home that night, I mentioned to my wife, that I had seen Mr. De Berenger at a quarter past six. I was induced to mention it, from knowing he was in the Rules of the Bench, and not having seen him that way for some time before; he went from the lodgings he had at Chelsea, to the King's Bench."
Upon cross-examination, he says, "I have known him three years and a half, I knew him to be an officer in a corps of Riflemen; that day fortnight I saw his servant, on the 6th of March, and he said, he was not clear of the Bench then. Last Monday week I was examined by the attorney. He had on, when I saw him, a black coat, a black waistcoat, and grey overalls or pantaloons. I have seen William Smith this morning. De Berenger wore whiskers when I knew him before, but when I saw him on this Sunday he was close shaved, he had none then; it was three miles and a half from the Asylum." Now it appears, that De Berenger was three miles and a half from the Asylum at a quarter past six, where he had dined; if he had dined any where, we have not heard. He says, "he thought it was wrong to be out of the Rules, and he was shocked at it."
Then Mr. Hopper says, "I am an architect. I saw Mr. Cochrane Johnstone's premises at Alsop's Buildings two nights ago." He is shewn the plan and prospectus, and he says, "From the trouble that must attend it, a compensation of from, L.200 to L.300. might not be excessive." I have mis-stated it, therefore before; he does not say, it would not be excessive, but it might not be so.
Then Mrs. M'Guire says, "I am the wife of M'Guire, the ostler. I did not know Mr. De Berenger, when he lived at Chelsea, I knew Smith his servant. My husband mentioned to me on the 20th of February, his having seen Mr. De Berenger, Smith's master; he mentioned it to me at ten at night; it was the Sunday before Shrove Tuesday, it was my child's birth-day, and therefore I remember it. My husband told me, he had seen him at about a quarter past six; he said, he wondered whether he had got his liberty yet or not; I cannot particularly say whether he said it was shocking or not; he said, he wondered whether he had got his liberty."
How this should have excited the curiosity of this man, one cannot well conceive; but one cannot comment upon that which one cannot read and believe.
Then Henry Doyle Tragear is called; he says, "I was at Mr. Donithorne's house in York-street, Westminster, in the month of February last. I was staying there; I went there upon the occasion of my leaving my house, No. 39, Little Queen-street, Holborn, where I had carried on the hatting business. I left my house finally on the 17th, and went to Donithorne's; I remain at his house still. I had seen Mr. De Berenger frequently previous to that, at Mr. Donithorne's house. I particularly remember having seen him there on Sunday the 20th of February; I saw him twice that day; I saw him between nine and ten in the morning, and again between eight and nine in the evening; I saw him at Donithorne's house both these times; he might stop about half an hour, more or less. I have seen him frequently talking with Mr. Donithorne about some drawings, designs for pieces of furniture, and things of that sort. Donithorne is a cabinet maker. Donithorne has shewn me these things before. I am a hat manufacturer; I am not entirely out of business but I have not a house at the present moment; I went there to reside till I could get a house to suit myself, to start in business again." According to the wife, it did not appear as if he was likely to go into business again. "My wife, Mrs. Donithorne and Mr. Donithorne were there in the evening. When he came, Mr. Donithorne went into the garden with him; he said he would not come into the parlour to disturb the company; I had seen him repeatedly before."
Then upon cross examination, he says, "I was not struck with any alteration in his appearance that night; he had no whiskers on that night; I do not know whether he had ever worn whiskers before; he had a black coat on that day; he had his hat on. It was between eight and nine when they took a walk in the garden. I cannot say whether his hair was powdered; they went out to take a survey of the premises in the morning. I have seen Mr. Donithorne and Mr. Tahourdin together one day last week. I will swear, that I did not know they were acquainted together before that time; I never was sent for to become a witness upon this occasion; I went myself; Tahourdin did not send for me; I went to Tahourdin I think one day last week. I did not know that I was to be a witness till last week, or that it was material I should recollect the 20th of February. I let my house on the 17th of February to Samuel Nicholson; and on the Sunday morning following Mr. Donithorne came to my room, and told me a gentleman was come to look over the house, and if I would get up he should be obliged to me. I have seen Smith, the servant." He then says, "I have been bail twice, once for fifteen pounds, that I believe is settled; I have been bail again, but I do not quite know whether that has been settled, nor the amount. I don't recollect if I have been bail oftener."
Then Mrs. Tragear, the wife of the last witness, is called; she says, "I know the defendant De Berenger; I have seen him often. I and my husband went to stay at Donithorne's when we gave up our house; the day we gave up our house was the 17th of February. Mr. De Berenger called at Donithorne's on Sunday the 20th, between nine and ten in the morning; we were not up then. Mr. Donithorne was in the cabinet business. He came up and said, he was anxious we should get up, as a gentleman was come to look over the house. When I got up, I threw down the sash, and saw Mr. De Berenger; he was measuring the ground in the garden. I am sure it was he; I saw him again in the evening between eight and nine; we were in the parlour along with Mr. and Mrs. Donithorne; asked him to come in; and he said he would not disturb the company; he wanted to speak with Mr. Donithorne; they walked backwards into the garden, and I saw him no more."
Then, on cross-examination, she says, "my husband is deaf at times; Mrs. Donithorne came to call us; Mr. De Berenger went into the attics; he did not go into our room." It is afterwards said by Donithorne, that he went two or three times into it. "I do not remember seeing any one in the garden with De Berenger and Donithorne; one of them held the measuring rod and the other, took the figures down. There was no snow; I think it was a wet morning, and the rain had cleared the snow away. My husband failed on the 17th of February; he then came to Mr. Donithorne's, who is a cousin."
Then Donithorne is called; he says, "I live in York-street, Westminster. Mr. and Mrs. Tragear came to live at my house, on Thursday the 17th of February. I had known De Berenger a long while; I am very well acquainted with his person; I am a cabinet-maker; De Berenger had furnished me with designs for furniture. I remember seeing him on the Sunday morning, after Tragear came to my house, which would be the 20th of February, between nine and ten in the morning; he came to look over my ground, as I was going to make some alterations in my little garden, and also some designs for cabinet work. I furnished Mr. Cochrane Johnstone's house in Cumberland-street, for Miss Johnstone. I saw him again between eight and nine in the evening; I let him in, and asked him to walk into the parlour where we were sitting; he said he would walk into the back-parlour; he stayed about a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes; he did not go into the garden. In the morning, we were I dare say, an hour together in the garden; he called in the evening, to give me an answer when he was to draw a plan for me." (This does not appear to be business of sufficient consequence to have led this man twice there in the course of that day.) "I was going to convert the front part of my house into an inn, and the back part into pleasure-ground; it was a misty rainy morning, and very cold."
On his cross-examination, he says, "he came as the friend of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, to give me plans for furniture; I proposed to him surveying my house, with a view to the improvements I intended to make. I went and called Mr. and Mrs. Tragear, and desired them to get up; I have no doubt of it, I went twice." He is then asked as to some writs against persons in the Stock Exchange; he says, "I employed the attorney, Mr. Tahourdin, by desire of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, to issue 135 writs; Mr. Cochrane Johnstone is to pay for them;" it appears that these writs are against persons for stock-jobbing transactions. "Tragear never failed, to my knowledge."
Gentlemen—This is the whole of the evidence on each side. I have made my observations upon it, as it has proceeded. You have heard from me already, that this is a case in which both the individuals and the public are deeply concerned. It is important that public justice should be vindicated by the conviction of the defendants, if they are guilty; and that justice should likewise be done to the defendants, by exempting them from punishment, if they have committed no crime. You will consider upon the whole of the evidence, whether these several parties were connected in one common plan, and were using their several endeavours and means to raise the Funds for corrupt advantage, by false contrivances, and the circulation of false intelligence—if you believe that all of them were concerned in it, you will find them all guilty—if you believe that any of them are exempt from a share in this Conspiracy, you will acquit them.—You will now consider of your Verdict.
Mr. Richardson. Your Lordship stated, that there were some Counts upon which they ought not to be found guilty.
Lord Ellenborough. Yes; Gentlemen, you will find the defendants not guilty upon the first and second Counts of the Indictment, as those allege facts and motives, in which they cannot all be supposed to be joined.
A Juryman. They are guilty or not guilty of a Conspiracy.
Lord Ellenborough. Yes; a Conspiracy, which is a crime that cannot be committed by one; it must be committed by more than one.
The Jury retired at ten minutes after six o'clock, and returned at twenty minutes before nine with their Verdict, finding all the Defendants—GUILTY.
Court of King's Bench.
Tuesday, 14 June 1814.
LORD COCHRANE.
My Lords, scarcely recovered as I am from the shock, which I experienced on hearing of the verdict pronounced against me at the late trial, I must crave your utmost indulgence, not only on that account, but also because I am unacquainted with the proceedings and forms in Courts of Law. I feel it essentially necessary, and I trust I shall make it evident to the minds of your Lordships, that it is essentially necessary to the cause of justice, that there should be a revision of the proceedings that have been lately had, and that a new trial should take place, at least as far as I am concerned and implicated in that transaction.
It has been my misfortune to suffer from an intimacy, or rather an acquaintance, with men, over whose conduct I could have no control whatever. I have been informed, that it is not competent for my counsel to rise up on the present occasion to ask your Lordships to grant me a new trial, and therefore it is necessary I should address you myself.
Lord Ellenborough. Your Lordship must have been misinformed on the subject; any application you wish to address to the Court may be addressed to them by counsel, and perhaps with more convenience to yourself.
Lord Cochrane. I understood there was the case of a conspiracy, in which it had been held that a revision of the case, and a new trial could not be moved for, unless all the defendants appeared in Court.
Lord Ellenborough. That would be the same, whether the application was made by counsel or by yourself.
Lord Cochrane. It is only for the purpose of preventing my counsel from trespassing on the rules of the Court, that I have adopted this mode of proceeding, and I trust—
Lord Ellenborough. I am afraid, my Lord, we cannot hear you, unless all the parties are present in Court. That is the rule of the Court, and we have acted on it so lately as this very morning.
Lord Cochrane. I have to complain, that evidence was not brought forward on the late trial, which was extremely material to shew my innocence. If your Lordships will permit me to read the evidence to which I allude—
Lord Ellenborough. It will answer no beneficial purpose, because we cannot advert to what you are now stating, unless the other parties convicted are now in Court.
Lord Cochrane. If your Lordships will grant me permission to read the statement, you will be better able to judge of the propriety or impropriety of granting my application.
Mr. Justice Dampier. By the rules of the Court it cannot be; your Lordship has been informed of the practice of the Court, and from that practice, the Court has no power to depart.
Lord Ellenborough. The practice of the Court is exceedingly beneficial, and must be adhered to by us.
Lord Cochrane. My Lords, I have now in my hands several affidavits that will prove my innocence, if the Court will hear them. They are very short.
Lord Ellenborough. We have announced to your Lordship the rule of practice, and we are extremely unwilling to give you any pain, but we cannot forego the regular practice of the Court. We could not do it on the application of Counsel, and no more can we do it upon your application.
Lord Cochrane. I shall be exceedingly brief. The facts, which I shall prove by these affidavits, will sufficiently justify me; and it will redound to the honour of the judges of this land, to suffer me in this instance, though contrary to the practice of the Court, to shew my innocence; when those who are guilty of this transaction, and over whose conduct I have no control, dare not appear in the place where I now stand.
Lord Ellenborough. We must abide by the rules of the Court. If we give way to the importunity of one, we must give way to the importunity of all; we must administer the same justice to all, without distinction of persons.
Lord Cochrane. I beg only to state——
Lord Ellenborough. It would be idle to announce to your Lordship, that there is such a rule of practice as that which I have mentioned, unless we meant to abide by it; the rule is, that no application can be made for a new trial, unless all the persons convicted are here: we have acted on that rule this day; and if we were now to adopt a different rule, it might very properly be said, there was one rule for the poor and another for the rich.
Lord Cochrane. My Lords, I have briefly to state these facts, that before the late trial, so conscious was I of my innocence, that I did not think it necessary to instruct counsel, as several gentlemen in court know. I never read over the brief on the subject, till after the trial, when I found a very gross error had crept into it, with regard to the dress of the stranger who called at my house; and my servant is in consequence represented as having admitted that he was dressed in a red coat. The fact was, that being questioned as to the colour of the coat, he stated that he appeared to be an army officer, to which he very naturally attached the idea of a red coat, for the servants did not see it.
Court of King's Bench.
Monday, 20 June 1814.
Mr. Gurney. I move your Lordships for the Judgment of the Court in the case of the King v. De Berenger, and others.
[The Officer called the Defendants, who appeared, excepting the Honourable Andrew Cochrane Johnstone, and Alexander M'Rae.]
Mr. Serjeant Best. Upon this occasion I appear only as Counsel for Mr. Butt; and before I make the motion which I feel myself called upon, under the circumstances of this case to make, I take the liberty to suggest to your Lordships, that if I should not succeed in my motion in arrest of judgment, there is a fact which was not proved at the trial, but which it was necessary to prove for the purpose of convicting these defendants upon any count of the indictment, in which it forms a material averment, namely, that there was war between England, and the Allies of England, and France.
Lord Ellenborough. I am afraid there are too many statutes which speak of war with France, for the Judges to allow themselves not to have cognizance of that objection.
Mr. Serjeant Best. But there is none, my Lord, which refers to any war between England, and the Allies of England, and France. Unfortunately it has been only of late that we have had Allies. I make this application on the part of Mr. Butt only, and I submit to your Lordships upon the counts on which this defendant has been convicted——
Lord Ellenborough. You appear now only for Mr. Butt?
Mr. Serjeant Best. I do, my Lord.
Lord Ellenborough. I have made a minute, that on the trial you told me you were Counsel for the second, third, and fourth, defendants, Lord Cochrane, Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, and Mr. Butt.
Mr. Serjeant Best. I am not now Counsel for Lord Cochrane, I am moving merely for Mr. Butt.
Lord Ellenborough. That is a new proceeding, that Counsel shall renounce some clients, in order to serve others.
Mr. Serjeant Best. My Lord, Lord Cochrane has desired me not to move on his behalf; and I may state so much for him, that he has no intention to move in arrest of judgment. My other client, Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, is not here.
Lord Ellenborough. If you move in arrest of judgment for one, all have the benefit of it.
Mr. Serjeant Best. My objections are three; first, taking the third count as it stands, (and the objections apply to every successive count in the indictment) that there is no body of crime alleged, no offence known to the law, the raising the price of the public funds not being necessarily a crime; In the second place, that if there be any crime, which is alleged, the persons who are to be affected by that crime are not particularized; My third objection is, that it is stated, that the object of the conspiracy was, to raise the price of the public funds of this kingdom: this kingdom being now the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, I conceive there is no kingdom of England, but that the kingdom of England is merged in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and I humbly conceive, nothing that is here charged has reference to any funds and government-securities, except the funds and government-securities of that part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, called England.
My Lords, I am aware of the extent to which the decisions pronounced on this subject have carried the doctrine, with respect to conspiracy; but I conceive it will not be found there is any adjudged case which goes so far as to reach this transaction, taking it as an abstract proposition, that the conspiracy was, to raise the price of the government funds of this country. Unless your Lordships can pronounce that the raising the price of the government funds of this country is a crime of itself, a conspiracy to raise the price of those funds cannot be a crime by itself; but in order to make it a crime, it is necessary to state some particular circumstance which gives it a criminal character.—I conceive nobody will be found to argue, that the raising the price of the public funds, without some side object, must be mischievous to the country, and therefore a crime; so far from that being the case, I conceive the higher the prices at which the government funds can be kept, except in particular cases, the better for the country, because it is upholding the credit of the country.
Mr. Justice Le Blanc. It is stated, that they were to be raised on a particular day.
Lord Ellenborough. By false reports and rumours.
Mr. Serjeant Best. An intention of doing that on a particular day, may be either a meritorious or a criminal action; but what I submit to your Lordships, is, that of itself, it is neither the one nor the other; it is therefore necessary to put on the record something which shall bring the fact within the purview of the law. It is not stated upon this record, that the defendants were possessed of any funds, that they were desirous of selling those funds, and that therefore they meditated a fraud on the particular persons to whom they should sell their funds, by raising the price;—it is merely stated, that the object was to raise the price of the funds, which I submit to your Lordships may be commendable or criminal.
One can conceive many circumstances in which this might be stated to be a public mischief, and some such circumstances were stated by my learned friend, who very ably opened this prosecution upon the trial. If the public funds were raised in price on a day on which the commissioners for reducing the national debt would make purchases, that would be an injury to the country, by the commissioners being enabled to purchase a smaller amount of stock for the same amount of money; but there is no allegation of the kind upon this indictment, and in no other way, do I conceive, could the public be injured. If the public had been injured, it was enough to have stated, that what was done, was done with a view to the injury of the public; but all that I find stated upon the record, is, that the defendants conspired and agreed together to raise the price of the public funds upon a given day; and the prosecutors knew there was no purchase made by the commissioners for reducing the national debt on that day; because, as I understand the fact to be, they never purchase on a Monday;—however, all that is material to me is, that the transaction is not so charged upon the face of the indictment. If I am right in this, I am persuaded your Lordships will be of opinion, that this is not an indictable offence.
If I am to be told, there is a distinction made between conspiracy and other offences, I submit to your Lordships, no distinction which has ever been made goes to a length which reaches the present case. I am aware many acts are made criminal, being accomplished by conspiracy, which accomplished by an individual only, would not be the subject of judicial animadversion; but I can find no case (and I have very carefully looked into all of them) which carries the principle on which the doctrine relating to conspiracy is founded further than this; that in conspiracy, though the means may be lawful, yet the end must be unlawful, either as it is mischievous to the public or to individuals; and I can state no case, in which parties have been held guilty of conspiracy, where the end they have had in view has not been either mischievous to the public, or at least to a specified class of individuals.
Looking back to the earlier statutes and cases on the subject of the law regarding conspiracy, your Lordships must collect, that neither the legislature nor the judges of the land had the least idea of embracing such a transaction as this, within their view of conspiracy. The older cases, in which the doctrine upon conspiracy has been applied, have been cases described by the statute of 21st Edward I. of persons who have conspired to instigate a criminal prosecution against an innocent individual, and of persons who, for the purpose of supporting their unlawful enterprises, have kept retainers in the country. In modern times, the decisions have come nearer to the present case; but I think I can satisfy your Lordships, there is none that reaches it.
The case in which the doctrine relating to conspiracy has travelled on, if I may so say, embracing a larger compass of acts, is that of the King v. Edwards, 8 Modern Reports, 320. In that case the doctrine laid down is, that a conspiracy to do a lawful act for effecting an unlawful end, is a crime. If the end be unlawful in this case, undoubtedly the endeavour to accomplish it was a crime. But I submit to your Lordships, as the act is stated upon the Record, the end is not unlawful, and that no case can be found which shews, that the end which these parties had in view was an unlawful end. Upon the principle of the case which I have mentioned, which goes far beyond the former cases on this subject, if I am right in stating, that per se there is nothing criminal in raising the price of the public funds, something must be added upon the record to make that act a crime.
Another case is that of The King v. Starling, 1 Siderfin, p. 174. It was an indictment for a conspiracy to depress what was called the gallon-trade, (that is, the practice of selling beer by the gallon) and thereby to cause the poor to mutiny, and to injure the farmers of excise; that was stated as the object of the conspirators. They were acquitted of that part of the charge which alleged an intention to cause the poor to mutiny; but found guilty of a design to injure the farmers of excise. The reporter says, after many debates it was adjudged, not that a conspiracy to injure the farmers of excise, speaking of them generally, was a crime—but, that the verdict relates to the information, the information relates to the excise, which is part of the revenue of the king; and to impoverish the farmers of excise would make them less able to pay the king his dues. And so the Court, in giving judgment, say, we must look at the record, to see if we can find out that what is charged upon the defendants be that which must necessarily produce a public mischief; and they say it does in this way; that the verdict relates to the information, and the information to the excise, which is part of the revenue of the country; and, as to impoverish the farmers of excise, would render them less able to pay the king his dues, there appears a public mischief on the face of the record itself. This I take to be a strong authority in my favour; for if the Court, after many debates as it is stated, and having given the subject every possible attention, came to the conclusion, that they were obliged to look at the record, to see whether the case stated on the record was one which necessarily connected the act done with some public mischief, we must necessarily infer from this, that the Court would have been of opinion, that unless that necessary connexion was established by the statement on the record, the judgment ought to be different. If I am not correct in this position, the Court had no occasion to look to the verdict and see whether it related to the information, and to the information, to see whether it had a relation to the revenue: the Court would have said, we must give judgment against the defendants, because it is stated upon this record, that the object of the defendants was, to impoverish the farmers of excise. It is by tracing back the thing itself, by shewing that the farmers of excise are thus made less able to pay their debts to the government, and therefore that the government was to be injured, that the act is constituted an offence.
There is another case, in Salkeld, 174, The King v. Best. The judgment of the Court in that case is, that several persons may lawfully meet and consult to prosecute a guilty person; otherwise, to charge a person who is innocent, right or wrong, would be indictable. The inference is, that upon a charge of conspiracy to do an act which in itself is perfectly innocent, which is not indictable, you must state something upon the face of the record, shewing a mischief connected with it, to make it indictable. I submit to your Lordships, there is nothing upon the face of this record, which does shew any mischief connected with the act which is made the subject of charge. In conspiracy as in every other offence, the means may be lawful; but in conspiracy, the end must be unlawful. It is this which constitutes the only distinction between cases of conspiracy and of any other crime; that although the means may be lawful, the end must necessarily be unlawful and mischievous. I say, it is impossible for your Lordships to collect from any part of this record, that the end sought to be obtained by these defendants was unlawful, as against any Act of Parliament or the positive decision of any Court; or unlawful, as generally mischievous to the public.
It is stated indeed upon these counts, that the act was mischievous to certain individuals; and if the individuals had been named, that would have answered my objection. But I submit to your Lordships, in support of the second proposition which I stated, that this offence, if it be any, is alleged in too general a way to convict any of the defendants. It would have been otherwise, if it had appeared that they were actuated by any malicious motive against those individuals, or had any clear intention of benefiting themselves at the expense of those individuals; and I may with safety to my client concede this, though I am not driven to it. On the contrary, I beg to state, it does not appear on this record, that the defendants could possibly gain any thing by what they are accused of having done; for it is not stated upon any of the counts, nor is it the fact, that they possessed one sixpenny worth of stock from the sale of which they could derive an advantage: they were therefore doing mischief without any purpose to answer by it.
Lord Ellenborough. Brother Best, was it possible to state that their purpose was to injure certain individual persons who should purchase stock, when by no possibility could they know who the persons were that would become purchasers? If that could have been stated, can you suggest any name which in any way might have been inserted?
Mr. Serjeant Best. I submit to your Lordship it might have been stated; and the evidence in the cause helps me to suggest an answer to your Lordship's question. Your Lordship will remember, that evidence was given of the accountant-general of the Court of Chancery having made purchases of stock on this day; it might have been stated on the face of this record, that it was known the accountant-general of the Court of Chancery would purchase stock on the day in question, for he purchased most days, and that the offence was committed with a view to injure the said accountant-general, or the persons in whose behalf he purchases.
Lord Ellenborough. I do not know, that in the course of his office he is directed to purchase on account of certain named individuals, on a given day; if he is not, even so the allegation could not be precise.
Mr. Serjeant Best. The stock is purchased, my Lord, to the credit of a particular cause, the accountant-general being the agent in the transaction for the suitors in that cause. Therefore the allegation might have been, that it was to injure the accountant-general, in his character of agent for those persons on whose behalf he purchased stock on the particular day. And this brings us to the true character of conspiracy. I submit to your Lordship, this act could only be made conspiracy, by shewing that the defendants possessed stock, and by stating on the indictment, that possessing stock, they conspired to raise the price of the funds on a particular day, and that when raised, they sold their stock to certain persons specified. Suppose they knew of persons who were going to purchase on this day, and with a view to make those persons pay more than they otherwise would, they did that which is charged upon this indictment; that would clearly be an indictable offence. It is not the difficulty of bringing the case within the law that furnishes an answer to the objection; if the law is defective, your Lordship would recommend it to the Legislature to remedy the defect, by making a new law.
Lord Ellenborough. Impossibility is some answer in point of law.
Mr. Serjeant Best. Your Lordships may be protecting gamblers as infamous as any of these defendants; you may be giving your support to prosecutions instituted by one set of gamblers against another, if this indictment is supported. A fair holder of stock could have no difficulty in coming by indictment, and stating, I was compelled by circumstances to lay out a sum of money in the public funds on a given day, the day on which this transaction took place, and I paid so much per cent. more for what I bought. If it is necessary to constitute conspiracy, that the intent be to injure that person who in the event is injured, then it is impossible to support this indictment. I put it most strongly against my clients when I say, they meditated a fraud upon all who should purchase stock on this day; but to use the criminal law of this country, for the protection of those who honestly purchase stock, and not to support a prosecution brought by one set of gamblers against another, your Lordships will require it to be stated on the face of the indictment, who they were that were injured.
Mr. Justice Bayley. Suppose the conspiracy had been stated in the way it is, but the allegation had gone on; that by reason of the said conspiracy, A. B. and C. who on that day were obliged to purchase stock, were obliged to pay a larger sum than they otherwise would have paid?
Mr. Serjeant Best. That would have answered my objection, and that is the way in which it should have been stated; because then your Lordships would see, you were raising the arm of criminal justice to protect those who were the objects of its protection.
Lord Ellenborough. Your argument goes upon this supposition, that the description of persons to be affected by a criminal act, may lessen its criminality, which it does not.
Mr. Serjeant Best. But I submit to your Lordship, there must be something to be gained on the part of the actors, moving them to injure those who are capable of being injured by the act which is done. No such thing is stated upon any part of the indictment. A conspiracy may be complete without any act, but there must be an intention. I say, the intention here, is too generally stated; strike out all but the words, "conspired to raise the price of the public funds," and I ask your Lordships whether it would be possible to pronounce any judgment upon it.
Mr. Justice Dampier. How could the object have been stated with more particularity, with reference to a future event, than that it was to raise the price of the public funds?
Mr. Serjeant Best. I do not state it to be necessary that any damage should actually follow, but damage must be meditated by the conspirators, either a damage which aims at the public at large, or at some individual. It could not have been stated, nor is it stated, that any damage was aimed at the public at large; was any meditated against a part of the public? they must be individuals.
Mr. Justice Dampier. All the public could not be named; and individuals could not be named, because of the impossibility of knowing the individuals.
Mr. Serjeant Best. I submit to your Lordship there could be no difficulty in that. If the indictment had been preferred before the 21st February, your Lordship's observation would be unanswerable; but after that period, the prosecutors could have no difficulty in obtaining the names of individual purchasers from the books of the Stock Exchange.
Mr. Justice Dampier. The crime was complete before the 21st of February.
Mr. Justice Le Blanc. If the conspiracy was, by false rumours to raise the price of the public funds on a certain day, with a view to oblige persons who should purchase into the funds on that day to pay an increased price, the crime would be complete if the funds were raised on that day, though no person should purchase a halfpenny-worth of stock; in like manner as conspiring to raise the price of commodities in a market, though no person should purchase, would still be a crime.
Mr. Serjeant Best. The commodities in a market are articles of necessity, which, I apprehend, makes a distinction.
Lord Ellenborough. Whether it be an article of necessity, or if universal sale, comes to the same thing. Besides, as to not stating the multitude, one would think we had forgotten the number of cases which have been decided on charges which are in their nature multitudinous; as for instance in barratry, or the inciting persons to institute and maintain suits; in those instances you need not state the individuals injured.
Mr. Serjeant Best. The instances of barratry and of common scolds, I believe, are the only exceptions.
Lord Ellenborough. By no means; I remember a case in which it was held, that where the circumstances cannot be conveniently specified upon the record, the necessity forms the exception.
Mr. Serjeant Best. But in all those cases your Lordship will find the excuse is stated upon the record; as ignotum, where an unknown person has been murdered.
Lord Ellenborough. In this case the nature and reason of the thing suggest the excuse, or one must reject one's common sense. The nature and reason of the thing form an exception, if it could be necessary to state the name of an individual, as having suffered from an act of this kind; but it is the tendency of the act, not the success of it, that constitutes the crime. If there had been an apprehension of pestilence or commotion, which made it unsafe to resort to the Stock Exchange on the day on which the fraud was practised, the crime would have been as complete by the conspiracy, as it was by the damage sustained by individuals who suffered under it.
Mr. Serjeant Best. In whatever way your Lordships dispose of these objections, I shall be satisfied. I am sure your Lordships will excuse my mentioning, in a case of this sort, The King v. Robe, 2d Strange, p. 999, though it is not a case of conspiracy.
Lord Ellenborough. No doubt they ought in that case to have specified the persons, they had the means of stating every one of them. The offence did not consist in the combination, but in doing the very act they combined to do.
Mr. Serjeant Best. Another objection which applies to all the counts is, that it is stated, the intention was to produce a great rise in the Government funds of this kingdom. It appears clearly on the face of this record that the intention was very different; in fact there are no general Government funds belonging to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.
Mr. Justice Bayley. But there are British and Irish funds?
Mr. Serjeant Best. Certainly, but that is not the allegation; the allegation is, that it was with a view to raise the funds of this kingdom, which supposes there are general funds of Great Britain and Ireland; whereas the funds of each are entirely distinct, and of that your Lordships will take notice, because there are Acts of Parliament which speak of the British and Irish funds separately. Therefore I submit to your Lordships, it is impossible those defendants could contemplate the mischief with which the count concludes.
Lord Ellenborough. In a large sense, the Irish funds are funds of this kingdom, and so are the British; they are each a part of the resources and means of the United Kingdom.
Mr. Serjeant Best. It is impossible they should have had in view the Irish funds.
Lord Ellenborough. Why not? I believe the Irish funds are saleable upon the Stock Exchange as well as the British. The interest is payable in this country, and the great money-market is here; and I believe full as much is done in the Irish funds here as in Ireland.
Mr. Serjeant Best. I am unacquainted with the fact; still I insist, that those funds could not be called the funds of this kingdom?
Lord Ellenborough. I think they could not be correctly called otherwise; they are funds of the kingdom in a large sense.
Mr. Serjeant Best. A very large part of the Irish funds were not raised by the United Parliament; and they have been kept distinct ever since the Union.
Lord Ellenborough. They may be distinctly arranged, and the application of them may have been in different ways; but still they are a part of one whole, they are a part of the stock and revenues of the United Kingdom.
MR. PARK,
My Lords, I am counsel for Mr. De Berenger alone. The first two general grounds of objection, my learned friend has argued very fully, and I shall not trouble your Lordships upon them; but I confess there seems to me to be a great deal of weight in the last objection. Your Lordship will recollect, the beginning of this indictment states His Majesty to be (as the Act of Parliament requires he shall be stated) the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. The very first article of Union requires, that after a day specified, the kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland shall be called the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Throughout this indictment, in all the counts except the last, the offence charged is stated to have been committed for the purpose of creating a rise in price of the funds of this kingdom. Now your Lordships perhaps may not be aware, that in the seventh article of Union it is expressly provided, that the funds of the United Kingdom, forming the separate funds of the two kingdoms, shall continue to be kept distinct. But after the indictment has stated His Majesty as King of this kingdom, which can only mean of the United Kingdom, then what is stated of the funds of this kingdom, can only relate to funds of the United Kingdom; not in the large sense in which your Lordship considers them, as forming a part of the funds of the United Kingdom, but in the same sense the general funds of the United Kingdom, as His Majesty is stated to be the King of this kingdom; whereas by the articles of Union, the funds of the United Kingdom are to be considered two distinct funds.
Mr. Justice Dampier. Then the statement relates to a fund, which, by law, can have no existence.
Mr. Park. That may be, my Lord.
Mr. Justice Dampier. If it could by possibility relate to no other fund, the objection might be a good one; but there is a sense in which it does relate to the funds of the United Kingdom, distributively considered.
Lord Ellenborough. It is a description applicable to a new state of society, namely, to the aggregate kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland; and the funds of the Kingdom are the funds of the United Kingdom.
Mr. Park. I only mention this to draw your Lordship's attention to the statute, in addition to the observations which my learned friend has made. Before I sit down, your Lordship will give me leave to suggest to the Court, upon the motion for a new trial, in addition to what the learned Serjeant threw out, an observation founded upon the Russian cases, where an Order of Council was stated, which your Lordships decided you could not take judicial notice of, that there was no proof of the falsehood of the rumours by which, they say, the price of the funds was to be raised.
Lord Ellenborough. But there was proof of the fabrication of them.
Mr. Serjeant Pell. On the part of Mr. Holloway, Mr. Random, and Mr. Lyte, I am not disposed to trouble your lordships with any observations in arrest of judgment.
Lord Ellenborough. Does Lord Cochrane wish to address any thing to the Court?
Lord Cochrane. My Lord, I am desirous, previously to your passing judgment upon this matter, that I should have an opportunity of explaining those things which I deem essential to be brought under your consideration.
Lord Ellenborough. If you mean to offer any observations in arrest of judgment, this is the proper time; we will afterwards hear, as a distinct thing, whatever may occur to you as fit to be presented to the Court, to induce them to grant a new trial; that is probably your object.
Lord Cochrane. I do not move in arrest of judgment.
LORD ELLENBOROUGH,
I am perfectly clear there is no ground for the motion in arrest of judgment, and that a public mischief is stated as being the object of this conspiracy. The conspiracy is, by false rumours to raise the price of the public funds and securities; that crime is committed in the act of conspiracy, concert, and combination, to effect the purpose, and the offence would have been completed even if it had not been pursued to its consequences, or from circumstances the conspirators had not been able to effect it. And the purpose is in its nature mischievous; it is one which strikes at the value of a vendable article in the market, and if it gives a fictitious value, by means of false rumours, it is a fraud on all who may by possibility have to do with that article; it is a fraud on all the public who may have to do with the funds on the day to which the conspiracy applies.
It seems to me quite unnecessary to specify the persons who became purchasers of stock, for without the gift of prophecy how could the defendants know who would be purchasers on a succeeding day? The impossibility is the excuse; besides if it were possible, the multitude is an excuse in point of law. But such a statement is wholly unnecessary, the conspiracy being complete independently of any persons becoming purchasers.
MR. JUSTICE LE BLANC,
The motion in arrest of judgment has been made upon three grounds; the first, that it is no crime in itself to raise the price of the public funds, and that we are to look to the indictment to see what is the mischief charged. The charge in the indictment is a conspiracy by false rumours to raise the price of the public funds on a particular day. I admit that the simple fact of raising or lowering the public funds is no crime. A man having a necessary occasion to sell a large sum out of the stocks, though it may have the effect of depressing the funds on that day; or to purchase a large sum, though he thereby raises the funds, commits no offence. But if a number of persons conspire to raise the funds on a particular day by spreading false rumours, that is an offence, and the offence consists in raising the funds by false rumours on that day, not in the simple act of raising the funds.
The next objection is, that the indictment states a purpose to defraud, without naming the persons who were to be defrauded. From the nature of the case, persons could not be named; the offence was a conspiracy on a previous day, to raise the price of the funds upon a future day. It was therefore uncertain who would be the purchasers; but the object was, that the price of the funds should be raised to all who should become purchasers on that day, and could not be aimed at particular individuals. The offence was general, in the same manner as if a false rumour were spread previous to a market-day, to raise the price of some commodity which should be brought to market.
A further objection is, that the indictment refers to the funds of this kingdom, and that since the Union, this kingdom can only mean the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. But although particular sums may be applied to the particular service of one or the other part of the United Kingdom, yet the public funds of either part are funds of the United Kingdom, and go in furtherance of the general service of the United Kingdom. It appears to me there is no reason why this judgment should be arrested.
MR. JUSTICE BAYLEY,
If the question admitted of any doubt, I should be desirous of giving the defendants the advantage of that doubt; but it seems to me perfectly clear, that there is no foundation for any one of the objections that have been made. To raise the funds may be an innocent thing; but a conspiracy to raise the funds by illegal means, and with an illegal view, is, as it seems to me, a crime; a crime which might perhaps affect the public in its aggregate capacity; but which, if it take effect, will certainly prejudice a class of His Majesty's subjects; and it is not necessary to constitute a crime, that it should be prejudicial to the public in its aggregate character, or to all of His Majesty's subjects, it is sufficient if it be prejudicial to a class of His Majesty's subjects. Here is not only a conspiracy for an illegal end, but a conspiracy to effect that end by illegal means; because when it is endeavoured to raise the funds by false rumours, the means are illegal, then is the end illegal. The object is to produce a temporary rise in the funds without any foundation; and the necessary consequence of that is, all those who purchase on the day, and during the period of time that rise affects the funds, will necessarily be prejudiced.
Another objection is, that the indictment does not state by name the persons whom the defendants intended to defraud; but it is said, the indictment would have been good if it had stated, that by means of this conspiracy certain persons, naming them, had been prejudiced. As to that, the conspiracy constitutes the crime, and it is sufficient to state the crime upon the indictment in the way it existed at the moment when the crime was complete. It might have happened from circumstances coming to light, that the plot should be detected before the mischief had been effected; yet the offence would not have been less, because the parties had done all in their power, and every thing that was necessary to constitute the crime, when they had formed the conspiracy, and used the illegal means for an illegal purpose. It depended not on them how far their crime would be prejudicial to others; but their criminality must depend on their own act, not upon the consequences of that act.
The other objection is, that the indictment describes the funds to be raised as the funds of this kingdom. It is true, that since the Union the funds which are raised must be raised in certain proportions upon one part of the kingdom and upon the other: but when those funds are raised, they become respectively the funds of the kingdom, they are raised by the Legislature of the kingdom, and are applied by the Government of the kingdom to such purposes as Parliament say they are to be applied to. But if you can properly predicate of them, that they are funds, in part only applicable to England, and in part to Ireland, still it is true that those two funds do constitute the funds of this kingdom; and when it can only be said, that the funds of this kingdom are distinguishable into British and Irish funds, then when you speak of the funds of this kingdom, you mean both the British and Irish funds.
MR. JUSTICE DAMPIER,
The charge upon this indictment is, that the defendants, by false rumours, conspired to create a temporary rise in the funds of the kingdom, in order to defraud those who should purchase into the funds on a particular day. I cannot raise any doubt in my mind, but that this is, according to any definition of the act of conspiracy, a complete crime of conspiracy. The means are wrong, they are false rumours; the object is wrong, for it is to give a false value to a commodity in a public market; and the consequences are injurious to all who have to purchase that commodity. This disposes of the first objection.
The second objection is, that the persons defrauded ought to have been named. The first answer to that is, the crime of conspiracy is complete when the concert to bring about an object with a mischievous intent is complete; it is not at all necessary for the perfection of the crime that its object should be attained. Therefore, the first answer is, there need be no person injured. The next answer is the impossibility of the defendants knowing before-hand who would be defrauded. It is said, the indictment was preferred after the mischief had taken effect, therefore the persons injured might have been named; but to require such a statement we must hold, that the consequential damage created by this crime is necessary to constitute the crime itself.
The third objection is, that there are no such funds as the funds of this kingdom; that there are no funds raised at the common charge of both parts of the United Kingdom. But every fund that is raised from either part becomes, when it is raised, a fund of the kingdom at large, and is strictly a part of the funds and government securities of the United Kingdom; the United Kingdom is answerable for them, and for the service of the United Kingdom, whether applied to England or Ireland, it is that they are raised. I think the description is better than any other which might be framed. For these reasons I am of opinion, there is no ground to arrest the judgment, nor any doubt to require a rule for a further discussion.
Lord Ellenborough read the report of the evidence.
LORD COCHRANE,
Your Lordships having listened to those who had any thing to offer which they considered material for their defence, emboldens me to trust that your Lordships, though I do not address you by Counsel, will grant me a similar indulgence, and even that you will extend that indulgence further to me on account of my not appearing by Counsel, for the reasons which I had the honour to state to you upon a former occasion. In order that those feelings which must agitate me on the present occasion, may as little as possible enter into what I have now to state, I have judged it proper to reduce it to writing; and in order to give the Court as little trouble as possible, to make my statement as short as the circumstances of the case appear to me to admit of.
It has been my very great misfortune to be apparently implicated in the guilt of others with whom I never had any connexion, except in transactions, so far as I was apprised of them, entirely blameless. I had met Mr. De Berenger in public company, but was on no terms of intimacy with him. With Mr. Cochrane Johnstone I had the intercourse natural between such near relatives. Mr. Butt had voluntarily offered, without any reward, to carry on stock transactions, in which thousands, as well as myself were engaged, in the face of day without the smallest imputation of any thing incorrect. The other four defendants were wholly unknown to me, nor have I ever, directly or indirectly, held any communication with them. Of Mr. De Berenger's concern in the fraud, I have no information, except such as arises out of the late trial. With regard to Mr. Johnstone and Mr. Butt, I am willing to hope that they are guiltless. They repeatedly protested to me their innocence. They did not dare to communicate any such plan to me, if such was projected by them, or either of them. Be they guilty, then, or be they, one or both, erroneously convicted, I have only to lament, that, without the most remote suspicion of their proceedings, if they, or either of them, were concerned in the fraud, I have, through my blameless intercourse with them, been subject to imputations which might, with equal justice, have been cast upon any man who now hears me. Circumstanced as I am, I must keep myself wholly unconnected with those whose innocence cannot be so clear to me as my own. Well had it been for me if I had made this distinction sooner.
I do not stand here to commend myself—unhappily, I must seek only for exculpation; but I cannot exist under the load of dishonour which even an unjust judgment has flung upon me. My life has been too often in jeopardy to make me think much about it; but my honour was never yet breathed upon; and I now hold my existence only in the determination to remove an imputation, as groundless, as it is intolerable.
The evidence which I now tender to your Lordship, will aid me in performing this duty towards myself, my rank, and my profession. I first offer the affidavit, which I have repeated at a risk which I formerly had no opportunity of encountering. I have been told, that I then incurred the moral guilt of perjury, without exposing myself to the legal penalties. I know nothing of such distinctions. I have repeated the statement upon oath—and I am now answerable to the laws if I have falsely sworn. The affidavits of three persons who saw De Berenger at my house on the 21st of February, fully confirm my statement, and I have only been prevented from bringing forward a fourth, by his sailing to a distant situation, before I could possibly stop him for this purpose.
The grounds upon which I have been convicted are these:—That notes were found in De Berenger's possession which had been changed for others, that had once been in mine. That De Berenger came to my house after returning from his expedition; and that my account of what passed at this visit is contradicted by evidence.
The first ground has been clearly explained away; it amounts to nothing more than that which may happen to any man who has money transactions. Mr. Butt voluntarily made purchases and sales of stock for me, and having received a small loan of money from him, I repaid him with bank notes which he used for his own purposes. He says that he exchanged these notes, and that a part of the notes which he received in exchange he paid to Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, who states, that he gave them to De Berenger in payment of some drawings; but with this story, whether true or false, I have no manner of concern, and consequently no wish to discuss it. In what way soever the notes which were received in exchange for mine reached De Berenger, I can only say, that mine were given to Mr. Butt in discharge of a bona fide debt; and I have no knowledge whatever of the uses to which he applied them.
De Berenger's coming to my house, I before accounted for upon the supposition of his being unconcerned in the fraud; but is it not obvious that he might have come there to facilitate his escape, by going immediately on board of my ship, with the additional prospect of obtaining employment in America? It has been said that there was a suspicious degree of familiarity in his treatment of me and my house. I can only observe, that over his conduct I had no controul. But he knew, it seems, of my change of abode, which had occurred within a few days. I trust it will be recollected, that he is proved to have left town three days after such change, and that though not intimate with me, he had the means of knowing where I resided, even if he should not have enquired at my former lodgings, where my address was left. Indeed, if taking refuge in my ship, in order to facilitate his escape, was part of his scheme, it was very likely that he would have ascertained the precise place of my abode, previous to his quitting London. Again, I am said to have left the tinman's, (where I think I should hardly have gone had I expected such a messenger) as soon as I heard of the officer's arrival. I was in apprehensions of fatal news respecting my brother then in France, from whom I had received a letter but three days before, with the intelligence of his being dangerously ill; and I now tender you his affidavit, with the surgeon's certificate, dated the 12th of February, which he brought home with him. And therefore, on receiving the note from De Berenger, whose name I was unable to decypher, and as that note announced that the writer, whom I learnt from my servant had the appearance of an officer in the army, who was desirous of seeing me, I hastened to learn intelligence so anxiously expected; nor had I the least doubt that it related to my brother. When, however, I found that the person was De Berenger, and that he had only to speak of his own private affairs, the apparent distress he was in, and the relief it gave my mind to know that he was not the bearer of the news I dreaded, prevented me from feeling that displeasure which I might otherwise have felt at the liberty he had taken or the interruption it had occasioned. Comments have been made on my saying so little to the servant who brought that note; but the fact is, I did ask him several questions, as appears by his affidavit. That I did not learn the name of the writer from the note itself, I have truly accounted for, by its being written so close to the bottom of the paper that I could not read it. This assertion is said to be contradicted by the circumstance of the writer having found room to add a postscript, as if there was only one side to the paper. Of the postscript I have no recollection, but it might have been written even opposite the signature. That I did not collect from the hand-writing, that it was addressed to me by De Berenger, is nothing extraordinary; my acquaintance with that person was extremely slight; and till that day I had never received more than one or two notes from him, which related to a drawing of a lamp. I was too deeply impressed with the idea that the note was addressed to me by an officer who had come with intelligence of my brother, to apprehend that it was written by De Berenger, from whom I expected no communication, and with whose hand-writing I was not familiar. All that I could afterwards recollect of the note, more than what is stated in my affidavit is, that he had something to communicate which would affect my feeling mind, or words to that effect, which confirmed my apprehensions that the writer was the messenger of fatal news of my brother.
If De Berenger had really been my agent in this nefarious transaction, how I should have acted or where I should have chosen to receive him, it is impossible for me to say: but I humbly apprehend that my own house was not the place I should have selected for that purpose. The pretended Du Bourg, if I had chosen him for my instrument, instead of his making me his convenience, should have terminated his expedition and have found a change of dress elsewhere. He should not have come immediately and in open day to my house. I should not so rashly have invited detection and its concomitant ruin.
But this is not the only extravagance of which I am accused. What supposition short of my absolute insanity will account for my having voluntarily made the affidavit which has been so much canvassed, if I really knew the plot in which De Berenger appears to have been engaged? Let me entreat your Lordships consideration of the situation in which I stood at the moment in which that affidavit was made; I was suspected of being connected with the pretended Du Bourg; if I had known that De Berenger was the person who had assumed that name, could I possibly have betrayed him, and consequently myself, more completely than by publishing such a detail to the world? The name of De Berenger was never mentioned till brought forward in my affidavit; which affidavit was made, as sworn by Mr. Wright, a witness on the trial, with the circumstance present to me, and remarked by me at the time I delivered it to him to be printed, that if De Berenger should happen to be Du Bourg, I had furnished a clue to his detection. The circumstance of his obtaining a change of dress at my house, never could have been known if I had not voluntarily discovered it; and thus I am represented as having brought him publicly to my own house, of being the first to disclose his name, and of mentioning a circumstance, which, of all others, it was the most easy to conceal, and, if divulged, the most certain to excite suspicion! Is it not next to impossible, that a man, conscious of guilt, should have been so careless of his most imminent danger?
My adversaries dwell upon some particulars of this affidavit, which they pretend to find contradicted in the evidence. The principle one is my assertion that Berenger wore a green coat. I have repeated this assertion upon oath, under all the risks of the law; and I also solemnly affirm, upon my honour, which I regard as an obligation no less sacred, that I only saw him in that dress. The witnesses on the part of the prosecution have asserted, that he wore a red coat when he arrived in town. Granted. But may he not have changed it in the coach, on his way to Green-street? Where was the difficulty, and for what purpose was the portmanteau? My own fixed opinion is, that he changed his dress in the coach, because I believe that he dared not run the risk of appearing in my presence till he had so changed it. I tender affidavits of those who saw him, as I did, in his green coat, at my house. That he should have changed his dress before I saw him is most natural, upon the supposition of his wishing to conceal from me the work he had been about; but it is like many other confirmations of my innocence, fated to excite no attention in the minds of those who only seek food for their suspicions. Much is said of the star and other ornaments, as if any proof had been given of his wearing them in my presence. He took especial care, I doubt not, to lay them aside on his way, when he had divested himself of his official capacity, long before I saw him. The small portmanteau before-mentioned, which it is admitted he brought with him, in all probability furnished him with the green coat, and received the red coat and its ornaments, and very possibly for this reason no remark has been made upon it. A good deal of observation has been bestowed upon De Berenger's unwillingness to appear before Lord Yarmouth in uniform, and the inference was, that this uniform could not have been the green dress of his corps, otherwise he must have felt the reverse of uneasy at being seen in it by his Colonel. Does any volunteer officer go out of a morning to make calls in his regimentals? Could so unusual a circumstance have failed to excite remark from Lord Yarmouth? To me, indeed, he had explained himself—he had of necessity told me his nearly desperate state, in asking me to receive him on board my ship; but is there any thing so very incredible in the statement that he was unwilling to tell his whole case to every body? It may now doubtless be perceived, that he might have had other reasons for disliking to go out in a green dress.
Let it, however, be recollected, that my statement was, that he only asked me for a hat in lieu of his military cap, and that the black coat was my own voluntary offer. The idea of his applying to Lord Yarmouth, or to any other of his friends, originated with me, and I proposed it in consequence of his calling to my recollection the certificates he had received from them. I then had no suspicion awake, and I believed what he told me. In what manner the disguise was ultimately disposed of I can only conjecture, as any one else might, from the evidence given on the trial. He presented himself to me in a grey great coat, and a green under coat; and if the persons whose affidavits I now tender had been examined on the trial, and they did attend for that purpose, I do feel persuaded that a very different impression would have been made on the jury and the world at large, than that which they appear to entertain; and that your Lordships might have been disposed to take an opposite view of the case as it affected me. Those witnesses would have corroborated the particulars of my affidavit relative to De Berenger's dress, when I first saw him at my house, namely, a grey great coat, and a green under coat and jacket. Unfortunately, through some mistake or misconception, not on my part, they were left unnoticed, and, of course, were not examined. I have now to offer their several affidavits to your Lordships.
I would further submit to your Lordships, that my affidavit was made at the impulse of the moment, as soon as I heard that placards had been posted, stating that the pretended colonel Du Bourg had gone to my house; and in the conscious rectitude of my own conduct, I not only introduced the name of the only officer I saw at my house on the day stated, but narrated every occurrence that took place, and all the conversation that look place at the interview, to the best of my recollection. If I am censured for having been too ingenuous in my communication, I trust it will be admitted, that as ingenuousness disclaims all connexion with guilt, it is indicative only of my innocence.
If your Lordships will be pleased to reflect on all that I have offered respecting De Berenger, and to bear in mind the avowed intercourse which I had with two other defendants, respecting whose conduct I have been compelled to speak at last upon a supposition of their guilt, I am confident you will perceive how easily any man living so circumstanced might have been placed in the very situation. But waiving the supposition of De Berenger acting under the direction of either of the other defendants, I do still contend, that any man who had stock concerns, and was slightly known to De Berenger, ran the same risk with me, of being driven into the ruin, which undeservedly, as I am still willing to hope, has befallen the others.
The artifices which have been used to excite so much prejudice against me, I unfeignedly despise, in spite of the injury they have done me. I know it must subside, and I look forward to justice being rendered my character sooner or later: It will come most speedily, as well as most gratefully, if I shall receive it at your Lordship's hands. I am not unused to injury; of late I have known persecution: the indignity of compassion I am not yet able to bear. To escape what is vulgarly called punishment, would have been an easy thing; but I must have belied my feelings by acting as if I were conscious of dishonour. There are ways, even of removing beyond the reach of ignominy, but I cannot feel disgraced while I know that I am guiltless. Under the influence of this sentiment, I persist in the defence of my character. I have often been in situations where I had an opportunity of showing it. This is the first time, thank God, that I was ever called upon to defend it.
* * * * *
The following Affidavits, handed in by Lord Cochrane, were read.
"In the King's Bench.
"The King against Charles Random De Berenger, & others.
"Sir Thomas Cochrane, commonly called Lord Cochrane, one of the above named defendants, maketh oath and saith, That the several facts and circumstances stated in his affidavit, sworn on the eleventh day of March last, before Mr. Graham, the Magistrate, are true; and this deponent further saith, that in addition to the several facts and circumstances stated in his said affidavit, he deposeth as follows, (that is to say); That he had not directly nor indirectly any concern whatever in the formation, or any knowledge of the existence of an intention to form the plot charged in the indictment, or any other scheme or design for affecting the public funds. That the sale of the pretended omnium on the twenty-first day of February, was made in pursuance of orders given to his broker at the time of the purchase thereof, on or about the fourteenth of that month, to sell the same whenever a profit of one per cent. could be realized; and that those directions were given, and the sale thereof took place without any knowledge, information, hint or surmise on the part of this deponent, of any concern or attempt whatever to alter the price of the funds; and the said sale on the twenty-first took place entirely without this deponent's knowledge. That when this deponent returned home from Mr. King's manufactory, on the twenty-first of February, which he did directly after the receipt of a note, he fully expected to have met an officer from abroad, with intelligence of his brother, who had by letter to this deponent received on the Friday before, communicated his being confined to his bed, and severely afflicted by a dangerous illness, and about whom this deponent was extremely anxious; but this deponent found Captain De Berenger at his house, in a grey great coat, and a green jacket. That this deponent never saw the defendants, Ralph Sandom, Alexander M'Rae, John Peter Holloway, and Henry Lyte, or any or either of them, nor ever had any communication or correspondence with them, or any or either of them, directly or indirectly; that this deponent, in pursuance of directions from the Admiralty, proceeded to Chatham to join his Majesty's ship "The Tonnant," to which he had been appointed on the eighth day of February last; that the ship was then lying at Chatham; that previous to the eighth day of February, this deponent applied to the Admiralty for leave of absence, which was refused until this deponent had joined the said ship, and had removed her down to Long Reach; that this deponent in pursuance of those directions removed the said ship from Chatham to Long Reach; and after that was done, viz. on Saturday the twelfth day of the said month, this deponent wrote to the Admiralty, to apply for leave of absence for a fortnight, for the purpose of lodging a specification for a patent, as had been previously communicated by this deponent to their Lordships; that leave of absence was accordingly granted for fourteen days, commencing on the fourteenth of the said month; that this deponent was engaged in London respecting the said specification, till the twenty-eighth of the said month, when the said specification was completed; and this deponent left town about one o'clock on the morning of the first day of March, and arrived at Chatham about day-light on the same morning; that on the eighth or ninth of the same month of March, this deponent received an intimation, that placards were affixed in several of the streets, stating that a pretended Colonel Du Bourg had gone to this deponent's house in Green-street; that he was on board the said ship at Long Reach, and in consequence went to Admiral Surrage, the Port Admiral at Chatham, to obtain leave of absence, which was granted previous to the receipt of the leave forwarded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty; this deponent arrived in London on the tenth of that month, to the best of his belief; and that after his arrival, he himself, conscious of his own innocence, and fearing no consequences from a developement of every part of his own conduct, and desiring only to rescue his character from erroneous impressions made by misrepresentations in the public prints, he without any communication whatsoever with any other person, and without any assistance, on the impulse of the moment prepared the before-mentioned affidavit, which he swore before Mr. Graham, the magistrate, on the eleventh; that at the time he swore such affidavit, he had not seen or heard the contents of the report published by the Committee of the Stock Exchange, except partial extracts in the newspapers; that when this deponent understood that a prosecution was to be instituted against him, he wrote to Admiral Fleming, in whose service Isaac Davis, formerly this deponent's servant, then was, under cover to Admiral Bickerton, at Portsmouth, and that Admiral Bickerton returned the letter, saying, that Admiral Fleming had sailed for Gibraltar; that this deponent sent his servants, Thomas Dewman, Elizabeth Busk, and Mary Turpin, on the trial of this indictment, to prove that an officer came to this deponent's house on the morning of the said twenty-first of February, and to prove the dress that he came in, but that the said Thomas Dewman only was called; and as this deponent has been informed, he was not interrogated as to the dress in which the said officer came to his house; and this deponent further saith, that had the said witnesses been examined, according to the directions of this deponent, and who were in attendance on the Court for that express purpose, they would, as he verily believes, have removed every unfavourable conclusion respecting this deponent's conduct, drawn from the supposed dress in which the said De Berenger appeared before this deponent on the twenty-first of February, and on which circumstance much stress was laid in the charge to the Jury, the said De Berenger's dress being exactly as stated in this deponent's former affidavit hereinbefore-mentioned; and this deponent solemnly and positively denies, that he ever saw the said De Berenger in a scarlet uniform, decorated by medal, or other insignia, and he had not the least suspicion of the said De Berenger being engaged in any plot respecting the funds, but merely believed he wished, for the reasons stated in this deponent's former affidavit, to go on board this deponent's ship, with a view to obtain some military appointment in America; and this deponent declined complying with his request to send him on board his ship, without permission or an order from the Lords of the Admiralty; and this deponent further saith, that he was in no degree intimate with the said De Berenger; that he had no personal knowledge of his private or public character; that he never asked the said De Berenger to his house, nor did he ever breakfast or dine with this deponent therein on any occasion whatsoever; and further, this deponent saith, that he hath been informed, and verily believes, that the Jury who tried the said indictment, and the Counsel for the defence, were so completely exhausted and worn out by extreme fatigue, owing to the Court having continued the trial without intermission for many hours beyond that time which nature is capable of sustaining herself without reflection and repose, that justice could not be done to this deponent.
Cochrane."
Sworn in Court the 14th June 1814.
"In the King's Bench.
"The King against Charles Random De Berenger, & others.
"Thomas Dewman, servant to Lord Cochrane, maketh Oath and saith,——"
Lord Ellenborough. This was a person called as a witness on the trial; if the affidavit goes beyond what he then stated, or in contradiction to what he stated, it cannot be received.
Lord Cochrane. Would your Lordship permit me to explain the reason why he was not interrogated?
Mr. Justice Bayley. It is a settled rule, not to allow the affidavits of persons who might have been called upon the trial, much less of persons who were called.
Lord Ellenborough. And if any were not called, they were not called under the discretion of your Lordship. It would be a very dangerous thing, if persons whose evidence may have been discreetly kept back, should afterwards be admitted to come forward as witnesses.
Mr. Dealtry. The next is the affidavit of Sarah Busk.
Lord Cochrane. My humble hope is, that you will be pleased to grant a new trial, in order that these persons may have the opportunity of being examined: they were not called from an error in the brief, which (so little was I conscious of any participation in the fraud) I had not even read.
Mr. Gurney. My Lord, the Counsel for the defendant were not uninstructed, as to the evidence which these persons could give; because, annexed to the affidavit which your Lordship has stated, of Lord Cochrane, were the affidavits of all the servants, of the one who is not now in England, as well as of the three who are in England. They are all printed together in Mr. Butt's pamphlet, which was produced at the trial. Therefore the Counsel for the defendant were informed of every circumstance, and they might, if they had thought it would serve their client, have called all those persons as witnesses.
Mr. Justice Le Blanc. There is no rule better established, than that after trial we cannot receive the affidavits of persons who were called, or who might have been called as witnesses. Whatever might be the reason for keeping back their testimony, that the Court cannot hear.
[The following Affidavit was read.]
"In the King's Bench.
"The King against Charles Random De Berenger & others.
"The Honourable William Erskine Cochrane, Major in the fifteenth regiment of dragoons, now residing in Portman-square in the county of Middlesex, on his oath saith, That he was seized with a violent and alarming illness on the first of January one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, at Cambo in the south of France; and that this deponent remained in a state of dangerous illness until the eighteenth of the following month. That early in February last he wrote to his brother Lord Cochrane, to acquaint his Lordship with this deponent's situation, as deponent had then very little hope of recovery, and telling him that he had received a notification that he would be ordered to England, where he should proceed, if ever able to undertake the journey. And this deponent further saith, that the annexed certificate was given to him for the purpose of being laid officially before a board of medical officers at Saint Jean de Luz, by the surgeon of this deponent's regiment, and is in the said surgeon's hand-writing.
W. E. Cochrane."
Sworn in Court, this 14th day of June 1814. By the Court.
"Statement of Major the Honourable William Cochrane's Complaint. Monday, February 12, 1814.
"Was seized with the usual symptoms of fever on the 1st of January, which was continued for the first three days; then the remittent character developed itself. The evening paroxism was severe every day, and he was all through much worse on the third day than on the two preceding days. The treatment consisted in keeping the bowels perfectly free and the skin moist, and this was generally obtained by calomel and antimonial powder combined, in the proportion of two grains, and three every third hour, and an occasional purge of neutral salts. When the bowels were well emptied, I frequently gave saline draughts, which kept the skin moist and favourable for the exhibition of bark, the use of which was commenced the 16th day. On the 23d he had a crisis, and went on very well till the 1st of February, when he suffered a relapse, attended with rather alarming symptoms. There was great determination to the head, the eyes were suffused, great drowsiness, and a tendency to comae; however, these symptoms gave way in six hours, in which time he was actively purged, the skin was made moist, and a profuse perspiration kept up for twelve hours, which left him perfectly tranquil and free from fever. From this term I continued to give him small doses of calomel, till his mouth was very slightly affected. He continued free from fever from the morning of the 2d till the 7th; his appetite good, his strength increasing, and every sign of health. On that morning he had a second relapse, but by no means so violent, though more embarrassing; he has not been well since, and has suffered very much indeed. The treatment latterly has been attention to the state of his bowels and diet. He has not taken bark since his first relapse. I hope the change of air and objects will serve him.
Tho. Cartan, Surgeon, 15th Hussars."
Lord Ellenborough. This affidavit is not even material to shew, that Lord Cochrane was in possession of his brother's letter previous to the morning of the 21st of February, so as to account for a connexion existing in his mind between the note he on that morning received, and the state of his brother's health, which should induce him immediately on the receipt of it, to return home?
Lord Cochrane. I was not present at the trial, or those witnesses would have been examined.
Lord Ellenborough. But those witnesses would not have gone to this point, and your mind must have been drawn to it at the time you made your affidavit, when you came to mention your brother's illness?
Lord Cochrane. My brother's affidavit states, that he wrote to me early in the month, and I received his letter on the Friday previous to the fraud.
Lord Ellenborough. That was capable of being most distinctly verified.
Mr. Justice Bayley. The original letter is not annexed to the affidavit?
Lord Cochrane. It is not; I had no idea of bringing the letter of my brother before a court of justice.
[The following Affidavit was read.]
"In the King's Bench.
"The King against Charles Random De Berenger, & others.
"Charles Random De Berenger, the above-named defendant, (having been found guilty of certain counts, but acquitted of the two first contained in this indictment,) maketh oath and saith, That he, this deponent, has zealously and loyally served His Majesty and this country as a volunteer, during a period of sixteen years, without ever receiving pay, remuneration, or reward of any kind, although by a most punctual and uninterrupted discharge of his various duties, his pecuniary interests and views were consequently greatly injured, but more especially during the time he acted as Adjutant, being for a period of near seven years, when his time was daily occupied more or less by the duties of that situation; and instead of drawing permanent pay, as is the usual custom of volunteer adjutants, he even put himself to considerable annual expences, to further the views of that service. And this deponent further saith, That the testimonials now produced in Court, as proofs of his energetic and loyal services, are of the proper hand-writing of the parties whose names are thereunto respectively subscribed. And this deponent further saith, That he has lost his paternal fortune, exceeding the sum of thirty-three thousand pounds, solely owing to his father's loyal adherence to the crown of Great Britain, during the American revolution; and that no indemnity of any kind has ever been given for such loss, either to his late father or to himself. That perfectly unprejudiced by such hard fate, this deponent constantly and without fee, or even condition for reward, has since, not only tendered his loyal assistance to this country to the utmost of his power, and in a variety of ways, but has actually given several important suggestions and communications, which although made use of by the offices of Government, still continue unrewarded. And this deponent further saith, that he lately lost a considerable fortune from the failure of an expensive and spirited endeavour on his part, having the formation of a national fund for the succour of artists, and the relief of their widows and orphans, for its object, whereby he was ruined a second time, and deprived, in consequence, of his liberty: that although distressed himself, and having numerous debts on his books due to him from Englishmen unable to pay, he has always been merciful to them. And this deponent further saith, That he has already suffered a painful imprisonment, ever since the eighth of April last, by which his means of defence were not only decidedly impeded, but his strength and health most materially injured; that in this particular, as also in the mode of seizing his papers and property, he has suffered considerable hardships, while his slender pecuniary resources, from the aforesaid causes, and by the heavy expences of his confinement and trial, are totally destroyed; and that on these accounts his sufferings have been greater than those of any of the other defendants. And this deponent also saith, that any further degradation must ruin his prospects in life for ever, and bring anguish and despair upon him, who has already suffered so severely from his attachment to this country; and he respectfully hopes, that his severe losses and ruined circumstances, his general exemplary conduct, his uninterrupted loyalty, and his many unrequited services, will have due weight with this honourable Court, in mitigation of punishment; he also relies that considerations additionally stimulating to forgiveness, will animate his judges, when it is stated, that deponent to this moment has received no recompence whatever, for his many patriotic exertions and ruinous sacrifices; and above all, that in consequence of his not having succeeded in obtaining a respite of the judgment for a short time, he has been prevented from experiencing the benefit of important affidavits, which he anxiously expected from other persons.
Charles Random De Berenger."
Mr. Topping. I was of Counsel with Mr. Serjeant Best on the trial; I am not furnished with any affidavit on the part of Mr. Butt.
Mr. Butt. I came into Court, my Lord, expecting the privilege of asking for a new trial, upon certain facts which I have put down in my pocket-book.
Lord Ellenborough. You are not in time to move for a new trial.
Mr. Butt. I know I am not, my Lord; I was merely going to explain——
Mr. Justice Le Blanc. If you appear by Counsel, your Counsel had better state what you have to suggest.
Mr. Topping. I have no instructions on the subject.
Mr. Butt. I hope you will forgive my importunity in begging for a few moments to address you, having never been before in a court of justice, either as plaintiff or defendant; that I trust will plead my apology. If you will hear me, I shall be much obliged to you.
My Lords; I have been tried for conspiring with other persons, to raise the price of the public Government funds, and also for promoting assistance to those measures, by the changing of notes, and various other circumstances. I beg to assure your Lordships, that I do not address you on the idea or wish of a mitigation of any punishment you may think proper to inflict upon me; it is merely to express to you, that my sole wish and desire is to claim the indulgence of the Court, in permitting me to have a new and distinct trial, that I may clear my character from the cloud with which it is now depressed, and which had previously been without a blemish; as I am confident, if my case was separated from other persons in the indictment, it would be the means of my acquittal. It was my intention to have appeared in Court some days since, to have made the same request which I now do of your Lordships, had it not been for my Counsel informing me, that I should have been committed directly I entered the Court; and that the defendants should all appear before the Court could grant my request. This I found impossible to accomplish; and I declare, that the defendants, Sandom, Lyte, Holloway, and M'Rae, are all perfectly unknown to me; that I never directly or indirectly had any knowledge or communication or ever saw them in my life, neither did I ever see Mr. De Berenger more than two or three times. I beg also to acquaint your Lordships, that the bank notes which have been stated to have passed through my hands must, unavoidably so have done, as I permitted, without thinking it any crime, at the solicitation of my friends, that all drafts connected with the Stock Exchange business should be paid in my name, whether I was in London or not; and I did at any time change notes, or lend Mr. Johnstone money, as a temporary accommodation, when he wished it; and yet it is a fact, that I had never seen Mr. Johnstone till the 2d of January last. But it is impossible for me, and certainly a case of hardship, that I should be answerable for the manner in which those notes might be disposed of afterwards. There appears no one witness on the trial, that can give any extraordinary reason for my having paid the notes alluded to by Mr. Johnstone; for I might, hundreds of times, have paid notes to an equal amount to him, or to any other man. |
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