[23] Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1824.

[24] Ibid., 1826.

[25] Ibid., 1839.

[26] Ibid., 1842.

[27] British and Foreign State Papers, 1857-8, p. 1250.

[28] Lord Napier to Secretary of State Cass, Dec. 24, 1857: British and Foreign State Papers, 1857-8, p. 1249.

[29] Parliamentary Papers, 1847-8, Vol. LXIV. No. 133, Papers Relative to the Suppression of the Slave Trade on the Coast of Africa, p. 2.

[30] Report of Perry: Senate Doc., 28 Cong. 2 sess. IX. No. 150, p. 118.

[31] Consul Park at Rio Janeiro to Secretary Buchanan, Aug. 20, 1847: House Exec. Doc., 30 Cong. 2 sess. VII. No. 61, p. 7.

[32] Suppose "an American vessel employed to take in negroes at some point on this coast. There is no American man-of-war here to obtain intelligence. What risk does she run of being searched? But suppose that there is a man-of-war in port. What is to secure the master of the merchantman against her [the man-of-war's commander's knowing all about his [the merchant-man's] intention, or suspecting it in time to be upon him [the merchant-man] before he shall have run a league on his way to Texas?" Consul Trist to Commander Spence: House Doc., 27 Cong. 1 sess. No. 34, p. 41.]

[33] A typical set of instructions was on the following plan: 1. You are charged with the protection of legitimate commerce. 2. While the United States wishes to suppress the slave-trade, she will not admit a Right of Search by foreign vessels. 3. You are to arrest slavers. 4. You are to allow in no case an exercise of the Right of Search or any great interruption of legitimate commerce.—To Commodore Perry, March 30, 1843: House Exec. Doc., 35 Cong. 2 sess. IX. No. 104.

[34] House Reports, 27 Cong. 3 sess. III. No. 283, pp. 765-8. Cf. Benton's speeches on the treaty of 1842.

[35] Report of Hotham to Admiralty, April 7, 1847: Parliamentary Papers, 1847-8, Vol. LXIV. No. 133, Papers Relative to the Suppression of the Slave Trade on the Coast of Africa, p. 13.

[36] Opinions of Attorneys-General, III. 512.

[37] Tenth Annual Report of the Amer. and Foreign Anti-Slav. Soc., May 7, 1850, p. 149.

[38] Opinions of Attorneys-General, IV. 245.

[39] Senate Doc., 28 Cong. 2 sess. IX. No. 150, pp. 108, 132.

[40] House Exec. Doc., 30 Cong. 2 sess. VII. No. 61, p. 18.

[41] Foote, Africa and the American Flag, pp. 286-90.

[42] British and Foreign State Papers, 1839-40, pp. 913-4.

[43] Cf. United States census reports; and Olmsted, Cotton Kingdom.

[44] House Journal, 26 Cong. 1 sess. p. 118.

[45] Ibid., 27 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 31, 184.

[46] Ibid., 27 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 14, 15, 86, 113.

[47] Senate Journal, 28 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 191, 227.

[48] House Exec. Doc., 31 Cong. 1 sess. III. pt. I. No. 5, p. 7.

[49] Foote, Africa and the American Flag, p. 152.

[50] Ibid., pp. 152-3.

[51] Ibid., p. 241.

[52] Cf. e.g. House Doc., 28 Cong. 2 sess. IV. pt. I. No. 148; 29 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 43; House Exec. Doc., 30 Cong. 2 sess. VII. No. 61; Senate Exec. Doc., 30 Cong. 1 sess. IV. No. 28; 31 Cong. 2 sess. II. No. 6; 33 Cong. 1 sess. VIII. No. 47.

[53] Foote, Africa and the American Flag, p. 218.

[54] Ibid., p. 221.

[55] Palmerston to Stevenson: House Doc., 26 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 115, p. 5. In 1836 five such slavers were known to have cleared; in 1837, eleven; in 1838, nineteen; and in 1839, twenty-three: Ibid., pp. 220-1.

[56] Parliamentary Papers, 1839, Vol. XLIX., Slave Trade, class A, Further Series, pp. 58-9; class B, Further Series, p. 110; class D, Further Series, p. 25. Trist pleaded ignorance of the law: Trist to Forsyth, House Doc., 26 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 115.

[57] House Doc., 26 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 115.

[58] Foote, Africa and the American Flag, p. 290.

[59] House Doc., 26 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 115, pp. 121, 163-6.

[60] Senate Exec. Doc., 31 Cong. 1 sess. XIV No. 66.

[61] Trist to Forsyth: House Doc., 26 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 115. "The business of supplying the United States with Africans from this island is one that must necessarily exist," because "slaves are a hundred per cent, or more, higher in the United States than in Cuba," and this profit "is a temptation which it is not in human nature as modified by American institutions to withstand": Ibid.

[62] Statutes at Large, V. 674.

[63] Cf. above, p. 157, note 1.

[64] Buxton, The African Slave Trade and its Remedy, pp. 44-5. Cf. 2d Report of the London African Soc., p. 22.

[65] I.e., Bay Island in the Gulf of Mexico, near the coast of Honduras.

[66] Revelations of a Slave Smuggler, p. 98.

[67] Mr. H. Moulton in Slavery as it is, p. 140; cited in Facts and Observations on the Slave Trade (Friends' ed. 1841), p. 8.

[68] In a memorial to Congress, 1840: House Doc., 26 Cong. 1 sess. VI. No. 211.

[69] British and Foreign State Papers, 1845-6, pp. 883, 968, 989-90. The governor wrote in reply: "The United States, if properly served by their law officers in the Floridas, will not experience any difficulty in obtaining the requisite knowledge of these illegal transactions, which, I have reason to believe, were the subject of common notoriety in the neighbourhood where they occurred, and of boast on the part of those concerned in them": British and Foreign State Papers, 1845-6, p. 990.

* * * * *



Chapter XI

THE FINAL CRISIS. 1850-1870.

80. The Movement against the Slave-Trade Laws. 81. Commercial Conventions of 1855-56. 82. Commercial Conventions of 1857-58. 83. Commercial Convention of 1859. 84. Public Opinion in the South. 85. The Question in Congress. 86. Southern Policy in 1860. 87. Increase of the Slave-Trade from 1850 to 1860. 88. Notorious Infractions of the Laws. 89. Apathy of the Federal Government. 90. Attitude of the Southern Confederacy. 91. Attitude of the United States.

80. The Movement against the Slave-Trade Laws. It was not altogether a mistaken judgment that led the constitutional fathers to consider the slave-trade as the backbone of slavery. An economic system based on slave labor will find, sooner or later, that the demand for the cheapest slave labor cannot long be withstood. Once degrade the laborer so that he cannot assert his own rights, and there is but one limit below which his price cannot be reduced. That limit is not his physical well-being, for it may be, and in the Gulf States it was, cheaper to work him rapidly to death; the limit is simply the cost of procuring him and keeping him alive a profitable length of time. Only the moral sense of a community can keep helpless labor from sinking to this level; and when a community has once been debauched by slavery, its moral sense offers little resistance to economic demand. This was the case in the West Indies and Brazil; and although better moral stamina held the crisis back longer in the United States, yet even here the ethical standard of the South was not able to maintain itself against the demands of the cotton industry. When, after 1850, the price of slaves had risen to a monopoly height, the leaders of the plantation system, brought to the edge of bankruptcy by the crude and reckless farming necessary under a slave regime, and baffled, at least temporarily, in their quest of new rich land to exploit, began instinctively to feel that the only salvation of American slavery lay in the reopening of the African slave-trade.

It took but a spark to put this instinctive feeling into words, and words led to deeds. The movement first took definite form in the ever radical State of South Carolina. In 1854 a grand jury in the Williamsburg district declared, "as our unanimous opinion, that the Federal law abolishing the African Slave Trade is a public grievance. We hold this trade has been and would be, if re-established, a blessing to the American people, and a benefit to the African himself."[1] This attracted only local attention; but when, in 1856, the governor of the State, in his annual message, calmly argued at length for a reopening of the trade, and boldly declared that "if we cannot supply the demand for slave labor, then we must expect to be supplied with a species of labor we do not want,"[2] such words struck even Southern ears like "a thunder clap in a calm day."[3] And yet it needed but a few years to show that South Carolina had merely been the first to put into words the inarticulate thought of a large minority, if not a majority, of the inhabitants of the Gulf States.

81. Commercial Conventions of 1855-56. The growth of the movement is best followed in the action of the Southern Commercial Convention, an annual gathering which seems to have been fairly representative of a considerable part of Southern opinion. In the convention that met at New Orleans in 1855, McGimsey of Louisiana introduced a resolution instructing the Southern Congressmen to secure the repeal of the slave-trade laws. This resolution went to the Committee on Resolutions, and was not reported.[4] In 1856, in the convention at Savannah, W.B. Goulden of Georgia moved that the members of Congress be requested to bestir themselves energetically to have repealed all laws which forbade the slave-trade. By a vote of 67 to 18 the convention refused to debate the motion, but appointed a committee to present at the next convention the facts relating to a reopening of the trade.[5] In regard to this action a pamphlet of the day said: "There were introduced into the convention two leading measures, viz.: the laying of a State tariff on northern goods, and the reopening of the slave-trade; the one to advance our commercial interest, the other our agricultural interest, and which, when taken together, as they were doubtless intended to be, and although they have each been attacked by presses of doubtful service to the South, are characterized in the private judgment of politicians as one of the completest southern remedies ever submitted to popular action.... The proposition to revive, or more properly to reopen, the slave trade is as yet but imperfectly understood, in its intentions and probable results, by the people of the South, and but little appreciated by them. It has been received in all parts of the country with an undefined sort of repugnance, a sort of squeamishness, which is incident to all such violations of moral prejudices, and invariably wears off on familiarity with the subject. The South will commence by enduring, and end by embracing the project."[6] The matter being now fully before the public through these motions, Governor Adams's message, and newspaper and pamphlet discussion, the radical party pushed the project with all energy.

82. Commercial Conventions of 1857-58. The first piece of regular business that came before the Commercial Convention at Knoxville, Tennessee, August 10, 1857, was a proposal to recommend the abrogation of the 8th Article of the Treaty of Washington, on the slave-trade. An amendment offered by Sneed of Tennessee, declaring it inexpedient and against settled policy to reopen the trade, was voted down, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia refusing to agree to it. The original motion then passed; and the radicals, satisfied with their success in the first skirmish, again secured the appointment of a committee to report at the next meeting on the subject of reopening the slave-trade.[7] This next meeting assembled May 10, 1858, in a Gulf State, Alabama, in the city of Montgomery. Spratt of South Carolina, the slave-trade champion, presented an elaborate majority report from the committee, and recommended the following resolutions:—

1. Resolved, That slavery is right, and that being right, there can be no wrong in the natural means to its formation.

2. Resolved, That it is expedient and proper that the foreign slave trade should be re-opened, and that this Convention will lend its influence to any legitimate measure to that end.

3. Resolved, That a committee, consisting of one from each slave State, be appointed to consider of the means, consistent with the duty and obligations of these States, for re-opening the foreign slave-trade, and that they report their plan to the next meeting of this Convention.

Yancey, from the same committee, presented a minority report, which, though it demanded the repeal of the national prohibitory laws, did not advocate the reopening of the trade by the States.

Much debate ensued. Pryor of Virginia declared the majority report "a proposition to dissolve the Union." Yancey declared that "he was for disunion now. [Applause.]" He defended the principle of the slave-trade, and said: "If it is right to buy slaves in Virginia and carry them to New Orleans, why is it not right to buy them in Cuba, Brazil, or Africa, and carry them there?" The opposing speeches made little attempt to meet this uncomfortable logic; but, nevertheless, opposition enough was developed to lay the report on the table until the next convention, with orders that it be printed, in the mean time, as a radical campaign document. Finally the convention passed a resolution:—

That it is inexpedient for any State, or its citizens, to attempt to re-open the African slave-trade while that State is one of the United States of America.[8]

83. Commercial Convention of 1859. The Convention of 1859 met at Vicksburg, Mississippi, May 9-19, and the slave-trade party came ready for a fray. On the second day Spratt called up his resolutions, and the next day the Committee on Resolutions recommended that, "in the opinion of this Convention, all laws, State or Federal, prohibiting the African slave trade, ought to be repealed." Two minority reports accompanied this resolution: one proposed to postpone action, on account of the futility of the attempt at that time; the other report recommended that, since repeal of the national laws was improbable, nullification by the States impracticable, and action by the Supreme Court unlikely, therefore the States should bring in the Africans as apprentices, a system the legality of which "is incontrovertible." "The only difficult question," it was said, "is the future status of the apprentices after the expiration of their term of servitude."[9] Debate on these propositions began in the afternoon. A brilliant speech on the resumption of the importation of slaves, says Foote of Mississippi, "was listened to with breathless attention and applauded vociferously. Those of us who rose in opposition were looked upon by the excited assemblage present as traitors to the best interests of the South, and only worthy of expulsion from the body. The excitement at last grew so high that personal violence was menaced, and some dozen of the more conservative members of the convention withdrew from the hall in which it was holding its sittings."[10] "It was clear," adds De Bow, "that the people of Vicksburg looked upon it [i.e., the convention] with some distrust."[11] When at last a ballot was taken, the first resolution passed by a vote of 40 to 19.[12] Finally, the 8th Article of the Treaty of Washington was again condemned; and it was also suggested, in the newspaper which was the official organ of the meeting, that "the Convention raise a fund to be dispensed in premiums for the best sermons in favor of reopening the African Slave Trade."[13]

84. Public Opinion in the South. This record of the Commercial Conventions probably gives a true reflection of the development of extreme opinion on the question of reopening the slave-trade. First, it is noticeable that on this point there was a distinct divergence of opinion and interest between the Gulf and the Border States, and it was this more than any moral repugnance that checked the radicals. The whole movement represented the economic revolt of the slave-consuming cotton-belt against their base of labor supply. This revolt was only prevented from gaining its ultimate end by the fact that the Gulf States could not get on without the active political co-operation of the Border States. Thus, although such hot-heads as Spratt were not able, even as late as 1859, to carry a substantial majority of the South with them in an attempt to reopen the trade at all hazards, yet the agitation did succeed in sweeping away nearly all theoretical opposition to the trade, and left the majority of Southern people in an attitude which regarded the reopening of the African slave-trade as merely a question of expediency.

This growth of Southern opinion is clearly to be followed in the newspapers and pamphlets of the day, in Congress, and in many significant movements. The Charleston Standard in a series of articles strongly advocated the reopening of the trade; the Richmond Examiner, though opposing the scheme as a Virginia paper should, was brought to "acknowledge that the laws which condemn the Slave-trade imply an aspersion upon the character of the South.[14] In March, 1859, the National Era said: "There can be no doubt that the idea of reviving the African Slave Trade is gaining ground in the South. Some two months ago we could quote strong articles from ultra Southern journals against the traffic; but of late we have been sorry to observe in the same journals an ominous silence upon the subject, while the advocates of 'free trade in negroes' are earnest and active."[15] The Savannah Republican, which at first declared the movement to be of no serious intent, conceded, in 1859, that it was gaining favor, and that nine-tenths of the Democratic Congressional Convention favored it, and that even those who did not advocate a revival demanded the abolition of the laws.[16] A correspondent from South Carolina writes, December 18, 1859: "The nefarious project of opening it [i.e., the slave trade] has been started here in that prurient temper of the times which manifests itself in disunion schemes.... My State is strangely and terribly infected with all this sort of thing.... One feeling that gives a countenance to the opening of the slave trade is, that it will be a sort of spite to the North and defiance of their opinions."[17] The New Orleans Delta declared that those who voted for the slave-trade in Congress were men "whose names will be honored hereafter for the unflinching manner in which they stood up for principle, for truth, and consistency, as well as the vital interests of the South."[18]

85. The Question in Congress. Early in December, 1856, the subject reached Congress; and although the agitation was then new, fifty-seven Southern Congressmen refused to declare a re-opening of the slave-trade "shocking to the moral sentiment of the enlightened portion of mankind," and eight refused to call the reopening even "unwise" and "inexpedient."[19] Three years later, January 31, 1859, it was impossible, in a House of one hundred and ninety-nine members, to get a two-thirds vote in order even to consider Kilgore's resolutions, which declared "that no legislation can be too thorough in its measures, nor can any penalty known to the catalogue of modern punishment for crime be too severe against a traffic so inhuman and unchristian."[20]

Congressmen and other prominent men hastened with the rising tide.[21] Dowdell of Alabama declared the repressive acts "highly offensive;" J.B. Clay of Kentucky was "opposed to all these laws;"[22] Seward of Georgia declared them "wrong, and a violation of the Constitution;"[23] Barksdale of Mississippi agreed with this sentiment; Crawford of Georgia threatened a reopening of the trade; Miles of South Carolina was for "sweeping away" all restrictions;[24] Keitt of South Carolina wished to withdraw the African squadron, and to cease to brand slave-trading as piracy;[25] Brown of Mississippi "would repeal the law instantly;"[26] Alexander Stephens, in his farewell address to his constituents, said: "Slave states cannot be made without Africans.... [My object is] to bring clearly to your mind the great truth that without an increase of African slaves from abroad, you may not expect or look for many more slave States."[27] Jefferson Davis strongly denied "any coincidence of opinion with those who prate of the inhumanity and sinfulness of the trade. The interest of Mississippi," said he, "not of the African, dictates my conclusion." He opposed the immediate reopening of the trade in Mississippi for fear of a paralyzing influx of Negroes, but carefully added: "This conclusion, in relation to Mississippi, is based upon my view of her present condition, not upon any general theory. It is not supposed to be applicable to Texas, to New Mexico, or to any future acquisitions to be made south of the Rio Grande."[28] John Forsyth, who for seven years conducted the slave-trade diplomacy of the nation, declared, about 1860: "But one stronghold of its [i.e., slavery's] enemies remains to be carried, to complete its triumph and assure its welfare,—that is the existing prohibition of the African Slave-trade."[29] Pollard, in his Black Diamonds, urged the importation of Africans as "laborers." "This I grant you," said he, "would be practically the re-opening of the African slave trade; but ... you will find that it very often becomes necessary to evade the letter of the law, in some of the greatest measures of social happiness and patriotism."[30]

86. Southern Policy in 1860. The matter did not rest with mere words. During the session of the Vicksburg Convention, an "African Labor Supply Association" was formed, under the presidency of J.D.B. De Bow, editor of De Bow's Review, and ex-superintendent of the seventh census. The object of the association was "to promote the supply of African labor."[31] In 1857 the committee of the South Carolina legislature to whom the Governor's slave-trade message was referred made an elaborate report, which declared in italics: "The South at large does need a re-opening of the African slave trade." Pettigrew, the only member who disagreed to this report, failed of re-election. The report contained an extensive argument to prove the kingship of cotton, the perfidy of English philanthropy, and the lack of slaves in the South, which, it was said, would show a deficit of six hundred thousand slaves by 1878.[32] In Georgia, about this time, an attempt to expunge the slave-trade prohibition in the State Constitution lacked but one vote of passing.[33] From these slower and more legal movements came others less justifiable. The long argument on the "apprentice" system finally brought a request to the collector of the port at Charleston, South Carolina, from E. Lafitte & Co., for a clearance to Africa for the purpose of importing African "emigrants." The collector appealed to the Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb of Georgia, who flatly refused to take the bait, and replied that if the "emigrants" were brought in as slaves, it would be contrary to United States law; if as freemen, it would be contrary to their own State law.[34] In Louisiana a still more radical movement was attempted, and a bill passed the House of Representatives authorizing a company to import two thousand five hundred Africans, "indentured" for fifteen years "at least." The bill lacked but two votes of passing the Senate.[35] It was said that the Georgian, of Savannah, contained a notice of an agricultural society which "unanimously resolved to offer a premium of $25 for the best specimen of a live African imported into the United States within the last twelve months."[36]

It would not be true to say that there was in the South in 1860 substantial unanimity on the subject of reopening the slave-trade; nevertheless, there certainly was a large and influential minority, including perhaps a majority of citizens of the Gulf States, who favored the project, and, in defiance of law and morals, aided and abetted its actual realization. Various movements, it must be remembered, gained much of their strength from the fact that their success meant a partial nullification of the slave-trade laws. The admission of Texas added probably seventy-five thousand recently imported slaves to the Southern stock; the movement against Cuba, which culminated in the "Ostend Manifesto" of Buchanan, Mason, and Soule, had its chief impetus in the thousands of slaves whom Americans had poured into the island. Finally, the series of filibustering expeditions against Cuba, Mexico, and Central America were but the wilder and more irresponsible attempts to secure both slave territory and slaves.

87. Increase of the Slave-Trade from 1850 to 1860. The long and open agitation for the reopening of the slave-trade, together with the fact that the South had been more or less familiar with violations of the laws since 1808, led to such a remarkable increase of illicit traffic and actual importations in the decade 1850-1860, that the movement may almost be termed a reopening of the slave-trade.

In the foreign slave-trade our own officers continue to report "how shamefully our flag has been used;"[37] and British officers write "that at least one half of the successful part of the slave trade is carried on under the American flag," and this because "the number of American cruisers on the station is so small, in proportion to the immense extent of the slave-dealing coast."[38] The fitting out of slavers became a flourishing business in the United States, and centred at New York City. "Few of our readers," writes a periodical of the day, "are aware of the extent to which this infernal traffic is carried on, by vessels clearing from New York, and in close alliance with our legitimate trade; and that down-town merchants of wealth and respectability are extensively engaged in buying and selling African Negroes, and have been, with comparatively little interruption, for an indefinite number of years."[39] Another periodical says: "The number of persons engaged in the slave-trade, and the amount of capital embarked in it, exceed our powers of calculation. The city of New York has been until of late [1862] the principal port of the world for this infamous commerce; although the cities of Portland and Boston are only second to her in that distinction. Slave dealers added largely to the wealth of our commercial metropolis; they contributed liberally to the treasuries of political organizations, and their bank accounts were largely depleted to carry elections in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut."[40] During eighteen months of the years 1859-1860 eighty-five slavers are reported to have been fitted out in New York harbor,[41] and these alone transported from 30,000 to 60,000 slaves annually.[42] The United States deputy marshal of that district declared in 1856 that the business of fitting out slavers "was never prosecuted with greater energy than at present. The occasional interposition of the legal authorities exercises no apparent influence for its suppression. It is seldom that one or more vessels cannot be designated at the wharves, respecting which there is evidence that she is either in or has been concerned in the Traffic."[43] On the coast of Africa "it is a well-known fact that most of the Slave ships which visit the river are sent from New York and New Orleans."[44]

The absence of United States war-ships at the Brazilian station enabled American smugglers to run in cargoes, in spite of the prohibitory law. One cargo of five hundred slaves was landed in 1852, and the Correio Mercantil regrets "that it was the flag of the United States which covered this act of piracy, sustained by citizens of that great nation."[45] When the Brazil trade declined, the illicit Cuban trade greatly increased, and the British consul reported: "Almost all the slave expeditions for some time past have been fitted out in the United States, chiefly at New York."[46]

88. Notorious Infractions of the Laws. This decade is especially noteworthy for the great increase of illegal importations into the South. These became bold, frequent, and notorious. Systematic introduction on a considerable scale probably commenced in the forties, although with great secrecy. "To have boldly ventured into New Orleans, with negroes freshly imported from Africa, would not only have brought down upon the head of the importer the vengeance of our very philanthropic Uncle Sam, but also the anathemas of the whole sect of philanthropists and negrophilists everywhere. To import them for years, however, into quiet places, evading with impunity the penalty of the law, and the ranting of the thin-skinned sympathizers with Africa, was gradually to popularize the traffic by creating a demand for laborers, and thus to pave the way for the gradual revival of the slave trade. To this end, a few men, bold and energetic, determined, ten or twelve years ago [1848 or 1850], to commence the business of importing negroes, slowly at first, but surely; and for this purpose they selected a few secluded places on the coast of Florida, Georgia and Texas, for the purpose of concealing their stock until it could be sold out. Without specifying other places, let me draw your attention to a deep and abrupt pocket or indentation in the coast of Texas, about thirty miles from Brazos Santiago. Into this pocket a slaver could run at any hour of the night, because there was no hindrance at the entrance, and here she could discharge her cargo of movables upon the projecting bluff, and again proceed to sea inside of three hours. The live stock thus landed could be marched a short distance across the main island, over a porous soil which refuses to retain the recent foot-prints, until they were again placed in boats, and were concealed upon some of the innumerable little islands which thicken on the waters of the Laguna in the rear. These islands, being covered with a thick growth of bushes and grass, offer an inscrutable hiding place for the 'black diamonds.'"[47] These methods became, however, toward 1860, too slow for the radicals, and the trade grew more defiant and open. The yacht "Wanderer," arrested on suspicion in New York and released, landed in Georgia six months later four hundred and twenty slaves, who were never recovered.[48] The Augusta Despatch says: "Citizens of our city are probably interested in the enterprise. It is hinted that this is the third cargo landed by the same company, during the last six months."[49] Two parties of Africans were brought into Mobile with impunity. One bark, strongly suspected of having landed a cargo of slaves, was seized on the Florida coast; another vessel was reported to be landing slaves near Mobile; a letter from Jacksonville, Florida, stated that a bark had left there for Africa to ship a cargo for Florida and Georgia.[50] Stephen A. Douglas said "that there was not the shadow of doubt that the Slave-trade had been carried on quite extensively for a long time back, and that there had been more Slaves imported into the southern States, during the last year, than had ever been imported before in any one year, even when the Slave-trade was legal. It was his confident belief, that over fifteen thousand Slaves had been brought into this country during the past year [1859.] He had seen, with his own eyes, three hundred of those recently-imported, miserable beings, in a Slave-pen in Vicksburg, Miss., and also large numbers at Memphis, Tenn."[51] It was currently reported that depots for these slaves existed in over twenty large cities and towns in the South, and an interested person boasted to a senator, about 1860, that "twelve vessels would discharge their living freight upon our shores within ninety days from the 1st of June last," and that between sixty and seventy cargoes had been successfully introduced in the last eighteen months.[52] The New York Tribune doubted the statement; but John C. Underwood, formerly of Virginia, wrote to the paper saying that he was satisfied that the correspondent was correct. "I have," he said, "had ample evidences of the fact, that reopening the African Slave-trade is a thing already accomplished, and the traffic is brisk, and rapidly increasing. In fact, the most vital question of the day is not the opening of this trade, but its suppression. The arrival of cargoes of negroes, fresh from Africa, in our southern ports, is an event of frequent occurrence."[53]

Negroes, newly landed, were openly advertised for sale in the public press, and bids for additional importations made. In reply to one of these, the Mobile Mercury facetiously remarks: "Some negroes who never learned to talk English, went up the railroad the other day."[54] Congressmen declared on the floor of the House: "The slave trade may therefore be regarded as practically re-established;"[55] and petitions like that from the American Missionary Society recited the fact that "this piratical and illegal trade—this inhuman invasion of the rights of men,—this outrage on civilization and Christianity—this violation of the laws of God and man—is openly countenanced and encouraged by a portion of the citizens of some of the States of this Union."[56]

From such evidence it seems clear that the slave-trade laws, in spite of the efforts of the government, in spite even of much opposition to these extra-legal methods in the South itself, were grossly violated, if not nearly nullified, in the latter part of the decade 1850-1860.

89. Apathy of the Federal Government. During the decade there was some attempt at reactionary legislation, chiefly directed at the Treaty of Washington. June 13, 1854, Slidell, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, made an elaborate report to the Senate, advocating the abrogation of the 8th Article of that treaty, on the ground that it was costly, fatal to the health of the sailors, and useless, as the trade had actually increased under its operation.[57] Both this and a similar attempt in the House failed,[58] as did also an attempt to substitute life imprisonment for the death penalty.[59] Most of the actual legislation naturally took the form of appropriations. In 1853 there was an attempt to appropriate $20,000.[60] This failed, and the appropriation of $8,000 in 1856 was the first for ten years.[61] The following year brought a similar appropriation,[62] and in 1859[63] and 1860[64] $75,000 and $40,000 respectively were appropriated. Of attempted legislation to strengthen the laws there was plenty: e.g., propositions to regulate the issue of sea-letters and the use of our flag;[65] to prevent the "coolie" trade, or the bringing in of "apprentices" or "African laborers;"[66] to stop the coastwise trade;[67] to assent to a Right of Search;[68] and to amend the Constitution by forever prohibiting the slave-trade.[69]

The efforts of the executive during this period were criminally lax and negligent. "The General Government did not exert itself in good faith to carry out either its treaty stipulations or the legislation of Congress in regard to the matter. If a vessel was captured, her owners were permitted to bond her, and thus continue her in the trade; and if any man was convicted of this form of piracy, the executive always interposed between him and the penalty of his crime. The laws providing for the seizure of vessels engaged in the traffic were so constructed as to render the duty unremunerative; and marshals now find their fees for such services to be actually less than their necessary expenses. No one who bears this fact in mind will be surprised at the great indifference of these officers to the continuing of the slave-trade; in fact, he will be ready to learn that the laws of Congress upon the subject had become a dead letter, and that the suspicion was well grounded that certain officers of the Federal Government had actually connived at their violation."[70] From 1845 to 1854, in spite of the well-known activity of the trade, but five cases obtained cognizance in the New York district. Of these, Captains Mansfield and Driscoll forfeited their bonds of $5,000 each, and escaped; in the case of the notorious Canot, nothing had been done as late as 1856, although he was arrested in 1847; Captain Jefferson turned State's evidence, and, in the case of Captain Mathew, a nolle prosequi was entered.[71] Between 1854 and 1856 thirty-two persons were indicted in New York, of whom only thirteen had at the latter date been tried, and only one of these convicted.[72] These dismissals were seldom on account of insufficient evidence. In the notorious case of the "Wanderer," she was arrested on suspicion, released, and soon after she landed a cargo of slaves in Georgia; some who attempted to seize the Negroes were arrested for larceny, and in spite of the efforts of Congress the captain was never punished. The yacht was afterwards started on another voyage, and being brought back to Boston was sold to her former owner for about one third her value.[73] The bark "Emily" was seized on suspicion and released, and finally caught red-handed on the coast of Africa; she was sent to New York for trial, but "disappeared" under a certain slave captain, Townsend, who had, previous to this, in the face of the most convincing evidence, been acquitted at Key West.[74]

The squadron commanders of this time were by no means as efficient as their predecessors, and spent much of their time, apparently, in discussing the Right of Search. Instead of a number of small light vessels, which by the reports of experts were repeatedly shown to be the only efficient craft, the government, until 1859, persisted in sending out three or four great frigates. Even these did not attend faithfully to their duties. A letter from on board one of them shows that, out of a fifteen months' alleged service, only twenty-two days were spent on the usual cruising-ground for slavers, and thirteen of these at anchor; eleven months were spent at Madeira and Cape Verde Islands, 300 miles from the coast and 3,000 miles from the slave market.[75] British commanders report the apathy of American officers and the extreme caution of their instructions, which allowed many slavers to escape.[76]

The officials at Washington often remained in blissful, and perhaps willing, ignorance of the state of the trade. While Americans were smuggling slaves by the thousands into Brazil, and by the hundreds into the United States, Secretary Graham was recommending the abrogation of the 8th Article of the Treaty of Washington;[77] so, too, when the Cuban slave-trade was reaching unprecedented activity, and while slavers were being fitted out in every port on the Atlantic seaboard, Secretary Kennedy naively reports, "The time has come, perhaps, when it may be properly commended to the notice of Congress to inquire into the necessity of further continuing the regular employment of a squadron on this [i.e., the African] coast."[78] Again, in 1855, the government has "advices that the slave trade south of the equator is entirely broken up;"[79] in 1856, the reports are "favorable;"[80] in 1857 a British commander writes: "No vessel has been seen here for one year, certainly; I think for nearly three years there have been no American cruizers on these waters, where a valuable and extensive American commerce is carried on. I cannot, therefore, but think that this continued absence of foreign cruizers looks as if they were intentionally withdrawn, and as if the Government did not care to take measures to prevent the American flag being used to cover Slave Trade transactions;"[81] nevertheless, in this same year, according to Secretary Toucey, "the force on the coast of Africa has fully accomplished its main object."[82] Finally, in the same month in which the "Wanderer" and her mates were openly landing cargoes in the South, President Buchanan, who seems to have been utterly devoid of a sense of humor, was urging the annexation of Cuba to the United States as the only method of suppressing the slave-trade![83]

About 1859 the frequent and notorious violations of our laws aroused even the Buchanan government; a larger appropriation was obtained, swift light steamers were employed, and, though we may well doubt whether after such a carnival illegal importations "entirely" ceased, as the President informed Congress,[84] yet some sincere efforts at suppression were certainly begun. From 1850 to 1859 we have few notices of captured slavers, but in 1860 the increased appropriation of the thirty-fifth Congress resulted in the capture of twelve vessels with 3,119 Africans.[85] The Act of June 16, 1860, enabled the President to contract with the Colonization Society for the return of recaptured Africans; and by a long-needed arrangement cruisers were to proceed direct to Africa with such cargoes, instead of first landing them in this country.[86]

90. Attitude of the Southern Confederacy. The attempt, initiated by the constitutional fathers, to separate the problem of slavery from that of the slave-trade had, after a trial of half a century, signally failed, and for well-defined economic reasons. The nation had at last come to the parting of the ways, one of which led to a free-labor system, the other to a slave system fed by the slave-trade. Both sections of the country naturally hesitated at the cross-roads: the North clung to the delusion that a territorially limited system of slavery, without a slave-trade, was still possible in the South; the South hesitated to fight for her logical object—slavery and free trade in Negroes—and, in her moral and economic dilemma, sought to make autonomy and the Constitution her object. The real line of contention was, however, fixed by years of development, and was unalterable by the present whims or wishes of the contestants, no matter how important or interesting these might be: the triumph of the North meant free labor; the triumph of the South meant slavery and the slave-trade.

It is doubtful if many of the Southern leaders ever deceived themselves by thinking that Southern slavery, as it then was, could long be maintained without a general or a partial reopening of the slave-trade. Many had openly declared this a few years before, and there was no reason for a change of opinion. Nevertheless, at the outbreak of actual war and secession, there were powerful and decisive reasons for relegating the question temporarily to the rear. In the first place, only by this means could the adherence of important Border States be secured, without the aid of which secession was folly. Secondly, while it did no harm to laud the independence of the South and the kingship of cotton in "stump" speeches and conventions, yet, when it came to actual hostilities, the South sorely needed the aid of Europe; and this a nation fighting for slavery and the slave-trade stood poor chance of getting. Consequently, after attacking the slave-trade laws for a decade, and their execution for a quarter-century, we find the Southern leaders inserting, in both the provisional and the permanent Constitutions of the Confederate States, the following article:—

The importation of negroes of the African race, from any foreign country other than the slaveholding States or Territories of the United States of America, is hereby forbidden; and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall effectually prevent the same.

Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any State not a member of, or Territory not belonging to, this Confederacy.[87]

The attitude of the Confederate government toward this article is best illustrated by its circular of instructions to its foreign ministers:—

It has been suggested to this Government, from a source of unquestioned authenticity, that, after the recognition of our independence by the European Powers, an expectation is generally entertained by them that in our treaties of amity and commerce a clause will be introduced making stipulations against the African slave trade. It is even thought that neutral Powers may be inclined to insist upon the insertion of such a clause as a sine qua non.

You are well aware how firmly fixed in our Constitution is the policy of this Confederacy against the opening of that trade, but we are informed that false and insidious suggestions have been made by the agents of the United States at European Courts of our intention to change our constitution as soon as peace is restored, and of authorizing the importation of slaves from Africa. If, therefore, you should find, in your intercourse with the Cabinet to which you are accredited, that any such impressions are entertained, you will use every proper effort to remove them, and if an attempt is made to introduce into any treaty which you may be charged with negotiating stipulations on the subject just mentioned, you will assume, in behalf of your Government, the position which, under the direction of the President, I now proceed to develop.

The Constitution of the Confederate States is an agreement made between independent States. By its terms all the powers of Government are separated into classes as follows, viz.:—

1st. Such powers as the States delegate to the General Government.

2d. Such powers as the States agree to refrain from exercising, although they do not delegate them to the General Government.

3d. Such powers as the States, without delegating them to the General Government, thought proper to exercise by direct agreement between themselves contained in the Constitution.

4th. All remaining powers of sovereignty, which not being delegated to the Confederate States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people thereof.... Especially in relation to the importation of African negroes was it deemed important by the States that no power to permit it should exist in the Confederate Government.... It will thus be seen that no power is delegated to the Confederate Government over this subject, but that it is included in the third class above referred to, of powers exercised directly by the States.... This Government unequivocally and absolutely denies its possession of any power whatever over the subject, and cannot entertain any proposition in relation to it.... The policy of the Confederacy is as fixed and immutable on this subject as the imperfection of human nature permits human resolve to be. No additional agreements, treaties, or stipulations can commit these States to the prohibition of the African slave trade with more binding efficacy than those they have themselves devised. A just and generous confidence in their good faith on this subject exhibited by friendly Powers will be far more efficacious than persistent efforts to induce this Government to assume the exercise of powers which it does not possess.... We trust, therefore, that no unnecessary discussions on this matter will be introduced into your negotiations. If, unfortunately, this reliance should prove ill-founded, you will decline continuing negotiations on your side, and transfer them to us at home....[88]

This attitude of the conservative leaders of the South, if it meant anything, meant that individual State action could, when it pleased, reopen the slave-trade. The radicals were, of course, not satisfied with any veiling of the ulterior purpose of the new slave republic, and attacked the constitutional provision violently. "If," said one, "the clause be carried into the permanent government, our whole movement is defeated. It will abolitionize the Border Slave States—it will brand our institution. Slavery cannot share a government with Democracy,—it cannot bear a brand upon it; thence another revolution ... having achieved one revolution to escape democracy at the North, it must still achieve another to escape it at the South. That it will ultimately triumph none can doubt."[89]

91. Attitude of the United States. In the North, with all the hesitation in many matters, there existed unanimity in regard to the slave-trade; and the new Lincoln government ushered in the new policy of uncompromising suppression by hanging the first American slave-trader who ever suffered the extreme penalty of the law.[90] One of the earliest acts of President Lincoln was a step which had been necessary since 1808, but had never been taken, viz., the unification of the whole work of suppression into the hands of one responsible department. By an order, dated May 2, 1861, Caleb B. Smith, Secretary of the Interior, was charged with the execution of the slave-trade laws,[91] and he immediately began energetic work. Early in 1861, as soon as the withdrawal of the Southern members untied the hands of Congress, two appropriations of $900,000 each were made to suppress the slave trade, the first appropriations commensurate with the vastness of the task. These were followed by four appropriations of $17,000 each in the years 1863 to 1867, and two of $12,500 each in 1868 and 1869.[92] The first work of the new secretary was to obtain a corps of efficient assistants. To this end, he assembled all the marshals of the loyal seaboard States at New York, and gave them instruction and opportunity to inspect actual slavers. Congress also, for the first time, offered them proper compensation.[93] The next six months showed the effect of this policy in the fact that five vessels were seized and condemned, and four slave-traders were convicted and suffered the penalty of their crimes. "This is probably the largest number [of convictions] ever obtained, and certainly the only ones for many years."[94]

Meantime the government opened negotiations with Great Britain, and the treaty of 1862 was signed June 7, and carried out by Act of Congress, July 11.[95] Specially commissioned war vessels of either government were by this agreement authorized to search merchant vessels on the high seas and specified coasts, and if they were found to be slavers, or, on account of their construction or equipment, were suspected to be such, they were to be sent for condemnation to one of the mixed courts established at New York, Sierra Leone, and the Cape of Good Hope. These courts, consisting of one judge and one arbitrator on the part of each government, were to judge the facts without appeal, and upon condemnation by them, the culprits were to be punished according to the laws of their respective countries. The area in which this Right of Search could be exercised was somewhat enlarged by an additional article to the treaty, signed in 1863. In 1870 the mixed courts were abolished, but the main part of the treaty was left in force. The Act of July 17, 1862, enabled the President to contract with foreign governments for the apprenticing of recaptured Africans in the West Indies,[96] and in 1864 the coastwise slave-trade was forever prohibited.[97] By these measures the trade was soon checked, and before the end of the war entirely suppressed.[98] The vigilance of the government, however, was not checked, and as late as 1866 a squadron of ten ships, with one hundred and thirteen guns, patrolled the slave coast.[99] Finally, the Thirteenth Amendment legally confirmed what the war had already accomplished, and slavery and the slave-trade fell at one blow.[100]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] British and Foreign State Papers, 1854-5, p. 1156.

[2] Cluskey, Political Text-Book (14th ed.), p. 585.

[3] De Bow's Review, XXII. 223; quoted from Andrew Hunter of Virginia.

[4] Ibid., XVIII. 628.

[5] Ibid., XXII. 91, 102, 217, 221-2.

[6] From a pamphlet entitled "A New Southern Policy, or the Slave Trade as meaning Union and Conservatism;" quoted in Etheridge's speech, Feb. 21, 1857: Congressional Globe, 34 Cong. 3 sess., Appendix, p. 366.

[7] De Bow's Review, XXIII. 298-320. A motion to table the motion on the 8th article was supported only by Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Maryland. Those voting for Sneed's motion were Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee. The appointment of a slave-trade committee was at first defeated by a vote of 48 to 44. Finally a similar motion was passed, 52 to 40.

[8] De Bow's Review, XXIV. 473-491, 579-605. The Louisiana delegation alone did not vote for the last resolution, the vote of her delegation being evenly divided.

[9] De Bow's Review, XXVII. 94-235.

[10] H.S. Foote, in Bench and Bar of the South and Southwest, p. 69.

[11] De Bow's Review, XXVII. 115.

[12] Ibid., p. 99. The vote was:—

Yea. Nay. Alabama, 5 votes. Tennessee, 12 votes. Arkansas, 4 " Florida, 3 " South Carolina, 4 " South Carolina, 4 " Louisiana, 6 " Total 19 Texas, 4 " Georgia, 10 " Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, and Mississippi, 7 " North Carolina did not vote; they either Total 40 withdrew or were not represented.



[13] Quoted in 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 38. The official organ was the True Southron.

[14] Quoted in 24th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 54.

[15] Quoted in 26th Report, Ibid., p. 43.

[16] 27th Report, Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[17] Letter of W.C. Preston, in the National Intelligencer, April 3, 1863. Also published in the pamphlet, The African Slave Trade: The Secret Purpose, etc., p. 26.

[18] Quoted in Etheridge's speech: Congressional Globe, 34 Cong. 3 sess. Appen., p. 366.

[19] House Journal, 34 Cong. 3 sess. pp. 105-10; Congressional Globe, 34 Cong. 3 sess. pp. 123-6; Cluskey, Political Text-Book (14th ed.), p. 589.

[20] House Journal, 35 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 298-9. Cf. 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 45.

[21] Cf. Reports of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., especially the 26th, pp. 43-4.

[22] Ibid., p. 43. He referred especially to the Treaty of 1842.

[23] Ibid.; Congressional Globe, 35 Cong. 2 sess., Appen., pp. 248-50.

[24] 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 44.

[25] Ibid.; 27th Report, pp. 13-4.

[26] 26th Report, Ibid., p. 44.

[27] Quoted in Lalor, Cyclopaedia, III. 733; Cairnes, The Slave Power (New York, 1862), p. 123, note; 27th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 15.

[28] Quoted in Cairnes, The Slave Power, p. 123, note; 27th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 19.

[29] 27th Report, Ibid., p. 16; quoted from the Mobile Register.

[30] Edition of 1859, pp. 63-4.

[31] De Bow's Review, XXVII. 121, 231-5.

[32] Report of the Special Committee, etc. (1857), pp. 24-5.

[33] 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 40. The vote was 47 to 46.

[34] House Exec. Doc., 36 Cong. 2 sess. IV. No. 7, pp. 632-6. For the State law, cf. above, Chapter II. This refusal of Cobb's was sharply criticised by many Southern papers. Cf. 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 39.

[35] New York Independent, March 11 and April 1, 1858.

[36] 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 41.

[37] Gregory to the Secretary of the Navy, June 8, 1850: Senate Exec. Doc., 31 Cong. 1 sess. XIV. No. 66, p. 2. Cf. Ibid., 31 Cong. 2 sess. II. No. 6.

[38] Cumming to Commodore Fanshawe, Feb. 22, 1850: Senate Exec. Doc., 31 Cong. 1 sess. XIV. No. 66, p. 8.

[39] New York Journal of Commerce, 1857; quoted in 24th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 56.

[40] "The Slave-Trade in New York," in the Continental Monthly, January, 1862, p. 87.

[41] New York Evening Post; quoted in Lalor, Cyclopaedia, III. 733.

[42] Lalor, Cyclopaedia, III. 733; quoted from a New York paper.

[43] Friends' Appeal on behalf of the Coloured Races (1858), Appendix, p. 41; quoted from the Journal of Commerce.

[44] 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., pp. 53-4; quoted from the African correspondent of the Boston Journal. From April, 1857, to May, 1858, twenty-one of twenty-two slavers which were seized by British cruisers proved to be American, from New York, Boston, and New Orleans. Cf. 25th Report, Ibid., p. 122. De Bow estimated in 1856 that forty slavers cleared annually from Eastern harbors, clearing yearly $17,000,000: De Bow's Review, XXII. 430-1.

[45] Senate Exec. Doc., 33 Cong. 1 sess. VIII. No. 47, p. 13.

[46] House Exec. Doc., 34 Cong. 1 sess. XII. No. 105, p. 38.

[47] New York Herald, Aug. 5, 1860; quoted in Drake, Revelations of a Slave Smuggler, Introd., pp. vii.-viii.

[48] House Exec. Doc., 35 Cong. 2 sess. IX. No. 89. Cf. 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., pp. 45-9.

[49] Quoted in 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 46.

[50] For all the above cases, cf. Ibid., p. 49.

[51] Quoted in 27th Report, Ibid., p. 20. Cf. Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1859; Senate Exec. Doc., 36 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 2.

[52] 27th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 21.

[53] Quoted in Ibid.

[54] Issue of July 22, 1860; quoted in Drake, Revelations of a Slave Smuggler, Introd., p. vi. The advertisement referred to was addressed to the "Ship-owners and Masters of our Mercantile Marine," and appeared in the Enterprise (Miss.) Weekly News, April 14, 1859. William S. Price and seventeen others state that they will "pay three hundred dollars per head for one thousand native Africans, between the ages of fourteen and twenty years, (of sexes equal,) likely, sound, and healthy, to be delivered within twelve months from this date, at some point accessible by land, between Pensacola, Fla., and Galveston, Texas; the contractors giving thirty days' notice as to time and place of delivery": Quoted in 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., pp. 41-2.

[55] Congressional Globe, 35 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1362. Cf. the speech of a delegate from Georgia to the Democratic Convention at Charleston, 1860: "If any of you northern democrats will go home with me to my plantation, I will show you some darkies that I bought in Virginia, some in Delaware, some in Florida, and I will also show you the pure African, the noblest Roman of them all. I represent the African slave trade interest of my section:" Lalor, Cyclopaedia, III. 733.

[56] Senate Misc. Doc., 36 Cong. 1 sess. No. 8.

[57] Senate Journal, 34 Cong. 1-2 sess. pp. 396, 695-8; Senate Reports, 34 Cong. 1 sess. I. No. 195.

[58] House Journal, 31 Cong. 2 sess. p. 64. There was still another attempt by Sandidge. Cf. 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-Slav. Soc., p. 44.

[59] Senate Journal, 36 Cong. 1 sess. p. 274; Congressional Globe, 36 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1245.

[60] Congressional Globe, 32 Cong. 2 sess. p. 1072.

[61] I.e., since 1846: Statutes at Large, XI. 90.

[62] Ibid., XI. 227.

[63] Ibid., XI. 404.

[64] Ibid., XII. 21.

[65] E.g., Clay's resolutions: Congressional Globe, 31 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 304-9. Clayton's resolutions: Senate Journal, 33 Cong. 1 sess. p. 404; House Journal, 33 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 1093, 1332-3; Congressional Globe, 33 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 1591-3, 2139. Seward's bill: Senate Journal, 33 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 448, 451.

[66] Mr. Blair of Missouri asked unanimous consent in Congress, Dec. 23, 1858, to a resolution instructing the Judiciary Committee to bring in such a bill; Houston of Alabama objected: Congressional Globe, 35 Cong. 2 sess. p. 198; 26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., p. 44.

[67] This was the object of attack in 1851 and 1853 by Giddings: House Journal, 32 Cong. 1 sess. p. 42; 33 Cong. 1 sess. p. 147. Cf. House Journal, 38 Cong. 1 sess. p. 46.

[68] By Mr. Wilson, March 20, 1860: Senate Journal, 36 Cong. 1 sess. p. 274.

[69] Four or five such attempts were made: Dec. 12, 1860, House Journal, 36 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 61-2; Jan. 7, 1861, Congressional Globe, 36 Cong. 2 sess. p. 279; Jan. 23, 1861, Ibid., p. 527; Feb. 1, 1861, Ibid., p. 690; Feb. 27, 1861, Ibid., pp. 1243, 1259.

[70] "The Slave-Trade in New York," in the Continental Monthly, January, 1862, p. 87.

[71] New York Herald, July 14, 1856.

[72] Ibid. Cf. Senate Exec. Doc., 37 Cong. 2 sess. V. No. 53.

[73] 27th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc., pp. 25-6. Cf. 26th Report, Ibid., pp. 45-9.

[74] 27th Report, Ibid., pp. 26-7.

[75] 26th Report, Ibid., p. 54.

[76] British and Foreign State Papers, 1859-60, pp. 899, 973.

[77] Nov. 29, 1851: House Exec. Doc., 32 Cong. 1 sess. II. pt. 2, No. 2, p. 4.

[78] Dec. 4, 1852: House Exec. Doc., 32 Cong. 2 sess. I. pt. 2, No. 1, p. 293.

[79] Ibid., 34 Cong. 1 sess. I. pt. 3, No. 1, p. 5.

[80] Ibid., 34 Cong. 3 sess. I. pt. 2, No. 1, p. 407.

[81] Commander Burgess to Commodore Wise, Whydah, Aug. 12, 1857: Parliamentary Papers, 1857-8, vol. LXI. Slave Trade, Class A, p. 136.

[82] House Exec. Doc., 35 Cong. 1 sess. II. pt. 3, No. 2, p. 576.

[83] Ibid., 35 Cong. 2 sess. II. pt. 1, No. 2, pp. 14-15, 31-33.

[84] Senate Exec. Doc., 36 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, p. 24. The Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1859, contains this ambiguous passage: "What the effect of breaking up the trade will be upon the United States or Cuba it is not necessary to inquire; certainly, under the laws of Congress and our treaty obligations, it is the duty of the executive government to see that our citizens shall not be engaged in it": Ibid., 36 Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 2, pp. 1138-9.

[85] Senate Exec. Doc., 36 Cong. 2 sess. III. pt. 1, No. 1, pp. 8-9.

[86] Statutes at Large, XII. 40.

[87] Confederate States of America Statutes at Large, 1861, p. 15, Constitution, Art. 1, sect. 9, Sec.Sec. 1, 2.

[88] From an intercepted circular despatch from J.P. Benjamin, "Secretary of State," addressed in this particular instance to Hon. L.Q.C. Lamar, "Commissioner, etc., St. Petersburg, Russia," and dated Richmond, Jan. 15, 1863; published in the National Intelligencer, March 31, 1863; cf. also the issues of Feb. 19, 1861, April 2, 3, 25, 1863; also published in the pamphlet, The African Slave-Trade: The Secret Purpose, etc. The editors vouch for its authenticity, and state it to be in Benjamin's own handwriting.

[89] L.W. Spratt of South Carolina, in the Southern Literary Messenger, June, 1861, XXXII. 414, 420. Cf. also the Charleston Mercury, Feb. 13, 1861, and the National Intelligencer, Feb. 19, 1861.

[90] Captain Gordon of the slaver "Erie;" condemned in the U.S. District Court for Southern New York in 1862. Cf. Senate Exec. Doc., 37 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, p. 13.

[91] Ibid., pp. 453-4.

[92] Statutes at Large, XII. 132, 219, 639; XIII. 424; XIV. 226, 415; XV. 58, 321. The sum of $250,000 was also appropriated to return the slaves on the "Wildfire": Ibid., XII. 40-41.

[93] Statutes at Large, XII. 368-9.

[94] Senate Exec. Doc., 37 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, pp. 453-4.

[95] Statutes at Large, XII. 531.

[96] For a time not exceeding five years: Ibid., pp. 592-3.

[97] By section 9 of an appropriation act for civil expenses, July 2, 1864: Ibid., XIII. 353.

[98] British officers attested this: Diplomatic Correspondence, 1862, p. 285.

[99] Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1866; House Exec. Doc., 39 Cong. 2 sess. IV. p. 12.

[100] There were some later attempts to legislate. Sumner tried to repeal the Act of 1803: Congressional Globe, 41 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 2894, 2932, 4953, 5594. Banks introduced a bill to prohibit Americans owning or dealing in slaves abroad: House Journal, 42 Cong. 2 sess. p. 48. For the legislation of the Confederate States, cf. Mason, Veto Power, 2d ed., Appendix C, No. 1.

* * * * *



Chapter XII

THE ESSENTIALS IN THE STRUGGLE.

92. How the Question Arose. 93. The Moral Movement. 94. The Political Movement. 95. The Economic Movement. 96. The Lesson for Americans.

92. How the Question Arose. We have followed a chapter of history which is of peculiar interest to the sociologist. Here was a rich new land, the wealth of which was to be had in return for ordinary manual labor. Had the country been conceived of as existing primarily for the benefit of its actual inhabitants, it might have waited for natural increase or immigration to supply the needed hands; but both Europe and the earlier colonists themselves regarded this land as existing chiefly for the benefit of Europe, and as designed to be exploited, as rapidly and ruthlessly as possible, of the boundless wealth of its resources. This was the primary excuse for the rise of the African slave-trade to America.

Every experiment of such a kind, however, where the moral standard of a people is lowered for the sake of a material advantage, is dangerous in just such proportion as that advantage is great. In this case it was great. For at least a century, in the West Indies and the southern United States, agriculture flourished, trade increased, and English manufactures were nourished, in just such proportion as Americans stole Negroes and worked them to death. This advantage, to be sure, became much smaller in later times, and at one critical period was, at least in the Southern States, almost nil; but energetic efforts were wanting, and, before the nation was aware, slavery had seized a new and well-nigh immovable footing in the Cotton Kingdom.

The colonists averred with perfect truth that they did not commence this fatal traffic, but that it was imposed upon them from without. Nevertheless, all too soon did they lay aside scruples against it and hasten to share its material benefits. Even those who braved the rough Atlantic for the highest moral motives fell early victims to the allurements of this system. Thus, throughout colonial history, in spite of many honest attempts to stop the further pursuit of the slave-trade, we notice back of nearly all such attempts a certain moral apathy, an indisposition to attack the evil with the sharp weapons which its nature demanded. Consequently, there developed steadily, irresistibly, a vast social problem, which required two centuries and a half for a nation of trained European stock and boasted moral fibre to solve.

93. The Moral Movement. For the solution of this problem there were, roughly speaking, three classes of efforts made during this time,—moral, political, and economic: that is to say, efforts which sought directly to raise the moral standard of the nation; efforts which sought to stop the trade by legal enactment; efforts which sought to neutralize the economic advantages of the slave-trade. There is always a certain glamour about the idea of a nation rising up to crush an evil simply because it is wrong. Unfortunately, this can seldom be realized in real life; for the very existence of the evil usually argues a moral weakness in the very place where extraordinary moral strength is called for. This was the case in the early history of the colonies; and experience proved that an appeal to moral rectitude was unheard in Carolina when rice had become a great crop, and in Massachusetts when the rum-slave-traffic was paying a profit of 100%. That the various abolition societies and anti-slavery movements did heroic work in rousing the national conscience is certainly true; unfortunately, however, these movements were weakest at the most critical times. When, in 1774 and 1804, the material advantages of the slave-trade and the institution of slavery were least, it seemed possible that moral suasion might accomplish the abolition of both. A fatal spirit of temporizing, however, seized the nation at these points; and although the slave-trade was, largely for political reasons, forbidden, slavery was left untouched. Beyond this point, as years rolled by, it was found well-nigh impossible to rouse the moral sense of the nation. Even in the matter of enforcing its own laws and co-operating with the civilized world, a lethargy seized the country, and it did not awake until slavery was about to destroy it. Even then, after a long and earnest crusade, the national sense of right did not rise to the entire abolition of slavery. It was only a peculiar and almost fortuitous commingling of moral, political, and economic motives that eventually crushed African slavery and its handmaid, the slave-trade in America.

94. The Political Movement. The political efforts to limit the slave-trade were the outcome partly of moral reprobation of the trade, partly of motives of expediency. This legislation was never such as wise and powerful rulers may make for a nation, with the ulterior purpose of calling in the respect which the nation has for law to aid in raising its standard of right. The colonial and national laws on the slave-trade merely registered, from time to time, the average public opinion concerning this traffic, and are therefore to be regarded as negative signs rather than as positive efforts. These signs were, from one point of view, evidences of moral awakening; they indicated slow, steady development of the idea that to steal even Negroes was wrong. From another point of view, these laws showed the fear of servile insurrection and the desire to ward off danger from the State; again, they often indicated a desire to appear well before the civilized world, and to rid the "land of the free" of the paradox of slavery. Representing such motives, the laws varied all the way from mere regulating acts to absolute prohibitions. On the whole, these acts were poorly conceived, loosely drawn, and wretchedly enforced. The systematic violation of the provisions of many of them led to a widespread belief that enforcement was, in the nature of the case, impossible; and thus, instead of marking ground already won, they were too often sources of distinct moral deterioration. Certainly the carnival of lawlessness that succeeded the Act of 1807, and that which preceded final suppression in 1861, were glaring examples of the failure of the efforts to suppress the slave-trade by mere law.

95. The Economic Movement. Economic measures against the trade were those which from the beginning had the best chance of success, but which were least tried. They included tariff measures; efforts to encourage the immigration of free laborers and the emigration of the slaves; measures for changing the character of Southern industry; and, finally, plans to restore the economic balance which slavery destroyed, by raising the condition of the slave to that of complete freedom and responsibility. Like the political efforts, these rested in part on a moral basis; and, as legal enactments, they were also themselves often political measures. They differed, however, from purely moral and political efforts, in having as a main motive the economic gain which a substitution of free for slave labor promised.

The simplest form of such efforts was the revenue duty on slaves that existed in all the colonies. This developed into the prohibitive tariff, and into measures encouraging immigration or industrial improvements. The colonization movement was another form of these efforts; it was inadequately conceived, and not altogether sincere, but it had a sound, although in this case impracticable, economic basis. The one great measure which finally stopped the slave-trade forever was, naturally, the abolition of slavery, i.e., the giving to the Negro the right to sell his labor at a price consistent with his own welfare. The abolition of slavery itself, while due in part to direct moral appeal and political sagacity, was largely the result of the economic collapse of the large-farming slave system.

96. The Lesson for Americans. It may be doubted if ever before such political mistakes as the slavery compromises of the Constitutional Convention had such serious results, and yet, by a succession of unexpected accidents, still left a nation in position to work out its destiny. No American can study the connection of slavery with United States history, and not devoutly pray that his country may never have a similar social problem to solve, until it shows more capacity for such work than it has shown in the past. It is neither profitable nor in accordance with scientific truth to consider that whatever the constitutional fathers did was right, or that slavery was a plague sent from God and fated to be eliminated in due time. We must face the fact that this problem arose principally from the cupidity and carelessness of our ancestors. It was the plain duty of the colonies to crush the trade and the system in its infancy: they preferred to enrich themselves on its profits. It was the plain duty of a Revolution based upon "Liberty" to take steps toward the abolition of slavery: it preferred promises to straightforward action. It was the plain duty of the Constitutional Convention, in founding a new nation, to compromise with a threatening social evil only in case its settlement would thereby be postponed to a more favorable time: this was not the case in the slavery and the slave-trade compromises; there never was a time in the history of America when the system had a slighter economic, political, and moral justification than in 1787; and yet with this real, existent, growing evil before their eyes, a bargain largely of dollars and cents was allowed to open the highway that led straight to the Civil War. Moreover, it was due to no wisdom and foresight on the part of the fathers that fortuitous circumstances made the result of that war what it was, nor was it due to exceptional philanthropy on the part of their descendants that that result included the abolition of slavery.

With the faith of the nation broken at the very outset, the system of slavery untouched, and twenty years' respite given to the slave-trade to feed and foster it, there began, with 1787, that system of bargaining, truckling, and compromising with a moral, political, and economic monstrosity, which makes the history of our dealing with slavery in the first half of the nineteenth century so discreditable to a great people. Each generation sought to shift its load upon the next, and the burden rolled on, until a generation came which was both too weak and too strong to bear it longer. One cannot, to be sure, demand of whole nations exceptional moral foresight and heroism; but a certain hard common-sense in facing the complicated phenomena of political life must be expected in every progressive people. In some respects we as a nation seem to lack this; we have the somewhat inchoate idea that we are not destined to be harassed with great social questions, and that even if we are, and fail to answer them, the fault is with the question and not with us. Consequently we often congratulate ourselves more on getting rid of a problem than on solving it. Such an attitude is dangerous; we have and shall have, as other peoples have had, critical, momentous, and pressing questions to answer. The riddle of the Sphinx may be postponed, it may be evasively answered now; sometime it must be fully answered.

It behooves the United States, therefore, in the interest both of scientific truth and of future social reform, carefully to study such chapters of her history as that of the suppression of the slave-trade. The most obvious question which this study suggests is: How far in a State can a recognized moral wrong safely be compromised? And although this chapter of history can give us no definite answer suited to the ever-varying aspects of political life, yet it would seem to warn any nation from allowing, through carelessness and moral cowardice, any social evil to grow. No persons would have seen the Civil War with more surprise and horror than the Revolutionists of 1776; yet from the small and apparently dying institution of their day arose the walled and castled Slave-Power. From this we may conclude that it behooves nations as well as men to do things at the very moment when they ought to be done.

* * * * *



APPENDIX A.

A CHRONOLOGICAL CONSPECTUS OF COLONIAL AND STATE LEGISLATION RESTRICTING THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE. 1641-1787.

1641. Massachusetts: Limitations on Slavery.

"Liberties of Forreiners & Strangers": 91. "There shall never be any bond slaverie villinage or Captivitie amongst vs, unles it be lawfull Captives taken in iust warres, & such strangers as willingly selle themselves or are sold to us. And those shall have all the liberties & Christian usages w^{ch} y^e law of god established in Jsraell concerning such p/^{sons} doeth morally require. This exempts none from servitude who shall be Judged there to by Authoritie."

"Capitall Laws": 10. "If any man stealeth aman or mankinde, he shall surely be put to death" (marginal reference, Exodus xxi. 16). Re-enacted in the codes of 1649, 1660, and 1672. Whitmore, Reprint of Colonial Laws of 1660, etc. (1889), pp. 52, 54, 71-117.

1642, April 3. New Netherland: Ten per cent Duty.

"Ordinance of the Director and Council of New Netherland, imposing certain Import and Export Duties." O'Callaghan, Laws of New Netherland (1868), p. 31.

1642, Dec. 1. Connecticut: Man-Stealing made a Capital Offence.

"Capitall Lawes," No. 10. Re-enacted in Ludlow's code, 1650. Colonial Records, I. 77.

1646, Nov. 4. Massachusetts: Declaration against Man-Stealing.

Testimony of the General Court. For text, see above, page 37. Colonial Records, II. 168; III. 84.

1652, April 4. New Netherland: Duty of 15 Guilders.

"Conditions and Regulations" of Trade to Africa. O'Callaghan, Laws of New Netherland, pp. 81, 127.

1652, May 18-20. Rhode Island: Perpetual Slavery Prohibited.

For text, see above, page 40. Colonial Records, I. 243.

1655, Aug. 6. New Netherland: Ten per cent Export Duty.

"Ordinance of the Director General and Council of New Netherland, imposing a Duty on exported Negroes." O'Callaghan, Laws of New Netherland, p. 191.

1664, March 12. Duke of York's Patent: Slavery Regulated.

"Lawes establisht by the Authority of his Majesties Letters patents, granted to his Royall Highnes James Duke of Yorke and Albany; Bearing Date the 12th Day of March in the Sixteenth year of the Raigne of our Soveraigne Lord Kinge Charles the Second." First published at Long Island in 1664.

"Bond slavery": "No Christian shall be kept in Bond-slavery villenage or Captivity, Except Such who shall be Judged thereunto by Authority, or such as willingly have sould, or shall sell themselves," etc. Apprenticeship allowed. Charter to William Penn, and Laws of the Province of Pennsylvania (1879), pp. 3, 12.

1672, October. Connecticut: Law against Man-Stealing.

"The General Laws and Liberties of Conecticut

"Capital Laws": 10. "If any Man stealeth a Man or Man kinde, and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall be put to death. Exod. 21. 16." Laws of Connecticut, 1672 (repr. 1865), p. 9.

1676, March 3. West New Jersey: Slavery Prohibited (?).

"The Concessions and Agreements of the Proprietors, Freeholders and Inhabitants of the Province of West New-Jersey, in America."

Chap. XXIII. "That in all publick Courts of Justice for Tryals of Causes, Civil or Criminal, any Person or Persons, Inhabitants of the said Province, may freely come into, and attend the said Courts, ... that all and every Person and Persons Inhabiting the said Province, shall, as far as in us lies, be free from Oppression and Slavery." Leaming and Spicer, Grants, Concessions, etc., pp. 382, 398.

1688, Feb. 18. Pennsylvania: First Protest of Friends against Slave-Trade.

"At Monthly Meeting of Germantown Friends." For text, see above, pages 28-29. Fac-simile Copy (1880).

1695, May. Maryland: 10s. Duty Act.

"An Act for the laying an Imposition upon Negroes, Slaves, and White Persons imported into this Province." Re-enacted in 1696, and included in Acts of 1699 and 1704. Bacon, Laws, 1695, ch. ix.; 1696, ch. vii.; 1699, ch. xxiii.; 1704, ch. ix.

1696. Pennsylvania: Protest of Friends.

"That Friends be careful not to encourage the bringing in of any more negroes." Bettle, Notices of Negro Slavery, in Penn. Hist. Soc. Mem. (1864), I. 383.

1698, Oct. 8. South Carolina: White Servants Encouraged.

"An Act for the Encouragement of the Importation of White Servants."

"Whereas, the great number of negroes which of late have been imported into this Collony may endanger the safety thereof if speedy care be not taken and encouragement given for the importation of white servants."

Sec. 1. L13 are to be given to any ship master for every male white servant (Irish excepted), between sixteen and forty years, whom he shall bring into Ashley river; and L12 for boys between twelve and sixteen years. Every servant must have at least four years to serve, and every boy seven years.

Sec. 3. Planters are to take servants in proportion of one to every six male Negroes above sixteen years.

Sec. 5. Servants are to be distributed by lot.

Sec. 8. This act to continue three years. Cooper, Statutes, II. 153.

1699, April. Virginia: 20s. Duty Act.

"An act for laying an imposition upon servants and slaves imported into this country, towards building the Capitoll." For three years; continued in August, 1701, and April, 1704. Hening, Statutes, III. 193, 212, 225.

1703, May 6. South Carolina: Duty Act.

"An Act for the laying an Imposition on Furrs, Skinns, Liquors and other Goods and Merchandize, Imported into and Exported out of this part of this Province, for the raising of a Fund of Money towards defraying the publick charges and expenses of this Province, and paying the debts due for the Expedition against St. Augustine." 10s. on Africans and 20s. on others. Cooper, Statutes, II. 201.

1704, October. Maryland: 20s. Duty Act.

"An Act imposing Three Pence per Gallon on Rum and Wine, Brandy and Spirits; and Twenty Shillings per Poll for Negroes; for raising a Supply to defray the Public Charge of this Province; and Twenty Shillings per Poll on Irish Servants, to prevent the importing too great a Number of Irish Papists into this Province." Revived in 1708 and 1712. Bacon, Laws, 1704, ch. xxxiii.; 1708, ch. xvi.; 1712, ch. xxii.

~1705, Jan. 12. Pennsylvania: 10s. Duty Act. ~

"An Act for Raising a Supply of Two pence half penny per Pound & ten shillings per Head. Also for Granting an Impost & laying on Sundry Liquors & negroes Imported into this Province for the Support of Governmt., & defraying the necessary Publick Charges in the Administration thereof." Colonial Records (1852), II. 232, No. 50.