52. The Louisiana Slave-Trade, 1803-1805. About this time the cession of Louisiana brought before Congress the question of the status of slavery and the slave-trade in the Territories. Twice or thrice before had the subject called for attention. The first time was in the Congress of the Confederation, when, by the Ordinance of 1787,[55] both slavery and the slave-trade were excluded from the Northwest Territory. In 1790 Congress had accepted the cession of North Carolina back lands on the express condition that slavery there be undisturbed.[56] Nothing had been said as to slavery in the South Carolina cession (1787),[57] but it was tacitly understood that the provision of the Northwest Ordinance would not be applied. In 1798 the bill introduced for the cession of Mississippi contained a specific declaration that the anti-slavery clause of 1787 should not be included.[58] The bill passed the Senate, but caused long and excited debate in the House.[59] It was argued, on the one hand, that the case in Mississippi was different from that in the Northwest Territory, because slavery was a legal institution in all the surrounding country, and to prohibit the institution was virtually to prohibit the settling of the country. On the other hand, Gallatin declared that if this amendment should not obtain, "he knew not how slaves could be prevented from being introduced by way of New Orleans, by persons who are not citizens of the United States." It was moved to strike out the excepting clause; but the motion received only twelve votes,—an apparent indication that Congress either did not appreciate the great precedent it was establishing, or was reprehensibly careless. Harper of South Carolina then succeeded in building up the Charleston slave-trade interest by a section forbidding the slave traffic from "without the limits of the United States." Thatcher moved to strike out the last clause of this amendment, and thus to prohibit the interstate trade, but he failed to get a second.[60] Thus the act passed, punishing the introduction of slaves from without the country by a fine of $300 for each slave, and freeing the slave.[61]

In 1804 President Jefferson communicated papers to Congress on the status of slavery and the slave-trade in Louisiana.[62] The Spanish had allowed the traffic by edict in 1793, France had not stopped it, and Governor Claiborne had refrained from interference. A bill erecting a territorial government was already pending.[63] The Northern "District of Louisiana" was placed under the jurisdiction of Indiana Territory, and was made subject to the provisions of the Ordinance of 1787. Various attempts were made to amend the part of the bill referring to the Southern Territory: first, so as completely to prohibit the slave-trade;[64] then to compel the emancipation at a certain age of all those imported;[65] next, to confine all importation to that from the States;[66] and, finally, to limit it further to slaves imported before South Carolina opened her ports.[67] The last two amendments prevailed, and the final act also extended to the Territory the Acts of 1794 and 1803. Only slaves imported before May 1, 1798, could be introduced, and those must be slaves of actual settlers.[68] All slaves illegally imported were freed.

This stringent act was limited to one year. The next year, in accordance with the urgent petition of the inhabitants, a bill was introduced against these restrictions.[69] By dexterous wording, this bill, which became a law March 2, 1805,[70] swept away all restrictions upon the slave-trade except that relating to foreign ports, and left even this provision so ambiguous that, later, by judicial interpretation of the law,[71] the foreign slave-trade was allowed, at least for a time.

Such a stream of slaves now poured into the new Territory that the following year a committee on the matter was appointed by the House.[72] The committee reported that they "are in possession of the fact, that African slaves, lately imported into Charleston, have been thence conveyed into the territory of Orleans, and, in their opinion, this practice will be continued to a very great extent, while there is no law to prevent it."[73] The House ordered a bill checking this to be prepared; and such a bill was reported, but was soon dropped.[74] Importations into South Carolina during this time reached enormous proportions. Senator Smith of that State declared from official returns that, between 1803 and 1807, 39,075 Negroes were imported into Charleston, most of whom went to the Territories.[75]

53. Last Attempts at Taxation, 1805-1806. So alarming did the trade become that North Carolina passed a resolution in December, 1804,[76] proposing that the States give Congress power to prohibit the trade. Massachusetts,[77] Vermont,[78] New Hampshire,[79] and Maryland[80] responded; and a joint resolution was introduced in the House, proposing as an amendment to the Constitution "That the Congress of the United States shall have power to prevent the further importation of slaves into the United States and the Territories thereof."[81] Nothing came of this effort; but meantime the project of taxation was revived. A motion to this effect, made in February, 1805, was referred to a Committee of the Whole, but was not discussed. Early in the first session of the ninth Congress the motion of 1805 was renewed; and although again postponed on the assurance that South Carolina was about to stop the trade,[82] it finally came up for debate January 20, 1806.[83] Then occurred a most stubborn legislative battle, which lasted during the whole session.[84] Several amendments to the motion were first introduced, so as to make it apply to all immigrants, and again to all "persons of color." As in the former debate, it was proposed to substitute a resolution of censure on South Carolina. All these amendments were lost. A long debate on the expediency of the measure followed, on the old grounds. Early of Georgia dwelt especially on the double taxation it would impose on Georgia; others estimated that a revenue of one hundred thousand dollars might be derived from the tax, a sum sufficient to replace the tax on pepper and medicines. Angry charges and counter-charges were made,—e.g., that Georgia, though ashamed openly to avow the trade, participated in it as well as South Carolina. "Some recriminations ensued between several members, on the participation of the traders of some of the New England States in carrying on the slave trade." Finally, January 22, by a vote of 90 to 25, a tax bill was ordered to be brought in.[85] One was reported on the 27th.[86] Every sort of opposition was resorted to. On the one hand, attempts were made to amend it so as to prohibit importation after 1807, and to prevent importation into the Territories; on the other hand, attempts were made to recommit and postpone the measure. It finally got a third reading, but was recommitted to a select committee, and disappeared until February 14.[87] Being then amended so as to provide for the forfeiture of smuggled cargoes, but saying nothing as to the disposition of the slaves, it was again relegated to a committee, after a vote of 69 to 42 against postponement.[88] On March 4 it appeared again, and a motion to reject it was lost. Finally, in the midst of the war scare and the question of non-importation of British goods, the bill was apparently forgotten, and the last attempt to tax imported slaves ended, like the others, in failure.

54. Key-Note of the Period. One of the last acts of this period strikes again the key-note which sounded throughout the whole of it. On February 20, 1806, after considerable opposition, a bill to prohibit trade with San Domingo passed the Senate.[89] In the House it was charged by one side that the measure was dictated by France, and by the other, that it originated in the fear of countenancing Negro insurrection. The bill, however, became a law, and by continuations remained on the statute-books until 1809. Even at that distance the nightmare of the Haytian insurrection continued to haunt the South, and a proposal to reopen trade with the island caused wild John Randolph to point out the "dreadful evil" of a "direct trade betwixt the town of Charleston and the ports of the island of St. Domingo."[90]

Of the twenty years from 1787 to 1807 it can only be said that they were, on the whole, a period of disappointment so far as the suppression of the slave-trade was concerned. Fear, interest, and philanthropy united for a time in an effort which bade fair to suppress the trade; then the real weakness of the constitutional compromise appeared, and the interests of the few overcame the fears and the humanity of the many.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Prince, Digest of the Laws of Georgia, p. 786; Marbury and Crawford, Digest of the Laws of Georgia, pp. 440, 442. The exact text of this act appears not to be extant. Section I. is stated to have been "re-enacted by the constitution." Possibly this act prohibited slaves also, although this is not certain. Georgia passed several regulative acts between 1755 and 1793. Cf. Renne, Colonial Acts of Georgia, pp. 73-4, 164, note.

[2] Marbury and Crawford, Digest, p. 30, Sec. 11. The clause was penned by Peter J. Carnes of Jefferson. Cf. W.B. Stevens, History of Georgia (1847), II. 501.

[3] Grimke, Public Laws, p. 466.

[4] Cooper and McCord, Statutes, VII. 431.

[5] Ibid., VII. 433-6, 444, 447.

[6] Ibid., VII. 449.

[7] Martin, Iredell's Acts of Assembly, I. 492.

[8] Ibid., II. 53.

[9] Cf. Ibid., II. 94; Laws of North Carolina (revision of 1819), I. 786.

[10] Virginia codified her whole slave legislation in 1792 (Va. Statutes at Large, New Ser., I. 122), and amended her laws in 1798 and 1806 (Ibid., III. 251).

[11] Dorsey, Laws of Maryland, 1796, I. 334.

[12] Laws of Delaware, 1797 (Newcastle ed.), p. 942, ch. 194 b.

[13] Dallas, Laws, II. 586.

[14] Paterson, Digest of the Laws of New Jersey (1800), pp. 307-13. In 1804 New Jersey passed an act gradually to abolish slavery. The legislation of New York at this period was confined to regulating the exportation of slave criminals (1790), and to passing an act gradually abolishing slavery (1799). In 1801 she codified all her acts.

[15] Acts and Laws of Connecticut (ed. 1784), pp. 368, 369, 388.

[16] Ibid., p. 412.

[17] Perpetual Laws of Massachusetts, 1780-89, pp. 235-6.

[18] Queries Respecting Slavery, etc., in Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll., 1st Ser., IV. 205.

[19] Annals of Cong., 1 Cong, 1 sess. pp. 336-41.

[20] Annals of Cong., 1 Cong. 1 sess. p. 903.

[21] Ibid., 1 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1182-3.

[22] Journals of Cong., 1782-3, pp. 418-9. Cf. above, pp. 56-57.

[23] Annals of Cong., 1 Cong. 2 sess. p. 1184.

[24] Ibid., pp. 1182-91.

[25] Annals of Cong., 1 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1197-1205.

[26] House Journal (repr. 1826), 1 Cong. 2 sess. I. 157-8.

[27] Annals of Cong., I Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1413-7.

[28] For the reports and debates, cf. Annals of Cong., 1 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1413-7, 1450-74; House Journal (repr. 1826), 1 Cong. 2 sess. I. 168-81.

[29] A clerical error in the original: "interdict" and "regulate" should be interchanged.

[30] See Memorials presented to Congress, etc. (1792), published by the Pennsylvania Abolition Society.

[31] From the Virginia petition.

[32] From the petition of Baltimore and other Maryland societies.

[33] From the Providence Abolition Society's petition.

[34] House Journal (repr. 1826), 2 Cong. 2 sess. I. 627-9; Annals of Cong., 2 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 728-31.

[35] Annals of Cong., 3 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 64, 70, 72; House Journal (repr. 1826), 3 Cong. 1 sess. II. 76, 84-5, 96-100; Senate Journal (repr. 1820), 3 Cong. 1 sess. II. 51.

[36] Statutes at Large, I. 347-9.

[37] Annals of Cong., 5 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 656-70, 945-1033.

[38] Annals of Cong., 6 Cong. 1 sess. p. 229.

[39] Dec. 12, 1799: House Journal (repr. 1826), 6 Cong. 1 sess. III. 535. For the debate, see Annals of Cong., 6 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 230-45.

[40] Senate Journal (repr. 1821), 6 Cong. 1 sess. III. 72, 77, 88, 92; see Ibid., Index, Bill No. 62; House Journal (repr. 1826), 6 Cong. 1 sess. III., Index, House Bill No. 247. For the debate, see Annals of Cong., 6 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 686-700.

[41] Annals of Cong., 6 Cong. 1 sess. p. 697.

[42] Ibid., p. 699-700.

[43] Statutes at Large, II. 70.

[44] Annals of Cong., 7 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 385-6.

[45] Ibid., p. 424.

[46] See House Bills Nos. 89 and 101; Annals of Cong., 7 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 424, 459-67. For the debate, see Ibid., pp. 459-72.

[47] Statutes at Large, II. 205.

[48] Cf. Fowler, Local Law in Massachusetts and Connecticut, etc., p. 126.

[49] Speech of S.L. Mitchell of New York, Feb. 14, 1804: Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1000. Cf. also speech of Bedinger: Ibid., pp. 997-8.

[50] Speech of Lowndes in the House, Feb. 14, 1804: Annals of Cong., 8 Cong., 1 sess. p. 992. Cf. Stanton's speech later: Ibid., 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 240.

[51] Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 820, 876.

[52] Ibid., pp. 992-1036.

[53] Huger of South Carolina declared that the whole South Carolina Congressional delegation opposed the repeal of the law, although they maintained the State's right to do so if she chose: Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1005.

[54] Ibid., pp. 1020-36; House Journal (repr. 1826), 8 Cong. 1 sess. IV 523, 578, 580, 581-5.

[55] On slavery in the Territories, cf. Welling, in Report Amer. Hist. Assoc., 1891, pp. 133-60.

[56] Statutes at Large, I. 108.

[57] Journals of Cong., XII. 137-8.

[58] Annals of Cong., 5 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 511, 515, 532-3.

[59] Ibid., 5 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 1235, 1249, 1277-84, 1296-1313.

[60] Annals of Cong., 5 Cong. 2 sess. p. 1313.

[61] Statutes at Large, I. 549.

[62] Amer. State Papers, Miscellaneous, I. No. 177.

[63] Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 106, 211, 223, 231, 233-4, 238.

[64] Ibid., pp. 240, 1186.

[65] Ibid., p. 241.

[66] Ibid., p. 240.

[67] Ibid., p. 242.

[68] For further proceedings, see Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 240-55, 1038-79, 1128-9, 1185-9. For the law, see Statutes at Large, II. 283-9.

[69] First, a bill was introduced applying the Northwest Ordinance to the Territory (Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 45-6); but this was replaced by a Senate bill (Ibid., p. 68; Senate Journal, repr. 1821, 8 Cong. 2 sess. III. 464). For the petition of the inhabitants, see Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 2 sess. p. 727-8.

[70] The bill was hurried through, and there are no records of debate. Cf. Annals of Cong., 8 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 28-69, 727, 871, 957, 1016-20, 1213-5. In Senate Journal (repr. 1821), III., see Index, Bill No. 8. Importation of slaves was allowed by a clause erecting a Frame of Government "similar" to that of the Mississippi Territory.

[71] Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 443. The whole trade was practically foreign, for the slavers merely entered the Negroes at Charleston and immediately reshipped them to New Orleans. Cf. Annals of Cong., 16 Cong. 1 sess. p. 264.

[72] House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 1 sess. V. 264; Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 445, 878.

[73] House Reports, 9 Cong. 1 sess. Feb. 17, 1806.

[74] House Bill No. 123.

[75] Annals of Cong., 16 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 73-7. This report covers the time from Jan. 1, 1804, to Dec. 31, 1807. During that time the following was the number of ships engaged in the traffic:—

From Charleston, 61 From Connecticut, 1 " Rhode Island, 59 " Sweden, 1 " Baltimore, 4 " Great Britain, 70 " Boston, 1 " France, 3 " Norfolk, 2 202

The consignees of these slave ships were natives of Charleston 13 Rhode Island 88 Great Britain 91 France 10 —— 202

The following slaves were imported:— By British vessels 19,949 " French " 1,078 ——— 21,027

By American vessels:— " Charleston merchants 2,006 " Rhode Island " 7,958 " Foreign " 5,717 " other Northern " 930 " " Southern " 1,437 18,048 ——— ———

Total number of slaves imported, 1804-7 39,075

It is, of course, highly probable that the Custom House returns were much below the actual figures.

[76] McMaster, History of the People of the United States, III. p. 517.

[77] House Journal (repr. 1826), 8 Cong. 2 sess. V. 171; Mass. Resolves, May, 1802, to March, 1806, Vol. II. A. (State House ed., p. 239).

[78] House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 1 sess. V. 238.

[79] Ibid., V. 266.

[80] Senate Journal (repr. 1821), 9 Cong. 1 sess. IV. 76, 77, 79.

[81] House Journal (repr. 1826), 8 Cong. 2 sess. V. 171.

[82] Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 274.

[83] Ibid., pp. 272-4, 323.

[84] Ibid., pp. 346-52, 358-75, etc., to 520.

[85] Ibid., pp. 374-5.

[86] See House Bill No. 94.

[87] Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 466.

[88] Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 519-20.

[89] Ibid., pp. 21, 52, 75, etc., to 138, 485-515, 1228. See House Bill No. 168. Cf. Statutes at Large, II. 421-2.

[90] A few months later, at the expiration of the period, trade was quietly reopened. Annals of Cong., 11 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 443-6.

* * * * *



Chapter VIII

THE PERIOD OF ATTEMPTED SUPPRESSION. 1807-1825.

55. The Act of 1807. 56. The First Question: How shall illegally imported Africans be disposed of? 57. The Second Question: How shall Violations be punished? 58. The Third Question: How shall the Interstate Coastwise Slave-Trade be protected? 59. Legislative History of the Bill. 60. Enforcement of the Act. 61. Evidence of the Continuance of the Trade. 62. Apathy of the Federal Government. 63. Typical Cases. 64. The Supplementary Acts, 1818-1820. 65. Enforcement of the Supplementary Acts, 1818-1825.

55. The Act of 1807. The first great goal of anti-slavery effort in the United States had been, since the Revolution, the suppression of the slave-trade by national law. It would hardly be too much to say that the Haytian revolution, in addition to its influence in the years from 1791 to 1806, was one of the main causes that rendered the accomplishment of this aim possible at the earliest constitutional moment. To the great influence of the fears of the South was added the failure of the French designs on Louisiana, of which Toussaint L'Ouverture was the most probable cause. The cession of Louisiana in 1803 challenged and aroused the North on the slavery question again; put the Carolina and Georgia slave-traders in the saddle, to the dismay of the Border States; and brought the whole slave-trade question vividly before the public conscience. Another scarcely less potent influence was, naturally, the great anti-slavery movement in England, which after a mighty struggle of eighteen years was about to gain its first victory in the British Act of 1807.

President Jefferson, in his pacificatory message of December 2, 1806, said: "I congratulate you, fellow-citizens, on the approach of the period at which you may interpose your authority constitutionally, to withdraw the citizens of the United States from all further participation in those violations of human rights which have been so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the reputation, and the best interests of our country, have long been eager to proscribe. Although no law you may pass can take prohibitory effect till the first day of the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, yet the intervening period is not too long to prevent, by timely notice, expeditions which cannot be completed before that day."[1]

In pursuance of this recommendation, the very next day Senator Bradley of Vermont introduced into the Senate a bill which, after a complicated legislative history, became the Act of March 2, 1807, prohibiting the African slave-trade.[2]

Three main questions were to be settled by this bill: first, and most prominent, that of the disposal of illegally imported Africans; second, that of the punishment of those concerned in the importation; third, that of the proper limitation of the interstate traffic by water.

The character of the debate on these three questions, as well as the state of public opinion, is illustrated by the fact that forty of the sixty pages of officially reported debates are devoted to the first question, less than twenty to the second, and only two to the third. A sad commentary on the previous enforcement of State and national laws is the readiness with which it was admitted that wholesale violations of the law would take place; indeed, Southern men declared that no strict law against the slave-trade could be executed in the South, and that it was only by playing on the motives of personal interest that the trade could be checked. The question of punishment indicated the slowly changing moral attitude of the South toward the slave system. Early boldly said, "A large majority of people in the Southern States do not consider slavery as even an evil."[3] The South, in fact, insisted on regarding man-stealing as a minor offence, a "misdemeanor" rather than a "crime." Finally, in the short and sharp debate on the interstate coastwise trade, the growing economic side of the slavery question came to the front, the vested interests' argument was squarely put, and the future interstate trade almost consciously provided for.

From these considerations, it is doubtful as to how far it was expected that the Act of 1807 would check the slave traffic; at any rate, so far as the South was concerned, there seemed to be an evident desire to limit the trade, but little thought that this statute would definitively suppress it.

56. The First Question: How shall illegally imported Africans be disposed of? The dozen or more propositions on the question of the disposal of illegally imported Africans may be divided into two chief heads, representing two radically opposed parties: 1. That illegally imported Africans be free, although they might be indentured for a term of years or removed from the country. 2. That such Africans be sold as slaves.[4] The arguments on these two propositions, which were many and far-reaching, may be roughly divided into three classes, political, constitutional, and moral.

The political argument, reduced to its lowest terms, ran thus: those wishing to free the Negroes illegally imported declared that to enslave them would be to perpetrate the very evil which the law was designed to stop. "By the same law," they said, "we condemn the man-stealer and become the receivers of his stolen goods. We punish the criminal, and then step into his place, and complete the crime."[5] They said that the objection to free Negroes was no valid excuse; for if the Southern people really feared this class, they would consent to the imposing of such penalties on illicit traffic as would stop the importation of a single slave.[6] Moreover, "forfeiture" and sale of the Negroes implied a property right in them which did not exist.[7] Waiving this technical point, and allowing them to be "forfeited" to the government, then the government should either immediately set them free, or, at the most, indenture them for a term of years; otherwise, the law would be an encouragement to violators. "It certainly will be," said they, "if the importer can find means to evade the penalty of the act; for there he has all the advantage of a market enhanced by our ineffectual attempt to prohibit."[8] They claimed that even the indenturing of the ignorant barbarian for life was better than slavery; and Sloan declared that the Northern States would receive the freed Negroes willingly rather than have them enslaved.[9]

The argument of those who insisted that the Negroes should be sold was tersely put by Macon: "In adopting our measures on this subject, we must pass such a law as can be executed."[10] Early expanded this: "It is a principle in legislation, as correct as any which has ever prevailed, that to give effect to laws you must not make them repugnant to the passions and wishes of the people among whom they are to operate. How then, in this instance, stands the fact? Do not gentlemen from every quarter of the Union prove, on the discussion of every question that has ever arisen in the House, having the most remote bearing on the giving freedom to the Africans in the bosom of our country, that it has excited the deepest sensibility in the breasts of those where slavery exists? And why is this so? It is, because those who, from experience, know the extent of the evil, believe that the most formidable aspect in which it can present itself, is by making these people free among them. Yes, sir, though slavery is an evil, regretted by every man in the country, to have among us in any considerable quantity persons of this description, is an evil far greater than slavery itself. Does any gentleman want proof of this? I answer that all proof is useless; no fact can be more notorious. With this belief on the minds of the people where slavery exists, and where the importation will take place, if at all, we are about to turn loose in a state of freedom all persons brought in after the passage of this law. I ask gentlemen to reflect and say whether such a law, opposed to the ideas, the passions, the views, and the affections of the people of the Southern States, can be executed? I tell them, no; it is impossible—why? Because no man will inform—why? Because to inform will be to lead to an evil which will be deemed greater than the offence of which information is given, because it will be opposed to the principle of self-preservation, and to the love of family. No, no man will be disposed to jeopard his life, and the lives of his countrymen. And if no one dare inform, the whole authority of the Government cannot carry the law into effect. The whole people will rise up against it. Why? Because to enforce it would be to turn loose, in the bosom of the country, firebrands that would consume them."[11]

This was the more tragic form of the argument; it also had a mercenary side, which was presented with equal emphasis. It was repeatedly said that the only way to enforce the law was to play off individual interests against each other. The profit from the sale of illegally imported Negroes was declared to be the only sufficient "inducement to give information of their importation."[12] "Give up the idea of forfeiture, and I challenge the gentleman to invent fines, penalties, or punishments of any sort, sufficient to restrain the slave trade."[13] If such Negroes be freed, "I tell you that slaves will continue to be imported as heretofore.... You cannot get hold of the ships employed in this traffic. Besides, slaves will be brought into Georgia from East Florida. They will be brought into the Mississippi Territory from the bay of Mobile. You cannot inflict any other penalty, or devise any other adequate means of prevention, than a forfeiture of the Africans in whose possession they may be found after importation."[14] Then, too, when foreigners smuggled in Negroes, "who then ... could be operated on, but the purchasers? There was the rub—it was their interest alone which, by being operated on, would produce a check. Snap their purse-strings, break open their strong box, deprive them of their slaves, and by destroying the temptation to buy, you put an end to the trade, ... nothing short of a forfeiture of the slave would afford an effectual remedy."[15] Again, it was argued that it was impossible to prevent imported Negroes from becoming slaves, or, what was just as bad, from being sold as vagabonds or indentured for life.[16] Even our own laws, it was said, recognize the title of the African slave factor in the transported Negroes; and if the importer have no title, why do we legislate? Why not let the African immigrant alone to get on as he may, just as we do the Irish immigrant?[17] If he should be returned to Africa, his home could not be found, and he would in all probability be sold into slavery again.[18]

The constitutional argument was not urged as seriously as the foregoing; but it had a considerable place. On the one hand, it was urged that if the Negroes were forfeited, they were forfeited to the United States government, which could dispose of them as it saw fit;[19] on the other hand, it was said that the United States, as owner, was subject to State laws, and could not free the Negroes contrary to such laws.[20] Some alleged that the freeing of such Negroes struck at the title to all slave property;[21] others thought that, as property in slaves was not recognized in the Constitution, it could not be in a statute.[22] The question also arose as to the source of the power of Congress over the slave-trade. Southern men derived it from the clause on commerce, and declared that it exceeded the power of Congress to declare Negroes imported into a slave State, free, against the laws of that State; that Congress could not determine what should or should not be property in a State.[23] Northern men replied that, according to this principle, forfeiture and sale in Massachusetts would be illegal; that the power of Congress over the trade was derived from the restraining clause, as a non-existent power could not be restrained; and that the United States could act under her general powers as executor of the Law of Nations.[24]

The moral argument as to the disposal of illegally imported Negroes was interlarded with all the others. On the one side, it began with the "Rights of Man," and descended to a stickling for the decent appearance of the statute-book; on the other side, it began with the uplifting of the heathen, and descended to a denial of the applicability of moral principles to the question. Said Holland of North Carolina: "It is admitted that the condition of the slaves in the Southern States is much superior to that of those in Africa. Who, then, will say that the trade is immoral?"[25] But, in fact, "morality has nothing to do with this traffic,"[26] for, as Joseph Clay declared, "it must appear to every man of common sense, that the question could be considered in a commercial point of view only."[27] The other side declared that, "by the laws of God and man," these captured Negroes are "entitled to their freedom as clearly and absolutely as we are;"[28] nevertheless, some were willing to leave them to the tender mercies of the slave States, so long as the statute-book was disgraced by no explicit recognition of slavery.[29] Such arguments brought some sharp sarcasm on those who seemed anxious "to legislate for the honor and glory of the statute book;"[30] some desired "to know what honor you will derive from a law that will be broken every day of your lives."[31] They would rather boldly sell the Negroes and turn the proceeds over to charity.

The final settlement of the question was as follows:—

"SECTION 4.... And neither the importer, nor any person or persons claiming from or under him, shall hold any right or title whatsoever to any negro, mulatto, or person of color, nor to the service or labor thereof, who may be imported or brought within the United States, or territories thereof, in violation of this law, but the same shall remain subject to any regulations not contravening the provisions of this act, which the Legislatures of the several States or Territories at any time hereafter may make, for disposing of any such negro, mulatto, or person of color."[32]

57. The Second Question: How shall Violations be punished? The next point in importance was that of the punishment of offenders. The half-dozen specific propositions reduce themselves to two: 1. A violation should be considered a crime or felony, and be punished by death; 2. A violation should be considered a misdemeanor, and be punished by fine and imprisonment.[33]

Advocates of the severer punishment dwelt on the enormity of the offence. It was "one of the highest crimes man could commit," and "a captain of a ship engaged in this traffic was guilty of murder."[34] The law of God punished the crime with death, and any one would rather be hanged than be enslaved.[35] It was a peculiarly deliberate crime, in which the offender did not act in sudden passion, but had ample time for reflection.[36] Then, too, crimes of much less magnitude are punished with death. Shall we punish the stealer of $50 with death, and the man-stealer with imprisonment only?[37] Piracy, forgery, and fraudulent sinking of vessels are punishable with death, "yet these are crimes only against property; whereas the importation of slaves, a crime committed against the liberty of man, and inferior only to murder or treason, is accounted nothing but a misdemeanor."[38] Here, indeed, lies the remedy for the evil of freeing illegally imported Negroes,—in making the penalty so severe that none will be brought in; if the South is sincere, "they will unite to a man to execute the law."[39] To free such Negroes is dangerous; to enslave them, wrong; to return them, impracticable; to indenture them, difficult,—therefore, by a death penalty, keep them from being imported.[40] Here the East had a chance to throw back the taunts of the South, by urging the South to unite with them in hanging the New England slave-traders, assuring the South that "so far from charging their Southern brethren with cruelty or severity in hanging them, they would acknowledge the favor with gratitude."[41] Finally, if the Southerners would refuse to execute so severe a law because they did not consider the offence great, they would probably refuse to execute any law at all for the same reason.[42]

The opposition answered that the death penalty was more than proportionate to the crime, and therefore "immoral."[43] "I cannot believe," said Stanton of Rhode Island, "that a man ought to be hung for only stealing a negro."[44] It was argued that the trade was after all but a "transfer from one master to another;"[45] that slavery was worse than the slave-trade, and the South did not consider slavery a crime: how could it then punish the trade so severely and not reflect on the institution?[46] Severity, it was said, was also inexpedient: severity often increases crime; if the punishment is too great, people will sympathize with offenders and will not inform against them. Said Mr. Mosely: "When the penalty is excessive or disproportioned to the offence, it will naturally create a repugnance to the law, and render its execution odious."[47] John Randolph argued against even fine and imprisonment, "on the ground that such an excessive penalty could not, in such case, be constitutionally imposed by a Government possessed of the limited powers of the Government of the United States."[48]

The bill as passed punished infractions as follows:—

For equipping a slaver, a fine of $20,000 and forfeiture of the ship.

For transporting Negroes, a fine of $5000 and forfeiture of the ship and Negroes.

For transporting and selling Negroes, a fine of $1000 to $10,000, imprisonment from 5 to 10 years, and forfeiture of the ship and Negroes.

For knowingly buying illegally imported Negroes, a fine of $800 for each Negro, and forfeiture.

58. The Third Question: How shall the Interstate Coastwise Slave-Trade be protected? The first proposition was to prohibit the coastwise slave-trade altogether,[49] but an amendment reported to the House allowed it "in any vessel or species of craft whatever." It is probable that the first proposition would have prevailed, had it not been for the vehement opposition of Randolph and Early.[50] They probably foresaw the value which Virginia would derive from this trade in the future, and consequently Randolph violently declared that if the amendment did not prevail, "the Southern people would set the law at defiance. He would begin the example." He maintained that by the first proposition "the proprietor of sacred and chartered rights is prevented the Constitutional use of his property."[51] The Conference Committee finally arranged a compromise, forbidding the coastwise trade for purposes of sale in vessels under forty tons.[52] This did not suit Early, who declared that the law with this provision "would not prevent the introduction of a single slave."[53] Randolph, too, would "rather lose the bill, he had rather lose all the bills of the session, he had rather lose every bill passed since the establishment of the Government, than agree to the provision contained in this slave bill."[54] He predicted the severance of the slave and the free States, if disunion should ever come. Congress was, however, weary with the dragging of the bill, and it passed both Houses with the compromise provision. Randolph was so dissatisfied that he had a committee appointed the next day, and introduced an amendatory bill. Both this bill and another similar one, introduced at the next session, failed of consideration.[55]

59. Legislative History of the Bill.[56] On December 12, 1805, Senator Stephen R. Bradley of Vermont gave notice of a bill to prohibit the introduction of slaves after 1808. By a vote of 18 to 9 leave was given, and the bill read a first time on the 17th. On the 18th, however, it was postponed until "the first Monday in December, 1806." The presidential message mentioning the matter, Senator Bradley, December 3, 1806, gave notice of a similar bill, which was brought in on the 8th, and on the 9th referred to a committee consisting of Bradley, Stone, Giles, Gaillard, and Baldwin. This bill passed, after some consideration, January 27. It provided, among other things, that violations of the act should be felony, punishable with death, and forbade the interstate coast-trade.[57]

Meantime, in the House, Mr. Bidwell of Massachusetts had proposed, February 4, 1806, as an amendment to a bill taxing slaves imported, that importation after December 31, 1807, be prohibited, on pain of fine and imprisonment and forfeiture of ship.[58] This was rejected by a vote of 86 to 17. On December 3, 1806, the House, in appointing committees on the message, "Ordered, That Mr. Early, Mr. Thomas M. Randolph, Mr. John Campbell, Mr. Kenan, Mr. Cook, Mr. Kelly, and Mr. Van Rensselaer be appointed a committee" on the slave-trade. This committee reported a bill on the 15th, which was considered, but finally, December 18, recommitted. It was reported in an amended form on the 19th, and amended in Committee of the Whole so as to make violation a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment, instead of a felony punishable by death.[59] A struggle over the disposal of the cargo then ensued. A motion by Bidwell to except the cargo from forfeiture was lost, 77 to 39. Another motion by Bidwell may be considered the crucial vote on the whole bill: it was an amendment to the forfeiture clause, and read, "Provided, that no person shall be sold as a slave by virtue of this act."[60] This resulted in a tie vote, 60 to 60; but the casting vote of the Speaker, Macon of North Carolina, defeated it. New England voted solidly in favor of it, the Middle States stood 4 for and 2 against it, and the six Southern States stood solid against it. On January 8 the bill went again to a select committee of seventeen, by a vote of 76 to 46. The bill was reported back amended January 20, and on the 28th the Senate bill was also presented to the House. On the 9th, 10th, and 11th of February both bills were considered in Committee of the Whole, and the Senate bill finally replaced the House bill, after several amendments had been made.[61] The bill was then passed, by a vote of 113 to 5.[62] The Senate agreed to the amendments, including that substituting fine and imprisonment for the death penalty, but asked for a conference on the provision which left the interstate coast-trade free. The six conferees succeeded in bringing the Houses to agree, by limiting the trade to vessels over forty tons and requiring registry of the slaves.[63]

The following diagram shows in graphic form the legislative history of the act:—[64]

Senate. 1805. House. Bradley gives notice. + Dec. 12. Leave given; bill read. + 17. Postponed one year. + 18. 1806. Feb. 4. + Bidwell's amendment. Notice. + Dec. 3. + Committee on Bill introduced. + 8. slave trade. Committed. + 9. 15. + Bill reported. 17. 18. 19. 23. 29. 31. 1807. Jan. 5. 7. 8. + Read third time; Reported. + 15. recommitted. 16. 20. + Reported Third reading. + 26. amended. PASSED. + 27. 28. Senate bill Feb. 9. reported. 10. 11. + Senate bill 12. amended. Reported from House. 13. + PASSED. Reported to House. 17. Reported back. - - - - - - - - - - - 18. House insists; - - - - - - - - - - - asks conference. / - - - - - - - - X House asks conference. / 2 5 - - - - Conference report - - - - - - adopted. Conference report / 2 6 adopted. Bill enrolled. - - - -2 8 March 2. V Signed by the President.

This bill received the approval of President Jefferson, March 2, 1807, and became thus the "Act to prohibit the importation of Slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, from and after the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eight."[65] The debates in the Senate were not reported. Those in the House were prolonged and bitter, and hinged especially on the disposal of the slaves, the punishment of offenders, and the coast-trade. Men were continually changing their votes, and the bill see-sawed backward and forward, in committee and out, until the House was thoroughly worn out. On the whole, the strong anti-slavery men, like Bidwell and Sloan, were outgeneraled by Southerners, like Early and Williams; and, considering the immense moral backing of the anti-slavery party from the Revolutionary fathers down, the bill of 1807 can hardly be regarded as a great anti-slavery victory.

60. Enforcement of the Act. The period so confidently looked forward to by the constitutional fathers had at last arrived; the slave-trade was prohibited, and much oratory and poetry were expended in celebration of the event. In the face of this, let us see how the Act of 1807 was enforced and what it really accomplished. It is noticeable, in the first place, that there was no especial set of machinery provided for the enforcement of this act. The work fell first to the Secretary of the Treasury, as head of the customs collection. Then, through the activity of cruisers, the Secretary of the Navy gradually came to have oversight, and eventually the whole matter was lodged with him, although the Departments of State and War were more or less active on different occasions. Later, at the advent of the Lincoln government, the Department of the Interior was charged with the enforcement of the slave-trade laws. It would indeed be surprising if, amid so much uncertainty and shifting of responsibility, the law were not poorly enforced. Poor enforcement, moreover, in the years 1808 to 1820 meant far more than at almost any other period; for these years were, all over the European world, a time of stirring economic change, and the set which forces might then take would in a later period be unchangeable without a cataclysm. Perhaps from 1808 to 1814, in the midst of agitation and war, there was some excuse for carelessness. From 1814 on, however, no such palliation existed, and the law was probably enforced as the people who made it wished it enforced.

Most of the Southern States rather tardily passed the necessary supplementary acts disposing of illegally imported Africans. A few appear not to have passed any. Some of these laws, like the Alabama-Mississippi Territory Act of 1815,[66] directed such Negroes to be "sold by the proper officer of the court, to the highest bidder, at public auction, for ready money." One-half the proceeds went to the informer or to the collector of customs, the other half to the public treasury. Other acts, like that of North Carolina in 1816,[67] directed the Negroes to "be sold and disposed of for the use of the state." One-fifth of the proceeds went to the informer. The Georgia Act of 1817[68] directed that the slaves be either sold or given to the Colonization Society for transportation, providing the society reimburse the State for all expense incurred, and pay for the transportation. In this manner, machinery of somewhat clumsy build and varying pattern was provided for the carrying out of the national act.

61. Evidence of the Continuance of the Trade. Undoubtedly, the Act of 1807 came very near being a dead letter. The testimony supporting this view is voluminous. It consists of presidential messages, reports of cabinet officers, letters of collectors of revenue, letters of district attorneys, reports of committees of Congress, reports of naval commanders, statements made on the floor of Congress, the testimony of eye-witnesses, and the complaints of home and foreign anti-slavery societies.

"When I was young," writes Mr. Fowler of Connecticut, "the slave-trade was still carried on, by Connecticut shipmasters and Merchant adventurers, for the supply of southern ports. This trade was carried on by the consent of the Southern States, under the provisions of the Federal Constitution, until 1808, and, after that time, clandestinely. There was a good deal of conversation on the subject, in private circles." Other States were said to be even more involved than Connecticut.[69] The African Society of London estimated that, down to 1816, fifteen of the sixty thousand slaves annually taken from Africa were shipped by Americans. "Notwithstanding the prohibitory act of America, which was passed in 1807, ships bearing the American flag continued to trade for slaves until 1809, when, in consequence of a decision in the English prize appeal courts, which rendered American slave ships liable to capture and condemnation, that flag suddenly disappeared from the coast. Its place was almost instantaneously supplied by the Spanish flag, which, with one or two exceptions, was now seen for the first time on the African coast, engaged in covering the slave trade. This sudden substitution of the Spanish for the American flag seemed to confirm what was established in a variety of instances by more direct testimony, that the slave trade, which now, for the first time, assumed a Spanish dress, was in reality only the trade of other nations in disguise."[70]

So notorious did the participation of Americans in the traffic become, that President Madison informed Congress in his message, December 5, 1810, that "it appears that American citizens are instrumental in carrying on a traffic in enslaved Africans, equally in violation of the laws of humanity, and in defiance of those of their own country. The same just and benevolent motives which produced the interdiction in force against this criminal conduct, will doubtless be felt by Congress, in devising further means of suppressing the evil."[71] The Secretary of the Navy wrote the same year to Charleston, South Carolina: "I hear, not without great concern, that the law prohibiting the importation of slaves has been violated in frequent instances, near St. Mary's."[72] Testimony as to violations of the law and suggestions for improving it also came in from district attorneys.[73]

The method of introducing Negroes was simple. A slave smuggler says: "After resting a few days at St. Augustine, ... I agreed to accompany Diego on a land trip through the United States, where a kaffle of negroes was to precede us, for whose disposal the shrewd Portuguese had already made arrangements with my uncle's consignees. I soon learned how readily, and at what profits, the Florida negroes were sold into the neighboring American States. The kaffle, under charge of negro drivers, was to strike up the Escambia River, and thence cross the boundary into Georgia, where some of our wild Africans were mixed with various squads of native blacks, and driven inland, till sold off, singly or by couples, on the road. At this period [1812], the United States had declared the African slave trade illegal, and passed stringent laws to prevent the importation of negroes; yet the Spanish possessions were thriving on this inland exchange of negroes and mulattoes; Florida was a sort of nursery for slave-breeders, and many American citizens grew rich by trafficking in Guinea negroes, and smuggling them continually, in small parties, through the southern United States. At the time I mention, the business was a lively one, owing to the war then going on between the States and England, and the unsettled condition of affairs on the border."[74]

The Spanish flag continued to cover American slave-traders. The rapid rise of privateering during the war was not caused solely by patriotic motives; for many armed ships fitted out in the United States obtained a thin Spanish disguise at Havana, and transported thousands of slaves to Brazil and the West Indies. Sometimes all disguise was thrown aside, and the American flag appeared on the slave coast, as in the cases of the "Paz,"[75] the "Rebecca," the "Rosa"[76] (formerly the privateer "Commodore Perry"), the "Dorset" of Baltimore,[77] and the "Saucy Jack."[78] Governor McCarthy of Sierra Leone wrote, in 1817: "The slave trade is carried on most vigorously by the Spaniards, Portuguese, Americans and French. I have had it affirmed from several quarters, and do believe it to be a fact, that there is a greater number of vessels employed in that traffic than at any former period."[79]

62. Apathy of the Federal Government. The United States cruisers succeeded now and then in capturing a slaver, like the "Eugene," which was taken when within four miles of the New Orleans bar.[80] President Madison again, in 1816, urged Congress to act on account of the "violations and evasions which, it is suggested, are chargeable on unworthy citizens, who mingle in the slave trade under foreign flags, and with foreign ports; and by collusive importations of slaves into the United States, through adjoining ports and territories."[81] The executive was continually in receipt of ample evidence of this illicit trade and of the helplessness of officers of the law. In 1817 it was reported to the Secretary of the Navy that most of the goods carried to Galveston were brought into the United States; "the more valuable, and the slaves are smuggled in through the numerous inlets to the westward, where the people are but too much disposed to render them every possible assistance. Several hundred slaves are now at Galveston, and persons have gone from New-Orleans to purchase them. Every exertion will be made to intercept them, but I have little hopes of success."[82] Similar letters from naval officers and collectors showed that a system of slave piracy had arisen since the war, and that at Galveston there was an establishment of organized brigands, who did not go to the trouble of sailing to Africa for their slaves, but simply captured slavers and sold their cargoes into the United States. This Galveston nest had, in 1817, eleven armed vessels to prosecute the work, and "the most shameful violations of the slave act, as well as our revenue laws, continue to be practised."[83] Cargoes of as many as three hundred slaves were arriving in Texas. All this took place under Aury, the buccaneer governor; and when he removed to Amelia Island in 1817 with the McGregor raid, the illicit traffic in slaves, which had been going on there for years,[84] took an impulse that brought it even to the somewhat deaf ears of Collector Bullock. He reported, May 22, 1817: "I have just received information from a source on which I can implicitly rely, that it has already become the practice to introduce into the state of Georgia, across the St. Mary's River, from Amelia Island, East Florida, Africans, who have been carried into the Port of Fernandina, subsequent to the capture of it by the Patriot army now in possession of it ...; were the legislature to pass an act giving compensation in some manner to informers, it would have a tendency in a great degree to prevent the practice; as the thing now is, no citizen will take the trouble of searching for and detecting the slaves. I further understand, that the evil will not be confined altogether to Africans, but will be extended to the worst class of West India slaves."[85]

Undoubtedly, the injury done by these pirates to the regular slave-trading interests was largely instrumental in exterminating them. Late in 1817 United States troops seized Amelia Island, and President Monroe felicitated Congress and the country upon escaping the "annoyance and injury" of this illicit trade.[86] The trade, however, seems to have continued, as is shown by such letters as the following, written three and a half months later:—

PORT OF DARIEN, March 14, 1818.

... It is a painful duty, sir, to express to you, that I am in possession of undoubted information, that African and West India negroes are almost daily illicitly introduced into Georgia, for sale or settlement, or passing through it to the territories of the United States for similar purposes; these facts are notorious; and it is not unusual to see such negroes in the streets of St. Mary's, and such too, recently captured by our vessels of war, and ordered to Savannah, were illegally bartered by hundreds in that city, for this bartering or bonding (as it is called, but in reality selling,) actually took place before any decision had [been] passed by the court respecting them. I cannot but again express to you, sir, that these irregularities and mocking of the laws, by men who understand them, and who, it was presumed, would have respected them, are such, that it requires the immediate interposition of Congress to effect a suppression of this traffic; for, as things are, should a faithful officer of the government apprehend such negroes, to avoid the penalties imposed by the laws, the proprietors disclaim them, and some agent of the executive demands a delivery of the same to him, who may employ them as he pleases, or effect a sale by way of a bond, for the restoration of the negroes when legally called on so to do; which bond, it is understood, is to be forfeited, as the amount of the bond is so much less than the value of the property.... There are many negroes ... recently introduced into this state and the Alabama territory, and which can be apprehended. The undertaking would be great; but to be sensible that we shall possess your approbation, and that we are carrying the views and wishes of the government into execution, is all we wish, and it shall be done, independent of every personal consideration.

I have, etc.[87]

This "approbation" failed to come to the zealous collector, and on the 5th of July he wrote that, "not being favored with a reply," he has been obliged to deliver over to the governor's agents ninety-one illegally imported Negroes.[88] Reports from other districts corroborate this testimony. The collector at Mobile writes of strange proceedings on the part of the courts.[89] General D.B. Mitchell, ex-governor of Georgia and United States Indian agent, after an investigation in 1821 by Attorney-General Wirt, was found "guilty of having prostituted his power, as agent for Indian affairs at the Creek agency, to the purpose of aiding and assisting in a conscious breach of the act of Congress of 1807, in prohibition of the slave trade—and this from mercenary motives."[90] The indefatigable Collector Chew of New Orleans wrote to Washington that, "to put a stop to that traffic, a naval force suitable to those waters is indispensable," and that "vast numbers of slaves will be introduced to an alarming extent, unless prompt and effectual measures are adopted by the general government."[91] Other collectors continually reported infractions, complaining that they could get no assistance from the citizens,[92] or plaintively asking the services of "one small cutter."[93]

Meantime, what was the response of the government to such representations, and what efforts were made to enforce the act? A few unsystematic and spasmodic attempts are recorded. In 1811 some special instructions were sent out,[94] and the President was authorized to seize Amelia Island.[95] Then came the war; and as late as November 15, 1818, in spite of the complaints of collectors, we find no revenue cutter on the Gulf coast.[96] During the years 1817 and 1818[97] some cruisers went there irregularly, but they were too large to be effective; and the partial suppression of the Amelia Island pirates was all that was accomplished. On the whole, the efforts of the government lacked plan, energy, and often sincerity. Some captures of slavers were made;[98] but, as the collector at Mobile wrote, anent certain cases, "this was owing rather to accident, than any well-timed arrangement." He adds: "from the Chandalier Islands to the Perdido river, including the coast, and numerous other islands, we have only a small boat, with four men and an inspector, to oppose to the whole confederacy of smugglers and pirates."[99]

To cap the climax, the government officials were so negligent that Secretary Crawford, in 1820, confessed to Congress that "it appears, from an examination of the records of this office, that no particular instructions have ever been given, by the Secretary of the Treasury, under the original or supplementary acts prohibiting the introduction of slaves into the United States."[100] Beside this inactivity, the government was criminally negligent in not prosecuting and punishing offenders when captured. Urgent appeals for instruction from prosecuting attorneys were too often received in official silence; complaints as to the violation of law by State officers went unheeded;[101] informers were unprotected and sometimes driven from home.[102] Indeed, the most severe comment on the whole period is the report, January 7, 1819, of the Register of the Treasury, who, after the wholesale and open violation of the Act of 1807, reported, in response to a request from the House, "that it doth not appear, from an examination of the records of this office, and particularly of the accounts (to the date of their last settlement) of the collectors of the customs, and of the several marshals of the United States, that any forfeitures had been incurred under the said act."[103]

63. Typical Cases. At this date (January 7, 1819), however, certain cases were stated to be pending, a history of which will fitly conclude this discussion. In 1818 three American schooners sailed from the United States to Havana; on June 2 they started back with cargoes aggregating one hundred and seven slaves. The schooner "Constitution" was captured by one of Andrew Jackson's officers under the guns of Fort Barancas. The "Louisa" and "Marino" were captured by Lieutenant McKeever of the United States Navy. The three vessels were duly proceeded against at Mobile, and the case began slowly to drag along. The slaves, instead of being put under the care of the zealous marshal of the district, were placed in the hands of three bondsmen, friends of the judge. The marshal notified the government of this irregularity, but apparently received no answer. In 1822 the three vessels were condemned as forfeited, but the court "reserved" for future order the distribution of the slaves. Nothing whatever either then or later was done to the slave-traders themselves. The owners of the ships promptly appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that tribunal, in 1824, condemned the three vessels and the slaves on two of them.[104] These slaves, considerably reduced in number "from various causes," were sold at auction for the benefit of the State, in spite of the Act of 1819. Meantime, before the decision of the Supreme Court, the judge of the Supreme Court of West Florida had awarded to certain alleged Spanish claimants of the slaves indemnity for nearly the whole number seized, at the price of $650 per head, and the Secretary of the Treasury had actually paid the claim.[105] In 1826 Lieutenant McKeever urgently petitions Congress for his prize-money of $4,415.15, which he has not yet received.[106] The "Constitution" was for some inexplicable reason released from bond, and the whole case fades in a very thick cloud of official mist. In 1831 Congress sought to inquire into the final disposition of the slaves. The information given was never printed; but as late as 1836 a certain Calvin Mickle petitions Congress for reimbursement for the slaves sold, for their hire, for their natural increase, for expenses incurred, and for damages.[107]

64. The Supplementary Acts, 1818-1820. To remedy the obvious defects of the Act of 1807 two courses were possible: one, to minimize the crime of transportation, and, by encouraging informers, to concentrate efforts against the buying of smuggled slaves; the other, to make the crime of transportation so great that no slaves would be imported. The Act of 1818 tried the first method; that of 1819, the second.[108] The latter was obviously the more upright and logical, and the only method deserving thought even in 1807; but the Act of 1818 was the natural descendant of that series of compromises which began in the Constitutional Convention, and which, instead of postponing the settlement of critical questions to more favorable times, rather aggravated and complicated them.

The immediate cause of the Act of 1818 was the Amelia Island scandal.[109] Committees in both Houses reported bills, but that of the Senate finally passed. There does not appear to have been very much debate.[110] The sale of Africans for the benefit of the informer and of the United States was strongly urged "as the only means of executing the laws against the slave trade as experience had fully demonstrated since the origin of the prohibition."[111] This proposition was naturally opposed as "inconsistent with the principles of our Government, and calculated to throw as wide open the door to the importation of slaves as it was before the existing prohibition."[112] The act, which became a law April 20, 1818,[113] was a poorly constructed compromise, which virtually acknowledged the failure of efforts to control the trade, and sought to remedy defects by pitting cupidity against cupidity, informer against thief. One-half of all forfeitures and fines were to go to the informer, and penalties for violation were changed as follows:—

For equipping a slaver, instead of a fine of $20,000, a fine of $1000 to $5000 and imprisonment from 3 to 7 years.

For transporting Negroes, instead of a fine of $5000 and forfeiture of ship and Negroes, a fine of $1000 to $5000 and imprisonment from 3 to 7 years.

For actual importation, instead of a fine of $1000 to $10,000 and imprisonment from 5 to 10 years, a fine of $1000 to $10,000, and imprisonment from 3 to 7 years.

For knowingly buying illegally imported Negroes, instead of a fine of $800 for each Negro and forfeiture, a fine of $1000 for each Negro.

The burden of proof was laid on the defendant, to the extent that he must prove that the slave in question had been imported at least five years before the prosecution. The slaves were still left to the disposal of the States.

This statute was, of course, a failure from the start,[114] and at the very next session Congress took steps to revise it. A bill was reported in the House, January 13, 1819, but it was not discussed till March.[115] It finally passed, after "much debate."[116] The Senate dropped its own bill, and, after striking out the provision for the death penalty, passed the bill as it came from the House.[117] The House acquiesced, and the bill became a law, March 3, 1819,[118] in the midst of the Missouri trouble. This act directed the President to use armed cruisers on the coasts of the United States and Africa to suppress the slave-trade; one-half the proceeds of the condemned ship were to go to the captors as bounty, provided the Africans were safely lodged with a United States marshal and the crew with the civil authorities. These provisions were seriously marred by a proviso which Butler of Louisiana, had inserted, with a "due regard for the interests of the State which he represented," viz., that a captured slaver must always be returned to the port whence she sailed.[119] This, of course, secured decided advantages to Southern slave-traders. The most radical provision of the act was that which directed the President to "make such regulations and arrangements as he may deem expedient for the safe keeping, support, and removal beyond the limits of the United States, of all such negroes, mulattoes, or persons of colour, as may be so delivered and brought within their jurisdiction;" and to appoint an agent in Africa to receive such Negroes.[120] Finally, an appropriation of $100,000 was made to enforce the act.[121] This act was in some measure due to the new colonization movement; and the return of Africans recaptured was a distinct recognition of its efforts, and the real foundation of Liberia.

To render this straightforward act effective, it was necessary to add but one measure, and that was a penalty commensurate with the crime of slave stealing. This was accomplished by the Act of May 15, 1820,[122] a law which may be regarded as the last of the Missouri Compromise measures. The act originated from the various bills on piracy which were introduced early in the sixteenth Congress. The House bill, in spite of opposition, was amended so as to include slave-trading under piracy, and passed. The Senate agreed without a division. This law provided that direct participation in the slave-trade should be piracy, punishable with death.[123]

- STATUTES AT LARGE. DATE. AMOUNT APPROPRIATED. - VOL. PAGE III. 533-4 March 3, 1819 $100,000 " 764 " 3, 1823 50,000 IV. 141 " 14, 1826 32,000 " 208 March 2, 1827 / 36,710 20,000 " 302 May 24, 1828 30,000 " 354 March 2, 1829 16,000 " 462 " 2, 1831 16,000 " 615 Feb. 20, 1833 5,000 " 671 Jan. 24, 1834 5,000 V. 157-8 March 3, 1837 11,413.57 " 501 Aug. 4, 1842 10,543.42 " 615 March 3, 1843 5,000 IX. 96 Aug. 10, 1846 25,000 XI. 90 " 18, 1856 8,000 " 227 March 3, 1857 8,000 " 404 " 3, 1859 75,000 XII. 21 May 26, 1860 40,000 " 132 Feb. 19, 1861 900,000 " 219 March 2, 1861 900,000 " 639 Feb. 4, 1863 17,000 XIII. 424 Jan. 24, 1865 17,000 XIV. 226 July 25, 1866 17,000 " 415 Feb. 28, 1867 17,000 XV. 58 March 30, 1868 12,500 " 321 March 3, 1869 12,500 - Total, 50 years $2,386,666.99 Minus surpluses re-appropriated (approximate) 48,666.99? $2,338,000 Cost of squadron, 1843-58, @ $384,500 per year (House Exec. Doc., 31 Cong. 1 sess. IX. No. 73) 5,767,500 Returning slaves on "Wildfire" (Statutes at Large, XII. 41) 250,000 Approximate cost of squadron, 1858-66, probably not less than $500,000 per year 4,000,000? - Approximate money cost of suppressing the slave-trade $12,355,500?

Cf. Kendall's Report: Senate Doc., 21 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, pp. 211-8; Amer. State Papers, Naval, III. No. 429 E.; also Reports of the Secretaries of the Navy from 1819 to 1860.

65. Enforcement of the Supplementary Acts, 1818-1825. A somewhat more sincere and determined effort to enforce the slave-trade laws now followed; and yet it is a significant fact that not until Lincoln's administration did a slave-trader suffer death for violating the laws of the United States. The participation of Americans in the trade continued, declining somewhat between 1825 and 1830, and then reviving, until it reached its highest activity between 1840 and 1860. The development of a vast internal slave-trade, and the consequent rise in the South of vested interests strongly opposed to slave smuggling, led to a falling off in the illicit introduction of Negroes after 1825, until the fifties; nevertheless, smuggling never entirely ceased, and large numbers were thus added to the plantations of the Gulf States.

Monroe had various constitutional scruples as to the execution of the Act of 1819;[124] but, as Congress took no action, he at last put a fair interpretation on his powers, and appointed Samuel Bacon as an agent in Africa to form a settlement for recaptured Africans. Gradually the agency thus formed became merged with that of the Colonization Society on Cape Mesurado; and from this union Liberia was finally evolved.[125]

Meantime, during the years 1818 to 1820, the activity of the slave-traders was prodigious. General James Tallmadge declared in the House, February 15, 1819: "Our laws are already highly penal against their introduction, and yet, it is a well known fact, that about fourteen thousand slaves have been brought into our country this last year."[126] In the same year Middleton of South Carolina and Wright of Virginia estimated illicit introduction at 13,000 and 15,000 respectively.[127] Judge Story, in charging a jury, took occasion to say: "We have but too many proofs from unquestionable sources, that it [the slave-trade] is still carried on with all the implacable rapacity of former times. Avarice has grown more subtle in its evasions, and watches and seizes its prey with an appetite quickened rather than suppressed by its guilty vigils. American citizens are steeped to their very mouths (I can hardly use too bold a figure) in this stream of iniquity."[128] The following year, 1820, brought some significant statements from various members of Congress. Said Smith of South Carolina: "Pharaoh was, for his temerity, drowned in the Red Sea, in pursuing them [the Israelites] contrary to God's express will; but our Northern friends have not been afraid even of that, in their zeal to furnish the Southern States with Africans. They are better seamen than Pharaoh, and calculate by that means to elude the vigilance of Heaven; which they seem to disregard, if they can but elude the violated laws of their country."[129] As late as May he saw little hope of suppressing the traffic.[130] Sergeant of Pennsylvania declared: "It is notorious that, in spite of the utmost vigilance that can be employed, African negroes are clandestinely brought in and sold as slaves."[131] Plumer of New Hampshire stated that "of the unhappy beings, thus in violation of all laws transported to our shores, and thrown by force into the mass of our black population, scarcely one in a hundred is ever detected by the officers of the General Government, in a part of the country, where, if we are to believe the statement of Governor Rabun, 'an officer who would perform his duty, by attempting to enforce the law [against the slave trade] is, by many, considered as an officious meddler, and treated with derision and contempt;' ... I have been told by a gentleman, who has attended particularly to this subject, that ten thousand slaves were in one year smuggled into the United States; and that, even for the last year, we must count the number not by hundreds, but by thousands."[132] In 1821 a committee of Congress characterized prevailing methods as those "of the grossest fraud that could be practised to deceive the officers of government."[133] Another committee, in 1822, after a careful examination of the subject, declare that they "find it impossible to measure with precision the effect produced upon the American branch of the slave trade by the laws above mentioned, and the seizures under them. They are unable to state, whether those American merchants, the American capital and seamen which heretofore aided in this traffic, have abandoned it altogether, or have sought shelter under the flags of other nations." They then state the suspicious circumstance that, with the disappearance of the American flag from the traffic, "the trade, notwithstanding, increases annually, under the flags of other nations." They complain of the spasmodic efforts of the executive. They say that the first United States cruiser arrived on the African coast in March, 1820, and remained a "few weeks;" that since then four others had in two years made five visits in all; but "since the middle of last November, the commencement of the healthy season on that coast, no vessel has been, nor, as your committee is informed, is, under orders for that service."[134] The United States African agent, Ayres, reported in 1823: "I was informed by an American officer who had been on the coast in 1820, that he had boarded 20 American vessels in one morning, lying in the port of Gallinas, and fitted for the reception of slaves. It is a lamentable fact, that most of the harbours, between the Senegal and the line, were visited by an equal number of American vessels, and for the sole purpose of carrying away slaves. Although for some years the coast had been occasionally visited by our cruizers, their short stay and seldom appearance had made but slight impression on those traders, rendered hardy by repetition of crime, and avaricious by excessive gain. They were enabled by a regular system to gain intelligence of any cruizer being on the coast."[135]

Even such spasmodic efforts bore abundant fruit, and indicated what vigorous measures might have accomplished. Between May, 1818, and November, 1821, nearly six hundred Africans were recaptured and eleven American slavers taken.[136] Such measures gradually changed the character of the trade, and opened the international phase of the question. American slavers cleared for foreign ports, there took a foreign flag and papers, and then sailed boldly past American cruisers, although their real character was often well known. More stringent clearance laws and consular instructions might have greatly reduced this practice; but nothing was ever done, and gradually the laws became in large measure powerless to deal with the bulk of the illicit trade. In 1820, September 16, a British officer, in his official report, declares that, in spite of United States laws, "American vessels, American subjects, and American capital, are unquestionably engaged in the trade, though under other colours and in disguise."[137] The United States ship "Cyane" at one time reported ten captures within a few days, adding: "Although they are evidently owned by Americans, they are so completely covered by Spanish papers that it is impossible to condemn them."[138] The governor of Sierra Leone reported the rivers Nunez and Pongas full of renegade European and American slave-traders;[139] the trade was said to be carried on "to an extent that almost staggers belief."[140] Down to 1824 or 1825, reports from all quarters prove this activity in slave-trading.

The execution of the laws within the country exhibits grave defects and even criminal negligence. Attorney-General Wirt finds it necessary to assure collectors, in 1819, that "it is against public policy to dispense with prosecutions for violation of the law to prohibit the Slave trade."[141] One district attorney writes: "It appears to be almost impossible to enforce the laws of the United States against offenders after the negroes have been landed in the state."[142] Again, it is asserted that "when vessels engaged in the slave trade have been detained by the American cruizers, and sent into the slave-holding states, there appears at once a difficulty in securing the freedom to these captives which the laws of the United States have decreed for them."[143] In some cases, one man would smuggle in the Africans and hide them in the woods; then his partner would "rob" him, and so all trace be lost.[144] Perhaps 350 Africans were officially reported as brought in contrary to law from 1818 to 1820: the absurdity of this figure is apparent.[145] A circular letter to the marshals, in 1821, brought reports of only a few well-known cases, like that of the "General Ramirez;" the marshal of Louisiana had "no information."[146]

There appears to be little positive evidence of a large illicit importation into the country for a decade after 1825. It is hardly possible, however, considering the activity in the trade, that slaves were not largely imported. Indeed, when we note how the laws were continually broken in other respects, absence of evidence of petty smuggling becomes presumptive evidence that collusive or tacit understanding of officers and citizens allowed the trade to some extent.[147] Finally, it must be noted that during all this time scarcely a man suffered for participating in the trade, beyond the loss of the Africans and, more rarely, of his ship. Red-handed slavers, caught in the act and convicted, were too often, like La Coste of South Carolina, the subjects of executive clemency.[148] In certain cases there were those who even had the effrontery to ask Congress to cancel their own laws. For instance, in 1819 a Venezuelan privateer, secretly fitted out and manned by Americans in Baltimore, succeeded in capturing several American, Portuguese, and Spanish slavers, and appropriating the slaves; being finally wrecked herself, she transferred her crew and slaves to one of her prizes, the "Antelope," which was eventually captured by a United States cruiser and the 280 Africans sent to Georgia. After much litigation, the United States Supreme Court ordered those captured from Spaniards to be surrendered, and the others to be returned to Africa. By some mysterious process, only 139 Africans now remained, 100 of whom were sent to Africa. The Spanish claimants of the remaining thirty-nine sold them to a certain Mr. Wilde, who gave bond to transport them out of the country. Finally, in December, 1827, there came an innocent petition to Congress to cancel this bond.[149] A bill to that effect passed and was approved, May 2, 1828,[150] and in consequence these Africans remained as slaves in Georgia.

On the whole, it is plain that, although in the period from 1807 to 1820 Congress laid down broad lines of legislation sufficient, save in some details, to suppress the African slave trade to America, yet the execution of these laws was criminally lax. Moreover, by the facility with which slavers could disguise their identity, it was possible for them to escape even a vigorous enforcement of our laws. This situation could properly be met only by energetic and sincere international co-operation. The next chapter will review efforts directed toward this end.[151]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 2 sess. V. 468.

[2] Cf. below, Sec. 59.

[3] Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 238.

[4] There were at least twelve distinct propositions as to the disposal of the Africans imported:—

1. That they be forfeited and sold by the United States at auction (Early's bill, reported Dec. 15: Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 167-8).

2. That they be forfeited and left to the disposal of the States (proposed by Bidwell and Early: Ibid., pp. 181, 221, 477. This was the final settlement.)

3. That they be forfeited and sold, and that the proceeds go to charities, education, or internal improvements (Early, Holland, and Masters: Ibid., p. 273).

4. That they be forfeited and indentured for life (Alston and Bidwell: Ibid., pp. 170-1).

5. That they be forfeited and indentured for 7, 8, or 10 years (Pitkin: Ibid., p. 186).

6. That they be forfeited and given into the custody of the President, and by him indentured in free States for a term of years (bill reported from the Senate Jan. 28: House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 2 sess. V. 575; Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 477. Cf. also Ibid., p. 272).

7. That the Secretary of the Treasury dispose of them, at his discretion, in service (Quincy: Ibid., p. 183).

8. That those imported into slave States be returned to Africa or bound out in free States (Sloan: Ibid., p. 254).

9. That all be sent back to Africa (Smilie: Ibid., p. 176).

10. That those imported into free States be free, those imported into slave States be returned to Africa or indentured (Sloan: Ibid., p. 226).

11. That they be forfeited but not sold (Sloan and others: Ibid., p. 270).

12. That they be free (Sloan: Ibid., p. 168; Bidwell: House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 2 sess. V. 515).

[5] Bidwell, Cook, and others: Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 201.

[6] Bidwell: Ibid., p. 172.

[7] Fisk: Ibid., pp. 224-5; Bidwell: Ibid., p. 221.

[8] Quincy: Ibid., p. 184.

[9] Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 478; Bidwell: Ibid., p. 171.

[10] Ibid., p. 172.

[11] Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 173-4.

[12] Alston: Ibid., p. 170.

[13] D.R. Williams: Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 183.

[14] Early: Ibid., pp. 184-5.

[15] Lloyd, Early, and others: Ibid., p. 203.

[16] Alston: Ibid., p. 170.

[17] Quincy: Ibid., p. 222; Macon: Ibid., p. 225.

[18] Macon: Ibid., p. 177.

[19] Barker: Ibid., p. 171; Bidwell: Ibid., p. 172.

[20] Clay, Alston, and Early: Ibid., p. 266.

[21] Clay, Alston, and Early: Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 266.

[22] Bidwell: Ibid., p. 221.

[23] Sloan and others: Ibid., p. 271; Early and Alston: Ibid., pp. 168, 171.

[24] Ely, Bidwell, and others: Ibid., pp. 179, 181, 271; Smilie and Findley: Ibid., pp. 225, 226.

[25] Ibid., p. 240. Cf. Lloyd: Ibid., p. 236.

[26] Holland: Ibid., p. 241.

[27] Ibid., p. 227; Macon: Ibid., p. 225.

[28] Bidwell, Cook, and others: Ibid., p. 201.

[29] Bidwell: Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 221. Cf. Ibid., p. 202.

[30] Early: Ibid., p. 239.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., p. 1267.

[33] There were about six distinct punishments suggested:—

1. Forfeiture, and fine of $5000 to $10,000 (Early's bill: Ibid., p. 167).

2. Forfeiture and imprisonment (amendment to Senate bill: Ibid., pp. 231, 477, 483).

3. Forfeiture, imprisonment from 5 to 10 years, and fine of $1000 to $10,000 (amendment to amendment of Senate bill: Ibid., pp. 228, 483).

4. Forfeiture, imprisonment from 5 to 40 years, and fine of $1000 to $10,000 (Chandler's amendment: Ibid., p. 228).

5. Forfeiture of all property, and imprisonment (Pitkin: Ibid., p. 188).

6. Death (Smilie: Ibid., pp. 189-90; bill reported to House, Dec. 19: Ibid., p. 190; Senate bill as reported to House, Jan. 28).

[34] Smilie: Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 189-90.

[35] Tallmadge: Ibid., p. 233; Olin: Ibid., p. 237.

[36] Ely: Ibid., p. 237.

[37] Smilie: Ibid., p. 236. Cf. Sloan: Ibid., p. 232.

[38] Hastings: Ibid., p. 228.

[39] Dwight: Ibid., p. 241; Ely: Ibid., p. 232.

[40] Mosely: Ibid., pp. 234-5.

[41] Tallmadge: Ibid., pp. 232, 234. Cf. Dwight: Ibid., p. 241.

[42] Varnum: Ibid., p. 243.

[43] Elmer: Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. p. 235.

[44] Ibid., p. 240.

[45] Holland: Ibid., p. 240.

[46] Early: Ibid., pp. 238-9; Holland: Ibid., p. 239.

[47] Ibid., p. 233. Cf. Lloyd: Ibid., p. 237; Ely: Ibid., p. 232; Early: Ibid., pp. 238-9.

[48] Ibid., p. 484.

[49] This was the provision of the Senate bill as reported to the House. It was over the House amendment to this that the Houses disagreed. Cf. Ibid., p. 484.

[50] Cf. Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 527-8.

[51] Ibid., p. 528.

[52] Ibid., p. 626.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., pp. 636-8; House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 2 sess. V. 616, and House Bill No. 219; Ibid., 10 Cong. 1 sess. VI. 27, 50; Annals of Cong., 10 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 854-5, 961.

[56] On account of the meagre records it is difficult to follow the course of this bill. I have pieced together information from various sources, and trust that this account is approximately correct.

[57] Cf. Senate Journal (repr. 1821), 9 Cong. 2 sess. IV., Senate Bill No. 41.

[58] Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 438. Cf. above, Sec. 53.

[59] This amendment of the Committee of the Whole was adopted by a vote of 63 to 53. The New England States stood 3 to 2 for the death penalty; the Middle States were evenly divided, 3 and 3; and the South stood 5 to 0 against it, with Kentucky evenly divided. Cf. House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 2 sess. V. 504.

[60] Ibid., V. 514-5.

[61] The substitution of the Senate bill was a victory for the anti-slavery party, as all battles had to be fought again. The Southern party, however, succeeded in carrying all its amendments.

[62] Messrs. Betton of New Hampshire, Chittenden of Vermont, Garnett and Trigg of Virginia, and D.R. Williams of South Carolina voted against the bill: House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 2 sess. V. 585-6.

[63] Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 626-7.

[64] The unassigned dates refer to debates, etc. The history of the amendments and debates on the measure may be traced in the following references:—

Senate (Bill No. 41).

Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 20-1; 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 16, 19, 23, 33, 36, 45, 47, 68, 69, 70, 71, 79, 87, 93, etc.

Senate Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 1-2 sess. IV. 11, 112, 123, 124, 132, 133, 150, 158, 164, 165, 167, 168, etc.

* * * * *

House (Bill No. 148).

Annals of Cong., 9 Cong. 1 sess. p. 438; 9 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 114, 151, 167-8, 173-4, 180, 183, 189, 200, 202-4, 220, 228, 231, 240, 254, 264, 266-7, 270, 273, 373, 427, 477, 481, 484-6, 527, 528, etc.

House Journal (repr. 1826), 9 Cong. 1-2 sess. V. 470, 482, 488, 490, 491, 496, 500, 504, 510, 513-6, 517, 540, 557, 575, 579, 581, 583-4, 585, 592, 594, 610, 613-5, 623, 638, 640, etc.

[65] Statutes at Large, II. 426. There were some few attempts to obtain laws of relief from this bill: see, e.g., Annals of Cong., 10 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1243; 11 Cong. 1 sess. pp. 34, 36-9, 41, 43, 48, 49, 380, 465, 688, 706, 2209; House Journal (repr. 1826), II Cong. 1-2 sess. VII. 100, 102, 124, etc., and Index, Senate Bill No. 8. Cf. Amer. State Papers, Miscellaneous, II. No. 269. There was also one proposed amendment to make the prohibition perpetual: Amer. State Papers, Miscellaneous, I. No. 244.

[66] Toulmin, Digest of the Laws of Alabama, p. 637.

[67] Laws of North Carolina (revision of 1819), II. 1350.

[68] Prince, Digest, p. 793.

[69] Fowler, Historical Status of the Negro in Connecticut, in Local Law, etc., pp. 122, 126.

[70] House Reports, 17 Cong. 1 sess. II. No. 92, p. 32.

[71] House Journal (repr. 1826), 11 Cong. 3 sess. VII. p. 435.

[72] House Doc., 15 Cong. 2 sess. IV. No. 84, p. 5.