"'Further on, in de Consolatione mortuorum, you say: 'Sed recedus anima quoe carnalibus oculis non videtur, ab angelis susciptur et collocatur, aut in sinu, Abrahae, si fidelis est, aut in carcerio inferni custodia si peccatrix est.' This means, 'But at the departure of that soul which the eyes of the flesh cannot see, the angels will receive and carry it to the Bosom of Abraham, if it has been faithful; or to Hell, if sinful.' On the other hand, I could quote a large number of your own texts showing that for you, Purgatory was not an impossibility. Add to all this what Saint Fulgentius, who flourished after you during the fifth and sixth century, says in Chapter XIV., of his 'de incarnatione et gratia,' etc.: 'Quicumque regnum Dei non ingreditur, poenis oeternis cruciatur.' That is to say, 'He who could not enter the Kingdom of God, will suffer eternal punishment.'

"'5th. Your son either cannot read, or else acts in bad faith; otherwise, how could he, from my estatement, 'The Protestants do not believe in it; neither do the Greek Fathers, because they miss,' etc., try to make 'The Greek Fathers DID NOT believe in a Purgatory?'

"'How could he deduct from a present, a past tense and twist the sentences to make from it 'The Holy Greek Fathers?'

"'I used 'believe,' the present tense, although in my time the Holy Greek Fathers did not exist, but simply the fathers belonging to the Greek Church. Moreover, as I was following an historical order, how could I refer to the Protestants, first, and to the Holy Greek Fathers afterwards, who believed what they wished, and who at the time of my earthly life were a past to me?

"'And enwrapped in such bad faith, he dares to qualify as a slanderer, imposter and ignoramus, the man who only quoted me!

"'But such proceeding is worthy of Friar Rodriguez, who, following his system of confusing a part with the whole, tries to condemn another's book, and mistakes the rays of the sun for the sun itself, all with the purpose of slandering the author and calling him Freemason.

"'Tell me, Holy Doctor, after what I have told you, who is the real ignoramus, impostor and slanderer?

"'6th. Instead of accusing others of ignorance, and presuming to know everything, he should be careful, because he has not even read your books, notwithstanding you are his father, and that it is his duty to know what you have said. Should he have done so, he would neither have written so much nonsense nor would he have shown the shallowness of his knowledge, which, by the way, he derives from some little books, which, to propagate and maintain obscurantism, were published in Cataluna, [8] by Sarda y Salvany.'

"Thus was old Tasio expressing himself, when the voice of the Almighty was heard summoning me to His presence.

"Trembling, I approached, and prostrated myself at His feet.'

"'Go to Earth,' said the voice, 'and tell those who call themselves your sons that I, having created millions of suns, around which, thousands of worlds, inhabited by millions of millions of beings, created by my infinite Mercy, gyrate, cannot be an instrument to the fulfilment of a few ungrateful creatures' passions, simply handfuls of dust carried away by a gust of wind; insignificant particles of the inhabitants of one of my smallest worlds!'

"'Tell them that my Name must not be used to extend the misery or ignorance of their brothers, nor shall they restrain in my Name, intelligence and thought, which I created free. That they must not commit abuses in my Name, cause a tear, nor a single drop of blood to be shed. That they must not represent me as being cruel, revengeful, subject to their whims and executor of their will. Not to represent me, The Fountain of Goodness, as a tyrant, or an unkind Father, pretending that they are the only possessors of Light and Eternal Life. How? I, who have given to each being air, light, life and love, that he may be happy, could I deny to one of the most transcendental, true happiness, for the sake of others? Impious! Absurd! Tell them that I, who am All, and apart from whom nothing exists, nor could exist, I have not and cannot have enemies. Nothing equals me, and no one can oppose my will!

"'Tell them that their enemies are not my enemies; that I have never identified myself with them, and that their maxims are vain, insensible, blasphemous! Tell them that I pardon error, but punish iniquity; that I will forgive a sin against me, but will prosecute those who should torture an unfortunate. That being infinitely Powerful, all the sins of all the inhabitants of all the worlds, thousands of times centuplicated, can never dim an atom of my glory. But the least injury to the poor and oppressed I will punish, for I have not created man to make him unhappy nor the victim of his brothers. I am the Father of all existent; I know the destiny of every atom; let me love all men, whose miseries and needs I know. Let each one perform his duty, that I, The God of Mercy, know my own will.'

"Thus spoke the Almighty; and I came here to fulfill his command. Now, I say to you:

"That the miseries of the unhappy Indian whom you have impoverished and stupefied, have reached the Throne of the Highest. There have arrived so many intelligences obscured and impaired by you! The cry of so many exiles, tortured, and killed at your instigation! The tears of so many mothers and the miseries of so many orphans, combined with the noise of your orgies! Know that there is a God, (perhaps you doubt His existence, and only use His name to advance your ends) who will some day call you to account for all your iniquities. Know that He needs not the money of the poor, nor is it necessary to worship Him by burning candles and incense, saying masses or believing blindly what others say, contrary to common sense.

"No! His luminary is greater than your own sun; His flowers more fragrant than those on earth. He suffices to Himself. He created intelligence for no subservient purpose; but that with its use, man could be happy in raising himself to Him. He needs no one. He created man, not for His sake, but for man's own. He is happy for all eternity!

"You obstinately uphold the existence of a Purgatory, using even the most ignoble weapons and means to defend your belief. Why, instead of wasting your time in affirming the existence of that which you never saw, do you not preach and practice love and charity amongst yourselves? Why not preach words of comfort and hope, to somewhat soothe the miseries of life, instead of frightening your brothers by tales of future punishment? Why? Because Christ's True Doctrine would bring you no earthly wealth, and all that you look for is gold, and gold! And to satisfy your end and bleed the timid souls, of money, you have invented a Purgatory! Why afflict orphans and widows with dreadful tales of the next life, only to extort from them a few cents? Have you forgotten what the Apostle said? 'Nolo vos ignorare, fratres, de dormientibus, ut non contristenuni, sicut qui spem non habent,' which means, 'I do not wish you to ignore, brethren, that which concerns those who sleep, that you may not be saddened, like those who have lost all hope.' Also, that I, myself, have said? 'Hoec enim est Christianoe fidei summa: vitam veram expectare post mortem,' that is 'Here is then the summary of the Christian faith: to hope for a true life after death.' But you, lacking in charity, and for a vile, greedy interest, live in opposition to Christ, and pretend to be able to mould Divine Judgment. All the strength of your philosophy seems to be derived from your own theory, which denies the existence of souls sufficiently sinners to be condemned, or pure enough to enter the Kingdom of God! By whose authority do you pretend to oppose the judgment of Him who weighs and considers the smallest thought? Who knows it is impossible to expect perfection from beings made of clay, subject to the miseries and oppressions of earthly life? Who told you that He will judge as you, with your narrow, limited intelligence, do? That the miseries of this life are not expiations of sins?

"Cease in your avaricious hoarding of wealth! You have now enough. Do not wrench from the poor his last mouthful of bread.

"Remember what Saint Fulgentius said: 'Et si mithetur in stagnum ignis et sulphuris qui nudum vestimento non tegit, quid passures est qui vestimento crudelis expoliat? Et si rerum suarem avarus possessor requiem non habebit, quomodo aliaenarum rerum insatiabilis raptor?' Meaning, 'And if he who never clothed the naked is sent to the pond of fire and sulphur, where will he, who cruelly stripped them, go? And if the greedy possessor of his own wealth may never rest, how shall it be with the thief, insatiable in his greed for the wealth of others?'

"Preach then, the religion of Hope and Promises, as you, above all, are in need of pardon and forgiveness. Do not speak of rigor, nor condemn others, lest God should hear and judge you according to the laws by you formulated. Bear always in mind Christ's words, 'Vae vobis scribae et Pharisae hypocrite qui clauditis regnum coelorum ante homines; vos non intratis, nec introeunts sinitis intrare!' This means, 'Woe to you, Scribes and Pharisees, who close to men the Kingdom of God, and neither enter nor allow others to enter!'

"Now, to you personally, I will say: You are an unfortunate fool, who speak numberless absurdities, although I could not expect aught else from you, and would not punish you for them. But you have had the audacity of not only insulting others, by which you forgot truth and charity, but praised yourself and called attention to your own praise.

"Referring to yourself, you said. This Father, whom I well know (liar, you do not even know yourself), although he may appear a little hard headed (a little hard-headed? Ask my crosier if your head is not harder than stone), never speaks in vain (this is true; every word you say causes as much laughter on earth as in Heaven), nor uses words without first thinking (if such is true, your intelligence is very limited).

"For such foolish vanity I ought to punish you severely, so that you would stop forever your senseless writings, saving me the trouble of coming to reprimand you at every instance.

"Were I to judge you according to your own theory, you should at least go to your Purgatory. But, after all, you are not so bad, as many learned persons are made to laugh at your writings.

"It would be well for your pride if you allowed the Indians to pass by you without taking off their hats or kissing your hand. But then, they would be imprisoned or exiled, and it would not do to increase the wrong you do them.

"Shall I make you lame and dumb? No! Your brothers would claim it was a trial of your forbearance, to which God had submitted you. No; you won't catch me on that!

"What shall I do with you?"

The old Bishop meditated for a few moments, and then, he exclaimed:

"Ah! Now I know! Your own sin shall be your punishment!

"I condemn you to continue saying and writing nonsense for the rest of your life, so that the world may laugh at you, and also, that on the Day of Judgment you may be judged according to your deserts!"

"Amen!" replied Friar Rodriguez.

The vision then disappeared; the light of the lamp regained its yellowish flame, and the soft perfume dispersed.

On the following day Friar Rodriguez started writing greater nonsense, with renewed energy.

Amen!

Jose Rizal.

Note.—The foregoing admirable translations from the writings of Dr. Rizal were made by Mr. F.M. de Rivas, of Chicago.



CHAPTER XV

Events of the Spanish-American War.

No Mystery About the Cause of the War—The Expected and the Inevitable Has Happened—The Tragedy of the Maine—Vigilant Wisdom of President McKinley—Dewey's Prompt Triumph—The Battles at Manila and Santiago Compared—General Shafter Tells of the Battle of Santiago—Report of Wainwright Board on Movements of Sampson's Fleet in the Destruction of Cervera's Squadron—Stars and Stripes Raised Over Porto Rico—American and Spanish Fleets at Manila Compared.—Text of Peace Protocol.

The war between Spain and the United States was a long time coming, and there is no more mystery about its cause than doubt as to its decisions. It was foretold in every chapter of the terrible stories of the conflicts between the Spaniards and their colonists, largely of their blood, in Central and South America. The causes of war in Cuba, and the conduct of warfare by Spain in that island were the same that resulted in revolutionary strife in Mexico and Peru, and, indeed, all the nations in the Americas that once were swayed by the sovereignty of Spain. The last of the islands of the Spanish possessions in the hemisphere introduced to the civilized world by Columbus were lost by the western peninsula of Europe, symbolized and personified in the Crown, as the first crumbling fragments of the colonial empires of Spain fell away from her. Only in the case of Cuba there was the direct intervention of the United States to establish "a stable government" in the distracted island, desolated by war, pestilence and famine, that had evolved conditions, of terrible misery incurable from within, and of inhumane oppression that should be resented by all enlightened people. It had long been realized by the thoughtful men of Spain capable of estimating the currents of events, that the time must come, and was close at hand, when the arms of the United States would be directed to the conquest of Cuba. It was not only in the air that this was to be, it was written in the history of Spanish America, and more than that, there was not an Atlas that did not proclaim in the maps of the continents of the Western world, that Cuba would and in the largest sense of right should, become a part of the United States, and must do so in order to be redeemed from the disabilities deeply implanted, and released from having the intolerable burdens imposed by the rule of Spain. The consciousness of the Spaniards, that the shadow of the United States lowered over the misgovernment of Cuba, and that there was a thunder-cloud in the north that must burst—with more than the force of the hurricanes that spin on their dizzy way of destruction from the Caribbean Sea—aroused the fury of passion, of jealous hatred and thirst for revenge, in anticipation of the inevitable, that caused the catastrophe of the blowing up of the Maine, and kindled with the flame of the explosion, the conflagration of warfare in the Indies West and East, that has reddened the seas and the skies with the blood of Spain and the glow of America's victory both in the Antilles and the Philippines, wiping from the face of the earth the last vestiges of the colonial imperialism of Spain that gave her mediaeval riches and celebrity, for which—as the system always evil became hideous with malignant growth, so that each colony was a cancer on the mother country—there has been exacted punishment of modern poverty, and finally the humiliation of the haughty, with no consolation for defeat, but the fact that in desperate and forlorn circumstances there were seen glimpses of the ancient valor in Spanish soldiers, that was once their high distinction among the legions of embattled Europe.

The United States was not ready for war. Our regular army was a 16 to 120 Spanish troops in Cuba, our field guns 1 to 6 of Blanco's batteries, our siege train nowhere, and fortified cities to assail; and the ability and industry of the Spaniards as well as their skill and strength in surveying and fortifying military lines, and their food resources were dangerously undervalued. The war was rushed upon the country, contrary to the calm executive judgement of the President. The army and navy were admirable but faulty in hasty equipment, the navy a perfect machine in itself, but without docks and arsenals in the right place for the supply of a fleet in the old battle field of European navies, the West Indies. The energies of the Government were put forth as soon as the war was seriously threatened, and the mighty people arose and swiftly as the aptitudes of Americans in emergencies could be applied, deficiencies were supplied. The first stroke of arms came as a dazzling flash from the far southwest, in the story of the smashing victory of Dewey at Manila. That splendid officer, gentleman and hero did not signal his fleet as Nelson at Trafalgar, that every man was expected to do his duty, but he reported that every man did his duty; and the East Indian fleet of Spain vanished, smashed, burned and sunken by a thunderbolt! The theory of war countenanced by the impetuous and demanded by the presumptuous, was that our aggressive forces must attack Havana. In and around that city were an enormous garrison, abundant military stores, forty miles of trenches defended by sixty thousand men; and far more to be dreaded the deadly climate, the overwhelming rains, the deep rank soil soaked under the tropical sun and the dense vegetation, and still more the pestilence—the ghastly Yellow Fever, and scarcely less poisonous and fatal pernicious malarial fevers, and dysenteries that exhausted as fast as fever consumed. Fortunately, it was decided that the place to attack Havana was Santiago, and there the regular army, with the exception of the regiments sent to the Philippines, was ordered and in due time reinforced by volunteers, safely embarked and disembarked, to become the winners on bloody fields and receive the surrender of the Spanish garrisons of the city and province of Santiago. The vaunted fleet of Cervera, having attempted flight, perished—the wrecks of his fine ships strewing the southern coast of Cuba, where they remain as memorials, like and unlike the distorted iron that was the Maine, in the harbor of Havana, and as the shattered and charred remnants of the fleet of Montejo, at Manila, still cumber the waters of the bay off Cavite, telling the story of the glory of our victorious heroes there.

The responsibility of the Chief Magistrate of the United States in the late war was remarkable. Everything of moment was referred to him from the Cabinet officers of the Government, and he gave all the closest attention, making, after conscientious consideration, the decisions that determined the course of action taken. This was true in unusual measure of the Treasury, State, War and Navy Departments.

It is well the President resisted while he could the "rush line" in Congress, that strove headlong for war, and strenuously urged in the time gained essential preparations, and that he pressed the war the day it was declared with a hurry message to Admiral Dewey, who won his immortal victory on the other side of the world within a week of his orders by cable to "destroy" the squadron of the enemy that might be found somewhere on the west coast of Luzon.

Nearer home there was a harder task. The Spanish army in Cuba was much more formidable on the defensive than in the offensive. There were greater numbers of soldiers of a better class in the service of Spain on the island, than had been supposed, and they did not lack, in the degree believed, discipline, ammunition or provisions. The Spaniards had an effective field artillery, more than one hundred guns, and their Mauser rifles were excellent, far-reaching; and, in field ammunition, they were ahead of us in smokeless powder. Our regiments would have given way before the Spanish rifles, that told no tales except with bolts, that flew invisible, fatal arrows, from the jungles, if the American soldier had not been of stuff that was like pure steel, and marched unflinchingly through the deadly hail, regarding the bitter pelting as a summons to "come on" and carry the trenches and ambuscades by storm. The incapacity of the Spaniards to put down the Cuban Rebellion caused grave misapprehensions, both as to the Spanish and Cuban soldiery, for few Americans understand the conditions of the interminable guerilla warfare, the particular military accomplishment of the Spanish race, impotent in all save the destructive effect upon those not engaged in it. In Congress no impression could be made of the real feebleness of the Cubans, except in bushwhacking, and it is still a puzzle that the immense masses of Spanish troops should be so helpless against the insurgents, and yet so troublesome in harassing invaders. The Cuban army was not a myth, certainly, but it has been a disappointment to those who were swift in shouting its praises, upon information given by the Cuban Key West Bureau of News novelettes. It was well that the attack on Spain in the West Indies was directed upon Santiago and Porto Rico. The former manifestly was a point that commanded the central waters of the West Indies; recently there have been expressions of surprise that the expedition to Porto Rico, finally and handsomely led by Major General Miles, commanding the army of the United States, was so delayed. Investigation from the inside will duly determine that no harm was done in that case by loss of time. Santiago was pointed out by many circumstances as the vital spot of Spanish power in America, where a mortal blow might be delivered. It was in the province where the insurgents had greater strength than in any other part of the island. It was so situated that our fleet in that locality was close to the Windward Passage, east of Cuba, where Columbus was at once perplexed and triumphant, and to Hayti, Jamaica and Porto Rico; and there were several landings where it would be possible to disembark troops, protected by the fire of our ships. More than that, Santiago is the old capital of Cuba, the place where the head of the Cuban church abides, and the scene of the Virginius Massacre—altogether having a place in history almost equal to that of Havana. It was not doubted the sanitary situation of the east end of Cuba was better than that of the west end. Experience shows that this easy assumption was questionable. If we omit the great plague spot, the city of Havana, it will appear that Santiago is in a region as pestilential as can be found in the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio. More than all other associations and conspicuities, the attention of the world was directed to Santiago because Cervera's elusive fleet, short of coal and provisions, and overmatched by the United States navy, took refuge in the deep harbor, hoping to clean his ships, get supplies and escape with coal enough to open a new career. The Spaniards were too slow, and the only ships of Spain that showed a sign of the spirit of enterprise and the capacity of adventure, were bottled up by a relentless blockade. Lieutenant Hobson became famous in a night in his most hazardous effort to use the Merrimac as a cork for the bottle, but fortunately left a gap through which the Spaniards made haste to their doom. When the second fleet of Spain was destroyed, all chance of disputing our supremacy at sea, or of doing anything to guard Spanish interests either in the East or West Indies, was extinguished.

There has been no marked features of contention as to the battles of Manila, except in the case of the gratuitous observations of critical persons, whose feelings have been disturbed, that the storming of the town was not bloody enough. The victory, however, was all the greater, for the casualty lists were not long, owing to the management of the Commanding General and the heroic Admiral, who won a battle famous as that at New Orleans, with less bloodshed, but as Jackson's victory was not belittled because he lost but half a dozen men killed, the victories at Manila should not be slighted. The Santiago battles, however, have stirred controversies, and there is a great mass of literature, official and other, subject to endless examination, and perhaps so voluminous as to confuse readers for some generations. The leading and indisputable facts are, that the Spaniards fought well on land, but were ineffectual afloat, in their attempts to inflict injuries, though they put to sea in dashing style, and did not flinch in efforts to evade a superior force, until the fire of the Americans crushed them. In the incidents of warfare on the hills around and the waves before Santiago, it is fair to say that the Spaniards redeemed themselves from imputation of timidity, and fought in a manner not unworthy of the countrymen of the Garrison of Morro Castle, Havana, whose gallantry in resisting the army and fleet of England, in 1762, commanded the respectful regard of their conquerors, and is a glorious chapter in the story of Spain. The Santiago events were most honorable to American arms, and it would lessen the splendor of the reputation of the American soldiers if one failed to do justice to the sturdy fighters they overcame. It is too early or too late for participation in the debates whether civil or acrimonious, as to the merits or faults of those engaged at Santiago, further than to quote that golden sentence from the report of Commodore Schley, that there was "glory enough to go around." We, whatever is said, remember what was done on those hills that have an everlasting place in history. There forever is to be application of marvelous propriety, of the mournful and noble lines of Kentucky's poet, Theodore O'Hara:

"On Fame's eternal camping ground Their silent tents are spread, And Glory guards with solemn round The bivouac of the dead."

There was a speedy realization by the country, and all the intelligent peoples of the earth, when our troops were embarked for the Santiago campaign, that the crisis of the war was at hand. No American thought of failure. The only questions were as to the power of the defense of Cuba by Spain, and the cost to us in men and money to overcome the defenders. Those who knew the most about the conditions in Cuba had the least confidence in the efficiency of the Cuban Army. The only body of organized Cubans of importance was that under command of Garcia, and it was the province of which he was in partial occupation that we invaded in force. The public had been considerably interested and entertained by the rousing accounts of the various naval bombardments of Spanish shore fortresses. But the firing from our ships had not materially shaken the Spanish defenses. The sea power had not shattered the shore lines, but found abundant occupation in guarding transports and protecting the troops when landing. It would have been an act of the most gross imprudence and incompetency to have put an army ashore unless the supremacy of the navy on the sea was absolute. More than that, our own cities had to be assured that they were secure from attack. On the 31st of May orders were issued for the embarkation of the army of invasion as follows:

1. The Fifth Army Corps.

2. The Battalion of Engineers.

3. The detachment of the Signal Corps.

4. Five squadrons of cavalry, to be selected by the commanding general of the cavalry division, in accordance with instruction previously given.

5. Four batteries of light artillery, to be commanded by a major, to be selected by the commanding officer of the light artillery brigade.

6. Two batteries of heavy artillery, to be selected by the commanding officer of the siege artillery battalion, with eight (8) siege guns and eight (8) field mortars.

7. The Battalion of Engineers, the infantry, and cavalry, will be supplied, with 500 rounds of ammunition per man.

8. All troops will carry, in addition to the fourteen (14) days' field rations now on hand, ten (10) days' travel rations.

9. The minimum allowance of tentage and baggage as prescribed in General Orders 54, A.G.O., current series, will be taken.

10. In addition to the rations specified in paragraph 8 of this order, the chief commissary will provide sixty (60) days' field rations for the entire command.

11. All recruits and extra baggage, the latter to be stored, carefully piled and covered, will be left in camp, in charge of a commissioned officer, to be selected by the regimental commander. Where there are no recruits available the necessary guard only will be left.

12. Travel rations will be drawn, at once, by the several commands, as indicated in paragraph 8.

This was by command of Major-General Shafter. There were delays on account of inadequate facilities for embarkation at Tampa and Port Tampa. Orders for General Shafter to move with not less than 10,000 men were issued on the 7th, and there was delay on account of reports of Spanish ships of war ready to strike a blow at the transports. Twelve squadrons of cavalry not mounted were added to the troops designated in the general order, and June 14th the expedition sailed with 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men, and had a smooth and uneventful passage. There were several demonstrations for the deception of the enemy, in one of which 500 Cubans were employed. General Shafter was committed by the movements and the ground, as he says in his official report:

"To approach Santiago from the east over a narrow road, at first in some places not better than a trail, running from Daiquiri through Siboney and Sevilla, and making attack from that quarter, was, in my judgment, the only feasible plan, and subsequent information and results confirmed my judgment."

The disembarkation commenced June 22nd, and all men were ordered to carry "on the person the blanket roll (with shelter tent and poncho), three days' field rations (with coffee, ground), canteens filled, and 100 rounds of ammunition per man. Additional ammunition, already issued to the troops, tentage, baggage, and company cooking utensils left under charge of the regimental quartermaster, with one non-commissioned officer and two privates from each company,"

Two days were occupied in getting the troops ashore, and the first engagement was on the morning of the 24th, General Young's brigade taking the advance, and finding a Spanish force strongly intrenched on the Santiago road three miles from Siboney. Young's force was 964 officers and men. The enemy were driven from the field. Our loss, 1 officer and 15 men killed, and 6 officers and 46 men wounded. Spanish loss reported 9 killed and 27 wounded. General Shafter says the engagement had "an inspiring effect" upon the men, and "gave us a well-watered country further to the front, on which to encamp our troops," and the rest of the month was occupied in attempting to land rations enough to have a reserve, and "it was not until nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place on shore three days' supplies in excess of those required for the daily consumption."

General Shafter reconnoitered, and formed his plan of battle June 30th, and reports that in the opening of the engagement on July 1st "the artillery fire from El Pozo was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evidently had the range of this hill, and their first shells killed and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the position of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery."

The advantages the Spaniards had in the use of smokeless powder were conspicuous throughout the scenes of fighting both at Santiago and Manila. We had, however, at Santiago a war balloon of the actual service, of which General Shafter says: "General Kent forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that stream. A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This information he furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left."

General Shafter officially makes the following reference to his illness at the time: "My own health was impaired by overexertion in the sun and intense heat of the day before, which prevented me from participating as actively in the battle as I desired; but from a high hill near my headquarters I had a general view of the battlefield, extending from El Caney on the right to the left of our lines on San Juan Hill. My staff officers were stationed at various points on the field, rendering frequent reports, and through them by the means of orderlies and the telephone, I was enabled to transmit my orders.

"After the brilliant and important victory gained at El Caney, Lawton started his tried troops, who had been fighting all day and marching much of the night before, to connect with the right of the cavalry division. Night came on before this movement could be accomplished. In the darkness the enemy's pickets were encountered, and the Division Commander being uncertain of the ground and as to what might be in his front halted his command and reported the situation to me. This information was received about 12:30 a. m., and I directed General Lawton to return by my headquarters and the El Pozo House as the only certain way of gaining his new position.

"This was done, and the division took position on the right of the cavalry early next morning, Chaffee's brigade arriving first, about half-past 7, and the other brigades before noon."

Of the hottest of the fight on the 1st of July, General Shafter reports: "Great credit is due to Brigadier-General H. S. Hawkins, who, placing himself between his regiments, urged them on by voice and bugle calls to the attack so brilliantly executed.

"In this fierce encounter words fail to do justice to the gallant regimental commanders and their heroic men, for, while the generals indicated the formations and the points of attack, it was, after all, the intrepid bravery of the subordinate officers and men that planted our colors on the crest of San Juan Hill and drove the enemy from his trenches and blockhouses, thus gaining a position which sealed the fate of Santiago.

"In this action on this part of the field most efficient service was rendered by Lieutenant John H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry, and the Gatling gun detachment under his command. The fighting continued at intervals until nightfall, but our men held resolutely to the positions gained at the cost of so much blood and toil.

"I am greatly indebted to General Wheeler, who, as previously stated, returned from the sick list to duty during the afternoon. His cheerfulness and aggressiveness made itself felt on this part of the battlefield, and the information he furnished to me at various stages of the battle proved to be most useful."

The report of the General Commanding of the further fighting is a model of forcible brevity, in these paragraphs:

"Soon after daylight on July 2 the enemy opened battle, but because of the intrenchments made during the night, the approach of Lawton's division, and the presence of Bates' brigade, which had taken position during the night on Kent's left, little apprehension was felt as to our ability to repel the Spaniards.

"It is proper here to state that General Bates and his brigade had performed most arduous and efficient service, having marched much of the night of June 30-July 1, and a good part of the latter day, during which he also participated in the battle of El Caney, after which he proceeded, by way of El Pozo, to the left of the line at San Juan, reaching his new position about midnight.

"All day on the 2d the battle raged with more or less fury, but such of our troops as were in position at daylight held their ground, and Lawton gained a strong and commanding position on the right.

"About 10 p..m., the enemy made a vigorous assault to break through my lines, but he was repulsed at all points.

"On the morning of the 3d the battle was renewed, but the enemy seemed to have expended his energy in the assault of the previous night, and the firing along the lines was desultory;" and this was stopped by a letter sent by General Shafter, saying he would be obliged to "shell Santiago," if not surrendered, and non-combatants would be given until 10 o'clock July 4th to leave the city. The reply of the Spanish General was that he would not surrender. Then foreign consuls came within our lines asking more time to remove the women and children. The language of General Shafter reporting the situation at the time and the events following, is here reproduced as of permanent interest:

"My first message went in under a flag of truce at 12:30 p.m. I was of the opinion that the Spaniards would surrender if given a little time, and I thought this result would be hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand they would be well treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon this presumption, I determined to offer to return all the wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear transportation, and who were willing to give their paroles not to serve against the forces of the United States until regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates, 27 in all, were sent to their lines under the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with honors, and I have every reason to believe the return of the Spanish prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades.

"The cessation of firing about noon on the 3d practically terminated the battle of Santiago.

"A few Cubans assisted in the attack at El Caney, and fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to materially change the strength, as indicated above. The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our own; they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched positions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry of the company, officers and men, and the benefits derived from the careful training and instruction given in the company in recent years in rifle practice and other battle exercises. Our losses in these battles were 22 officers and 208 men killed, and 81 officers and 1,203 men wounded; missing, 79. The missing, with few exceptions, reported later.

"The arrival of General Escario on the night of July 2, and his entrance into the city was not anticipated, for although it was known, as previously stated, that General Pando had left Manzanillo with reinforcements for the garrison of Santiago, it was not believed his troops could arrive so soon. General Garcia, with between four and five thousand Cubans, was intrusted with the duty of watching for and intercepting the reinforcements expected. This, however, he failed to do, and Escario passed into the city along on my extreme right and near the bay."

On the 11th, when the firing ceased and was not resumed "the sickness in the army was increasing very rapidly, as a result of exposure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and the heavy rains. Moreover, the dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bring the siege to an end, but in common with most of the officers of the army I did not think an assault would be justifiable, especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in their preliminary propositions to surrender.

"July 12 I informed the Spanish Commander that Major-General Miles, Commander-in-Chief of the American army, had just arrived in my camp, and requested him to grant us a personal interview on the following day. He replied he would be pleased to meet us. The interview took place on the 13th."

The Spanish raised many points, as is their habit, and were tenacious about retaining their arms, but yielded, and "the terms of surrender finally agreed upon included about 12,000 Spanish troops in the city and as many more in the surrendered district."

July 17th "we met midway between the representatives of our two armies, and the Spanish Commander formally consummated the surrender of the city and the 24,000 troops in Santiago and the surrendered district.

"After this ceremony I entered the city with my staff and escort, and at 12 o'clock noon the American flag was raised over the Governor's palace."

The men and material surrendered by the Spaniards at Santiago largely exceeded the two English armies and their equipments at Saratoga and Yorktown.

The yellow fever appeared in the American camp at Siboney July 4th, and the fact was soon known to the army. General Shafter says of the wounded and sick: "They received every attention that it was possible to give them. The medical officers without exception worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which was no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. It would have been better if we had more ambulances, but as many were taken as was thought necessary, judging from previous campaigns."

General Joe Wheeler's report of the action of July 1st is a paper full of striking points. The movement into battle began in wading the San Juan river under heavy fire, and the General says:

"We were as much under fire in forming the line as we would be by an advance, and I therefore pressed the command forward from the covering which it was formed. It merged into open space, in full view of the enemy, who occupied breastworks and batteries on the crest of the hill which overlooked Santiago, officers and men falling at every step. The troops advanced gallanty, soon reached the foot of the hill and ascended, driving the enemy from their works and occupying them on the crest of the hill.

"Colonel Carroll and Major Wessels were both wounded during the charge, but Major Wessels was enabled to return and resume command. General Wyckoff, commanding Kent's Third Brigade, was killed at 12:10. Lieutenant-Colonel Worth took command and was wounded at 12:15. Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum then took command and was wounded at 12:20, and the command then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, Ninth Infantry.

"Upon reaching the crest I ordered breastworks to be constructed, and sent to the rear for shovels, picks, spades, and axes. The enemy's retreat from the ridge was precipitate, but our men were so thoroughly exhausted that it was impossible for them to follow. Their shoes were soaked with water by wading the San Juan River; they had become drenched with rain, and when they reached the crest they were absolutely unable to proceed further. Notwithstanding this condition these exhausted men labored during the night to erect breastworks, furnished details to bury the dead and carry the wounded back in improvised litters."

Wheeler's loss was 6 officers and 40 men killed, 29 officers and 288 men wounded, and 10 men missing—total 372, out of a force of 127 officers and 2,536 men.

General Bates says that after his brigade remained for some time in the first cross road after wading the San Juan river: "We moved to the right to assault a small hill, occupied upon the top by a stone fort and well protected by rifle pits. General Chaffee's brigade charged them from the right, and the two brigades, joining upon the crest, opened fire from this point of vantage, lately occupied by the Spanish, upon the village of El Caney.

"From this advantageous position the Spanish were easily driven from place to place in the village proper, and as fast as they sought shelter in one building were driven out to seek shelter elsewhere. The sharpshooters of my command were enabled to do effective work at this point. The town proper was soon pretty thoroughly cleaned out of Spanish, though a couple of blockhouses upon the hill to the right of the town offered shelter to a few, and some could be seen retreating along a mountain road leading to the northwest. A part of these made a stand in a field among some bowlders.

General Lawton observes: "The light battery first opened on a column of Spanish troops, which appeared to be cavalry moving westward from El Caney, and about 2 miles range, resulting, as was afterwards learned, in killing 16 in the column."

The General has much to say of a pleasing personal nature.

The report of General Kent is of extraordinary merit for the exact detail and local color. Colonel McClernand, he says, "pointed out to me a green hill in the distance which was to be my objective on my left," and as he moved into action, "I proceeded to join the head of my division, just coming under heavy fire. Approaching the First Brigade I directed them to move alongside the cavalry (which was halted). We were already suffering losses caused by the balloon near by attracting fire and disclosing our position.

"The enemy's infantry fire, steadily increasing in intensity, now came from all directions, not only from the front and the dense tropical thickets on our flanks, but from sharpshooters thickly posted in trees in our rear, and from shrapnel apparently aimed at the balloon. Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, of General Shafter's staff, met me about this time and informed me that a trail or narrow way had been discovered from the balloon a short distance back leading to the left to a ford lower down the stream. I hastened to the forks made by this road, and soon after the Seventy-first New York Regiment of Hawkins' brigade came up. I turned them into the by path indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, leading to the lower ford, sending word to General Hawkins of this movement. This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder on the troops in the rear."

The Second and Third Battalions "came up in better order," but there was some delay, and General Kent says:

"I had received orders some time before to keep in rear of the cavalry division. Their advance was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts, presumably to drop their blanket rolls and due to the natural delay in fording a stream. These delays under such a hot fire grew exceedingly irksome, and I therefore pushed the head of my division as quickly as I could toward the river in column files of twos parallel in the narrow way by the cavalry. This quickened the forward movement and enabled me to get into position as speedily as possible for the attack. Owing to the congested condition of the road, the progress of the narrow columns was, however, painfully slow. I again sent a staff officer at a gallop to urge forward the troops in rear."

The Second Brigade and Third "moved toward Fort San Juan, sweeping through a zone of most destructive fire, scaling a steep and difficult hill, and assisting in capturing the enemy's strong position (Fort San Juan) at 1:30 p.m. This crest was about 125 feet above the general level, and was defended by deep trenches and a loop-holed brick fort surrounded by barbed-wire entanglements."

General Hawkins, after General Kent reached the crest, "reported that the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry had captured the hill, which I now consider incorrect. Credit is almost equally due the Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-fourth regiments of infantry. Owing to General Hawkins' representations, I forwarded the report sent to corps headquarters about 3 p.m. that the Sixth and Sixteenth infantry regiments captured the hill. The Thirteenth Infantry captured the enemy's colors waving over the fort, but, unfortunately, destroyed them, distributing the fragments among the men, because, as was asserted, 'It was a bad omen,' two or three men having been shot while assisting private Arthur Agnew, Company H, Thirteenth Infantry, the captor. All fragments which could be recovered are submitted with this report.

"I have already mentioned the circumstances of my Third Brigade's advance across the ford, where in the brief space of ten minutes it lost its brave commander (killed) and the next two ranking officers by disabling wounds. Yet, in spite of these confusing conditions the formations were effected without hesitation, although under a stinging fire, companies acting singly in some instances, and by battalion and regiments in others, rushing through the jungle, across the stream waist deep, and over the wide bottom thickly set with barbed wire."

General Kent says:

"The bloody fighting of my brave command can not be adequately described in words. The following list of killed, wounded, and missing tells the story of their valor:

"July 1st the loss was 12 officers and 77 men killed, 32 officers and 463 men wounded, 58 men missing. Total loss, 642."

The following day the Spaniards resumed the battle, and the losses of Kent's command on the 2nd and 3d of July made up a total loss in three days of 99 killed and 597 wounded, and 62 missing. General Shafter said that before closing his report he desired to dwell upon "the natural obstacles I had to encounter, and which no foresight could have overcome or obviated. The rocky and precipitous coast afforded no sheltered landing places, the roads were mere bridle paths, the effect of the tropical sun and rains upon unacclimated troops was deadly, and a dread of strange and unknown diseases had its effect on the army.

"The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so as to prevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with the command had to be depended upon for the victualing of my army, as well as the 20,000 refugees, who could not in the interests of humanity be left to starve while we had rations."

During the Chicago Peace Jubilee, General Shafter made an address at the Armory of the First Illinois Volunteers, and, released from the continual forms of official reports, added much of interest to the story of Santiago. He says of the send-off:

"We were twice embarked and twice taken back to Tampa and disembarked. On the first occasion the cause was the appearance of Admiral Cervera's fleet; it requiring the entire navy that was disposable to go after that fleet, and the second time by a report that afterwards turned out to be incorrect, that in the St. Nicholas channel, through which we would have to go, some Spanish cruisers had been seen."

When ordered to Tampa to command the first Cuban expedition, he continued:

"I took the troops that I thought best fitted and prepared for that service. There were some magnificent regiments of volunteers, but to part of them I had issued arms only two or three days before. They were not properly equipped, and lacked experience. As I had the choice, I took all of the regulars that were there, and with them three regiments of volunteers. They were magnificent men, as perfect as men could be, but, as you know who served in '61, poorly prepared to take care of themselves at first. You recollect it was months before we were prepared, and we made numerous mistakes that led to sickness and death. The same things have occurred again, and they always will continue with troops that are not used to the field, and in this campaign men were taken directly from their camps immediately after being mustered in, and put into the most difficult campaign of modern military history.

"I practically had the entire regular army of the United States, twenty of the twenty-five regiments of infantry, five of the ten regiments of cavalry, and five batteries of artillery, with three regiments of volunteers, the Seventy-first New York, the Second Massachusetts, and the regiment known as Roosevelt's rough riders. The last were practically seasoned soldiers. They were men from the frontier, men who had been accustomed for years to taking a little sack of corn meal on their saddles, and a blanket, and going out to sleep out of doors for a week or a month at a time. Of course, they knew how to care for themselves in camp.

"Early in June I was called to the telephone in Tampa, and told from the President's mansion in Washington to proceed immediately with not less than 10,000 men to Santiago; that news had been received that day that the fleet of Cervera was surely within that harbor, and that if 10,000 men could be placed there at once the fleet and the city could be captured in forty-eight hours. The horses and mules had been taken off from the ships as well as the men, and the time consumed in reloading the horses and mules allowed me to embark 17,000 men nearly. That was very fortunate for me and our cause."

On arrival off Santiago, he, "with Admiral Sampson, went down the coast about twenty miles, and saw General Garcia, and asked him his opinion of the country, what his force was, and whether he was disposed to assist. I found him very willing and very glad to offer his services at once, with 3,000 men that he had with him and another thousand that he had up the country a little further, which were to join us immediately. In sailing along the coast, looking for a landing place, I selected two places—Siboney, a little indentation in the coast about twelve or thirteen miles east of Santiago, and another little bay about eight miles further east, where small streams entered into the sea, making a valley and a sandbar about 150 to 200 yards in extent. All the rest of the coast is abrupt, perpendicular walls of rock from ten to thirty feet high, against which the waves were dashing all the time, and where it is utterly impossible to land.

"We had the earnest and able support of the navy and their assistance in disembarking, and the next morning were bombarding the two little places and driving the few hundred Spanish soldiers, that were there away. We began disembarking, and before the end of the day the men were on shore, with 2,000 horses and mules that we had to throw overboard to get ashore, and the artillery."

The General noted the loss of 17,000 troops out of 24,000 in the English army that besieged Havana in 1762, at the same time of year that he landed at Santiago, and remarked:

"I knew that my entire army would be sick if it stayed long enough; that it was simply a question of getting that town just as soon as possible. I knew the strength, the courage, and the will of my men, or I thought I did, and the result shows that I was not mistaken. It was a question of starting the moment we landed and not stopping until we reached the Spanish outposts, and, therefore, as soon as a division was put on shore it was started on the march.

"On the 24th the first engagement took place, in which we had between 800 and 900 men on the American side and probably 1,000 or 1,200 on the Spanish. The enemy was strongly intrenched, showing only their heads, while the American forces had to march exposing their whole bodies to the fire of the enemy.

"It is announced by military experts as an axiom that trained troops armed with the present breech-loading and rapid-firing arm cannot be successfully assailed by any troops who simply assault. Of course you can make the regular approaches and dig up to them. The fallacy of that proposition was made very manifest that day when the men composing the advance marched as deliberately over those breastworks as they ever did when they fought with arms that you could only load about twice in a minute and of the range of only 200 or 300 yards.

"This army was an army of marksmen. For fifteen years the greatest attention has been paid to marksmanship, and I suppose four-fifths of all the men in that army wore on their breasts the marksman's badge. I had given orders, knowing that the noise of firing is harmless and that shots put in the air are harmless—I had given the strictest orders to all officers that their men should be told not to fire a shot unless they could see something moving, and the firing was to be by individuals, what is called file firing, individual firing. The Spanish troops, not so well drilled in firing as ours, used volley firing, which is very effective against large bodies of troops massed and moving over a plain, but utterly inefficient when used against skirmishers moving over a rough country. In that battle, which lasted two hours, less than ten rounds of ammunition per man was fired by my men, and the losses, notwithstanding my men were exposed, their whole bodies, while the enemy were in trenches, where only their heads could be seen, were about equal.

"I saw the commander of that force a few days later in Santiago, and in talking about it he said to me: 'Your men behaved very strange. We were much surprised. They were whipped, but they didn't seem to know it; they continued to advance (laughter and applause), and we had to go away.' He was quite right about it. They did have to go away.

"On the 29th we had reached the immediate vicinity of the peaks in front of Santiago, about a mile and a half from the city. On the 30th I carefully reconnoitered the ground as much as one could in the dense undergrowth, and determined where I would make my attack, which was simply directed in front, and to make a direct assault. There was no attempt at strategy, and no attempt at turning their flanks. It was simply going straight for them. In that I did not misjudge my men, and that is where I succeeded so well. (Applause.) If we had attempted to flank them out or dig them out by regular parallels and get close to them my men would have been sick before it could have been accomplished, and the losses would have been many times greater than they were.

"The only misfortune, as I judged it, of the first day's fight,but which I have since learned was for the best, was that immediately on our right, and what would be in our rear when we attacked the town, was a little village called El Caney, four miles and a half from Santiago, and whence the best road in the country connected with Santiago. I did not know the exact force there, but it was estimated to be 1,000, and perhaps a little more, and it would, of course, have been very hazardous to have left that force so near in our rear.

"Instead of finishing the affair by 9 o'clock, as we expected, it took until 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon before the last shot was fired, and then after a loss of nearly a hundred killed and 250 wounded on our side and the almost total annihilation of the force opposed to us. They had an idea that they would be killed, and when men believe that it is hard to capture them. Just at the close of the battle three or four hundred did attempt to escape, but ran out in front of a brigade that they did not see, and in the course of about three or four hundred yards most of them were dead or mortally wounded, so that probably not more than twenty men on the other side escaped from that battle. It was a most desperate struggle.

"Men were killed in the trenches by being knocked on the head with muskets, and one man I was shown two days later with what would be called a tremendous head on him, and the interpreter asked him how that had occurred, and he doubled up his fist and spoke of the soldier that had hit him as a black man, that he had dropped his gun and hit him in the head with his fist. That was pretty close work.

"Meanwhile the battle in front of Santiago progressed, with three divisions on our side, one of dismounted cavalry and two of infantry. It was beautifully fought. Every man knew what he had to do, and so did every officer. The orders were that Immediately upon being deployed they were to attack. They did it. Every man kept going, and when one's comrade dropped the rest kept going. The result was that in about two hours the line was taken, and practically that afternoon the battle of Santiago was ended, for those men never advanced beyond that point.

"During the night I brought up the division of General Lawton that had been on the right at Caney and put them on the extreme right, where I had intended to have them the day before, and where, had they been, we should probably have taken the town and have gotten only the men that were there, and not the 12,000 that were far beyond our reach who were surrendered a few days later.

"On the morning of the 2d a weak attempt was made upon our lines. In that the Spaniards had to expose themselves, while my men were covered. The fight lasted but a little while, and they retreated.

"On the morning of July 3 I thought we had so much of an advantage that I could notify the enemy, first, that I wanted a surrender, and, second, if they declined to surrender that they could have twenty-four hours to get the women and children out of town. Of course, civilized people do not fire on towns filled with women and children if they will come out if it can be avoided. The Spanish commander declined very promptly to surrender, but said he would notify the women and children and those that desired to go, but he wanted twenty-four hours more, and said there were a great many people to go out. They began to stream out at once, and for forty-eight hours old men, women, and children poured out until it was estimated that at least 20,000 people passed through our lines and out into the woods in the rear. Of course, there was an immense amount of suffering, and numbers died, especially of the old. Fortunately we were enabled to give them some food, enough so that they existed, but at that time, with the Cuban forces that I had, I was issuing daily 45,000 rations. Forty-five thousand people are a good many to feed when you have such fearful roads and food could only be carried on the backs of mules.

"On that morning of the 3d, about an hour after the time for surrendering, Cervera's fleet left the harbor, and went out, as you know, to total annihilation. It was not more than twenty or thirty minutes after they left the mouth of the harbor before, so far as we could hear, the firing had ceased, and 1,700 men were prisoners, 600 were killed, and three or four battleships and some torpedo boats were either on the rocks or in the bottom of the sea—a most wonderful victory, never equaled before in naval history, and due mainly to the magnificent marksmanship of our men, which covered the Spanish decks with such a hail of iron that no sailors on earth could stand against it.

"Two days after this I saw General Toral, and I was convinced from conversation with him that he was going to surrender. I had no one but myself to take the responsibility, in fact, I did not want anyone else to do it, but while I was convinced myself it was hard to convince others. I knew that we could capture the town at any time, that we had it surrounded so that they could not possibly get away, although on the night of July 2 2,800 men marched in. I had understood there were 8,000, but when we counted them a few days afterward there were only 2,800. I knew that if we carried that town by force a thousand men at least would be lost to the American army, and a thousand good American men are a good many to expend in capturing a Spanish town (applause), and I did not propose to do it if I could possibly talk them out of it.

"General Toral knew just as well as I did that I knew just what he had—that he was on his last rations, and that nothing but plain rice, that we had his retreat cut off, that we had the town surrounded, that he could not hurt us, while we could bombard him and do some little damage, perhaps, and that it was only a question of a few days.

"I found out a few days later what the hitch was which caused the delay, for General Toral had told me that he had been authorized by Blanco, the Governor-General, to enter into negotiations and make terms for surrender, and in Cuba you know General Blanco was in supreme command. His authority was such that he could even set aside a law of Spain. Knowing that, I felt sure that after very little delay they would surrender. They desired to get permission from the Madrid government to return to Spain. It was that that delayed them. Immediately upon receiving the permission to return to Spain they surrendered.

"I had in line when the fighting was going on, about 13,000 men—not more than that at any time. Inside the Spanish trenches there were about 10,000. There were 11,500 surrendered, and I think about 1,500 of them were sick. The disproportion, considering the difference of situation, is not very great. In fact, I think that 10,000 American soldiers could have kept 100,000 Spaniards out had they been in the same position (applause), although I do not wish to disparage the bravery of the Spanish troops. They are gallant fellows, but they have not the intelligence and do not take the initiative as do the American soldiers; and they have not the bull-dog pluck that hangs on day after day.

"Toral made the first proposition to surrender. He said if I would let him take his men and such things as they could carry on their persons and on a few pack mules that they had and guarantee him safe conduct to Holguin, which was fifty-two miles away to the north and in the interior, they would march out. I told him, of course, that was out of the question; that I could not accept any such terms as that, but I would submit it to the President. I did so, and was very promptly informed that only unconditional surrender would be received, but I was at liberty to say to General Toral that if they would surrender they would be carried, at the expense of the United States government, back to Spain. When that proposition was made to him I could see his face lighten up and the faces of his staff, who were there. They were simply delighted. Those men love their country intensely, they had been brought to Cuba against their will, and had stayed there three years, poorly clad, not paid at all, and not well fed, and the prospect of going back to their homes had as much to do with conforming their views to our wishes as anything that was done during the campaign.

"Meanwhile ten or twelve days had elapsed and I had received quite a number of volunteer regiments—two from Michigan, the First District of Columbia, a Massachusetts regiment, and an Ohio regiment, the Eighth Ohio—all splendid troops and well equipped, and while they were not there at the hardest of the fighting they were there during the suffering, and everything that soldiers were called upon to do they did like men.

"It is a great deal harder to stand up day after day and see companions go from sickness and disease than it is to face the perils of battle.

"When I told General Toral that we would carry his men back he said: 'Does that include my entire command?' I said: 'What is your command and where are they?' He replied the Fourth Army Corps; 11,500 men in the city, 3,000 twenty miles in the rear of us; 7,500 he said were up the coast less than sixty miles, and about 1,500 125 to 150 miles off on the northeastern coast.

"There were 3,440 odd, and at a place less than sixty miles east there were 7,500 and a few over, because we counted them and took their arms. The result of that surrender was as unexpected to us as probably it was to every person in the United States. There was simply a little army there, which had gone down to assist the navy in getting the Spanish fleet out and capturing that town, and we expected no other result from it than victory at the spot at the utmost, but in attacking the limb we got the whole body. It was expected that, beginning about the first of October, the objective point of the campaign was to be Havana, where we knew there were from 125,000 to 150,000 men, and it was expected that about the first of October a large army would be sent over there, and the battle that would decide the war would be fought in the vicinity of Havana. I think that was the universal feeling. The loss of that city and of those 24,000 men—23,376, to be accurate—so dispirited them that within a week the proposition of Spain to close the war was made, and, happily, the war was ended.

"The difficulties of that campaign were not in the fighting. That was the easiest part of it. The difficulties were in getting food and medicine to the front. There was but a single road, a muddy and terrible road, and with five or six wagons going over it the sixth wagon would be on the axle tree, and in taking up some artillery I had fourteen horses on one battery that was usually drawn by four, and even with that number it went out of sight, and we had to leave it and dig it out after the water had subsided."

Admiral Sampson's report, dated August 3d, was published October 23d, and covers the conduct of the fleet under his command, in its operations in the West Indies, for about two months prior to the destruction of Admiral Cervera's ships on July 3. It was made up largely of official dispatches and the movements of the fleet, with explanations and comment by the Admiral, and begins with a statement of the determination reached by the Navy department to send a squadron to the Windward Passage for the purpose of observation, because of the information received of the sailing, on April 29, of Admiral Cervera's squadron from the Cape Verde Islands.

On the voyage eastward from the naval base at Key West, which began on May 4, Admiral Sampson reports there was experienced endless trouble and delay because of the inefficiency of the two monitors accompanying the other ships, and which had to be taken in tow. Their coal supply was so small that it was at once evident that they must either frequently coal or be towed. The Admiral says:

"Had the sea been rough, or had the enemy appeared at this juncture, the squadron would have been in a much better position for an engagement had the monitors been elsewhere. Subsequently, when engaging the batteries of San Juan, it was evident that their shooting was bad.

"Owing to the quick rolling of these vessels, even in a moderate sea, they were unable to fire with any degree of accuracy."

Among the telegrams received by the Admiral from the department at Washington when off Cape Haytien was the following:

Washington, D.C., May 6.—Do not risk or cripple your vessels against fortifications as to prevent from soon afterwards successfully fighting Spanish fleet, composed of Pelayo, Carlos V., Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, four deep sea torpedo boats, if they should appear on this side. Long.

It was determined to go to Porto Rico, and the squadron arrived off San Juan on the morning of the 12th and the bombardment of that place ensued. Regarding his action at this place the Admiral says:

"It was clear to my own mind that the squadron would not have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the fact that we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the flying squadron was still north and not in a position to render any aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was thus open to entry by such force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant, made our immediate movement toward Havana imperative.

"I thus reluctantly gave up the project against San Juan and stood westward for Havana."

Several telegrams are here presented, based on reports that Cervera's squadron had returned to Cadiz and they had in view "to return and capture San Juan, the desire to do so and occupy the place being assured in the event of Admiral Cervera's failure to cross the Atlantic."

Shortly after news was received that the Spanish fleet had appeared off Curacao, West Indies, and the squadron under orders from the department proceeded to Key West, to which place the flying squadron under Commodore (now Admiral) Schley had already been ordered.

Arrangements were then hurriedly made and the flying squadron, augmented by the other vessels under Commodore Schley, was sent off Cienfuegos, where it was believed the enemy would go, in which case an effort was to be made to engage and capture him. Sampson was given the choice either of the command of the blockading squadron off Havana or at Cienfuegos, Schley in either case to remain with his own squadron.

From messages received by the Admiral from the department about May 20 it appears that reports had reached the United States that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago, so the department advised Sampson to send immediately word to Schley to proceed to that place, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos.

On May 21 instructions were written by Samnson for Commodore Schley and sent to him via the Marblehead regarding the possibility of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago. They are in part as follows:

United States Flagship New York, First Rate, Key West, Fla., May 21.—Sir: Spanish squadron is probably at Santiago de Cuba—four ships and three torpedo boat destroyers. If you are satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants—fishermen or others—to learn definitely that the ships are in port, it being impossible to see into it from the outside.

The Admiral said he felt much concerned as to the delivery of these orders and sent a duplicate by the Hawk with an additional memorandum. The Admiral suggested that if the information did not reach Commodore Schley before daylight of May 23 to mask the real direction he should take as much as possible. He adds: "Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction they take."

The Admiral off Havana gives copies of orders of battle which were to be followed in the event that Cervera left Santiago on the approach of Schley's fleet from Cienfuegos and attempted to cruise around the coast to Havana, in which case the Havana squadron would attempt to intercept him by going east about 200 miles beyond the junction of Santiren and Nicholas Channels. Strict orders were given for screening lights and to see that none were accidentally shown.

The squadron was to cruise generally to the eastward in the day and westward during the night.

On May 23, as shown by the report, Commodore Schley expressed the belief that the Spaniards were at Cienfuegos. On the 27th the Admiral sent word to Schley, directing him to proceed with all possible speed to Santiago because of information received that the Spaniards were there. The same time orders were sent to have the collier Sterling dispatched to Santiago with an expression of opinion that the Commodore should use it to obstruct the channel at its narrowest part leading into the harbor.

The details of the plan were left to the Commodore's judgment, as he (Sampson) had "the utmost confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a successful conclusion, and earnestly wished him good luck."

Sampson apparently felt certain of the presence of the Spaniards at Santiago and urged that the harbor must be blockaded at all hazards. Schley in the meantime had proceeded to Santiago, although it appears not the same day Admiral Sampson expected.

At one time Commodore Schley contemplated going to Key West with the squadron for coal, but this was abandoned, his collier having been temporarily repaired, and the necessity for a trip to Key West being avoided Santiago was then blockaded.

Admiral Sampson arrived at Santiago June 1st. June 8 the Admiral urged upon the department, as he had previously done, to expedite the arrival of the troops for Santiago, the difficulty of blockading the Spanish ships daily increasing.

In a memorandum dated June 15, the Admiral says:

"The Commander-in-Chief desires again to call the attention of the commanding officers to the positions occupied by the blockading fleet, especially during the daytime, and it is now directed that all ships keep within a distance of the entrance to Santiago of four miles, and this distance must not be exceeded.

"If the vessel is coaling or is otherwise restricted in its movements it must nevertheless keep within this distance. If at any time the flagship makes signal which is not visible to any vessel, such vessel must at once approach the flagship or retreating vessel to a point where it can read the signal.

"Disregard of the directions which have already been given on this head has led to endless confusion. Many times during the day the fleet is so scattered that it would be perfectly possible for the enemy to come out of the harbor and meet with little opposition.

"The Commander-in-Chief hopes that strict attention will be given this order."

In the order of battle incidental to the landing of Shafter's army corps June 22, when ships were sent to shell the beach and cover the landing of the men" the following occurs:

"The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward, both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish Admiral ever intends to attempt to escape that attempt will be made soon."

The Admiral says trouble was experienced in the landing of Shafter's army on account of the wandering proclivities of some of the transports. The progress of the disembarkation was rendered somewhat difficult by a heavy sea, the heaviest during the three weeks the fleet had been stationed there, owing to a stiff blow off the coast of Jamaica.

According to a dispatch to Secretary Long, dated June 26, the channel at Santiago not having been obstructed by the sinking of the Merrimac, Admiral Sampson was preparing a torpedo attack to hasten the destruction of the Spanish vessels, although he regretted resorting to this method because of its difficulties and small chance of success. He would not do this, he says, were the present force to be kept there; as it then insured a capture, which he believed would terminate the war.

There was contemplated at this time sending a fleet to the Spanish coast; and this expedition was to consist of the Iowa, Oregon, Newark, Yosemite, Yankee, and Dixie, and they were to go to the Azores for orders, en route to Tangier, Morocco. The colliers were to join the fleet at the Azores.

On June 30 the Admiral received a communication from Major-General Shafter announcing that he expected to attack Santiago the following morning, and asking that he (Sampson) bombard the forts at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry, and make such demonstrations as he thought proper at the harbor's mouth, so as to keep as many of the enemy there as possible.

This request was complied with, and on July 1 General Shafter asked that the Admiral keep up his fight on the Santiago water front. On July 2 the following was received from General Shafter.

"Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly intrenched about three-fourths of a mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can. Please telephone answer."

A reply was telephoned General Shafter from Admiral Sampson, through Lieutenant Stanton, which said the Admiral had bombarded the forts at the entrance of Santiago and also Punta Gorda battery inside, silencing their fire, and asked whether he (Shafter) wanted further firing on the Admiral's part. The explanation was made that it was impossible to force an entrance until the channel was cleared of mines—a work of some time after the forts were taken possession of by the troops. To this General Shafter replied:

"It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance of harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against it will be some time and at great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all means keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, however, in time and with sufficient men to capture the forts along the bay."

On the 2nd of July, Sampson wrote to Shafter.

"An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning, but I must say in addition to what he told you that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except to seaward. They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first has been the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of attempting to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.

"It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

"If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

"We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining mines, which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use I will enter the harbor.

"This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.

"It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port."

The Admiral says he began making preparations to countermine, and, with the object of arranging an attack upon the batteries at the entrance a visit was arranged to General Shafter, so that the matter might be thoroughly discussed, and combined action take place.

He adds: "I had in view the employment of the marines for an assault an either the Morro or Socapa battery, while at the same time assaulting the defenses at the entrance with the fleet."

The Admiral says of the sortie and destruction of Cervera's fleet:

"This event closes the purely naval campaign, crowning with complete success the anxious work of almost exactly two months."

The error of Commodore Schley as to the location of Cervera's fleet, his hesitation in accepting the report of the Spaniards' presence at Santiago, appears to have caused the advancement of Admiral Sampson and subordinated Schley. Out of this came differences of opinion about facts among the close friends of the two distinguished officers. Schley was close at hand when Cervera's run from Santiago took place, while Sampson was out of the way on other duty, and Schley has been charged with an evasive movement of the New York just then that lost valuable time. It is related by the Washington staff correspondent of the Chicago Times-Herald that just after the battle of Santiago, Commodore Schley went aboard the Iowa and hailed Captain Evans with the remark that it had been a great day for the American navy.

"But why didn't you obey orders and close in on the mouth of the harbor instead of heading out to sea?" inquired Evans.

Commodore Schley's reply was that he was afraid the Vizcaya would ram the Brooklyn. This colloquy referred to a striking maneuver of the flagship Brooklyn early in the engagement at Santiago, which has been commented on before. In justice to Commodore Schley the navy department officers admit the Spanish officers after the battle said that it had been their purpose, on emerging from the harbor, to have the Vizcaya ram the Brooklyn, believing that the Spanish cruisers could outrun the remaining vessels in the American fleet, most of which were battleships, supposed to be of a lower rate of speed than the Spanish cruisers.

The action of the Vizcaya as she headed toward the Brooklyn indicated her determination to carry out this programme. But the remark of Captain Evans to the nominal commander of the squadron would under ordinary circumstances have been an act of insubordination and only illustrates the feeling of some of the captains of the fleet toward the Commodore.

It has been said that Schley, being ordered to Key West when Cervera appeared in Cuban waters, "proceeded to Cienfuegos, which was thought to be the destination of the Spanish warships. That port commanded the only direct railroad connection with Havana, and had the Spanish fleet gone there Admiral Cervera could have relieved General Blanco with money and munitions of war and received in return supplies necessary for his squadron. It is believed even now that had the Spanish ships been properly supplied and equipped they would have gone to Cienfuegos instead of to Santiago. But subsequent developments have shown that Admiral Cervera was permitted to take only enough coal to carry him to the nearest port, Santiago."

Schley credited Cervera with knowing enough to know that Cienfuegos was the better port for his purposes, and therefore adhered to his opinion, and Sampson was made his superior officer. So important have the differences seemed that the Wainwright Board was convened to investigate the parts taken in the Santiago naval battle respectively by Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley. But in official phrase this board was convened for the purpose of determining the position and courses of the ships engaged in the action at Santiago July 3, and reporting to the Secretary of the Navy.

The report is:

"U.S.F.S. New York, First Rate, Navy Yard, New York, Oct. 8, 1898.—Sir: In obedience to your order of Sept. 2, 1898, appointing us a board to plot the positions of the ships of Admiral Cervera's squadron and those of the United States fleet in the battle of July 3, off Santiago de Cuba, we have the honor to submit the following report, accompanied by a chart, showing the positions of the ships at seven different times.

"These times, as taken by the United States ships engaged, with the incidents noted, are as follows:

"No. 1, 9:35 a.m.—Maria Teresa came out of the harbor.

"No. 2, 9:50 a.m.—Pluton came out.

"No. 3, 10:15 a.m.—Maria Teresa turned to run ashore.

"No. 4, 10:20 a.m.—Oquendo turned to run ashore.

"No. 5, 10:30 a.m.—Furor blew up and Pluton turned to run ashore.

"No. 6, 11:05 a.m.—Vizcaya turned to run ashore.

"No. 7, 1:15 p.m.—Colon surrendered.

"The chart selected by the board for plotting is H.O. chart No. 716, 1885, West Indies, eastern part of Bahama Islands, with part of Cuba and north coast of San Domingo. This selection was made after a careful comparison with all other charts at hand, as the positions of the principal headlands and inlets and the distances between them on it agree more nearly with the observation of members of the board than those given by any other.

"The positions of the United States ships were established by known bearings and distances from the Morro at No. 1, with the exception of the New York, whose position is plotted by the revolutions of its engines during a run of forty-five minutes cast from its position, southeast half south of the Morro, 6,000 yards. Position at No. 2 is plotted by all ships according to their relative bearings from each other, the operations of their engines from 9:35 to 9:50, the evidence of the officers on board them, and the ranges used in firing at the Spanish ships. Position No. 3 is plotted from observations of the officers of the United States ships, with regard to their nearness to each other, and relative bearings of themselves from Teresa, with ranges in use at the time, the performance of the engines, and general heading of the ships. Position No. 4 same as No. 3, substituting Oquendo for Teresa. Position Nos. 5, 6, and 7 are plotted on the same general plan.

"Before plotting these positions the board took each ship separately and discussed the data for the position under consideration—this data being obtained from the report of the commanding officers, notes taken during the action, and the evidence of the members of the board. In reconciling differences of opinion in regard to distances, bearings, ranges, etc., full liberty was given to the representative of the ships under discussion to bring in any argument or data he considered necessary, and the board submits this report with a feeling that, under the circumstances, it is as nearly correct as is possible so long after the engagement. Very respectfully,

"Richard Wainwright, "Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N., Senior Member. "S.P. Comly, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "L.C. Heilner, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "W.H. Schuetze, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "A.C. Hodgson, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "W.H. Allen, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "Edward E. Capehart, "Lieutenant, U.S.N.

"To the Commander-in-Chief."

Measurements upon the chart showing the positions of the vessels at the specified times named in the report will give as fair an idea of the work of the board as can be made without the chart itself.

"Position No. 1, 9:35 a.m. When the Maria Teresa came out of the harbor the New York was nine miles east of Morro, accompanied by the Hist and Ericsson. The Brooklyn was three miles southwest of Morro, being two and two-tenths miles from the shore west of the mouth of the harbor. The Texas was eight-tenths of a mile east of the Brooklyn; the Iowa one and eight-tenths miles east and south of the Brooklyn, and the Oregon a half mile east of the Iowa, the Iowa being three miles directly south of Morro. The Indiana was two and two-tenths miles southwest of Morro and the Gloucester one mile almost directly north of the Indiana, a mile and four-tenths from Morro.

"Position No. 2, 9:50 a.m. When the Pluton came out all the Spanish vessels had come out of the harbor and their positions were: Maria Teresa two and a half miles southwest of Morro, the Vizcaya, Colon and Oquendo, in the order named, behind the Teresa and from four-tenths to half a mile apart. The position of the American vessels were: The New York had moved up two and one-tenth miles westward. The Brooklyn had started north, swerved to the northeast and toward the mouth of the harbor, and was turning east on the swing it made to the right and around to the westward course; it was eight-tenths of a mile from the Vizcaya. At position No. 2 the Texas first went east a half mile, swinging toward the harbor, then turning to the left it is at No. 2 a half mile directly north of the first position. The Iowa moved by a varying course northwest and was a mile and four-tenths from the Vizcaya, the Oregon being two-tenths of a mile behind the Iowa, the Indiana three-tenths behind the Iowa. The Gloucester's first start was half a mile directly away from the harbor, but swinging to the right, had advanced toward the Spanish ships, being one and seven-tenths miles from the nearest, the Oquendo.

"Position No. 3, 10:15 a.m. Maria Teresa turned to run ashore. It was five and one-half miles from Morro. The Vizcaya was two and three-tenths miles westward from the Teresa, the Oquendo one and two-tenths miles, and the Colon one and four-tenths miles in advance of the Teresa. The American vessels were as follows: The New York had come within three miles of Morro, being southeast of that point. The Brooklyn had made its swing to the westward, crossing its track, and was two and one-half miles south and west of the Teresa, and one and three-tenths miles directly south of the Colon, and one and one-tenth miles and a little behind the Vizcaya, one and three-tenths miles and a little in advance of the Oquendo. The Texas was one and two-tenths miles from the Teresa, a little behind it, and one and four-tenths miles from and behind the next Spanish ship, the Oquendo. The Iowa was one and one-tenth miles from the Teresa and a little closer in, but not quite as far west as the Texas. The Oregon had pulled up and passed the Texas and Iowa, being a little further in shore than the Texas and a little further out than the Iowa. It was in advance of the Teresa, being one and seven-tenths miles from that vessel, six-tenths of a mile from and directly in the line of the Oquendo, seven-tenths of a mile from the Colon, and one and two-tenths miles behind the Vizcaya. The Indiana was two miles from the Texas and two and six-tenths miles from the Oquendo, the nearest Spanish vessel. The Gloucester had moved up six-tenths of a mile and was just a mile directly south of Morro.

"Position No. 4, 10:20 a. m. Oquendo turned to run ashore. Only five minutes elapsed from position No. 3. All vessels had been running westward without material changes in their positions. The Colon had run one and three-tenths miles, the Vizcaya about one-tenth of a mile less, and swerved to the left, bringing it to within one and one-tenth miles of the Brooklyn. The Iowa was the same distance, but almost directly astern, and the Oregon was one and three-tenths miles from the Vizcaya, but farther out to sea. The Iowa was eight-tenths of a mile from the Oquendo, the Oregon nine-tenths of a mile from the same vessel, and both somewhat in advance of the doomed Spanish ship. The Indiana had advanced eight-tenths of a mile and was two and six-tenths miles away from the Oquendo, the nearest Spanish ship. The New York had advanced nearly a mile, but was not yet abreast of Morro. The Gloucester had run over two miles and was now well west of Morro, but five miles east of the Oquendo.

"Position No. 5, 10:30 a. m. Furor blew up and Pluton turned to run ashore. This is ten minutes later than position No. 4. The Gloucester had run a little more than two miles, and was four-tenths of a mile from the Furor and but little further from the Pluton. The New York had run two and two-tenths miles, and was three and three-tenths miles from the Furor, the nearest Spanish ship, and two and two-tenths miles south and a little west of Morro. The Colon had run two and nine-tenths miles, and the Vizcaya two and seven-tenths miles. The Brooklyn had run two and three-tenths miles, and was one and two-tenths miles from the Vizcaya and one and six-tenths miles from the Colon, which was running nearer the shore. The Oregon had sailed two and a half miles, and was one and one-half miles from the Vizcaya, and about the same distance from the Colon. The Texas was one and two-tenths miles astern of the Oregon, two and four-tenths miles from the Oregon. The Indiana was one and one-half miles astern of the Texas.

"Position No. 6, 11:05 a.m. Vizcaya turned to run ashore. In thirty-five minutes the Vizcaya had sailed about seven miles, and was off the mouth of the Aserradero River. The Colon had run five and one-half miles further, and was more than that distance in advance of any of the American vessels. The Brooklyn was one and three-tenths miles distant from the Vizcaya and slightly behind it. The Oregon was one and a half miles from the Vizcaya, but nearer the shore and somewhat more astern of the enemy. The Texas was two and seven-tenths miles from the Vizcaya and directly astern of the Oregon. The Iowa was three and two-tenths miles directly astern of the Vizcaya. The New York was five miles behind the Iowa. The Ericsson had kept along with the New York all the time, and was, at this position, one-half a mile in advance of it. The Indiana was nearly four miles behind the Iowa.

"Position No. 7, 1:15 p.m. The Colon surrendered. In the two hours and ten minutes from the last position given the vessels had coursed westward a great distance. The Colon had run twenty-six and one-half miles and was off the Tarquino River. The Brooklyn was the nearest American vessel. It had sailed twenty-eight and one-half miles and was three and four-tenths miles from the Colon. The Oregon was four and one-half miles from the Colon and more in shore than the Brooklyn. The Texas was three and four-tenths miles behind the Oregon. The New York was nine and one-half miles from the Colon. No one of the other vessels had come up save the Vixen, which was abreast of the New York. This little vessel in the beginning of the fight steamed out to sea and sailed westward on a course about two and one-quarter miles from that of the nearest Spanish ships.