Their equipment consists of a gun, bayonet and cartridge box; their uniform of a straw hat, gingham shirt and trousers and bare feet; their transportation of a few ponies and carts, impressed for a day or week at a time; for quarters they have taken the public building in each village or pueblo, locally known as the Tribunal, and the churches and convents; from these details are sent out to man the trenches. Their food while on duty consists of rice and banana leaves, cooked at the quarters and sent out to the trenches. After a few days or a week of active service they return to their homes to feed up or work on their farms, their places being taken by others to whom they turn over their guns and cartridges. Their arms have been obtained from various sources, from purchases in Hongkong, from the supply which Admiral Dewey found in the arsenal at Cavite, from capture made from the Spaniards. They are partly Mausers and partly Remingtons. Their ammunition was obtained in the same way. They have used it freely and the supply is now rather short. To replenish it they have established a cartridge factory at the village of Imus, about ten miles south of Cavite, where they have 400 people engaged in re-loading cartridges with powder and lead found at Cavite, or purchased abroad. They have no artillery, except a few antique Columbiads obtained from Cavite, and no cavalry. Their method of warfare is to dig a trench in front of the Spanish position, cover it with mats as a protection against the sun and rain, and during the night put their guns on top of the trench above their heads and fire in the general direction of the enemy. When their ammunition is exhausted they go off in a body to get a fresh supply in baskets and then return to the trenches.

The men are of small stature, from 5 feet to 5 feet 6 inches in height, and weigh from 110 to 130 pounds. Compared with them our men from Colorado and California seemed like a race of giants. One afternoon just after we entered Manila a battalion of the insurgents fired upon the outposts of the Colorado regiment, mistaking them, as they claimed, for Spaniards. The outpost retreated to their support, and the Filipinos followed; they easily fell into an ambush and the support, numbering about fifty men, surrounded the 250 Filipinos, wrenched the guns out of their hands and marched them off as unarmed prisoners—all in the space of a few minutes. Such a force can hardly be called an army, and yet the service which it has rendered should not be underestimated. Between 2,000 and 3,000 Spanish native troops surrendered to it during the months of June and July. It constantly annoyed and harrassed the Spaniards in the trenches, keeping them up at night and wearing them out with fatigue; and it invested Manila early in July so completely that all supplies were cut off and the inhabitants as well as the Spanish troops were forced to live on horse and buffalo meat, and the Chinese population on cats and dogs. It captured the water works of Manila and cut off the water supply, and, if it had been in the dry season, would have inflicted great suffering on the inhabitants for lack of water. These results, it is true, were obtained against a dispirited army, containing a considerable number of native troops of doubtful loyalty. Yet, from August, 1896, to April, 1897, they fought 25,000 of the best regular troops sent out from Spain, inflicting on them a loss of over 150 officers and 2,500 men, killed and wounded, and they suffered still greater losses themselves. Nevertheless, from daily contact with them for six weeks, I am very confident that no such results could have been obtained against an American army, which would have driven them back to the hills and reduced them to a petty guerilla warfare. If they attack the American army this will certainly be the result, and, while these guerilla bands might give some trouble so long as their ammunition lasted, yet, with our navy guarding the coasts and our army pursuing them on land, it would not be long before they were reduced to subjection.

Insurgent Civil Administration.

In August, 1896, and insurrection broke out in Cavite, under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, and soon spread to other provinces on both sides of Manila. It continued with varying successes on both sides, and the trial and execution of numerous insurgents, until December, 1897, when the Governor-General, Primo de Rivera, entered into written agreement with Aguinaldo, the substance of the document, which is in possession of Senor Felipe Agoncillo, who accompanies me to Washington, being attached hereto and marked "A." In brief, it required that Aguinaldo and the other insurgent leaders should leave the country, the Government agreeing to pay them $800,000 in silver, and promising to introduce numerous reforms, including representation in the Spanish Cortes, freedom of the press, amnesty for all insurgents, and the expulsion of secularization of the monastic orders. Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A portion of the money, $400,000, was deposited in banks at Hongkong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs, named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents, according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms, and if they failed to do so it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Artacho $5,000.

No steps have been taken to introduce the reforms, more than 2,000 insurgents who had been deported to Fernando Po and other places are still in confinement, and Aguinaldo is now using the money to carry on the operations of the present insurrection.

On the 24th day of April Aguinaldo met the United States Consul and others at Singapore and offered to begin a new insurrection in conjunction with the operations of the United States navy at Manila. This was telegraphed to Admiral Dewey and, by his consent, or, at his request, Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong on April 26th, and, when the McCullough went to Hongkong early in May to carry the news of Admiral Dewey's victory, it took Aguinaldo and seventeen other revolutionary chiefs on board and brought them to Manila Bay. They soon after landed at Cavite, and the Admiral allowed them to take such guns, ammunition and stores as he did not require for himself. With these and some other arms which he had brought from Hongkong Aguinaldo armed his followers, who rapidly assembled at Cavite and, in a few weeks, he began moving against the Spaniards. Part of them surrendered, giving him more arms, and the others retreated to Manila.

Soon afterwards two ships, which were the private property of Senor Agoncillo and other insurgent sympathizers, were converted into cruisers and sent with insurgent troops to Subig Bay and other places, to capture provinces outside of Manila. They were very successful, the native militia in Spanish service capitulating with their arms in nearly every case without serious resistance. On the 18th of June Aguinaldo issued a proclamation from Cavite establishing a Dictatorial Government, with himself as Dictator. In each village or pueblo a Chief (Jefe) was to be elected, and in each ward a Nendrum (Cabeza); also in each pueblo three delegates, one of Police, one of Justice, and one of Taxes. These were to constitute the Junta, or Assembly, and after consulting the Junta the Chiefs of pueblos were to elect a Chief of Province and three Counsellors, one of Police, one of Justice, and one of Taxes. They were also to elect one or more Representatives from each Province to form the Bevolutionary Congress. This was followed on June 20th by a decree giving more detailed instructions in regard to the elections. On June 23d another decree followed, changing the title of the Government from Dictatorial to Revolutionary, and of the chief officer from Dictator to President; announcing a Cabinet with a Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marine and Commerce, another of War and Public Works, another of Police and Internal Order, Justice, Instruction and Hygiene, and another of Taxes, Agriculture and Manufactures; the powers of the President and Congress were defined, and a code of military justice was formulated. On the same date a manifesto was issued to the world explaining the reasons and purposes of the Revolution. On June 27th another decree was issued containing instructions in regard to elections. On August 6th an address was issued to Foreign Governments, stating that the Revolutionary Government was in operation and control in fifteen Provinces, and that in response to the petition of the duly elected Chiefs of these Provinces an appeal is made for recognition of belligerency and independence. Translations of these various documents are all apended, marked "B," "C," "D," "E," "F," "G" and "H."

The scheme of Government is set forth in the decree of June 23d, marked "D." An examination of this document shows that it provides a Dictatorship of the familiar South American type. All power is centered in the President, and he is not responsible to any one for his acts. He is declared to be "the personification of the Philippine public, and in this view cannot be held responsible while he holds office. His term will last until the Revolution triumphs." He appoints not only the heads of the departments, but all their subordinates, and without reference to Congress. This body is composed of a single Chamber of Representatives from each Province. The election is to be conducted by an agent of the President, and the qualifications of electors are "those inhabitants most distinguished for high character, social position and honorable conduct."

If any Province is still under Spanish rule its Representative is to be appointed by the President. Congress is to deliberate on "all grave and transcendental questions, whose decision admits of delay and adjournment, but the President may decide questions of urgent character, giving the reasons for his decision in a message to Congress." The acts of Congress are not binding until approved by the President, and he has power of absolute veto.

Congress was to hold its first session at Saloles about September 28th.

While this scheme of Government is a pure despotism, yet it claims to be only temporary, and intended to "prepare the country so that a true Republic may be established." It also provides a rude form of governmental machinery for managing the affairs of the Provinces. To what extent it has actually gone into operation it is difficult to say. Aguinaldo claims, in his address of August 6th, that it is in force in fifteen Provinces, whose aggregate population is about 2,000,000. They include the island of Mindoro and about half of Luzon. None of those (except Cavite) have yet been visited by Americans, and all communication with them by the Spanish Government at Manila has been cut off since May 1st.

In the province of Cavite and that portion of the Province of Manila outside of the city and of its suburbs, which was occupied by the insurgent troops as well as those of the United States, their military forces, military headquarters, etc., were very much in evidence, occupying the principal houses and churches in every village and hamlet, but there were no signs of Civil Government or administration. It was reported, however, that Aguinaldo's agents were levying taxes or forced contributions not only in the outside villages, but (after we entered Manila) by means of secret agents, in the market places of the city itself. At Aguinaldo's headquarters, in Bacoor, there were signs of activity and business, and it was reported that his Cabinet officers were in constant session there.

Aguinaldo never himself failed to claim all the prerogatives due to his alleged position as the de facto ruler of the country. The only general officer who saw him or had any direct communication with him was General Anderson. He did much to thwart this officer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise providing for his troops, and he went so far, in a letter of July 23d (copy herewith marked "J"), as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops on Philippine soil without his consent—a notice which, it is hardly necessary to say, was ignored. The day before the attack on Manila he sent staff officers to the same General, asking for our plans of attack, so that their troops could enter Manila with us. The same request had previously been made to me by one of his Brigade Commanders, to which I replied that I was not authorized to give the information desired.

Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt on his arrival, and this enabled the latter to avoid any communication with him, either direct or indirect, until after Manila had been taken. General Merritt then received one of Aguinaldo's staff officers in his office as Military Governor. The interview lasted more than an hour. General Merritt referred to his proclamation as showing the conditions under which the American troops had come to Manila and the nature of the Military Government, which would be maintained until further orders from Washington. He agreed upon the lines outside of the city of Manila, up to which the insurgent troops could come, but no further with arms in their hands. He asked for possession of the water works, which was given, and, while expressing our friendship and sympathy for the Philippine people, he stated very positively that the United States Government had placed at his disposal an ample force for carrying out his instructions, and even if the services of Aguinaldo's forces had been needed as allies he should not have felt at liberty to accept them.

The problem of how to deal with Aguinaldo's Government and troops will necessarily be accompanied with embarrassment and difficulty, and will require much tact and skill in its solution. The United States Government, through its Naval Commander, has, to some extent, made use of them for a distinct military purpose, viz.: to harass and annoy the Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish Government prior to the arrival of our troops, and for this purpose the Admiral allowed them to take the arms and munitions which he had captured at Cavite, and their ships to pass in and out of Manila Bay in their expeditions against other Provinces. But the Admiral has been very careful to give Aguinaldo no assurances of recognition and no pledges or promises of any description. The services which Aguinaldo and his adherents rendered in preparing the way for attack on Manila are certainly entitled to consideration, but, after all, they were small in comparison with what was done by our fleet and army.

There is no reason to believe that Aguinaldo's Government has any elements of stability. In the first place, Aguinaldo is a young man of twenty-three years. Prior to the insurrection of 1896 he had been a schoolmaster, and afterward Gobernadorcillo and Municipal Captain in one of the pueblos in the Province of Cavite. He is not devoid of ability, and he is surrounded by clever writers. But the educated and intelligent Filipinos of Manila say that not only is he lacking in ability to be at the head of affairs, but if an election for President was held he would not even be a candidate. He is a successful leader of insurgents, has the confidence of young men in the country districts, prides himself on his military ability, and if a Republic could be established the post he would probably choose for himself would be General-in-Chief of the Army.

In the next place, Aguinaldo's Government, or any entirely independent Government, does not command the hearty support of the large body of Filipinos, both in Manila and outside, who have property, education and intelligence. Their hatred of the Spanish rule is very keen and they will co-operate with Aguinaldo or any one else to destroy it. But after that is done they fully realize that they must have the support of some strong nation for many years before they will be in a position to manage their own affairs alone. The nation to which they all turn is America, and their ideal is a Philippine Republic, under American protection—such as they have heard is to be granted to Cuba. But when it comes to defining their ideas of protection and the respective rights and duties of each under it, what portion of the Government is to be administered by them and what portion by us; how the revenues are to be collected, and in what proportion the expenses are to be divided; they have no clear ideas at all; nor is it expected that they should have, after generations of Spanish rule without any experience in self government. The sentiment of this class, the educated native with property at stake, looks upon the prospect of Aguinaldo's Government and forces entering Manila with almost as much dread as the foreign merchants or the Spaniards themselves.

Finally, it must be remembered that this is purely a Tagalo insurrection. There are upwards of thirty races in the Philippines, each speaking a different dialect, but five-sixths of the entire Christian population is composed of the Tagalos and Visayas. The former live in Mindoro and the southern half of Luzon, and the latter in Cebu, Iloilo and other islands in the center of the group. The Tagalos are more numerous than the Visayas, but both races are about equal in civilization, intelligence and wealth. It is claimed by Aguinaldo's partisans that the Visayas are in sympathy with his insurrection and intend to send representatives to the congress. But it is a fact that the Visayas have taken no active part in the present insurrection nor in that of 1896, that the Spanish Government is still in full control at Cebu and Iloilo, and in the Viscayas islands, and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no effort to attack them. The Visayas number nearly 2,000,000, or about as many as the population of all the Tagalo Provinces, which Aguinaldo claims to have captured. There is no evidence to show that they will support his pretensions, and many reasons to believe that on account of racial prejudices and jealousies and other causes they will oppose him.

Upon one point all are agreed, except possibly Aguinaldo and his immediate adherents, and that is that no native government can maintain itself without the active support and protection of a strong foreign government. This being admitted it is difficult to see how any foreign government can give this protection without taking such an active part in the management of affairs as is practically equivalent to governing in its own name and for its own account.

United States Troops and Navy.

I assume that the reports received at the War and Navy Departments give all the desired information in regard to the military forces of the United States.

At the time I left (August 30th) the Eighth Corps consisted of two divisions, numbering in all about 12,000 men, with 16 field guns and 6 mountain guns. No wagons or animals had then arrived.

One regiment was stationed within the walled city guarding its gates, and the captured guns and ammunition; a small force was at Cavite, and the bulk of the troops were in Manila, outside of the walled city. They were quartered in the Spanish barracks, which were all in good condition, and in convents and private houses. The health of the troops was excellent, notwithstanding the extraordinary hardships to which they had been subjected in the trenches before entering Manila.

Admiral Dewey had under his command the Charleston, Monterey and Monadnock, which arrived in July and August, the Callao and Leyte, which had been captured from the Spaniards, and the ships which were in the battle of May 1st, viz: Olympia, Boston, Baltimore, Raleigh, Concord, Petrel and McCullough. The health of the squadron was excellent. The Olympia and Concord were being docked and cleaned at Hongkong. Permission to use the docks at Nagansaki during the suspension of hostilities had been declined.

United States Civil Administration.

We entered Manila on the afternoon of August 13th. On the 14th the capitulation was signed, and the same day General Merritt issued his proclamation establishing a Military Government. On the 15th General McArthur was appointed Military Commander of the walled city and Provost Marshal General of the City of Manila and its suburbs, and on the 17th I was appointed to take charge of the duties performed by the intendente General de Hacienda, or Minister of Finance, and all fiscal affairs. Representatives of the Postoffice Department had arrived on the Steamship China in July and they immediately took charge of the Manila Post-office, which was opened for business on the 16th. The Custom House was opened on the 18th, with Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier as Collector, and the Internal Revenue office, with Major Bement as Collector on the 22nd. Captain Glass of the Navy was appointed Captain of the Port, or Naval Officer, and took charge of the office on August 19th. The collections of customs during the first ten days exceeded $100,000. The collection of internal revenue was small owing to the difficulty and delay in ascertaining what persons had or had not paid their taxes for the current year. The administration of Water Works was put in charge of Lieutenant Connor, of the Engineers, on August 25th, the Provost Court with Lieutenant-Colonel Jewett, Judge Advocate United States Volunteers, sitting as Judge, was appointed and held its first session on August 23rd.

The Provost Marshal General has charge of the Police, Fire, Health and Street Cleaning Departments, and the issuing of licenses. The Guardia Civil, or Gendarmerie of the City, proving indifferent and inefficient, they were disarmed and disbanded; the 13th Minnesota regiment was detailed for police duty, and one or more companies stationed in each Police Station, from which patrolmen were sent out on the streets to take the place of the sentries who had constantly patrolled them from the hour of entering the city.

The shops were all closed when we entered on Saturday afternoon, the 13th; on Monday some of them opened, and by Wednesday the Banks had resumed business, the newspapers were published, and the merchants were ready to declare goods at the Custom House, the tram cars were running and the retail shops were all open and doing a large business. There was no disorder or pillage of any kind in the city. The conduct of the troops was simply admirable, and left no ground for criticism. It was noted and commented upon by the foreign naval officers in the most favorable terms, and it so surprised the Spanish soldiers that a considerable number of them applied for permission to enlist in our service.

At the time I left General McArthur fully established his office as Provost Marshal General, and was organizing one by one the various bureaus connected with it, all with United States military officers in charge; the Provost Court was in daily session, sentencing gamblers and persons guilty of petty disturbances, and a military commission had just been ordered to try a Chinaman accused of burglary.

In various public offices I collected the following Spanish funds:

At the General Treasury $795,517.71 At the Mint 62,856.08 At the Internal Revenue Office 24,077.60 —————- $882,451.39

Of this amount there was in

Gold Coin $ 4,200.00 Gold Bars 3,806.08 Silver Coin 190,634.81 Copper Coin 297,300.00 Spanish Bank Notes 216,305.00 Accepted Checks 170,205.50 —————- $882,451.39

The money was counted by a board of officers and turned over to Major C. H. Whipple, Paymaster U. S. A as custodian of Spanish Public Funds. A few thousand dollars in other public offices were still to be collected.

The money received at the Custom House and other offices is turned in daily, at the close of business, to Major Whipple. Money for current expenses is furnished to heads of departments on their requisition, by warrant drawn by the Intendente General on the Custodian of Spanish Public Funds. The heads of the departments are to submit their vouchers and accounts monthly to an auditing department, which was being organized when I left.

All these public offices and funds were surrendered to me only on threat of using force and on granting permission to file a formal written protest. None of these had been received at the time I left, but the ground of verbal protest was that the officials recognized no authority in these islands but the Governor General appointed by the King of Spain, and without his order they were unwilling to surrender them. On the other hand, I recognized no authority of the Spanish Governor General who was merely a prisoner of war; I acted under the orders of General Merritt as the United States Military Governor, and in accordance with the terms of capitulation. The claim will probably be made by the Spanish officials that as we captured Manila a few hours after the peace protocol had been signed at Washington, this property still belongs to the Spaniards. But I believe that the law in such cases was clearly defined in decisions made by the United States Supreme Court in 1815. We captured Manila, and the capitulation (under which these funds became United States property) was signed by both parties, before either had received any notice of the protocol of suspension of hostilities.

On the opening of the Custom House several important questions arose for immediate decision. The first was in regard to Mexican dollars. The importation of these has for several years been prohibited, with a view of forcing the Spanish coinage (which contains less silver) into circulation. The large English banks represented that there was a scarcity of currency, owing to the amount which had been hoarded and sent away during the seige, and they agreed in consideration of being allowed to import Mexican dollars free of duty, to guarantee the notes and accepted checks of the Spanish bank, which should be received by us in payment of customs up to $200,000 at any one time. The Spanish bank was in difficulty, owing to the enormous amount which the Government had taken from it under the form of a forced loan, and any discrimination on our part against it would result in its failure, entailing widespread financial disturbance. As there seemed no reason against allowing the importation of Mexican dollars and many in favor of it, I recommended that the Custom House continue to receive the notes and checks of this bank in payment of customs (for which we were amply protected by the guarantee of the strong English banks) and with General Merrill's approval wrote to these banks authorizing them to import Mexican dollars free of duty until further notice.

The next question was in regard to the rate of duties on imports and exports. After a careful consideration of the matter, I recommended that the tariff be not changed until the question had been fully studied and ample notice given. General Merritt approved this and the customs are being collected on the Spanish tariff.

About a week after the Custom House was opened certain parties came to me representing that Consul General Wildman, of Hongkong, had informed them that United States goods would be admitted free of duty in Manila, that acting on this they had purchased a cargo of American illuminating oil in Hongkong, and that the payment of the heavy duty on it ($30 per ton, or about 8c per gallon) would ruin them. On consulting Lieutenant Colonel Crowder, Judge Advocate of the Eighth Army Corps, he pointed out the language of paragraph 5 of General Merritt's proclamation, which followed literally the instructions of the President, viz: "The Port of Manila will be open while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation."

Under this there was clearly no authority for discriminating in favor of American goods, either coming direct from a United States Port or by transshipment at Hongkong.

The Collector of Customs was directed to act accordingly.

Another question was in regard to the importation of Chinamen into Manila. The Consul at Hongkong telegraphed to know if they would be admitted. As there had been no time for examining the treaties and laws in force on this subject, I replied with General Merritt's approval that for the present it was not practicable to admit Chinese laborers into Manila.

Another very important question which arose was in regard to trade with the other Philippine islands. Nearly all the hemp and the greater part of the sugar is grown in the Visayas. The hemp is bought by foreign merchants in Manila, who bring it there from the other islands, and export it, paying large duties to the Manila Custom House. These merchants were anxious to bring up their stock, of which a large amount had accumulated during the war, and ship it abroad. The ships engaged in this island trade were idle in the Pasig. They belonged to a Spanish corporation, owned entirely by Scotch capital, and had a Spanish Register. The owners were ready to transfer them to the American flag. Could these vessels be allowed to clear for the ports of Cebu and Iloilo, which were in Spanish possession? The Judge Advocate advised me that they could not, without the express authority of the President. I so notified the owners of the ships and the hemp merchants. The day before I left Manila, however, Admiral Dewey received a cable from the Navy Department stating that Spanish ships had been granted the privilege of trading to American ports during the suspension of hostilities, and that American ships could be granted a similar privilege for Spanish ports. I understood that on the strength of this cable General Otis intended to allow the United States Consul at Manila to grant these vessels an American Register and then allow them to clear for the other islands. I do not know what the arrangement, if any was made, in regard to the payment of export duties at Iloilo. Clearly the hemp cannot pay export duties at both Iloilo and Manila, and the Spaniards are not likely to allow it to leave Iloilo free while we collect an export duty on it at Manila. Incidentally, this illustrates the complications and loss that will arise if the islands are subdivided. The principal merchants for all the islands are at Manila, and 90 per cent, of the duties in imports and exports are collected at its Custom House. A large part of the imports are redistributed through the islands; and all the hemp and sugar, which form the principal exports, come to Manila from other islands. If, then, we retain Luzon and give the other islands back to Spain or some other nation, that nation will impose import and export duties on everything coming from or to Manila. The foreign trade of that city as a distributing and collecting point for all the islands will be lost, and its prosperity will be destroyed; moreover, the Government revenue from that trade will be lost.

In view of the fact that Spanish officials declined to co-operate or assist in any way in the American government of Manila, the ease and rapidity with which order was maintained, the machinery of government put in operation and business reestablished, after our entry into Manila is very remarkable. For every position in the Government service, legal, administrative, financial, mechanical, clerical, men could be found in our volunteer ranks who were experienced in just that class of work at home, and they took charge of their Spanish positions with promptness and confidence.

Even in the matter of language no serious difficulty was encountered, for no less than 30 good interpreters were found in the California and Colorado regiments.

The Military Government as now organized and administered, fulfills all the requirements of preserving order and collecting the public revenue.

The civil courts, however, have yet to be organized, and their organization will present many difficulties.



CHAPTER X

Official History of the Conquest of Manila.

The Pith of the Official Reports of the Capture of Manila, by Major-General Wesley Merritt, Commanding the Philippine Expedition; General Frank V. Greene, General Arthur McArthur, and General Thomas Anderson, With the Articles of Capitulation, Showing How 8,000 Americans Carried an Intrenched City With a Garrison of 13,000 Spaniards, and Kept Out 14,000 Insurgents—The Difficulties of American Generals With Philippine Troops.

One of the most interesting events in the records of the fall of cities, that carried with them decisive factors affecting nations, is that of the conquest of Manila, by the army and navy of the United States in the memorable year of 1898. The victory of Admiral George Dewey May 1st, in the bay of Manila, nigh Cavite, has been celebrated in every clime and in all languages, and the great story if related in this book as one of universal fame, and given in outline and also in pen pictures meant to show the local coloring, and these are incidents most illustrative that are not familiar. The names of the ships and the officers of the victorious fleet, and the force of the contending squadrons in men and guns are herewith presented as an indisputable record.

Admiral Dewey held on to his command of the bay and city of Manila, braving all dangers—and they were many—and as fast as the army could be organized and equipped, reinforcements were forwarded. General Wesley Merritt was appointed the Commander in Chief of the expedition to the Philippines, and arrived at Cavite, July 25th. The official history of the operations that forced the surrender of the old Spanish capital in the East Indies has not received the public attention its unusual and instructive character demands, because the reports were not received in the States and given to the public until the Paris peace commission was assembling, and this singularly suggestive detail has been almost neglected. It is here for the first time consecutively arranged, annotated and adjusted, so as to tell the whole story. The part played by the insurgents is one that has not been stated by authority and with precision combining narrative form with the internal evidence of authenticity.

The first expeditionary force of the United States to arrive was that of General Thomas Anderson, on June 30, sixty days after Dewey's victory. The second expeditionary force, under General Frank V. Greene, arrived July 17, and the third, under General McArthur, July 30th, five days later than General Merritt, who found Rear Admiral George Dewey's war ships "anchored in line off Cavite, and just outside of the transports and supply vessels engaged in the military service." He was "in full control of the navigation of the bay, and his vessels passed and repassed within range of the water batteries of the town of Manila without drawing the fire of the enemy." This immunity of protected cruisers from the fire of nine-inch Krupp guns with an abundance of ammunition that was, and some that was not serviceable, was due to the terrible prestige of the American Admiral and the consequent power of his word that if fired upon he would destroy the city. Anderson's Americans were, General Merritt reports, disposed as follows:

The Second Oregon, detachments of California Heavy Artillery, Twenty-third Infantry, and Fourteenth Infantry occupied the town of Cavite; while Brigadier General F.V. Greene, United States Volunteers, was encamped with his brigade, consisting of the Eighteenth Infantry, Third United States Artillery, Company A, Engineer Battalion, First Colorado, First California, First Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania, and Batteries A and B of the Utah Artillery, along the line of the bay shore near the village of Paranaque, about five miles by water and twenty-five miles by the roads from Cavite.

The Major General commanding visited General Greene's camp and made a reconnaissance of the position held by the Spanish, and also the opposing lines of the insurgent forces, finding General Greene's command encamped on a strip of sandy land running parallel to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the great difficulties of landing supplies "the greater portion of the force had shelter tents only, and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season." The General commanding was at once struck "by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circumstances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American soldier, volunteer and regular alike, accept the necessary hardships of the work they have undertaken to do, has grown and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion."

The left or north flanks of General Green's camp extended to a point on the "Calle Real," about 3,200 yards from the outer line of Spanish defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at the powder magazine, or old fort San Antonio, within a hundred yards of the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and stretched away to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward, through swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach to the town and encircling the city completely."

General Merritt defines with firmness and perspicuity his position regarding the Filipinos in these terms:

"The Filipinos, or insurgent forces at war with Spain, had, prior to the arrival of the American land forces, been waging desultory warfare with the Spaniards for several months, and were at the time of my arrival in considerable force, variously estimated and never accurately ascertained, but probably not far from 12,000 men. These troops, well supplied with small arms, with plenty of ammunition and several field guns, had obtained positions of investment opposite to the Spanish line of detached works throughout their entire extent; and on the particular road called the "Calle Real," passing along the front of General Greene's brigade camp and running through Malate to Manila, the insurgents had established an earthwork or trench within 800 yards of the powder-magazine fort. They also occupied as well the road to the right, leading from the village of Passay, and the approach by the beach was also in their possession. This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with, owing to the peculiar condition of our relations with the insurgents, which may be briefly stated as follows:

"Shortly after the naval battle of Manila Bay, the principal leader of the insurgents, General Emilio Aguinaldo, came to Cavite from Hongkong, and, with the consent of our naval authorities, began active work in raising troops and pushing the Spaniards in the direction of the city of Manila. Having met with some success, and the natives flocking to his assistance, he proclaimed an independent government of republican form, with himself as president, and at the time of my arrival in the islands the entire edifice of executive and legislative departments and subdivision of territory for administration purposes had been accomplished, at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many points in the islands other than those in the vicinity of Manila.

"As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival, nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that "the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants," I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs.

"For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed, and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held against the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs."

General Anderson was the first officer of the American army to arrive, and says Admiral Dewey gave him "every possible assistance," and favored him "with a clear statement of the situation." On the second day after he appeared at Cavite, which was one day after General Merritt's departure from San Francisco, he had "an interview with the insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, and learned from him that the Spanish forces had withdrawn, driven back by his army as he claimed, to a line of defense immediately around the city and its suburbs. He estimated the Spanish forces at about 14,000 men, and his own at about the same number. He did not seem pleased at the incoming of our land forces, hoping, as I believe, that he could take the city with his own army, with the co-operation of the American fleet.

"Believing that however successful the insurgents may have been in guerilla warfare against the Spaniards, that they could not carry their lines by assault or reduce the city by siege, and suspecting, further, that a hearty and effective co-operation could not be expected, I had at once a series of reconnaissances made to exactly locate the enemy's lines of defense and to ascertain their strength."

The date of the impression made on General Anderson's mind as to the displeasure of Aguinaldo is important. The insurgent chief would have preferred the military distinctions to have been reserved for himself. General Anderson says of the Spanish attacks on General Greene's lines:

"These conflicts began on the night of July 31, as soon as the enemy had realized that we had taken the places of the Filipinos, and began a system of earthworks to the front of their old line. It may have been merely coincident, but these attacks and sorties began at the time the Captain General of Manila was relieved by his second in command. For more than six weeks the insurgents had kept up a bickering infantry fire on the Spanish trenches, firing occasionally some old siege pieces captured by Admiral Dewey at Cavite and given to Aguinaldo. These combats were never serious, and the Spaniards, so far as I know, made no sorties upon them. But there is no doubt of the fact that the Spaniards attacked our lines with force and vindictiveness, until they were informed that the bringing on of a general engagement would lead to a bombardment of the city. After this there was for several days a tacit suspension of hostilities."

As to the situation of General Greene, Brigadier General Merritt says:

"The difficulty in gaining an avenue of approach to the Spanish line lay in the fact of my disinclination to ask General Aguinaldo to withdraw from the beach and the 'Calle Real,' so that Greene could move forward. This was overcome by instructions to General Greene to arrange, if possible, with the insurgent brigade commander in his immediate vicinity to move to the right and allow the American forces unobstructed control of the roads in their immediate front. No objection was made, and accordingly General Greene's brigade threw forward a heavy outpost line on the "Calle Real" and the beach and constructed a trench, in which a portion of the guns of the Utah batteries was placed.

"The Spanish, observing this activity on our part, made a very sharp attack with infantry and artillery on the night of July 31. The behavior of our troops during this night attack was all that could be desired, and I have, in cablegrams to the War Department, taken occasion to commend by name those, who deserve special mention for good conduct in the affair. Our position was extended and strengthened after this and resisted successfully repeated night attacks, our forces suffering, however, considerable loss in wounded and killed, while the losses of the enemy, owing to the darkness, could not be ascertained.

"The strain of the night fighting and the heavy details for outpost duty made it imperative to re-enforce General Greene's troops with General MacArthur's brigade, which had arrived in transports on the 31st of July. The difficulties of this operation can hardly be overestimated. The transports were at anchor off Cavite, five miles from a point on the beach where it was desired to disembark the men. Several squalls, accompanied by floods of rain, raged day after day, and the only way to get the troops and supplies ashore was to load them from the ship's side into native lighters (called 'cascos') or small steamboats, move them to a point opposite the camp, and then disembark them through the surf in small boats, or by running the lighters head on to the beach. The landing was finally accomplished, after days of hard work and hardship; and I desire here to express again my admiration for the fortitude and cheerful willingness of the men of all commands engaged in this operation.

"Upon the assembly of MacArthur's brigade in support of Greene's, I had about 8,500 men in position to attack, and I deemed the time had come for final action. During the time of the night attacks I had communicated my desire to Admiral Dewey that he would allow his ships to open fire on the right of the Spanish line of intrenchments, believing that such action would stop the night firing and loss of life, but the Admiral had declined to order it unless we were in danger of losing our position by the assaults of the Spanish, for the reason that, in his opinion, it would precipitate a general engagement, for which he was not ready. Now, however, the brigade of General MacArthur was in position and the Monterey had arrived, and under date of August 6 Admiral Dewey agreed to my suggestion that we should send a joint letter to the Captain General notifying him that he should remove from the city all non-combatants within forty-eight hours."

The joint note of General Merritt and Admiral Dewey was as follows:

Headquarters U.S. Land and Naval Forces, Manila Bay, Philippine Islands, August 7, 1898.

The General in Chief Commanding Spanish Forces in Manila.

Sir: We have the honor to notify your excellency that operations of the land and naval forces of the United States against the defenses of Manila may begin at any time after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the hour of receipt by you of this communication, or sooner if made necessary by an attack on your part.

This notice is given in order to afford you an opportunity to remove all non-combatants from the city.

Very respectfully,

Wesley Merritt, Major-General, United States Army, Commanding Land Forces of the United States.

George Dewey, Rear-Admiral, United States Navy, Commanding United States Naval Forces on Asiatic Station.

The notable words in this are those "against the defenses of Manila," instead of against the city itself—the usual way—the city was to be spared if possible.

Manila, August 7, 1898.

The Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines to the Major-General of the Army and the Rear Admiral of the Navy, commanding, respectively, the Military and Naval Forces of the United States.

Gentlemen: I have the honor to inform your excellencies that at half-past 12 to-day I received the notice with which you favor me, that after forty-eight hours have elapsed you may begin operations against this fortified city, or at an earlier hour if the forces under your command are attacked by mine.

As your notice is sent for the purpose of providing for the safety of non-combatants, I give thanks to your excellencies for the humane sentiment you have shown, and state that, finding myself surrounded by insurrectionary forces, I am without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, women, and children who are now lodged within the walls.

Very respectfully, and kissing the hands of your excellencies,

Formire Jaudenes, Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.

The second paragraph of the Governor-General and Captain-General's letter indicates a sense of helplessness, and credits the insurgents with surrounding the city so that there was no refuge. August 9th there was a second joint note from Major-General Merritt and Rear Admiral Dewey, in the terms following:

"The Governor-General and Captain-General of the Philippines.

"Sir: The inevitable suffering in store for the wounded, sick, women, and children, in the event that it becomes our duty to reduce the defenses of the walled town in which they are gathered, will, we feel assured, appeal successfully to the sympathies of a general capable of making the determined and prolonged resistance which your excellency has exhibited after the loss of your naval forces and without hope of succor.

"We therefore, submit, without prejudice to the high sentiments of honor and duty which your excellency entertains, that surrounded on every side as you are by a constantly increasing force, with a powerful fleet in your front and deprived of all prospect of reinforcement and assistance, a most useless sacrifice of life would result in the event of an attack, and therefore every consideration of humanity makes it imperative that you should not subject your city to the horrors of a bombardment. Accordingly, we demand the surrender of the city of Manila and the Spanish forces under your command."

The Captain-General wanted time to hear from Madrid, and was refused.

The language of General Greene, in stating the fact that he took possession of the intrenchments of the insurgents, is in these words:

"On the morning of July 29, in compliance with verbal instructions received the previous day from the Adjutant-General of the Eighth Army Corps, I occupied the insurgent trenches, from the beach to the Calle Real, with one battalion Eighteenth United States Infantry, one battalion First Colorado Infantry, and four guns—two from each of the Utah batteries—these trenches being vacated at my request by the insurgent forces under Brigadier-General Noriel. As these trenches were badly located and insufficient in size and strength, I ordered another line constructed about 100 yards in advance of them, and this work was completed, mainly by the First Colorado, during the night of July 29-30. The length of this line was only 270 yards, and on its right were a few barricades, not continuous, occupied by the insurgents, extending over to the large rice swamp, just east of the road from Pasay to Paco (shown on the accompanying map). Facing these was a strong Spanish line, consisting of a stone fort, San Antonio de Abad, near the beach, intrenchments of sandbags and earth about seven feet high and 10 feet thick, extending in a curved direction for about 1,200 yards and terminating in a fortified blockhouse, known as No 14, beyond our right on the Pasay road. It faced our front and enveloped our right flank."

General Greene, reporting the fighting on his front, says of the Spanish position and first attack.

Mounted in and near the stone fort were seven guns in all, viz., three bronze field guns of 3.6 inches caliber, four bronze mountain guns of 3.2 inches caliber, and in the vicinity of Blockhouse No. 14 were two steel mountain guns of 3.2 inches caliber. The line was manned throughout its length by infantry, with strong reserves at Malate and at the walled city in its rear.

Shortly before midnight of July 31-August 1 the Spaniards opened a heavy and continuous fire with both artillery and infantry from their entire line. Our trenches were occupied that day by the two battalions of the Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry, one foot battery (H), nearly 200 strong, of the Third Artillery, and four guns, two of Battery A and two of Battery B, Utah Artillery. For about an hour and a half the firing on both sides, with artillery and infantry, was very heavy and continuous, our expenditure of ammunition being 160 rounds of artillery and about 60,000 rounds of infantry. That of the Spaniards was nearly twice as much.

The American loss was ten killed and forty-three wounded.

General Greene says: "Major Cuthbertson, Tenth Pennsylvania, reports that the Spaniards left their trenches in force and attempted to turn our right flank, coming within 200 yards of his position. But as the night was intensely dark, with incessant and heavy rain, and as no dead or wounded were found in front of his position at daylight, it is possible that he was mistaken and that the heavy fire to which he was subjected came from the trenches near Block House 14, beyond his right flank, at a distance of about 700 yards. The Spaniards used smokeless powder, the thickets obscured the flash of their guns, and the sound of the Mauser bullets penetrating a bamboo pole is very similar to the crack of the rifle itself.

"This attack demonstrated the immediate necessity of extending our intrenchments to the right and, although not covered by my instructions (which were to occupy the trenches from the bay to Calle Real, and to avoid precipitating an engagement), I ordered the First Colorado and one battalion of the First California, which occupied the trenches at 9 a. m., August 1, to extend the line of trenches to the Pasay road. The work was begun by these troops, and continued every day by the troops occupying the trenches in turn, until a strong line was completed by August 12, about 1,200 yards in length, extending from the bay to the east side of the Pasay road. Its left rested on the bay and its right on an extensive rice swamp, practically impassible. The right flank was refused, because the only way to cross a smaller rice swamp, crossing the line about 700 yards from the beach, was along a cross-road in rear of the general line. As finally completed the works were very strong in profile, being five to six feet in height and eight to ten feet in thickness at the base, strengthened by bags filled with earth.

"The only material available was black soil saturated with water, and without the bags this was washed down and ruined in a day by the heavy and almost incessant rains. The construction of these trenches was constantly interrupted by the enemy's fire. They were occupied by the troops in succession, four battalions being usually sent out for a service of twenty-four hours, and posted with three battalions in the trenches, and one battalion in reserve along the crossroad to Pasay; Cossack posts being sent out from the latter to guard the camp against any possible surprise from the northeast and east. The service in the trenches was of the most arduous character, the rain being almost incessant, and the men having no protection against it; they were wet during the entire twenty-four hours, and the mud was so deep that the shoes were ruined and a considerable number of men rendered barefooted. Until the notice of bombardment was given on August 7, any exposure above or behind the trenches promptly brought the enemy's fire, so that the men had to sit in the mud under cover and keep awake, prepared to resist an attack, during the entire tour of twenty-four hours.

"After one particularly heavy rain a portion of the trench contained two feet of water, in which the men had to remain. It could not be drained, as it was lower than an adjoining rice swamp, in which the water had risen nearly two feet, the rainfall being more than four inches in twenty-four hours. These hardships were all endured by the men of the different regiments in turn, with the finest possible spirit and without a murmur of complaint."

This is a vivid picture of hard service. General Greene continues:

"August 7 the notice of bombardment after forty-eight hours, or sooner if the Spanish fire continued, was served, and after that date not a shot was fired on either side until the assault was made on August 13. It was with great difficulty, and in some cases not without force, that the insurgents were restrained from opening fire and thus drawing the fire of the Spaniards during this period.

"Owing to the heavy storm and high surf it was impossible to communicate promptly with the division commander at Cavite, and I received my instructions direct from the major-general commanding, or his staff officers, one of whom visited my camp every day, and I reported direct to him in the same manner. My instructions were to occupy the insurgent trenches near the beach, so as to be in a good position to advance on Manila when ordered, but meanwhile to avoid precipitating an engagement, not to waste ammunition, and (after August 1) not to return the enemy's fire unless convinced that he had left his trenches and was making an attack in force. These instructions were given daily in the most positive terms to the officer commanding in the trenches, and in the main they were faithfully carried out.

"More ammunition than necessary was expended on the nights of August 2 and 5, but in both cases the trenches were occupied by troops under fire for the first time, and in the darkness and rain there was ground to believe that the heavy fire indicated a real attack from outside the enemy's trenches. The total expenditure of ammunition on our side in the four engagements was about 150,000 rounds, and by the enemy very much more.

"After the attack of July 31-August I, I communicated by signal with the captain of the U. S. S. Raleigh, anchored about 3,000 yards southwest of my camp, asking if he had received orders in regard to the action of his ship in case of another attack on my troops. He replied:

"Both Admiral Dewey and General Merritt desire to avoid general action at present. If attack too strong for you, we will assist you, and another vessel will come and offer help. "In repeating this message, Lieutenant Tappan, commanding U. S. S. Callao, anchored nearer the beach, sent me a box of blue lights, and it was agreed that if I burned one of these on the beach the Raleigh would at once open fire on the Spanish fort."

General Merritt speaks of the Colorado skirmishers leaving their breastworks when the navy ceased firing on the 13th of August, and advancing swiftly, finding the Spanish trenches deserted, "but as they passed over the Spanish works they were met by a sharp fire from a second line, situated in the streets of Malate, by which a number of men were killed and wounded, among others the soldier who pulled down the Spanish colors still flying on the fort and raised our own."

General Greene is complimentary to the officers and who conducted the reconnaissances while he was at Camp Dewey twenty-five days, and states:

"Captain Grove and Lieutenant Means, of the First Colorado, had been particularly active in this work and fearless in penetrating beyond our lines and close to those of the enemy. As the time for attack approached, these officers made a careful examination of the ground between our trenches and Fort San Antonio de Abad, and, finally, on August 11, Major J. F. Bell, United States Volunteer Engineers, tested the creek in front of this fort and ascertained not only that it was fordable, but the exact width of the ford at the beach, and actually swam in the bay to a point from which he could examine the Spanish line from the rear. With the information thus obtained it was possible to plan the attack intelligently. The position assigned to my brigade extended from the beach to the small rice swamp, a front of about 700 yards.

"After the sharp skirmish on the second line of defense of the Spaniards, and after Greene's brigade moved through Malate, meeting a shuffling foe, the open space at the luneta, just south of the walled city, was reached about 1 p. m. A white flag was flying at the southwest bastion, and I rode forward to meet it under a heavy fire from our right and rear on the Paco road. At the bastion I was informed that officers representing General Merritt and Admiral Dewey were on their way ashore to receive the surrender, and I therefore turned east to the Paco road. The firing ceased at this time, and on reaching this road I found nearly 1,000 Spanish troops who had retreated from Santa Ana through Paco, and coming up the Paco road had been firing on our flank. I held the commanding officers, but ordered these troops to march into the walled city. At this point, the California regiment a short time before had met some insurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on the walls, and the latter in returning the fire had caused a loss in the California regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded.

"My instructions were to march past the walled city on its surrender, cross the bridge, occupy the city on the north side of the Pasig, and protect lives and property there. While the white flag was flying on the walls yet, very sharp firing had just taken place outside, and there were from 5,000 to 6,000 men on the walls, with arms in their hands, only a few yards from us. I did not feel justified in leaving this force in my rear until the surrender was clearly established, and I therefore halted and assembled my force, prepared to force the gates if there was any more firing. The Eighteenth Infantry and First California were sent forward to hold the bridges a few yards ahead, but the second battalion, Third Artillery, First Nebraska, Tenth Pennsylvania, and First Colorado were all assembled at this point. While this was being done I received a note from Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier, of General Merritt's staff, written from the Captain-General's office within the walls, asking me to stop the firing outside, as negotiations for surrender were in progress."

And General Greene continues: "I then returned to the troops outside the walls and sent Captain Birkhimer's battalion of the Third Artillery down the Paco road to prevent any insurgents from entering. Feeling satisfied that there would be no attack from the Spanish troops lining the walls, I put the regiments in motion toward the bridges, brushing aside a considerable force of insurgents who had penetrated the city from the direction of Paco, and were in the main street with their flag expecting to march into the walled city and plant it on the walls. After crossing the bridges the Eighteenth United States Infantry was posted to patrol the principal streets near the bridge, the First California was sent up the Pasig to occupy Quiapo, San Miguel, and Malacanan, and with the First Nebraska I marched down the river to the Captain of the Port's office, where I ordered the Spanish flag hauled down and the American flag raised in its place."

The insurgents were disposed to disregard the white flag and the process of the capitulation, but "a considerable force" of them was "brushed aside." General Greene's losses before Manila were 16 killed and 66 wounded: his force 5,100. He remarks: "The resistance encountered on the 13th was much less than anticipated and planned for, but had the resistance been greater the result would have been the same, only the loss would have been greater. Fortunately, the great result of capturing this city, the seat of Spanish power in the East for more than three hundred years, was accomplished with a loss of life comparatively insignificant."

Captain T.B. Mott, detached from General Merritt's temporarily, served on General Greene's staff, and received this mention:

"In posting troops in the trenches, in making reconnaissances, in transmitting orders under fire, and in making reports, he has uniformly exhibited courage, military ability, and sound judgment, the qualities, in short, which are most valuable in a staff officer."

Captain Bates, Lieutenant Schieflie, and Captain D.F. Millet, artist and author, are praised for activity, intelligence and valuable service. Millet was with Greene before Plevna, during the Russo-Turkish campaign. Greene was appointed the senior member of the committee to arrange the terms of the capitulation.

General Anderson had instructions to extend his line to crowd the insurgents out of their trenches with their consent, but this was not attempted, for that would have brought on an engagement prematurely. Anderson had purchased wire-cutters with insulated handles in San Francisco, and they were useful! Anderson had his trenches with the insurgents. McArthur's division was before a "circulated line of earthworks faced with sand bags," and the problem of the advance was made difficult because "we could not be sure whether our first attack was to be tentative or serious, this depending on action of the navy; second, from our orders not to displace the insurgents without their consent from their position to the right of their guns on the Pasay road. This to the very last the insurgent leaders positively refused to give. Yet, if we could not go far enough to the right to silence their field guns and carry that part of their line, they would have a fatal cross fire on troops attacking blockhouse No. 14. I therefore directed General MacArthur to put the three 2.10 inch guns of Battery B, Utah Volunteer Artillery, in the emplacement of the insurgent gun and to place the Astor Battery behind a high garden wall to the right of the Pasay road, to be held there subject to orders.

"I assumed that when the action became hot at this point, as I knew it would be, that the insurgents would voluntarily fall back from their advanced position, and that the Astor Battery and its supports could take position without opposition."

General Anderson got a message from General MacArthur. "I knew from this that he wished to push the insurgents aside and put in the Astor Battery. I then authorized him to attack, which he did, and, soon after, the Twenty-third Infantry and the Thirteenth Minnesota carried the advance line of the enemy in the most gallant manner, the one gun of the Utah Battery and the Astor Battery lending most effective assistance."

It was General Anderson's opinion that MacArthur should counter march and go to Malate by the beach, but he had gone too far, for "the guns of the Astor Battery had been dragged to the front only after the utmost exertions, and were about being put into battery. At the same time I received a telegram stating that the insurgents were threatening to cross the bamboo bridge on our right; and to prevent this and guard our ammunition at Pasay, I ordered an Idaho battalion to that point."

Again the insurgents were making mischief, and General Anderson, as well as General Greene had the experience of the continuance of fire when the white flag was flying. The loss of General Anderson in the taking of the city was nineteen men killed and one hundred and three wounded. He concludes by saying:

"The opposition we met in battle was not sufficient to test the bravery of our soldiers, but all showed bravery and dash. The losses show that the leading regiments of the First Brigade—Thirteenth Minnesota, Twenty-third Infantry, and the Astor Battery—met the most serious opposition and deserve credit for their success. The Colorado, California, and Oregon regiments, the Regulars, and all the batteries of the Second Brigade showed such zeal that it seems a pity that they did not meet foemen worthy of their steel."

General MacArthur says: "Several hours before the operations of the day were intended to commence, there was considerable desultory firing from the Spanish line, both of cannon and small arms, provoked no doubt by Filipino soldiers, who insisted upon maintaining a general fusilade along their lines."

General MacArthur's personal mention is remarkably spirited, and makes stirring reading. We quote:

"The combat of Singalong can hardly be classified as a great military event, but the involved terrain and the prolonged resistance created a very trying situation, and afforded an unusual scope for the display of military qualities by a large number of individuals.

"The invincible composure of Colonel Ovenshine, during an exposure in dangerous space for more than an hour, was conspicuous and very inspiring to the troops; and the efficient manner in which he took advantage of opportunities as they arose during the varying aspects of the fight was of great practical value in determining the result.

"The cool, determined, and sustained efforts of Colonel Reeve, of the Thirteenth Minnesota, contributed very materially to the maintenance of the discipline and marked efficiency of his regiment.

"The brilliant manner in which Lieutenant March accepted and discharged the responsible and dangerous duties of the day, and the pertinacity with which, assisted by his officers and men, he carried his guns over all obstacles to the very front of the firing line, was an exceptional display of warlike skill and good judgment, indicating the existence of many of the best qualifications for high command in battle.

"The gallant manner in which Captain Sawtelle, brigade quartermaster, volunteered to join the advance party in the rush; volunteered to command a firing line, for a time without an officer, and again volunteered to lead a scout to ascertain the presence or absence of the enemy in the blockhouse, was a fine display of personal intrepidity.

"The efficient, fearless, and intelligent manner in which Lieutenant Kernan, Twenty-first United States Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general of the brigade, and Second Lieutenant Whitworth, Eighteenth United States Infantry, aid, executed a series of dangerous and difficult orders, was a fine exemplification of staff work under fire.

"The splendid bravery of Captains Bjornstad and Seebach, and Lieutenant Lackore, of the Thirteenth Minnesota, all wounded, and, finally, the work of the soldiers of the first firing line, too, all went to make up a rapid succession of individual actions of unusual merit."

Major General Merritt's account of the capture of the city must be given in full, for there are no words wasted, and he clears the field of all confusion.

"The works of the second line soon gave way to the determined advance of Greene's troops, and that officer pushed his brigade rapidly through Malate and over the bridges to occupy Binondo and San Miguel, as contemplated in his instructions. In the meantime the brigade of General MacArthur, advancing simultaneously on the Pasay road, encountered a very sharp fire, coming from the blockhouses, trenches, and woods in his front, positions which it was very difficult to carry, owing to the swampy condition of the ground on both sides of the roads, and the heavy undergrowth concealing the enemy. With much gallantry and excellent judgment on the part of the brigade commander and the troops engaged these difficulties were overcome with a minimum loss (see report of brigade commander appended), and MacArthur advanced and held the bridges and the town of Malate, as was contemplated in his instructions.

"The city of Manila was now in our possession, excepting the walled town, but shortly after the entry of our troops into Malate a white flag was displayed on the walls, whereupon Lieutenant-Colonel C. A Whittier, United States Volunteers, of my staff, and Lieutenant Brumby, United States Navy, representing Admiral Dewey, were sent ashore to communicate with the Captain-General. I soon personally followed these officers into the town, going at once to the palace of the Governor-General, and there, after a conversation with the Spanish authorities, a preliminary agreement of the terms of capitulation was signed by the Captain-General and myself. This agreement was subsequently incorporated into the formal terms of capitulation, as arranged by the officers representing the two forces, a copy of which is hereto appended and marked.

"Immediately after the surrender the Spanish colors on the sea front were hauled down and the American flag displayed and saluted by the guns of the navy. The Second Oregon Regiment, which had proceeded by sea from Cavite, was disembarked and entered the walled town as a provost guard, and the colonel was directed to receive the Spanish arms and deposit them in places of security. The town was filled with the troops of the enemy driven in from the intrenchments, regiments formed and standing in line in the streets, but the work of disarming proceeded quietly and nothing unpleasant occurred.

"In leaving the subject of the operations of the 13th, I desire here to record my appreciation of the admirable manner in which the orders for attack and the plan for occupation of the city were carried out by the troops exactly as contemplated. I submit that for troops to enter under fire a town covering a wide area, to rapidly deploy and guard all principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing for admission, to quietly disarm an army of Spaniards more than equal in numbers to the American troops, and finally by all this to prevent entirely all rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete possession of a city of 300,000 people filled with natives hostile to the European interests, and stirred up by the knowledge that their own people were fighting in the outside trenches, was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate, resolute American soldier, well and skillfully handled by his regimental and brigade commanders, could accomplish.

The trophies of Manila were nearly $900,000,000, of which $240,000,000 were copper coin, 13,000 prisoners and 22,000 arms.

Three days after the surrender, General Merritt received news of the protocol, and soon was ordered to Paris. In parting he says of the insurgent chief that he had written communication with him on various occasions, and "he recognized my authority as military governor of the town of Manila and suburbs, and made professions of his willingness to withdraw his troops to a line which I might indicate, but at the same time asking certain favors for himself. The matters in this connection had not been settled at the date of my departure. Doubtless much dissatisfaction is felt by the rank and file of the insurgents that they have not been permitted to enjoy the occupancy of Manila, and there is some ground for trouble with them owing to that fact, but notwithstanding many rumors to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the leaders will be able to prevent serious disturbances, as they are sufficiently intelligent and educated to know that for them to antagonize the United States would be to destroy their only chance of future political improvement.

The Commanding General's personal acknowledgments are very handsome, as follows:

"Brigadier-General E.P. Hughes, my inspector-general at San Francisco, was especially noticeable in accomplishing the instruction of the green troops that came to the city, many of them without arms, clothing, or equipment of any kind. His services will undoubtedly be duly recognized by Major-General Otis, with whom I left him to continue the good work.

"I desire especially to express my acknowledgments to Brigadier-General Babcock, my adjutant-general and chief of staff, for his most valuable services from the inception of the campaign in San Francisco to the close of the work at the present time. This officer is too well known to require special mention of his services in any one direction. He was my right arm, not only in the office but in the field, and much of the success that has attended the expedition is due to his individual efforts.

"I desire especially to mention Major McClure and Major Whipple, of the pay department, who volunteered their services after they had completed their legitimate duties, and performed excellent work whenever called upon. Major McClure was especially important in his services immediately after the surrender, taking long rides under my orders to the Spanish lines, and bearing instructions to them which resulted in effecting their withdrawal in such manner as to prevent the incursion of the insurgents in the northern portions of the city. Other officers have been named in my special reports and have been recommended for brevets and promotion.

"I especially call attention to the services of Captain Mott, as mentioned in the report of Brigadier-General Greene. He was cheerful, willing, intelligent, and energetic in the discharge of the multifarious duties imposed upon him in connection with our troops and trenches during the rainy season, and in the final action showed these rare characteristics which stamp him as a very superior soldier."

The Terms of Capitulation

The undersigned having been appointed a commission to determine the details of the capitulation of the city and defenses of Manila and its suburbs and the Spanish forces stationed therein, in accordance with the agreement entered into the previous day by Major General Wesley Merritt, United States Army, American commander in chief in the Philippines, and His Excellency Don Fermin Jaudenes, acting General in chief of the Spanish Army in the Philippines, have agreed upon the following:

1. The Spanish troops, European and native, capitulate with the city and its defenses, with all the honors of war, depositing their arms in the places designated by the authorities of the United States, and remaining in the quarters designated and under the orders of their officers, and subject to the control of the aforesaid United States authorities, until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the two belligerent nations.

All persons included in the capitulation remain at liberty, the officers remaining in their respective homes, which shall be respected as long as they observe the regulations prescribed for their government and the laws in force.

2. Officers shall retain their side arms, horses, and private property.

3. All public horses and public property of all kinds shall be turned over to staff officers designated by the United States.

4. Complete returns in duplicate of men by organizations, and full lists of public property and stores shall be rendered to the United States within ten days from this date.

5. All questions relating to the repatriation of officers and men of the Spanish forces and of their families, and of the expenses which said repatriation may occasion, shall be referred to the Government of the United States at Washington.

Spanish families may leave Manila at any time convenient to them.

The return of the arms surrendered by the Spanish forces shall take place when they evacuate the city or when the American Army evacuates.

6. Officers and men included in the capitulation shall be supplied by the United States, according to their rank, with rations and necessary aid as though they were prisoners of war, until the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the United States and Spain.

All the funds in the Spanish treasury and all other public funds shall be turned over to the authorities of the United States.

7. This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army.

F.V. Greene, Brigadier-General of Volunteers, United States Army.

B.P. Lamberton, Captain, United States Navy.

Charles A. Whittier, Lieutenant-Colonel and Inspector-General.

E.H. Crowder, Lieutenant-Colonel and Judge-Advocate.

Nicholas de la Petra, Auditor General Excmo.

Carlos, Coronel de Ingenieros.

Jose, Coronel de Estado Major.

The Spaniards wanted a long array of specifications as to what the Americans might and should not do, but finally were struck with the sufficiency of the shining simple words, "under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American Army."



CHAPTER XI

The Administration of General Merritt.

The Official Gazette Issued at Manila—Orders and Proclamations Showing the Policy and Detail of the Administration of Major-General Wesley Merritt, Who, as Commander of the Philippine Expedition, Became, Under the Circumstances of the Capture of Manila, the Governor of That City.

General Merritt's Proclamation to the Filipinos.

Headquarters Department of the Pacific, August 14, 1898.

To the People of the Philippines:

I. War has existed between the United States and Spain since April 21 of this year. Since that date you have witnessed the destruction by an American fleet of the Spanish naval power in these islands, the fall of the principal city, Manila, and its defenses, and the surrender of the Spanish army of occupation to the forces of the United States.

II. The commander of the United States forces now in possession has instructions from his Government to assure the people that he has not come to wage war upon them, nor upon any part or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, by active aid or honest submission, co-operate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose, will receive the reward of its support and protection.

III. The government established among you by the United States is a government of military occupation; and for the present it is ordered that the municipal laws such as affect private rights of persons and property, regulate local institutions, and provide for the punishment of crime, shall be considered as continuing in force, so far as compatible with the purposes of military government, and that they be administered through the ordinary tribunals substantially as before occupation, but by officials appointed by the government of occupation.

IV. A Provost-Marshal-General will be appointed for the city of Manila and its outlying districts. This territory will be divided into sub-districts, and there will be assigned to each a Deputy-Provost-Marshal.

The duties of the Provost-Marshal-General and his deputies will be set forth in detail in future orders. In a general way they are charged with the duty of making arrests of military, as well as civil offenders, sending such of the former class as are triable by courts-martial to their proper commands, with statements of their offenses and names of witnesses, and detaining in custody all other offenders for trial by military commission, provost courts, or native criminal courts, in accordance with law and the instructions hereafter to be issued.

V. The port of Manila, and all other ports and places in the Philippines which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces, will be open, while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation.

VI. All churches and places devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all educational institutions, libraries, scientific collections, and museums are, so far as possible, to be protected; and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places or properly, of historical monuments, archives, or works of science and art, is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity. Severe punishment will be meted out for all violations of this regulation.

The custodians of all property of the character mentioned in this section will make prompt returns thereof to these headquarters, stating character and location, and embodying such recommendations as they may think proper for the full protection of the properties under their care and custody, that proper orders may issue enjoining the co-operation of both military and civil authorities in securing such protection.

VII. The Commanding General, in announcing the establishment of military government, and in entering upon his duty as Military Governor in pursuance of his appointment as such by the government of the United States, desires to assure the people that so long as they preserve the peace and perform their duties toward the representatives of the United States they will not be disturbed in their persons and property, except in so far as may be found necessary for the good of the service of the United States and the benefit of the people of the Philippines.

Wesley Merritt,

Major-General, United States Army, Commanding.

The general orders following are full of curious interest, as they declare the true intent and meaning of the Philippine Expedition, and define the situation at Manila, with extraordinary precision, and are in the strictest sense by authority: