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These admirable—and more than admirable, these wonderful—deeds necessarily engender the most firm and ineradicable convictions of the necessity of leaving the Philippines free and independent, not only because they deserve it, but because they are prepared to defend, to the death, their future and their history.
Filipinos are fully convinced that if individuals have need of material, moral and intellectual perfection in order to contribute to the welfare of their fellows peoples require to have fullness of life; they need liberty and independence in order to contribute to the indefinite progress of mankind. It has struggled and will struggle, with decision and constancy, without ever turning back or retrograding before the obstacles which may arise in its path, and with unshakable faith that it will obtain justice and fulfill the laws of Providence.
And neither will it be turned aside from the course it has hitherto followed by the unjustifiable imprisonment, tortures, assassinations, and the other vandal acts committed by the Spaniards against the persons of peaceful and defenseless Filipinos. The Spaniards believe themselves released from every legal obligation toward the Filipinos for the sole reason that the belligerency of the Revolution has not been recognized, taking no account of the fact that over and above every law, whether written or prescriptive, are placed with imprescriptible characters, culture, national honor and humanity. No; the Filipinos have no need ever to make use of reprisals because they seek independence with culture, liberty with unconditional respect for the law, as the organ of justice, and a name purified in the crucible of human sentiments.
In virtue of the foregoing considerations the undersigned, giving voice to the unanimous aspiration of the people whom they represent, and performing the offices received from them and the duties pertaining to the powers with which they are invested,
Proclaim solemnly in the face of the whole world the Independence of the Philippines;
Recognize and respect Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy as President of the Revolutionary Government, organized in the manner prescribed by decree of the 23d and instructions of the 27th of June last, and beg the said President that he will ask and obtain from foreign Governments the recognition of its belligerency and independence, not only because this act constitutes a duty of justice, but also because to no one is it permitted to contravene natural laws nor stifle the legitimate aspiration of a people for its amelioration and dignification.
Given in the Province of Cavite the 1st day of August, of the year of our Lord 1898, and the first year of Philippine independence.
Follow the signatures of the local Presidents of the Provinces of Cavite and many others.
The undersigned, Secretary of the Interior, certifies, That the present document is a literal copy of the original, which is deposited in the Secretaryship under his charge; in proof of which he signs it, with the approval of the President of the Revolutionary Government in Bacoor, the 6th day of August, 1898.
El Presidente del G. R., Emilio Aguinaldo. El Secretano del Interior, Leandro Ibarra.
Letter from Senor Aguinaldo to General Anderson.
July 23d, 1898.
To Brigadier-General T. M. Anderson, U. S. A., etc., etc., Cavite.
In answer to the letter of your Excellency dated the 22nd of the present month, I have the honor to manifest to you the following:
That even supposing that the effects existing in the storehouse of Don Antonio Osorio were subject to capture, when I established myself in the plaza (town) of Cavite, Admiral Dewey authorized me to dispose of everything that I might find in the same, including the arms which the Spanish left in the arsenal. But as he was aware that said effects belonged to the personal property (ownership) of a Filipino, who traded with them by virtue of a contribution to the Spanish Government, I would not have touched them had not the owner placed them at my disposition for the purposes of the war.
I came from Hong Kong to prevent my countrymen from making common cause with the Spanish against the North Americans, pledging, before, my word to Admiral Dewey to not give place to (to allow) any internal discord because (being) a judge of their desires I had the strong conviction that I would succeed in both objects; establishing a government according to their desires.
Thus it is that at the beginning I proclaimed the dictatorship, and afterwards, when some of the Provinces had already liberated themselves from Spanish domination, I established a revolutionary government that to-day exists, giving it a democratic and popular character, as far as the abnormal circumstances of war permitted, in order that they (the Provinces) might be justly represented and administered to their satisfaction.
It is true that my government has not been acknowledged by any of the foreign powers; but we expect that the great North American nation, which struggled first for its independence and afterwards for the abolition of slavery, and is now actually struggling for the independence of Cuba, would look upon it with greater benevolence than any other nation. Because of this we have always acknowledged the right of preference as to our gratitude.
Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the favors which we have received through Admiral Dewey, and being more desirous than any other of preventing any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention which must be extremely prejudicial not alone to my nation, but also to that of Your Excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations, the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights.
I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly; because of this I take the liberty of indicating to Your Excellency the necessities that before disembarking troops you should communicate in writing to this government the places that are to be occupied, and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and (thus) prevent the commission of any transgression against friendship. I can answer for my people, because they have given me evident proofs of their absolute confidence in my government, but I cannot answer for that which another nation, whose friendship is not well guaranteed, might inspire in it (the people); and it is certain that I do this not as a menace, but as a further proof of the true and sincere friendship which I have always professed to the North American people in the complete security that it will find itself completely identified with our cause of liberty.
I am, with respect,
Your obedient servant,
Emilio Aguinaldo.
CHAPTER VII
Interview with the Archbishop of Manila.
Insurgents' Deadly Hostility to Spanish Priests—The Position of the Archbishop as He Defined It—His Expression of Gratitude to the American Army—His Characterization of the Insurgents—A Work of Philippine Art—The Sincerity of the Archbishop's Good Words.
The intense feeling by the Philippine insurgents against the Spanish priests made it seem very desirable to see the Archbishop of Manila, and he informed two American priests that he would have pleasure in making an expression of his views to me to be placed before the people of the United States. He had been charged with extreme vindictiveness and the responsibility of demanding that the city should be defended to the last extremity, when actually, in the consultation of dignitaries that took place, and the surrender of the capital was demanded by General Merritt and Admiral Dewey, he declared the situation hopeless and that it was a plain duty to prevent the sacrifice of life. He was overruled by the peculiar folly that has caused Spain in the course of the war to inflict heavy and avoidable losses upon herself. Indeed, the war originated in the Spanish state of mind that it was necessary to open fire and shed blood for the honor of the arms of Spain. The Spanish officers knew they could not save Manila from the hands of the Americans while the command of the sea by our fleet was indisputable and we had unlimited reserves to draw upon to strengthen the land forces, irrespective of the swarms of insurgents pressing in the rear and eager to take vengeance for centuries of mismanagement and countless personal grievances. It was the acknowledgment of the Spanish Captain-General, when he received the peremptory summons from Merritt and Dewey to give up the city, that there was no place of refuge for the women and children, the sick and the wounded; and yet it was insisted that the honor of Spain required bloodshed—not much, perhaps, but enough to prove that the army of Spain was warlike. When the American army had been reinforced so as to have 8,000 men ready to take the field, General Merritt and Admiral Dewey had a conference and agreed to send the Spaniards in authority a formal notification that in forty-eight hours they would bombard and assail the defenses of the city of Manila if it were not surrendered. The Spanish reply was that the Americans could commence operations at once, but there was no place where the women and children, the wounded and the sick could go to find a place of security. This was tantamount to a declaration that the Spaniards were sliding into a surrender, but wanted to make a claim to the contrary.
The residence of the Archbishop is within the walled city and a very substantial edifice, the stone work confined to the lower story and hardwood timber freely used in massive form instead of stone. His grace was seated at a small table in a broad hall, with a lamp and writing material before him. He is imposing as a man of importance and his greeting was cordial to kindliness. He said his acknowledgments were personally due the American people for the peace of mind he had enjoyed during the occupation of the city by the army of the United States, for its establishment of order and the justice in administration that relieved good citizens from oppression and alarm. He was glad to have Americans know his sensibility on this subject, and wanted me to convey his sentiments to the President.
When asked what it was that caused the insurgents to be so ferocious against the priests and resolved on their expulsion or destruction he said the rebels were at once false, unjust and ungrateful. They had been lifted from savagery by Catholic teachers, who had not only been educators in the schools but teachers in the fields. The same Catholic Orders that were singled out for special punishment had planted in the islands the very industries that were sources of prosperity, and the leaders of the insurgents had been largely educated by the very men whom now they persecuted. Some of the persecutors had been in Europe and became revolutionists in the sense of promoting disorder as anarchists. It was the antagonism of the church to murderous anarchy that aroused the insurgents of the Philippines to become the deadly enemies of priests and church orders. It was true in Spain, as in the Philippines, that the anarchists were particularly inflamed against the church. His grace did not seem to have heard of the American anarchist, but the European revolutionist has received a large share of his attention.
He produced a box of cigars, also a bottle of sherry, and chatted comfortably and humorously. There was one thing then that he had in his heart—that his anxiety for peace and appreciation of order as enjoyed under the American military government should be recorded and responsibly reported to the people of the United States. The American priests had informed him that I was a friend of long standing of President McKinley, and he again enjoined that I should declare his sentiments to the President. A beautiful work of wood carving was shown on an easel, which had a frame of hard wood, the whole, easel and frame, with elaborately wrought ornamentation, cut out of one tree. It was at once strong and graceful, simple and decorative. The picture was a gold medallion, raised on a plate of silver, an excellent likeness of his grace. It was evident that the refinements of art were known to "these barbarians of the Philippines," for their works testified.
His grace announced that he would return my call, and his convenience being consulted, the time was fixed for him to appear at 11 o'clock the next day, Sunday, and he came accordingly, accompanied by three priests, the chaplain of the First California, Father Daugherty who sailed with General Merritt to Manila, and Father Boyle, the superintendent of the famous observatory founded by the Jesuits, who was a typical Irishman of a strong and humorously hearty type. Father Boyle had one of the most perfect methods of speaking English in the Irish way that I have ever heard, and admitted that he had resided in England long enough to be born there; and this was great fun. It is not too much to say that the institution he represented is illustrious.
The cathedral of Manila is within the walled city and of immense proportions. It was shattered by an earthquake, and in its reconstruction wood rather than marble was used for the supporting pillars within, but no one would find out that the stately clusters of columns were not from the quarries rather than the forests, unless personally conducted to the discovery. Here 2,000 Spanish soldiers, held under the articles of capitulation, were quartered, consumed their rations and slept, munching and dozing all around the altar and pervading the whole edifice. The other great churches, five in number, in the walled city, were occupied in the same way. The Archbishop was anxious to have the soldiers otherwise provided with shelter, and if not all of them could be restored to their ordinary uses it was most desirable, in his opinion, the cathedral should be.
It is estimated that 2,000 of the American soldiers in the expeditionary force are Catholics, and Father Daugherty was anxious to preach to them in English. During the call upon me by the Archbishop this subject was discussed, and the suggestion made that the Americans had tents in great number that they did not occupy and that would probably not be preserved by keeping them stored in that hot and trying climate. They might be pitched on the Luneta, which is beside the sea, and the town thus relieved of 13,000 men, who, herded in churches, produced unsanitary conditions. This seemed reasonable, and the policy of the change would have a tendency to develop an element of good-will not to be despised and rejected. It might be that the cathedral alone could be cleared without delay or prejudice with a pleasant effect, and if so why not? His grace was certainly diplomatic and persuasive in stating the case, and his attendants were animated with zeal that the Americans should have the credit of re-opening the cathedral for worship. It was true the Spanish garrison first occupied it, but if the necessity that its ample roof should protect soldiers from the torrential rains had existed perhaps it had ceased to be imperative. The matter was duly presented to the military authorities, and the objection found to immediate action that the Spanish prisoners of war should not for the time be located outside the walled city. They must be held where they could be handled.
Coincident with the call of the Archbishop came Captain Coudert, of the distinguished family of that name in New York, and his grace was deeply interested in that young man and warmly expressed his gratification in meeting an American officer of his own faith. The Archbishop is a man of a high order of capacity, and his influence has been great. His position is a trying one, for it would be quite impossible for him to remain in Manila if the insurgents should become the masters of the situation. The claim of hostile natives that the Spanish priests have an influence in matters of state that make them a ruling class is one that they urge when expressing their resolve that the Friars must go. The Spanish policy, especially in the municipal governments, has been to magnify the office of the priests in political functions. The proceedings of a meeting of the people in order to receive attention or to have legal standing must be certified by a priest. It is the Spanish priest that is wanted in matters of moment, and the laws make his presence indispensable. The Spanish priests are, therefore, identified in the public mind with all the details of misgovernment. The civilized Filipinos profess christianity and faith in the native priests, carefully asserting the distinction. In his conversation with me, General Aguinaldo repeatedly referred to the necessity of consulting his advisers, and said he had to be careful not to offend many of his followers, who thought he had gone very far in his friendship for the United States. He gave emphasis to the assertion that they were "suspicious" of him on that account. It was my judgment at first that the General, in stopping short when a question was difficult and referring to the Council he had to consult, was showing a capacity for finesse, that he really had the power to do or to undo, though he has not a personal appearance of possible leadership. Now this, even, has been modified. His Council seems to be the real center of power. When I was talking with Aguinaldo there were two American priests waiting to propose the deportation of his prisoners who were priests, and he had to refer that question. The Council has decided to keep the priests in confinement, and it is remarked that the General desired to give up his prisoners and was false in saying he favored sending them to Spain. There are misapprehensions in this association. He has no doubt thought well of holding fast his most important hostages. If he personally desired to release the priests, he probably would not venture to do it. He is not so silly as to believe in his own inviolability by bullets, and digestion of poisons; and those who are such savages as to confide in these superstitions are not unlikely to try experiments just to strengthen their faith. The potentiality of Aguinaldo as a personage is not so great as has been imagined, and if he attempts a rally against the American flag he will be found full of weakness.
The Archbishop, I was told, had much pleasure in meeting an American he was assured would attempt to be entirely just, and present him according to his own declarations to the people of the United States. He knew very well, unquestionably, the stories circulated in the American camps, that his voice had been loudest and last in urging hopeless war, in telling impossible tales of visionary Spanish reinforcements, and denouncing the Americans as "niggers" and "pigs." It is a fact that Spaniards have cultivated the notion among the rural Filipinos, that Americans are black men, and pigs is their favorite epithet for an American. The radical enemies of His Grace are, no doubt, responsible for unseemly stories about his animosities, for that he and those around him were sincere in their respect for, and gratitude toward the American army of occupation, for its admirable bearing and good conduct, was in itself too obviously true to be doubted.
CHAPTER VIII
Why We Hold the Philippines.
The Responsibility of Admiral Dewey—We Owe It to Ourselves to Hold the Philippines—Prosperity Assured by Our Permanent Possession—The Aguinaldo Question—Character Study of the Insurgent Leader—How Affairs Would Adjust Themselves for Us—Congress Must Be Trusted to Represent the People and Firmly Establish International Policy.
If Admiral Dewey, after obeying the order of the President to destroy the Spanish fleet at Manila, had steamed away and sought a station to get coal to drive him somewhere else, there would have been no Philippine question on the other side of the world from Washington City. The Admiral desired to keep open telegraphic communication, and made a proposition to that effect, but the Spanish authorities curtly refused. Then the cable was cut by order of the Admiral, a section removed, and both ends marked by buoys. Reflection caused the Spaniards to regret that they had not consented to keep open the cable, that it might be used under restrictions by both belligerents. They mentioned their change of mind, and were told they were too late. The American Admiral may have been apprehensive, and he had reason to be, that the Spaniards, knowing they would be crushed in the West Indies if they risked a decisive naval engagement there, might send all their available ships of war to the Philippines, and secure a superiority of force, possibly to destroy their enemies at Manila. It is clear now that this is what the Spaniards ought to have tried to do. The Americans were committed to the blockade of Cuba, occupying all the vessels of war they had at hand, and the whole fleet of Spain could have been in the Suez Canal, on the way to Manila when the movement was known to our navy department. Then Admiral Dewey would, of course, have been warned by way of Hong Kong and a dispatch boat, that he should put to sea and take care of his men and ships. The result might have been the temporary restoration of the Philippines to Spain. Our Admiral, six hundred miles from Hongkong, the closest cable connection, could not afford to leave Manila in direct communication with Madrid. It was for this reason and not that he desired to keep out of way or orders, as some able publicists have kindly promulgated, that the Admiral cut the cable.
The gravest of his responsibilities came upon him after his victory freed the harbor of declared enemies, and placed the great city at his mercy. If the Spaniards used their big Krupp guns against his ships, he could bombard the city and burn it. He held the keys to the Philippines, with Manila under his guns, and the question before him then was the same before the country now. The question that incessantly presses is, whether the Dewey policy is to be confirmed, and the logic of the stay in the harbor, and the dispatch of troops to take the town made good. We hold the keys of the Philippines. Shall we continue to do so? This question transcends in immediate importance—inevitable consequence—remote as well as near, all the war with Spain has raised. So broad a matter should not be rested on narrow grounds, nor decided with haste. It ought to be scrutinized in all its bearings, and all susceptibilities and material affairs regarded, for it will affect all the people for all time.
What are the Philippines? They are the richest prize of soil and climate that has been at hazard in the world for many years—one that would be seized, if it could be done without war, by any of the great nations other than our own without hesitation. The only scruple we need entertain, the sole reason for deliberation, is because it is a duty of the government to be sure when there are imperial considerations to be weighed, that the people should be consulted. It was on this account distinctly, that the President knew the issue of the permanency of the possession of the Philippines was one of peculiar novelty and magnitude, that he permitted it to exist. Spain must have been as acquiescent in this as in yielding the independence of Cuba, and the concession to us without any intermediate formality of Porto Rico. It is not inconsistent with the policy of magnanimity that is generally anticipated after the victory of a great power over a lesser one, that we should hold the Philippines. We have only to keep the power we have in peace, and let it work as a wholesome medicine, and all the islands of the group of which Manila is the central point, will be ours without conflict. In our system there is healing for wounds, and attraction for the oppressed. The holding of the islands by Spain would signify the continued shedding of blood, and drainage of the vital resources of the peninsula. As against Spain the Philippines will be united and desperate unto death, while they would without coercion walk hand in hand with us, and become the greatest of our dependencies—not states, but territories.
It would be an act of mercy to Spain to send her soldiers and priests from the Philippines, home. Even if we consent that she may keep her South Sea possession, she will lose it as she has all the rest, for the story of the Philippines is that of Spanish South and Central America, and the modern story of Cuba is the old one of all countries South and West of the Gulf of Mexico and around by way of the Oceans to Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Chili, and the rest had the same bloody stream of history to trace, and sooner or later the tale must all be told. Since Spain has already surrendered Cuba and Porto Rico, the record of the Philippines is the last chapter of her colonial experiences, by which she has dazzled and disgusted the world, attaining from the plunder of dependencies wealth that she invested in oppressive warfare to sustain a depraved despotism and display a grandeur that was unsound, sapping her own strength in colonial enterprises that could not be other than without profit, because the colonies were the property of the crown, and the prey of caste.
The Spanish nation was forbidden by their government, not of the people or for the people, to profit by the colonies, and the viceroys, the captain-generals, and the whole official class were corrupted, and inefficient in all things, except methods of tyranny to procure a harvest of gold and silver not from the mines of the metals alone, but from the industries, whatever they were. The people at large were allowed no share in their own earnings, beyond a subsistence so scanty that deep humiliation and grievous hardship were the fateful rewards of labor.
It was because the colonial policy of Spain impoverished and degraded the Spaniards at home, through the injustice, greed and profligacy of those abroad, that the huge structure, once so great an imposition upon mankind, a rotten fabric so gilt that the inherent weakness was disguised, has finally fallen into universal and irretrievable ruin.
It is well Spain should retain the Canaries and the Balearic group, for they are as Spanish as any peninsular province, and legitimately belong therefore to the kingdom. The application of this principle excludes Spain from the Philippines, and their des- [NOTE: gap in original] been committed by the failure of war to our hands. There is no nation that will dispute our peaceable possession of the Philippines. Any other nation's proprietorship will be challenged. Our authoritative presence in the islands will be a guarantee of peace. Any other assertion of supremacy will be the signal for war. Our assumption of sovereignty over the islands would quickly establish tranquility. Any other disposition of the burning questions now smoldering will cause an outburst of the flames of warfare. The Spaniards in Manila have been transient. They are not rooted in the soil. They all come and go like Captain-Generals, a mere official class, with the orders of the Church participating actively in secular concerns, more active as politicians than as teachers of religion. In the view of the native population it is as indispensable that the priests of Spain shall return to their native land as that the soldiers should go. The deportation of these people would remove classes of consumers and not affect unfavorably a productive industry, or the prosperity of a self-sustaining community, and there would be but rare instances of the severance of family ties.
It will be said of the affirmation that, the avowal of the possession of the Philippines as a responsibility without end would be a peace measure, and anything else make for war, does not take into account the attitude of the Philippine Dictator, by proclamation, General Aguinaldo, and his followers. We desire to speak with respect of the General, for he has shown in trying times, under strong temptations, the presence in his character of personal integrity in public matters, and reference is made to his refusal to consent to the division among insurgents alleged to be leaders, of the money paid by the Spaniards for the disarmament of the rebels, when two years ago there was an agreement upon the terms of a truce. This money transaction has been referred to as the sale of their cause by Aguinaldo and his associates, as if they, as individuals, had pocketed the usufruct of the bargain. The money was paid by Spain as an earnest of her sincerity, the Captain-General representing the force and good faith of the kingdom, in granting reforms to the Philippines. On condition of insurgent disarmament the people of the island were to be allowed representation in the Spanish Cortes, the orders of the Church were to be removed from relations to the Government that were offensive to the people. There was a long list of articles of specification of the reforms that were to be granted, the usual liberality of words of promise always bestowed by Spain upon her colonists. The representatives of Spain denied nothing that was asked; and to give weight to the program of concessions, there was paid in hand to Aguinaldo, through a transaction between banks in Manila and Hongkong, four hundred thousand dollars, the first installment of eight hundred thousand dollars agreed upon. [1] The Spaniards probably understood that they were bribing the insurgents and paying a moderate sum to cheaply end the war; and it did not cost the authorities of Spain anything, for they exacted the money from the Manila Bank of Spain, and still owe the bank. Aguinaldo's understanding, acted upon, was different. He accepted the money as a war fund, and has held and defended it for the purchase of arms, and resumed hostilities when all promises of reform were broken, and nothing whatever done beyond the robbery of the bank to bribe the rebel chiefs, which was the Spanish translation. Of course, it was claimed by the enemies of Aguinaldo that he was bought and paid for, but he has maintained the fund, though there were those professors of rebellion, who made claims to a share of the money. The second installment of the money that the rebels were to have been paid is yet an obligation not lifted, and the hostilities were revived as soon as the craft of the Spanish negotiators in promising everything because they meant to do nothing, became obvious. The actual proceedings in this case can be summed up in a sentence: The Spaniards took four hundred thousand dollars out of the Bank of Spain and gave it to the insurgents, for a temporary armistice. General Aguinaldo, though he appears very well in refusing to employ the money paid by Spain as a bribe for himself, has not the elements of enduring strength as the leader of the insurgents. As against the Spaniards he can keep the field, and carry on a destructive guerilla warfare, hopeless on both sides, like that going on in Cuba, when that island was invaded by the American army. But as against American rule the Philippines would cease to be insurgents. The islanders will not be controlled by sentimentalism. Government by the United States would differ from that by Spain, as the two nations are different in character, in the nature of their political institutions, in their progressive movement. America is all active and free, and her freedom would be extended to the islanders. The transformation would be one from the paralysis of despotism to the life of liberty. The words despotism and freedom would instantly have a distinct business meaning. Make known in the city of Manila that the Americans will abandon it, and the reviving hopes of the men of affairs would be instantly clouded, and the depression deepen into despondency and despair. Let it be the news of the day that the Americans will stay, and the intelligence of the city would regard its redemption as assured, every drooping interest revive, and an era of prosperity unknown under the dismal incompetency of Spain, open at once. It is legitimate that there should be freedom of speech as to the details of the proceedings. If our Government should do what Admiral Dewey did when he was the master of Manila, because he had annihilated the Spanish fleet and had the power to destroy the city—cast anchor and stay where we are already in command—the task is neither so complex nor costly as its opponents claim. Our territorial system is one easy of application to colonies. We have had experience of it from the first days of our Government. There is no commandment that a Territory shall become a State in any given time, or ever. We can hold back a Territory, as we have Arizona and New Mexico, or hasten the change to Statehood according to the conditions, and the perfect movement of the machinery requires only the presence in Congress of dominant good sense. Congress is easily denounced, but no one has found a substitute for it, and it is fairly representative of the country. Congress will never gamble away the inheritance of the people. It will probably, in spite of all shortcomings, have its average of ability and utility kept up. Congress may go wrong, but will not betray. Our outlying possessions must be Territories until they are Americanized, and we take it Americans know what that word means. If a specification is wanted as a definition, we have to say the meaning is just what has happened in California since our flag was there. In the case of the Philippines, if we stick, and we do not see how we can help doing so, the President will, in regular course, appoint a Territorial Governor, and as a strong Government capable of quick and final decisions must be made, the Governor should be a military man, and have a liberal grant, by special Act of Congress, of military authority. He should be a prompt, and all around competent administrator. He will not have to carry on war offensive or defensive. He need not be in a hurry to go far from Manila. He will not be molested there. The country will gravitate to him. The opponents of the Republican form of Government, as it is in the United States and the Territories of the Nation will become insignificant in the Philippines. They will have no grievances, except some of them may not be called at once to put on the trappings of personal potentiality. General Aguinaldo would find all the reforms the Spanish promised when they paid him four hundred thousand dollars to prove their good intentions, free as the air. He could not make war against the benignancy of a Government, Republican in its form and its nature, which simply needs a little time, some years maybe, before erasing the wrongs that have had a growth of centuries. The American Governor-General need not send out troops to conquer districts, coercing the people. The people will soon be glad to see the soldiers of the United States, the representatives of the downfall and departure of the instruments of Spain. Aguinaldo and his party have a Congress. It might be an approved beginning of a Territorial Legislature, and the insurgent General might be the presiding officer. There would be abundant reason for the auspicious exercise of all his rights in the public service. As for the cost of the Philippines under our Government, that would fall upon the treasury of the United States. There can be no doubt that it would be for several years a considerable sum, but the public men who favored peace for the liberation of Cuba, did not make counting the cost the most prominent feature of the war they advocated, but accepted the fact that the national honor and fame, the glory of heroism and deeds of daring and sacrifice, are priceless, and their achievement beyond price. There is to be said under this head, that the Philippine Islands are of natural riches almost without parallel. The great isle of Luzon teems with productions that have markets the world over, and it is commonplace for the savages in the mountains to come out of their fastnesses with nuggets of gold to make purchases. Cotton, sugar, rice, hemp, coffee and tobacco, all tropical fruits and woods, are of the products. There is profusion of the riches that await the freedom of labor and the security of capital, and the happiness of the people. Under American government the Philippines would prosper, and it would be one of our tasks to frame legislation. The laws of Congress would be the higher code of law, and the Philippines would desire, and be invited, of course, to send their ablest men to be Territorial representatives in the Congress of the United States. In the name of peace, therefore, and in behalf of the dignity and authority of this Nation—in mercy to the Spaniards, in justice to the Filipinos, it is due ourselves, and should have the favor of all who would see our country expand with the ages, and walking in the footsteps of Washington and Jefferson, finding the path of empire that of freedom and taking our place as a great Power, accepting the logic of our history, and the discharge of the duties of destiny—we should hold on to the Philippines—and when the great distance of those islands from this continent is mentioned, remember that the Pacific may now be crossed in as few days as was the Atlantic forty years ago.
The labor questions and the silver questions even come into the Philippines problem to be scanned and weighed. In Eastern Asia, which we have invaded, and a part of which we have appropriated for a time, the people use silver for the measure of value, and in the islands that interest us, as they do not deal in the mysteries of rupees, but in dollars, the facts in the case are plainly within the common understanding. In Manila the Mexican dollar goes in ordinary small exchanges, payment of wages and settlement of bills, for fifty cents; but the banks sell the Mexicans twenty-one of them for ten gold dollars—an American eagle! So far as the native people go, labor and produce are counted in silver, and the purchaser, or employer gets as much for a silver dollar as for a gold dollar. The native will take ten dollars in gold for ten dollars only in all settlements of accounts, and would just as willingly—even more so, accept ten Mexican dollars as ten American dollars in gold coin. Salaries are paid and goods delivered according to the silver standard. Of course, in due time this state of things will pass away, if we hold to the gold standard, but as the case stands the soldiers and sailors of our army and fleet, paid under the home standard, receive double pay, and get double value received for clothing, tobacco and whatever they find they want—indeed, for the necessaries and luxuries of life. The double standard in this shape is not distasteful to the boys.
We have both theories and conditions confronting us in these aspects of the silver and labor questions. The Oriental people are obdurate in their partiality for silver. It is the cheaper labor that adheres to the silver standard, partially, it is held, because silver is the more convenient money for the payment of small sums. But labor cannot be expected, at its own expense, to sustain silver for the profit of capital, or rather of the middle man between labor and capital. Labor, so far as it is in politics in this country, should not, without most careful study and deliberation, conclude that its force in public affairs would be abated, and its policy of advancing wages antagonized by the absorption of the Philippines in our country. On the contrary, the statesmanship that is representative of labor may discover that it is a great fact, one of the greatest of facts, that the various countries and continents of the globe are being from year to year more and more closely associated, and that to those intelligently interested, without regard to the application of their views of justice or expediency, in the labor and silver questions—the convictions, the fanaticisms, of the vast silver nations—and enormous multitudes of the people of Asia, touching the silver standard—and the possible progress of labor, as a guiding as well as plodding ability increases incessantly in interest, and must grow in inheritance. As the conditions of progressive civilization are developed our interests cannot be wholly dissevered from those of the Asiatics. We would be unwise to contemplate the situation of to-day as one that can or should perpetuate itself. Suppose we accept, the governing responsibility in the Philippines. It is not beyond the range of reasonable conjecture that American labor can educate the laborers of the Philippines out of their state of servitude as cheap laborers, and lead them to co-operate rather than compete with us, and not to go into the silver question further than to consent that it exists, and is in the simplest form of statement, whether the change in the market value of the two money metals is natural or artificial. It is necessary in common candor to state that the most complete solution of the money metal embarrassments would be through the co-operation of Asia and America. Europe is for gold, Asia for silver, and the Americas divided. Japan is an object lesson, her approximation to the gold standard has caused in the Empire an augmentation of the compensation of labor. This is not wholly due to the change in the standard. The war with China, the increase in the army and navy, and the absorption of laborers in Formosa, the new country of Japan, have combined with the higher standard of value, to elevate wages. All facts are of primary excellence in the formation of the policies of nations.
CHAPTER IX
The Philippine Islands As They Are.
Area and Population—Climate—Mineral Wealth—Agriculture—Commerce and Transportation—Revenue and Expenses—Spanish Troops—Spanish Navy—Spanish Civil Administration—Insurgent Troops—Insurgent Civil Administration—United States Troops—United States Navy—United States Civil Administration—The Future of the Islands.
General Frank V. Greene made an exhaustive study of all reports of an official character regarding the area, population, climate, resources, commerce, revenue and expenses of the Philippines Islands, and prepared a memorandum for the general information that is the most thorough and complete ever made, and is the latest and highest authority on all the subjects to which it relates, and they include the solid information the business men of the United States want respecting our Asiatic associations. The memorandum is herewith submitted in substance, and all the particulars of public concern.
Area and Population.
These islands, including the Ladrones, Carolinas and Palaos, which are all under the Government of Manila, are variously estimated at from 1,200 to 1,300 in number. The greater portion of these are small and of no more value than the islands off the coast of Alaska. The important islands are less than a dozen in number, and 90 per cent. of the Christian population live on Luzon and the five principal islands of the Visayas group.
The total population is somewhere between 7,000,000 and 9,000,000. This includes the wild tribes of the mountains of Luzon and of the islands in the extreme south. The last census taken by the Spanish Government was on December 31, 1887, and this stated the Christian population to be 6,000,000 (in round numbers). This is distributed as follows:
Per Area. Population. Sq. Mile. Luzon 44,400 3,426,000 79 Panay 4,700 735,000 155 Cebu 2,400 504,000 210 Leyte 3,300 279,000 71 Bohol 1.300 245,000 188 Negros 3,300 242,000 73 ====== ========= === 59,800 5,422,000 91
The density of population in these six islands is nearly 50 per cent. greater than in Illinois and Indiana (census of 1890), greater than in Spain, about one-half as great as in France, and one-third as great as in Japan and China, the exact figures being as follows:
Area. Population. Per Sq. Mile. Illinois 56,000 3,826,351 68 Indiana 35,910 2,192,494 61 ——— ————- —- 91,910 6,018,755 64
Spain 197,670 17,565,632 88 France 204,092 38,517,975 189 Japan 147,655 42,270,620 286 China 1,312,328 383,253,029 292
The next most important islands, in the order of population, are:
Area. Population. Per Sq. Mile. Mindanao 34,000 209,000 6 Samar 4,800 186,000 38 Mindoro 4,000 67,000 17 Nomblon 600 35,000 58 Masbate 1,400 21,000 15 ——— ———- — 44,800 518,000 11
Various smaller islands, including the Carolinas, Ladrones and Palaos, carry the total area and Christian population to—
140,000 6,000,000 43
This is considerably greater than the density of population in the States east of the Rocky Mountains. Owing to the existence of mountain ranges in all the islands, and lack of communication in the interior, only a small part of the surface is inhabited. In many provinces the density of population exceeds 200 per square mile, or greater than that of any of the United States, except Massachusetts and Rhode Island. The total area of the Philippines is about the same as that of Japan, but its civilized population is only one-seventh.
In addition to the Christian population, it is estimated (in the Official Guide) that the islands contain the following:
Chinese (principally in Manila) 75,000 Moors or Mohametans in Paragon and Jok 100,000 Moors or Mohametans in Mindanao and Basilan 209,000 Heathen in the Philippines 830,000 Heathen in the Carolinas and Palaos 50,000 ————- 1,264,000
The Official Guide gives a list of more than thirty different races, each speaking a different dialect; but five-sixths of the Christian population are either Tagalos or Visayas. All the races are of the Malay type. Around Manila there has been some mixture of Chinese and Spanish blood with that of the natives, resulting in the Mestizos or Half-breeds, but the number of these is not very great.
As seen in the provinces of Cavite and Manila, the natives (Tagalos) are of small stature, averaging probably 5 feet 4 inches in height, and 120 pounds in weight for the men, and 5 feet in height, and 100 pounds in weight for the women. Their skin is coppery brown, somewhat darker than that of the mulatto. They seem to be industrious and hard-working, although less so than the Chinese. By the Spaniards they are considered indolent, crafty, untruthful, cowardly and cruel, but the hatred between the Spaniards and the native races is so intense and bitter that the Spanish opinion of the natives is of little or no value. To us they seem industrious and docile, but there are occasional evidences of deceit and untruthfulness in their dealings with us. The bulk of the population is engaged in agriculture, and there were hardly any evidences of manufactures, arts or mining. The greater number seemed to be able to read and write, but I have been unable to obtain any exact figures on this subject. They are all devout Roman Catholics, although they hate the monastic orders.
In Manila (and doubtless also in Cebu and Iloilo) are many thousands of educated natives, who are merchants, lawyers, doctors and priests. They are well informed and have accumulated property. They have not traveled much, but there is said to be quite a numerous colony of rich Filipinos in Madrid, as well as in Paris and London. The bibliography of the Philippines is said to number 4,500 volumes, the greater part of which have been written by Spanish priests and missionaries. The number of books on the subject in the English language is probably less than a dozen.
Climate.
The climate is one of the best known in the tropics. The islands extend from 5 to 21 deg. north latitude, and Manila is in 14d. 35m. The thermometer during July and August rarely went below 79 or above 85. The extreme ranges in a year are said to be 61 and 97, and the annual mean, 81. There are three well-marked seasons, temperate and dry from November to February, hot and dry from March to May, and temperate and wet from June to October. The rainy season reaches its maximum in July and August, when the rains are constant and very heavy. The total rainfall has been as high as 114 inches in one year.
Yellow fever appears to be unknown. The diseases most fatal among the natives are cholera and smallpox, both of which are brought from China. Low malarial fever is brought on by sleeping on the ground or being chilled by remaining, without exercise, in wet clothes; and diarrhea is produced by drinking bad water or eating excessive quantities of fruit. Almost all of these diseases are preventable by proper precautions, even by troops in campaign. The sickness in our troops was very small, much less than in the cold fogs at camp in San Francisco.
Mineral Wealth.
Very little is known concerning the mineral wealth of the islands. It is stated that there are deposits of coal, petroleum, iron, lead, sulphur, copper and gold in the various islands, but little or nothing has been done to develop them. A few concessions have been granted for working mines, but the output is not large. The gold is reported on Luzon, coal and petroleum on Cebu and Iloilo, and sulphur on Leyte. The imports of coal in 1894 (the latest year for which the statistics have been printed) were 91,511 tons, and it came principally from Australia and Japan. In the same year the imports of iron of all kinds were 9,632 tons.
If the Cebu coal proves to be good quality there is a large market for it in competition with the coal from Japan and Australia.
Agriculture.
Although agriculture is the chief occupation of the Philippines, yet only one-ninth of the surface is under cultivation. The soil is very fertile, and even after deducting the mountainous areas, it is probable that the area of cultivation can be very largely extended, and that the islands can support a population equal to that of Japan (42,000,000).
The chief products are rice, corn, hemp, sugar, tobacco, cocoanuts and cacao. Coffee and cotton were formerly produced in large quantities—the former for export and the latter for home consumption; but the coffee plant has been almost exterminated by insects, and the home made cotton clothes have been driven out by the competition of those imported from England. The rice and corn are principally produced in Luzon and Mindoro, and are consumed in the islands; the rice crop is about 765,000 tons; it is insufficient for the demand and 45,000 tons of rice were imported in 1894, the greater portion from Saigon, and the rest from Hongkong and Singapore; also 8,669 tons (say 60,000 barrels) of flour, of which more than two-thirds came from China and less than one-third from the United States.
The cacao is raised in the southern islands, the best quality of it in Mindanao. The production amounts to only 150 tons, and it is all made into chocolate and consumed in the islands.
The sugar cane is raised in the Visayas. The crop yielded, in 1894, about 235,000 tons of raw sugar, of which one-tenth was consumed in the islands and the balance, or 210,000 tons, valued at $11,000,000, was exported, the greater part to China, Great Britain and Australia.
The hemp is produced in southern Luzon, Mindoro, the Visayas and Mindanao. It is nearly all exported in bales. In the year 1894 the amount was 96,000 tons, valued at $12,000,000.
Tobacco is raised in all the islands, but the best quality and the greatest amount in Luzon. A large amount is consumed in the islands, smoking being universal among the women as well as the men, but the best quality is exported. The amount, in 1894, was 7,000 tons of leaf tobacco, valued at $1,400,000, and 1,400 tons of manufactured tobacco, valued at $1,750,000. Spain takes 30 per cent, and Egypt 10 per cent of the leaf tobacco. Of the manufactured tobacco, 70 per cent, goes to China and Singapore, 10 per cent. to England, and 5 per cent. to Spain.
Cocoanuts are grown in southern Luzon and are used in various ways. The products are largely used in the islands, but the exports, in 1894, were valued at $2,400,000.
Cattle, goats and sheep have been introduced from Spain, but they are not numerous. Domestic pigs and chickens are seen around every hut in the farming districts.
The principal beast of burden is the carabac or water buffalo, which is used for ploughing rice fields, as well as drawing heavy loads on sledges or on carts.
Large horses are almost unknown, but there are great numbers of native ponies, from nine to twelve hands high, but possessing strength and endurance far beyond their size.
Commerce and Transportation.
The internal commerce between Manila and the different islands is quite large, but I was unable to find any official records giving exact figures concerning it. It is carried on almost entirely by water, in steamers of 500 to 1,000 tons. There are regular mail steamers, once in two weeks, on four routes, viz.; Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao; also a steamer every two months to the Carolines and Ladrones, and daily steamers on Manila Bay. These lines are all subsidized. To facilitate this navigation extensive harbor works have been in progress at Manila for several years, and a plan for lighting the coasts has been made, calling for forty-three principal lights, of which seventeen have already been constructed in the most substantial manner, besides sixteen lights of secondary importance.
There is only one line of railway, built by English capital, running from Manila north to Dagupan, a distance of about 120 miles. The roads in the immediate vicinity of Manila are macadamized and in fairly good order; elsewhere they are narrow paths of soft, black soil, which becomes almost impassable in the rainy season. Transportation is then effected by sledges, drawn through the mud by carabacs. There are telegraph lines connecting most of the provinces of Luzon with Manila, and cables to the Visayas and southern islands, and thence to Borneo and Singapore, as well as a direct cable from Manila to Hongkong. The land telegraph lines are owned by the Government, and the cables all belong to an English company, which receives a large subsidy. In Manila there is a narrow gauge street railway, operated by horse-power, about eleven miles in total length; also a telephone system, and electric lights.
Communications with Europe are maintained by the Spanish Trans-Atlantic Company (subsidized), which sends a steamer every four weeks from Manila and Barcelona, making the trip in about twenty-seven days. The same company also sends an intermediate steamer from Manila to Singapore, meeting the French Messagoric each way. There is also a non-subsidized line running from Manila to Hongkong every two weeks, and connecting there with the English, French and German mails for Europe, and with the Pacific mail and Canadian Pacific steamers for Japan and America.
There has been no considerable development of manufacturing industries in the Philippines. The only factories are those connected with the preparation of rice, tobacco and sugar. Of the manufactures and arts, in which Japan so excels, there is no evidence.
The foreign commerce amounted, in 1894, to $28,558,552 in imports, and $33,149,984 in exports, 80 per cent, of which goes through Manila. About 60 per cent. of the trade is carried in British vessels, 20 per cent. in Spanish and 10 per cent. in German.
The value of the commerce with other countries in 1894 was as follows:
In Millions of Dollars (Silver).
Imports. Exports. Spain 10.5 2.9 Great Britain 7.1 8.7 China 4.6 6.8 Germany 1.9 —- Saigon .9 —- United States .7 7.4 France .7 1.2 Singapore .4 1.7 Japan .2 1.2 Australia .1 2.6 Other Countries 1.5 .6 —— —— 25.6 33.1
It is interesting to note that next to Great Britain we are the largest customers of the Philippines, and that they export to us nearly three times as much as to Spain. On the other hand Spain sells to the Philippines fifteen times as much as we do.
The articles of import and their value in 1894 were as follows:
In Millions of Dollars (Silver).
Spain. Great China. Germany. United Other Total. Britain. States. Countries Cotton Goods 3.9 4.O .4 .3 — .7 9.3 Cotton Yarns 1.2 .9 .2 .1 — .1 2.5 Wines 1.8 — — — — .1 1.9 Russia. Mineral Oils — — .2 — .4 .8 1.4 Iron .2 .7 — .2 — .1 1.2 Rice — — 1.0 — — .1 1.1 Flour — — .7 — .2 — .9 Sweet Meats .5 — — — — .3 .8 Paper .4 — — .1 — .2 .7 Linen Goods .1 .1 .1 — — .3 .6 Hats .1 — — .3 — .2 .6 Other Articles 2.3 1.4 2.O .9 .1 .9 7.6 — — — — — — — 10.5 7.1 4.6 1.9 .7 3.8 28.6
The articles of export and their value in 1894 were as follows:
In Millions of Dollars (Silver).
Spain Great China United Austra- Other Total Britain States lia Countries Hemp — 5.3 .9 6.6 .6 1.1 [2] 14.5 Sugar .4 2.7 4.O .7 1.9 1.3 [3] 11.O Man'f. Tobacco .2 .1 .7 .. .1 .7 [4] 1.3 Leaf Tobacco 1.1 .. .. .. .. .3 1.4 Coffee .3 .. .1 .. .. .. .4 Cocoanuts .. .6 .1 .. .. .. .7 Other Articles .9 .. 1.O .1 .. 1.3 3.3 — — — — — — — 2.9 8.7 6.8 7.4 2.6 4.7 33.16
With these islands in our possession and the construction of railroads in the interior of Luzon, it is probable that an enormous extension could be given to this commerce, nearly all of which would come to the United States. Manila cigars of the best quality are unknown in America. They are but little inferior to the best of Cuba, and cost only one-third as much. The coffee industry can be revived and the sugar industry extended, mainly for consumption in the far East. The mineral resources can be explored with American energy, and there is every reason to believe that when this is done the deposits of coal, iron, gold and lead will be found very valuable. On the other hand, we ought to be able to secure the greater part of the trade which now goes to Spain in textile fabrics, and a considerable portion of that with England in the same goods and in iron.
Revenue and Expenses.
The budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, was as follows:
Income.
1st. Direct Taxes $8,496,170 2nd. Indirect Taxes (Customs) 6,200,550 3rd. Proceeds of Monopolies 1,222,000 4th. Lottery 1,000,000 5th. Income of Government Property 257,000 6th. Sundry Receipts 298,300 —————- Total $17,474,020
Expenses.
1st. General Expenses, Pensions and Interest $1,506,686 2nd. Diplomatic and Consular Service 74,000 3rd. Clergy and Courts 1,876,740 4th. War Department 6,035,316 5th. Treasury Department 1,392,414 6th. Navy Department 3,562,716 7th. Civil Administration 2,195,378 8th. Education 614,395 —————- Total $17,258,145
The Direct Taxes were as follows:
1st. Real Estate, 5 per cent, on income $ 140,280 2nd. Industry and Commerce 1,400,700 3rd. Cedalas (Poll Tax) 5,600,000 4th. Chinese Poll Tax 510,190 5th. Tribute from Sultan of Jolo 20,000 6th. Railroads, 10 per cent. of Passenger Receipts 32,000 7th. Income Tax, 10 per cent. on Public Salaries 730,000 8th. Sundry Taxes 63,000 ————— Total $8,496,170
Indirect Taxes were as follows:
1st. Imports $3,600,000 2nd. Exports 1,292,550 3rd. Loading Tax 410,000 4th. Unloading Tax 570,000 5th. Fines and Penalties 27,000 6th. Special Tax on Liquors, Beer, Vegetables, Flour, Salt and Mineral Oils 301,000 ————— Total $6,200,550
Monopolies:
1st. Opium Contract $ 576,000 2nd. Stamped Paper and Stamps 646,000 ————— Total $1,222,000
Lottery:
1st. Sale of Tickets, Less Cost of Prizes $ 964,000 2nd. Unclaimed Prizes 30,000 3rd. Sundry Receipts 6,000 ————— Total $1,000,000
Income of Government Property:
1st. Forestry Privileges $170,000 2nd. Sale and Rent of Public Land and Buildings 85,000 3rd. Mineral Privileges 2,000 ———— Total $257,000
Sundry Receipts:
1st. Mint (Seignorage) $200,000 2nd. Sundries 98,300 ———— Total $298,300
The largest source of income is the Cedala or Poll Tax. Every man and woman above 18 years of age, residing in the Philippines, whether Spanish subject or foreigner, is required to have in his or her possession a paper stating name, age, and occupation, and other facts of personal identity. Failure to produce and exhibit this when called upon renders anyone liable to arrest and imprisonment. This paper is obtained from the internal revenue office annually, on payment of a certain sum, varying, according to the occupation and income of the person from $0.75 to $20.00, and averaging about $3.00 for each adult. An extra sum of 2 per cent. is paid for expense of collection. The tax is collected at the Tribunal in each pueble, and 20 per cent. is retained for expenses of local administration, and 80 per cent. paid to the General Treasury. This tax falls heavily on the poor and lightly on the rich. The tax on industry and commerce is similarly graded according to the volume of business transacted by each merchant or merchantile corporation. The tax on real estate is absurdly low and levied only on municipal property and on the rent, not the value.
The tax on imports is specific and not ad valorum; it amounts to about 13 per cent. of estimated values. The free list is very small, nearly everything of commercial value which is imported being subject to duty. The revenue from imports has increased from $566,143 in 1865, to $3,695,446 in 1894. It was about the same in 1897. On the other hand the export tax, which was nothing in 1892, the loading tax, which was nothing in 1893, and the unloading tax, which was nothing in 1894, have all been increased in the last few years in order to meet the expenses of suppressing the insurrection. These three items yielded nearly $2,700,000 in 1897.
The monopoly of importing and selling opium is sold, by auction, to the highest bidder for a term of three years. The present contract runs until 1899, and yields $48,000 per month.
Every legal document must be drawn up on paper containing a revenue stamp, engraved and printed in Spain, and every note, check, draft, bill of exchange, receipt or similar document must bear a revenue stamp in order to be valid. These stamps and stamped paper yielded a revenue of $646,000 in 1897.
The lottery is conducted by the Government—the monthly drawings taking place in the Treasury (Hacienda) Department. The sale of tickets yielded $1,000,000 over and above prizes in 1897.
In a report to General Merritt, on August 29th, I recommended that the opium contract be cancelled and the lottery abandoned during our occupation of Manila; and as the poll tax and the tax on industry and commerce had been paid for the most part in the early part of the year, our chief sources of revenue were from the custom house, the sale of stamps and stamped paper, and the sale of such licenses as the law allowed (amusements, liquor saloons, etc.), for the benefit of the city of Manila as distinguished from the general revenue. I estimated the total at about $500,000 per month.
The expenses of administering the military government of occupation (apart from the expenses of the army) will consist of the current expenses of the office at the Provost Marshal General's office and its various bureaus—at the custom house, internal revenue office, and other offices—and the salaries of interpreters and minor employes who are anxious to resume work as soon as they dare do so. An estimate of these expenses was being prepared at the time I left, but was not completed. It can hardly exceed $200,000 per month and may be much less. This should leave $300,000 (silver) excess of income per month, to go towards the military expenses of occupation.
As soon as it is decided that we are to retain the islands it will be necessary to make a careful study of the sources of revenue and items of expenses for all the islands, with a view to thoroughly understanding the subject, before introducing the extensive changes which will be necessary.
Currency.
The standard of value has always, until within a few years, been the Mexican milled dollar. The Spanish dollar contains a little less silver and, in order to introduce it and profit by the coinage, the Spaniards prohibited the importation of Mexican dollars a few years since. Large numbers of Mexican dollars remained in that country, however, and others were smuggled in. The two dollars circulate at equal value.
All valuations of goods and labor are based on the silver dollar, and a change to the gold standard would result in great financial distress and many failures among the banks and mercantile houses in Manila. Their argument is that while an American ten-dollar gold piece will bring twenty-one silver dollars at any bank or house having foreign connections, yet it will not buy any more labor or any more hemp and sugar from the original producer than ten silver dollars. The products of the country are almost entirely agricultural, and the agricultural class, whether it sells its labor or its products, would refuse to accept any less than the accustomed wages or prices, on account of being paid in the more valuable coin. The result of the change would be that the merchant or employe would have to pay double for what he buys, and would receive no increase for what he sells. While trade would eventually adjust itself to the change, yet many merchants would be ruined in the process and would drag some banks down with them.
The Mexican dollar is the standard also in Hongkong and China, and the whole trade of the Far East has, for generations, been conducted on a silver basis. Japan has, within the last year, broken away from this and established the gold standard, but in doing so the relative value of silver and gold was fixed at 32 1/2 to 1, or about the market rate.
Public Debt.
I was unable to obtain any precise information in regard to the colonial debt. The last book on statistics of imports and exports was for the fiscal year 1894, and the last printed budget was for 1896-7, which was approved by the Queen Regent in August, 1896. Subsequent to this date, according to the statements made to me by foreign bankers, the Cortes authorized two colonial loans of $14,000,000 (silver) each, known as Series A and Series B. The proceeds were to be used in suppressing the insurrection. Both were to be secured by a first lien on the receipts of the Manila custom house.
Series A is said to have been sold in Spain and the proceeds to have been paid into the Colonial Office; but no part of them has ever reached the Philippines. Possibly a portion of it was used in sending out the 25,000 troops which came from Spain to the Philippines in the autumn of 1896.
Series B was offered for sale in Manila, but was not taken. An effort was then made to obtain subscribers in the Provinces, but with little or no success. The Government then notified the depositors in the Public Savings Bank (a branch of the Treasury Department similar to the postal savings bureaus in other countries) that their deposits would no longer be redeemed in cash, but only in Series B bonds. Some depositors were frightened and took bonds, others declined to do so. Then came the blockade of Manila and all business was practically suspended.
No printed report has been made concerning the debt, and I was unable to obtain any satisfactory statement of the matter from the treasury officials.
The exact in regard to the Series A bonds can be learned in Madrid; but it will be difficult to learn how many of Series B were issued and what consideration was received for them.
As already stated, both series of bonds rest for security on the receipts of the Manila custom house.
Spanish Troops.
The Spanish prisoners of war number about 13,000, including about 400 officers. The infantry arms are about 32,000, the greater part Mauser model 1895, caliber 28, and the others Remingtons, model 1889, caliber 43. The ammunition is about 22,000,000 rounds. The field artillery consists of about twelve breech-loading steel guns, caliber 3 5-10 inches, and ten breech-loading mountain guns, caliber 3 2-10 inches. There are six horses (ponies) for each gun, but the harness is in bad order. Ammunition, about sixty rounds per gun, with possibly more in the arsenals. There are about 500 cavalry ponies, larger than the average of native horses, with saddles and equipments complete. There is also a battalion of engineers. The fortifications of the walled city are a fine sample of the Vauban type, on which military engineers expended so much ingenuity 150 years ago, and of which Spain possessed so many in her Flemish dominions. The first walls of Manila were built about 1590, but the present fortifications date from a short time after the capture and occupation of the place by the English, in 1762-64. They consist of bastions and curtains, deep, wet ditch, covered way, lunettes, demilunes, hornworks, and all the scientific accessories of that day. They are in a good state of preservation, and mount several hundred bronze guns, but they are chiefly of interest to the antiquarian. On the glacis facing the bay, and also on the open space just south of the walls, are mounted 9-inch breech loaders, four in all, made at Hoatoria, Spain, in 1884. They are well mounted, between high traverses, in which are bomb-proof magazines. These guns are practically uninjured, and Admiral Dewey has the breech blocks. While not as powerful as the guns of the present day of the same caliber, they are capable of effective service. Their location, however, is very faulty, as they are on the shore of the bay, with all the churches, public buildings and most valuable property immediately behind them. On the day after the naval battle Admiral Dewey sent word to the Governor-General that if these guns fired a shot at any of his vessels he would immediately reply with his whole squadron. Owing to their location, this meant a bombardment of the city. This threat was effective; these guns were never afterward fired, not even during the attack of August 13th, and in return the navy did not fire on them, but directed all their shells at the forts and trenches occupied by the troops outside of the suburbs of the city.
Within the walled city are the cathedral and numerous churches, convents and monasteries, the public offices, civil and military, military workshops and arsenals, barracks for artillery, cavalry and engineers, storehouses and a few dwellings and shops.
The infantry barracks are outside of the walls, four in number; viz.: Neysing, Fortin, Calzada and Fruita. They are modern and well constructed, and will accommodate about 4,000 men. They are now occupied by the United States troops. Under the terms of the armistice the arms laid down by the Spanish troops on August 14th are to be returned to them whenever they evacuate the city, or the American army evacuates it. All other public property, including horses, artillery, public funds, munitions, etc., is surrendered to the United States unconditionally.
The question of sending back the troops to Spain is left absolutely to the decision of the authorities in Washington. They are all within the walled city, but as the public buildings are insufficient to accommodate them, they are quartered in the churches and convents. These buildings are not adapted for this purpose; they have no sinks, lavatories, kitchens or sleeping apartments, and there is great danger of an epidemic of sickness if the troops are not soon removed.
Pending their removal they are being fed with rations furnished by the United States Commissary Department, and the officers receive from the United States sufficient money for their support.
Spanish Navy.
At the outbreak of the war the naval force in the Philippines consisted of
10 Cruisers. 19 Gunboats. 4 Armed Launches. 3 Transports. 1 Survey Boat. 37
Of these Admiral Dewey destroyed, on May 1st, ten cruisers and one transport, and he has since captured two gunboats. The Spaniards have sunk one transport and two or three gunboats in the Pasig River. There remain thirteen or fourteen gunboats, which are scattered among the islands. They are of iron, from 140 to 200 tons each, are armed with one breech-loading rifle, caliber 3 6-10 inches, and two to four machine guns, each caliber 44-100 to 1 inch. One of the captured boats, the Callao, under command of Lieutenant Tappan, United States Navy, and a crew of eighteen men, rendered very efficient service in the attack of August 13th. These boats would all be useful in the naval police of the islands. They will, however, probably be scuttled by the Spaniards before the islands are surrendered.
The Navy Yard at Cavite has barracks for about 1,500 men (now occupied by United States troops) and has shops and ways for light work and vessels of less than 1,000 tons. Many of the gunboats above mentioned were built there. The shallow depth of water in Canacoa or Cavite Bay would prevent the enlargement of this naval station to accommodate large vessels, and the plan of the Spaniards was to create a large naval station in Subig Bay, on which considerable money has already been spent.
Spanish Civil Administration.
The Government of the Philippine Islands, including the Ladrones, Carolinas and Palaos, is vested in the Governor-General, who, in the language of the Spanish Official Guide, or Blue Book, "is the sole and legitimate representative in these islands of the supreme power of the Government of the King of Spain, and, as such, is the supreme head of all branches of the public service, and has authority to inspect and supervise the same, not excepting the courts of justice." The office is held by a Lieutenant-General in the Spanish army, and he is also Vice Royal Patron of the Indies, exercising in these islands the ecclesiastical functions conferred on the King of Spain by various Bulls of the Popes of Rome, Captain-General-in-Chief of the Army of the Philippines, Inspector-General of all branches of the service, Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, and President of all corporations and societies which partake of an official character.
What corresponds to his Cabinet, or Ministry, consists of
(a) The Archbishop of Manila and four Bishops, who administer ecclesiastical affairs in the five dioceses into which the islands are divided for this purpose; the appointment of parish priests and curates, however, is vested in the Governor-General. The various religious orders which exercise so large an influence in the politics and business of the islands, viz.: Augustinians, Dominicans, Recollects. Franciscans, Capuchins, Benedictines and Jesuits, are all under the management of the Bishops, subject to the supervision of the Pope, and the prerogatives of the King as Royal Patron, which prerogatives are exercised by the Governor-General as Viceroy.
(b) The High Court of Justice in Manila, which is the Court of Appeals in civil and governmental cases for all the islands. There are two principal criminal courts in Cebu and Vigan (northern Luzon) and appeal in criminal cases lies to these courts or to the High Court of Manila. In every Province there is a court of primary jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases.
(c) The General, second in command, who is a General of Division in the Spanish army. He is the sub-inspector of all branches of the military service, is Military Governor of the Province and city of Manila and commands all the troops stationed therein, and in the absence or sickness of the Captain General he commands all the military forces in the islands.
(d) The General Commandant of Dock Yards and Squadron. This post is filled by a Vice Admiral in the Spanish navy, and he commands the naval forces, ships and establishments in the islands.
(e) The Minister of Finance, or Intendente General de Hacienda, who is charged with the collection of customs and internal taxes, the expenditures of public money, and the audit and control of public accounts.
(f) The Minister of the Interior, or Director General of Civil Administration, who is charged with all public business relating to public instruction, charities, health, public works, forests, mines, agriculture, industry and commerce, posts and telegraphs and meteorology.
For the purpose of local administration the islands are divided into Provinces and Districts, classified as follows:
19 Civil Governments. 24 Political-Military Governments. 23 Political-Military Commands. 15 Military Commands.
The most important of the Provinces are Manila, with a population of 400,238 (of which 10 per cent. are Chinese), and Cebu, with 501,076; and the least important districts are Balabas and Corregidor, with 420 and 320 respectively.
The governor or commandant has supreme control within his province or district of every branch of the public service, including the Courts of Justice, and each reports to the Governor General. The Guardia Civil or Gendarmerie, is subject only to his orders, and for arrests and imprisonment for political offenses, he is responsible, not to the law, but to the Governor General and the King.
The Civil Governments are governed by Civil Governors, of the rank in the Spanish Civil Service of Chiefs of Administration of the second class. The Political Military Governments and Commands are in charges of military and naval officers of various grades, according to their size and importance; ranging from General of Division at Mindanao, Brigadier-Generals at Cebu and Iloilo, Captain in the navy at Paragua, down to Lieutenant at Balabas and Corregidor.
The Civil or Military Governor is assisted by a secretary, a judge, an administrator of finances, a postmaster and a captain of police.
The affairs of cities are managed by a council (Ayuntamiento) consisting of a president, a recorder (Sindico), one or more mayors (Alcaldo), six to ten aldermen (Regidores) and a secretary.
Outside of the cities each province or district is divided into a number of villages or parishes (Pueblos); the total number of these is 1,055; in each there is a parish priest, a municipal captain, a justice of the peace, a school master and school mistress. The number of cities is very small, and the social life of the community depends almost wholly on the form of government of the Pueblos, or villages. In 1893 this was reorganized with the alleged intention of giving local self-government. The scheme is complicated and curious and only an outline of it can be given here. It is contained in full in the Royal Decree of May 19, 1893, a long document, supplemented by still longer regulations for carrying the same into effect.
In brief every Pueblo in which there are paid more than 1,000 Cedulas (poll tax) shall have a municipal tribunal consisting of five members, by whom its local affairs and funds shall be managed. The members are a
Municipal Captain. Senior Lieutenant. Lieutenant of Police. Lieutenant of Agriculture. Lieutenant of Cattle.
And the Village Priest is required to attend all the important meetings.
The Captain holds office for four years, and is eligible for indefinite re-election; the Lieutenants hold office for four years also, one-half of them going out of office every two years, and they are ineligible for re-election until two years after the expiration of their term. Both Captains and Lieutenants are elected, on a day designated by the Governor, and in presence of the village priest, and out going Captain, by the Principalia, or body of principal men of the village. The village is subdivided into Barangayes, or group of about 100 families each, and for each Barangay there is a Chief or Headman (Cabeza), who is appointed by the Governor, on the recommendation of the Municipal Tribunal. The Principalia is made up of
Former Municipal Captains. Former Municipal Lieutenants. Former Gobernadorcilles. Chiefs of Barangayes. All inhabitants paying more than $50 annually in taxes.
The Principalia choose the 12 electors as follows:
6 from the Chiefs of Barangayes. 3 from Former Municipal Captains. 3 from the largest taxpayers.
The electors hold office for six years, and one-third go out of office every two years.
The municipal Captain must be a resident of the village, more than 25 years of age, read and speak Spanish and be a Chief of Barangay. While the Municipal Tribunal nominally controls the local affairs, yet the Captain has the right to suspend all its acts which he considers against the public welfare, and report the matter to the Provincial Governor, who has power to rescind them; the Captain appoints all village employes, and removes them at will; he can also fine and punish them for petty offenses; he issues orders to the police and collects the taxes. He holds a commission as Delegate or Representative of the Governor General, and, in fact, he exercises within his little bailiwick the same supreme power that the governor exercises in the province, and the Governor General in the whole Archipelago.
In each province there is a Junta or Council, whose membership consists of
The Administrator of Finance. Two Vicars. The Public Physician.
The latter Four Members must be residents of the Capital of the Province, and they are elected by the Municipal Captains, from a list of names submitted to them by the Junta with the approval of the Governor.
The functions of this Junta or Council are solely those of inspection and advice. It watches over affairs of the Municipal Tribunals, and reports to the Governor its advice and recommendations concerning them. The Municipal Captain is obliged to deposit the taxes in the Provincial Treasury, the keys of which are held by three members of the Council; he draws out the money in accordance with the municipal budget, and his accounts must be approved by his lieutenants, countersigned by the village priest, passed upon by the Provincial Council, and finally approved by the Governor.
The Governor has power to suspend the Municipal Captain or any of his colleagues for a period of three months, and the Governor General can remove one or all of them from office at will; and "in extraordinary cases or for reasons of public tranquility, the Governor shall have power to decree, without any legal process, the abolition of the Municipal Tribunals." (Article 45.)
In December, 1896, General Polavieja issued a decree, suspending the elections which were to take place that month for one-third of the municipal electors, and directed the Governors of Provinces to send in names of persons suitable for appointment, together with the recommendations of the village priest in each case.
An examination of this unique scheme of village government shows that one-half of the electors are to be chosen from persons holding a subordinate office and appointed by the Governor; that the village priest must be present at all elections and important meetings; that the Captain has all the responsibility, and he must also be of the class holding a subordinate office by appointment of the governor; that the acts of Municipal Tribunal can be suspended by the Captain and rescinded by the Governor; and, finally, if the Municipal Tribunal is offensive to the Governor General he can either remove its members and appoint others in their place or can abolish it altogether.
Such is the Spanish idea of self-government; the Minister of the Colonies, in submitting the decree to the Queen Regent, expatiated on its merits in giving the natives such full control of their local affairs, and expressed the confident belief that it would prove "most beneficent to these people whom Providence has confided to the generous sovereignty of the Spanish monarchs."
This scheme of government by Municipal Tribunals was highly approved by the natives, except that feature of it which placed so much power in the hands of the Governor and Governor General. This, however, was the essence of the matter, from the Spanish standpoint, and these portions of the Decree were the ones most fully carried out. The natives complained, on the one hand, of the delay in putting the Decree into operation, and on the other hand that so much of it as was established was practically nullified by the action of the Governors. Seeing that the Tribunals had really no power, the members soon turned their sessions (which the Decree required to be secret) into political meetings in favor of the insurrection. So the whole project is thus far a failure: and the local administration is in considerable disorder, apart from that caused by the insurgents. In point of fact self-government and representation are unknown in these islands. The Archbishop and the four Bishops are appointed by the Pope; the Governor General, military and naval officers and all officials with a salary exceeding about $2.000 (silver) are appointed by the King or the Minister of the Colonies. Yet all the expenses are paid from the Philippine Treasury; the salaries of all officials, military, naval, civil and ecclesiastical, the expenses and pensions of the army, navy and church, the cost of the diplomatic and consular service in Japan, China and Singapore, even a portion of the expenses of the Colonial office, Madrid, and of pensions paid to the descendants of Columbus—all come out of the taxes raised in the islands. The natives have no place in the government, except clerks in the public offices at Manila and the petty positions in the villages and the Ayentamientos of cities, where their powers and responsibilities, as we have seen, are at all times limited and subject to revocation whenever disapproved by the Governor.
Though the population of the islands is 40 per cent. of that of Spain, they have no representation in the Cortes.
There is a widespread report, almost universally believed by native Filipinos and by foreign merchants, and even acknowledged by many Spaniards, that pecuniary dishonesty and corruption exist throughout the whole body of Spanish office-holders, from the highest to the lowest. Forced contributions are said to be levied on the salaries of minor officials; the Regimental Paymasters and Commissaries are said to have sold part of the regimental stores for their own profit, the Collector of Customs and the Minister of Finance to have imposed or remitted fines at the Custom House and Internal Revenue Office, according to payment or non-payment of presents by merchants, the judges and court officials to have "borrowed" from attorneys large sums which are never paid, and even the Governor General is reported to have organized a regular system of smuggling in Mexican dollars, the importation of which was prohibited by law, on a fixed scale of payment to himself. The current report is that Weyler carried away over $1,000,000 as his savings during the three years from 1888 to 1891 that he held the office of Governor General, on a salary of $40,000 a year. Of the proof of these reports I have naturally no personal knowledge, but they are matters of common talk and belief, and they have been stated to me by responsible persons, who have long resided in the islands.
As above stated, the Governor General is supreme head of every branch of the public service, not excepting the Courts of Justice. How this power was exercised is shown in the hundreds of executions for alleged political offenses, which took place during the years 1895, 1896 and 1897, by the thousands deported to Mindanao and Fernando Po, and by the number of political prisoners in jail at the time of our entry into Manila. On the first examination which General McArthur, as Military Governor, made of the jail, about August 22nd, he released over 60 prisoners confined for alleged political offenses. One of them was a woman who had been imprisoned for eleven years, by order of the Governor General, but without any charges ever having been presented against her; another was a woman who had been in jail for three years on a vague charge, never formulated, of having carried a basket of cartridges to an insurgent.
The day of reckoning for three centuries of this sort of government came when Admiral Dewey destroyed the Spanish squadron on May 1st, 1898. An insurrection had been in progress from August, 1896, to December, 1897. Unable to suppress it the Government had made a written treaty with the insurgent leaders, paying them a large sum of money and promising to introduce various reforms on condition that they would leave the country. Hardly had the Spanish officials recovered from this when the appalling disaster of the destruction of their fleet occurred under their very eyes.
Then followed in rapid succession the naval blockade, the arrival of the insurgent leaders from Hongkong, the raising of the insurgent army, which blockaded Manila on the land side, and finally, the American troops. At the end of 104 days after the destruction of the Spanish fleet, the city surrendered to a combined land and naval attack of the American forces. On the day after the capitulation, the American Commander in Chief issued his proclamation establishing a military government, appointed a Military Governor, a Minister of Finance, a Collector of Customs, Collector of Internal Revenue, Postmaster and Judge of the Provost Court; took possession of all public funds (about $900,000), and all public offices, and as rapidly as possible put this government in operation.
The machinery of the Spanish Government was thoroughly disorganized when we entered Manila. The Courts of Justice, except the inferior criminal courts, had not been in session since early in May; the officials had been cut off from communication with the other islands and with Spain for over three months; there had been no customs to collect, and, owing to the entire suspension of business, but little internal revenue; a forced loan of $2,000,000 for military purpose had been extracted from the Spanish-Philippine Bank, and yet the troops were several months in arrears of pay; all government offices outside the walled city had been moved to temporary quarters within the walls and their records had been lost or thrown into confusion; the officials seeing the inevitable end in sight, were intent only on planning for their return to Spain.
This disorganization was completed when the American Military officers took charge of the Government, and every Spanish official, without exception, refused absolutely to continue in service. They were immediately dismissed and dispersed.
The situation thus created is without precedent in American history. When Scott captured the City of Mexico it was acknowledged on both sides that his occupation was only to be temporary, and there were no insurgents to deal with. When the Americans entered California they found only a scanty population, who were soon outnumbered by the American immigrants. But in the Philippine Islands there is a population of more than 7,000,000, governed by an alien race, whose representatives present in the Islands, including military and naval forces, clergy and civil employes do not exceed 30,000 in number. Against this Government an insurrection is in progress, which claims to have been successful in provinces containing a population of about 2,000,000. The city and province of Manila, with a population of 400,000 more, have been captured and occupied by a foreign army, but whether its occupation is to be temporary or permanent has not yet been decided.
Finally, the Government officials of all classes refuse to perform their functions; the desire of most of them is to escape to Spain. It was stipulated in the capitulation that they should have the right to do so at their own expense, and numbers of them, as well as friars, have already taken their departure. The Spanish officials have intense fear of the Insurgents; and the latter hate them, as well as the friars, with a virulence that can hardly be described. They have fought them with success, and almost without interruption for two years, and they will continue to fight them with increased vigor and still greated prospects of success, if any attempt is made to restore the Spanish Government. In its present disorganized condition the Spanish Government could not successfully cope with them; on the other hand, it would not surrender to them. The result, therefore, of an attempted restoration of Spanish power in any of the islands would simply be civil war and anarchy, leading inevitably and speedily to intervention by foreign nations whose subjects have property in the islands which they would not allow to be destroyed.
Insurgent Troops.
It is very difficult to give figures for the exact numbers of insurgent troops. In his message to foreign governments of August 6th, asking for recognition of belligerency and independence, Aguinaldo claims to have a force of 30,000 men, organized into a regular army. This included the force in the provinces of Luzon outside of Manila. What was in evidence around Manila varied from 10,000 to 15,000. They were composed of young men and boys, some as young as fifteen years of age, recruited in the rural districts, having no property and nothing to lose in a civil war. They have received no pay and, although Aguinaldo speaks in his proclamation of his intention and ability to maintain order wherever his forces penetrate, yet the feeling is practically universal among the rank and file that they are to be compensated for their time and services and hardships by looting Manila. |
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