Thus what is known to international law as a "measure of constraint short of war" was instituted. The pressure was at once felt. At Saloniki particularly the people were obliged to live from hand to mouth, the supply boats being able to bring in only enough flour to last two days. So great was the need of grain in Greece itself that a cargo of flour which had been condemned at Piraeus was baked into bread. The Bulgarians attempted to relieve the situation by sending in 15,000 tons of wheat by rail from Sofia, but as the line over which it passed through Drama was presently occupied by the British, this source of supply could not be maintained, nor would it have been sufficient to have relieved the situation.

The Greek public and their Government were strongly impressed. One dispatch stated that Greek troops were patrolling the streets of Athens and that a heavy guard had been placed around the royal palace in fear of revolutionary attempts. Meanwhile the Cabinet Council was sitting in permanent conference with the chiefs of the General Staff trying to come to a decision.

"You are wicked," said M. Rallis, Greek Minister of Justice, to a British newspaper correspondent; "the only thing we want is peace and you force us to make war. You are starving us; two wheat vessels were stopped to-day. You want us to save you when no English soldiers shed their blood for Serbia, when scarcely an English rifle has been fired. We do not wish to be another Serbia."

The newspapers which supported Venizelos, on the other hand, accused the Government of having precipitated the country to the verge of a conflict with the Entente Powers by want of foresight and a policy of deception.

Finally, however, the Greek Government came to terms, accepting practically all that the Allies demanded and withdrawing most of the Greek soldiers from Saloniki, while the Gevgheli-Saloniki and the Doiran-Saloniki railroads were handed over to the Allies with their adjacent roads and land. King Constantine complained that he was between the devil and the deep sea, or words to that effect, and protested that Greek neutrality was violated, though he did not deny that he had at first acceded to the invitation Venizelos had extended to the Allies to send troops to Saloniki. The king, anxious to be rid of his unwelcome guests, let it be understood that if the Allies would only retire from Greece altogether, he and his army would protect their retreat and see that they were not molested on embarking. But this was a proposition which the Entente Powers were not inclined to consider at all by this time.

Meanwhile, before Greece was finally compelled to come to a complete understanding with the Allies regarding her attitude in the event of a general retirement on Saloniki, General Sarrail's position was becoming decidedly dangerous. The Bulgarian armies were, for the time being, busy pursuing the last remnants of the Serbians out of the country beyond Monastir, but presently they would be able to give their full attention and strength to an attack on the Allies. Thanks to the difficulties occasioned by the concentration of Greek troops in that section of the country, the British forces had not been afforded ample means of transportation and they were arriving but very slowly, though gradually they had established a line along the rugged hills to the north of Doiran. They had not, at the end of November, 1915, fought a general action as yet.

General Sarrail's position was a remarkably insecure one. The taking of Prilep, and subsequently the occupation of Monastir by the Bulgarians, practically turned his line and exposed him to a perilous flanking movement against his extreme left on the Tcherna. His troops were bunched up in a very acute salient, the head of which was just south of Gradsko, and his front very largely conformed to the convolutions of this and the Vardar River. On his right, from before Strumitza Station, the British continued the line to the north of Lake Doiran.

It will seem somewhat strange that, though the British were the first to disembark in Saloniki in the first week in October, 1915, two months should elapse before they took any prominent part in the fighting. The British commander, General Mahon, reached Greece on October 12, 1915, to be followed a month later by General Munro, but the British made no move of any importance. There were some trifling encounters with outposts, and these had been magnified into battles by the dispatches from Greece, but the truth was that the French had borne the brunt of the struggle on the Tcherna, perhaps because they were then more numerous than the British, who were not actively engaged in force until the first week of December. Their trenches, north and West of Lake Doiran, among bleak hills covered with snow, spread out fanwise in the direction of Strumitza, which they had taken over from the French when the latter had gone up the Vardar to Krivolak.



CHAPTER XXXVIII

BULGARIAN ATTACKS—ALLIES CONCENTRATE AT SALONIKI

On December 5, 1915, the Bulgarians gave the first indications of their preparations to break through the thin lines of the Allies. On that date the British were to have their first taste of heavy fighting. The Bulgarians delivered a massed attack at two points; one at Demir Kapu, another against the British positions on the Rabrovo-Doiran road.

The first assault of the enemy succeeded in gaining a foothold in the British trenches, but the British were presently able to regain their positions and drive the Bulgarians back. Here again it was obvious that the hearts of the Bulgarian soldiers were not in this fighting. Most of the British soldiers had never seen any fighting before, yet they were able to accomplish what the fierce Serbians had not been able to do; drive a superior force of Bulgarians back at the point of the bayonet. Numbers of the Bulgarians were taken prisoners, willingly enough, it seemed, and they told their captors that up to the actual fighting, until they actually saw the troops they were engaging, they had been under the impression they were to fight Greeks.

This first attack made the British commander realize, however, that the enemy opposing him was vastly his superior in numbers. A second assault, delivered in the face of a hot fire from the British, but with overwhelming numbers, drove the British soldiers from their first line of trenches; but they held on to their second line and every effort to expel them was a costly failure.

Meanwhile, Sarrail, on the Vardar, under cover of a feigned attack on Ishtip from Kara Hodjali, drew in his men from the Tcherna, and before the enemy had realized what he was doing, he had retired from the Kavaar Camp with all his stores, of which there was by this time a tremendous accumulation, and entrained at Krivolak, blowing up the bridges and tearing up the railroad behind him. On December 5, 1915, he had reached the north end of the Demir Kapu Gorge (Defile) practically without opposition, but in the gorge he had to fight hard to get out of it.

He had had the forethought, however, to throw up strong defensive works at the entrance and this enabled him to repel the attacks of the Bulgarians in spite of the determination with which they were being pushed. The retreat through the defile was an extremely precarious and difficult task, as there was no way out except along the railroad, running along a narrow shelf cut out of the steep, rocky banks of the Vardar. Yet the retreat was successfully accomplished, with all the stores, and, after destroying a tunnel and a bridge across the Vardar, it was continued to Gradetz, where heavy intrenchments had been thrown up.

Here, on December 8-9, 1915, the Bulgarians delivered a very violent attack, but were driven off with heavy losses. On the 10th the French announced that they were now occupying a new front, along the Bojimia, a branch of the Vardar, and that they were in touch with the left flank of the British.

Meanwhile, on the east side of the Vardar, General Todoroff was continuing his attack on the British. He had massed together about 100,000 men. On the morning of the 6th, after the first assault and under cover of dense mists that were rolling up from the swamps down near Saloniki, he was able to get in close to the British without being seen. As the dawn began breaking he poured a rain of high-explosive shells on the British, which here consisted mostly of Irish regiments.

As on the day before, the enemy came on in successive waves, so thick that the later ones carried the first before them, even when they turned to flee from the heavy fire of the British. Finally the British were again compelled to give way before the heavy impact of numbers. By evening they had retired two miles, not a great deal, considering the masses that were driving them. More than once it looked as though the British would be literally overwhelmed and annihilated. Eight guns were lost and about 1,300 men were killed or wounded.

The retirement had been in the direction of the Vardar and by the end of the second week of December, 1915, the British were able to make another stand over on the banks of the Vardar, below the right wing of the French.

The whole Bulgarian field army was evidently divided between the Rabrovo road and north of Strumitza Junction. It was clearly the enemy's intention to drive a wedge into the center, thus to isolate all the northern divisions and to bring about a general disaster.

Sarrail recognized his danger and began to retire his northern units, covering the movement with a fiercely contested action in the region of Strumitza.



By December 11, 1915, the French and British lines were close back on the Greek frontier, and although the Bulgarians delivered a heavy attack on that day, it was their final effort; the following day the Allies were across the frontier and the Bulgarians made no attempt to follow them. Possibly they were restrained by their German allies, or possibly they had no desire to involve Greece, for had the Bulgarians set foot on Greek soil, it is more than likely that Greek troops would have resisted them, and once such an encounter had taken place, Greece would probably have thrown herself into the war on the side of the Allies. As they retired, the allied troops destroyed the railroad behind them and set fire to Gevgheli and other towns on the other side of the border. And, by a fortunate coincidence, it was on the day before they crossed the frontier that Greece had finally accepted the proposals of the Allies that their forces were to be allowed freedom of movement.

Considering the tremendous difficulties he had had to contend with, in the face of the immense strength of his enemy, General Sarrail's retreat by no means diminished his reputation as a military leader. Although his men had at their disposal only one single-track line of railroad and no roads, their retirement was conducted in such order that they were able to save and withdraw all their stores, while the total of their casualties did not exceed 3,500, a very moderate loss under the circumstances. In less skillful hands the retreat might easily have developed into an irretrievable disaster. In its main object, saving Serbia from being crushed, the campaign had certainly been a failure, but this was rather the fault of the allied governments, and not because of the inefficiency of the leaders in the field.

The Bulgarians, naturally, felt that they had attained a great victory, and in a measure they had. On December 14, 1915, they published their version of the operations as follows:

"December 12, 1915, will remain for the Bulgarian Army and nation a day of great historical importance. The army on that day occupied the last three Macedonian towns that still remained in the hands of the enemy: Doiran, Gevgheli, and Struga. The last fights against the British, French, and Serbians took place near Doiran and Ochrida Lakes. The enemy was everywhere beaten. Macedonia is free! Not a single hostile soldier remains on Macedonian soil.... In the course of ten days the expeditionary army of General Sarrail was beaten and thrown back on neutral territory. On December 12, the whole of Macedonia was freed. The pursuit of the enemy was immediately stopped when the neutral frontier of Greece was reached."

This communique further pointed out that Serbia had been beaten in forty, and the British and French in ten, days. An official paper in Sofia declared that the "victories won over the Franco-British hordes" was even more glorious than those won over Serbia and declared that Bulgaria had given a lesson to the so-called Great Powers, Great Britain and France, showing them at the same time the manner in which small nations could fight for their independence.

That the Bulgarians did not pursue the allied troops across the Greek frontier was one of the surprises of the campaign. What the Greeks would have done had their hereditary enemies invaded their soil, even though not for the purpose of attacking them, was a question which perhaps the Greek Government itself had not fully answered. Certainly the critical character of the situation placed the Greeks in a very uncomfortable position. It had been at their suggestion that the Allies had come to Greece, and though a protest had been made against their landing, that protest was the last word in formality.

Consequently the Allies had some shadow of a moral right to the use of Saloniki, but now that Sarrail was falling back, with every prospect of his bringing the battle front down with him into Greek territory, the diplomatic situation became extremely delicate. To add to the confusion of the situation, it must be remembered that two or three divisions of the Greek Army had been concentrated in the very district through which the Bulgarians must pass, should they decide to follow the retiring column of the Allies' troops. Here, then, was the Greek dilemma; they had allowed, under formal protest, a pacific penetration of their country in accordance with the agreement they had made with Serbia, that the latter should be allowed to import armies, munitions, and other military material over the Saloniki-Uskub railroad. This agreement, Venizelos insisted, was binding on Greece, notwithstanding the equivocations of the king. But when the French and British troops retired, another situation was created altogether, because it was scarcely likely that the Bulgarians would stop short at the frontier of Greece, and more than likely that they would follow up their advance and incidentally shell and destroy Greek property. Thus Bulgaria would be doing what the Allies had very carefully avoided doing: commit an act of war against Greece.

But fortunately for Greece, the Bulgarians did not continue the pursuit, though the Greek Government waited anxiously to see what turn events would immediately take. Sofia published the most reassuring things about the friendliness of Bulgaria for Greece, though of course Athens, being herself the seat of a Balkan nation, knew what value such protestations of affection had. Greece had only to recall the expressions of friendliness Bulgaria had uttered to Serbia less than a week before attacking her.

Meanwhile the French and British had fallen back on an intrenched line two or three miles to the south of the Greek frontier. This front stretched from Karasuli, on the Vardar River, to Kilindir, on the Doiran-Saloniki railroad, and was about fifteen miles in length. The French were still on the left and the British on the right. The British flank, in the east, was about thirty miles from Saloniki. These lines were strongly intrenched and otherwise strengthened, for it was not yet certain that the enemy did not mean to invade Greece.

In the early days of October, when the Allies had first begun landing their troops, it had not yet been definitely decided that Saloniki was to be held permanently, or at least as long as the war lasted, but by this time the value of the port had been realized. So long as it was held in strong force it constituted a constant threat against any attempt on the part of the Austro-Germans to push their invasion down into Egypt. Further, it was suggested by naval experts that if ever it passed into the hands of the Germans, it might easily become the base for an effective submarine warfare in the eastern Mediterranean, which would be extremely dangerous to the allied fleets in those waters, already the scene of considerable submarine activity, as was demonstrated by the sinking of not a few transports, war vessels, and other, ships by the enemy. These waters could not be dragged with steel nets, as had been done in the British Channel. As the terminus of the railroad running through Macedonia from Belgrade, Saloniki was potentially an important city. Austria had long been aware of the high significance of this port and it was, in fact, the final objective of her "Drang nach Osten" policy. When it fell to Greece after the Second Balkan War she had been bitterly disappointed, which was one reason why she had done her best to spur Bulgaria on to precipitate that unfortunate campaign. And this was another little matter which probably helped to swing the balance of Greek sympathy toward the Allies. What prosperity Saloniki had enjoyed during Turkish rule had been entirely due to its big Jewish population, which had been the mainstay of its commercial activities.

When Greece acquired possession little change followed, and when the troops of the Allies began to disembark in the beginning of October they were at once confronted by a serious difficulty in the absence of docking and local transportation facilities. There was, further, the serious difficulty of obtaining space ashore for camp ground for the troops, as well as suitable level stretches for aeroplanes, Greek troops being in occupation of all such spots. Moreover, the railroad facilities, even when given over entirely to their use, were inadequate.

So long as the outcome of the effort to join up with the Serbians remained in doubt the Allies had not given much energy to fortifying Saloniki in great strength, but immediately the retirement was decided upon this task was undertaken with some dispatch. On and after December 12, 1915, the Allies, having at last succeeded in compelling Greece to agree to their plans for a permanent occupation, began preparations to meet all possible events in the future. As the Greek troops withdrew, French and British forces took their places, some being fresh arrivals, for reenforcements were landing daily at the rate of between 4,000 and 5,000. As there were many rumors of the enemy's intention to advance and attack before the city should be made more defensible, the work of making it as formidable as possible was pushed with fever heat.

Steps were at once taken to establish strong lines of intrenchments. In the course of a week or ten days this task was sufficiently under way to settle the alarms of an immediate attack from the enemy; the lines of the defensive works followed a half circle of hills and lakes, some fifty miles in extent, reaching on the west from the Vardar River to the Gulf of Orfano on the east and inclosing a very considerable area, giving the Allies sufficient freedom of movement.

Yet it was fortunate for the Allies that political considerations deterred the enemy from making the attack. Had the Bulgarians advanced in full force, the Allies would have been heavily outnumbered, not only in men, but in heavy artillery and ordinary field guns as well. It is doubtful whether they could successfully have resisted a determined effort to turn their flanks.

The conformation of the coast line around Saloniki is a handicap to a continuous defensive line. It would demand more men than other conformations would. Saloniki stands on a gulf, or bay, and this would necessitate spreading the defending lines around it in almost a complete circle, so that the adjacent shores would be protected as well.

There does exist a natural horseshoe of positions from which Saloniki could be held and which would cover the port from sea to sea, but their development extends from 120 to 130 miles of country, an area which could not well be held with less than a force of half a million men. At the eastern horn of the Gulf of Saloniki runs the Kaloron Ridge, culminating in a peak some 3,000 feet above sea level. All the southern slopes of this ridge are exposed to the fire of any fleet of warships that might lie offshore. This ridge continues toward the north by two more peaks, each connected with its neighbor by a saddle-shaped ridge. The positions along this ridge would pass first over a point about a thousand feet high, covering the village of Galatista, and next by a chain to the Hortak Dagh Mountains, one of the nearest points in the line to Saloniki.

To the north again the ground falls abruptly to the level of Lake Langaza, thence turns eastward to the height of Dautbaba, after which the lines could be stretched to the borders of the swampy region at the mouth of the Vardar, ground which is as impassable as the Pripet Marshes on the Russian front and which were formerly occupied by the Bulgarian comatjis, in spite of all the efforts of the Turks to eject or capture them.



On December 20, 1915, there arrived in Saloniki, General de Castelnau, Chief of the General Staff of the French Army. He came with the same purpose that had brought Lord Kitchener, to make a tour of inspection of the Near Eastern situation. No doubt a certain anxiety was felt in France and England regarding the security of the Saloniki position, and General de Castelnau had been dispatched to investigate. With General Sarrail he made a thorough survey of the French lines, and with General Mahon he undertook an equally searching tour of the British section. Apparently he was satisfied with the situation, for soon after he stated in an interview to the press that the position of the Allies in Saloniki was excellent. After having passed a week with Generals Sarrail and Mahon, he paid a short visit to King Constantine on the 26th. On the same day the French Government issued an official communique, which announced that General de Castelnau, together with Generals Sarrail and Mahon, had settled upon the plan of action to be followed by the Allies and that he had assured the French Government that the arrangements which had already been made rendered the safety of the whole expedition absolutely certain.

This statement came as rather a strong contrast to an official declaration made by the German Government to the effect that Germany would be established in Saloniki by January 15, 1916. Possibly the Teutonic allies may have planned at that time to initiate a campaign against Saloniki, but apparently pressure on their lines on the other fronts became so strong as to divert them from this object.

However, the year was not to close without some disturbance of the monotony of the situation that now set in at Saloniki. In the middle of the forenoon of December 30, 1915, an attack was made on the city by a fleet of the enemy's aeroplanes, which sailed overhead at a great height and dropped bombs, doing considerable damage. One bomb fell on a detachment of Greek troops, which was carrying on drill maneuvers outside the city in the presence of Prince Andrew of Greece. Attempts were made from the warships in the harbor to reach the aircraft with their antiaircraft guns, but as the aeroplanes were over ten thousand feet high they were not hit. French aeroplanes were sent up to engage them, but by the time they had circled up to the same high altitude, the enemy had disappeared over the mountain tops toward Monastir.

Less than six hours later the soldiers of the Allies suddenly descended on the German, Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turkish consulates and arrested the enemy consuls and vice-consuls, taking them prisoners together with their families and entire staffs. They were immediately marched down to the quays and sent aboard one of the battleships. The four consular buildings were then taken over by the Allies as barracks. On the following day the consuls and their belongings were on their way across the Mediterranean to some unknown destination, though, as developed later, they were landed at Marseilles in France, thence sent to, and liberated in, Switzerland. Later the Norwegian consul was also arrested on a charge of espionage.

One of the disadvantages under which the Allies labored in Saloniki was the comparative ease with which the enemy could spy on their movements. This had especially been the case when their lines had been advanced beyond the Greek frontier.

The Greek Government protested at this breach of neutrality, declaring that such high-handed proceedings undermined its sovereignty and the enemy Powers also protested and threatened reprisals.

Further proof of the decision that the Allies had made to remain in Saloniki was given by their occupation of Castellorizo, an island lying off the mainland of Asia Minor near Rhodes, commanding the Gulf of Adalia. Five hundred French soldiers had been landed, with a view to using the place as a base for operations in that part of Turkey, should that later become feasible. The Greek Government again protested, as it also did when, in the first week of January, the Allies arrested the German, Austrian, and Turkish consuls at Mitylene for the same reasons that had led to the arrests in Saloniki, and shipped these men away on a man-of-war. Greece was indeed kept quite busy framing protests during this period, for on January 11, 1916, a detachment of French soldiers took possession and military control of the island of Corfu, but the Greek garrison there offered no opposition. The place had some strategic value, but the main purpose for which it was to be used was as a sanitarium for the Serbian refugees, who were beginning to arrive from Albania, and many of whom were in miserable physical condition.



CHAPTER XXXIX

ITALIAN MOVEMENTS IN ALBANIA—CONQUEST OF MONTENEGRO

While the French and British were strengthening their position in Saloniki in every possible way, the Italians were beginning a movement which was to have some influence in the Balkans.

Already, a year before, Italy had landed a small containing force in Avlona, Albania, on the Adriatic coast, because Greece had previously occupied a section of southern Albania, contiguous to her frontier. Albania, it will be remembered, had been declared an independent nation after the Balkan wars and William of Wied had been appointed its sovereign, by the consent of the Powers. But so turbulent had his subjects been that finally, when an uprising threatened his life, he fled on a foreign warship. The leader of the Albanians, in so far as they could be brought to respect any one general leader, was Essad Pasha, the Albanian commander at Scutari, who had defended that place so long and so valiantly against the attacks of the Montenegrins during the First Balkan War.

Already in the latter days of November there had been rumors that Italy was landing an army of considerable size in Avlona, to assist the Serbians. This could easily be done without attracting much attention, as this town, often described as the "Gibraltar of the Adriatic," is not more than fifty or sixty miles from the Italian coast and can be reached by steamer in a few hours. Its occupation by an enemy would be highly undesirable, from the point of view of Italian interests.

Baron Sonnino, the Italian prime minister, made a speech in which he declared that Italy was determined to do everything to assist the Serbian army, and that the Italian flag on the other side of the Adriatic would also constitute a reaffirmation of Italy's traditional policy, which included the maintenance of Albanian independence.

By the end of the first week of December, 1915, an army of 50,000 had been landed. With part of this force Italy occupied Durazzo on December 21, 1915, joining up there with Essad Pasha, who had declared himself against Austria. A few days later this chief, in the name of the Albanian nation, declared war on Austria.

Meanwhile, the Austrian warships had become very active along the coast; in December their activities culminated in an attempt to bombard Durazzo, whereupon they were engaged by some Italian, French, and British ships and compelled to retire, with the loss of two destroyers.

Thus, at the beginning of the year 1916, a period of comparative quiet seemed to be settling down over the Balkans, with one exception. And that exception was Montenegro. Austria was now prepared to turn her full attention to this little state, whose soldiers had invaded her territory several times, during the Serbian campaign at the very beginning of the war, and now again, when the final invasion had been undertaken.

Little was heard of Montenegro in the press dispatches, but she had thrown the full strength of her little army into the field against the Austro-German invaders. Before the Balkan wars her fighting men had numbered some forty thousand, but by this time they were reduced to something less than twenty thousand. They were short of artillery and munitions, short of all kinds of supplies, even food, but it was a difficult task for the Allies to offer them any material relief. Montenegro is unserved by any seaport and even the Italians who had landed at Avlona did not hope to establish any communication with them through the mountainous country intervening.

The one topographical feature of Montenegro that must be especially noted is a mountain which rises abruptly, dominating the surrounding Austrian territory along the coast, more especially the seaport and naval station, Cattaro. The importance of this eminence, Mount Lovcen, would have been paramount, had it been properly equipped for offensive action.

For Cattaro is a natural harbor of the first order, capable of accommodating the whole Austrian fleet. The barracks at Cattaro are plainly visible from the top of Mount Lovcen, but to bring guns of a large enough caliber up there to reach those barracks was practically impossible, on account of the rugged nature of the surrounding country.

During the ten weeks the fourth and final invasion of Serbia was running its course, the warriors of the Black Mountains were engaged in giving their kinsmen, the Serbians, their full support. Indeed, the Montenegrin army, though it amounted only to a few regiments, had held a slice of Bosnia for some time, formed the left flank of the whole Serbian position and did good service during the earlier stages of the conflict, being opposed to the Austrian lines around Fotcha and on the Lim, a branch of the Drina.

But the Austrians along this part of the front were satisfied merely to hold the Montenegrins back, not a very difficult task, considering their numbers. On the other hand, any attempt to advance into their mountainous country would have been an extremely arduous undertaking, entirely out of proportion to the importance of the Montenegrin forces, from a military point of view.

When Serbia had finally been overrun, Mackensen withdrew his Germans and also some of the Austrians, these being sent north up to the Russian front, where there seemed danger of renewed activities on the part of the czar's forces. Especially threatening were the rumors that the Russians were about to make a descent on Bulgaria through Rumania, or across the Black Sea.

The Austrians along the Montenegrin front, however, remained where they were and presently they were strongly reenforced, for Austria was determined on the permanent elimination of Montenegro, as she had been determined on putting an end to the Serbian nation. Nor was this impossible, in spite of the mountainous nature of the country, if only the invaders were provided with heavy enough guns. What could be done in Serbia could also be done in Montenegro.

As far back as the middle of November, 1915, it was announced in the dispatches from Rome that Austria was assembling a force of three army corps in Herzegovina to attack Montenegro from that side. There was also available the Austrian troops already in Serbia on the eastern frontier of Montenegro, to say nothing of the Bulgarians, who so far assisted the Austrians as to take Djakova, on December 3, 1915. The whole expedition was put under the command of Von Koevess, shortly after the fall of Mitrovitza.

King Nicholas was not ignorant of what was coming. At the end of November, 1915, after Serbia's last resistance had been overcome, he issued a proclamation to his people in which he said that Montenegro would continue the fight to the bitter end, even though it was probable that she would share the fate of Serbia. The Allies, he went on to state, would make every effort to keep, not only the army, but the people as well, supplied with all that was needed to live and to resist the enemy. Supplies had always been a hard problem in that poverty-stricken little land and when the Serbian refugees began flocking in, it became an insoluble problem, unless with help from outside, which was not always forthcoming.

It was obvious that, in spite of the fact that they had assisted in a successful invasion of Serbia, the Austrians, now that they were by themselves again, were not so confident of overcoming even the Montenegrins that they could afford to undertake the campaign impulsively, for during the whole month of December, 1915, they did not press the campaign on the Montenegrin front. During this period and the first week of January, 1916, they were satisfied with more or less holding their lines, though they did advance some distance on the eastern, or Sanjak, front, capturing Plevlie, Ipek, and Bielopolie. But, as an offset to this success, the Montenegrins scored at least one victory of considerable magnitude. On December 1, 1915, the Montenegrin forces operating in southeastern Bosnia defeated the Austrians near Foca, on the Drina, seven miles across the Drina, forcing the enemy to retreat along the river toward Gorazda. A few days later the Austrians retaliated by sending an aeroplane flying over Cettinje, which dropped a number of bombs on that small city. Other aeroplanes, flying over the Montenegrin encampments, dropped circulars stating that all Serbia had been conquered, and if Montenegro made any further resistance, she would suffer the same fate. Toward the end of the month the Austrians began a heavy bombardment of Mount Lovcen and launched a strong infantry attack against it, but were repelled with considerable losses.

On December 23, 1915, the Montenegrin Government reported having inflicted a reverse on the Austrians advancing from the east. The Austrians bombarded violently in the Mojkovac sector, then attacked Touriak, in the direction of Rozai-Berane, but were thrown back. At Berane the Montenegrins assumed the offensive for a brief space, and at Bielo they drove the enemy troops back as far as Ivania.

However, these were all minor operations and the successes of the Montenegrins were not of a permanent nature. Apparently the Austrians were all this time strengthening their lines and arranging their forces for the general offensive, which they were ready to begin early in January, 1916.

On January 6, 1916, Koevess began decisive operations with a series of violent attacks on the eastern front, on the Rivers Tara, Lim, and Ibar, while at the same time the warships in the Gulf of Cattaro opened a terrific fire on Mount Lovcen.

For four days the Montenegrin troops offered a determined resistance. Berane, on the Lim, was captured by the Austrians on the 10th. On the same day the warships suddenly ceased their bombardment of Mount Lovcen and Austrian infantry swept up the mountain sides and delivered a strong attack. The handful of Montenegrins at the top were completely overwhelmed and Lovcen was captured. Some surprise was expressed among the Allies at the time that this supposedly powerful stronghold should so easily succumb, but it soon developed that the defenders were not only short of food, but they had run out of ammunition and had practically fired their last cartridges.

With Lovcen in the hands of the enemy Cettinje could no longer be held by the Montenegrins, and on January 13, 1916, it was occupied by the Austrians. The back of the Montenegrin resistance had now been broken.

On January 17, 1916, it was announced in the Austrian Parliament by Count Tisza that the Montenegrin Government had sued for terms of peace. Montenegro's official version of this sudden surrender was given in a note by the Montenegrin Consul General in Paris:

"The newspapers announce that unhappy Montenegro has had to submit to the inevitable after having struggled heroically under particularly disadvantageous conditions against an enemy much superior in number and formidably armed. It may be considered as certain that if the king and the Government have yielded it is because the army had expended the last of its munitions.

"Even flight was impossible. The enemy was on the frontiers; there was no escape by the sea; inveterate hostility was to be encountered in Albania. If the Serbian army was able to escape from Serbia, the weak contingents of Montenegro, exhausted by the superhuman efforts of their long and desperate, but effective resistance, and by privations of all kinds, were not able to seek refuge on friendly territory. It is possible to discuss ad infinitum the conditions of the suspension of hostilities, the details of which, it is to be observed, come from enemy sources; it is even possible to heap insults on the unfortunate conquered...."

The question immediately raised in the British and French newspapers was: who opened negotiations with the enemy—the king or his minister? Miuskovitch, who was frankly in favor of the Austrians, had become premier at a critical moment in Montenegro's fate and negotiations were undoubtedly proceeding while the fighting on Mount Lovcen was still in progress. It was said that this was well known to the troops in the field, and in consequence they had not made so determined a resistance as they might otherwise have done.

Meanwhile throughout Germany and Austria celebrations of the great victory were going on and a Vienna paper published what purported to be the terms that were to be granted the conquered Montenegrins, harsh in the extreme. It was even indicated that the Montenegrin soldiers must all serve with the Austrians on the Italian front. And next there was a strange silence, a period during which no mention at all was made of Montenegrins, as to whether they had accepted the terms or not.

Meanwhile among the Allies, who had not expected that Montenegro would give in so quickly, there was much criticism of the little state's surrender. It was suggested that it had been inspired for dynastic reasons, by a pro-Austrian section of the court. It was even asserted that King Nicholas had secretly come to terms with Austria before the fall of Mount Lovcen and that the resistance put up by the Montenegrins was unreal and of a purely theatrical character. It was recalled that the wife of the Montenegrin Crown Prince was a German princess. It was said that a compact was in existence, and had been in existence for several months, by which Montenegro agreed to hand Mount Lovcen over to the Austrians in return for Scutari.

These speculations were finally terminated by an official statement issued by Sir J. Roper Parkington, the Consul General for Montenegro in London, in which he said that the king and the Government of Montenegro had peremptorily refused the conditions of peace offered them by Austria and that Montenegro would continue the struggle to the bitter end. The announcement made by the Austrian Government that the Montenegrins had already laid down their arms seemed, therefore, to have been without foundation. This communique also stated that all the reports issued by the Austrians had been in large part untrue.

"King Nicholas," continued this official announcement, "remains with his two sons at the head of his troops, to organize a final defense, and to take part, in case of necessity, in the retreat of his brave army. His majesty expresses the hope that the Allies will eventually afford him effectual assistance for the retreat, as they have already done for the Serbian army."

In the fourth week in January, 1916, the Montenegrin premier, M. Miuskovitch, issued a note admitting there had been negotiations with Austria, but asserted that they had been merely a pretext to gain time, to insure the safe retreat of the army toward Podgoritza and Scutari, as well as to give opportunity to the Serbian troops to leave Podgoritza and Scutari for Alessio and Durazzo in Albania.

On January 23, 1916, old King Nicholas appeared in Rome, where he was met by his son-in-law, the King of Italy, and from thence he went on to Lyons, in France, where his queen had preceded him and where, by the courtesy of the French Government, the capital of Montenegro was temporarily established.

At this time the Austrian Government had continued issuing reports to the effect that the Montenegrin soldiers were laying down their arms, but this seems to have been only partly true. Though many of them were captured, a much greater number joined the Serbians in Albania, where they made a juncture with the forces under Essad Pasha.

The Austrians, however, continued their advance, occupying Scutari on the 23d and San Giovanni di Medua on the 25th. Thus Montenegro itself was finally overrun.

But this little country, the poorest in Europe, offered the Austrians very little reward for their enterprise.

An Austrian journalist, accompanying the invading forces when they took possession of the king's palace in Cettinje, described the interior decorations as follows:

"In the reception room two great oil paintings occupied the positions of honor. One was that of the Emperor of Austria and the other was that of the Queen of Hungary. In the king's study, on one of the writing tables, there was a portrait of Francis Joseph and in other rooms we also came across his picture."



On the whole, Montenegro had not made the desperate resistance which its reputation for hard fighting had led people to believe it would put up. This partial failure was explained by M. Miuskovitch, who declared that when Montenegro entered the war on the side of the Allies she had been promised everything necessary for the army and also for the civil population, because even in normal times they import wheat. Russia and France were to have sent supplies, but this promise could not be carried out. They had done the best they could with the materials on hand, but without ammunition they could not be expected to fight.

The Montenegrins, said the premier, had been given the task of protecting the rear of the Serbian army and they had defended the Sandjak frontier so successfully that on this side the Serbians had had time to retire. But when the Serbians were obliged to fall back on Montenegrin territory, their arrival precipitated events. The Montenegrins had still some supplies, but with 120,000 to 130,000 additional mouths to feed, these were soon exhausted. On many occasions the Montenegrin soldiers did not receive rations for a whole week and when they did, each ration only amounted to half a pound of corn flour a day.

After escaping, King Nicholas sent the following letter to General Vukovitch:

"I order you anew to resist the enemy in the most energetic way possible. In the event of a retreat, follow the direction of the Serbian army toward Durazzo. The Serbian commanders have been informed of this. You will receive food supplies at Medua and farther on.

"Prince Mirko and all the other ministers who have remained cannot in any case open negotiations with anyone whatever. The French Government has promised our retreating army all possible facilities, such as it gave to the Serbian army. Prince Mirko and the other ministers must in no case remain, but make every possible effort to escape."

Having completed their invasion of Montenegro, the Austrians now began to continue their advance over into Albania. On January 26, 1916, they reached San Giovanni di Medua, a seaport in northern Albania. At the same time Essad Pasha at Durazzo reported that he was being threatened by an Austrian and Bulgarian column marching northwest from Berat, while still another column was heading toward the Italian forces in Avlona.

Meanwhile all haste was being made in getting the Serbians safely out of Albania and transporting them to Corfu, the Greek island lying south of Avlona, in the Adriatic, which the Allies had occupied under the protest of the Greek Government. This undertaking was much facilitated by an improvement in the weather, which until then had been very severe, and by the construction of bridges across the rivers by a force of British engineers. Depots of provisions were also established along all the roads by which the refugees were straggling in toward the coast. The few guns, limbers, and munitions which these fragments of the Serbian army had brought with them were transported to Brindisi. At about the same time that the Austrians occupied San Giovanni di Medua, a Bulgarian detachment had occupied Dibra, in southern Albania, just above the Greek frontier and not far from Lake Ochrida and Monastir.

On February 10, 1916, the last of the Serbian soldiers had been taken out of Albania. In spite of the attempt made by Austrian ships and submarines, involving several minor naval engagements with the ships of the Allies, the embarkations had been going on at the rate of from eight to ten thousand men a day. In Corfu alone, 75,000 had been landed; others were taken to Bizerta, the French naval port in Tunis, and some had been sent to Italy. On this date Dr. Vesnitch, the Serbian minister in Paris, made the following statement:

"One hope still illumines the night of invaded Serbia; her avenging army. At present that army numbers more than 100,000 men. It can be confidently stated that it will be increased to 150,000."

On February 11, 1916, the Austrians had advanced within a few miles of Durazzo and on the following day occupied the Tirana heights, between Breza and Bazar Siak, Breza being about twelve miles northeast of Durazzo and Bazar Siak about halfway between these two towns. Two days later the Italian forces advanced against this Austrian column and delivered a strong attack, which was repulsed by the Austrians, according to Vienna dispatches. Meanwhile the Bulgarians were occupying Fieri, about sixteen miles from Avlona, and claimed that they had taken possession of a third of southern Albania. A day or two later the Austrian and Bulgarian columns operating in central Albania made a junction and occupied Elbassan, thirty-eight miles southeast of Durazzo.

The enemy was, in fact, closing in on Durazzo. On February 25, 1916, the Austro-Bulgarian forces had driven the Italians to the isthmus west of the Durs lakes and the Austrian artillery began to open fire on Durazzo itself. At daybreak the next morning the Austrians closed in and the Italians and Albanians under Essad Pasha were finally, after a spirited resistance, driven back from their positions at Bazar Siak. Soon afterward the Italians on the southern bank of the lower Arzen were forced to abandon their positions. The Austrians crossed the river and proceeded southward.

At noon a decisive action east of Bazar Siak drove the Italians from their positions. The same fate was suffered by the defenders of Sasso Blanco, six miles east of Durazzo. By evening the entire outer circle of defenses had been taken. The Austrians, advancing to the inner line positions, observed that the Italians were embarking on their ships.

They were now able to reach the docks with their artillery, and attempted to hinder the retirement of the Italians with a heavy shell fire and succeeded in inflicting some damage to some of the ships. But by the following morning the Italians had made good their escape, and with them went Essad Pasha and his Albanian troops.

On February 28, 1916, the Austrian Government issued a full report on the campaign in Albania which had culminated in that section in the capture of Durazzo:

"The Austrian troops have captured Durazzo. During the forenoon one column, under the fire of the Italians, advanced across the northern isthmus to Portos, four miles north of Durazzo. Our troops advancing across the southern isthmus were hindered at the beginning by the fire of the Italian artillery, but toward night numerous detachments, by wading, swimming, and floating, reached the bridge east of Durazzo, driving back the Italian rear guard. At dawn an Austrian battalion entered the burning town."

The spoils were, according to the report, twenty-three cannon, including six big coast defense guns, 10,000 rifles, and a large amount of artillery ammunition and provisions.

The Italian version was:

"After our ships had silenced the enemy batteries and swept the coast and near-by roads of their fire, all the Italian troops which were sent temporarily to Durazzo to cover the evacuation of the Serbians, Montenegrins, and Albanians, reembarked without incident and were transported to Avlona, notwithstanding the bad weather which still prevails in the lower Adriatic. War material which was still serviceable was also taken aboard the ships and the damaged supplies were either rendered useless or destroyed."

Thus, by the first of March the Austro-Bulgarian forces had almost completed their conquest of Albania, the only important point still in the hands of the Italians being Avlona. At this point, however, the Italians had made longer and bigger preparations for defense, besides which they were here in far greater numbers, estimated at from 50,000 to 120,000.



CHAPTER XL

CONDITIONS IN SERBIA, GREECE, AND RUMANIA

During this time the Bulgarians and Germans were establishing a semicivil government in Serbia. Many conflicting reports were circulated, some of them to the effect that there was much friction between the German and Bulgarian officers. Whether Germany and Bulgaria really intended to make an attack on Saloniki has until now been a question, but in those districts near the Greek frontier considerable forces of Germans remained, garrisoning the large towns, notably Monastir. The forces along the frontier itself were Bulgarians at first, but toward the end of February, 1916, detachments of Germans began taking their places along the front. The Allies in Saloniki reported that up to this time there were heavy desertions from the Bulgarian forces, the deserters coming in to Saloniki, complaining that they were starved and did not wish to fight the French and British. When the Germans appeared on the front, these desertions suddenly ceased.

In the middle of January Emperor William of Germany paid Serbia a visit and inspected the captured towns and cities of most prominence. On the 18th he arrived in Nish, where he was met by King Ferdinand and Prince Boris of Bulgaria. The two sovereigns then attended Mass in the cathedral together, after which they reviewed the troops.

At a dinner which followed the emperor announced to King Ferdinand his nomination to the rank of a Prussian field marshal and presented him with the baton. King Ferdinand in turn bestowed the order for bravery on the emperor and General von Mackensen. In a speech which he made, King Ferdinand addressed the emperor with "Ave Imperator, Caesar et Rex." ("Hail Emperor, Caesar and King.")

During the first two months of the year the Allies had continued to reenforce their forces in Saloniki, and toward the end of February there were reports to the effect that General Sarrail would assume an offensive up into Macedonia and Bulgaria. On January 20, 1916, the ships of the Allies again bombarded Dedeagatch vigorously, then proceeded to Port Lagos and swept that seaport with a heavy shell fire. A few days later a feat, which in some respects established a new record in the annals of French aviation, was performed by an attacking squadron of forty French aeroplanes.

The French squadron left Saloniki at seven in the morning and divided into two parts, one of which proceeded to Monastir, about sixty miles distant, and the other going to Ghevgli. Some of the aeroplanes were armed with guns.

Altogether over two hundred projectiles were discharged at the enemy's camp, on the building occupied by the Bulgarian headquarters in Monastir, and on other military establishments. The airmen were vigorously bombarded in return, but sustained no casualties. One notable feature of the raid was that the squadron had to contend with a forty-mile gale from abeam during the whole trip and they had also to fly over mountains 6,000 feet in height. By noon both sections of the squadron had returned to Saloniki.

On the part of Greece there was no change; she still continued her attitude of sullen acquiescence to the presence of the Allies' troops in Saloniki. In the last week of January General Sarrail sent a detachment to occupy Cape and Fort Kara Burun, about twelve miles from Saloniki and commanding the harbor. This action, it was stated, was due to the fact that a British transport had been torpedoed by a German submarine under the very guns of the fort. As usual, Greece protested, and, again as usual, no notice was taken of her protest.

At about this same time King Constantine sent for the American correspondent of the Associated Press in Athens and asked him to make public certain statements he wished to make, whereupon he gave the journalist an interview so remarkable that when it was published it attracted world-wide attention.

"It is the merest cant," he said, "for Great Britain and France to talk about the violation of the neutrality of Belgium after what they themselves have done and are doing.... The only forum of public opinion open to me is the United States. The situation is far too vital for me to care a snap about royal dignity in the matter of interviews when the very life of Greece as an independent country is at stake. I shall appeal to America again and again, if necessary, for that fair hearing which has been denied me by the press of the Allies.

"Just look at the list of Greek territories already occupied by the allied troops—Lemnos, Imbros, Mytilene, Castelloriza, Corfu, Saloniki, including the Chalcidice Peninsula, and a large part of Macedonia. In proportion to all Greece it is as if that part of the United States which was won from Mexico after the Mexican War were occupied by foreign troops, and not so much as by your leave.... Where is the necessity for the occupation of Corfu? If Greece is an ally of Serbia, so also is Italy, and transportation of the Serbs to Italy would be simpler than to Corfu. Is it because the Italians are refusing to accept the Serbs, fearing the spread of cholera, and the Allies are thinking that the Greeks want to be endangered by cholera any more than the Italians?... The history of the Balkan politics of the Allies is the record of one crass mistake after another, and now, through pique over the failure of their every Balkan calculation, they try to unload on Greece the results of their own stupidity. We warned them that the Gallipoli expedition would be fruitless and that the Austro-Germans would surely crush Serbia.... At the beginning of the war eighty per cent of the Greeks were favorable to the Allies; to-day not forty, no, not twenty per cent would turn their hands to aid the Allies."

As for Venizelos, his voice was no longer heard. So disliked was he by the Government that when certain soldiers joined in a celebration of his name-day, fifty of them were sentenced to a month's confinement as a punishment for so expressing their sympathy. In the middle of February, 1916, this enmity was especially acute. Venizelos himself told a journalist that he was holding himself so aloof from politics that he did not even read the reports of the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies.

But on March 1, 1916, there was a report from Athens that King Constantine had suddenly summoned Venizelos. Several interviews followed, and it was then announced that the king and Venizelos were reconciled. Whether that meant any change in Greece's policy was not mentioned. The general impression prevailed at this time, however, that the great success of the Russians in Asiatic Turkey was having its effect on the King of Greece and his Government.

Of Rumania little was heard during the entire winter, no startling changes having taken place in her attitude. In January the British Government contracted with Rumania for the purchase of 800,000 tons of wheat, to the value of about fifty million dollars, to be delivered by the middle of April.

On February 14, 1916, the Rumanian Government announced that its mobilization had been completed by the calling up of a fresh class and that the General Staff was completing the defenses of the Carpathians and the fortifications along the banks of the Danube in the new Dobrudja territory, which had been taken from Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars. Take Jonescu, the well-known Rumanian statesman, in an interview with a French journalist on the same date said:

"As regards Rumanian policy; we made a great mistake in not intervening when Bulgaria entered the war. I hope that we shall not make the same mistake again and that we shall not quail before Germany's threats, if she makes them.... The country is unanimous on this point."



PART VII—THE DARDANELLES AND RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN



CHAPTER XLI

CONDITIONS IN GALLIPOLI—ATTACK AT SUVLA BAY

We left the allied troops at the end of July, 1915, firmly established at two points on the Gallipoli Peninsula. But though they had won these secure bases by terrible losses and much heroism, yet they had progressed but slightly toward their ultimate objects—the capture of the three key points to the peninsula defenses and the opening of the Dardanelles to the fleets of England, France, and Russia.

Indeed, it had become apparent, not only to those in command on the spot, but to the authorities in London and in Paris, that the allied forces had reached a condition of stalemate on the two fronts. In other words, the Turks by their stubborn, intelligent, and brave defense had eliminated the possibility of the element of surprise, without which it was almost hopeless to expect success under the modern conditions of trench warfare.

Much as the world appreciated the virtues of the Turk as a fighting man, it must be confessed that he furnished the allied troops with an unpleasant surprise. He displayed, first of all, a quite remarkable degree of bravery, hurling himself against the intrenched troops of France and England with an abandon and a disregard of personal safety that excited the admiration of his enemies. The whole Gallipoli campaign is replete with examples of Turkish valor.

Furthermore, the Turks were well led, not only by their German officers, but by the Turkish commanders as well. Frequently they surprised and confounded the allied command in this respect, successfully foiling vital movements by daring and original maneuvers. This was all the more remarkable because it demanded cool thinking at critical moments, not the excited religious fanaticism for which the Turk had been noted. The Turk is an adept in the construction of trenches and their use.

Thus it became apparent to all that if any real success was to be obtained in the Dardanelles campaign the element of surprise must be reintroduced. Sir Ian Hamilton refused to throw away his troops in hopeless frontal attacks against practically impregnable defenses. He called upon Lord Kitchener for reenforcements, at the same time issuing an encouraging bulletin to his troops, telling them that help was coming.

These new troops, which began to arrive at Mudros about the first week of August, 1915, were not to be used for strengthening the two fronts, but were to be employed in an entirely fresh attempt to surprise the Turks at a new point, push inland before the defenders had time to bring up troops, and seize commanding positions in the first great rush. In fact it was a repetition of the attempts made at Achi Baba and Krithia at the original landings, applying the lessons learned at such tremendous cost on those occasions.

Besides the military considerations which made such an attempt desirable, the political situation in the Balkans made an allied success in the Dardanelles highly imperative. The success of the great German drive against the Russians in Poland and Galicia had had a disturbing effect upon at least one of the Balkan neutrals. Bulgaria, it soon became apparent, was preparing to enter the struggle on the side of the Central Powers and Entente diplomats reported to their Governments that nothing short of a smashing victory at the Strait would change the purpose of King Ferdinand. Furthermore, the Entente Powers were disturbed over the attitude of Greece and Rumania. It had been confidently expected that the latter country would enter the struggle on the side of the Entente Powers at the same time that Italy actively entered the struggle. Indeed, the Bank of England had made an advance to Rumania of $25,000,000, although it was expressly understood that the loan was purely a business transaction and had no political import. It was believed that Rumanian sympathy, as a whole, was with the Entente Powers, but it was known that financial, commercial, and dynastic ties with Germany and Austria were important and might at any moment, in favorable circumstances, turn the scales in favor of the Central Powers.

It had become apparent, too, that even Greece had been impressed by the success of the Germans. It was known that King Constantine, with his strong German sympathies, and especially his oft-expressed admiration for the power of the German military machine, was determined at all costs to keep his little kingdom out of the great struggle. Inasmuch as these two countries, Greece and Rumania, had been confidently regarded as belligerents on the side of the Entente Powers, even their neutrality was regarded as a blow to the Allies.

This, then, was the situation that made a dashing stroke in Gallipoli necessary. Sir Ian Hamilton prepared for it with great skill. A point called Suvla Bay, north of the base established by the Australian and New Zealand troops at Anzac Cove, was selected for the point of landing, aiming to cooperate with the force already ashore and assisted by a strong diversion aimed against the Bulair lines.

For this supreme attack, upon which so much was dependent, fresh troops were brought from England—men who had seen nothing of the fighting on any front. Indeed, it is a question for future experts and historians to argue pro and con whether or not the outcome of the attack was not due almost entirely to this use of green troops. How they were depended upon in a crucial operation, how they wavered, and the consequences to the allied operations will be told in the narrative.

Suvla Bay lies between five and six miles from Anzac Cove. It is a wide, shallow indentation forming an almost perfect half circle. Although the landing facilities were not as good as at some other points on the coast of the peninsula, it had the advantage of providing plenty of more or less open country for maneuvering, once the troops were well ashore. This was an element lacking in the case of all the other landings, and one that Sir Ian Hamilton found of vital importance. The nature of the Gallipoli country as a whole made flank attacks almost impossible, but he hoped in the case of the fresh landing to be able to avoid a direct frontal assault.

The new troops, once ashore at Suvla Bay, were to push rapidly across country, skirt Salt Lake, and carry the crest of the Anafarta Hills, a range running to something like 600 feet in height and dominating two important roads and the adjacent country, excepting the all-important peak of Sari Bair.

At the same time the Australian and New Zealand troops were to make a sudden and supreme attack upon Sari Bair itself. It speaks volumes for the confidence which Sir Ian Hamilton had in the fighting qualities of these colonial troops that he set them such a tremendous task. Since the landing at Anzac Cove, the Turks, under the supervision of their German mentors, had fortified every yard of the thousand feet of heights known as Sari Bair. An unprecedented number of machine guns had been brought up and placed in concealed positions from which it was possible to sweep every line of advance, thus powerfully increasing the volume of the infantry and artillery fire. It did not seem possible that an attack, however resolutely and bravely made, could succeed in the face of such a fierce defense.

The third element in this new attack was to be a demonstration against Karachali, on the European mainland of Turkey, menacing the Bulair lines as well as the railway running to Sofia, Bulgaria. For this purpose a number of troopships and warships carrying what was known as the Greek Legion and made up of Cretan volunteers, were to be used. It was hoped that this diversion would attract most of the available reserves in and about the Gallipoli Peninsula and make impossible the reenforcement of the troops stationed near Anafarta Hills and Sari Bair.

The fourth and last element was to consist of a determined attack upon the Turkish defenses about Krithia, pinning to that spot all the troops possible. Curiously enough the plans of the Turkish command, dominated by Enver Pasha, favored the allied troops in that the Turks had planned an attack upon the enemy on the Krithia lines about this time and had concentrated most of their available reserves near the tip of the peninsula.

This intention on the part of the Turks was undoubtedly due to the information they had received of the arrival of fresh British troops. But quickly as they pushed forward their preparations, the Allies were too lively for them. On August 6, 1915, the French and British troops advanced against the Turks and there followed some of the most determined and desperate fighting of the whole Dardanelles campaign. In the fighting the East Lancashire Division, a territorial force, did heroic work and bore the brunt of the fighting. There were many individual feats of daring and bravery, yet one stands out conspicuously. A youthful Manchester schoolmaster, Lieutenant W. T. Forshaw, held his trench against attacks for forty-five hours. For forty-one of those hours he was continuously throwing bombs and only desisted when his arm became temporarily paralyzed. When, finally, the Turks swarmed into his trench, revolver in hand he led his wearied troops and drove them out. He richly deserved the coveted Victoria Cross which was conferred upon him.

At dawn on the following day, the Australians began the attack at Sari Bair. The force at Anzac Cove had been reenforced with Indian troops and two divisions of the new troops from England. As planned, the operations at Sari Bair were to consist of an attack, first on the right, to serve as a feint, and then a main attack on the left which was to link up and support the attack from Suvla Bay, moving around in back of Salt Lake.

The attack on the right, upon what was called Lone Pine Plateau, was a dispiriting failure on the opening day. The dismounted troops of the Third Australian Light Horse, a magnificent body of men, were sent forward to storm the elaborate trenches of the enemy. The attack was made in three lines. The first was mowed down to a man; of the second only a few survivors reached the Turkish trenches to be either captured or killed; the third was stopped by a change of orders just as it was about to follow the other two into the valley of sure death.

On the following day, the 8th, the main Australian infantry forces were sent forward against the same trenches and, after some bloody fighting, succeeded in capturing and holding them against repeated counterattacks.

While this holding operation was in progress the main attack was being made on the left. New Zealand and Australian troops, supported by a picked force of Indian hillmen, used to night warfare and campaigning in difficult mountain country, starting in the evening of August 6, 1915, made a rapid march along the coast as far as Fisherman's Hut. There large quantities of stores had been gradually accumulated in preparation for this very movement.

At Fisherman's Hut the force, numbering 6,000 men, under the command of Major General Sir A. J. Godley, turned sharply inland and just before dawn, almost without the knowledge of the Turkish defenders, had arrived within half a mile of one of the dominating hills on the right flank of the vitally important Sari Bair.

At this point Godley's force was split into three columns. One composed of Australian troops, was based on Asma Dere, almost within touch of Suvla Bay. The Indian troops were within striking distance of Chunuk Bair, close to the towering peak of Koja Chemen, rising sharply to almost 1,000 feet, while the New Zealanders were within striking distance of Rhododendron Ridge.

With the dawn of August 7, 1915, the Turks awoke to the seriousness of the new menace. So difficult was the country in which the British troops were operating that the Ottoman commander had dismissed all idea of a serious attack from that point and had merely posted patrols in the hills guarding the flank of Sari Bair. Now, however, reserves were hurried to the scene, and so rapidly and in such large numbers did they arrive that the troops from Anzac were soon compelled to dig themselves in in an attempt to hold what they had won by their surprise march.

Early on the morning of August 8, 1915, the Australians moved out from Asma Dere. They had as an objective a near-by hill from which it was proposed to storm the height known as Koja Chemen. Unfortunately for their plan, the Turks by this time had brought up such forces that the Australians were outnumbered. They had not proceeded far before they discovered that they were being rapidly encircled. A retreat was immediately decided upon and so closely were they followed by the Turks that the British troops had difficulty even in holding their original position at Asma Dere.

Meanwhile the New Zealanders were having more success. Carrying full kit, food, and water, these splendid colonials clambered up the steep sides of Rhododendron Ridge, swept the Turks from the crest and charged up the southwestern slope of the main peak of Sari Bair. There they dug in and fought desperately to hold their advantage against successive waves of Turkish infantry that came charging down upon them.

At the same time the Indian troops gained some fresh ground in the neighborhood of Hill Q.

During the night of August 8, 1915, and the early morning of the following day, the officers of the British forces who had survived the fighting reorganized the scattered remnants and prepared for a fresh advance. About midnight reenforcements arrived at all three bases and were hurried forward to relieve as much as possible the exhausted men in the firing line.

Just as dawn was breaking on August 9, 1915, word was passed along the lines that a supreme effort was to be made to carry the heights that barred the allied troops from a great victory. British and French warships posted close inshore and in wireless touch with the troops opened an intense bombardment of the Chunuk Bair, Hill Q, and Koja Chemen. Then the whistles blew, the infantry leaped out of its shallow trenches and, with a yell that echoed and reechoed through the Gallipoli hills, charged up the precipitous slopes.

Of the three columns, the greatest success was gained by the Indians. Led by the hardy Gurkhas, they actually reached the crest of Hill Q and looked down on the much-to-be-desired Strait, bathed in the hot August sunshine.

The Turkish command full well realized the importance of this position, and immediately guns from every angle were turned on the Indian troops and the New Zealanders who were supporting them on the left. A hurricane of shells was poured on the troops before they had time to dig themselves in. A few seconds later a counterattack was launched in such force against the New Zealanders that they and the Indians were swept down the slopes of Sari Bair.

By nightfall of August 8, 1915, the few Turkish patrols in the district had been driven off and considerable forces of the British troops had made their way inland. Splitting into two columns, one moved north and seized Karakol Bagh; the other and larger force marched across the low country until it had arrived in position facing the Anafarta Ridge, its objective.

Lying between the line of advance from Suvla Bay to the Anafarta Ridge and Asma Dere, the base of the Australian troops operating against Sari Bair, were a number of hills, two of which played supremely important parts in the fighting of the next few days. They have been called Chocolate Hill and Burnt Hill.

It was in an action against Chocolate Hill that the battle opened. Moving in a night attack on August 8, 1915, Irish troops stormed Chocolate Hill and came within measurable distance of connecting up with the Australian division. Then preparations were made for an attack upon the Anafarta Ridge.

On August 11, 1915, the right wing of the forces landed at Suvla Bay succeeded in working along the coast and linking up with the Australians at Asma Dere. They brought with them to the hard-hitting Colonials the first word of the progress of the Anafarta operation, and it was a bitter disappointment to the latter to learn that their heroic efforts against Sari Bair had been largely made in vain because of the failure of the Suvla Bay force to accomplish its task.

Both sides then busied themselves preparing for the new warfare in this region. The British consolidated their positions, and on August 15, 1915, sent forward the same Irish division that had captured Chocolate Hill in an attempt to rush Dublin Hill. After a hand-to-hand fight with the Turkish troops, who swarmed out of their trenches to meet the charging Irishmen, the hill was won.

The Turks, meanwhile, were strongly fortifying not only the Anafarta Ridge proper but some of the hills commanding its left flank. Here Hill 70 and Hill 112 were the major positions, and on August 21, 1915, the British troops moved out in an effort to capture them.

A portion of the British troops succeeded in reaching the top of Hill 70. There, however, they were greeted by a terrible fire from a battery concealed on Hill 112 and forced to fall back, first to the lower slopes of the hill and then, when the fire slackened, to their original intrenched positions.

Even less success was enjoyed by the troops making the assault upon Hill 112. The Turkish artillery poured a curtain of fire among the shrubs at the foot of the hill which effectively prevented the proposed advance. Farther to the south at the same time the Australians were attacking Hill 60 of the Sari Bair group and succeeded in driving the Turkish defenders from its crest.



PART VIII—AGGRESSIVE TURKISH CAMPAIGN AT DARDANELLES



CHAPTER XLII

SARI BAIR—PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALLIES

Thus practically ended the Suvla Bay operation and its supporting movements. Much had been expected of it and, by the barest margin, in the opinion of many competent military men, great results had been missed. Just what ultimate effect its success in this operation would have had on the Gallipoli campaign, on the position of Turkey in the war and, finally, upon the course of the war as a whole, it is obviously impossible to say. There are those who claim that the capture of Constantinople would have brought the struggle to a quick and disastrous end from the viewpoint of the Central Powers. There are others, equally entitled by experience and knowledge to speak, who claim that it would have had no appreciable influence on the final result. And there is a third body of critics of opinion that the capture of Constantinople would have been a disaster for the Allies, inasmuch as it would have opened up vast questions of age-long standing that would have led to wide dissension between England, Russia, and France.

There is another and no less interesting phase of the Suvla Bay operation that will one day be studied with care. In this crucial attack a reliance was placed upon raw troops who had seen little or no actual fighting. It was, in a way, an attempt to prove that patriotic youths, rallying to the colors at their country's need, although without previous training, could in a few months be made more than a match for the obligatory military service troops of the Continental system.

Some extremely interesting details of the preparation for the landing at Suvla Bay have been given by a correspondent who was permitted to be present, but who, like all except a few officers of General Ian Hamilton's immediate staff, was kept in absolute ignorance of the exact location of the spot selected.

"It has long been obvious that some new landing on a vast scale was about to be attempted," he wrote, "and surmise has therefore been rife as to the exact point on which the blow would fall. It was hoped to take the Turk completely by surprise, and to obtain a firm foothold on the shore before he could bring up his reenforcements. In this it would seem as if we have been successful, for two divisions were yesterday (August 7, 1915) put ashore almost without opposition. The enemy probably had accurate knowledge of the arrival of large reenforcements, for it is almost impossible to keep movements of troops unknown in the Near East, and his airmen have frequently flown over our camps. He knew, therefore, we were preparing to strike, but on the vital point as to where the blow would fall he seems to have been entirely ignorant.

"No one who has not seen a landing of a large army on a hostile shore can have any idea of the enormous amount of preparation work and rehearsal which must precede any such movement. For three weeks this has been going on incessantly.

"For many days past a division has been practicing embarking and disembarking until every officer and every man knew the exact role he had to play.

"On the morning of August 6, 1915, I was told to hold myself in readiness to embark that evening for an unknown destination, which would not be disclosed to me until after I got on board the transport. There was general rejoicing among the troops when it became known that the period of preparation was at length passed and that the hour for action had at last arrived.

"Throughout the whole of August 6, 1915, the work of embarking proceeded without a stop. Dense masses of fully equipped infantry, each carrying two days' rations, and tin dishes strapped on their knapsacks, moved down to the quay and were there embarked. The troops seemed in excellent spirits and full of fight. They were cracking jokes and singing many familiar songs, the favorite of which seemed to be a blending of 'Tipperary' with 'Are We Downhearted?' Which query was answered by a deafening roar of 'No!'"

In writing of the country around Suvla Bay the same correspondent said:

"The country is in fact terrible; the hills are an awful jumble, with no regular formation, but broken up into valleys, dongas, ravines, and partly bare sandstone, and partly covered with dense shrub. In places there are sheer precipices over which it is impossible to climb and down which a false step may send you sliding several hundreds of feet."

Finally, deeply illuminating is the official communique published in England on August 26, 1915, regarding the operations in early August. The most striking paragraphs follow:

"Very severe and continuous fighting, with heavy losses to both sides, has resulted. Our forces have not yet gained the objectives at which they were aiming in sphere eight, though they have made a decided advance toward them and have greatly increased the area in our possession.

"The attack from Anzac after a series of desperately contested actions, was carried to the summit of Sari Bair and Chunuk Bair Ridge, which are the dominating positions on this area, but, owing to the fact that the attack from Suvla Bay did not make the progress which was counted upon, the troops from Anzac were not able to maintain their position in the actual crest, and after repeating counterattacks, were compelled to withdraw to positions close below it."

And the communique ends up with the significant sentence:

"But these facts must not lead the public to suppose that the true objective has been gained or that further serious and costly efforts will not be required before a decisive victory is won."

Picturesque accounts of the fighting by the Australian troops for Sari Bair on August 6, 7, and 8, 1915, have been written by an eyewitness of the fighting. Speaking of the few moments before the fighting, he said:

"Meanwhile the combined Australians and New Zealanders braced for the desperate night attack that had been decided upon. The men had long been waiting for this hour to arrive.

"Strict orders were given that not a shot was to be fired; the bayonet alone was to be used. Exactly at ten o'clock on Friday night a brigade clambered over their trenches and furiously charged the Turkish line amid loud cheers, bayoneting all the enemy found therein. The Turks, taken apparently quite unawares, fired wildly and were unable to check the advance.

"Thus in a few minutes all the enemy nearest the sea were in our hands and the way was thus cleared for the main advance. The New Zealanders stopped only to take breath and then pursued their victorious career, rushing in succession the old No. 3 outpost, 'Bauchop's Hill,' and other Turkish positions. The native Maoris entered into the charge with great dash, making the darkness of the night hideous with their wild war cries, and striking terror into the hearts of the Turks with the awful vigor with which they used their bayonets and the butt end of their rifles.

"The darkness of the night, the broken nature of the ground, and the shell fire with which the enemy had smothered every available bit of ground, with his deadly snipers, delayed the main advance somewhat after these preliminary positions had been successfully rushed, for every hill and spur had to be picketed to keep down the fire from lurking marksmen left in the rear of our advancing columns. The fighting throughout the night was continuous, for amid these gloomy ravines the Turks offered courageous and despairing resistance to the Australians, the New Zealanders and Maoris, and many bloody encounters, the details of which will never be known, were fought in the dark hours which preceded a still more eventful dawn."



CHAPTER XLIII

AGGRESSIVE TURKISH MOVEMENTS—OPINION IN ENGLAND—CHANGE IN COMMAND

With the withdrawal of the allied troops from Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay, the Turks were free to concentrate all their forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula in the south against the British and French forces that were still intrenched on a line running roughly from Y Beach on the Aegean Sea to Kereves Dere on the Dardanelles, skirting the slopes that led up to the town of Krithia and the heights of Achi Baba.

Immediately the Turks began to transfer the guns and men that had been used against the northern position. Obviously such a transfer in difficult country with few roads and a restricted front took considerable time. In the meantime the British and French in front of Krithia were not inactive. They countered constantly against the ever-increasing pressure of the enemy. Although few infantry attacks were engaged in, bomb and mine warfare for the improvement of the allied positions and the prevention of fresh inroads by the Turks was an almost constant affair.

Fortunately for the safety and subsequent plans of the Allies, the Gallipoli Peninsula at that time of the year was rendered most difficult for offensive fighting. Heavy rains and consequent floods make the country almost impassable for the movement of big guns or large bodies of troops in the face of a determined defense.

But while the position of the allied troops in the hills away from the fringe of coast was becoming desperate, at or near the beaches they could enjoy practical immunity except from a few long-range Turkish batteries. The powerful guns of the allied warships so far outranged and outweighed anything the Turks could bring into the field about Krithia and Achi Baba that the allied troops could lie sheltered under their protection.

This fact undoubtedly contributed largely to the astonishing success of the reembarkation operations here, as it had at the two northern bases. The chief danger to the allied troops about Krithia was in the retreat over the few miles that separated them from the embarkation beaches.

Finally, however, the pressure of the Turks became so heavy that there was very real apprehension for the safety of the allied troops still left on the peninsula. Whether or not it was ever intended to maintain the positions won in the south it is impossible to say at this time. Some observers were of the opinion that it was England's desire to construct on the territory in her possession at the entrance to the Dardanelles a second Gibraltar, commanding at least one end of the important waterway. German opinion held that it had been agreed between the Entente Powers in the event of the forcing of the Dardanelles that the land commanding the waterway was to be divided among the three countries, each dominating a stretch—probably Russia in Constantinople, England at the Narrows, and France in between.

However that may be, any intention of hanging on to the territory captured in the south was soon to be impracticable. By the first of the year, 1916, the Turks were hotly pressing the allied troops to the left of Krithia and it became imperative to shorten the line.

Favored by the floods and the fact that, despite the knowledge of the Turks that a reembarkation had been decided upon, they did not know exactly when it was to be carried out, the retirement was effected with small loss. On the nights of January 8-9, 1916, the men were embarked from the beaches at the north of Sedd-el-Bahr under the guns of the British and French fleet.

At the last moment it was found impossible to get eleven British guns away. Reluctantly it was decided to destroy them and they were rendered useless by the last troops leaving the peninsula. Similarly the French were compelled to abandon six heavy pieces. Immense stores were burned and all the buildings, piers, etc., erected by the allied troops blown up.

While the Allies' offensive was beginning to wane at Gallipoli, an interesting incident developed at Constantinople which gives some idea of the high tension existing there at the time. The story is best told in the original words of Mr. Henry Wood, an American newspaper correspondent, who in a dispatch dated August 17, 1915, first gave the news to the New York "World." He wrote:

"The following is the story of the manner in which Mr. Morgenthau, the American Ambassador, intervened in favor of 2,000 English and French civilians whom Enver Pasha had decided to expose to the bombardment of the allied fleet at Gallipoli:

"The decision had not only been taken, but every detail had been covertly prepared for its carrying out on a Monday morning, when on the previous evening Mr. Morgenthau learned of it. He at once telephoned to Enver Pasha and secured from him a promise that women and children should be spared. A second request, that the execution of the order be delayed until the following Thursday, was only granted after the ambassador had assured Enver that it would be the greatest mistake Turkey had ever made to carry it out without first advising the powers interested.

"Mr. Morgenthau at once telegraphed to France and England by way of Washington, and no reply having arrived by Wednesday morning, again telephoned to the War Minister, insisting on being received in personal audience.

"'I have not a single moment left vacant until four o'clock, at which time I must attend a Council of the Ministers,' was the reply.

"'But unless you have received me by four o'clock,' Mr. Morgenthau replied, 'I will come out and enter the Council of Ministers myself, when I shall insist upon talking to you.'

"An appointment was therefore granted for three o'clock, and after a long argument Enver Pasha was persuaded to agree to send only twenty-five French and twenty-five English to Gallipoli 'as a demonstration,' the War Minister arguing that any farther retraction would weaken discipline. It was also agreed to send only the youngest men, and Bedri Bey, the Constantinople chief of police, was at once sent for in order that he might be acquainted with the new limitation of the decision. But he at once protested. 'I don't want to send a lot of boys down there. I want to send down notables. You have tricked me,' he declared, turning to the ambassador.

"Next morning the ambassador attended personally to the going aboard of the twenty-five French and twenty-five English who had been finally selected. For all that, they knew the original orders to expose them to the fire of the fleet were to be carried out to the letter, and the farewell to their friends and relatives at the Golden Horn pier was one of the most affecting ever enacted at Constantinople. At the last minute one of the British ministers, who still remained at Constantinople, volunteered to go along in order that he might offer spiritual consolation should they eventually face death, and a young Englishman was released in his place. Mr. Morgenthau insisted that the party be accompanied by Mr. Hoffman Phillip, First Secretary of the American Embassy.

"On their arrival at Gallipoli they were imprisoned in two empty houses and informed that the allied fleet was expected any moment to resume its bombardment. The city had been under fire for several days, and was almost completely deserted. No provision had been made for their subsistence. During the days which followed the fifty men suffered considerable hardships, but at last orders came from Constantinople for all fifty to be returned and released."

Meanwhile a curious hardening of public opinion regarding the Dardanelles was taking place in England, which in the course of time was destined to have an all-important influence on the operations in that part of the world. Before the Suvla Bay landing there had been considerable but mild criticism of the manner in which the whole affair had been undertaken and carried out. Close upon the early successes of the naval bombardment there had been an unjustified public optimism. Then came weeks of pessimism following that black day when three battleships were sent to the bottom almost at one blow.

Subsequent events and the false color given to them by the official, but especially the unofficial, accounts served to hearten the British public for a time. Then came Winston Churchill's famous speech in which he spoke of Sir Ian Hamilton's forces being "only a few miles from a great victory," such as would have a determining effect upon the outcome of the war. This was followed by many absurd but circumstantial reports that the Dardanelles had actually been forced but, for some unexplained reasons, the news was being withheld by the Government.

A little later there came news of the arrival of German submarines off Gallipoli and of the sinking of two more battleships. This was followed by unofficial intimation that the major fleet had had to be withdrawn from the waters about the peninsula and that the forces on land were in a measure cut off and dependent upon smaller vessels for naval support and supply.

At this point criticism of the Dardanelles campaign became more pronounced and daring in many quarters in England. The public was ripe for it and many openly expressed their regret that it had ever been entered upon. Then came the Suvla Bay landing, and affairs rapidly moved to a climax.

The Suvla Bay attempt, like all of the other operations at Gallipoli, was conceived in a spirit of excessive optimism. It was intended to be a surprise and the public in England were kept absolutely ignorant of the preparations, so far as it was possible to prevent a leakage with thousands of troops being sent out of the country. Even after the landing and the fighting were well over, little or no news was allowed to get into the papers. Finally there came a long dispatch from the United States, which, curiously enough, the British censor passed, telling of the utter defeat of the Turk, the complete success of the Suvla Bay maneuver, and intimating that the forcing of the Dardanelles was now but a question of a few days.

This amazing dispatch, in which there was of course no truth, was printed in the leading English papers, and a large part of the unthinking public and even a portion of the more intelligent classes swallowed it whole. The news came just at the time of the blackest week of the war up to that time, from the British point of view, when the Germans were racing to the end of their remarkable drive against the Russians and the czar's great fortresses were falling like packs of cards before the furious onslaughts of the Teuton forces.

But with the arrival and publication in England of Sir Ian Hamilton's account, and the declaration by him that the ends aimed at had not been achieved, it soon was realized that even this great attempt, upon which so much had been builded, had failed. Depression became universal, and there were for the first time responsible demands that the whole expedition be abandoned.