On July 26, 1915, the Russians made a determined counteroffensive from the line of Goworowo-Wyszkow-Serock in an effort to remove the threat to the rear of Warsaw. This, however, had little success, the Russians losing 3,319 men to the Germans in prisoners.

To the south of Warsaw the Germans had seized the villages of Ustanov, Lbiska, and Jazarzew, which brought them nearly to the Vistula, just below the capital.

The great attacks of the Germans on the troops defending Warsaw were being hampered to some extent by the laying waste of the country by the retiring Russians. Difficulty in moving heavy artillery on roads had also interfered with their progress, but on the morning of July 28, 1915, Von Woyrsch crossed to the eastern shore of the Vistula between the mouth of the Pilica and Kozienice at several places, and was threatening the Warsaw-Ivangorod railway.

Novo Georgievsk was steadily being inclosed. The Russian counterthrusts in the neighborhood of Warsaw both on the north and the south of the city were repelled by night and day. To the south near Gora-Kalvaria a desperate attempt of the Russians to push forward toward the west on the night from July 27th to the 28th, 1915, was shattered.

The armies of Field Marshal von Mackensen, breaking through Russian positions to the west of the Wieprz, captured thousands of prisoners and many guns, and once more thrust back the Russian front between the Vistula and the Bug. On the evening of the 29th they attained the Warsaw-Kiev railway at Biskupice, about halfway between Lublin and Cholm, thus crowning their efforts to get astride their important line of communications. The Russians were destroying everything of value in the country as they retired, even burning grain in the fields.

On the afternoon of July 30, 1915, Lublin at last was occupied by the army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and on the 31st the Germans of Von Mackensen passed through Cholm. Thus the Teutonic armies were now across the important railway from Warsaw and Ivangorod to Kiev, on a broad front, running all the way down to the Vistula at Novo Alexandria. In Courland the Germans continued to push forward, so that on the 12th of August they were enabled to seize the important railway center Mistan.

Hope in Russia died hard. Press correspondents up to July 29, 1915, still spoke of the possibility of the Russians standing a siege in their principal fortress on the Warsaw salient. On the 29th, however, reports came from Petrograd that the fortresses of the Warsaw defense were to be abandoned and the capital of Poland given up to the army.

The correspondent of the New York "Times" on July 29, 1915, in a special cable summed up the situation in an announcement that the fate of Europe hung on the decision that Russia might make on the question: "Shall Russia settle down to a war of position in her vast fortifications around Warsaw, or shall she continue to barter space against time, withdrawing from the line of the Vistula and points on it of both strategic and political importance, in order to gain the time which Germany has already stored in the form of inexhaustible gun munitions?" The reply was the evacuation of Warsaw.

The decisive blow to Russia's hopes came with the crossing of the Vistula about twenty miles north of Ivangorod on July 28, 1915, already noted. It showed that Warsaw was being rapidly surrounded. The Russian communique of the 30th of July told of the crossing over of the Teutons on both sides of the Radomka, a tributary of the Vistula, to the right bank of the Vistula on pontoons, and of attempts to throw bridges across the great rivers. Von Woyrsch's troops that had crossed over were irresistibly pursuing still farther east on the 30th, defeating troops hastily brought up to stop their advance. By August 1 two entire German army corps reached the right bank of the Vistula. Ivangorod, now threatened from all directions, could evidently not be held much longer.

The fortress surrendered on August 4, 1915, after a violent bombardment of the outer forts had taken place, beginning on the first of the month. Austro-Hungarian troops under General von Koevess especially distinguished themselves in the attack on the west front.



CHAPTER LX

WARSAW FALLS

The retreat from Warsaw began during the night of August 3 and 4, 1915. Already the city had been stripped as far as possible, to judge by reports from Petrograd, of metals, such as church bells and machinery that might possibly be of use to the Germans. A portion of the civilian population left the city. The Blonie line just to the west of the capital was given up under pressure from the Teutons on the 3d. While the retreat was taking place the Russians gave all possible support to their forces defending the Narew lines, so far as they still were maintained.

Desperate charges were hurled by the Russians against the Germans moving forward all along the front Lowza-Ostrow-Wyszkow. The bravery of the Russians, especially in their counterattacks on both sides of the road from Rozan to Ostrow on the 4th of August, won the admiration of the Germans.

The correspondent of the London "Times" reports that on August 4, 1915, there was probably not over one Russian corps on the west side of the Vistula. "Half of that crossed south of Warsaw before 6 p. m.," he writes, "and probably the last division left about midnight, and at 3 a. m. on August 5 the bridges were blown up. The Germans arrived at 6 a. m." The formal entry of the Polish capital was made by Prince Leopold of Bavaria as Commander in Chief of the army which took the city.



The formal announcement issued by the German Great Headquarters on the 5th of August read: "The army of Prince Leopold of Bavaria pierced and took yesterday and last night the outer and inner lines of forts of Warsaw in which Russian rear guards still offered stubborn resistance. The city was occupied to-day by our troops."



In the capture of Warsaw seven huge armies had been employed. The German northern army, operating against the double-track line which runs from Warsaw to Petrograd, 1,000 miles in the northeast, via Bielostok and Grodno; the army operating in the Suwalki district, threatening the same line farther west; the army aimed at the Narew based on Mearva; the army directly aimed at Warsaw, north of the Vistula; the (Ninth) army directly aimed at Warsaw, south of the Vistula; ten or twelve Austrian army corps attempting to reach the single-and double-track railway from Ivangorod to Brest-Litovsk and Moscow, and the line from Warsaw to Kiev via Lublin and Cholm, which is for the most part a single track, and, finally, the army of Von Linsingen, operating on the Lipa east of Lemberg.

The campaign for Warsaw had been fought along a front of 1,000 miles, extending from the Baltic to the frontier of Rumania. An estimate which lays claim to being based upon authoritative figures placed the number of men engaged in almost daily conflict on this long line at between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000. The attacks upon the sides of the lines on which the defense of Warsaw depended had been the most furious in the course of the war on the eastern front. The losses on both sides undoubtedly were enormous, though they can be ascertained only with difficulty, if at all.

The following summary of captures was issued by the German Great Headquarters on August 1, 1915: "Captured in July between the Baltic and the Pilica, 95,023 Russians; 41 guns, including two heavy ones; 4 mine throwers; 230 machine guns. Taken in July in the southeastern theatre of war (apparently between Pilica and the Rumanian frontier): 323 officers; 75,719 men; 10 guns; 126 machine guns."



PART VIII—THE BALKANS



CHAPTER LXI

DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS

In discussing the causes of the Great War in Vol. I we have already shown how important a part the little Balkan States played in the long chain of events leading up to the final catastrophe. When two mighty lords come to blows over the right of way through the fields of their peasant neighbors, it is only natural that the peasants themselves should be deeply concerned. While it is not likely that any of them would feel especially friendly toward either of the belligerents, it might, however, be to their advantage to take a hand in the struggle on the side of the victor. But until each thought he had picked the winner he would hold aloof.

This was, in fact, the situation of all the Balkan States when the Great War began, with the exception, of course, of Serbia, which had been directly attacked. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece very hastily announced their complete neutrality to each other as well as to the world at large, though Greece was in the very awkward position of having signed a defensive treaty with Serbia.

Though the Balkan situation has always been considered very complicated, certain broad facts may be laid down which will serve as a key to a fair understanding of the motives behind each of the various moves being made on the Balkan chess board.

First of all, it must be realized that popular sentiment plays a much smaller part in Balkan politics than it does in such countries as England, France and our own country. Though each is more or less democratic in form, none of these governments is really controlled by its people in matters requiring such quick decisions as war. At the head of each of the Balkan States is a monarch surrounded by a governing clique who have full authority in military matters. Each of these cliques has only one aim in mind: How shall it increase the area of its territory, or at least save itself from losing any of what it already controls?

Rumania, being of Latin blood, has no natural affinity with either of the big fighting powers that concern her: Austria or Russia. In her case, therefore, sympathy may be entirely eliminated. She does, however, covet a piece of Austrian territory, Transylvania, in which there is a substantial Rumanian population which has always been rather badly treated by Austria.

Bulgaria, like Russia, is Slavic. Added to that, Bulgaria owes her freedom to Russian arms. Because of these two reasons there is a very strong sentiment among the people in favor of Russia. Russian political intrigues during the past thirty years have done a great deal, however, in undermining this kindly feeling among the more intelligent Bulgarians. And then Russia's ambition to possess herself of the Bosphorus as an outlet into the Mediterranean is directly contrary to the ambitions of the governing clique of Bulgaria, which also has its eyes on Constantinople.

Toward the Austrians the Bulgarians feel nothing but dislike: "Schwabs," they call them contemptuously. Moreover, Austria's contemplated pathway to Saloniki would cut down through Macedonia, another territory coveted by Bulgaria. Ferdinand, King of Bulgaria, however, is a German by birth and training.

Greece, like Rumania, is also racially isolated. She fears Russia for the same reason that Bulgaria does; Greece is determined that Constantinople shall one day be hers. And she fears Austria because Austria's pathway would even take Saloniki from her. And finally she fears Italy because Italy has ambitions in Asia Minor and Albania. All the belligerents seem to be treading on the toes of Greece.

It will be seen, therefore, that the diplomatic game was an especially delicate one in the Balkans. Being comparatively weak, these small states cannot fight alone for themselves. Their selfish ambitions, or of their governing cliques rather, make a combination impossible. Their only chance is to bargain with the winner at the right moment.

During the first half year of the war there was very little for the Balkan diplomats to do but lie low and watch; watch for the first signs of weakening of either the Allies or the Teutons. To be sure, Turkey threw in her lot with the Teutons during this period, but German control of the Turkish machinery of government and the army appears to have been so strong that it seems doubtful whether Turkish initiative was much of a factor in the move.

One of the first moves by the Teutonic Powers through Austria-Hungary was the attempted invasion of Serbia, by which they hoped to eliminate her from the field and also to swing the other Balkan States, especially Bulgaria, over to their side. And had Austria succeeded in penetrating the peninsula through Serbia, there can hardly be any doubt that the effect would have been immediate.

But the invasion by Austria, attempted three times, was an abject failure. At the end of five months a whole Austrian army corps had been annihilated by the Serbians and the rest of the huge invading armies had been driven back across the Danube and Save. Following close upon this came the extraordinary success of the Russians in Bukowina and in the Carpathians, which placed Hungary in immediate danger of being invaded. The cause of the Allies began to look promising and the machinery of Balkan diplomacy began slowly to revolve.

Meanwhile the principal efforts of the Entente statesmen had been directed toward effecting a reconciliation between Bulgaria and the other Balkan States which, she maintained, had robbed her of Macedonia. Indeed, it may well be said that the Treaty of Bucharest, whereby the Macedonian Bulgars were largely handed over to Serbia, and Greece was, and continued to be, the main stumblingblock in the path of the Allies to bring Bulgaria around to a union with Serbia and Greece and Rumania, for Rumania had also picked Bulgaria's pockets while she was down, by taking a strip of territory at the mouth of the Danube. In this she had not even had the excuse of reclaiming her own people, for here were none but pure Bulgarians.

In January, 1915, Rumania began to show signs of shaping a definite policy that might later lead her to taking sides. Her King, Carol, a Hohenzollern by blood, had died shortly after the war and his nephew, Ferdinand, ascended the throne on October 11, 1914. Possibly he may have had something to do with the change. At any rate, though Rumania had previously accepted financial assistance from Austria, in January she received a loan of several millions from Great Britain, most of which was spent on the army, then partly mobilized.

At the same time negotiations of a tentative nature were opened by the Foreign Office with Russia offering to throw the Rumanian troops into the conflict on the side of the Allies for a certain consideration. This consideration was that she receive Bukowina, part of the province of Banat, and certain sections of Bessarabia populated by Rumanians. The Allies considered these demands extortionate, and the negotiations were protracted. When the Austrians and Germans, later in the spring, succeeded in driving the Russians out of the Carpathians, Rumania hastily dropped these negotiations and seated herself more firmly on top of the fence. And so, under the guidance of Bratiano, her prime minister, she has continued throughout the whole year, listening to proposals, first from one side, then from the other, but always carefully maintaining her neutral position.

Bulgaria had, at about the same time, accepted a loan from Germany. Attempts were made at the time to explain away the political significance of the transaction by representing the advance as an installment of a loan the terms of which had been arranged before the beginning of the war, but the essential fact was that the cash came from Germany at a time when she was herself calling in all the gold of her people into the Imperial treasury.

Bulgaria now plainly let it be understood under what conditions she would join a union of the Balkan neutrals against the Teutonic Powers. Her premier, Radoslavov, head of the Bulgarian Liberal Party, whose policy has always been anti-Russian, is one of the most astute politicians in the Balkans, and this description is equally true of King Ferdinand as a monarch. These two stated definitely Bulgaria's price; that part of Macedonia which was to have been allowed to her by the agreement which bound her to Serbia and Greece during the first Balkan War; the Valley of the Struma, including the port of Kavalla, that part of Thrace which she herself had taken from Turkey, and the southern Dobruja, the whole of the territory Rumania had filched from her while her back was turned during the two Balkan wars.

The Entente Powers held council with the other Balkan States, each of which had taken its share of booty from Bulgaria. In order to persuade them to consent to Bulgaria's terms, they suggested certain compensations for the concessions they were asked to make. To Serbia, which, in spite of her very precarious situation at the time, was very averse to returning any part of her Macedonian territory, they pointed out that she could find compensation in adding to her territory Bosnia, Herzegovina and the other Slav provinces of Austria, where the population was truly Serb. To Rumania, which was already willing to meet Bulgaria half way, they promised Transylvania and Bukowina. To Greece, which had done less and gained more than any of the other states during the two Balkan Wars and so could afford to be generous, they held out the prospect of gaining a considerable area in Asia Minor, thickly populated by Greeks.

These changes naturally all depended on the complete defeat of the Teutonic Powers, but Bulgaria demanded that at least some, and especially Serbian Macedonia, should be handed over to her at once.

This latter demand brought about strong opposition. The other Balkan States considered that, granting even that all these concessions were to be promised to Bulgaria, she should not expect their fulfillment until she had earned them by helping to defeat the Teutonic Powers.

Venizelos, the premier of Greece, and probably the most broad-minded statesman in the Balkans, stated that, on the part of Greece, concessions to Bulgaria were possible, though, as developed later, in this he did not have the backing of the King and the rest of the governing clique. In February no progress in the negotiations had been made, though a special French Commission, headed by General Pau, visited all the Balkan capitals and tried to bring about a mutual agreement.

At about that time another important military event occurred, especially affecting the Balkans; the warships of the Entente began bombarding the forts in the Dardanelles and it seemed that Constantinople was presently to fall into their hands. Not long after Venizelos stated, in an interview, that he was privy to this action and proposed to send 50,000 Greek soldiers to assist the Allies by a land attack on the Turks.

The Greek General Staff, however, immediately declined to support Venizelos. Such a campaign, it declared, was impossible unless Greece first had strong guarantees that Bulgaria would not take the opportunity to invade Greek Macedonia and fall on the flank of the Greek army operating against the Turks. Venizelos thereupon approached Bulgaria and was told that Bulgaria would remain neutral if Greece would cede most of her Macedonian conquests, which would include Kavalla, Drama, and Serres, which stretch so provokingly eastward along the coast and hold Bulgaria back from the sea.

Venizelos attempted to compromise, and here he was caught between two obstacles. Bulgaria absolutely refused to recede one inch from her demand; and, on the other hand, the Greek governing clique suddenly refused to consider any proposal that would mean the cession of any territory at all to the hated Bulgars. What probably stiffened the opposition of the other members of the Greek Government to the Turkish campaign was the growing suspicion on their part that the Allies were also negotiating with Italy for her support. Now it was obvious that if Italy was to fight in the Near East, she meant to demand a good price. And this looked bad for Greece. Greece and Italy had already nearly come to blows over their clashing interests in southern Albania, yet even this was a small matter compared to rivalry in the AEgean and Asia Minor. What deepened these suspicions was the fact that the Allies refused to indicate definitely just what territory Greece was to have in return for her support against the Turks. Their promise of "liberal compensation" was not at all definite enough. Only Venizelos was satisfied with this promise; he was in favor of trusting implicitly to Anglo-French gratitude.

To bring this deadlock to a conclusion King Constantine called a Royal Council, and by this body the matter was thoroughly discussed during the first few days of March. The Council, together with the king, decided against supporting the Allies actively on such terms. On the morning of March 6 Venizelos called at the British legation in Athens to say that the opposition of the king made it impossible to fulfill his promise. That night he resigned.

The fall of Venizelos was, naturally, a heavy blow to the Allies. He was succeeded by Gounaris, an ex-Minister of Finance, who announced his policy as one of strict neutrality. Venizelos was so deeply mortified that he declared that he would withdraw permanently from public life, and then left Greece.

April, 1915, opened with an occurrence that seemed to throw a strong light on the attitude of Bulgaria. On the night of the second day of the month a large force of Bulgar Comitajis made a raid over the southeastern frontier of Serbia, and, after attacking successfully the Serbian outposts and blockhouses, in an attempt to cut the railroad, by which Serbia was getting war supplies from the Allies, they were repelled by the Serbians, though only after severe fighting.

Serbia and Greece both protested loudly, but Bulgaria affirmed that she had had nothing to do with the matter.

As has developed since, Bulgaria had by this time definitely decided to strike for the Teutonic allies when the right moment should come. Already back in January, 1912, a secret treaty had been negotiated between Bulgaria and Germany. This was signed a little later by Prince Buelow and M. Rizoff at Rome. There were more reasons than one for keeping this secret. For within the Bulgarian Parliament there was a strong opposition to the German policy of Ferdinand and Radoslavov, led by Malinoff, chief of the Democratic party, and Stambulovski, chief of the Agrarian party, an opposition so bitter and determined that the king had good reason to fear an open revolution should he openly declare himself for the Germans.

On May 29, 1915, the Allies again sent a note to Bulgaria, making proposals which comprised the results of their efforts to obtain concessions from the other Balkan States. On June 15 Radoslavov sent a reply, asking for further information, obviously drawn up in order to gain time.

Meanwhile, on June 11, Venizelos had again appeared in Athens, where he received a warm welcome from the populace, with whom he was the prime favorite. Within a few days he resumed the leadership of the Greek Liberal party and, at a general election, which was held shortly after, he showed a popular majority support of 120 seats in the Popular Assembly, notwithstanding a determined opposition made by his opponents. Before the Balkan wars the Greek Parliament had consisted of 180 members, but by according representation to the districts in Macedonia annexed after the wars the number was brought up to 316. Venizelos and his policy in favor of the Allies were emphatically indorsed by the Greek suffrage. Naturally this expression of the people's voice was a smart blow at the king and his councillors. On the other hand, they were encouraged by an unfavorable turn that was now taking place in the military operations of the Allies.

The attack on the Dardanelles by the warships had been a decided failure. Nor were the operations of the British troops on the peninsula of Gallipoli meeting with any real success. The Austrians and the Germans had driven the Russians back from the Carpathians and had retaken Przemysl and Lemberg. In fact, the situation of the Austro-German armies had now become so favorable that it was possible for the Teutonic allies to make proposals to the Balkan States with a fair chance of being listened to.

During July, 1915, Serbia was approached by Germany with an offer of a separate peace, but Serbia would not even consider the terms.

On July 8 Austria delivered a note to Rumania, through the Austrian Minister in Bucharest, Count Czernin, which contained two sets of proposals. One was contingent upon the continued but "friendly" neutrality of Rumania, the other on her active participation in the war on the side of Austria-Hungary.

In the first proposal Rumania was promised all of Bukowina south of the Seret River, better treatment of the Rumanian population of Austrian territory, the establishment of a Rumanian university in Brasso, large admissions of Rumanians into the public service of Hungary, and greater liberty of administration to the Rumanian churches in Austria.

The second proposal specified that Rumania should put five army corps and two cavalry divisions at the disposal of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff to operate against the Russians. In return Rumania should receive all of Bukowina up to the Pruth River, territory along the north bank of the Danube up to the Iron Gate, complete autonomy for the Rumanians in Transylvania and all of Bessarabia that the Rumanian troops should assist in conquering from the Russians.

Just a week after this note was received in the Rumanian capital, Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, whose wife was a sister of the Queen of Rumania, arrived in Bucharest and tried to induce King Ferdinand to come to terms with Austria, or at least to allow the transportation of war munitions through the country to the Turks, who were then running short of ammunition. The king refused this concession. How important it would have been, had it been granted, may be judged from the many efforts the Germans had made to smuggle material down to Turkey. In one case the baggage of a German courier traveling to Constantinople had been X-rayed and rifle ammunition had been found. Again, cases of beer had been opened and found to contain artillery shells.

Rumania, however, could not yet make up her mind which was going to be the winner. She accepted neither of the Austrian proposals, and protracted making any definite answer as long as possible.

There was another reason why Rumania wished to continue her neutrality until the following winter, at least. The harvesting of her great wheat crops would begin soon, and this wheat could, as had been done the previous year, be sold to the Germans and Austrians at big prices, the blockade of the British fleet having already produced a pressing shortage in foodstuffs. And then, her conscience being uneasy regarding her robbery of territory from Bulgaria, she must also be quite certain how Bulgaria was going to turn.

Having failed at Bucharest, the German agent, Prince Hohenlohe-Langenburg, moved on to Sofia. At that moment King Ferdinand of Bulgaria was endeavoring to get Turkey to sign a treaty, for which negotiations had been going on secretly for some months, by which Bulgaria was to obtain all the Turkish land on the west side of the Maritza River, and so free the Bulgarian railroad to Dedeagatch from Turkish interference. On July 23 this treaty was finally signed, and Bulgaria acquired a full right of way along the line.

Bulgaria was now frankly asking bids for her support from both sides. In an interview which the Premier, Radoslavov, granted to the correspondent of a Budapest newspaper on August 3, 1915, and who remarked to the premier that it was at least strange for a nation to carry on such negotiations simultaneously with two groups of powers, he replied:

"It is these negotiations which give us the chance to make a decision. Our country seeks only her own advantages and wishes to realize her rights. We have decided to gain these in any case. The only question is: How can we achieve this with the least sacrifices? As regards the internal situation of Bulgaria, I may proudly say that our conditions have improved, and that everybody in the country looks forward to the great national undertaking we are about to embark on with immense joy and enthusiasm."



PART IX—ITALY ENTERS THE WAR



CHAPTER LXII

SPIRIT OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE—CRISIS OF THE GOVERNMENT

The crystallization of popular opinion in favor of intervention kept pace with the trend of diplomatic negotiations. Italy, especially the northern provinces, was a great beehive, humming with patriotic fervor. Evenings in almost any northern town might be seen companies of young men in civilian dress marching in companies and maneuvering with military precision. At first the organizers of these "training walks," as they were called, maintained reticence regarding their purpose. The youths, they said, were merely undergoing voluntary training to be ready "in case they should be needed." But the purpose of these volunteer drills was unmistakable. At times, when the drill grounds were rather isolated, the marchers would burst into patriotic songs—the hymn of the Garibaldians, or, perhaps "Trieste of My Heart." Soon the neutralists began to organize counterpreparations. Encounters between bands of the rival factions became increasingly frequent, in fact daily occurrences. From jeers they passed to scuffles, in which missiles and clubs were the weapons. As a rule these encounters took place far enough from the city limits to avoid interference by the police, and only vague reports of them reached the main body of home-loving citizens.

Milan was the center of these demonstrations. During April, 1915, the Socialists proclaimed a "general strike," which left a large part of the working population idle to attend gatherings addressed by the neutralist orator. These meetings generally wound up with a parade, and perhaps a hostile demonstration in front of the office of some interventionist newspaper, or cheers outside the German Consulate. The next day the Piazza would be thronged with a gathering of interventionists wearing the national colors entwined with the flag of Trieste, and, perhaps, with the "honorable red shirt" of the Garibaldians. During the period just before the entrance of Italy into the war these rival processions were held on different days by order of the police, who ruthlessly broke up any attempt to interfere with assemblies entitled to the right of way. As the war party began to gain, their opponents adopted the custom of attacking the demonstrants after they had disbanded.

As it was, a mob attacked the Milan branch of the Siemens-Schuckert works, the great Berlin electrical machinery factory, battered in the main entrance, and exchanged shots with some young German employees left in charge. The timely arrival of the armed police stopped this riot, and removed the Germans to safe quarters.

At this juncture, or before, the influence of the "Garibaldi" movement became widely apparent. Early in the war the Garibaldians had launched a movement to recognize the aid received from France by Italy during her War of Independence. A special corps of Garibaldi volunteers was enrolled in France, and its valiant service in the Alsace campaign, where one of the members of the Garibaldi family fell, had a telling effect in Italy. Volunteers for this corps at once sprang up from all parts of the country.

On May 10, 1915, Germans and Austrians throughout Italy were advised by their consulates to leave the country. The exodus proceeded rapidly, and during the next ten days nearly all the citizens of the two Central Powers who were able to leave had taken refuge in Switzerland. Italy seemed ripe for war; but still the Government delayed. There was now no doubt of the popular mind; but events outside the country were not encouraging. Perhaps the weightiest of these deterring factors was news of the Russian retirement in the north and information reaching the Italian Minister of War that the Entente Allies were short of ammunition.

Then came the crisis in the Government. Baron Sonnino's denunciation of the Alliance caused a change in the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office. Prince von Buelow and the Austrian Ambassador, Baron von Macchio, were authorized to conclude a new agreement on the basis of further Austrian concessions. Sonnino refused to accept the new terms and the German and Austrian representatives played their last trump. Baron von Macchio telegraphed to Vienna accusing the Italian Foreign Minister of concealing information of the Austrian concessions both from the king and the majority of the cabinet. The concessions were printed and circulated widely among the people. Signor Giolitti, Salandra's predecessor, and at one time all but dictator of Italy, hurried to Rome and rallied his followers. The neutralists hailed him as the man to save Italy from a ruinous war.

Parliament was to meet on May 20, 1915. It was clear that the supporters of Giolitti, in majority both in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, could, if they chose, overthrow the Government. Popular anxiety was intense.

On the evening of May 13, 1915, came the announcement that the Salandra ministry had resigned. If there had been any doubt of the state of things throughout Italy up to that point, this news cleared the situation. The whole country burst into a flame of indignation. The next day Italy learned for the first time that the Triple Alliance had been denounced early in the month.

It became clear that whatever the fate of Salandra and his cabinet, his foreign policy was bound to be continued.

On May 15, 1915, announcement that the king had declined to accept Salandra's resignation caused a great popular outburst of joy. In Rome an immense gathering called to protest against the Giolittians and German influence was transformed into a demonstration of triumph; more than 150,000 persons took part in a procession a mile long that moved from the Piazza del Popolo to the Quirinal.

The next morning, May 16, 1915, there was nobody in Rome who doubted what Italy would do. That day Giolitti left Rome, and his departure marked the end of his active influence during the opening months of the war. His party crumpled.

When Parliament met on May 20, 1915, Salandra received an overwhelming vote of confidence in the passage of a bill conferring extraordinary powers upon the Government in the event of war. Miles north of Rome, word came to the Austrian commanders, working feverishly to strengthen their forts in the fastnesses of the Alps, to brace themselves for the assault.



CHAPTER LXIII

THE DECISION MADE—ITALIAN STRATEGIC PLAN

On the night of May 24, 1915, little groups of the Alpini, Italy's famous mountain troops, moved silently. They passed from San Giorgio, Cividale and Palmanova on the eastern frontier, from Paluzza and San Stefano and Pieve on the north, from Agordo, Feltre and Asiago, from Brentino and Malcesine toward Lake Garda, from Garganano the western shore of the lake and from other positions all along the mountain frontier up to the Stelvio Pass.

Marching silently and in single file, by three o'clock in the morning of May 25, 1915, one detachment reached a deep trench. "Our frontiers," said their officers. "We advance to make new ones." Then began a long, steep climb up narrow mountain paths, through snow lying in patches knee-deep, and through a storm of sleet and rain that broke along the Trentino boundary before dawn. As dawn broke they hurled themselves upon an Austrian shelter trench excavated the autumn before on the plateau. It was empty. The enemy had retired only a few hours before. The camp-fire ashes were still warm. As the sun began to throw the long shadows of the Alpine peaks to the west Austrian guns crashed out their first salute from the rocky fortresses beyond. Italy and Austria-Hungary were at war.

To comprehend the task before the Italian army it is necessary to examine the Italian-Austrian frontier. Austria's problem was one only of defense. Her warning had been ample and when war was declared she was prepared to the last detail. Being the challenged party hers was the choice of weapons, and she had equipped herself with an almost impregnable line of fortifications. The grievance was Italy's, and hers the duty of assault. Every advantage of position lay with Austria.

The strategic plan of the Italian generals was determined by hard geographical facts. The Italo-Austrian frontier is about 480 miles long, divided naturally into three sections. On the west the Austrian province of Trentino indents Italian territory like a wedge; next comes the great wall of the Dolomites and the Carnic and Julian Alps; then, on the east, a boundary line running north and south between the main Alpine chain and the Adriatic Sea. Steep mountain heights dominated by Austrian troops guarded the first two parts of this frontier. Only on the eastern border, from Pontebba to the Adriatic was Italian offensive on a large scale at all feasible; but before offensive operations could be started here it was necessary for the Italians to close the open gates to the north.

Here in the north lay Italy's problem at the opening of the war; and here her armies confronted an almost impossible task. In a word, they had to fight uphill. A salient, such as that formed by the Trentino, may offer dangers for the side that holds it—an example of which is the Russian position in Poland at the opening of the war; but the Trentino situation was quite unlike that in Poland. The sides of the Trentino were buttressed with mountains. The most tempting avenue of invasion was the valley of the Adige River. An enemy advancing by this route would find himself confronted with the strongly fortified town of Trent, which long resisted attacks from Venice in the Middle Ages. Having forced his way past Trent the enemy would be in a wilderness of lateral valleys with the main ridge of the Alpine chain, at the Brenner, still before him.

On the western side of the Trentino is the lofty Stelvio Pass, leading from the Upper Adige to the valley of Adda. This pass is 9,000 feet high and its narrow defiles were easily defended. To the south lies the pass of Tonale over which runs the road from Noce to the Oglio, but this offers similar difficulties. The road pass of Cornelle, close to Lake Garda, is too narrow for any considerable force. On the eastern side of the salient conditions for invasion are still worse. The railway from Venice to Innsbruck crosses the Valsugana at Tezze, but the Brenta valley through which it runs is a difficult road to Trent. Summed up, the salient of the Trentino was an ideal position for those who held it, both offensive and defensive. The few breaches by which invasion could come were a source of strength rather than weakness, because they compelled attack from the Italian plain to be made on divergent lines from different bases.

The second part of the frontier is the ramparts of the Dolomite and Carnic ranges through which an important offensive was possible for neither belligerent. The main pass, at Ampezzo, 5,000 feet high, makes a sharp detour toward the west to circumvent the mass of Cristallo, and here the road is a narrow defile commanded by a hundred points of danger. The adjacent passes of Misurina and the Monte Croce are no better, and the defiles to the east contain little more than bridle paths. The lowest pass, which leads from the valley of the Fella by Pontebba to the upper streams of the Drave and carries the railway from Venice to Vienna is only 2,615 feet high at its greatest elevation. Although this is the easiest of the great routes through the mountain barrier, it is still narrow and difficult. A modern army given the advantages of time and preparation should be able to close and hold it with ease.

Although the maps show few natural difficulties on the third section of the frontier to compare with those farther west, it is not the obvious avenue of attack a hasty survey would seem to suggest. It is only twenty miles wide and behind it is the line of the River Isonzo with hills along its eastern bank. The upper part of this stream, above Salcana, is a ravine; then comes six miles of comparatively level ground in front of Gorizia; then the hills begin again and sweep round to the seacoast by Monfalcone. What this front lacks in natural defenses had been amply supplied before the war opened by Austria with artillery and men. Toward this narrow twenty-mile stretch, and especially toward the plain before Gorizia, tended, in a sense, however, all the operations of the Italian strategists. The engagements fought during the first of the Italo-Austrian struggle all had their bearing upon the great offensive launched later against Gorizia.

But the natural lay of the land was by no means the only consideration with which the rival generals had to deal. In respect to lateral communications Italy had the advantage. Behind her invading armies stretched an elaborate system of railways through her northern provinces. Austria had a railway running through the whole curve of the frontier, but owing to the difficulty of breaking through from the hill valleys this system had few feeders. This lack of branch lines meant that Austria had to concentrate any offensive at certain definite places—Trent, Tarvis, and Gorizia. Italy aimed at these points and one more, Franzensfeste, the junction of the Pusterthal line with the railway from Innsbruck to Trent. If she could take this point she could cut Austria's communications in the whole Trentino salient. But Franzensfeste was the most difficult of any of these local points for Italy to reach, for south and east of it lay the bristling system of the Dolomites.

The successive revelations of Italian strategy during the first months of the war brought few surprises. Austria had her hands full in the Carpathians just then and was unable to take advantage of the opportunities for swift offensive which her frontier positions offered. It was a foregone conclusion that the first advance would come from the Italian side and the direction of that movement was not long in doubt. Its objective was Trieste, the Austrian peninsula, and the hills of Styria which sweep to Vienna. There lay the country where modern armies could maneuver. At the same time the whole northern boundary must be watched to prevent Austrian forces from the Trentino cutting the communications of the invader and attacking him in the rear. Therefore General Cadorna, the Italian commander in chief, resolved to attack at all the salient points. Such a plan led to a series of movements—toward Trent, across the Dolomite passes against the Pusterthal railway, at the Pontebba Pass, and across the Julian Alps to threaten the line between Tarvis and Gorizia. Meanwhile the main Italian army was to strike at the Isonzo and the road to Trieste.

The same conditions which made the Austrian frontier lines easy to defend also would have given the Central Power a big advantage in offensive operations, but for excellent reasons the Austrian staff did not attack. In the first place, Austria lacked men. The Teutonic war councils concluded that Austro-Hungarian troops were of more value in the great drive then in progress against the Russians than they would have been in offensive operations against the cities of the northern Italian plains. Had the Austrians debouched from their mountain strongholds and forced the Italians to concentrate against them in Italian territory, as they undoubtedly could have done, the benefits of such an enterprise from the standpoint of the alliance powers would have been small in proportion to the risks. Only a combined drive by both Austria and Germany, it is believed, could have gained any telling advantage in northern Italy; and Italy, it must be remembered, had not declared war on Germany. Ensconced in their mountain fastnesses, the Austrians believed they could maintain a successful defensive indefinitely. Then, after the Italian armies had exhausted themselves beating against the mountain barrier, an opportunity might arise for Austrian reprisals. At the time few believed that Italy would long be able to maintain her attitude of neutrality regarding Germany—an opinion, by the way, which was not supported by the developments of the first year of the war.

The Austrians had months in which to prepare, and they had made good use of their time. The natural difficulties confronting an Italian assault had been enormously increased by trenches of steel and concrete. The Austrian engineers had connected their elaborate systems of wire entanglements with high-power electric stations, and dug mines at all vulnerable points. Heavy guns had been moved, at great expenditure of labor, to the frontier forts and rails laid on which to move them from place to place. The broken nature of the ground afforded ideal opportunities for the concealment of artillery positions. It is safe to say that nowhere in the whole theatre of the Great War was there a line better adapted by nature and equipped by man for purposes of defensive warfare. The Austrian Archduke Eugene, who was in charge of the Italian operations, revealed his plan of campaign during the first few days after the beginning of hostilities. His aim was to risk nothing until Field Marshal von Mackensen had finished his operations in Galicia, where Austria's best troops were fighting with their German allies. To meet the Italians he had only the Landsturm and a few reserve divisions, but these were considered enough. The archduke resolved to hold the crests of the passes along the Trentino frontier and the line of the Carnic Alps, withdrawing his outposts before the enemy's advance. On the Isonzo he would abandon the country west of the river line and make his stand on a fortified line to the east which touched the Isonzo only at Gorizia, where the Austrians held the bridgehead on the western bank.

It has been pointed out in preceding pages that not a little of Italy's delay in entering the war, and of the tortuous diplomatic negotiations which for several months kept the outside in doubt as to her ultimate intentions, was due to the state of military unpreparedness confronting the country in the summer of 1914. But by May, 1915, the country had had nine months in which to get ready. Moreover, she had been able to profit by the lessons of the war. When Italy started to get ready there was no waste motion, although the task to be accomplished entailed enormous labor and expense.



CHAPTER LXIV

STRENGTH OF ITALIAN ARMY AND NAVY

At the head of the Italian army and navy was the king, Victor Emmanuel, a monarch whose gallantry and simplicity had made him a popular idol. Popularity with the people meant also popularity with the army. The chief of the General Staff was General Count Luigi Cadorna. At the outbreak of the war General Cadorna was sixty-five years old. As a young man he had seen service under his father, Rafaele Cadorna, who, in September 1870, led an army into papal territory and blew in the Porta Pia. He had been a corps commander at Genoa. In 1914 he had succeeded General Pollio as chief of the General Staff.

Cadorna was the Von Hindenburg of Italy. As the German commander had studied the bogs of East Prussia, so he had devoted a large part of his life to becoming familiar with the broken line of Italy's northern frontier. He was known throughout Europe for his writings on military science.

The beginning of the war found the Italian navy far better equipped than the army. For the task of holding Austria in the Adriatic, which Italy now took over from France, she possessed four dreadnoughts and two more almost ready. She possessed also ten battleships of the predreadnought class and a number of older vessels. Compared with those of Great Britain and Germany, her armored cruisers were slow, none of them being capable of a speed exceeding twenty-two knots; but she had twenty submarines, forty destroyers and a large number of torpedo boats. Compared with the Austro-Hungarian fleet, the Italian navy showed on paper a distinct superiority. Its admiral in chief, the Duke of the Abruzzi, ranked among the most brilliant men of his time, not only as a naval man, but as a scientist, explorer, and man of affairs. He was first cousin of the king.

By May, 1915, General Cadorna virtually had remade the Italian army. Nine months earlier Italy's military forces were anything but prepared. There was a shortage in every kind of munitions, stores, and equipment. This was plainly evidenced when General Porro had refused an offer of the portfolio of Minister of War in the spring of 1914 because he was unable to obtain a pledge for the adoption of a program of re-equipment that demanded a great expenditure of money. The late Government had not made good the expenditure of material caused by the Lybian War, and great quantities of stores had been allowed to deteriorate until they were almost valueless. There was a certain number of guns of medium caliber, but no heavy artillery of the modern type which the Teutonic allies soon showed they possessed in abundance. Of machine guns Italy had a lower proportion than any other of the great powers. All this had been realized, but the money to repair these deficiencies was not forthcoming until the Italian statesmen knew that they were on the brink of war.

Filling the gaps in the army, raising it from a peace to a war footing, was an easier matter. The Italian military law provided automatically for this increase. Every Italian citizen able to bear arms is liable to military service. Recruits are called in the year during which they become twenty years old, although volunteers are accepted as young as eighteen. The last Italian census, in 1911, gave Italy a population of 34,686,683 and the levy lists of that year totaled 487,570. By the close of the year 1914, when the mobilization began, it is reasonable to suppose that the population had grown to something like thirty-six or thirty-seven million, with a corresponding increase in the number available for military service. The peace strength of the army was 14,000 officers and 271,000 men. Mobilization added to each of the twelve corps a division of Mobile Militia bringing its strength up to 37,000 men and 134 guns. The army's war strength was about 700,000 in the first line—from the two classes of the regular army—and 320,000 in the Mobile Militia with a reserve of more than 2,000,000 in the Territorial Militia. The force of trained men that Italy put into the field at the beginning of hostilities, therefore, numbered something over 1,000,000 men. The reservoir of the Territorial Militia contained twice as many more untrained men who for some reason or other were exempt from military service in times of peace, although physically fit to be soldiers. This class was designed primarily for garrison duty, guarding railways and bridges, but in war time was liable to any service. When the mobilization began the men of this class immediately went into training. Each of the twelve army corps consisted of two divisions of line infantry, a regiment of Bersaglieri (light infantry corresponding to the French Chasseurs and the German Jaegers), a regiment of cavalry, a section of Carabinieri (military police), thirty-six field guns and from two to three heavy howitzer batteries. In addition there was the ammunition column, telegraph and engineer parks, ambulance and supply sections, reserve store and supply sections, and a section of field bakery.

The famous Alpine troops ("Alpini") and the mountain artillery were not within the organization of the twelve permanent army corps. These numbered seventy-eight companies, each of 256 officers and men on a war footing. The rest of the Italian infantry units at normal war strength were as follows: Company, 255 officers and men; Battalion, 1,043 officers and men; Regiment, 3,194 officers and men. Five of the cavalry regiments contained six squadrons, the rest five. The war strength of a squadron was 142 officers and men.

The infantry were armed with a magazine rifle of very small caliber, .256-inch. The magazine held six rounds and was loaded with a clip. The length of this piece was 4 feet 2-3/4 inches, with bayonet 5 feet 2-1/2 inches. It weighed without bayonet 8 pounds 6 ounces, and was sighted up to 2,200 yards. The outbreak of the war found a process of rearmament going on in the artillery. Italy at that time had no adequate siege train and her heaviest mobile weapons were 210-millimeter howitzers and 149-millimeter guns. While the details of the final artillery equipment were not made public by the War Department, events showed that the Italians were well supplied with modern guns of both medium and heavy caliber. The mountain artillery, of which there were thirty-nine batteries, was especially efficient, not only in guns, but in men and transport animals. It was said that the Italian artillery mules could drag a gun wherever there was room for its emplacement.

Italy was one of the first countries to use aeroplanes in war, and her aviation corps had had experience in Tripoli. Although handicapped by lack of money, the Italian military aviators were well abreast of their opponents, at least in the theoretical and mechanical development of the science. During the winter of 1914 a considerable increase was made in the personnel of the corps and in the number of machines.

There is reason to believe that at the beginning of the war the Italian soldier was not highly regarded by Austrian and German military authorities. As a whole the army's reputation had been injured by the Adowa disaster and by the slowness of the campaign in Tripoli. But the developments of actual warfare in the spring and summer of 1915 proved that Italian apologists were correct in their claim that in the former war the army was handicapped by political causes. Physically the Italian troops were equal to any in Europe. The Alpini were perhaps the best mountain soldiers in the world. The Italian soldier is not impressive as to stature, but he is tough and enduring. He is cheerful and obedient under discipline and hardship, and the relations between officers and men were such as to produce the best results in a hard campaign.

All these qualities were requisite for the difficult task to which General Cadorna now turned his first line troops, numbering about 700,000 men. To oppose this advance the Austrians mustered on the frontier about half that number. General von Hofer was chief of staff under Archduke Eugene and General Dankl was in command in the Tyrol.

Two reasons have been advanced to explain the succession of small victories with which the Italians opened their campaign. The first, already mentioned, is that it was part of the Austrian plan to yield their outpost positions with slight resistance and protect their numerically inferior forces in the main strongholds of the mountains. The other is that the archduke and his generals made the mistake of underestimating the enemy. For centuries Italy had supplied the Austrian Court with its poets and musicians, until in the Dual Monarchy the Italians were regarded as an effete race, fit only for the politer pursuits of art, literature and song. Italy's successful War of Independence in the latter half of the nineteenth century had not altogether destroyed this impression. This idea, it may be said, was not shared by the Germans, whose military men had made a closer study of world conditions and had learned to respect the virility of the men of modern Italy.



CHAPTER LXV

FIRST ENGAGEMENTS

Owing to the nature of the scene of hostilities the first days of the Austro-Italian campaign brought a series of engagements between small groups of combatants. Artillery played a large part, and here the Austrians, with their big guns already in carefully studied positions, had a decided advantage. Viewed as a whole only does the campaign at this stage take on an importance and dignity that ranks with the great battles on other fronts of the Great War. Never before had two great powers fought in territory so absolutely ill adapted to the movement of large bodies of troops. For the same reason the story attains a picturesqueness absent from the dreary plains of Galicia and Poland and Flanders. Austrians, Hungarians and Italians fought in a land known throughout the world to tourists for its grandeur of scenery, its towering, snow-clad peaks, and idyllic lakes and valleys. It was warfare where the best soldier was the man most able to surmount the natural difficulties and take advantage of the natural protection of the ground. The official statements of the Italian and Austrian war offices told of feats of mountaineering, and of hand-to-hand struggles, of dripping bayonets and of combatants locked in last embrace with hands clutching each other's throats.

On both sides of the boundary were thousands of men who had spent their lives exploring the trackless mountainsides, climbing with ropes and ice axes and staves. Both nations had encouraged the formation of Alpine clubs.

Soon after midnight on May 23, 1915, the Alpini and Bersaglieri of the Italian army, supported by a few battalions of first line troops and gendarmes, crossed the mountain frontier. Soon the peaks resounded with the popping of rifle fire and the louder detonations of the Austrian mountain guns. Along the whole Trentino front that night a hundred skirmishes drove back the Austrian outpost. Only a few thousand men in all were engaged. The Italian cyclist sharpshooters advanced swiftly up the steep mountain roads until greeted by musketry fire. Then they sought shelter, pushing forward from rock to rock and from tree to tree. Often the light infantry and Alpini foot soldiers were able to skirt the enemy's posts and catch them in the rear.

By May 26, 1915, all Italy was thrilled by the news that all the lower passes of the Dolomites were won and breaches made at Tonale Pass along the northwest and in the Carnic and Julian Alps along the northeast front. Among the points occupied were the Montozzo Pass, 9,585 feet high, Ponte Caffaro, running into southwestern Trentino, the ridge of Monte Baldo, extending northward fifteen miles toward Arco and Roverto in southern Trentino, some of the heights looking westward toward Trento, all the valleys in the labyrinth of the Dolomites, and several footholds in the Alps of Carinthia. The eastern army was well inside Austrian territory, its left at Caporetto on the Isonzo just under Monte Nero, its center looking down on Gorizia from the heights between Indria and the Isonzo, and its right between Cormons and Terzo. Losses on both sides were surprisingly small considering the extent of territory covered by the fighting. The Austrians, after slight resistance, withdrew into their fortresses and waited behind their guns, grimly conscious that the real struggle was still before them.

Then, through the holes pierced by the mountain troops, the Italian engineers began to move forward their artillery and building emplacements and constructing trenches. Skirmishing on the mountain frontier continued until the end of May, 1915. By that time Italian forces attacking Trentino had crossed the Lessini Mountains north of Verona, captured the Austrian town of Ala on the Adige, and penetrated nearly ten miles into Austrian territory. They held high ground on the south commanding the forts of Roverto, and had begun to bring up their heavy guns against this important stronghold. Roverto is one of a number of strongly fortified places girdling Trent and commanding the converging routes to this center of the Austrian defensive. Other lesser fortresses in this girdle are Laredo on the Chiese, Levico on the Brenta, and Riva at the head of Lake Garda. Upon these the Italians closed in, and there they consolidated their positions awaiting the support of the first-line troops advancing in heavy detachments, and of their artillery.

While Italy struck the first blow on land, the first offensive operation of the Italo-Austrian conflict by sea came from Austria. This was an extensive raid on Italy's Adriatic coast. Its object was to delay the Italian concentration by attacking vital points on the littoral railway from Brindisi to the north.



The Austrian fleet began its attack early on the morning of Monday, May 24, 1915. The ships engaged were a squadron from Pola, consisting of two battleships, four cruisers, and eighteen destroyers, strongly supported by aircraft. The assault extended from Brindisi to Venice, and covered a large extent of coast territory hard to defend. At Venice the Austrian air raiders dropped bombs into the arsenal and the oil tanks and balloon sheds on the Lido. The priceless relics of art and architecture, all that remained to recall the city's proud position as ruler of the Adriatic, were uninjured, but the attack from the air caused an outcry from the nations of the Entente almost equal to that which rang through the world when the Germans shelled the cathedral at Rheims and destroyed Louvain. The Austrians replied that the attack was a serious military operation, and by no means the wanton outrage their enemies had tried to make it appear.

The Austrian naval raid lasted barely two hours, but in that time the cruiser Novara and several destroyers attacked Porto Corsini, north of Ravenna, in a vain effort to destroy the Italian torpedo base; the cruiser St. Georg shelled the railway station and bridges at Rimini; the battleship Zrinyi attacked Sinigaglia, and wrecked the railway station and bridge; south of Ancona the battleship Radetzky destroyed a bridge over the River Potenza. In the south the cruisers Helgoland and Admiral Spaun with destroyers shelled a railway bridge and station and several signal stations in the neighborhood of Manfredonia and Viesti, and caused some damage in small coast towns. The raid was well planned and swiftly executed, and it accomplished much of its purpose. The Italian fleet was taken by surprise, and the marauders were back in safety at Pola by six o'clock in the morning, unharmed.

While Italian Alpine troops were driving in the Austrian outposts on the frontiers of Trentino and the Tyrol, General Cadorna advanced his main infantry force, the Third Army, across the Friuli Plain through Udine, Palmanova, and St. Georgio toward the Isonzo. Here the covering troops on May 24 and 25 had captured nearly all the small towns and villages between the frontier and the river from Caporetto in the north just below Monte Nero to Belvedere in the south on the Gulf of Trieste. Cadorna feared lest his opponent, General von Hofer, would launch his main attack from Gorizia against the Italian city of Palmanova, fourteen miles to the west. But Von Hofer, so it developed, had a subtler plan of campaign than a direct attack through Gorizia. What he did was to place a strong force on the mountain of Korada between the Isonzo and the Judrio. This height commanded the middle course of the Isonzo, and it had been transformed into a network of permanent trenches, protected by strong wire entanglements.

The Austrian general believed that by the time the Italians could bring up their heavy artillery and begin to smash the entanglements with their field guns, supports could be pushed across the river. Realizing that Korada must be captured, if at all, by dash and surprise, the Italian brigadier in charge of the attack gathered a herd of fierce bulls, which are numerous in that part of Venetia, and penned them in a hollow out of sight of the enemy, while his artillery began to bombard the hostile trenches. When the animals were wrought to a frenzy of rage and fear by the noise of the guns, they were let loose and driven up the mountain against the Austrian positions. Their charge broke through many strands of the wire entanglements, and before the last of them fell dead under the Austrian rifle fire, Italian troops with fixed bayonets had crowded through the gaps in the wires and captured the position.

By the end of May, 1915, the Third Army had reached the Isonzo River, but had not crossed. Its advance was slow and cautious. Operations were hampered by the heavy rains, which caused the river to overflow its banks and added greatly to the difficulties put in the path of the advancing army by the Austrians, who, as they withdrew, left not a bridge behind them.

Grado, a fishing town of about 5,000 inhabitants, but important on account of its strategic situation, was occupied by the Italians with no great difficulty. Grado lies at the head of the Adriatic, and is twelve miles from Trieste and sixty from Pola. The waters of the lagoons in this neighborhood were valuable to the Italians as a safe shelter for submarines and other small war-craft, and as a base for a prospective attack later upon Pola itself. The inhabitants, most of whom preserved their Italian traits and sympathies, although the town had been under Austrian rule since 1809, hailed the conquerors enthusiastically. Cannon and military carriages were decorated with flowers. Thousands of Italian flags appeared as if by magic. The entering troops were greeted with shouts of "All our lives we have been waiting for this moment when we can cry 'Viva Italia!'" The possession of Grado gave the Third Army virtual control of the mouth of the Isonzo, but the main Austrian position of defense at Gorizia remained apparently unweakened.

Scenes like those at Grado were witnessed at Ala, the first Austrian town of any size and the first railroad center captured by the Italians in the Trentino. Ala was occupied May 27, 1915. Three days before this the Italian light infantry had massed behind the boundary line, and when they began their advance along the main highway their first act was to pull down the yellow and black pole that marked the frontier.

The next day, May 28, 1915, the commanding general with his chief of staff and two guards motored to the spot, cut a passage-way through the barricade, and, encountering no opposition, kept on until they reached Ala, seven miles beyond.

The Italian troops were ordered to advance next day, May 29, 1915, and as they marched into the town, officers shouted: "Open your windows. Long live Italy!" The Mayor of Ala called out his townsmen and set them at work removing the barricades on the main road.

In the midst of these rejoicings the sharp rattle of musketry was heard, and the Italians rushed to cover. A reconnoitering party reported that the Austrians were intrenched in a large villa beyond a stream outside the town. The Italian troops began an attack upon this position, and a skirmish party sought to take a position in a house on a near-by hill commanding the villa held by the enemy. Although the way to this house was exposed to the Austrian fire, the Italian officer decided to risk an attempt to reach it. But as he raised his sword to signal an advance, a young girl ran to his side and told him of a path sheltered from the Austrian fire. This girl, Signorina Abriani, whose name will go down in Italian history as one of the first heroines of the war, guided the detachment safely. The Austrians holding the villa were strongly intrenched, and they held out against superior forces until late in the afternoon, when four shells crashed into the building, bringing it down about their ears. The Italians had brought up a battery on the opposite side of the Adige River and opened fire at long range. The Austrians made good their retreat, leaving all their ammunition and three dead. Later fifty-seven Austrians were taken prisoners.

That night the Italian general took the precautions, usual on entering a newly occupied town, of ordering that all the windows in town be kept open and illuminated, and kept patrols about the town. The mayor was reconfirmed, and his first act was to announce to the citizens that "the royal military authorities, knowing the needs of the inhabitants, have with affectionate solicitude and great generosity placed 5,000 rations of bread and 2,000 of rice at the disposal of the poor." Thus Ala became Italian.

The incidents of these first advances into Austrian territory were reported in detail in Italy, and are set down here as typical of events that accompanied the irruption of Italian troops over the border into the country which once had been Italian and where, despite more than a century of Austrian occupation, a large proportion of the inhabitants in spirit was Italian still. Such reports spread through Italy naturally increased enthusiasm for the restoration of the "unredeemed" provinces.

Although, as a rule, the Austrians retired before the first Italian advance into Trentino, they did not depart until they had left every possible obstacle. Roads were barricaded, bridges destroyed, and mines were laid, cleverly concealed on hillsides where it was intended their explosion would overwhelm the Italians under masses of rock and earth. But this was just what the Alpini and Bersaglieri had been trained to anticipate. According to the official Italian accounts, their scouting was so excellent that the wires connecting these mines with Austrian hiding places were discovered and cut, and hardly a mine was exploded. All this took place while the Austrians were drawing in their outposts and consolidating their forces in the great strongholds where later they held the Italians in absolute check. The Italians advanced cautiously in small groups, and the Austrians abandoned the frontier villages soon enough to avoid serious encounters, but not a minute sooner.

In the Alps in these days of May, 1915, the Great War was fought much as wars have been fought in times we are accustomed to regard as the age of true romance. The Italian King visited the Alpine troops and surprised his men and redoubled their devotion by showing his skill as a mountain climber. "You forget," he told an officer who remonstrated with him as he was about to scale a particularly difficult position to examine a gun "chamois hunting is my favorite sport."

If certain portions of the Italian population seemed lukewarm toward the war during the period of diplomatic negotiations, there was no doubt of the temper of the nation after hostilities actually began. The chord of national feeling was struck by King Victor Emmanuel in an order issued upon taking supreme command of the army and navy.

"Soldiers on land and sea," said the order, "the solemn hour of the nation's claims has struck. Following the example of my grandfather, I take to-day supreme command of Italy's forces on land and sea, with the assurance of victory which your bravery, self-abnegation, and discipline will obtain.

"The enemy you are preparing to fight is hardened to war and worthy of you. Favored by the nature of the ground and skillful works, he will resist tenaciously, but your unsubdued ardor will surely vanquish him.

"Soldiers, to you has come the glory of unfurling Italy's colors on the sacred lands which nature has given as the frontiers of our country. To you has come the glory of finally accomplishing the work undertaken with so much heroism by our fathers."

The stormy scenes which followed the resignation of the Salandra cabinet gave way to a confident calm. From his seclusion in the Vatican the pope addressed a letter to Cardinal Vannutelli, breathing a spirit of resignation and faith, but carefully refraining from any expression of partisanship in the great struggle.

"The hour which we are traversing is painful," he said, "but our prayers will go out more frequently and more fervently than ever to those who have in their hands the fate of nations." The pope recalled that in his first Encyclical issued at the beginning of the war he exhorted the belligerent nations to make peace, but his voice was unheeded and the war continued "until the terrible conflagration has extended to our beloved Italy. While our hearts bleed at the sight of so much misery," he wrote, "we have not neglected to continue our work for relief and the diminution of the deplorable consequences of war. I wish that the echo of our voice might reach to all our children affected by the great scourge of war, and persuade all of them of our participation in their troubles and sorrows. There is little of the grief of the child that is not reflected in the soul of the father."

The greatest enthusiasm, naturally, was manifested in the cities of the north nearest the scene of war. The Master Workers' Guild of Milan voted unanimously to give up one day's pay each month to be devoted to the relief of the families of men at the front. Many business houses carried soldiers' names on their payrolls and remitted their wages to their families.

In all cities within range of the enemy's aircraft precautions were taken to guard public buildings, and especially the famous objects which for centuries had made Italy the Mecca of lovers of art. In Venice the bronze horses of St. Mark's were taken down from their pedestals and hidden in the subterranean caverns of the cathedral. The gilded statue of the Virgin surmounting the celebrated white marble cathedral at Milan was covered with cloth, so that it might not serve as a guide to Austrian raiders. The stained glass windows of the edifice were removed as a precaution against possible bombardment. After the first Austrian sea and air raid along the Adriatic coast orders were issued that lights should be darkened in all Adriatic ports. This order was extended also to certain inland cities, such as Milan, Bologna, Verona, Brescia, and Udine. A special watch for aeroplanes was kept at Bologna on account of the location there of an important factory for the manufacture of explosives. Watches were set on the crests of the Appenines ready to notify Rome of approaching danger from the air.

The attitude of Germany toward Italy at this period of the war is best indicated by the speech delivered at the session of the Reichstag by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor. He imputed the Italian declaration of war to a combination of mob dictation, bad faith on the part of the cabinet of Premier Salandra, and, to a certain degree, to the money of the powers of the Entente. The greater part of the Italian people, the chancellor asserted, and a majority in the Italian Parliament had not wanted war, and were even kept in ignorance of the extent of the concessions which Austria-Hungary was willing to make for the sake of peace. The Salandra cabinet, he declared, long before the Triple Alliance had ceased to exist, aligned itself with the Triple Entente and "unchained the mob spirit and intimidated the advocates of peace."

On the eve of leaving Rome, Prince von Buelow gave out a statement in which he declared that Italy was led into the war by a "noisy minority," and that even if in the end she obtained what she asked she would not get much more than what Austria already had offered. "It should be understood," he explained, "that it was impossible to deprive the central empires of Trieste, their only outlet to the Adriatic in the Mediterranean."

Turkey regarded the entrance of Italy into the war on the side of the Entente with apparent equanimity. "We will not declare war on Italy," announced Talaat Bey, the Turkish Minister of the Interior. "We can wait. What can Italy do to us?"



CHAPTER LXVI

FIGHTING IN THE MOUNTAINS

While the world hears little about strategic plans that fail to work out, it is believed that the Austrians in May, 1915, had in mind to let the enemy obtain a good start in his advance against Trieste. Then, when the Italian operations were well under way, and the two railroads from Venice were choked with their supplies, the Austrians probably intended to launch a swift attack upon Verona and the rich cities of Lombardy, thus cutting off the chief centers of Italian industry. At the same time, they undoubtedly meant to send an invading army through the passes of the Carnic and Julian Alps from their base at Tarvis, and by a sudden swoop southward take the Italian forces on the Isonzo in the flank. At least this is what the Italian staff believed was their plan, and they arranged their own forces accordingly.

This was the reason for the extensive Italian drive during the third week of May, 1915, at all the mountain passes of the long frontier. For almost any of these passes might prove to be the gateway of invasion, whereas, once captured, they could be held by a few battalions. But behind each force that occupied the passes won in the first Italian dash was a large reserve ready to lend support wherever the enemy tried to break through. The Italians were not kept long in suspense as to where this thrust from the north first would come.

On May 29, 1915, under cover of a heavy fog, the Austrians concentrated a strong force from Villach, brought them to Mauthen, and from that point launched five successive attacks in an effort to win back the pass of Monte Croce in the Carnic Alps. The Alpini met the attacks with musketry and machine-gun fire, then, after the last attempt had failed, leaped from their trenches and drove the Austrians down the valley.

Thus began the battle of Monte Croce, an engagement described in the official bulletins of both countries in a way that gave the world its first intimation of the peculiar features of this mountain warfare. Each side had large reserves, and the struggle for the pass continued day and night, the Italians pushing over the neighboring passes and gathering their strength for a counterattack when the Austrians were exhausted.

On June 8, 1915, the Italians stormed Freikofel, a height commanding the Plocken Plateau, and took the Pass of Valentina and the Pass of Oregione, 7,500 feet high, and overlooking the wooded valley of Gail. The Alpini won Oregione by climbing through ice and snow over Paralba Mountain and fighting their way downward. Undaunted, General Dankl called up a fresh corps.

On the night of June 14, 1915, the Austrians made a supreme effort to break through the Italian line and put into effect his plan of pouring an army through the Carnic Alps to attack the flank of the main Italian army. Although 100,000 men were engaged in this battle, the ground permitted no massed movements. For miles the saddle of Oregione, the snow-clad sides of Paralba, and every smaller peak and ravine extending to Monte Croce and Freikofel were speckled with fighting men. After the two sides came to grips, the big guns held their fire, and it was man to man and bayonet against bayonet. At one point only did the Austrian thrust reach Italian soil. For a short time the Austrians were on Paralba at an elevation of 8,840 feet, but threatened both in the flank and in the rear they were forced to retreat and take refuge in their prepared positions on Steinwand, a huge limestone mountain overlooking the Gail Valley.

The strategic idea of General Cadorna is more easily understood when one studies the railway map of the Austrian territory north of the Carnic border. Here their railway line through the Drave Valley passed closer to the boundary line than did the Italian system on the south, and they could bring up fresh troops with more speed. In the Gail Valley they had a wide region in which they could mass hidden from the enemy, and they had a good road up the mountains from Mauthen, while the Italians had to depend upon rough tracks through the valley. Although Cadorna had the hard task of keeping the doorway to Venice closed while he attacked the enemy on both flanks, he accomplished his purpose.

The Italian army operating in the province of Cadore won its next success in an attack upon the village of Cortina, situated in a salient of the frontier, 4,000 feet high, amid some of the most beautiful scenery in the world. Cortina was taken on May 30. The Austrians had barricaded the famous road winding up through the Dolomites, and dug elaborate trenches; but the Italians, by superhuman efforts, moved up their mountain guns, while the Alpini scrambled over the mountains by the glaciers of Serapis and the tarns of Croda da Lago, and descended into Cortina on either side. Then, holding the enemy on the east, they advanced into the Tyrol westward to Falzarego.

In this region they had an experience which illustrated the foresight of the Austrians in preparing for the attack they believed would come. Some years before an Austrian had built a hotel in a deep ravine shut in by walls of limestone and very difficult of approach. Tourists had commented upon the lack of practicability of the man who placed a hostelry in so inaccessible a spot. But when the war came it developed that the hotel builder probably had a subsidy from the Government. For sandbags, machine guns, and quick-firers quickly converted the hotel into an excellent fort, which dominated the famous ravine. Thanks to the hardiness and ingenuity of their picked Alpine troops, the Italians, after a week of hard fighting, cleared the mountains above the ravine and dropped upon the hotel fort.

By June 9, 1915, the Italians had won the Falzarego Pass. At times the fighting raged on summits 10,000 feet high, where the thin air exhausted the combatants far quicker than their physical exertions. In the last battle of this engagement the Italians obtained a footing upon a point of great strategical importance three miles beyond the pass on the Sasso d'Istria, close to where the Dolomite road bends southward through the ravine and penetrated the mountains in two tunnels.

This victory gave the Austrians cause for anxiety regarding the western defenses of Tyrol, for by a double flanking movement along the Cordevole River and the Dolomite road the Italians in Cadore had extended like two arms around one of the principal systems of defense. General Dankl hurried reenforcements to the Cadore front to check the thrust up the Cordevole Valley. At the end of this valley was the focal point of the system of railways that carried food and munitions to both the Trentino forces and those in southern Tyrol. If the Italians had succeeded in cutting the railway at this point the enemy would have had great difficulty in maintaining his armies on the Trentino and Tyrol fronts. The Italian effort was not pushed to success; but it at least had the effect of discouraging any plans General Dankl might have formed of invading the plains of northern Italy at the foot of the frontier mountains.

Only twenty miles south of the Austrian outposts was the important city of Verona, famed for its memories of Romeo and Juliet. Nearer still was Brescia with the fertile lands of Lombardy surrounding it. But by his maneuvers at the opening of the war, General Cadorna effectively protected Italian territory and forced the enemy to devote all his attention to resisting the attacks of active light infantry and mountain artillery. The great 12-inch Skoda howitzers, upon which Austria depended to batter down the defenses of these Italian cities, were needed elsewhere, behind the Julian and Carnic Alps, and especially in the corner of the frontier near Predil Pass, by which Napoleon invaded Italy, and on the Isonzo front between Tolmino and the Adriatic.

Thus with his infantry, Cadorna overcame the artillery handicap under which Italy labored during all the first months of the war. The Skoda gun was reputed to be the best in the world. It had proved its worth in Belgium and Russia, and the fact that the Austrians were able to lend guns to their ally proved their wealth of big-gun power. Now, even after ten months of war, when thousands of the great howitzers were busy in Galicia and along the Danube, the Skoda works could still produce an armament superior to that of Italy. Much of the effectiveness of the Skoda gun lay in the fact that it could be separated into two parts for easier transportation. In addition to these 12-inch mortars, Austria had a 6-inch steel Skoda, designed in the summer of 1914, for use in the Carpathians and well adapted to fighting in the Alps. Due in part to their realization of this superiority of Austria in big guns, the Italians remained neutral for ten months, but meanwhile they had created a new armament for their own armies at full speed. For the attack on the Austrian infantry in the field they adapted the French 75-millimeter quick-firer, and for siege work they manufactured 6-and 12-inch howitzers. But it takes time to build heavy artillery, and at this time every armament firm in the world was pushed to its full capacity, while the Italians, being without coal fields, were handicapped in the development of armament resources at home. For political reasons also General Cadorna would not risk sacrificing his men to overcome this artillery handicap. His problem was to conserve his forces as much as possible in readiness for a defensive campaign against combined Teutonic armies, winning what small victories he could, and meanwhile keeping down his casualty lists, while fighting heavy howitzers with light mountain guns and 3-inch quick-firers.

After the Italians had established their hold upon the frontier points there was an apparent relaxation of effort while the infantry of the line waited for the heavy siege artillery to issue from the armament factories and come into action. This movement of artillery was slow, especially on the Isonzo front where engineering operations were delayed by the summer floods caused by the melting snows from the mountain tops. To transport heavy pieces of ordnance across the floods the Italian engineers had to build strong bridges, often under heavy fire from the enemy, who, even after their retirement from the east bank of the river, continually harassed the Italian advance guard holding the bridgeheads. The Austrians aided the work of the mountain floods by breaking down the high embankment used to carry off the snow water, and thereby inundated the plain. Working under a plunging fire from the enemy's batteries on the foothills, the Italian sappers built light pontoon bridges over the floods upon which the first Italian contingent crossed at night and occupied the first line of Austrian trenches near the river.

This much the Italians accomplished by the first week in June, 1915; but there they were forced to pause for the reasons already described. Active hostilities during the first part of June on the Isonzo front centered around Monfalcone, a seaport just below the dominating Carso headlands. Taken from Venice by the Austrians during the Napoleonic era, Monfalcone had become the third most important port in the empire. In its yards warships were being constructed.

On June 9, 1915, the Italians made their swift stroke in a southwesterly direction from their Isonzo line. The port was bombarded on June 7, 1915, by a light Italian cruiser squadron, and the Castle of Duino, standing at the sea edge near Trieste and defended by three artillery batteries, was shattered and set afire apparently to prepare for the operations against Monfalcone from the southwestern side of the Gulf of Panzano. Archduke Eugene hastily collected a strong force above Duino ready to resist an attempt by the Italians to land, but the attempt never was made. It developed that the bombardment of Duino was a feint.

The real movement against Monfalcone was launched from another quarter straight across the Isonzo. The Bersaglieri cyclist corps and grenadiers broke through the Austrian line at the river, and since the Austrians had neglected to prepare a reserve line, the Italians advanced by a swift, running fight through the villages around the Isonzo delta. Near the historic town of Aquileia, now a mere hamlet, the Italians forced a passage of the river at the point of the bayonet and flowed in two streams around the enemy's positions, depending for their rapid movements upon their cyclists with machine guns and their fast-marching light infantry. The Austrians set fire to the pine-clad mountain slopes, but were unable to stem the rush of the Italians who, under the flare of the forest fires, broke into the open town of Monfalcone after storming the promontory of Rocca.

Here, however, the Italian advance guard was in a dangerous position, for the Austrian batteries posted on the limestone bluffs rising 1,000 feet on the northern side of the town still dominated the streets occupied by the Italians near the water's edge. The situation was critical, not only because the troops in the lower town were in danger of annihilation if they held their ground, but because the Italians were anxious to save the town from bombardment, and preserve the warships under construction in the shipyards. So a brigade of light troops scaled the limestone cliffs dragging their mobile 3-inch guns, and forced the Austrians to retire, taking their heavy howitzers with them. Monfalcone now rested securely in Italian possession. The Italians in all this engagement lost only about 100 killed and wounded, while the enemy's casualties were estimated at 2,000. The loss stung the Austro-Hungarian Government deeply.



CHAPTER LXVII

ATTACKS IN GORIZIA

After the Italian success in June, 1915, certain readjustments were manifest in the Austrian forces in the Italian theatre. Although there was no declaration of war between Italy and Germany, it was reported that German officers were sent to aid the Austrians, and that the forces of Archduke Eugene were progressively strengthened from this time on. German soldiers who joined the Austrian detachments were supposed to have volunteered in an irregular individual manner. In this manner Germany preserved the appearance of neutrality.

The latter part of June, 1915, found Austria occupied with the siege of Lemberg, and the archduke, apparently, was content to hold his own on the Italian front until a decision had been obtained in the more important operations against the Russians. Satisfied with their initial successes, General Cadorna on land and the Duke of Abruzzi at sea settled down to a slow, patient chess play, not unlike that worked out by General Joffre in France. Cadorna issued a statement to the Italian people in which he warned them that the preliminary successes which, he said, had made good the strategical defects of their frontier, would be followed by a long stage of gradual approaches against the enemy's second line.

The attrition of the Austro-Hungarian forces would be carried on by long-range artillery and sappers and local trench warfare with hand grenades. The Italian commander in chief resolutely refused to divert any part of his forces to the Dardanelles. Possible danger to Italian dominion in Tripoli, pointed out by the leaders of the Entente Powers, did not change his purpose to maintain a single concentrated front and not diffuse his efforts. The war with Austria, he believed, would be won or lost on the Italian frontier. His theory as to the best way to meet advances by the Teutonic allies in new fields was to increase pressure on their home frontiers where their interests were most vital. The Italian army in the field was increased to a million men, and, after the fall of Lemberg, Austria gradually moved more and more troops to the Alpine passes and the Isonzo, until by August she had 600,000 men facing the Italians, double the number arrayed on this front when Italy declared war. Had the Russians been able to hold out longer in Galicia, there is little doubt that Cadorna would have had something to show for the month of July besides a few local victories which did not vitally affect the main campaign.