The German admiralty report of the actual sinking of the ship, which was issued on the 14th of May, 1915, was brief. It read: "A submarine sighted the steamship Lusitania, which showed no flag, May 7, 2.20 Central European time, afternoon, on the southeast coast of Ireland, in fine, clear weather.

"At 3.10 o'clock one torpedo was fired at the Lusitania, which hit her starboard side below the captain's bridge. The detonation of the torpedo was followed immediately by a further explosion of extremely strong effect. The ship quickly listed to starboard and began to sink.

"The second explosion must be traced back to the ignition of quantities of ammunition inside the ship."

One of the effects of the sinking of the Lusitania was to cut down the number of passengers sailing to and from America to Europe on ships flying flags of belligerent nations. Attacks by submarines on neutral ships did not abate, however, for on the 15th of May, 1915, the Danish steamer Martha was torpedoed in broad daylight and in view of crowds ashore off the coast of Aberdeen Bay.

The sinking of ships in the "war zone" continued in spite of rumors that the German admiralty was expected to discontinue operations of the submarines against merchantmen on account of the unfriendly feeling aroused in neutral nations, particularly the United States. On the 19th of May, 1915, came the news that the British steamship Dumcree had been torpedoed off a point in the English Channel. A torpedo fired into her hull failed to sink her immediately, and a Norwegian ship came to her aid, passing her a cable and attempting to tow her to port. But the submarine returned, and fearing attack, the Norwegian ship made off. A second torpedo fired at the Dumcree had better effect than the first one, and she began to settle. When the submarine left the scene the Norwegian steamship again returned to the Dumcree and managed to take off all of her crew and passengers. Three trawlers, one of them French, were sunk in the same neighborhood during the next forty-eight hours.

As soon as Italy entered the war an attempt was made by the Teutonic Powers to establish the same sort of submarine blockade in the Adriatic which obtained in the waters around Great Britain. This was evinced when the captain of the Italian steamship Marsala reported on May 21, 1915, that his ship had been stopped by an Austrian submarine, but the latter not wishing to disclose its location to the Italian navy, allowed his ship to proceed unharmed.

The suspicion that the German admiralty maintained bases for their submarines right on the coasts of Great Britain where the submersible craft could obtain oil for driving their engines, as well as supplies of compressed air and of food for the crew, was confirmed on the 14th of May, 1915, when it was reported that agents of the British admiralty had discovered caches of the kind at various points in the Orkney Islands, in the Bay of Biscay, and on the north and west coasts of Ireland.

In order to damage shipping in the "war zone" by having ships go wrong through having no guiding lights an attack was made by a German submarine on the lighthouse at Fastnet, on the southern coast of Ireland, on the night of May 25, 1915. Shortly after nine in the evening the submarine was sighted in the waters near the lighthouse by persons on shore. She was about ten miles from Fastnet, near Barley Cove. When she came near enough to the lighthouse to use her deck guns, men on shore opened fire on her with rifles, and she submerged, not to reappear in that neighborhood again.

But this same submarine managed to do other damage. The American steamship Nebraskan was in the neighborhood on its way to New York. The sea was calm and the ship was traveling at 12 knots, when some time near nine o'clock in the evening a shock was felt aboard. A second later there came a terrific explosion, and a subsequent investigation showed that a large hole, 20 feet square, had been torn in her starboard bow, not far from the water line. When she began to settle the captain ordered all hands into the small boats. They stayed near the damaged ship for an hour and saw that she was not going to sink. When they got aboard again they found that a bulkhead was keeping out the water sufficiently to allow her to proceed under her own steam. In crippled condition she made for port, being convoyed later by two British warships which answered her calls for help.

In spite of the sharp diplomatic representations which were at the time passing back and forth between Germany and the United States over the matter of the German submarine warfare, the craft kept up as active a campaign against merchant ships as they did before the issues became pointed. On May 28, 1915, there came the news that three more ships had been sent to the bottom. The Spennymoor, a new ship, was chased and torpedoed off Start Point, near the Orkney Islands. Some of her crew were drowned when the lifeboat in which they were getting away capsized, carrying them down. On the same day the large liner Argyllshire was chased and fired upon by the deck guns of a hostile submarine, but she managed to get away. Not so fortunate, however, was the steamship Cadesby. While off the Scilly Islands on the afternoon of May 28, 1915, a German submarine hailed her, firing a shot from a deck gun across her bows as a signal to halt. Time was given for the crew and passengers to get into small boats, and when these were at a distance from the ship the deck guns of the submarine were again brought into action, and after firing thirty shots into her hull they sank her. The third victim was the Swedish ship Roosvall. She was stopped and boarded off Malmoe by the crew of a German submarine. After examining her papers they permitted her to proceed, but later sent a torpedo into her, sinking her.

A new raider, the U-24, made its appearance in the English Channel during the last week in May, 1915. On the twenty-eighth of the month this submarine sank the liner Ethiope. The captain of the steamship attempted some clever maneuvering, which did not accomplish its object. He paid no attention to a shot from the deck guns of the submarine which passed across his bow. The hostile craft then began to circle around the liner, while the rudder of the latter was put at a wide angle in an effort to keep either stern or bow of the ship toward the submarine, thus making a poor target for a torpedo. But the commander of the submarine saw through the movement and ordered fire with his deck guns. After shells had taken away the ship's bridge and had punctured her hull near the stern the crew and passengers were ordered into the small boats. They had hardly gotten twenty feet from their ship when she was rent by a violent explosion and went down.

The transatlantic liner Megantic had better luck, for she managed to escape a pursuing submarine on May 29, 1915, as she was nearing Queenstown, Ireland, homeward bound. A notable change in the methods adopted by the commanders of submarines as a result of orders issued by the German admiralty in answer to the protests throughout the press of the neutral nations after the sinking of the Lusitania was the giving of warning to intended victims. By the end of May, 1915, in almost every instance where a German submarine stopped and sank a merchantman the crew was given time to get off their ship and the submarine did not hesitate to show itself. In fact, warning to stop was generally given when the submarine's deck was above water and the gun mounted there had the victim "covered." This was done in the case of the British steamship Tullochmoor, which was torpedoed off Ushant near the most westerly islands of Brittany, France.

On the 1st of June, 1915, there came the news of the sinking of the British ship Dixiana, near Ushant, by a German submarine which approached by aid of a clever disguise. The crew managed to get off the ship in time; when they landed on shore they reported that the submarine had been seen and on account of sails which she carried was thought to be an innocent fishing boat. The disguise was penetrated too late for the Dixiana to make its escape.

The clear and calm weather which came with June, 1915, made greater activity on the part of German submarines possible. On the 4th of June, 1915, it was reported by the British admiralty that six more ships had been made victims, three of them being those of neutral countries. In the next twenty-four hours the number was increased by eleven, and eight more were added by the 9th of June, 1915.

On that date Mr. Balfour, Secretary of the British admiralty, announced that a German submarine had been sunk, though he did not state what had been the scene of the action. At the same time he announced that Great Britain would henceforth treat the captured crew of submarines in the same manner as were treated other war prisoners, and that the policy of separating these men from the others and of giving them harsher treatment would be abandoned.

On the 20th of June, 1915, the day's reports of losses due to the operations of German submarines, issued by the British Government, contained the news of the sinking of the two British torpedo boats, the No. 10 and the No. 20. No details were made public concerning just how they went down.

On the same day the Italian admiralty announced that a cache maintained to supply submarines belonging to the Teutonic Powers and operating in the Mediterranean, had been discovered on a lonely part of the coast near Kalimno, an island off the southwest coast of Asia Minor. Ninety-six barrels of benzine and fifteen hundred barrels of other fuel were found and destroyed. It was believed that this supply had been shipped as kerosene from Saloniki to Piraeus. How submarines belonging to Germany had reached the southern theatre of naval warfare had been a matter of speculation for the outside world. But on the 6th of June, 1915, Captain Otto Hersing made public the manner in which he took the U-51 on a 3,000 mile trip from Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea to Constantinople. He was the commander who managed to torpedo the British battleships Triumph and Majestic.

He received his orders to sail on the 25th of April, 1915, and immediately began to stock his ship with extra amounts of fuel and provisions, allowing only his first officer and chief engineer to know the destination of their craft. He traveled on the surface of the water as soon as he had passed the guard of British warships near the German coast; traveling "light" allowed him to make six or seven knots more in speed. As he passed through the "war zone" he kept watch for merchantmen which might be made victims of his torpedo tubes. His craft was sighted by a British destroyer, however, off the English coast and he had to submerge to escape the fire of the destroyer's guns. He then proceeded cautiously down the coast of France, encountering no hostile ships. When within one hundred miles of Gibraltar he was again discovered by British destroyers, but again managed to escape by submerging his craft.

Passage through the Strait of Gibraltar was made in the early morning hours, while a mist hung near the surface of the water and permitted no one at the fort to see the wake of the U-51's periscope. Once inside the Mediterranean he headed for the south of Greece, escaping attack from a French destroyer and proceeding through the AEgean Sea to the Dardanelles. The journey ended on the 25th of May, just one month after leaving Wilhelmshaven.

The British ships Triumph and Majestic were sighted early in the morning, but attack upon them was difficult on account of the destroyers which circled about them; one of the destroyers passed right over the U-51 while she was submerged. Captain Hersing brought her to the surface soon afterward and let go the torpedo which sank the Triumph. For the next two days the submarine lay submerged, but came up on the following day and found itself right in the midst of the allied fleet. This time the Majestic was taken as the target for a torpedo and she went down. Again submerging his vessel Captain Hersing kept it down for another day, and when he again came to the surface he saw that the fleets had moved away. He then returned to Constantinople.

On the 23d of June, 1915, the British cruiser Roxborough, an older ship, was hit by a torpedo fired by a German submarine in the North Sea, but the damage inflicted was not enough to prevent her from making port under her own steam.

The deaths of a number of Americans occurred on the 28th of June, 1915, when the Leyland liner Armenian, carrying horses for the allied armies, was torpedoed by the U-38, twenty miles west by north of Trevose Head in Cornwall. According to the story of the captain of the vessel, the submarine fired two shots to signal him to stop. When he put on all speed in an attempt to get away from the raider her guns opened on his ship with shrapnel, badly riddling it. She had caught fire and was burning in three places before he signaled that he would surrender. Thirteen men had meanwhile been killed by the shrapnel. Some of the lifeboats had also been riddled by the firing from the submarine's deck guns, making it more difficult for the crew to leave the ship. The German commander gave him ample time to get his boats off.

To offset the advantage which the Germans had with their submarines the British admiralty commissioned ten such craft during the week of June 28, 1915. These vessels were of American build and design and were assembled in Canada. During the week mentioned they were manned by men sent for the purpose from England. Each was manned by four officers and eighteen men, to take them across the Atlantic. Never before in history had so many submarines undertaken a voyage as great. They got under way from Quebec on July 2, 1915, and proceeded in column two abreast, a big auxiliary cruiser, which acted as their escort steaming in the center.

The next large liner which had an encounter with the German submarine U-39 was the Anglo-Californian. She came into Queenstown on the morning of July 5, 1915, with nine dead sailors lying on the deck, nine wounded men in their bunks, and holes in her sides made by shot and shell. She had withstood attack from a German submarine for four hours. Her escape from destruction was accomplished through only the spirit of the captain and his crew, combined with the fact that patrol vessels came to her aid forcing the submarine to submerge.

A variety in the methods used by the commanders of German submarines was revealed in the stopping of the Norwegian ship Vega which was stopped on the 15th of July, while voyaging from Bergen to Newcastle. The submarine came alongside the steamship at night and the commander of the submarine supervised the jettisoning of her cargo of 200 tons of salmon, 800 cases of butter, and 4,000 cases of sardines, which was done at his command under threat of sinking his victim.

The week of July 15, 1915, was unique in that not one British vessel was made the victim of a German submarine during that period, though two Russian vessels had been sunk. Figures compiled by the British admiralty and issued on the 22d of July, 1915, gave out the following information concerning the attacks on merchantmen by German submarines since the German admiralty's proclamation of a "war zone" around Great Britain went into effect on the 18th of February, 1915.

The official figures were as follows:

Week ending Vessels lost Lives lost Feb. 25, 1915 11 9 March 4, " 1 None March 11, " 7 38 March 18, " 6 13 March 25, " 7 2 April 1, " 13 165 April 8, " 8 13 April 15, " 4 None April 22, " 3 10 April 29, " 3 None May 6, " 24 5 May 13, " 2 1,260 May 20, " 7 13 May 27, " 7 7 June 3, " 36 21 June 10, " 36 21 June 17, " 19 19 June 24, " 3 1 July 1, " 9 29 July 8, " 15 2 July 15, " 12 13 July 22, " 2 None 235 1,641

The first year of the Great War came to an end with the German submarines as active in the "war zone" as they had been during any part of it. On the 28th of July, 1915, the anniversary of the commencement of the war, there was reported the sinking of nine vessels. These were the Swedish steamer Emma, the three Danish schooners Maria, Neptunis, and Lena, the British steamer Mangara, the trawlers Iceni and Salacia, the Westward Ho, and the Swedish bark Sagnadalen. No lives were lost with any of these vessels.

The first year of the war closed with a cloud gathered over the heads of the members of the German admiralty raised by the irritation the submarine attacks in the "war zone" had caused. Germany's enemies protested against the illegality of these attacks; neutral nations protested because they held that their rights had been overridden. But the German press showed the feeling of the German public on the matter—at the end of July, 1915, it was as anxious as ever to have the attacks continued. Conflicting claims were issued in Germany and England. In the former country it was claimed that the attacks had seriously damaged commerce; in the latter it was claimed that the damage was of little account.



PART VI—THE EASTERN FRONT—AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN



CHAPTER XXXV

THE CARPATHIAN CAMPAIGN—REVIEW OF THE SITUATION

In the beginning of 1915 comparative calm reigned over the Austro-Russian theatre of war, so far as actual hostilities were concerned. But it was not altogether the variable climatic conditions of alternate frost and thaw—the latter converting road and valley into impassable quagmires—that caused the lull. It was a short winter pause during which the opposing forces—on one side at least—were preparing and gathering the requisite momentum for the coming storm.

During January, 1915, the Russian armies were in a decidedly favorable position. In their own invaded territory of Poland, as we have seen, they held an advanced position in front of the Vistula, which circumstance enabled them to utilize that river as a line of communication, while barring the way to Warsaw against Von Hindenburg. Lemberg, the capital of Galicia, which they had captured in September, 1914, was still in their hands. Sixty miles away to the west there lay the great fortress of Przemysl, invested by the Russians under General Selivanoff, and completely cut off from the outer world since November 12, 1914. At least 150,000 troops and enormous quantities of stores and munitions were locked up in the town and outlying forts, together with a population of 50,000 inhabitants, mostly Polish. In addition to these material advantages, the Russians held all the Carpathian passes leading from Galicia into the vast plains of Hungary, and a strong advanced position on the Dunajec in the west, which, besides threatening Cracow, the capital of Austrian Poland, served also as a screen to the mountain operations. Finally, to the far east of the range, they had occupied nearly the whole of the Bukowina right up to the Rumanian frontier.

Such, briefly, was the situation on the Austro-Russian front when the second winter campaign opened. For Austria the situation was extremely critical. Her armies, broken and scattered after a series of disastrous reverses, could scarcely hope by their own efforts to stem the threatened invasion of Hungary. General Brussilov, however, made no serious attempt to pour his troops through the passes into the plain below; although what was probably a reconnaissance emerged from the Uzsok Pass and penetrated as far as Munkacs, some thirty miles south, while on several occasions small bands of Cossacks descended from the Dukla and Delatyn (Jablonitza) passes to raid Hungarian villages. General Brussilov evidently regarded it inadvisable to risk an invasion of the plain, especially as he did not hold control of the southern exits from the passes, beyond which he would be exposed to attack from all sides and liable to encounter superior forces. The main Austrian anxiety for the moment was the precarious position of Przemysl, to relieve which it was first essential to dislodge Brussilov or to pierce his line. Again, in the hour of her extremity, Austria's powerful ally came to the rescue.



Under the command of the Archduke Eugene the Austrian troops—all that were available—were formed into three separate armies. For convenience sake we will designate them A, B, and C. Army A, under General Boehm-Ermolli, was ordered to the section from the Dukla Pass to the Uzsog. It was charged with the task of cutting a way through to relieve Przemysl. Army B, under the German General von Linsingen, who also had some German troops with him, was to assail the next section eastward, from the Uzsog to the Wyszkow Pass; and Army C, under the Austrian General von Pflanzer-Baltin, likewise supplied with a good "stiffening" of German soldiers, was accredited to the far-eastern section—the Pruth Valley and the Bukowina. These three armies represented the fighting machine with which Austria hoped to retrieve the misfortunes of war and recover at the same time her military prestige and her invaded territories. We have no reliable information to enable us to estimate the exact strength of these armies, but there is every reason to believe that it was considerable, having regard to the urgency of the situation and the bitter experience of the recent past. Hence the figure of 400,000 men is probably approximately correct. Somewhere about January 23, 1914, after a period of thaw and mud the weather settled down to snow and hard frost. Then the machine began to move. A snow-clad mountain rampart lay spread before; over 200 miles of its length embraced the area of the projected operations. Here we may leave this army for a while in order to review some of the political and strategic considerations underlying the campaign, which is the scope of this chapter.

The Russian occupation of the Bukowina, which was undertaken and accomplished by a force far too small to oppose any serious resistance, appears to have been carried out with the definite political object of favorably impressing Rumania, and to guide her into the arms of the Allies. From her geographical position Rumania commands nearly the whole western frontier of the Dual Monarchy. Her fertile soil supplied the Central Powers with grain, dairy produce, and oil. Furthermore, Rumania's foreign policy leaned to the side of Italy, and the general European impression was, after the death of King Carol, October 10, 1914, that if one of the two countries entered the war, the other would follow suit. As subsequent events have shown, however, that expectation was not realized. Rumania, too, had aspirations in the direction of recovering lost territories, but her grievance in this respect was equally divided between Russia and Austria, for, while the one had despoiled her of Bessarabia, the other had annexed Transylvania (Siebenbuergen). Hence the Russian tentative conquest and occupation of the Bukowina paved the way for Rumania, should she decide on intervention. The road was clear for her to step in and occupy the Bukowina (which Russia was prepared to hand over), and probably Transylvania as well, which latter the proximity of a Russian force might—at the time—have enabled her to do. But the bait failed, no doubt for weighty reasons. Even if Rumania had favored the Triple Entente, which there is strong ground to presume she would, by entering the war, have found herself in as perilous a position as Serbia, with her Black Sea littoral exposed to hostile Turkey and her whole southern boundary flanked by a neighbor—Bulgaria—whose intentions were as yet unknown. However, on January 27, 1915, the Bank of England arranged a $25,000,000 loan to Rumania—an event which further heightened the probability of her entry into the arena.

We may safely take it for granted that these considerations were not overlooked by the German staff, in addition to the patent fact that the Russians were persistently gaining ground against the Austrians. German officers and men were therefore rushed from the eastern and western fronts to the south of the Carpathians to form the three armies we have labeled A, B, and C. The points of attack for which they were intended have already been stated; but the roundabout manner in which they traveled to their respective sections is both interesting and worthy of notice. At this stage a new spirit seemed to dominate Austro-Hungarian military affairs; we suddenly encounter greater precision, sounder strategy, and deeper plans: a master mind appears to have taken matters in hand. It is the cool, calculating, mathematical composite brain of the German General Staff. As the formation and dispatching of three great armies can hardly be kept a secret, especially where hawk-eyed spies abound, a really astute piece of stage management was resorted to. Wild rumors were set afloat to the effect that the Austrian Government had decided to undertake a great offensive—for the third time—against Serbia, and erase her from the map, with the assistance of four German army corps. The concentration zone for operations against either Serbia or the Russian front in the Carpathians was naturally in the central plains of Hungary. But to cover the real object of Austro-German concentration active demonstrations were made on the Serb border in the form of bombardments of Belgrade, and occupation of Danube islands. These demonstrations made plausible the Teutonic assertion that the concentration of troops was being carried out with a view to an invasion of Serbia. So successful was the ruse, and so well had the secret been kept that on February 1, 1914, a Petrograd "official" gravely announced to an eagerly listening world: "The statement is confirmed that the new Austro-German southern army, intended for the third invasion of Serbia, consists of six Austrian and two German corps or 400,000 men, under the command of the Archduke Eugene(!)" At the very time this appeared the new Austro-German "southern" army had been already, for quite a week, making its presence severely felt in the eastern and central sections of the Carpathians, and still the Russian authorities had not recognized the identity of the forces operating there.

A brief description of the battle ground will enable the reader to follow more easily the course of the struggle. Imagine that length of the Carpathian chain which forms the boundary between Galicia and Hungary as a huge, elongated arch of, roughly, 300 miles. (The whole of the range stretches as a continuous rampart for a distance of 900 miles, completely shutting in Hungary from the northwest to the east and south, separating it from Moravia [Maehren], Galicia, the Bukowina, and Rumania.) Through the curve of this arch run a number of passes. Beginning as far west as is here necessary, the names of the chief passes eastward leading from Hungary are: into Galicia—Beskid, Tarnow, Tilicz, Dukla, Lupkow, Rostoki, Uzsok, Vereczke (or Tucholka), Beskid[2] (or Volocz), Wyszkow, Jablonitza (or Delatyn); into the Bukowina—Strol, Kirlibaba, Rodna; into Rumania—Borgo. In parts the range is 100 miles in width, and from under 2,000 to 8,000 feet high. The western and central Carpathians are much more accessible than the eastern, and therefore comprise the main and easiest routes across. The Hun and Tartar invasions flooded Europe centuries ago by this way, and the Delatyn is still called the "Magyar route." The passes vary in height from under a thousand to over four thousand feet. The Dukla and Uzsok passes were to be the main objective, as through them lay the straightest roads to Lemberg and Przemysl. The former is crossed by railway from Tokay to Przemysl, and the latter by rail and road from Ungvar to Sambor. A railroad also runs through the Vereczke from Munkacs to Lemberg, and another through Delatyn from Debreczen to Kolomea. So far as concerned means of communication, matters were nearly equal, but geographical advantage lay with the Russians, as the way from Galicia to Hungary is by far an easier one than vice versa.

[Footnote 2: There are two passes named Beskid.]



CHAPTER XXXVI

BATTLE OF THE PASSES

Before proceeding with the opening of the second winter campaign in the Carpathians, the reader should remember that, as stated in the beginning of this narrative, a Russian army under General Radko Dmitrieff (a Bulgarian), held an advanced position on the Dunajec-Biala line, extending from the Vistula to Zmigrod, northwest of Dukla. This force was consequently beyond the zone of the Austro-German offensive, but, as events proved, it had not been overlooked, for it was here that the heaviest blow was finally to fall. It is also important to bear in mind that the Russian armies occupying Galicia and the northern slopes of the Carpathians were not conducting an isolated campaign on their own account; they formed an integral part of the far-flung battle line that reached from the shores of the Baltic down to the Rumanian frontier, a distance of nearly 800 miles. Dmitrieff's force represented a medial link of the chain—and the weakest.

Over the slushy roads of the valleys and into the snow-laden passes the Germanic armies advanced, each of the widely deployed columns with a definite objective: From Dukla, Lupkow, and Rostoki to relieve Przemysl; from Uzsok through the valley of the Upper San to Sambor; through Beskid and Vereczke northward to Stryj, thence westward also to Sambor; over Wyszkow to Dolina; via Jablonitza to Delatyn; and across Kirlibaba and Dorna Vatra into the Bukowina. Opposed to them were the Russian Generals Brussilov, Ivanoff, and Alexieff, respectively.

Correspondents with the Teutonic troops in these weeks wrote in wonderment of the scenes of the slowly forward toiling advance into the mountains which they had seen. On every road leading into Galicia there was the same picture of a flood rolling steadily on. Everywhere could be seen the German and Austro-Hungarian troops on the move, men going into the firing line to fight for days, day after day, with the shedding of much blood, among the peaks and valleys, under changing skies.

Here is a word picture of the supply columns winding upward into the Carpathians to the support of the Teutonic troops furnished by a German correspondent:

"Truly fantastic is the appearance of one of these modern supply caravans, stretching in zigzag, with numerous sharp corners and turns, upward to the heights of the passes and down on the opposite side. Here we see in stages, one above the other and moving in opposite directions, the queerest mixture of men, vehicles, machines and animals, all subordinated to a common military purpose and organization by military leadership, moving continually and regularly along. The drivers have been drummed up from all parts of the monarchy, Serbs, Ruthenians, Poles, Croats, Rumanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Austrians, and turbaned Mohammedans from Bosnia. Everyone is shouting to his animals and cursing in his own language. The whole mix-up is a traveling exhibition of most variegated characteristic costumes, for the most part, of course, extremely the worse for wear. Common to all these are the little wagons adapted to mountain travel, elastic and tough, which carry only half loads and are drawn by little ponylike, ambitious horses. In between are great German draft horses, stamping along with their broad high-wheeled baggage and ammunition wagons, as though they belonged to a nation of giants.

"Gravely, with a kind of sullen dignity, slow-stepping steers drag at their yokes heavily laden sledges. They are a powerful white breed, with broad-spreading horns a yard long. These are followed in endless rows by carefully stepping pack animals, small and large horses, mules and donkeys. On the wooden packsaddles on their backs are the carefully weighed bales of hay or ammunition boxes or other war materials. Walking gingerly by the edges of the mountain ridges they avoid pitfalls and rocks and walk round the stiff, distended bodies of their comrades that have broken down on the way. At times there ambles along a long row of working animals a colt, curious and restlessly sniffing. In the midst of this movement of the legs of animals, of waving arms, of creaking and swaying loaded vehicles of manifold origin, there climbs upward the weighty iron of an Austrian motor battery, with an almost incomprehensible inevitableness, flattening out the broken roads like a steam roller.

"From the first pass the baggage train sinks down into the depths, again to climb upward on the next ridge, to continue striving upward ever toward higher passages, slowly pushing forward toward its objective against the resistance of numberless obstacles.

"The road to the battle field of to-day crosses the battle field of recent weeks and months. Here there once stood a village, but only the stone foundations of the hearths are left as traces of the houses that have been burned down. Sometimes falling shots or the terrors of a brief battle in the streets have reduced to ruins only a part of a village. The roofs of houses have been patched with canvas and boards to some extent, and now serve as quarters for troops or as stables. In the narrow valleys the level places by the sides of streams have been utilized for encampments. Here stand in order wagons of a resting column and the goulash cannons shedding their fragrance far and wide, or the tireless ovens of a field bakery. Frequently barracks, hospital buildings, and shelters for men and animals have been built into the mountain sides. Here and there simple huts have been erected, made of a few poles and fir twigs. Often they are placed in long rows, which, when their inmates are warming themselves by the fire at night turn the dark mountain road into a romantic night encampment, and everywhere fresh crosses, ornamented at times in a manner suggestive of the work of children, remind us of our brothers now forever silenced, who, but a short time before went the same road, withstood just such weather and such hardships, talked perhaps in these same huts of the war, and dreamt of peace.

"The saddest spectacle, however, were the lightly wounded, poor fellows, who might under ordinary conditions have readily walked the distance from the first aid station to the central gathering point, but who here on account of the ice or muddy roads require double and three times the usual time."



CHAPTER XXXVII

BATTLE OF KOZIOWA—OPERATIONS IN THE BUKOWINA

Owing to the topographical conditions under which fighting must be carried on in the central Carpathians, some weeks might be expected to elapse before a general engagement developed along the entire front. Lateral communication or cooperation between the advancing columns was out of the question; the passes were like so many parallel tunnels, each of which must first be negotiated before a reunion can take place at the northern exits.

We will follow the achievements of the three groups in separate order. Army A, under Boehm-Ermolli, crossed Uzsok and Rostoki, and forced part of the Russian line back upon Baligrod, but Brussilov held it fast on Dukla and Lupkow, strongly supported by Dmitrieff on his right. Here the attack failed with severe losses; the Germanic forces were thrown back into Hungary, and the Russians commanded the southern ends of the passes around Dukla. The Uzsok Pass was of small strategical value to the Austrians now that they had it. It is extremely vulnerable at every point; steep, narrow, and winding roads traverse its course nearly 3,000 feet high, with thickly wooded mountains up to 4,500 feet overlooking the scene from a close circle. Regarded merely as a short cut to Przemysl and Lemberg, the Uzsok was a useful possession provided always that the northern debouchment could be cleared and an exit forced. But the Russians held these debouchments with a firm grip, and the pass was consequently of no use to the Austrians. About February 7, 1915, the Russians attempted to outflank the Austrian position in the Lupkow Pass from the eastern branch of the Dukla by pushing forward in the direction of Mezo-Laborc on the Hungarian side. The movement partially succeeded; they took over 10,000 prisoners, but failed to dislodge the Austrians from the heights east of the pass. Severe fighting raged round this district for over a month, the Russians finally capturing Lupkow, as well as Smolnik at the southern exit of Rostoki. Had the Russians succeeded in getting between Uzsok and the Austrian line of communication, as was undoubtedly their aim, the Austrians would have been compelled to relinquish the pass without even a fight. However, General Boehm-Ermolli's mission proved a failure.

Army B, under Von Linsingen, succeeded in traversing all the passes in its appointed section. Crossing by the railway pass of Beskid and the two roads leading through Vereczke and Wyszkow, they pushed forward in the direction of Stryj and Lemberg, but never reached their destination. Barely through the passes, the Germans struck upon Lysa Gora, over 3,300 feet high. This mountain range is barren of all vegetation—no sheltering trees or shrubs adorn its slopes. The route of the Germans crossed Lysa Gora south and in front of the ridge of Koziowa, where the Russian lines, under General Ivanoff, lay in waiting. Passing down the bald slopes of Lysa Gora toward the valley of the Orava River, the advancing German columns presented a conspicuous target for the Russians on the opposite slopes of Koziowa, screened by thick forests. Here one of the most desperate battles of the campaign ensued on February 6, 1915, between Von Linsingen's Austro-German army and Brussilov's center.

In close formation and with well-drilled precision the Germans attempted to storm the position at the point of the bayonet. Again and again they returned to the charge, only to be repulsed with severe losses. As many as twenty-two furious bayonet charges were made in one day, February 7. Wherever a footing was gained in the Russian lines, there a few minutes ferocious hand-to-hand melee developed—Saxon and Slav at death grips—the intruders were expelled or hacked down. Great masses of Austro-German dead and wounded were strewn over the lower slopes of Koziowa. For five weeks Von Linsingen hammered at the Russian front without being able to break through. So long as the Russians held the heights it was impossible for their enemy to emerge from the passes. These two, Vereczke and Beskid, so close together, may literally be described as twin tunnels. Owing to the highland between them, the two columns moving through could not cooperate; if one side needed reenforcements from the other, they had to be taken back over the range into Hungary to the junction where the roads diverged. It was sound strategy on the Russian side to select Koziowa as the point from which to check the Germanic advance. For the time being, with Dukla and Lupkow in their hands and the exits of Uzsok and Rostoki strongly guarded, the defense of Koziowa held Galicia safe from reconquest. The attacks against Koziowa continued beyond the middle of March, 1915. On the 16th of that month the Russians captured a place called Oravcyk, about four miles westward, from where they could threaten the German left, which had the effect of keeping Von Linsingen still closer to his mountain passages. The fighting in this region represents one of the important phases of the war, for it prevented the relief of Przemysl; temporarily saved Stryj and Lemberg for the Russians; enabled them to send reenforcements into the Bukowina, and, finally, inspired the German General Staff to plan the great and decisive Galician campaign, which was to achieve the task wherein Boehm-Ermolli and Von Linsingen had both failed.

Meanwhile, what had Von Pflanzer-Baltin accomplished with Army C—the third column? His path lay through Jablonitza, Kirlibaba, and Dorna Vatra; his task was to clear the Russians out of the Bukowina, and either to force them back across their own frontiers, or to turn the extreme end of their left flank. We have seen that the Russian occupation of the Bukowina was more in the nature of a political experiment than a serious military undertaking, and that their forces in the province were not strong enough to indulge in great strategical operations. Hence we may expect the Austrian general's progress to be less difficult than that of his colleagues in the western and central Carpathians. To some extent this presumption is correct, for on February 18, 1915, after launching out from the southern corner of the Bukowina at Kimpolung and via the Jablonitza Pass down the Pruth Valley, they captured Czernowitz, and after that Kolomea, whence the railway runs to Lemberg. Within three days they reached Stanislawow, another important railway center, defended by a small Russian force, and a big battle ensued. Altogether, the Germanic troops in the Bukowina were reported at 50,000 in number, though these were split up into two columns, one of which was making but slow progress farther east.



Russian reenforcements were thrown into the town, and the struggle for the railway, which lasted a week, appears to have been of a seesaw nature, for no official reports of the fighting were issued by either side. Still the Austrians pushed westward in the hope of reaching the railways which supplied those Russian armies which were barring the advance through the central passes. The Russians were forced to withdraw from Stanislawow, and their opponents now held possession of the line running to Stryj and Przemysl—a serious menace to the Russian main communications. This meant that Von Pflanzer-Baltin had succeeded in getting to the rear of the Russians. But assistance came unexpectedly from the center, whence Ivanoff was able to send reenforcements to his colleague, General Alexeieff, who was continually falling back before the Austrians. Furious counterattacks were delivered by the Russians at Halicz and Jezupol, the bridgeheads of the southern bank of the Dniester. If the Austrians could not force a victory at these points, their position in Stanislawow would be untenable, since the Russians still had a clear road to pour reenforcements into the fighting area between the Dniester and the Carpathians. On March 1, 1915, the Austrians were defeated at Halicz in a pitched battle, and on the 4th the Russians reentered Stanislawow. According to their official communique the Russians captured nearly 19,000 prisoners, 5 guns, 62 machine guns, and a quantity of stores and munitions. About March 16 the opposing forces came again into touch southeast of Stanislawow on the road to Ottynia, but nothing of importance appears to have happened. To sum up the results of the Germanic offensive, we must remember what the objectives were. Of the latter, none was attained. The Russians had not been expelled from Galicia; Przemysl was no nearer to relief than before, and Lemberg had not been retaken. With the exception of Dukla and Lupkow, all the passes were in Austrian hands; but the Russians dominated the northern debouchments of all of them excepting Jablonitza.



CHAPTER XXXVIII

FALL OF PRZEMYSL

The town and fortress of Przemysl formally surrendered to the Russian General Selivanoff on Monday, March 22, 1915. The first investment began at the early stages of the war in September, 1914. On the 27th of that month the Russian generalissimo announced that all communications had been cut off. By October 15, 1914, the Russian investment had been broken again, and for a matter of three weeks, while the road was open, more troops, provisions, arms, and munitions were rushed to the spot. As we have seen, however, the Russians recovered their lost advantage, for, after the fall of Jaroslav, the fortress to the north of Przemysl, their troops were hurried up from east, north, and west, and within a few days the Austrians were sent back along the whole front. From the region of Przemysl three railroads cross the Carpathians to Budapest, along all of which the Russians had pushed vigorously, besides advancing on the west. As regarded railroad communications, the fate of Przemysl was sealed by the capture of Chyrow, an important junction about twenty miles south of the fortress. Przemysl itself was important as a road junction and as a connecting link with the Uzsok and Lupkow passes. The garrison prepared to make a stubborn resistance with the object of checking the Russian pursuit. A week later the Russians had broken up their heavy artillery and had begun a steady bombardment. By November 12, 1914, Przemysl was once more completely besieged by General Selivanoff with not more than 100,000 troops.

Przemysl is one of the oldest towns of Galicia, said to have been founded in the eighth century. It was once the capital of a large independent principality. In the fourteenth century Casimir the Great and other Polish princes endowed it with special civic privileges, and the town attained a high degree of commercial prosperity. In the seventeenth century its importance was destroyed by inroads of Tatars, Cossacks, and Swedes. Przemysl is situated on the River San, and was considered one of the strongest fortresses of Europe.

The original strategic idea embodied in the purpose of the fortress was purely defensive; in the event of war with Russia only the line of the San and Dniester was intended to be held at all costs, while the whole northeastern portion of Galicia was to be abandoned. With the fortress of Cracow guarding the west, Przemysl was meant to be the first defense between the two rivers and to hold the easiest roads to Hungary through the Dukla, Lupkow, and Uzsok passes. Within the last ten years, however, the Austrian War Staff altered its plans and decided upon a vigorous offensive against Russia should occasion offer, and that Eastern Galicia was not to be sacrificed. Hence a network of strategic railways was constructed with a view to attacking the prospective enemy on a wide front extending from the Vistula near Cracow on the west to the Bug on the east, where the latter flows into Austrian territory and cuts off a corner of eastern Galicia. The plan does not appear to have worked successfully, for, before the war was many days old, the Russians had taken Lemberg, swept across the Dniester at Halicz, across the San at Jaroslav, just north of Przemysl, and had already besieged the fortress, which at no time imposed any serious obstacle in the path of their progress. Perhaps the only useful purpose that Przemysl served was that it restrained the Russians from attempting an invasion of Hungary on a big scale, by holding out for nearly seven months. Not having sufficient siege artillery at their disposal, the Russians made no attempt to storm the place. General Selivanoff surrounded the forts with a wide circle of counterdefenses, which were so strongly fortified that the garrison would have found it an almost hopeless task to attempt a rush through the enemy's lines. The Austrian artillery was naturally well acquainted with the range of every point and position that lay within reach of their guns; and Selivanoff wisely offered them little opportunity for effective practice. Considering it too expensive to attack by the overland route, he worked his way gradually toward the forts by means of underground operations. To sap a position is slow work, but much more economical in the expenditure of lives and munitions. The weakness of Przemysl lay in the fact that its garrison was far too large for its needs, and that provisions were running short. In the early part of the campaign the Germanic armies operating in the San region had drawn freely on Przemysl for supplies, and before these could be adequately replaced the Russians had again forged an iron ring around the place. The Russian commander, moreover, was aware that a coming scarcity threatened the town, and that he had only to bide his time to starve it into submission. Whilst he was simply waiting and ever strengthening his lines, the Austrians found it incumbent on them to assume the offensive. Several desperate sorties were made by the garrison to break through the wall, only to end in complete disaster. General Herman von Kusmanek, the commander in chief of the fortress, organized a special force, composed largely of Hungarians, for "sortie duty," under the command of a Hungarian, General von Tamassy. These sorties had been carried out during November and December, 1914, especially during the latter month, when the Austro-German armies were pouring across the mountains. So critical was the Russian position at the time that the relief of Przemysl was hourly expected. According to an officer of General Selivanoffs staff, "The Austrians in the fortress were already conversing with the Austrians on the Carpathians by means of their searchlights. The guns of Przemysl could be heard by the Austrian field artillery. The situation was serious, and General Selivanoff took prompt measures. He brought up fresh troops to the point of danger and drove the sortie detachments back to the fortress." It is stated from the Austrian side that one of the sortie detachments had succeeded in breaking through the Russian lines and marching to a point fifteen miles beyond the outer lines of the forts. A Russian official announcement states that during two months of the siege the Austrian captures amounted only to 4 machine guns and about 60 prisoners, which occurred in an engagement where two Honved regiments fell on a Russian company which had advanced too far to be reenforced in time. On their part in repulsing sorties by the garrison, frequently made by considerable forces, the Russians made prisoners 27 officers and 1,906 soldiers, and captured 7 machine guns, 1,500,000 cartridges, and a large quantity of arms. In two sorties the garrison in the region of Bircza had more than 2,000 killed and wounded, among them being many officers. No further sorties were undertaken in that particular region. During January and February, 1915, very little fighting took place around Przemysl; sorties were useless as there was no Austro-German force anywhere near the fortress, and the Russians were tightening the pressure around it. The only means of communication with the outer world was by aeroplane, so that, despite the rigid investment, the Austro-German war staff were kept fully informed of the straits in which Przemysl found itself. General Boehm-Ermolli, with Army A, was making desperate efforts to extricate himself from the Russian grip round Uzsok, Lupkow, and Dukla; he did not get beyond Baligrod, as the crow flies, thirty miles south of Przemysl.

On March 13, 1915, the Russians stormed and captured the village of Malkovise, on the northeast, breaking through the outer line of the defense. From this position they began to bombard parts of the inner ring. About the beginning of the third week in March, 1915, a new spirit of activity appeared to seize the beleaguered garrison: they commenced a terrific cannonade which, however, elicited no response. It was but the energy of despair: they were firing to get rid of their ammunition, hoping at the same time to hit something or somebody. The end was at hand.

On March 18, 1915, a Petrograd "official" laconically reports that: "In the Przemysl sector the fortress guns continue to fire more than a thousand heavy projectiles daily, but our troops besieging the fortress lose only about ten men every day." It is also on March 18 that General von Kusmanek issued the following manifesto to the defenders of Przemysl:—"Heroes, I announce to you my last summons. The honor of our country and our army demands it. I shall lead you to pierce with your points of steel the iron circles of the enemy, and then march ever farther onward, sparing no efforts, until we rejoin our army, which, after heavy fighting, is now near us."

Just before the surrender two Austrian officers escaped from the fortress in an aeroplane. These reported concerning the last days of the siege:

"On the 18th of March the last provisions had been dealt out and at the same time the last attempt at breaking through the line of the besiegers had been ordered. This was carried out on the night of the 19th of March. It was shattered, however, against the unbreakable manifold ring of the Russian inclosing lines and against the superior forces which were brought in time to the threatened points. Our men were so weakened by their long fasting that it took them fully seven hours to make the march of seven kilometers, and even in this short stretch many of them had to lie down from exhaustion, yet they fought well and were bravely led by their officers.

"In spite of all this," Captain Lehmann, one of the escaped officers, reported, "the heroic garrison fought on, after their last sortie, for fully forty-eight hours, against assaults of the Russians which now set in with terrific violence. The men of the fortress were fully informed of the situation by an announcement of the commander. They knew that the provisions were at an end and this very knowledge spurred them on to make their last sacrifice. Practically all the nations of the monarchy were represented in the fortress. Tyrolese Landsturm held the south, Hungarians the west, Ruthenians and Poles the north, and lower Austrians the east. To this last battle the troops marched out singing, striving thus to master their weakness. On this, occasion the above mentioned notice had fallen into the hands of the Russians and the prospect had thus been opened to them to seize the fortress with little effort. For two days and nights all the works of Przemysl were taken under an uninterrupted terrible artillery fire, including that of modern howitzers of all calibers, up to eighteen centimeters. Then followed an assault at night on the east front, which, however, was again bloodily repelled."

Starvation is conducive neither to good feeling nor heroism, especially when it is superimposed upon an unbroken series of more or less disastrous experiences. Misfortune and the so-called "tradition of defeat" had dogged the steps of Austria's troops from the beginning of the war; unlucky generals—Dankl, Auffenberg, and others—had been relieved of their commands and replaced by "new blood"—Boehm-Ermolli, Boroyevitch von Bojna, and Von Pflanzer-Baltin. Of these three, two had as yet failed in carrying to success the German plans which had taken the place of those of their own strategists. Hence it is not at all improbable that the reports of dissensions among the garrison, which leaked out at the time, were substantially accurate. That jealousies broke out among the numerous races forming the Austrian Army—especially between the Slavonic and Germanic elements—is supported by strong evidence. The sentiments of the Slav subjects of Austria leaned more toward Russia than the empire of which they formed a considerable portion, while there was never any love lost between them and the Magyars. However that may be, the Slav regiments were reported to have refused obedience to the general's order for the last sortie, which was eventually undertaken by a force composed of the Twenty-third Hungarian Honved Division, a regiment of Hussars, and a Landwehr brigade, altogether about 30,000 men. Everything depended upon the venture, for not only were all their food supplies used up, but they had already eaten most of their horses. Instead, therefore, of making southward to where their comrades were fighting hard to tear themselves away from the Carpathian passes, the sortie turned toward the east, in the direction of Mosciska, twenty miles off, which was supposed to be the Russian supply base. This attempted foraging expedition—for it was nothing else—can only be defended on the broad general principle that it is better to do something than nothing as a last resort. Supplies were essential before any more could be undertaken to cut a passage through the strong double set of Russian lines that lay between the Carpathians and Przemysl; but that these supplies were stored at Mosciska was a pure speculation. Further, considering that the whole country was in their opponents' hands, a strength of 30,000 men was insufficient to attempt so hazardous an adventure. Even if they succeeded in breaking through, their return to the fortress was not assured. In that case, if they could not get back, they would have to go forward: eastward lay Lemberg, held by the Russians; northward was the Russian frontier, and southward stood the Russian forces holding the passes. Thus, in any case, however successful the expedition might prove, it meant breaking at least twice through lines which the enemy had spent months in strengthening or fortifying. Undeterred by the almost certain possibility of failure, the expedition of the "forlorn hope" set out across the plain of the San—and speedily came to grief. They had to pass by the strongest Russian artillery position, which was stationed in the low hollow through which the railway runs to Lemberg. Here a terrific hail of shells burst over their heads; rattle of machine guns and rifle fire tore great holes in their ranks; the stoutest courage and bravest hearts were unavailing against an enemy who could not be reached nor even seen. The number of killed and wounded in that fatal sortie has not been made public; that it was an enormous figure is certain. The Russians took 4,000 prisoners of those who survived the ordeal, and captured the forts on the western side directly after the struggling remnants had regained their starting place. General von Kusmanek issued his manifesto in the morning, and by the same night the sortie ended in disaster. Like the misdirected charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in 1854, it was "brilliant, but it wasn't war."

One more attempt was made on Saturday, March 20, 1915, toward Oikovice, but it was easily frustrated by the vigilant Russians. On Sunday and Monday, the 21st and 22d of March, a number of explosions were heard in and around Przemysl. The Austrians were destroying everything possible previous to surrendering. Large quantities of explosives were thrown in the river; all kinds of arms were destroyed or rendered useless; three bridges were crippled; the few remaining horses were shot, and a railway bridge over the Wiar, which possessed no strategic value, was also destroyed. These tactics of destroying approaches naturally isolated the town more than ever, and made it exceedingly difficult afterward to convey food supplies to the starving population.

On Monday morning, March 22, 1915, the Austrian chief of staff appeared outside the lines of Przemysl under a flag of truce. He was blindfolded, driven by automobile to Russian headquarters, and ushered into the presence of General Selivanoff. When the bandage had been removed from his eyes, the Austrian officer handed over a letter of capitulation from General von Kusmanek, which ran as follows:

"In consequence of the exhaustion of provisions and stores, and in compliance with instructions received from my supreme chief, I am compelled to surrender the Imperial and Royal Fortress of Przemysl to the Imperial Russian Army."

The Russians took charge without any triumphal display. Some officers were sent to receive the surrender and take stock of the spoils. General von Kusmanek himself supplied the inventory, in which were listed 9 generals, 93 superior officers, 2,500 "Offiziere und Beamten" (subalterns and officials), and 117,000 rank and file, besides 1,000 pieces of ordnance, mostly useless, and a large quantity of shells and rifle cartridges.

General Artamoff was appointed military governor and to superintend the process of dispatching the prisoners into Russian territory, which was carried out at the rate of 10,000 a day. Extensive arrangements were set on foot to supply the inhabitants with food, drink, and other necessaries of life. As the Russians had not bombarded the town, its natural and artificial beauties had suffered no damage beyond that which the Austrians had themselves inflicted; only the outskirts and the fortifications had been injured by fire and explosion.

Thus fell, on March 22, 1915, Przemysl, "by its own momentum like an overripe fruit," and with a garrison twice as large as would have been adequate to defend it. To Austria the blow was a severe one, for it cost her about four army corps; the immediate advantage it brought to the Russians was the release of Selivanoff's army of 100,000 men, who were urgently required elsewhere. It was only a week earlier that the commander in chief of all the Austro-Hungarian armies, the Archduke Frederick, had granted an interview to an American journalist (Dr. J. T. Roche), in the course of which he stated: "We have only recently reached the point where we are really prepared, to carry on a campaign as it should be carried under modern conditions of warfare. Now that our organization has been completed and all branches of the service are working harmoniously, we entertain no doubts as to our ability to hold the enemy at all points and to drive him back from that section of Galicia which is still in his possession."



CHAPTER XXXIX

NEW RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE—AUSTRO-GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Three days before the fall of Przemysl the Russians abandoned the defensive and commenced a vigorous attack on the Carpathian front. Active preparations for the advance had been completed when the capitulation of the fortress was to be expected any hour. Having so far held the Germanic armies in check, it was necessary for the Russians to regain complete control of the Carpathians and the passes before the snow should begin to melt, especially if they decided on an invasion of Hungary. On the other hand, before any offensive could be undertaken against the Germans in Poland, or the Austrians at Cracow, it was imperative to secure the southern flank in Galicia. They had by this time partially grasped one particular feature of German strategy, namely, to parry a blow from one direction by striking in another. A further consideration may have been the absolute certainty that Germany would dispatch more reenforcements to the aid of her ally. Selivanoff's siege army was distributed between Dmitrieff, Brussilov, and Ivanoff, but they could not be employed to full advantage owing to the restricted area presented by the Germanic front. Being largely composed of siege artillery as well as cavalry, a considerable portion of Selivanoff's army was unsuited for mountain warfare. Cavalry were converted into infantry, but could not be supplied with the necessary equipment; they had no bayonets, and most of the fighting was hand-to-hand.

Great masses of Germanic reserves were concentrating in northern Hungary, into which the Russians had driven a thin wedge south of Dukla, where they held an isolated outpost near Bartfeld. To leave this position undeveloped meant compulsory withdrawal or disaster. With the continual influx of reenforcements on both sides, the struggle for the main passes gradually develops into an ever-expanding and unbroken battle front: all the gaps are being filled up. From Dukla westward to the Dunajec-Biala line and the Carpathian foothills a new link is formed by the Fourth Austrian Army, commanded by the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, with two and a half army corps and one German division. In the Central Carpathians a fifth army, under the command of the Austrian General von Bojna, appears between the forces of Boehm-Ermolli and those of Von Linsingen. Right away eastward the purely Austrian army of Von Pflanzer-Baltin was holding the Pruth Valley. The Germanic chain was complete, with every link welded together.

When the Russian offensive opened on March 19, 1915, the entire battle line still rested on the northern side of the Carpathians, and here the struggle was resumed. The Russian grand attack was directed between the Lupkow and Uzsok passes, where great forces of the enemy, concentrated for the purpose of relieving Przemysl, were stationed. In the western sector, facing Dmitrieff, the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand held the roads leading from Novy-Sacz and Grybow to Tarnow, covering Cracow; and from south of the range the two roads diverging from Zboro to Gorlice and Jaslo were in Russian possession, though the Austrians held their junction at Zboro, eight miles north of Bartfeld. Of the actual fighting that took place in this region very few details were published by the Russian official communique. One of these documents, dated April 18, 1915, announced that on March 23, "our troops had already begun their principal attack in the direction of Baligrod, enveloping the enemy positions from the west of the Lupkow Pass and on the east near the sources of the San. The enemy opposed the most desperate resistance to the offensive of our troops. They had brought up every available man on the front from the direction of Bartfeld as far as the Uzsok Pass, including even German troops and numerous cavalrymen fighting on foot. The effectives on this front exceeded 300 battalions. Moreover, our troops had to overcome great natural difficulties at every step. In the course of the day, March 23, 1915, we captured more than 4,000 prisoners, a gun, and several dozen machine guns."

On March 24, 1915, the battle was in full progress: "Especially severe is the fighting for the crest of the mountain south of Jasliska and to the west of the Lupkow Pass. The forests which cover these mountains offer special facilities for the construction of strong fortifications." March 25: "The woods in the Lupkow region are a perfect entanglement of barbed wire ... surrounded by several layers of trenches, strengthened by deep ditches and palisades. On this day our troops carried by assault a very important Austrian position on the great crest of the Beskid Mountains." The Russian captures for the day amounted to 100 officers, 5,600 men, and a number of machine guns. Advancing from Jasliska the Russians seriously threatened the Austro-German position in the Laborcza Valley, to which strong reenforcements were sent on March 25. With terrific violence the battle raged till far into the night of the 27th, the Russians forcing their way to within seven miles of the Hungarian frontier.

In eight days they had taken nearly 10,000 prisoners. By the night of March 28, 1915, the entire line of sixty miles from Dukla to Uzsok was ablaze—the storm was spreading eastward. Like huge ant hills the mountains swarmed with gray and bluish specks—each a human being—some to the waist in snow, stabbing and hacking at each other ferociously with bayonet, sword, or lance, others pouring deadly fire from rifle, revolver, machine gun, and heavy artillery. Over rocks slippery with blood, through cruel barbed-wire entanglements and into crowded trenches the human masses dash and scramble. Here, with heavy toll, they advanced; there, and with costlier sacrifice, they were driven back. Fiery Magyars, mechanical Teutons and stolid muzhiks mixed together in an indescribable hellbroth of combative fury and destructive passion. Screaming shells and spattered shrapnel rent the rocks and tore men in pieces by the thousand. Round the Lupkow Pass the Russians steadily carved their way forward, and at the close of the day, March 29, 1915, they had taken 76 officers, 5,384 men, 1 trench mortar, and 21 machine guns. Along the Baligrod-Cisna road the fighting proceeded, up to March 30, by day and night.

Gradually the Russians pushed toward Dvernik and Ustrzyki south of Lutoviska, threatening the Austrian position in the Uzsok and lines of communications to the south. German reserves were hurried up from the base at Ungvar, but could not prevent the capture of 80 Austrian officers, over 5,000 men, 14 machine guns, and 4 pieces of cannon. Ivanoff had been careful to hold his portion of Selivanoff's army in reserve; their presence turned the scale.

On the day and night of March 31, 1915, the Russians stormed and carried the Austrian positions 4,000 feet high up on the Poloniny range during a heavy snowstorm. So deep was the snow in places that movement was impossible; the trampling of the charging battalions rushing down over the slopes dislodged avalanches of snow, overwhelming both attackers and defenders. By April 1, 1915, the Russians approached Volosate, only twelve miles from the rear of the Uzsok Pass, from which they were now separated by a low ridge. Holding full possession of the Poloniny range farther west, they commanded the road from Dvernik to Vetlina. From the north other Russian columns captured Michova on the Smolnik-Cisna railroad, crossed the Carpathians, and penetrated into the Virava Valley. Occupying the entire loop of the Sanok-Homona railway north and south of Lupkow, and Mezo-Laborcz toward Dukla, the Russians now threatened the Austrian mountain positions between Lupkow and the Vetlina-Zboj road from the western flank as well. Violent winter storms raged across the Carpathians on April 2 and 3, 1915; nature spread a great white pall over the scenes of carnage. While the elements were battling, the weary human fighting machine rested and bound its wounds. But not for long. Scarcely had the last howls of the blizzard faded away when the machine was again set in motion.

South of Dukla and Lupkow and north of Uzsok fighting was resumed with intense vigor. Painfully digging through the snowdrifts the Austrians retired from the Smolnik-Kalnica line, now no longer tenable. Storm hampered the pursuing enemy, who captured the Cisna railway station on April 4, 1915, with all its rolling stock and large stores of munitions.

On April 6, 1915, a Russian communique announced that "during the period from March 20 to April 3, 1915, we took prisoners in the Carpathians, on the front from Baligrod to Uzsok, 378 officers, 11 doctors, and 33,155 men. We captured 17 guns and 101 machine guns. Of these captives 117 officers, 16,928 men, 8 guns, and 59 machine guns were taken on a front of fifteen versts (10 miles)."

The Russians again advanced along their whole front on April 4, 1915; forcing their way along the Rostoki stream, they carried the village of Rostoki Gorne with the bayonet and penetrated the snow-bound Rostoki Pass. Their first line arrived at a Hungarian village called Orosz-Russka, five miles from Nagy Polena, at the foot of the pass. The Austrians attempted to drive them back, but they held their ground.

While fortune was steadily following the efforts of the czar's troops in the Lupkow-Uzsok sector, the German War Staff were preparing their plans for the great decisive blow that was soon to be struck. South of the Carpathians, barely thirty miles away, formidable reenforcements were collecting; they arrived from the East Prussian front, from Poland, and even from the west, where they had faced the French and British. There were also new formations fresh from Germany. General von der Marwitz arrived in the Laborcza Valley with a whole German army corps. These gigantic preparations were not unknown to the Russians; they, also, strained every nerve to throw all available reenforcements behind and into the battle line, strengthening every position except one. South of the Lupkow the Germanic forces opened their counteroffensive on April 6, 1915. Official reports on the first day's fighting differ somewhat. The Russians admit a slight German advance, but assert that they were able to withstand all further attacks. The Germans, on the other hand, claim great successes and the capture of 6,000 Russian prisoners.

The Germanic armies in this case, however, certainly did advance, for the Russians withdrew from the Virava Valley, which they had entered four days earlier. The first object of the counteroffensive was to save the Austrians who were holding the frontier south of Lupkow from being enveloped and cut off. But on April 9, 1915, the Russians again moved forward, and recovered part of the Virava Valley. By this day the whole mountain crest from Dukla to Uzsok, a distance of over seventy miles, had been conquered by the Russians. By the same night they had repulsed a counterattack near the Rostoki and captured a battalion of Austrian infantry. The Russian report sums up thus: "We seized Height 909 (909 meters=3,030 feet) with the result that the enemy was repulsed along the entire length of the principal chain of the Carpathians in the region of our offensive."

For the next three days Brussilov attempted to work his way to the rear of the Uzsok position with his right wing from the Laborcz and Ung valleys, while simultaneously continuing his frontal attacks against Boehm-Ermolli and Von Bojna. Cutting through snow sometimes more than six feet deep, the Russians approached at several points within a distance of three miles from the Uzsok Valley. But the Austrians still held the Opolonek mountain group in force. Severe fighting then developed northwest of the Uzsok on the slopes between Bukoviec and Beniova; the Russians captured the village of Wysocko Nizne to the northeast, which commands the only roads connecting the Munkacz-Stryj and the Uzsok-Turka lines. Though both sides claimed local successes, they appear to have fought each other to a deadlock, for very little fighting occurred in this zone after April 14, 1915. Henceforth Brussilov directed his main efforts to the Virava and Cisna-Rostoki sector. From here and Volosate, where there had been continuous fighting since the early days of April, the Russians strove desperately for possession of the Uzsok. They were ow only two or three days' march from the Hungarian plains.

Between April 17 and 20, 1915, a vigorous Austrian counterattack failed to check the Russian advance. Between Telepovce and Zuella, two villages south of the Lupkow, the Russians noiselessly approached the Austrian barbed-wire entanglements, broke through, and after a brief bayonet encounter gained possession of two heights and captured the village of Nagy Polena, a little farther to the east. During the night of April 16-17, 1915, the Russians took prisoners 24 officers, 1,116 men, and 3 machine guns.

On April 18, 1915, the Austrians directed several fierce attacks against the heights south of Telepovce, but were compelled to evacuate the approaches to their positions. Here, also, an Austrian battalion was cut off and forced to surrender. Meanwhile the fighting was gradually decreasing in intensity; the great Carpathian campaign had reached the end of another chapter. The Austro-German offensive had failed in its purpose. From Uzsok eastward there had been but little fighting after the Russian recapture of Stanislawow.



CHAPTER XL

CAMPAIGN IN GALICIA AND BUKOWINA—BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

While the struggle for the passes was raging in the central Carpathians an interesting campaign was being conducted in Eastern Galicia and the Bukowina between Von Pflanzer-Baltin and Lechitsky. There we left the Russians in possession of Stanislawow, which they had reoccupied on March 4, 1915. Two days before, an Austrian detachment of infantry and two divisions of cavalry attempted a raid into Russian territory near the Bessarabian frontier. Within forty-eight hours they were hurled back. Beyond local skirmishes and maneuvering for positions, nothing of importance happened from March 4 till the 15th, when the Russians attacked the main Austrian forces southeast of Czernowitz. Crossing the River Pruth opposite Ludihorecza, which lies about 600 feet high, and where the Czernowitz waterworks are situated, the Russians occupied the place and threatened the Austrian position in the town, around which pressed laborers were digging trenches night and day for the defenders. Along the line between Sadagora and Old Zuczka the Russians had been settled for over six months. The Austrians attacked this position on March 21, 1915, with the aid of reenforcements and compelled the Russians to evacuate Sadagora. While falling back in the south the Russians endeavored to advance in the north, from the direction of Czerniavka, and outflank the Austrians. Violent fighting raged for several days, especially northeast from Czernowitz to beyond Rarancze, with the result that the Russians were compelled to withdraw toward Bojan, near their own frontier, on March 27. Three days later some Hungarian Honved battalions, who had penetrated into Russian territory near Szylowce, were surrounded by Cossacks and severely handled. Besides many killed and wounded the Austrians lost over 1,000 prisoners, and by April 2, 1915, the Russians had thrown the remainder back across their borders. On April 10, 1915, the Russians withdrew from Bojan, but returned on the 14th. Here, at the close of April, they concentrated large reenforcements and recovered most of the ground they had lost since the middle of March.

Some twenty miles northwest of Czernowitz, sheltered in a loop of the Dniester, lies an important fortified town called Zaleszczyki. It had a population of over 76,000, and is a station on the branch line connecting Czortkow junction with the Kolomca-Czernowitz railway. From the dense forests east of the town an Austrian column commanded by Count von Bissingen had attempted during the night of March 22-23, 1915, to turn the adjacent Russian positions, held by Cossacks and Siberian fusiliers. A furious fight developed, and the Austro-Hungarian column, which included some of the finest troops, was repulsed with heavy loss. Two other attempts were made here, on April 10 and 17, 1915. On the latter date a detachment of Tyrolese sharpshooters were trapped in the wire entanglements and annihilated.

One more battle on a big scale remains to be chronicled from the far eastern sector; it may also serve to illustrate the wide divergence that not infrequently exists between official communiques recording the same event. Early in April, 1915, a Russian force threw a bridge across the Dniester near the village of Filipkowu and moved along the road running from Uscie Biskupie via Okna and Kuczurmik on to Czernowitz, the intention being to turn the Austrian positions south of Zaleszczyki from the rear. We will let the rival communiques relate what happened:

Austrian Version

Annihilated two battalions of Russian infantry belonging to the Alexander Regiment; took 1,400 prisoners, and drove Russians back beyond the Dniester.

Russian Version

Annihilated two battalions of the Honveds; captured 21 officers, over 1,000 rank and file, and 8 machine guns.

The curtain was about to rise for the next act, wherein will be played one of the most terrific reversals of fortune ever produced in military history.

For quite a month it had been an open secret that considerable masses of German troops were being transported to the Carpathian front. What was not known, however, was the magnitude or the plan of these preparations. Never was a greater concentration of men and machinery more silently and more speedily accomplished. All along the south of the range, on the great Hungarian plains, there assembled a gigantic host of numerous nationalities. But it was away to the west, in that narrow bottle neck where the Dunajec flows from the Polish frontier down to the Tarnow Pass, that the mighty thunderbolt had been forged. Thousands of heavy guns were here planted in position, and millions of shells conveyed thither under cover of night. Countless trains carried war materials, tents, pontoons, cattle, provisions, etc. Finally the troops arrived—from the different fronts where they could be spared, and new levies from Germany and Austria-Hungary. Smoothly and silently men and machines dropped into their respective places: All was ready; not a detail had been overlooked; German organization had done its part. The commander was Von Mackensen, nominally Commander of the Eleventh German Army, but in reality supreme director of the whole campaign.

During April, 1915, a number of changes had taken place among the commanding officers of the Austro-German armies; the new dispositions of groups along the battle line differ considerably from those which obtained during the fighting for the passes. The line was now enormously strengthened, and more compact. This applies only to the Germanic side; there is little change on the Russian. At this stage the Russian front on the west of Galicia extended from Opatovie on the Polish frontier along the Dunajec, Biala, and Ropa Rivers by Tarnow, Ciezkovice, and Gorlice down to Zboro in Hungary; from here it runs eastward past Sztropko, Krasnilbrod, Virava, and Nagy Polena to the Uzsok Pass, a distance of about 120 miles. Ewarts commanded the army on the Nida; the Dunajec-Biala line was still held by Dmitrieff, Commander in Chief of the Eighth Russian Army; Brussilov still commanded the main army of the Carpathians, and Lechitsky in the Bukowina in the place of Alexeieff, who had succeeded General Russky in the northern group. The whole southern group, from the Nida to the Sereth inclusive, was under the supreme command of General Ivanoff. Facing Dmitrieff on the Dunajec front stood now the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, about five army corps, including a German cavalry division under General von Besser; then the Ninth and Fourteenth Austrian Army Corps; to their right, several Tyrolese regiments; the Sixth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps of General Arz von Straussenburg, with the Prussian Guards on his left and Bavarian troops under Von Emmich on his right; the Eleventh German Army Corps under Von Mackensen; the Third Austro-Hungarian Army under General Boroyevitch von Bojna; the Tenth Army Corps under General Martiny. This formidable combination now confronted the Dunajec-Biala positions, which Dmitrieff had held without exertion for four months. Only a mile or two away he still inspected his trenches and conducted his minor operations, totally unconscious of the brewing storm specially directed against him. The Laborza district was held by the Archduke Joseph with the Seventh Army Corps; on his left stood a German corps under Von Marwitz, and on his right the Tenth Army Corps, north of Bartfeld, with some additional forces in between. Around the Lupkow and Uzsok passes the Second Austro-Hungarian Army under Boehm-Ermolli was stationed where it had been since February, 1915. Next, on the right, the Austro-Hungarian army corps under Von Goglia; in the Uzsok lay an army under Von Szurmay, nearly all Magyars, of whom the chief commander was Von Linsingen. Farther eastward stood a Prussian corps, embodying a division of Prussian Guards and other regiments commanded by General Bothmer, a Bavarian, who had been reenforced with a Hungarian division under Bartheldy; then followed the corps of Generals Hofmann and Fleischman, composed of all Austrian nationalities, intrenched in the mountain valleys. More German troops held the next sector, and, finally, came Von Pflanzer-Baltin's army groups in the Bukowina and Eastern Galicia. Against this huge iron ring of at least twenty-four Germanic corps (about 2,000,000 men) and a great store of reserves, the Russians could not muster more than about fourteen of their own corps. As has already been pointed out, the greatest disparity of strength existed on the Dunajec line, where Dmitrieff stood opposed to about half of the enemy's entire force with only five corps of Russian troops. The Austro-German forces, moreover, were infinitely better equipped with munitions and heavy artillery. The lack of big guns was undoubtedly the reason why the Russians had not attempted an invasion of Hungary. Hence they stuck to the mountain passes where their opponents were unable to carry their artillery, although they were amply supplied with the same. It is true that the Russians could have produced an equal—or even greater—number of men, but they had not the arms and accouterments.

Speaking from safe knowledge after the event, it is possible to indicate with moderate accuracy at least one of the ingenious stratagems adopted by the Germans to disguise their tremendous preparations against the Dunajec line. For months the fighting in this region had never been severe. When, therefore, local attacks and counterattacks on a small scale started on the Biala, as far back as April 4, 1915, Dmitrieff and his staff regarded this activity on the Austrians part as merely a continuation of the sporadic assaults they had grown accustomed to. Besides holding his own, Dmitrieff had on several occasions been able to assist Brussilov on his left. Until the big German drive commenced they had only been opposed to three Austro-German army corps and a Prussian division; now there were twelve corps on their front, supplied with enormous resources of artillery, shells, and cavalry. Most serious of all, Dmitrieff had neglected to construct second and third lines to which he could retire in an emergency. Of the rivers that lay behind him—the Wisloka, the Wistok, and the San—the first would be useful to cover Brussilov's position at the western passes, but beyond that he could not retreat without imperiling the whole Carpathian right flank. It was on this very calculation that the German plan—simple but effective—was based. The Russian grip on the Carpathians could only be released either by forcing a clear road through any pass into Galicia, or by turning one of the extreme flanks. Had the Austrians succeeded in breaking through as far as Jaslo, Dmitrieff would have been cut off and Brussilov forced to withdraw—followed by the whole line. The same result would follow if a thrust from the Bukowina succeeded in recapturing Lemberg. Both methods had been attempted, and both had failed. Germany's overwhelming superiority in artillery could not be effectively displayed in mountain warfare, but Dmitrieff's position on the Dunajec offered an easy avenue of approach.

At the eleventh hour Dmitrieff grasped the situation and applied to Ivanoff for reenforcements. Owing to some blunder the appeal never reached the Russian chief, and Dmitrieff had to do the best he could. Nothing now could save his small force from those grim lines of gaping muzzles turned against his positions. The overture began on April 28, 1915, with an advance on the Upper Biala toward Gorlice, by Von Mackensen's right. Here some minor attacks had been previously made, and the gradually increasing pressure did not at first reveal the intent or magnitude of the movement behind it. Meanwhile the German troops about Ciezkovice and Senkova—respectively northwest and southeast of Gorlice—were moving by night nearer to the battle line. The Russian front line extended from Ciezkovice in a southeasterly direction. Hence it soon became clear that Gorlice itself was to be the main objective of the attack. A Russian official announcement of May 2, 1915, boldly states:

"During the nights of April 30 to May 1 strong Austrian forces opened an offensive in the region of Ciezkovice. Our fire forced the enemy to intrench 600 paces in front of our trenches." Furthermore, the Germans at the same time had directed artillery fire and bayonet attacks against various points on the Rava, Pilica, Nida, and the Dunajec. These, however, were merely movements aiming at diversion, meant to mask the intentions of the main attack and to mislead the Russians. On the evening of May 1, 1915, the German batteries began experimenting against the Russian positions. This was kept up all night while the engineers attempted to destroy the first line of the Russian wire entanglements. During the same night the Austrians dragged several heavy howitzers across the road from Gladyszow to Malastow, and got them into position without the knowledge of the Russians. In the morning of May 2, 1915, the great batteries began to roar against the Russian line—a fire such as had perhaps never been witnessed before. A spectator thus describes the scene: "In one part the whole area was covered with shells till trenches and men were leveled out of existence." It was reported that 700,000 shells had been fired in the space of four hours, for which period this preliminary bombardment lasted. The Russian line was turned into a spluttering chaos of earth, stones, trees, and human bodies. The German and Austrian batteries then proceeded to extend the range, and poured a hurricane of shells behind the enemy's front line. This has the effect of doubly isolating that line, by which the survivors of the first bombardment cannot retreat, neither can reenforcements be sent to them, for no living being could pass through the fire curtain. Now is the time for the attacker's infantry to charge. Along the greater part of the Ciezkovice-Walastow line this stage was reached by ten o'clock in the morning of May 2, 1915.



A German writer tells us that "in this part of the front infantry fighting has given place for the time being to the action of our heavy artillery, which is subjecting to a terrible fire the positions of the enemy. These positions had been carefully reconnoitered during the lull in the fighting which prevailed during the last few months. Only after all cover is destroyed, the enemy's infantry killed or forced to retire, we take up the attack against the positions; the elan of our first attack now usually leads to a favorable result."

At Ciezkovice the Germans pushed bridges across the Biala under cover of a furious cannonade. Troops were thrown over, and after a very short struggle the village was taken. The huge oil tanks soon were in flames and Ciezkovice a heap of smoldering ruins. The Russian defense crumpled up like smoke; their position blown out of existence. Their guns were toys compared with those of the Germans and Austrians. North of Ciezkovice the Prussian Guard and other German troops under General von Francois fell upon the Russians and forced them to retire toward the Olpiny-Biecz line. The ground of the Russian positions on Mount Viatrovka and Mount Pustki in front of Biecz had been "prepared" by 21-centimeter (7-inch) Krupp howitzers and the giant Austrian 30.5-centimeter (10-inch) howitzers from the Skoda-Werke at Pilsen. The shells of the latter weigh nearly half a ton, and their impact is so terrific that they throw the earth up 100 feet high. Whatever had remained of the town of Gorlice in the shape of buildings or human beings was meanwhile being wiped out by a merciless spray of shells. Being the center of an important oil district, Gorlice possessed oil wells, great refineries, and a sulphuric-acid factory. As the flames spread from building to building, streets pouring with burning oil, huge columns of fire stretching heavenward from the oil wells in full blaze, and, over all, the pitiless hail of iron and explosives pouring upon them, the horror of the situation in which the soldiers and civilians found themselves may be faintly imagined. Gorlice was an inferno in a few hours. When the German infantry dashed into the town they found the Russians still in possession. Fighting hand to hand, contesting every step, the Russians were slowly driven out.

We have mentioned that German troops were moving on Senkova, southeast of Gorlice, by night. During the last two days of April the Bavarians captured the Russian position in the Senkova valley. A further move was made here during the night of May 1-2, 1915, preparatory to dislodging the Russians from the ground they still held. At seven o'clock in the morning the big howitzers started to "prepare" that ground. By ten o'clock it was deemed that every living thing had perished, when the "fire curtain" was drawn behind the Russian position. Infantry were then thrown forward—some Bavarian regiments. To their intense astonishment they were received with a most murderous fire from Russian rifles, and machine guns. The first attack failed and many were killed, few getting beyond the wire entanglements. Cautiously other troops advanced to the battered Russian trenches cut off from the rear by the artillery screen behind. Yet here again they met with strenuous resistance in the Zamczysko group of hills. The Austrian artillery shelled the heights, and the Bavarians finally took possession. The Tenth Austrian Army Corps had meanwhile conquered the Magora of Malastow and the majority of the heights in the Ostra Gora group. On Sunday, May 2, 1915, the Austro-German armies pierced the Dunajec-Biala line in several places, and by nightfall the Russians were retreating to their last hope—the line of the Wisloka. The operations round Gorlice on that day resulted in breaking the Russian defenses to a depth of over two miles on a front of ten or eleven miles. Mr. Stanley Washburn wrote from the battle field at the time: "The Germans had shot their last bolt, a bolt forged from every resource in men and munitions that they could muster after months of preparation." Of the Russian army he said, "it was outclassed in everything except bravery, and neither the German nor any other army can claim superiority in that respect."

With the center literally cut away, the keystone of the Russian line had been pulled out, and nothing remained but to retire. Ten miles north of Ciezkovice lies the triangle formed by the confluence of the Dunajec and Biala rivers and the Zakliczyn-Gromnik road. Within this triangle, commanding the banks of both rivers up to the Cracow-Tarnow line, the Russians held the three hills marked 402, 419, and 269 which figures express their height in meters.

During February and March, 1915, the Austrians attempted to dislodge the enemy, but without success. It was now necessary to take those positions before advance could be made against Tarnow, and the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army, commanded by the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, undertook the task. At six A. M. on May 2 the Austrian artillery opened fire against Hill 419 from Mount Val (also within the triangle), and the opposite bank of the Dunajec. After three hours' bombardment some regiments of Tyrolese fusiliers, who had crossed the valley between Mt. Val and 419 and had taken up positions at the foot of the latter, about 400 yards from the Russian trenches, were ordered to charge. Dashing up the open, steep slope the fusiliers were suddenly enfiladed from their right by a spray of machine gun and rifle fire, killing many and driving back the survivors. Next day Hill 419 was again fiercely shelled, this time with deadly effectiveness; but even then the Russians still clung to their battered ground.

The Austrians now charged the trenches on Hill 412, whence the fusiliers had been ambushed the previous day. A desperate hand-to-hand encounter, in which they had to force their way step by step, finally gave the position to the attackers. The few Russians still left on 419 could not hold out after the loss of 412. They retired northward on to Height 269, but subsequently followed the general retreat of the line. Still farther north, almost at the right flank of Dmitrieff's line, the Austrians effected a crossing of the Dunajec opposite Otfinow, thus breaking the connection between the West Galician Army of Dmitrieff, and the neighboring Russian Army on the Nida—the left wing of the northern groups commanded by Alexeieff.

Just below Tarnow, however, the Russians still held out; losing the three hills had not quite broken their defense on the Biala. The right wing of Von Mackensen's army, which had smashed the Russian front around Gorlice, rapidly moved east in an almost straight line to reach the Dukla Pass and cut off the retreat of the Russian troops stationed south of the range between Zboro and Nagy Polena, in northwest Hungary. The left wing, on the other hand, advanced in a northeasterly direction, ever widening the breach made in the enemy's domain. This clever move brought the Germans to the rear of Tarnow and onto the lines of communications of the Russians holding it. It also prevented reenforcements from reaching the truncated end of Dmitrieff's right—or what had been his right—wing. By pushing on to Dembica and Rzeszow, along which route assistance could otherwise have been sent to the Russians, Von Mackensen opened a wide triangle into Western Galicia, by drawing an almost horizontal line from Gorlice to Radymno, between Jaroslav and Przemysl, and from there perpendicular down to the Uzsok Pass.