It is interesting to observe that this is one of the few important features of the Constitution not copied by the Confederate States at the outbreak of the Civil War. The constitution which they adopted provided an easier method of amendment. Any three states could suggest amendments and require Congress to summon a convention of all the states to consider them. To adopt a proposed amendment ratification by legislatures or conventions in two-thirds of the states was necessary.]

[Footnote 38: Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. 151.]

[Footnote 39: The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, Ch. III.]

[Footnote 40: Second Edition, Vol. I, Appendix, Note on Constitutional Conventions.]

[Footnote 41: Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, p. 328.]

[Footnote 42: McMaster, With the Fathers, p. 71.]

[Footnote 43: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 423.]

[Footnote 44: Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion, p. 12.]

[Footnote 45: The vote in Massachusetts was 187 to 168 in favor of ratification; in New York, 30 to 27; in Virginia, 89 to 79.]

[Footnote 46: No. 81.]

[Footnote 47: The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, Ch. XXXII.]

[Footnote 48: Ibid.]

[Footnote 49: Roosevelt in 1904 received less than 56.4 per cent. of the total popular vote.]

[Footnote 50: In 1904 Roosevelt carried thirty-two states—two more than two-thirds.]

[Footnote 51: Poore, Charters and Constitutions.]

[Footnote 52: A. Lawrence Lowell, Essays on Government, p. 40.]

[Footnote 53: The Federalist, No. 78.]

[Footnote 54: "The object of the Act of Parliament was to secure the judges from removal at the mere pleasure of the Crown; but not to render them independent of the action of Parliament." Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, Sec. 1623.]

[Footnote 55: Works (Ford's Edition), Vol. X, p. 38.]

[Footnote 56: Cf. supra p. 21.]

[Footnote 57: The Jeffersonian System, pp. 112-113.]

[Footnote 58: Referring to Hamilton's defence of the judicial veto, Jefferson says "If this opinion be sound, then indeed is our Constitution a complete felo de se. For intending to establish three departments, coordinate and independent, that they might check and balance one another, it has given, according to this opinion, to one of them alone, the right to prescribe rules for the government of the others, and to that one too, which is unelected by, and independent of the nation." Ford's Edition of his works, Vol. X, p. 141.]

[Footnote 59: The Federalist, No. 78.]

[Footnote 60: The Federalist, No. 85.]

[Footnote 61: Elliot's Debates, Vol I, p. 421.]

[Footnote 62: Ibid., Vol. V, Appendix No. 5.]

[Footnote 63: Brinton Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, p. 165. The reader is referred to this work for a discussion of this and other cases.]

[Footnote 64: The constitutions of Massachusetts, Maryland, New Hampshire, North Carolina and Virginia contained provisions expressly declaring that no power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, should be exercised unless by the legislature, or by authority derived from it. The Vermont constitution of 1786 also contained a similar provision.]

[Footnote 65: Commonwealth v. Caton, Hopkins and Lamb. Quoted from Coxe, p. 221.]

[Footnote 66: Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 193, n. and Thorpe, A Short Constitutional History of the United States, p. 238.]

[Footnote 67: Quoted in Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, p. 252.]

[Footnote 68: Ibid., p. 263.]

[Footnote 69: Burgess, Pol. Sci. and Const. Law, Vol. II, p. 364.]

[Footnote 70: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 507.]

[Footnote 71: Ibid., Vol. V, p. 429.]

[Footnote 72: Ibid., Vol. V, pp. 151, 344, 345, 346, 347.]

[Footnote 73: Federalist, No. 78.]

[Footnote 74: Elliot's Debates, Vol. II, p. 196.]

[Footnote 75: Elliot's Debates, Vol. II, p. 489.]

[Footnote 76: Ibid., Vol. III, p. 553.]

[Footnote 77: 3 Dallas.]

[Footnote 78: "'You have made a good Constitution,' said a friend to Gouverneur Morris after the adjournment of the Convention. 'That,' replied Morris, 'depends on how it is construed.'" Gordy, Political Parties in the United States, Vol. I, p. 114. This was clearly understood by the framers of the Constitution and by all the leading Federalists.]

[Footnote 79: Rutledge, Wilson, Blair, Patterson, and Ellsworth.]

[Footnote 80: Jay, Rutledge, Wilson, Blair, Iredell, Johnson, Chase, Ellsworth, Cushing, Washington, and Marshall.]

[Footnote 81: Wilson, Ellsworth, and Marshall.]

[Footnote 82: Supra, p. 89.]

[Footnote 83: Alfred Moore.]

[Footnote 84: Elliot's Debates, Vol. III, pp. 324-325.]

[Footnote 85: Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. II, p. 365.]

[Footnote 86: Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. II, p. 365.]

[Footnote 87: Infra, pp. 119-122.]

[Footnote 88: Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, pp. 117-118 (Eng. Trans.).]

[Footnote 89: Referring to the power of the Supreme Court in our scheme of government, Jefferson said "It is a misnomer to call a government republican, in which a branch of the supreme power is independent of the nation." Works, Vol. X, p. 199.]

[Footnote 90: Lee, Source Book of English History, p. 336.]

[Footnote 91: Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, sec. 1399; cf. Infra pp. 321-325.]

[Footnote 92: Constitutional History as Seen in American Law, p. 80.]

[Footnote 93: Ibid., p. 258.]

[Footnote 94: For a list of these cases see United States Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 131. Appendix CCXXXV. Banks and Brothers Edition.]

[Footnote 95: Dissenting opinion Inter-State Commerce Commission, v. Alabama Midland Railway Company, 168 United States, 144.]

[Footnote 96: For a discussion of these cases see "The Legal Tender Decisions" by E.J. James, Publications of the American Economic Association, Vol. III.]

[Footnote 97: Report of the Am. Bar Association, 1895, p. 246.]

[Footnote 98: For a discussion of this recent use of the injunction by our Federal Courts see Annual Address of the President of the Georgia Bar Association, John W. Akin, on "Aggressions of the Federal Courts," 1898; W.H. Dunbar, "Government by Injunction," Economic Studies, Vol. III; Stimson, Handbook of Am. Labor Laws.]

[Footnote 99: "We should like to see the law so changed that any man arrested for contempt of court, for an act not performed in the presence of the court and during judicial proceedings, should have a right to demand trial by jury before another and an impartial tribunal. It is not safe, and therefore it is not right, to leave the liberties of the citizens of the United States at the hazard involved in conferring such autocratic power upon judges of varied mental and moral caliber as are conferred by the equity powers which our courts have inherited through English precedents." Editorial in the Outlook, Vol. LXXIV, p. 871.]

[Footnote 100: C.H. Butler, Treaty-Making Power of the United States, Vol. II, p. 347.]

[Footnote 101: Art. III, sec. 2.]

[Footnote 102: The constitutions of Maine (since 1820), Rhode Island (since 1842), Florida (since 1875), and Missouri (constitution of 1865, but omitted in constitution of 1875 and since).

A provision of this kind is also found in the Massachusetts constitution of 1780, from which it was copied in the New Hampshire constitution of 1784. Its purpose in these two constitutions, however, was not to guard against the subsequent exercise of the judicial veto, since the latter was then unknown, but to make the judges of the Supreme Court an advisory body to the legislature.]

[Footnote 103: Democracy and Liberty, Vol. I, p. 9.]

[Footnote 104: Elliot's Debates, Vol. III, p. 218.]

[Footnote 105: Works, Vol. I, p. 29. Cralle's Ed.]

[Footnote 106: Supra, p. 18.]

[Footnote 107: Infra p. 239.]

[Footnote 108: Pennsylvania and Georgia had only a single legislative body.]

[Footnote 109: "There was certainly no intention of making the appointment of the Presidential electors subject to popular election. I think it is evident that the framers were anxious to avoid this." Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. II, p. 219.

According to Fiske, "electors were chosen by the legislature in New Jersey till 1816; in Connecticut till 1820; in New York, Delaware, and Vermont, and with one exception in Georgia, till 1824; in South Carolina till 1868. Massachusetts adopted various plans, and did not finally settle down to an election by the people until 1828." The Critical Period of American History, p. 286.]

[Footnote 110: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 421.]

[Footnote 111: Madison, Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 450.]

[Footnote 112: Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, p. 158.]

[Footnote 113: Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, p. 91 (Eng. Trans.).

See also Ford, The Rise and Growth of American Politics, p. 254.]

[Footnote 114: Previous to Andrew Johnson's administration but six measures were passed over the President's veto. Up to 1889 the veto power of the President had been exercised four hundred and thirty-three times, and in but twenty-nine instances had it been overridden by the required two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress. Fifteen measures vetoed by Andrew Johnson were passed over his veto—more than in the case of all other Presidents combined. Mason, The Veto Power, p. 214.]

[Footnote 115: Mason, The Veto Power, p. 214.]

[Footnote 116: Elliot's Debates, Vol. V, p. 151. Hamilton's statement, which was made in support of a motion to give the President an absolute veto on acts of Congress, was not correct. William III vetoed no less than four acts of Parliament, and his successor used the veto power for the last time in 1707. Medley, English Constitutional History, p. 315.]

[Footnote 117: Supra, p. 19.]

[Footnote 118: Infra, p. 231.]

[Footnote 119: Senate in South Carolina and Maryland (constitutions of 1776) exceptions, Infra p. 239.]

[Footnote 120: Constitution, Art. II. Sec. I.]

[Footnote 121: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 503.]

[Footnote 122: Ibid., p. 494.]

[Footnote 123: For a discussion of this feature of our government see the following chapter.]

[Footnote 124: Under the Articles of Confederation the Congress of the United States was required to "publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations as in their judgment require secrecy." Art. IX.]

[Footnote 125: The Revolutionary constitutions of New York and Pennsylvania provided that the doors of the legislature should be kept open at all times for the admission of the public except when the welfare of the state should demand secrecy.]

[Footnote 126: Cf. Ford, The Rise and Growth of American Politics, p. 63.]

[Footnote 127: Quoted from Article on Reporting in Encyclopedia Brittanica.]

[Footnote 128: Vol. XIV, p. 62. See also Porritt, The Unreformed House of Commons, Vol. I, pp. 590-596.]

[Footnote 129: Greene, The Provincial Governor, pp. 198-199.]

[Footnote 130: Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 514-516.]

[Footnote 131: Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maryland.]

[Footnote 132: Art. V.]

[Footnote 133: Elliot's Debates, Vol. I, p. 181 and Vol. V, p. 132.]

[Footnote 134: Constitutional History of the United States, Vol. I, p. 79.]

[Footnote 135: No. 46.]

[Footnote 136: No. 45.]

[Footnote 137: Von Holst, Vol. I, p. 88.]

[Footnote 138: Ford's Ed. Jefferson's Works, Vol. VII, p. 301.]

[Footnote 139: Works, Vol. I, p. 169.]

[Footnote 140: Works, Vol. I, p. 242.]

[Footnote 141: Sept., 24, 1789. U.S. Statutes at Large, Vol. I.]

[Footnote 142: Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, p. 4.]

[Footnote 143: Art. I, Sec. 4.]

[Footnote 144: The states of Maine, Oregon and Vermont still elect their representatives to Congress before the general November election. Maine holds her election on the second Monday in September, Oregon on the first Monday in June and Vermont on the first Tuesday in September next preceding the general November election.]

[Footnote 145: John F. Shafroth, When Congress Should Convene; North Am. Rev., Vol. 164. The writer of this article makes the common but erroneous assumption that the fundamental principle of our government is majority rule. From the standpoint of democracy, however, his argument is unassailable.]

[Footnote 146: A modification of this check on public opinion has been incorporated in the charter of one of our new Western cities. In Spokane, Washington, one-half of the councilmen take their seats immediately after the regular municipal election, and the other half, though elected at the same time, do not enter upon the discharge of their duties until one year later.]

[Footnote 147: Art. I, Sec. 2.]

[Footnote 148: The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, Ch. 15.]

[Footnote 149: The American Commonwealth, Vol. I, Ch. 15.]

[Footnote 150: The Conduct of Business in Congress, North Am. Rev., Vol. CXXVIII, p. 121.]

[Footnote 151: Ibid., p. 122.]

[Footnote 152: For instances of the exercise of this power see Follett, The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ch. IX.]

[Footnote 153: Senator Hoar's Article.]

[Footnote 154: Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, pp. 98-99.]

[Footnote 155: Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. I, p. 20.]

[Footnote 156: Federalist, No. 10.]

[Footnote 157: For a discussion of the causes of present-day corruption, see an article by Professor Edward A. Ross in The Independent, July 19, 1906, on "Political Decay: An Interpretation."]

[Footnote 158: In the enabling acts for the admission of Nebraska and Nevada (1864), Colorado (1875), North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Washington (1889), and Utah (1896), we find the provision that the state constitution shall not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of Independence.]

[Footnote 159: See Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. VI, p. 469.]

[Footnote 160: Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, p. 20.]

[Footnote 161: Municipal Problems, p. 9.]

[Footnote 162: Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, p. 23.]

[Footnote 163: Goodnow, Municipal Home Rule, pp. 24-26.]

[Footnote 164: Tacoma Gas and Electric Light Co. v. Tacoma, 14 Wash.]

[Footnote 165: The employment of the special fund device for municipal ownership purposes has been upheld by the Supreme Court of Washington. See Winston v. Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, and Faulkner v. Seattle, 19 Wash. 320.]

[Footnote 166: Const., Art. I, sec. 2 and Art. II, sec. 1.]

[Footnote 167: Abstract of the Twelfth Census, p. 133.]

[Footnote 168: Constitution of Colorado, Art. X, Sec. 3.]

[Footnote 169: These figures concerning municipally owned waterworks as well as those in the following paragraph relating to electric light plants, are based on the data contained in the Fourteenth Annual Report of the U.S. Commissioner of Labor on Water, Gas and Electric Light Plants.]

[Footnote 170: Water, Gas and Electric Light Plants, 1899.]

[Footnote 171: Abstract of the Twelfth Census, p. 133.]

[Footnote 172: Ibid, p. 28.]

[Footnote 173: Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., p. 282, n.]

[Footnote 174: The Shame of the Cities, p. 5.]

[Footnote 175: Bryce, Vol. I, p. 663.]

[Footnote 176: Willoughby, The Nature of the State, p. 416.]

[Footnote 177: Pol. Sci. and Const. Law, Vol. I, p. 197.]

[Footnote 178: Ford's ed. of The Federalist, Introduction, p. xiii.]

[Footnote 179: Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law, p. 155.]

[Footnote 180: Principles of Sociology, Vol. III, p. 525.]

[Footnote 181: In the year 1857 over 37 per cent. of the immigrants arriving in the United States were from Germany, and over 39 per cent. were from Great Britain and Ireland. The bulk of our foreign immigration continued to come from these two countries until about 1886 or 1887. In 1890 these countries together contributed but little more than 47 per cent. of our foreign immigrants, and in 1904 but 17 per cent. Italy, including Sicily and Sardinia, supplied but 6 per cent. of the total number of immigrants in 1886 and 23 per cent. in 1904. The Russian Empire and Finland furnished only 5 per cent. of the total number in 1886 and about 18 per cent. in 1904. In 1886 the immigration from Asiatic countries was insignificant, but in 1904 it had increased to 26,186. See Report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration, 1904.]

[Footnote 182: Art. I, sec. 9.]

[Footnote 183: Federalist, No. 36.]

[Footnote 184: Considerations, on the Power to Incorporate the Bank of North America, Works, Vol. I.]

[Footnote 185: 6 Cranch, 87.]

[Footnote 186: Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 335-336, n.]

[Footnote 187: Money and Banking, p. 327. See also Myers, The History of Tammany Hall, pp. 113-116.]

[Footnote 188: "Over and over again our government has been saved from complete breakdown only by an absolute disregard of the Constitution, and most of the very men who framed the compact would have refused to sign it, could they have foreseen its eventual development." Ford's Federalist, Introduction, p. vii.]

[Footnote 189: This was true of Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic candidate in 1876.]

[Footnote 190: Supra p. 56.]

[Footnote 191: Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 1st sess., 30th Cong., p. 94.]

[Footnote 192: Vol. I, p. 520.]

[Footnote 193: Outlook, Vol. 79, p. 163.]

[Footnote 194: Popular Government, p. 181.]

[Footnote 195: Politics and Administration, p. 9.]

[Footnote 196: This was one of the objects of the Oregon Direct Primary Law, which was enacted by the people of that state upon initiative petition at the general election held June 6, 1904. Under this law the elector seeking nomination for the office of senator or representative in the legislative assembly is expected to sign and file, as part of his petition for nomination, one of the two following statements:

No. 1. "I further state to the people of Oregon as well as to the people of my legislative district, that during my term of office, I will always vote for that candidate for United States Senator in Congress who has received the highest number of the people's votes for that position at the general election next preceding the election of a Senator in Congress, without regard to my individual preference."

No. 2. "During my term of office I shall consider the vote of the people for United States Senator in Congress as nothing more than a recommendation, which I shall be at liberty to wholly disregard if the reason for doing so seems to me to be sufficient."]

[Footnote 197: Pure Sociology, p. 487.]

[Footnote 198: "The art of printing, in the hands of private persons, has, until within a comparatively recent period, been regarded rather as an instrument of mischief, which required the restraining hand of the government, than as a power for good, to be fostered and encouraged.... The government assumed to itself the right to determine what might or might not be published; and censors were appointed without whose permission it was criminal to publish a book or paper upon any subject. Through all the changes of government, this censorship was continued until after the Revolution of 1688, and there are no instances in English history of more cruel and relentless persecution than for the publication of books which now would pass unnoticed by the authorities....

"So late as 1671, Governor Berkeley, of Virginia, expressed his thankfulness that neither free schools nor printing were introduced in the Colony, and his trust that these breeders of disobedience, heresy, and sects, would long be unknown....

"For publishing the laws of one session in Virginia, in 1682, the printer was arrested and put under bonds until the King's pleasure could be known, and the King's pleasure was declared that no printing should be allowed in the Colony. There were not wanting instances of the public burning of books as offenders against good order. Such was the fate of Elliot's book in defense of unmixed principles of popular freedom, and Calef's book against Cotton Mather, which was given to the flames at Cambridge." Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., pp. 513-515.]

[Footnote 199: Aristocracy and Evolution, p. 58.]

[Footnote 200: Ibid. p. 377.]

[Footnote 201: Social Evolution, p. 39.]

[Footnote 202: Aristocracy and Evolution, p. 105.]

[Footnote 203: Ibid p. 218.]

[Footnote 204: Ibid p. 219.]

[Footnote 205: Principles of Biology, Vol. I, p. 469.]

[Footnote 206: Aristocracy and Evolution, p. 105.]

[Footnote 207: Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Book I, Ch. 2.]

[Footnote 208: Supra, chapters XI and XII.]

[Footnote 209: P. 534.]



INDEX

Alien and sedition laws, 166.

Amendment, Articles of Confederation, 57; Australia, 62; England, 62; France, 62; Revolutionary state constitutions, 59; state constitutions after 1787, 235; Switzerland, 63; checks on undemocratic, 63. See Constitution of the United States.

American colonies, government of, 12.

American government, aristocratic, 79, 103, 126. See Checks and Balances, Constitution of the United States, House of Representatives, President, Senate, Supreme Court.

American revolution, change in the spirit of, 13; results of, 27.

Anarchism. See Checks and Balances.

Articles of Confederation, democratic tendency of, 25, 57; weakness of, 23.

Baldwin, Simeon E., on the source of the Constitution, 28.

Bank of North America, repeal of the charter of, 321.

Boutmy, Emile, on the powers of the Supreme Court, 98; on the relation of the House of Representatives to treaties, 138; on hasty voting in the House, 202; on the sovereignty of the majority in France, 301.

Bryce, James, on the opposition of the masses to the ratification of the Constitution, 49; on the ratification of the last three amendments, 54; on the committee system, 196.

Budget. See House of Representatives.

Burgess, John W., on the difficulty of amending the Constitution, 47; on the veto power of the Supreme Court, 90; on the desire of the framers to avoid popular choice of Presidential electors, 134 note; on the protection of private property by the Supreme Court, 299.

Butler, C.H., on the attitude of the Supreme Court toward treaties, 119.

Calhoun, John C., on popular government, 132; on state rights, 178.

Channing, Edward, on removal of judges, 71.

Checks and balances, American system of artificial, 130; anarchism an extreme application of, 132; belief of framers in, 125; in early state constitutions, 21; in English government, 8; limitation of power of the people under, 129; origin of, 126; Poland an example of, 131; practical limit to extension of, 130; relation of, to laissez faire, 131; subordination of House of Representatives not in accord with, 147. See Constitution of the United States.

Chinese exclusion act, 315.

Common law, influence of the ruling class upon, 11.

Constitutional convention of 1787. See Constitution of the United States.

Constitutional government, origin of, 3; relation to democracy, 3.

Constitution of the United States, a product of 18th century thought, 28; change in the attitude of the people toward, 184; germs of national government in, 161; influence of the Federalists upon the development of, 164; limitation of the taxing power in, 318; no provision for political parties in, 205; numerical majority not recognized in, 176; power of minority to modify, 167; protection of property in, 298; purpose of, misrepresented by the framers, 77; relation of, to individual liberty, 297; relation of, to the doctrine of nullification, 169; responsible for the state rights controversy, 163; significance of, economic, 299; states not expressly subordinated in, 161; substitutes for monarchy and aristocracy in, 132; vote in the conventions ratifying, 53 note; an insignificant minority may prevent amendment of, 46; Patrick Henry's objection to the amendment feature of, 44; number of amendments proposed, 47; power of two-thirds of the states to call a constitutional convention, 346; importance of this provision, 346; difficulty of securing the co-operation of the smaller states, 347; the first ten amendments, 53; the eleventh amendment, 53; the twelfth amendment, 53; the last three amendments, 54. See House of Representatives. President, Senate, Supreme Court.

Contracts, laws impairing the obligation of, 320-325.

Cooley, T.M., on the difference between judicial and political power, 107; on the attitude of the fathers toward publicity, 156; on the evils of legislative interference in municipal affairs, 284; on the influence of the Dartmouth College decision upon the growth of corporate power, 325; on government censorship of printing, 381 note.

Coxe, Brinton, on the judicial veto in England, 85; on the judicial veto in the early state governments, 88, 89.

Dartmouth College case, 325.

Declaration of Independence, 14, 33, 219.

Democracy, immediate aim of, political, 388; influence of economic progress on, 384; influence of printing on growth of, 380; reaction against, 27; relation of, to reform, 380.

Direct primary, 350; adoption of, in Oregon, 357 note.

Electoral college, influence of democracy on, 332. See President.

English Bill of Rights, 152; abuse of, by Parliament, 153.

Federal elections, 188.

Federalists, 165.

Federal judiciary. See Supreme Court.

Fiske, John, on the conservatism of the framers, 29; on the secrecy of the debates on the Constitution, 34 note; on the election of Presidential electors by state legislatures, 134 note.

Ford, Paul L., on the protection of the minority by the Supreme Court, 299; on the rigidity of the Constitution, 331 note.

Framers of the Constitution, attitude of, toward criticism of public officials, 152-159; character of, 32; deliberations of, secret, 34.

Free land, influence of, on wages, 314.

Free speech, in American colonies, 155.

Goodnow, F.J., on the freedom of New York City from legislative interference in the early years of our history, 253; on the abuses of legislative interference in municipal affairs, 257.

Governor, limited powers of, under early state constitutions, 19; small executive power of, 244; veto power of, 19, 244. See Impeachment, State constitutions after 1787.

Government, but two functions of, 344; distinction between national and federal, 159; influence of the minority upon, 370; kinds of, 128; ultimate source of authority in, 296.

Government of England, control of, by the landlord class in the 18th century, 204; change in the character of, 207.

Government by injunction, 116-119.

Great Charter, the political significance of, 4.

Great Council, 4; separation of, into lords and commons, 6.

Greene, E.B., on free speech in the colonies, 155.

Hamilton, Alexander, on life tenure of judges, 66; on the right of the courts to declare legislative acts null and void, 73-75; his effort to mislead the public, 77; his defense of poll taxes, 319; his policy as Secretary of the Treasury, 164; his reasons for supporting the Constitution, 82; kind of government favored by, 79.

Henry Patrick, on amending the Constitution, 44; on the right of judges to oppose acts of the legislature, 96; offer of the Chief Justiceship to, 95.

Hoar, George F., on law-making in the House of Representatives, 197, 198, 200.

House of Commons, character of, in the 18th century, 10, 153, 204.

House of Representatives, an irresponsible body during the second regular session, 189; a subordinate branch of the government, 136; influence of the committee system on, 192; relation of, to taxation and expenditure, 148. See President, Senate, Speaker of the House.

Immigration, decline in the quality of, 314.

Impeachment, by a majority of the legislature, 142; changes in state constitutions relating to, 231; of judges, 20; reason for making difficult, 142; relation of, to executive and judicial veto, 143. See Judges, President, Senate.

Income Tax decision, 114, 222, 320.

Industry, control of, by the few, 307.

Initiative and referendum, 352.

Iredell, James, judicial veto defended by, as a means of limiting the power of the majority, 89.

James I, on the divine right of kings, 104.

Jefferson, Thomas, on the independence of Federal judges, 68, 73 note, 100 note; on the right of a state to nullify a federal law, 173.

Johnson, Alexander, on the conservatism of the Federal Convention, 33 note.

Judges, reason for advocating the independence of, 67; removal of, under the early state constitutions, 71. See Impeachment, Judicial Veto, Supreme Court.

Judicial infallibility, 115, 344.

Judicial veto, effort to revive, 87; how conferred, 92; in England, 85; relation of, to the executive veto, 85; relation of, to popular government, 99, 356; significance of, 97.

Judiciary Act of 1789, 182; why not incorporated in the Constitution, 183.

Kentucky resolutions, 172.

Kidd, Benjamin, on social progress, 391.

Labor, free trade in, 314.

Laissez faire, opposition of the masses to, 308; relation of, to progress, 309, 311, 398.

Law, lack of respect for, 376-378.

Lawyers, virtually a ruling class, 300-302.

Lecky, W.E.H., on the purpose of the framers, 129.

Liberty, class control of industry destructive of, 306; democratic conception of, 293; eighteenth century economic conditions favorable to, 304; eighteenth century view of, negative, 291; survival of the old view in our legal literature, 301-303.

Lincoln, Abraham, on the right of the majority to overthrow minority government, 335; a minority president, 334.

Lowell, A. Lawrence, on the importance of the judiciary in our scheme of government, 65.

Madison, James, on the evils of American government, 42; on the power of a state to oppose the Federal government, 170; on the danger of government by a majority, 205.

Maine, Henry S., on the success of the Senate in opposing democracy, 337.

Mallock, W.H., on the benefits and justice of minority control, 389, 392, 394.

Marshall, John, on the judicial veto, 93, 322.

Martin, Luther, on the precautions against publicity in the Federal Convention, 34 note.

McMaster, J.B., on the character of the framers, 32; on the political immorality of the fathers, 50.

Miller, S.F., on the relation of the people to the government, 31.

Morality, change in the standard of, 361; effect of change in theological beliefs on, 364; influence of class rule on, 366-378.

Municipal government, a creature of the legislature, 252; attitude of the courts toward, 254; evils of, attributed to the rule of the masses, 251, 284; examples of legislative interference, 258-263; extension of legislative authority over, 254; fear of majority rule in, 277; financial powers of, limited, 271-273; franchise granting power in, 288-290; home rule movement, 265; retarded by the extension of the suffrage, 287; hostility of the courts to home rule, 268, 270; legislative control a source of corruption, 256; limitation of the power of the majority, 266-268; municipal ownership under class rule, 280; origin of municipal charters, 253; origin of restrictions on the borrowing power, 274-276; prohibition of special legislation, 261; survival of property qualifications, 279; source of corruption in, 288; twofold character of, 256. See Special Fund.

Oath of office. See President.

Opportunity, equality of, indispensable, 390; but will not ensure progress, 395.

Ostrogorski, M., on class control of the House of Commons, 204.

Parliament, control of taxing power by, 6; four distinct constituencies represented in, 7. See English Bill of Rights, Government of England, House of Commons, Suffrage.

Party government, attitude of the framers toward, 135, 205.

Poland. See Checks and Balances.

Political parties, attitude of, on the money question, 221; monopolies, 222; control of nominations by minority, 218; erroneous view of the Constitution promulgated by, 219-221; evils of, due to checks on the majority, 214; influence of the Constitution on, 208; lack of power to control the government, 209; largely representative of private interests, 216; purpose of the party platform, 218; reason for lack of interest in, 210.

Poll tax. See Hamilton.

Popular government, effort to discredit the theory of, 212, 251, 284.

President, administrative veto of, 145; difficulty of passing measures over his veto, 139; effort of the framers to preclude the election of a popular favorite, 135; election of, by a minority, 56; growth of veto power of, 141; limited term of, 133; not obligated by his oath of office to enforce the acts of Congress, 145; minority election of, a source of danger, 334-336. See Impeachment.

Press, influence of corporate wealth upon, 376.

Printing, minority control of, in the past, 381.

Property qualifications. See Suffrage.

Protective tariff, defended as a means of raising wages, 313; maintained in the interest of the capitalist class, 313-317; relation of, to laissez faire, 312.

Publicity, lack of adequate provision for, in the Constitution, 150; relation of, to democracy, 372; should extend to political contributions and the record of candidates, 372-373; would cure many business evils, 374-375.

Public opinion, control of the organs of, by corporate wealth, 375.

Recall of public officials, 351.

Rogers, J.E.T., on the attitude of the English government toward the laborer, 11.

Senate, difficulty of reforming by constitutional amendment, 338-340; Direct nomination of the members of, 357; disadvantages of equal representation of the states in, 339; election of, by state legislatures an evil, 335; long term of office of, 338; influence of, on state politics, 358; its large powers, 339; members of, can not be impeached, 144; opposition of to democratic legislation, 337.

Serfs, numerical importance of, 5.

Shafroth, J.F., on how to make the House of Representatives more responsive to public opinion, 189.

Slavery, 317.

Smith, Adam, on civil government as a means of protecting the rich against the poor, 37.

Social progress, influence of theological beliefs upon the accepted theory of, 395-398; relation of government to, 399-402.

Speaker of the House, veto of, on legislation, 199.

Special fund, for local improvements, 274; for municipal ownership purposes, 276.

Spencer, Herbert, on the wage system as a form of slavery, 306; on the need of more restriction, 399.

State constitutions after 1787, adoption of direct election and limited term for judges, 240; administrative power decentralized, 242; change from annual to biennial sessions, 233; development of the judicial veto, 230; direct election of the governor, 239; influence of democracy on, 239-242; local administrative veto on state laws, 243; majority deprived of power to amend, 235; term of members of the legislature extended, 232.

State constitutions of the Revolutionary period, movement toward democracy seen in, 16-21.

State legislatures, administrative veto of, 246; distrust of, 352-355; limitation of the power of, by the courts a cause of corruption, 325-330. See Contracts.

State rights. See Calhoun, Constitution of the United States.

Steffens, Lincoln, on the wealthy business man as a corruptor of municipal politics, 289.

Story, Joseph, on the independence of judges in England, 67 note; on the right of courts to veto laws, 105.

Suffrage, limitation of in England in the 18th century, 10; property qualifications for, 25, 43, 333; universal, does not ensure popular government, 369.

Supreme Court, attitude toward, a survival of monarchy, 103-105; cases in which it has exercised the veto power, 111; decline of faith in, 113-117; Federalist appointments, 94-99, 342; freedom from criticism, 110; influence of, upon legislation, 111-113; non-interference with treaties, 119-123; political and judicial powers, 107-110; possibility of controlling, 341; significance of powers claimed by, 105; the controlling branch of the government, 102. See Contracts, Hamilton, Impeachment, Jefferson, Judges, Judicial Infallibility, Judicial Veto.

Taft, W.H., on the movement to confiscate private property under the guise of reform, 115.

Taxes, limitation of the power to impose, 318.

Treaty making power, importance of, 137.

Tyler, M.C., on the number and character of the opponents of the Revolution, 15.

Vested rights, an obstacle to reform, 299; means of enforcing, 300.

Veto power. See Judicial Veto, President.

Virginia resolutions, 172.

Von Holst, H., on the origin of the doctrine of nullification, 169, 171.

Ward, L.F., on deception in business, 374.

Waterworks, public ownership of, 280.

White, Horace, on favoritism in granting bank charters in New York, 327.

Willoughby, W.W., on the tyranny of majority rule, 295.

Wilson, James, on amending the Articles of Confederation, 35; argument of, against the right of a legislature to revoke privileges granted, 321.

Wilson, Woodrow, on the Constitution as the outcome of a ruling class movement, 51; on the deification of the Constitution, 185.

THE END