Enough and more than enough work was entailed in all these details to keep us busy during the short time available before the attack. Nevertheless all was ready by the appointed time, and about 3 a.m. on the morning of September 29th, after a most welcome issue of rum, which fortunately arrived just in time, we began to move into our final assembly position on the Eastern side of "Ascension Valley." The valley never had been a place to linger in, as most nights and early mornings the Hun was in the habit of treating it liberally with high explosive and gas shells, and this occasion was no exception, a combination of the two making things very unpleasant. Further, it was a dark night, and, worse than all, a dense fog came down over everything, so that movement over these more or less open spaces with little or nothing to guide us was extremely difficult. However, in the end everyone got into position in good time and without accident. Fortunately most of the shells were then passing over us into the valley behind. Companies were drawn up as follows: Right Front (A Company), Capt. Thomas; Left Front (B Company), 2nd Lieut. Bloor; Right Support (C Company), Lieut. Cairns, in the absence of Capt. Miners on leave; Left Support (D Company), Capt. White. Capt. C. P. Elliott was acting as Second-in-Command, Major Andrews being away on leave.

Zero was fixed for 5.50 a.m., at which time the 137th Brigade were to advance from our front line. At the same time the 1st Division were to advance so as to protect our right flank up to a point near Bellenglise Bridge.

Promptly at Zero an uncanny stillness was broken by an inferno of noise. With a din and roar that can never be forgotten by those who heard it, one of the greatest concentrations of artillery the World had ever seen came into action. The crash and rattle were appalling. Sandwiched as we were, with machine guns blazing away just in front, and 18-pounders belching out fire just behind, it was perfect pandemonium. Speech was impossible. Though it was now practically daylight the fog was so intense that you could not see a yard in front of you. All over the battlefield it was the same. We could only imagine the difficulty with which the Staffords were going, if they were going at all, and we could see nothing. Our right Company, A, had been detailed to assist that Brigade to mop up the enemy trenches West of the canal, and on completion re-form in the old German front line, and await the arrival of the other Companies. This Company advanced in Artillery formation as soon as the machine guns ceased firing, about 15 minutes after Zero, and reached these trenches without accident. Little was found to be done there, and having distributed themselves in the trenches, they awaited the time for the general advance to begin. The rest of the Battalion moved forward at the same time in a similar formation to "Nib" and "Quill" trenches on "Helene Ridge." Even for this short move direction could only be maintained by means of compasses. We made ourselves as comfortable as possible there, as we knew that we should have some time to wait before advancing further. In any case we were not to move without orders from Brigade Headquarters, and it was not intended that we should be involved in the actual fighting until the 137th Brigade were East of the canal, and then probably not for some time unless they were in difficulties. The Boche had put down a counter-barrage directly after our attack began, and a certain number of shells and some machine gun bullets fell about the ridge where we were, but caused us little inconvenience.

In spite of the fog wounded men were finding their way back, and odd lots of German prisoners were being brought back by escorts of Staffords. How they did it we never quite knew, but it was reported that in one case the escort of a party of prisoners having been lost in the fog, got a captured German Officer to act as guide by marching due West on a compass bearing! For over three hours we were unable to get any definite news as to the progress of the battle. The first official message which reached our Brigade Headquarters to the effect that the 137th Brigade were across the canal, arrived at 8.30 a.m., and orders were at once sent to the three Battalions to get on the move and keep in close touch. Unfortunately our telephone line to Brigade Headquarters was broken, and the message had to be sent by runners, who after experiencing the greatest difficulty owing to the fog, eventually reached us at 9.37 a.m. Orders were sent to Companies as quickly as possible, and we moved off again in artillery formation, keeping direction with our compasses. Progress, of course, was extremely slow. By the time we reached the canal, which seemed much further away than we had imagined, the fog began to clear and caused us no more trouble. The canal was crossed by plank foot bridges, which, fortunately, were still more or less intact, and Companies pushed on in a direction practically half-right towards the villages of Bellenglise on the right and La Baraque on the left.

Here our first real fighting began, considerable opposition being met with from isolated snipers and machine gun posts, particularly on the right, where A Company had a very rough time. Two Platoons of that Company, under 2nd Lieuts. Bradwell and Shackleton, worked their way along the bend of the canal sheltered by a large ditch, and rushed several "pill-boxes" from the rear. At one large concrete dug-out a Boche was discovered just emerging with his machine gun ready to fire. Bradwell stopped him with a revolver bullet through the chest. The bullet went through the next man behind him as well, and finished by lodging in the throat of a third—a very useful shot! A little later the same Officer got a sniper, who was obstinately holding up the advance with a small group of men, by a rifle bullet neatly placed between the eyes at 300 yards. The left of A Company also met with opposition from machine gun nests in the ruins of the houses. Thomas himself, in rushing one machine gun, had no time to draw his revolver, but put one Boche out of action by a kick under the jaw. C Company reinforced A and shared with them the clearing of Bellenglise, but in doing so they also had a bad time. Stanley Cairns led them with great dash, only to be killed in an attack on a group of Boches who were holding up the left of A Company. They were, however, eventually rushed and all bayoneted. On the left some of B Company lost direction and strayed over to the 138th Brigade. Though the resistance on this flank was not so great it was not altogether easy going, and there was considerable shelling and machine gun fire. Bloor, in command, got badly wounded, and Rawding, his very gallant Comp. Sergt.-Major also fell, dying the next day. Mobilised with the Battalion he went out with it as a Private and won promotion by sheer merit. All ranks of the Battalion had the greatest regard for him and his loss was very keenly felt. D Company, under Capt. White, ably assisted by 2nd Lieut. Smith, acting as Second-in-Command, also gave a hand in the mopping up. Casualties were, of course, mounting, as there was heavy shelling going on most of the time, particularly on the Eastern edge of Bellenglise. Eventually, however, the village was cleared and we got to our next starting-point, the "Brown Line," with our right on the canal, at 11.30 a.m. This was only ten minutes after our scheduled time which, considering the almost insuperable difficulties caused by the fog, must be considered excellent. It meant, of course, that our barrage, which advanced again at 11.20 a.m. (five-and-a-half hours after Zero) was slightly ahead of us, but that was now too late to be altered and we had to make the best of it.

At this point we were to have been joined by a Company of five Tanks, but they had not turned up. They arrived, however, a little later and were going forward to help the attack of the 6th Battalion, who followed us, when they were put out of action by enemy field guns firing from South of the canal and at point blank range. Our final advance, therefore, had to be continued without their help. We moved off this time in extended order and met with little opposition, though there was considerable machine gun fire from the South side of the canal, which was not particularly accurate and did little damage. We reached our final objective about 12.15 p.m., only a few minutes after scheduled time, and the 6th Battalion immediately pushed on through us.

Our right flank was somewhat exposed, as the enemy were still holding the ground South of the canal, and one or two feeble attempts at counter-attacks were made from that direction, but were easily broken up. The 1st Division had been unable to advance to connect across with us at Bellenglise, but by their demonstration they doubtless prevented the enemy from concentrating for a counter-attack in that quarter, which was a decidedly weak spot.

Our advance had been extremely rapid and to a certain extent our success was due to that fact. The enemy in many cases were taken before they had time to get to their battle positions. At the same time every member of the Battalion was determined to "get there." Particularly good work was done by Sergt. Peach, who was acting Comp. Sergt.-Major of C Company, and himself accounted for three of the enemy at one post, by Sergt. Oldham, Lance-Sergts. Field and Illger, and Corpl. Slater, when in temporary command of Platoons, also by Sergt. Claxton, Corpls. Gadsby, Skelton and W. Foster, L.-Corpl. R. Harvey. and Pvtes. Cook, Titmus, Welbourne and Stapleton. Communication throughout the day was almost entirely by runners, who had an exceptionally strenuous time, but in spite of all their difficulties they never failed to get their messages through. Specially valuable work was done in this respect by Pvtes. B. Smithurst, Feighery, Sully, Colton and Parker. The Signallers had a thankless task in trying to keep their lines repaired. A special word of praise is due to L.-Corpl. J. North for his work in this connection. The Medical Officer, Capt. Homan, had a difficult task in attending to the wounded in open trenches and often under heavy shell fire. He got great help from Padre Sturt, who was always rendering faithful service, and from a willing band of Stretcher Bearers, who worked unceasingly throughout the battle, notably Corpl. Wrigglesworth and Pvtes. Westnidge and Green. Comp. Sergt.-Major Stokes, who was acting as Regt.-Sergt.-Major, was also of the greatest service in looking after ammunition and other stores.

The sight presented by the enemy defences East of the canal gave no room for doubt that our guns had done most deadly work. The ground was literally torn to pieces, trenches and wire being blown to atoms in all directions, and there seemed to be scarcely a spot that had not been touched.

The prisoners taken by us numbered something like 300. There is no doubt that our bombardment had caused many of them to become more or less senseless. In many cases all they did was to retire to their dug-outs and await the end. Full dug-outs emptied themselves at the first word, and poured out their garrisons, which were as quickly marshalled by our men and led off to the prisoner cages in batches, 50 or more in a batch, and very often not more than one of our men in charge. In addition to prisoners we captured over 40 machine guns and 10 trench mortars. Guns did not come within our province, as they were all beyond our objective.

Our casualties, considering all things, were small, and this was doubtless due to the great rapidity with which the advance had been carried out. In addition to the two Officer casualties, our losses during the day were 14 other ranks killed and 80 wounded.

The battlefield after the fog lifted presented a sight never to be forgotten. On the left, Tanks could be seen working their way along the German trenches, followed by groups of Infantry, who at once took possession of the ground gained. Behind, guns were limbering up and being got forward to fresh positions; pack ponies and limbers were being taken up with ammunition; parties of Boche prisoners were wending their way back from the front areas in batches of 10's, 20's, up to 200 or more, presenting a very bedraggled appearance. Many of them had been requisitioned for duty at the forward aid posts and were carrying back our wounded. Add to the whole, shells bursting here and there—one knew not when or where the next was coming and didn't care—and some idea may be formed of what the battlefield of Bellenglise looked like. It was like an enormous circus.

The 138th Brigade on the left met with equal success, but North of them the attack did not go so well, and at the end of the day the Australians and Americans, though in a satisfactory position for continuing the attack, were considerably behind their objective.

During the afternoon the 32nd Division came moving over the back areas by Companies in artillery formation and pushed on through us, but there was no time that day for them to make any fresh attacks, and they had to be content with putting out outposts. There is no doubt that could their attack have been pushed on at once the fighting of the next few days would not have been necessary. As it was our line did not get further than the final objective of the 5th Battalion, and further preparation was required to push the Boche from the few remaining points that he still held in the Hindenburg Line. By the victory of the 46th Division on September 29th the main portion of that line had been absolutely smashed and the last great turning-point in the war passed, and from now onwards the final defeat of the enemy was but a matter of days. It must be confessed that the fog, which lasted practically the whole morning, largely accounted for our success. Without it it is very difficult to conceive how we could have managed to get possession of the canal and the high ground on the East of it. A naturally strong defensive line itself, it formed with the addition of the artificial defences made by the enemy, an almost impregnable position. General Headquarters thought it was impregnable.

It has since transpired that our fears that our attack was only in the nature of a "demonstration" were only too well founded, as it appears to be a fact that we were not expected to cross the canal at all. Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, who commanded the Australian Corps on our left, referring in his book, "The Australian Victories in France in 1918,"[1] to the action of September 29th, says:—

"Quite early in the day news came in that the IX Corps on my right hand had achieved an astonishing success, that Bellenglise had been captured, and that the deep canal had been successfully crossed in several places. It was the 46th Imperial Division to which this great success was chiefly due.——There can be no doubt that this success, conceived at first as a demonstration to distract attention from the Australian Corps' front, materially assisted me in the situation in which I was placed later on the same day."

[Footnote 1: Published by Messrs. Hutchinson & Co.]

For once General Headquarters' arrangements for the 46th Division miscarried.

Sappers got the Riquerval Bridge fit for transport early in the afternoon, and by 3.0 p.m. guns and other horse transport were passing over it. Later in the evening, after the 32nd Division had got clear, some of our Transport and cookers came up, and our hardworking Quarter-Master-Sergts. brought us very welcome and much-needed refreshment after a most strenuous day.



CHAPTER XVI

RAMICOURT AND MONTBREHAIN

Sept. 30th, 1918. October 4th, 1918.

September 30th was spent in dug-outs and trenches in the region of our objective of the previous day, between Bellenglise and Lehaucourt. Early that morning the 1st Division advanced and occupied Thorigny and Talana Hill, South of the canal, thus securing our right flank, the retreating enemy offering splendid targets for our Lewis guns. The same day St. Quentin fell to the French.

In the afternoon the 32nd Division moved forward to the attack, supported by Cavalry, which it was hoped it would be possible to use if the Infantry broke through the last remaining fragment of the Hindenburg Line. This was known as the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line and ran more or less North and South about midway between Joncourt and Ramicourt. It consisted of a strong barbed wire entanglement and a double line of shallow trenches about a foot deep, with concrete machine gun emplacements every 50 yards. The whole was in a very incomplete state, but at the same time constituted a strong line of defence. Unfortunately the 32nd Division were unable to break this line, which the enemy were holding in force. Similarly, the 1st Division on the right were unable to make any further progress, and the 2nd Australian Division met with no greater success on the left. In consequence the Cavalry had to withdraw behind the canal.

The arrival of the Cavalry a few days previously behind our lines had presented one of the most picturesque scenes one could wish to see. Two abreast they came in almost endless streams along the roads and side-tracks and passed on to forward positions behind the canal, and the sight was one never to be forgotten. Not less wonderful, perhaps, was the unceasing flow of transport of every conceivable kind backwards and forwards along the Vadencourt-Bellenglise Road. The surface of the road was in excellent condition and in an incredibly short period the Sappers, who were now having very strenuous times, erected an Inglis bridge over the canal at Bellenglise, capable of carrying lorries and guns of all calibres. The way all this work was pushed on was little short of marvellous, and one could not help being struck by the enormous amount of organisation it all entailed, and the care with which every detail connected with the advance had been arranged.

The 139th Brigade were now temporarily attached to the 32nd Division, whilst the 137th and 138th Brigades were concentrated near the canal. We were supposed at this moment to be ready either for another battle or for moving forward according to the ordinary rules of warfare, with advanced guards and so on, if the enemy should give way. Preliminary orders were indeed received that portions of the Brigade were to be employed as Advanced Guard to the Corps, with their objective as Le Cateau.

With the object, therefore, of reorganising as far as possible, we were withdrawn from our position near Lehaucourt on October 1st, and moved about a mile North, to the trench system in "Springbok Valley," just behind Magny la-Fosse. On the same day the Transport, Quarter-Master's Stores and Battle Details which had previously moved to a field near "Hart Copse," a few hundred yards North-West of the Twin Craters, moved further forward and established themselves in Chopper Ravine, near the canal. This was not a specially comfortable spot, and the Quarter-Master's Department was constantly put out of order by the arrival from time to time of odd shells from a German long-range gun. Several of the riding horses, the cookers and some of the ammunition and Lewis gun limbers were up with the Battalion, so that the amount of transport left behind was not great. Both men and horses were now having a most strenuous time, and we were lucky at this juncture in getting back Capt. A. Bedford from a tour of duty at home. He arrived on September 29th and was at once appointed Transport Officer. We had been obliged to leave behind at Bernes large quantities of stores, including packs and Lewis gun tin boxes, owing to lack of transport, and it was a most trying business, when everyone was wanting lorries, to get the extra transport necessary to bring them along. To make matters worse the Hun was just now particularly active with his aeroplanes, and with fine nights he made frequent trips over our lines, dropping bombs. When the nights were very dark he often used to let off brilliant white parachute lights, and as they descended he was able to get some view of the roads and transport lines and any movement there might be. Usually he flew extremely low, and there is no doubt that he did considerable damage; especially as there were such masses of troops and transport concentrated in a particularly small area. We unfortunately lost several horses, but casualties amongst personnel were insignificant. His best bombing effort was on the evening of October 3rd. Having evidently seen a large party of men near La Baraque cross-roads, the airman promptly made for them and let loose two bombs, which fell right amongst them. Between 40 and 50 were blown to bits, whilst nearly as many were badly wounded, and the rest scared out of their wits. What the airman doubtless did not know was that they were a party of Boche prisoners! Only about six British soldiers were killed. It made a ghastly mess at the cross-roads, which was a most uninviting spot to pass for days afterwards.

During the short time at our disposal we did the best we could to reorganise our somewhat reduced forces. In spite of our losses at Bellenglise we still had 46 Officers and 752 other ranks, so were fairly well off. Second Lieut. Winter was put in command of B Company, and Capt. Miners, who had just returned from leave, resumed command of C.

On October 2nd orders were received that we were to take part in another big attack in conjunction with the 2nd Australian Division. Our Divisional Commander only received his orders for this attack at 4.30 p.m. on that day, and the operation was to take place early the next morning, so that there was very little time to get orders passed to the lower commanders and the necessary arrangements made. The orders were explained by the Brigade Commander to Battalion Commanders at a conference at Brigade Headquarters at Magny-la-Fosse about 9 p.m., and it was after 10 p.m. before Col. Dempster was able to give his orders out to Companies. The general scheme was that the 139th Brigade were to break through the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line and capture the villages of Ramicourt and Montbrehain, whilst the 137th Brigade on the right and the 2nd Australian Division on the left, were to attack at the same time, and the 1st Division, on the right of the 137th Brigade, were to capture Sequehart.

The objective of the 5th and 8th Battalions was the "Red Line" running North-West to South-East, just West of Montbrehain, the 5th Battalion being on the right and the 8th on the left, whilst the 6th Battalion was to pass through, capture Montbrehain and push out outposts as far as the "dotted blue line." This was something like 4,000 yards from our present Outpost Line. A Company of nine Tanks were to co-operate with the Brigade, advancing immediately behind the first line. The attack was to be launched at dawn and was to be carried out under an artillery barrage which, after delaying six minutes on the opening line, was to move at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes. The delay was to enable the Infantry to adjust their distance behind the barrage, which was to open a good deal further in front of them than usual, owing to the fact that the Artillery had mostly to move into fresh positions, and we could not, therefore, risk getting up close to its assumed line, whilst allowance also had to be made for the attacking troops not being exactly in their right position, owing to the difficulty of forming up in the dark on an uncertain mark.

Our jumping-off line ran from near Joncourt Cemetery to the Railway Cutting. The Battalion frontage was approximately 1,000 yards and was divided into two Company lengths. A (Thomas) on the right, and B (Winter) on the left were to lead, with C (Miners) and D (White) in support about 150 yards behind them. Second Lieut. Plant was sent as Liaison Officer to the Australian Battalion on our left, 2nd Lieut. Newton to Brigade Headquarters, and 2nd Lieut. Jacques to the 5th Battalion. Some additional work was to be thrown on C and D Companies, who were to follow up the 6th Battalion, mop up for them in Montbrehain and then return to the "Red Line." There was no time for reconnaissance. All we knew of the country was what we had gathered from maps or our Intelligence Department. From personal observation we knew nothing. Even the front held by the 32nd Division was not at all certain. We did know, however, that the enemy were holding the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line in force and that the country was of a fairly open type, sloping gently down to Ramicourt in the valley and up again beyond to Montbrehain, which would probably be a difficult problem to tackle.

It was in these circumstances that we set out shortly before midnight in the pitch darkness from Springbok Valley. Guides from the 32nd Division met us at the entrance to Joncourt and conducted us to the forming-up line, A and B Companies throwing out a screen of scouts in front as a precaution before we formed up. Though this was a most precarious proceeding it was carried out successfully, and by 5.30 a.m. on October 3rd, all troops were in their assembly positions, leading Companies extended in two lines and support Companies in lines of "section-blobs." During this operation the enemy did a certain amount of shelling, but not enough to cause us any great trouble. There was some fog at first, and this in the early stages of the battle, combined with smoke from a screen put down by the Artillery to hide the Tanks, made direction somewhat difficult. Later on it cleared and the day became quite bright and fine.

There was not such a concentration of guns as we had had on September 29th, nor had we anything like so many heavies, though there was a certain number of them firing on a few special targets, such as villages and other points behind the lines. The Guards Machine Gun Battalion again helped with the preliminary barrage, which opened promptly at 6.5 a.m., just as it was beginning to get light. We adjusted our position to the line of bursting shells and followed on as soon as the guns lifted. The rate of progress, 100 yards in four minutes, was throughout found to be too slow in this more open fighting, and we were constantly either waiting for the barrage to move on or running into it—not at all a pleasant proceeding.

It was not long before we began to encounter, in addition to the enemy's counter-barrage, opposition of a serious nature from his Infantry. The inevitable delay since we crossed the canal on September 29th had given the enemy time to bring up large reserves, and on this occasion the 46th Division had opposed to it four Boche Divisions—two tired and two fresh. Doubtless the enemy realised that every effort must be made to retain this, his last organised defence on this part of the front, and certainly the men holding the line we had to attack put up a most strenuous fight, and in hundreds of cases died bravely, fighting to the last.

The Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line was strongly held. In addition to many machine guns in the line itself, there were also machine gun sections in rifle-pits immediately behind it. Unfortunately the barrage put down by our guns was somewhat thin. There had been no previous bombardment, and as a result we found that the defences of this line were practically intact. No machine gun emplacements had been touched and not a single gap made in the wire, which was very strong, and we had to manipulate it as best we could.

A good deal of resistance in the early part of the fight was met with from the neighbourhood of Wiancourt on the left, and the high ground South-East of Swiss Cottage, and it was found that the Australians had not been able to make much progress and were practically held up. This being the case it was realised that the village of Wiancourt, which should have been taken by them, would be a serious menace to our left flank, and it was, therefore, decided that we should go out of our way and take it in the general advance. Two Platoons of A Company, with portions of B and D (Companies having got somewhat mixed owing to loss of direction), penetrated into the village and opened heavy Lewis gun and rifle fire on its defenders, who offered a stubborn resistance, mainly from machine gun posts. Eventually some of them were seen to run back, and our line immediately rushed forward with the bayonet and killed or captured the whole of the garrison. Several were killed whilst still holding the handles of their machine guns. Comp. Sergt.-Major Attenborough, of A Company, here performed several gallant feats in leading rushes against machine gun groups, and later did most valuable work in trying to establish liaison with the Australians, who unfortunately, even after the capture of Wiancourt, were unable to advance so as to help us.

Meanwhile the right was not making much headway, and C Company, from support, had become one with the attacking Company. The advance here being held up by machine gun fire, L.-Corpl. Vann with much gallantry crawled forward and managed to knock out the gun team which was causing most of the trouble. A trench something like 100 yards long, crowded with the enemy, was thus taken in the flank, and those who did not surrender were killed in trying to escape. They had, however, caused us many casualties, including 2nd Lieut. Dunkin and Sergt. Hurt killed, besides many wounded. One of the most gallant N.C.O.'s in the Battalion, Sergt. Hurt had already won the D.C.M. and M.M., and his death was a very great loss.

Similar actions had been taking place in other parts of the line. Again and again nests of machine guns were rushed at the point of the bayonet, which weapon undoubtedly did more deadly work on this occasion than on any other in our experience. Where they could not be taken by frontal attack, parties worked round their flanks and rushed them from the rear. The intensity of the fighting can be imagined from the fact that after the battle nearly 200 dead Germans were found along this line of trenches on the front of the 139th Brigade alone.

The main Fonsomme Line was now ours, though won at heavy cost. Direction had improved, though we were all too far to the left and much disorganised. We had to make the best of it and try to straighten out as we pushed on into the valley towards Ramicourt. Here we were met with fire from Boche guns firing from behind Montbrehain with open sights, causing many casualties. The position was as exposed as it could be, the only shelter being provided by one or two sunken roads. At the same time four or five of the Tanks, which for some reason had got behind at the start, had now come up and did much useful work in the outskirts of Ramicourt, though the same Boche guns brought most effective fire to bear on them, one of them getting five direct hits. On the left, B Company, who under Winter's excellent leadership, had done much fighting, now mixed up with A and reinforced by D, were also suffering heavily from the enemy artillery fire, and advanced by section rushes covered by Lewis gun fire. It was here that 2nd Lieut. T. F. Mitchell, commanding a Platoon of D Company, which he led with supreme gallantry, caring nothing for his own safety, was mortally wounded, dying the next day.

Ramicourt was eventually reached by oddments of A, C and D Companies, the remainder of the Battalion having got too far left, and passing through its Northern outskirts. There were several machine guns in the village, and snipers were active from the windows of the houses. These were all successfully mopped up with the help of the 6th Battalion, who pushed up a Company and their Battalion Headquarters, as there were so few troops at this point, the 5th Battalion having edged off through the Southern outskirts of the village. Jack White was seen in the village, wandering round quite unconcerned, revolver in holster—a small cane which he carried being apparently his most trusty weapon.

Having completed the capture of the village, which yielded a total of something like 400 prisoners, the remnants of the troops there were gathered together and the advance continued. A machine gun nest at Ramicourt Station having been rushed with the aid of a Tank, we pushed on to our objective, which, except on the extreme left, we reached practically up to scheduled time, 10.30 a.m., most of the troops being disposed in sunken roads on the West of Montbrehain. It had not been a good day for the Tanks, which in the end were all knocked out, though the last one working with the 5th Battalion on the right had a good run and knocked out no fewer than 16 machine guns before being put out of action.

As soon as the barrage lifted from the "Red Line," the 6th Battalion began to push on. They had met with an appalling disaster soon after crossing the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, where Col. Vann, once more gallantly leading his Battalion and in the forefront of the battle, was killed, shot through the head. The 5th Battalion too, lost Col. A. Hacking, who was wounded in the arm. Thus two old Officers of the 8th were put out of action almost at the same moment, both leading Battalions in our own Brigade. Alfred Hacking had done invaluable work during the few months he had commanded the 5th Battalion, and for his excellent leadership and gallantry during the fighting of September 29th and October 3rd was awarded the D.S.O. and Bar. Bernard Vann, affectionately known to some of his earlier friends as "Vasi," was described on one occasion by General Allenby, as the most fearless Officer he had ever met, whilst a brother Officer writes of him: "I can think of him only as a fighter, not merely against the enemy in the field, but a fighter against everything and everybody that was not an influence for good to his men. It was his extraordinary courage and tenacity which will be remembered by all who knew him: he inspired all by his wonderful example of courage and energy." Wounded at least eight times, and awarded the M.C. and Bar, and the French Croix de Guerre with Palm, it was fitting that his constant gallantry and magnificent example should be further recognised—alas! after his death—by the award of the Victoria Cross.

On continuing the advance the 6th Battalion edged towards the South, going through the centre and right of Montbrehain, and leaving the Northern portion alone. This left us considerably exposed, and an enemy machine gun firing from a position at the cross-roads on our left front, was doing much damage. White, Thomas and Miners held a hasty conference and decided to rush it, and the two former with a reconnoitring party went into the village to see if it could be outflanked from the region of the cemetery. At this moment a little "Joey" came in with "hands up," and it was decided to try a ruse. It was suggested to him that he should go and tell his friends to surrender, and after a little persuasion he went. The Machine gun stopped firing and he approached the post and disappeared into the ground, thus telling us what we wanted to know—the way in. Action was taken at once to deal with it. Second Lieut. Harrap, who had already done much valuable work, got together some Lewis guns and opened frontal fire on the position, whilst Miners and Sergt. Stimson worked round the flank from the village side and by a careful manoeuvre rushed on to the post the instant Harrap's guns stopped firing. Much to their surprise the post was found to be a quarry containing something like ten or a dozen machine guns and 60 or 70 men! A few bombs and revolver shots and the white flag went up. Harrap, who had rushed his men forward across the intervening 200 yards, was also at hand, and the capture of the post was complete. Second Lieut. Barker's Platoon (A Company) also assisted with rifle and Lewis gun fire, Barker himself being wounded.

Out of the medley of troops which collected there—of all Battalions in the Brigade—some attempt was then made to organise a Company, and posts were pushed further forward. The rest of the village after a hard struggle fell into the hands of the 6th Battalion about the scheduled time, 11.30 a.m. Loud explosions, heard soon after the village was entered, were caused by the blowing up by the Boche of two houses in the main street near the Church. Attempts were made to push out Platoons to the "line of exploitation," beyond the village, but this was found to be impossible owing to heavy machine gun fire.

Both in Ramicourt and Montbrehain we found French civilians, whose pleasure at being at last released from the Hun terror knew no bounds. About 70 all told had remained behind, refusing to be evacuated by the Boche. They gave us a great welcome and in spite of shells and bullets, brought out coffee to our men as they passed by. Later, under the guidance of the Brigade Interpreter, M. Duflos, they were taken back to safer regions.

It soon became evident that further trouble was in store for us owing to the fact that our left flank was again in the air. The Australians were not up with us and we were very uncertain of their whereabouts, though apparently not altogether out of touch with them, for one of their Officers, who was met in hospital later in the day, reported having received from someone in our Battalion the laconic message: "We are at ——. Where is the Australian Corps?" The enemy were still holding in force a position at no great distance from our left flank, and indeed, at one time were reported to be massing for a counter-attack which, however, did not mature. But on the right of the Brigade the situation was far worse. There the 137th Brigade, after making some progress, had eventually to give ground, and their left was now considerably behind our right. We were thus in a most awkward salient with both flanks exposed. It was, therefore, not surprising to find soon after noon very evident signs of a real counter-attack being prepared against the Brigade exposed right flank, and when a little later this attack was launched, the enemy managed to get round the South-East of Montbrehain and into that corner of the village in some strength, and it was decided to withdraw from it. This was successfully carried out under great difficulties, and eventually the Brigade took up a line just East of Ramicourt, the 8th Battalion occupying the railway and sunken road North-East of that village. The enemy soon reoccupied the whole of Montbrehain, but was unable to advance further.

We were now very short of ammunition as no supplies had been sent forward. This was mainly due to the fact that we had depended on a "Supply Tank," which did not fetch up quite where we expected. Fortunately no ill results accrued, but it taught the lesson that the supply of ammunition to advanced troops in moving warfare requires very careful prearrangement.

Company Commanders again conferred and decided to alter their dispositions, and with a view to protecting our left flank, B and C Companies moved across to bridge the gap there, leaving A and D Companies in the railway cutting. In these positions we were left for the rest of the day more or less in peace.

In spite of a slight set-back it had been a glorious day for the 8th Battalion. There was really no comparison between this battle and that of September 29th. The attack on September 29th was undoubtedly more spectacular, but in our humble judgment, having regard to the extremely short notice received, the strength of the enemy and the many difficulties encountered, the breaking of the Fonsomme Line on October 3rd may truly be counted as one of the most gallant exploits of the whole war.

Where one and all did so well and so many gallant deeds were performed it is difficult to single out any for special praise, but it is desired to note specially the good work of the following in addition to those already mentioned: Sergt. H. Wilson, L.-Sergt. Wicks, Corpl. Clark, L.-Corpl. Creamer, and Pvtes. Draper, Crowe, Slater, Wesley, Starr, Baxter, Jackson, and Martin. The day, however, had cost us much. Our casualties were one Officer and 20 other ranks (including Sergt. Gurdens) killed, and three Officers (2nd Lieuts. T. F. Mitchell, who died the next day, Barker, and F. T. W. Saunders), and 86 other ranks wounded.

Captain Homan had his Regimental Aid Post with Battalion Headquarters in a dug-out in the sunken road near our jumping-off line. Here he and Padre Sturt worked for something like 24 hours on end, attending to the wounded, though both badly gassed, whilst a willing band of Stretcher Bearers again performed a prodigious amount of work under most trying circumstances. Particular praise is due to Corpls. Wrigglesworth and J. Wright, and to Pvtes. L. Thomas and F. Green, the latter of whom was awarded a bar and the former a second bar to his M.M., for gallant work on this occasion.

It was impossible to estimate the actual number of prisoners captured by us, as there was one "pool" for the whole Brigade, but undoubtedly we had a very large share of the total, which was 36 Officers and nearly 1,500 other ranks; in addition to which large numbers were left on the ground dead. Of machine guns too, we captured a very large number, but owing to the impossibility of collecting them, little idea of the total could be formed.



During much of the day Horse Artillery and numbers of light rapid-moving Tanks, known as "Whippets," had been waiting in the valleys behind Joncourt, ready to push on once the line was broken, and endeavour to make a clean break through. Unfortunately their services could not be used, and once more they had to withdraw.

Late at night we got news that we were being relieved by the 4th Leicesters. They turned up alright to take over from B and C Companies, but owing to some error failed to relieve A and D, who were left holding the line, with little ammunition and no rations, and were not relieved until the afternoon of October 4th, when they made their way back to the valley just in front of Magny-la-Fosse and joined the rest of the Battalion in tents and bivouacs put up by "Tony" Bradish and Hallam, with the help of the Battle Details. "Bedder" too, was there, with Regt.-Quarter-Master-Sergt. Pritchard (who during these strenuous times had to carry on without a Quarter-Master), and the four Quarter-Master-Sergeants, all of whom did their utmost to make everyone comfortable.



CHAPTER XVII

THE LAST FIGHT

October 4th, 1918. November 11th, 1918.

Such impromptu cleaning up as was possible, was carried out during what remained of October 4th, and we felt much better. We also carried out a certain amount of reorganisation of Companies, which were now thinning rather more rapidly than we cared for, but the opportune arrival of 85 reinforcements at this moment, helped us considerably. The enemy caused a certain amount of annoyance, and a few casualties, by every now and then firing in our direction with a high-velocity gun, and at night dropped a few bombs uncomfortably near, so that it was not quite as peaceful as we should have liked.

The next morning we were rather disturbed at hearing that there was more work to be done. The 32nd Division on our right had suffered heavy casualties in trying to get hold of Sequehart, and the 139th Brigade was now detailed to relieve some of their exhausted troops. At this moment our Brigade was attached to the 6th Division. Rapid reconnaissance was made during the day, and at night we relieved the 97th Brigade. So heavy had their casualties been that our three Companies for the front line and support each relieved a Battalion. These were Dorsets, Highland Light Infantry and Royal Scots.

The line taken over ran through the village of Sequehart, and was the extreme right of the British front, next to the French. C Company were on the right, D on the left, astride the cross roads, with B in support and A in reserve. C Company had the unusual privilege of forming an "International Post" with the French, and Corpl. Simpson, who spoke the language, was put in charge of our part of the garrison. We cannot say that after our visits to the French Headquarters, we felt we quite knew where their front line was, but possibly it was our fault. When they suggested "we are here," we certainly thought they were somewhere else, but we managed very well, and materially assisted them in an attack on the 7th, by conforming to their movements and giving them flank support, and their Commanding Officer expressed his grateful thanks for our help.

We have before spoken of "Bloody Ypres." The Officer Commanding D Company is reported to have applied the superlative of the same expressive word to this sector, but then he had cause for doing so, for during the two days the Battalion held it, his Company Headquarters got five direct hits. Perhaps under such circumstances, he was slightly embittered! During the time we were there, the enemy hardly ceased to shell the village—not desultory shelling, but veritable barrages from end to end. It had already changed hands three times, and we wondered if they were going to try and turn us out! Signs of fierce struggles were on every hand. In the streets and all around lay bodies still unburied, both of our own and the enemy's. It was a ghastly place to be in. Signallers and linesmen had a particularly rough time, and lines were down almost continuously.

October 6th, was a particularly bad day, as we lost Col. Dempster and the Second-in-Command (Capt. C. P. Elliott), both wounded. They had gone to see how things were going on in the forward area, and on returning to Headquarters, which was in a dug-out behind Levergies, they were unfortunate enough to be in the neighbourhood of a dump of shells by the roadside at the same moment as a Hun gunner dropped a shell right on the dump. The result was that both these Officers began to soar skywards, as if off for their "harp and wings divine," but eventually found themselves on mother earth once more, the Commanding Officer badly shaken and cut about the face, the strap of his tin hat broken by the force of the explosion, and Pynsent Elliott finding that for some little time he would have to take his meals off the mantelpiece! The Commanding Officer was anxious to be allowed to remain with us, but eventually was persuaded otherwise, and they both left for the Dressing Station, and Major V. O. Robinson, M.C., of the 6th Battalion, was sent to take over temporary command.

The following night we were relieved by the Monmouths, who had orders to clear out the Boche from some machine gun nests on the Sequehart-Mericourt Road the next morning, in conjunction with an attack by the 6th Division on the left, and French on the right. Relief was complete about midnight, and we marched back to Lehaucourt, where we spent the following day. On October 9th, Col. Dempster returned, though not looking at all well. Major Robinson remained with us as Second-in-Command, as Major Andrews had left a few days previously, to attend the Senior Officers' Course at Aldershot. A day or two later Capt. Miners was appointed Adjutant, and was succeeded in command of C Company by 2nd Lieut. Druce.

Things were now moving rapidly. Although the gallant attack by the Monmouths had been repulsed with heavy casualties, their action had enabled the 6th Division to get on, and eventually surround the enemy and capture the lot. The enemy then withdrew more quickly, closely followed by the 138th Brigade, who led the pursuit. On October 9th, we moved to Levergies, and the next day to Mericourt, where we went into bivouacs. This village was just on the West of Fresnoy-le-Grand, which was entered by the 138th Brigade the same morning.

We now took a little more interest in life. Everyone was feeling better for the rest, and found the rapid movement quite entertaining, especially as we were now approaching civilisation again. Fresnoy was the first town of any size that we reached; though showing distinct signs of shelling here and there, it was not badly damaged. It was interesting to see the Boche "War Savings Campaign" posters, and probably the most interesting specimen, painted all over the gable end of a house, represented "John Bull" on his Island, tearing his hair in a perfect frenzy, with "U" Boats all around him! Here, too, there were many inhabitants, who were of course delighted to see us. Much of the land was under cultivation, and we had really come to the end of that desolate region which was so distasteful to us all.

On October 12th, we moved a further step forward, and that afternoon reached Jonnecourt Farm, between Fresnoy and Bohain. Just before leaving we had all welcomed back Col. Currin, more or less recovered from his wound, and with his arrival Col. Dempster left us. Jonnecourt Farm was somewhat damaged, and said to be mined, so we put up our bivouacs and tents in the open just by it. The farm had been captured only a few days before by our Cavalry, and we had the uncongenial task of burying the bodies of those who had been killed in the attack. We now had a few days peace, and were able to refit, bath at the old German baths in Fresnoy, which were excellently fitted up, and reorganise our diminished forces. A pleasing little ceremony was performed here, when the "Congratulatory Cards" from the Divisional Commander for the N.C.O.'s and men, who had been recommended for good work during the recent fighting, were presented to them by the Commanding Officer at a Battalion Parade, ending up with the Battalion marching past the recipients whilst the band played the Regimental March.

We were not left here for long, there being more "dirty work" to be done yet. The 138th Brigade had been joined by the 137th Brigade, and together they were now held up about the Bois-de-Riquerval, East of Bohain, where some tough fighting had been going on, the enemy rear-guard making a stout defence, so as to give his main body time to get away. With the object, therefore, of clearing the whole of this front and pushing the enemy back to the Sambre-Oise Canal, a general attack was arranged to take place on October 17th, by the IX Corps in conjunction with the French on the right, and the Americans on the left, the 46th Division being ordered to clear the enemy from the Bois-de-Riquerval and the Andigny-les-Fermes Ridge.

On October 16th, we received orders for the attack, which was to take place early the following morning. The 138th Brigade were to attack on the left of the 139th Brigade whilst the 137th Brigade were to hold their present line on the right. The attack of the 139th Brigade was to be on a one Battalion front, and we were selected to carry out the attack, with two Companies of the 5th Battalion in close support, the remainder of the Brigade being in reserve. The objective (The "Blue Line") was the line of the Andigny-les-Fermes-Bohain Road, the consolidation of which was to include two strong points, one being the hamlet of Regnicourt. Royal Engineers were allotted to us to help in the consolidation, and posts were to be pushed forward South of this road. The two Companies of the 5th Battalion had two tasks allotted. One was to move through our right Company, after the objective had been captured, occupy a small length of trench there, and seize a small wood, so as to protect our right from possible counter-attack from Hennechies Wood. The other was to follow our centre Company, mop up any enemy left in the elements of trenches in that Company's area, and help to mop up Regnicourt itself.

Tanks were to assist in the operation, one moving down our right boundary, and helping to mop up the trenches on the extreme right, and two others working along the high ground on the left, and assisting if required in the capture of Regnicourt, proceeding thence to help the 138th Brigade at Andigny-les-Fermes.

A glance at the map will show that the attack was at right angles to the general line of our advance, which was North East. It was therefore impossible for our guns to fire the normal barrage, and the attack had to be carried out under an enfilade barrage, working forward on the leap-frog principle. This was difficult to lay correctly, and the greatest care had to be taken that troops forming up were well clear of it. After three minutes on the opening line it was to advance at the rate of 100 yards every three minutes. One round of smoke shell was to be fired at each lift, which obviously would not be so easy to identify as in the case of an overhead barrage. A smoke curtain was also to be fired on the Northern edge of the Foret d'Andigny. The Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion were to help with their barrage, also a Company of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. Three sections of our own Machine Gun Battalion were allotted to us, to be used mainly in defence against possible counter-attacks, and a section from the 139th Trench Mortar Battery, to assist in the capture of Regnicourt.

In order to help matters on our front a "Chinese" or "Dummy" attack was arranged to take place on the front of the 137th Brigade on the right. Dummy Tanks and figures were to be placed in position during the night, so as to appear at dawn as if attacking the Bois-de-Riquerval from the West, whilst a rolling barrage was arranged to move through the wood in order to give a further idea of an attack being in progress there, and, it was hoped, bring down some of the enemy's barrage in that quarter.

During the afternoon of October 16th, a reconnaissance was made by the Commanding Officer, Second-in-Command, and Company Commanders. During this operation, which was interrupted by a fierce bombardment of our lines, an old lady could be seen quietly moving her household effects on a wheelbarrow down that portion of the Vaux-Andigny Road running between our lines and the enemy's.

Leaving our surplus stores, bivouacs and other paraphernalia at Jonnecourt Farm, we moved off about 10.30 p.m., Col. Currin having previously harangued us in no uncertain way, and in a manner truly characteristic. On reaching the outskirts of Bohain, we turned off to the right and proceeded by a track previously taped out by the Royal Engineers, so as to relieve the roads of traffic, and avoid going through the town. On reaching the quarry East of Bohain, just off the Bohain-Vaux-Andigny Road, we halted, and had an excellent issue of hot porridge, tea and rum—our cookers having gone up to that point beforehand. Pack mules and limbers with ammunition and other stores, were a little further behind, but near enough to be got forward quickly if required during the battle. On this occasion the ammunition supply was well arranged, thanks to the good work of "Bedder" and "Tommy" Tomlinson, who got pack mules forward in the attack with Lewis gun "drums" just at the right moment, to the accompaniment of some very expressive language on the part of the Transport men.

We moved on again between 2 and 3 a.m., and without difficulty reached and formed up on our jumping-off line, which had been previously taped out by the Brigade Major, Capt. Grinling, about 70 yards South of the Bohain-Vaux-Andigny Road. We had three Companies in the front line, A (Toyne, in the absence of Thomas on leave) on the right; B (Geary) in the centre; and C (Druce) on the left; whilst D (Warner), in support behind C Company, was in the vicinity of Vallee Hasard Farm. Battalion Headquarters and the Regimental Aid Post were at a house near the road. A and B Companies each had attached half a section of Royal Engineers from the 465th Field Company. Two Companies of the 5th Battalion were in rear, and the rest of that Battalion were more or less dug in under the woods on our right. The 6th Battalion were in reserve North-West of the road. All troops were in position by 3.45 a.m. on October 17th. Our actual forming up line was in the area of the 6th Division, who had been holding the front we were attacking; they withdrew from this line some time before "zero" so as to give us a free course.

The frontage allotted to us was about 1,200 yards, each of the leading Companies thus having approximately 400 yards. This was a long space to cover, especially now that our numbers were so diminished that we had been forced to reduce platoons to three sections instead of four. Each of the leading Companies had three platoons in the front line, with sections in blobs, and one platoon in support, whilst D Company was formed in a rectangle with a platoon at each corner, and Company Headquarters in the centre, the three sections of each platoon being arranged in a kind of arrowhead.

Zero was 5.20 a.m. The barrage came down punctually, and we started forward to our last attack. There was a certain amount of mist which developed into a dense fog, and was doubtless intensified by our own smoke shells. A troop of our Cavalry in the vicinity of the Vaux-Andigny road put their gas masks on, and were last seen moving along the road in that "get-up."

It is pretty safe to say that everyone was lost almost immediately, and as a consequence we wandered out of our course, a fact which was destined to give us much trouble. It was also impossible to judge the lifts of the barrage, so that there was great confusion, and things for a long while did not go at all well. On this occasion, too, compasses do not appear to have proved of great avail. C Company on the left kept going for some time alright, and got possession of some high ground after overcoming, under the excellent leadership of 2nd Lieut. Druce, some opposition from machine gun nests, though some of these were missed owing to the fog. Then they wandered off in an Easterly direction and got on to the 138th Brigade area on our left, and later, when the fog cleared, they found themselves nearly at Andigny-les-Fermes. B Company in the centre went on until they were held up by unbroken wire, and heavy machine gun fire from the Regnicourt Ridge, and from a clearing in the centre of the Battalion area. Their Commander, Capt. Geary, was killed by machine gun fire after leading his men with the greatest bravery. On many previous occasions he had done excellent work, and his loss was most keenly felt. A Company on the right soon lost touch with B, but got on until they reached a position near the railway track, in spite of having had a very nasty time and many casualties from the machine guns in the same clearing.

D Company lost touch with everyone at first, and got completely split up. Company Headquarters were lucky enough to run into a Boche machine gun post, which they cleared with much skill, capturing 11 men, and putting the two guns out of action. Then they decided to try and find Battalion Headquarters, as they concluded they must have got too far forward. By a somewhat circuitous route they eventually succeeded in doing so, and found that Col. Currin had also had difficulty in getting to his advanced Headquarters, which was no more than a "Map Reference." Of the rest of D Company, three platoons got across to the right of our front and did good work there, particularly 2nd Lieut. Newton and his platoon, who were of great assistance to A Company. A great feat was performed by some members of the other platoon of D Company, who had kept their direction on the left towards Regnicourt. Having run up against a couple of machine guns, Sergt. Robinson and L.-Corpl. Harper went forward to reconnoitre the position, and finding it strongly held, went back for the rest of the platoon. With a combination of "fire and movement" they succeeded in getting round the flank of the post and rushing it. L.-Corpl. Harper, who stood up when only a few yards from the post in order to be able to aim more accurately, was shot through the head, and L.-Corpl. Coombes at once rushed forward, shot six Germans with his revolver, and finished off the last man who was trying to run away with his Lewis gun.

When news of all these happenings duly reached him by runners, stragglers and other means. Col. Currin collected all the oddments who had wandered to his Headquarters, and sent them forward under Major Robinson to push the enemy out of the clearing between B and C Companies. The fog had to a certain extent cleared by this time, but it was still not easy to keep direction. Very soon, however, it lifted altogether, and the party found itself on the Western edge of the clearing and fired at by the enemy both from the clearing and from the ridge towards their right front, from which the enemy were also firing into the rear of B Company, who had gone past them.

The party now advanced by bounds, and was throughout most gallantly led by Major Robinson, who went out absolutely unarmed, but later managed to get a Boche pistol lent him, which he very soon lost. Knowing him as we do we are not surprised that such a small matter did not worry him in the least! Eventually they got possession of a trench on the ridge, which afforded them a certain amount of cover. The garrison of this trench, about 10 men with a machine gun, were very fortunate in receiving quarter, as they fired on our advancing line up to the last minute, and then threw up their hands. Most of the trouble now came from machine guns about half right, and it was determined to round them up. At this point Sergt. Winson, of C Company, did most excellent work. Regardless of all risk he kept his Lewis gun trained on the enemy, whilst a party worked round their right flank, first by crawling over to a small clearing, and then rushing the post from there. This manoeuvre was entirely successful, six machine guns, and about 40 prisoners being captured.

At the same time that part of C Company, which had wandered away to the left, turned back and moved towards the high ground East of Regnicourt. The enemy in the clearing now realised that they were more or less surrounded, and after little more resistance surrendered, 27 machine guns and 140 prisoners being taken from this small area. A Company of the 5th Battalion under our old Regimental Quarter-Master Sergt., now Capt. Dench, arrived shortly afterwards and took up a position in the clearing as a reserve.

A Company on the right had fared very badly, having met with heavy machine gun and rifle fire and suffered many casualties, including their commander. Lieut. Toyne, who was wounded, and 2nd Lieut. Jacques, killed, leaving the Company under the command of 2nd Lieut. Shackleton. Eventually, owing to their exposed position they had to retire slightly, but later were reinforced by two Companies from the 5th Battalion, and together they were able, after some very stiff fighting, to dislodge the enemy and get their objective. Lieut. Thomas of the 465th Field Company, Royal Engineers, did some very gallant work here in reorganising parties and leading them forward in attempts to get on, and the greatest praise is due to him for his splendid efforts.

Major Robinson's party, after getting the Ridge, pushed on to Regnicourt Village, where they found some of the Leicesters, who had wandered on to our front. Just beyond, one of our Tanks had broken down, and had a very rough time before its crew could be rescued. It was now about 10.15 a.m. Capt. Warner was put in charge of the front line with orders to consolidate, and he accordingly reorganised the odd parties of men he found under his command, and began to establish strong points South of the Andigny-les-Fermes-Bohain Road. Some trouble was caused at this time by a German field gun inside Hennechies Wood, which was firing on these parties at point blank range. Once its position was located, however, it was not long before our Gunners forced it to withdraw, and the posts were eventually established.

About 11 a.m. the enemy were seen massing for a counter-attack about 1,500 yards away on our right front, but we got the guns of the whole "group" turned on to the area in a very short time, and the Boches were completely broken, only a half-hearted attempt being made, and only one man reaching our lines.

By noon the enemy in the Foret d'Andigny must have begun to feel that with the 138th Brigade—who had now captured the village of Andigny-les-Fermes—on their right flank, and the 137th Brigade and ourselves on their left, it was time they were moving, for a patrol which we pushed out towards the wood found it occupied only by a few odd machine guns. Major Robinson himself took charge of this patrol, which consisted of a platoon of B Company, under Comp. Sergt.-Major Cobb. On one or two occasions, owing to their small numbers they had to creep round to avoid these machine guns, but they escaped without accident, and after proceeding a distance of something like 2,000 yards in a South-Eastern direction, they eventually found a French post about 100 yards South of "Forester's House." The "poilus" were delighted to see them, and shewed their appreciation by giving our men the whole of the contents of their water bottles.

About 5 p.m., Companies having been to some extent reorganised, an outpost line was formed running due North and South from Hennechies Wood, East of Regnicourt, and joining up on the left with the 138th Brigade. Later on, the 137th Brigade moved up a Battalion through the wood to fill the gap between our right flank and the French.



During the attack we captured something like 220 prisoners, and nearly 100 machine guns, besides inflicting many other casualties. Our own losses, too, were heavy—the heaviest in Officers that we had experienced in the recent fighting. Besides Geary, we lost 2nd Lieuts. Plant and Jacques killed, and Lieuts. Toyne and Whitelegge, and 2nd Lieut. John H. Smith wounded, whilst in other ranks we lost 25 killed or died of wounds, and 54 wounded, including Sergts. Oldham, Sharrock and Wicks. Deeds of gallantry were conspicuous on all sides, and especially good work was done by several N.C.O.'s in charge of platoons. Amongst the following, who did particularly well and have not already been mentioned in connection with the Battle of Regnicourt, are several who had previously displayed conspicuous courage in other recent battles: Sergts. Shepperson, Sharrock, Wallis, Scrimshaw, and H. Wilson; Corpls. Watson and Francis; L.-Corpls. Slater, Creamer (killed), Robinson and Beech, and Pvtes. Wesley, Houghton, Martin, Draper, Jackson, Berresford, C. Smith, Vipond, Lees, Turpin and Roe.

In a way it was an unsatisfactory day, and we feel we have hardly had our deserts for the gallant work done by all ranks against an enemy holding in much greater strength much more strongly fortified positions than had been anticipated. The fighting was extremely hard, if anything harder than at Ramicourt, and the greatest possible credit is due to all for the gallant way they fought, and the great dash and determination they displayed to get their objective. Regnicourt is apt to be looked on as a small matter, but for the 8th Battalion it was one of the most strenuously fought battles of the war.

About midnight, we were relieved by the 6th Battalion, and rested for the night just behind Regnicourt. The following day, as the Brigade had been squeezed out of the line altogether by the further retirement of the enemy, we were able to withdraw, and in the evening marched back to Fresnoy. We were met on the road by our Drums, under the leadership of Corpl. (shortly to become Sergt.-Drummer) Coupe, who had got them to a wonderful state of perfection. They cheered everyone up, and considerably helped the last part of the march. We were glad to see General Harington waiting for us just before reaching the village, and his brief "Well done, Sherwoods" as we passed, was the fullest appreciation of our efforts that we could wish for.

We now had several days complete rest, and were fortunate in getting, almost at once, a draft of 120 reinforcements, mostly men of the Northumberland Hussars, who had not previously seen service abroad. They were a good lot, and with their addition we felt more like ourselves once more; in fact our paper strength now totalled 34 Officers, and 745 other ranks. We had quite a pleasant time doing a little training, as well as reorganising and cleaning, and devoting the afternoons to football.

The fighting moving further off each day, we had to move forward on October 29th to Bohain. This was carried out as a Brigade march, and we entered Bohain with bands playing, and the civilian population in the streets to welcome us. The town had been knocked about very little, and the billets were extremely comfortable. Our training here included a route march across the scene of our recent fighting, in order to imbue the newly arrived with a sense of the honour they should realise had been done them in posting them to such a fine Battalion!

A great drawback to our advance all this time was the business-like way in which the Boche had mined the roads and blown up railways. Every railway and river bridge had been systematically blown up, and mines had been put at every cross roads, and usually in the deep cuttings and high embankments, so as to give the maximum of trouble in filling and getting past. In many cases, these mines had actually been blown and all we found were huge craters. In a few cases delay-action mines had been laid, which did not explode for some little time. All this gave our Sappers much work to do in reconnoitring road crossings, and other points for signs of mining where they were not blown, or in arranging for temporary roadways to be constructed, or craters to be filled in where they had been exploded. But on a larger scale the enemy's very clever system of working his delay-action mines on the railways, was the biggest nuisance we had to contend with. The railway having been repaired well forward, a mine would suddenly go up miles behind, thus preventing trains getting on to the appointed railhead, and so causing endless worry to the authorities who had to arrange for our supplies coming up. To them this disorganisation must have been extremely disconcerting, and it went on altogether for nearly a month. The mines were so cunningly concealed that it was impossible to locate them. In spite of everything supplies reached us in some marvellous way without a hitch.

On November 3rd, in order to support the 1st and 32nd Divisions, who were to attack the line of the Sambre-Oise Canal on the following day, and to exploit the success if they broke through, we moved to the little village of Escaufort. It was a heavy march, the roads were bad, and we arrived late in the evening soaked through to spend a dreary night in poor billets, many of which had suffered during the bombardment of the last few days, and in bivouacs. Early the following morning we pushed on to St. Souplet, where we prepared to stay for the night in a few old barns. Later in the day, however, news was brought that the attack had been successful, and we moved on to Catillon, on the Canal. Transport, Quarter-Master's Stores and Battle Details moved to Mazinghien. The same night we got orders that we were to pass through the 1st Division and 138th Brigade, and take up the pursuit, the following day.

We had been informed that owing to the "blowing" of the bridge over the Canal at Catillon, we should have to make a detour of several miles with cookers and Lewis gun limbers to get across by a pontoon bridge, in order to arrive at our point of assembly on the Catillon-La Groise Road, which was only about 1,000 yards away! We determined to see if we could not find some other means of doing this, and thanks to a reconnaissance by Major Robinson, we found that it was possible for Infantry to cross the Canal over debris from the blown up bridge, though the Transport would have to go round. This was a great boon, as it enabled us to get breakfast before starting considerably later than would otherwise have been necessary. Capt. A. Bedford arrived with the rations about 3.0 a.m., we had breakfast at six, and at eight moved off, being across the Canal, and in our proper position by 8.30. Limbers and cookers joined us about nine, A Company's cooker having fallen overboard in crossing the pontoon bridge but having been extricated without damage. We were the only Battalion in the Brigade that day to start out with a full stomach and our day's rations with us!

Late in the afternoon we moved into poor billets in the village of Mezieres, where we stayed the night, and were joined by Transport, Stores and Battle Details. Bedford worked uncommonly well, as did also the Quarter-Master's Branch, in getting up rations, which they had to man-handle over the canal crossing—still impossible for traffic—and reload into our transport limbers. For all their efforts we were duly thankful.

On November 6th, the 5th Battalion were to attack as the 6th had been held up just West of Prisches, and we were to move up in support. The method adopted was for the attacking troops to pass round the village, whilst the support Battalion, pushing one Company on the road as an advanced guard, moved by platoons at about 50 yards interval. This was now true open warfare, and there was no organised line of defence. The day's objectives were Prisches and Cartignies. After an early start we continued our march towards Prisches, the attacking troops meeting with little opposition, and our advanced guard, A Company, were quickly in after them. The enemy had gone and we had got possession by 10.30 a.m.

We shall never forget the reception by the inhabitants of Prisches! We were the first of the relieving troops they had seen, and their feelings at being thus released after four years of oppression and slavery at the hands of the Hun, found expression in many demonstrations of joy and gratitude. Civilians of all ages came out to greet us. Their national flags—Heaven only knows where they came from or how they were concealed from the enemy—were displayed on all sides, and even before the enemy were clear of the village the Tricolour was floating from the Church Tower! It was truly a wonderful sight, and a day never to be forgotten. We were surrounded by offers of coffee and fruit, cider and cognac, plentifully mingled with the tears and kisses of the grateful inhabitants. Indeed, so insistent were they that progress became difficult. We eventually, however, managed to establish Battalion Headquarters in a farmhouse at the East end of the village, where we again had a great reception, and stayed for some refreshment during a temporary hold-up of the advanced troops.

The attacking troops were to push on through the next village, Cartignies, and establish an outpost line on the other side of it. So rapid was the retreat, and so certain were we of success, that whilst at Prisches we despatched Bradish and a party of N.C.O.'s to get our billets there for the night! In the afternoon we were able to push on with the rest of the Battalion, B Company forming the advanced guard. On arriving at Cartignies we were met by Bradish, who informed us that he had made arrangements for billeting us, but that half the village was still in the hands of the enemy, who were firing on the 5th Battalion with machine guns. The Commanding Officer whilst reconnoitring near the Church, soon discovered this for himself, so withdrew diplomatically, deciding that it was not "our war" just then. Accordingly we got into our billets and posted sentries and Lewis guns at windows and other points for our protection. Owing to some of the Staffords who were also in the village, deciding to hold their outpost line in the village, instead of on the other side the river, the clearing of the village was a longer process than it should have been. It caused us no trouble, but we doubt if Tomlinson and Tebbutt would have slept so comfortably had they known that their billet was in No Man's Land! However, all was well; we had had another great reception from the delighted inhabitants, and after a long and tiring day we were soon asleep in good, comfortable billets.

For the next three days we stayed there, being joined by the Transport and Stores, Battle Details and several Officers from England, who had never been out before.

The Hun was now going away rapidly, and it was very doubtful if we should be required again. We never were, and were glad to find we had done with him.

There was talk of an Armistice, and we were also warned that German Envoys were expected, and might come through our lines. This they did not do and we were not sorry.

On November 10th, we had to move out of Cartignies to a small village, Boulogne-sur-Helpe, near by—the most Easterly point the Battalion ever reached.

November 11th came in just the same as any other day, but quite early a wire from Brigade Headquarters stated that the Germans had agreed to our Armistice terms, and the Great War was over.



CHAPTER XVIII

HOME AGAIN

November 12th, 1918. July 5th, 1919.

For the next few days we lived in an atmosphere of uncertainty. Were we to be one of the chosen Divisions to go forward as part of the Army of Occupation, or were we to be left to spend weary months scavenging in the fair land of France? There may have been a few who did not want to go on, thinking they would probably lose their chance of an early return home, but in the main we were anxious to push on and satisfy our souls by actually setting foot on German soil as part of the Conquering Army. Our hopes fell from day to day as we heard no orders to prepare to move forward, and eventually, much to our regret, we learnt that after all we were not going to Germany. It was nearly the end of November when we received the following letter from General Sir H. S. Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth Army:—"It is a matter of very deep regret to me that the 46th Division is not accompanying the Fourth Army to the Frontier. I desire, however, to place on record my appreciation of the splendid performances of the Division during the recent operations, and to congratulate all ranks on the conspicuous part they have played in the battles of the 100 days. The forcing of the main Hindenburg line on the Canal, and the capture of Bellenglise rank as one of the finest and most dashing exploits of the war. The attacks of October 3rd, and the subsequent operations about Bohain, together with the later advance towards the Sambre Canal, constitute a record of which all ranks of the Division may justly feel proud. I offer to all ranks my warmest thanks for their great gallantry, and to the leaders and staffs my admiration of their skilful direction and staff work throughout these battles. To every Officer, N.C.O., and man of the Division, I offer my warm thanks and hearty congratulations, and trust that at some future time they may again form part of the Fourth Army."

On the day after the Armistice, Major-General Boyd came to see us, and presented some medal ribbons, and in the afternoon an entertaining football match between Officers and N.C.O.'s was won by the latter, the Officers in a few cases having some difficulty in staying the course.

We left Boulogne-sur-Helpe on November 14th, and marched via Cartignies to Landrecies—a town which had seen much of the recent fighting, as well as having played a prominent part in the early days of the war. The whole of the 139th Brigade was concentrated here, and as our stay was likely to be a lengthy one, we soon set to work to make ourselves comfortable. Most of the Battalion were billeted in one of the French Barracks, D Company being allotted a school near by. Though the town had been considerably damaged by shells, our billets were more or less watertight, and in fairly good order. The Transport and Quarter-Master's Stores were also in the town close to the Barracks.

On Sunday, November 17th, a Church Parade of the whole Division was held at Landrecies, as a Thanksgiving Service, and afterwards the Major-General distributed medal ribbons. He paid us a high compliment as we marched past after the ceremony, when he said that in all his military career he had never seen a Battalion march past in better style!

The work of clearing the battlefield in the area round about Landrecies began at once. We did four hours a day at this work on four days a week, and on the other two days carried out ordinary military training. Education classes were also started and carried on for several months, and though the numbers who attended were not large, there is no doubt that very much useful work was done in this way. Lieut. C. M. Bedford was responsible for the educational work at first, handing it over later to Lieut. Tebbutt. Afternoons were invariably spent in recreation, Inter-Battalion and Inter-Company "Soccer" matches, cross-country runs, and other sports. There were also "Rugger" teams in the Division, and later a Brigade Hockey team was formed. A few lucky ones got trips in Col. Barron's Ambulances to Brussels, Amiens, Valenciennes, and other towns of interest within reach, but this luxury did not last long. A recreation room at the Barracks was started for reading and indoor games, whilst Lieut. Pennington got an extraordinarily good Concert Party going, which was known eventually as "The Penguins" and gave entertainments to several other units. "Robbo" managed to "scrounge" a piano for them from a ruined house in the town, and during the dark nights we had much to thank them for. Later on there were whist drives, and some of the gayer element even went to dances, classes in which gentle art were held by the 6th Battalion. Padre Sturt, in addition to giving valuable help with the Education Classes, started a Debating Society, at which many entertaining topics were discussed.

On November 29th, the first batch of miners left for demobilisation, an urgent call having been made for these men owing to the coal shortage. The batch included several "old hands," who had crossed to France with the Battalion in 1915. The remainder were sent off in December, during which month we lost no fewer than 230.

In the afternoon of December 1st, we were honoured by a visit from the King, the Prince of Wales, and Prince Albert. They were received by Major-General Boyd and the Mayor, and afterwards walked through the town surrounded by masses of troops of the Division. It was all delightfully informal; they had a wonderful reception, and at times found it difficult to get on.

A week later, on December 8th, we were delighted to see a representative from our own County, in the person of the Duke of Portland. He was accompanied by Cols. Mellish and Foljambe, the Bishop of Southwell, and Major E. T. Baines, whilst Padre Hales, who was now Deputy Chaplain General of a neighbouring Corps, also came over for the ceremony. The opportunity was taken of getting the Duke to present medal ribbons to some Officers and men who had been awarded decorations during the recent fighting. This was done at a Battalion Parade, at which the Duke gave a short address, saying that he had brought from the Home County congratulations and greetings on our work during the last few months. After the Parade the Battalion marched past the Duke headed by the Brigade band.

The following week a Colour party consisting of Capt. White, 2nd Lieut. James H. Smith, Comp.-Sergt.-Major Cobb, Sergt. Martin and Sergt. Skelton, having been sent to Newark for the special purpose, arrived with the Colours, which remained with the Battalion for the rest of our stay in France.

Amongst numerous Officers who joined us in these days we were particularly glad to welcome our old friend Torrance, who at once resumed the duties of Quarter-Master.

The last item of interest in the great year 1918, was the celebration of Christmas. The only drawback on this occasion was that we were not able to celebrate it until Boxing Day, owing to the non-arrival of the necessary feeding stuffs and drinks. Something had gone wrong in the back regions, a thing which had been going on for some time, as canteen stores were always short, and rations at no other period of the war were so scarce or poor. We poured curses on the Royal Army Service Corps, and all connected with them, but to no purpose. Boxing day, however, will live long in our memory. There was plenty of food and drink, and all sorts of other good things, towards the purchase of which we had been largely helped by money presents from friends at home. Each Company had its own dinner, followed by a concert. The Major-General visited every Company, and was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm. He wished every one a happy time and prosperity in the New Year. The children of Landrecies also had a treat, being given a special show by the Divisional Cinema, and a sumptuous feed, and we venture to think they will not forget Christmas 1918 for many a long day—they had certainly not had one like it during the previous four years. Col. Barron and his excellent Quarter-Master, Major Moreton, of our Field Ambulance, were largely responsible for the feed, whilst we helped to buy toys.

It took us some time to get over Christmas. In fact, Christmas at Landrecies in 1918 lasted several days, and was full of incident! As soon as the New Year came in—on January 3rd, 1919—we moved once more to Prisches, where a fresh area was allotted us to clear. Here we carried on in much the same way as at Landrecies, but owing to demobilisation having become more general, we were losing men daily and our numbers were gradually but surely dropping. Early in the New Year Major Robinson left us to rejoin the 6th Battalion, and Major Andrews resumed duty as Second-in-Command.

On February 19th, we began a Westward move to be nearer railhead, marching that day to Bazuel, and the following day to Bethencourt, near Caudry, from which place we were destined finally to be scattered to the four winds. From here we sent back most of our horses and mules, with others from the Brigade, to an Auction sale at Prisches, where they were sold in a most entertaining manner by a French Auctioneer at good prices to the local inhabitants. Our Transport vehicles were sent to the Divisional Park at Caudry.

The same sort of work and play and demobilisation continued, and at the end of April we were left with only nine Officers and 52 other ranks. Officers and men who were not demobilised went mostly to the 51st and 52nd Sherwood Foresters (Young Soldiers Battalions), or to Prisoners of War Camps at Nancy and Peronne. Eventually in June, Col. Currin and the Cadre left for England, leaving behind only a baggage guard under Capt. Warner, who came home in July. Col. Currin and his party arrived at Newark late on June 21st, and the official welcome took place on June 23rd, when the Mayor met them at the Town Hall, and the Colours were once more placed at the Drill Hall. With the Colonel were Regimental Sergt.-Major Mounteney, Comp. Quarter-Master Sergt. Bee, Sergt. Blunt, L.-Corpl. Tuckwood, and Pvte. Durand. With the exception of two short periods when he was away sick or wounded, Regimental Sergt.-Major Mounteney served with us the whole of our stay in France. Both in and out of the line he rendered most valuable service to the Battalion, and even in the darkest hours we were always sure of his cheerful help.

On July 5th, a Memorial Service was held at Southwell Cathedral, for the Nottinghamshire men who had fallen in the war. After the ceremony, the men of the Battalion who were present, were entertained to tea in the schools at Southwell, and Col. Huskinson took that opportunity of thanking the ladies of the County for their kind help during the war. We feel sure, that though on this occasion they are put last, they will none the less accept our kind appreciation of all the work they were at such pains to do, and for the thousands of comforts they got together and sent out to us.

From the time we left England to final disembodiment no fewer than 193 Officers, and 2,650 other ranks served with the Battalion. There were 21 deaths from sickness and four fatal accidents. Battle casualties amounted to 26 Officers, and 447 other ranks killed, or died of wounds, and 64 Officers, and 1,400 other ranks wounded. Such a tragic total, however, cannot wholly be a measure of the trials and vicissitudes of three-and-a-half years' fighting. If in this record we have succeeded in conveying an impression to those who were not so fortunate as to be with us, or in reminding those who were, of courage, dogged perseverance, and unselfish devotion to duty in action, of pleasures, humour and happier times at rest, our efforts may not, perhaps, be without value in the days that are to come.