The detailing of such a large party naturally left us with very few men for training at Burbure, so that we were able to do little in that respect. Such refitting as was possible was done, and bathing after a good deal of trouble was arranged at Lillers, but as was the case in many of the back areas "billet comforts" were not good. Just at this time, too, we suffered from a scarcity of clean clothes, and later on the scarcity became worse. The supply was extremely short, and more often than not the clothes were rather dirtier on their return from the Abbeville laundry, than when they were sent off. This was not our experience in the I Corps, which we had just left, and whatever we may have thought or said about some of the doings of that Corps, it must be confessed that many of their "Q" matters were very well worked, and in the whole of their area, which included the entire region round about and in front of Bethune, in which we spent many months, we were seldom short of anything in the nature of supplies which one might reasonably require, though there may have been some Battalion Commanders who considered that there should have been a much more liberal allowance of motor lorries, which they were certainly very chary about letting us have.

Economy in all things was now the order of the day, and in order to make the most of our diminishing forces, and to reduce the number of units, it was decided to reorganise the Army on the basis of three instead of four Battalions to a Brigade. This was begun whilst we were at Burbure, the 46th Division being one of the earliest to undergo the change. In the 139th Brigade the 7th Battalion was the one selected to be temporarily broken up. The change was carried out with lightning rapidity, and within about three days of first getting the order that they were to be so treated, our old friends the 7th, were scattered almost to the four winds. We were very glad to be allotted of their number six Officers, Lieuts. R. B. Gamble, S. E. Cairns, S. Sanders, who was attached to the 139th Trench Mortar Battery, and B. W. Dale, and 2nd Lieuts. W. S. Peach and O.S. Kent, also 151 other ranks, who joined us and were absorbed into our Battalion on January 29th. On the 30th we said "Goodbye" with much regret to their Commander Col. Toller, who left that day with the bulk of his Headquarter Staff, to join their corresponding unit in the 59th Division. From the 2/8th Battalion, which was the Sherwood Forester Battalion of the 59th Division to be broken up, we also got a quota of five Officers, Major F. G. Cursham, Capt. C. P. Elliott, M.C., Lieuts. G. G. Elliott, M.C., and G. Thomas, and 2nd Lieut. E. R. Elphick, and 85 other ranks, who joined us on January 31. Frank Cursham, who later met such a sad fate in England, was known to some of the older members of the Battalion, and G. G. Elliott too, had already served with us. This large influx sent up our strength with a bound, and at the end of January, we were probably the strongest we ever touched, viz., 53 Officers and 987 other ranks. The old nomenclature "1/8th" and "2/8th," used to designate the 1st and 2nd lines of the Battalion, was no longer necessary, and we were henceforth known simply as the "8th Sherwood Foresters."

On February 9th, the Division moved back by route march to the First Army Training Area, known officially as the "Bomy Area." This move was carried out as a sort of scheme, the idea being that the Division was following up a retreating enemy, and that at the end of the day's move we should billet just as though we were actually pursuing in a hostile country, without so much prearrangement as was generally possible. This did not tend, perhaps, to billeting in as great comfort as one might have wished, and we were inclined to think it was unnecessary. Be that as it may, we found ourselves at the end of the day with Headquarters and two Companies at Laires, and two Companies at Livossart, all somewhat crowded. This in the nature of things was unsatisfactory, and steps were at once taken to try and bring about a change, with the result that on February 13th, we moved to a very nice little mining village, Enquin-les-Mines, which we had to ourselves. The Headquarter Mess was at the Maire's House, where we were particularly comfortable, and received much kindness from the Maire and his family. There we had rather more callers than on some other occasions, but none of them seemed disappointed if we were not at home, so long as they could leave a message with the Maire's charming daughter, and Officers of the Battalion positively vied with each other in gallantry!

Musketry played the most important part in our training, and ranges were in great demand. An A.R.A. platoon competition was carried out in the Division and roused considerable interest. The winning platoon in the Battalion was No. 15 (D Company), but unfortunately in the Brigade competition, they were beaten by the platoon from the 5th Battalion. Much open warfare and trench-to-trench attack practice was also carried out, a very ominous sign being that this consisted mainly of counter-attacks to regain portions of trenches lost! The training culminated in a fairly successful Brigade Field Day, near Coyecque.

Recreation of course figured largely in the training. In a Brigade inter-Company football competition, B Company's team reached the semi-final, in which they were knocked out by a team from the 5th Battalion. For amusements we were not well off, as we were somewhat isolated. We did, however, manage to get the Divisional Cinema for the last week of our stay, a very acceptable acquisition.

Whilst we were at Enquin our "tin hats" which had recently been shorn of their questionably ornamental or useful sandbags, with which we had been ordered to keep them covered, were painted a dull green, with, for some curious reason, the Transport sign (dark blue square), and narrow light green stripe on the left (denoting 8th Battalion) painted on the side. The change was doubtless due to the pressing need for economy.

By the first week in March, it was realised on all hands that the great Boche offensive could not long be delayed. The enemy had brought Division after Division from the Russian front across to the Western, and, during the Winter, had got together an enormous concentration of troops in France and Belgium, including at least three Austrian Divisions, and it was now only a question of knowing exactly when and where the onslaught would come. In these circumstances our training was cut short, and on March 5th, we began to retrace our steps once more towards the forward area, marching that day to Westrehem, where we had been so comfortably billeted nearly a year before, and were now enthusiastically greeted by our old friends. Only one night was spent there, and the next day we were taken in 'buses to Bethune, and billeted once more at the Orphanage, this being our third time to be quartered there. We were now back again in the I Corps.

Then began a period of about seven weeks activity, during which we had a considerable amount of excitement, some of it of not too pleasant a nature, and one was never quite certain what a day might bring forth. The first week, however, was spent in absolute peace at Bethune in most delightful summer-like weather, and was thoroughly enjoyed by all. During that time the 46th Division took over the Cambrin sector again, and on March 14th, we relieved the support Battalion in that sector, the 5th Lincolns, who were holding the Annequin "Locality," including the whole of Annequin Fosse and its Colliery cottages, which was being put in a state of defence, and was to be held to the last in the event of the enemy breaking through the front line system of trenches.

With the greatest regret we had now to say goodbye to Col. Blackwall, who left us for a tour of duty at home. He had been in command of the Battalion without a break since October 15th, 1915, and during the whole time had never been off duty, except when on leave or attending courses. We feel sure no one felt more than he did what bad luck it was that he should go just at this important juncture, but he left with the best wishes of everyone for a well-earned rest at home. At the same time we welcomed to the command of the Battalion Lieut.-Col. R. W. Currin, D.S.O., of the York and Lancaster Regiment, who was destined to remain with us, with only a short break, until the conclusion of the war.

Several other changes had recently taken place. Hugh Kirby had left to take up a commission in the Indian Cavalry, and the Transport was now under the charge of Capt. Tomlinson. We had also lost Lieuts. White, Day, and Cairns, who had gone to England for a rest, and were followed shortly afterwards by Lieut. H. G. Kirby. Lieut. Gamble, and 2nd Lieuts. Sutton, Peach and Saunders were unfit and were struck off strength, and 2nd Lieut. Clarke went to the Machine Gun Corps. Major Cursham had taken over C Company from Capt. Geary, and Capt. C. P. Elliott had succeeded Lieut. Day in command of B Company. We had been given a new Padre, W. N. Kempe, who made himself very popular during his few months' stay with us. Sergt. J. Eggleston, after a long period of excellent work as Pioneer Sergt., was appointed Comp. Quarter-Master Sergt. of D Company, in place of Gammon, who went home for a commission.

Transport was lucky in being put in lines at Le Quesnoy, probably the best constructed and best equipped that we ever struck during the whole war. Units which had been there before had evidently worked hard on them to carry out improvements, and for once we were really lucky in finding a good spot. The stables were strongly built, well roofed, floored, and provided with harness and fodder rooms, and to a certain extent protected from bomb splinters by earth revetments.



On March 20th, we relieved the 5th Battalion in the Cambrin left sub-sector, with which we were already well acquainted. On the following day there took place in the South the first onslaught of the Boche, in his great Spring Offensive of 1918. There was no actual attack anywhere near us, the only offensive action on our front being a "demonstration" in the shape of a heavy bombardment with gas shells, which was decidedly unpleasant, though not causing us any casualties.

During the night of March 21/22nd, we did experience a real touch of the offensive in the shape of a big raid on the right Company, the most vulnerable portion of the line on the whole Brigade front. This front, which was held by A Company was of enormous length, extending from Railway Craters on the right to Munster Parade on the left, a distance of about 600 yards. Three platoons (about 60 all told) held the outpost line in small posts of four or five men, each under a N.C.O., the fourth platoon being held in support as a counterattacking platoon in Old Boots Trench at the West end of Munster Tunnel. The latter was about 400 yards behind the outpost line, and was also occupied by the support Company, and contained the right Company Headquarters. The orders laid down were that in case of attack the platoon detailed for the task was to counter-attack either through the tunnel (quite impossible if the enemy obtained a footing in the trench at the tunnel mouth) or over the top.

Shortly after midnight, the enemy put down an intense barrage of trench mortars, wing bombs, and shells of all calibres, along the whole of the Brigade front and support lines, forward communication trenches, Battalion Headquarters, the Village Line, and extending even to roads, villages, and batteries far behind the line. Telephone wires were broken immediately, but the "S.O.S." was sent by signal rocket and power buzzer, and our artillery and machine guns replied at once. There had been no preliminary bombardment or warning of any kind. The enemy entered our trenches directly behind his barrage from the cover of the craters on the right, between our right post and the left Company of the 138th Brigade, who were on our right, also near Dundee Walk in the centre, and just North of Munster Tunnel on the left. Such wire as had been put up by the few men who were usually available was swept away by the hurricane bombardment, which prevented movement of any kind, either to or from the front or support lines. Two runners were wounded whilst attempting to take messages between Company Headquarters and Munster Tunnel, a distance of 50 yards. The posts in the front line were unable, owing to their small numbers, to offer any prolonged resistance, or on account of the distance between them, to assist neighbouring posts.

The front line entrance to Munster Tunnel was held by us the whole time, and an attempt to blow it in, which was one of the main objects of the raid, was frustrated, 2nd Lieut. Hartle being wounded by a hand grenade. That the garrison of the outpost line withstood the onslaught to their utmost there is no doubt, and to this the pools of blood and reeking bayonets of some of the rifles found afterwards in the trench, bore convincing testimony. After the enemy's withdrawal, one unwounded and one seriously wounded German were left in our hands, the former having apparently become detached from his party, and being discovered later in front of our trench with a sheet of newspaper fluttering from his rifle.

The thoroughness with which the Boche trained for this raid was proved from the prisoners' statements and documents, which afterwards came into our hands. For six weeks the raiding party, consisting of about 250 men, had been training over an exact replica of our trenches, constructed with the help of an aeroplane photograph. The training had also included the teaching of several words of English. The work of the raiders was extraordinary, and our own men in the front line testified to the remarkable dexterity with which they removed their casualties. This is the more wonderful inasmuch as they had to penetrate our barrages, in order to regain their trench, and there is no doubt that in doing so they lost heavily. Our casualties amounted to three other ranks killed, including a very gallant N.C.O., Corpl. Tyne, 26 other ranks missing, and one Officer (Hartle), and ten other ranks wounded. We should like to pay tribute to the excellent work done by the Signallers, who as usual worked their hardest, to try and keep their lines in order, in spite of the heavy shelling. L.-Corpl. Parry's efforts to repair the broken lines back from one of the front Companies, were especially praiseworthy.

Though there was an element of surprise in the raid, there is no doubt that its success was due to the fact that the defence was designed for an attack on a large scale, and led inevitably to a weakening of our outpost line, making it peculiarly vulnerable to a raid or attack with a limited objective.

The following night, the whole Battalion was ordered to wire as hard as possible, and hundreds of reels of barbed wire were put out. Even Battalion Headquarters shared in the work, the whole staff being out in an endeavour to wire themselves in.

On March 24th, we were relieved by the 6th Battalion, Headquarters and two Companies proceeding to Beuvry, and two Companies remaining in the trenches in close support. "Wind" at this time was very "high," and our Intelligence reported that we must be prepared for any eventuality. The enemy had made enormous progress in their attack in the South, and everything pointed to the possibility of a general attack along the whole front. As a matter of fact no such attempt was ever made on the Cambrin-St. Elie sector, but we had to take every precaution, and for the next two or three nights, we marched up to our battle positions in front of Cambrin, in case the expected attack should mature. We even made arrangements for a possible retreat, and worse than that, all leave was stopped.

It was at this juncture that our Brigade Commander, General Carey left us to take Command of the 20th Division, with everyone's good wishes and congratulations. He arrived near Amiens in time to assume Command of a composite Army, known as "Carey's Force," and to assist materially in finally stopping the great German onslaught. He was succeeded by General Wood.

The "wind" in this quarter, dropped for the moment, but we heard that things just North of Arras were not looking too bright. The enemy were expected to attack at Vimy, and the Canadians who were holding the sector opposite Lens, were to be moved to that part to help the defence. As a result, we got orders on March 25th, to move back once more to the Lens region, to relieve the Canadians. Hasty plans were made by which the 11th Division took over from us, and on March 27th, we marched to Calonne and relieved the 72nd Canadian Battalion there in reserve, moving up the following night to the St. Emile sector, in front of St. Pierre, where we took over the right sub-sector front line from the 78th Canadian Battalion. The completion of the relief had to be rather hurried, as the enemy attacked at Oppy on March 28th, and the Canadians were hastily sent there to help. Transport and Quarter-Master's Stores had meanwhile gone to Fosse 10.

The front line in this sector was now of course much further forward, than when we were last there, as the Canadians in connection with their attack on Hill 70, had forced the enemy out of the whole of St. Pierre, St. Laurent, and St. Emile Cites, back to the outskirts of Lens itself. These Cites were now to all intents and purposes destroyed, and presented nothing but a mass of streets heaped up with broken tiles, brick and other debris, interspersed here and there with trenches, the remains of houses, and a few shattered trees. Amongst the ruins the Canadians had laid a splendid system of tramways, and the transport of stores and rations to the line was carried out every night by this means, in a most expeditious manner. Canadian Engineers continued to run the lines during our stay, and we must confess that we did not envy the drivers their job, for the lines went up uncomfortably close to the front line, and a good deal of noise accompanied the arrival and departure of the trains, unloading of stores, and loading of empties for the return journey, the guard or man in charge usually helping matters with a few shrill blasts of his whistle, quite in approved Canadian fashion.

After a quiet tour of four days, we were relieved in the early morning of April 1st, by the 6th Battalion, and went back to Brigade support at St. Pierre, where we lived in the cellars of the otherwise destroyed houses. Our stay there was rendered less pleasant than it might have been, by the fact that practically the whole of the village was under observation from Lens, so that during the day hardly any movement was possible, and most of our exercise had to be taken by night, when we were kept pretty busy with carrying and working parties. The nightly gas shelling of the village made this work anything but pleasant. Bathing parades too, were held at night, and took place in the weirdest bathing establishment we ever met, which was in the crypt of the church. It was well protected by the ruins of the church, and had been fitted up with a spray bath.

On April 3rd, we relieved the 5th Battalion in the line, and had a somewhat "thin" six days, owing to the enemy being extremely active, particularly with heavy trench mortars, with which he did a lot of damage to our front line, being particularly obnoxious on the night of April 5/6th, in retaliation for one of our gas projector shows. L.-Corpl. Beech did especially commendable work during these days in charge of a Lewis gun post.

One morning during a tour in the front line in this sector. Col. Currin very nearly lost his runner. It was a rather foggy morning, and the Commanding Officer sent him to find an Officer in an adjoining Company. Unfortunately the runner made a mistake at a trench junction, and gaily followed an old communication trench, running straight to the enemy's lines. It was doubtful which party was the more surprised when he suddenly found himself confronted by a Boche sentry post behind a barricade. At any rate the latter were too amazed to shoot, whilst true to his calling the runner ran, and never stopped until he nearly crashed into the arms of the Colonel, who was wondering what on earth had happened.

On April 9th, the 6th Battalion relieved us again, and we went back to St. Pierre. On the same day there happened an event which was to have an enormous effect on the future of the war, at any rate so far as the fighting on the Northern portion of the front was concerned, viz., the attack on the British line immediately North of the La Bassee Canal, and on the Portuguese in the Neuve Chapelle area. The result was that whilst the 55th Division put up a magnificent defence on the Canal, and completely beat off all the enemy attacks, the Portuguese gave way, and the enemy were able to push on West for a considerable distance, until brought to a halt by the British, who were later helped by reinforcements rapidly sent up by the French. This had an almost immediate effect on us, for on the night of April 11/12th, we were taken out of the line, being relieved once more by the Canadians (13th Battalion) who were hurried up from the area North of Arras, where things seemed to be quiet once more. After a great scramble, relief was completed by 5.30 a.m. when it was practically daylight. Some got rides on the trains which brought up the Canadians, but the rest had to walk, and eventually we all got to Noeux-les-Mines, where we had breakfast and dinner, and proceeded in the afternoon to Vaudricourt. The whole Division had been relieved—one of the quickest reliefs known—and we now found ourselves in Army Reserve, to be sent to any spot where we might be required.

Things once more were in a very "nervy" state, as it was felt that ere long the enemy would make another desperate attempt to capture the rest of the mining area, either by direct frontal attack from the East towards Bethune, or by continuing his enveloping movement from the North, and attacking it from that direction across the La Bassee Canal. A large part of this area now formed a prominent salient, with the enemy on the East and North, and the consequence was a rapid evacuation of the French inhabitants from many of the mining towns and villages in that district, including Bethune, Beuvry, Annequin, Sailly-Labourse, Noeux-les-Mines, and Bully Grenay—all of which we knew well. For several days we watched the wretched inhabitants toiling along the roads, taking with them by whatever means they could, the few belongings they most treasured or required. Some had carts loaded with bedding and furniture, some their little dog carts full to overflowing, others footed it burdened with loads almost beyond human strength to carry. Ever the throng kept passing back from the forward regions, having left everything that they could not carry just as it was in their houses, with no other protection than locked doors. Their cattle and horses too, were driven back, and taken to pounds in villages in safer regions. Several more mines had to cease work, and the French miners thus thrown out of employment were mostly set to work in digging line upon line of additional trenches about Fouquieres and Drouvin, for us to fall back on in case of a break through, as it was determined to contest every bit of the ground to the very utmost. Right well they worked, and in an incredibly short time, they had dug miles of trenches, and well wired them in front with substantial entanglements. Our only fear was that if the enemy got through, we should not have sufficient men to garrison these trenches so excellently dug!

This was probably the darkest period of the war. The inspiring message from the Commander-in-Chief was read to all ranks, and all indeed realised that we had our backs to the wall and were fighting for our very existence, and that it was touch and go whether the Hun would not, after all, break through the whole line and sweep through to the coast, and ultimately to England.

It was in these circumstances, after a few days quiet training about Vaudricourt, that we got word at 2.30 a.m. on the morning of April 18th, that a German prisoner had been captured, and had given information to the effect that the enemy were going to make another desperate attack that morning along the La Bassee Canal. We were accordingly ordered at once to man part of the Sailly-Labourse "Locality," known as the "Tuning Fork Line," just in front of that village, so-called because it formed part of a system of trenches and breastworks shaped like a tuning fork. There was some slight delay in getting the orders passed on, and it was 4.30 a.m. before we marched off. This was unfortunate, for we were not able to reach our battle position before dawn, when the enemy's barrage began. This as usual included heavy shelling of the rear roads and villages through which we had to pass, particularly Verquigneul and Sailly, where we suffered several casualties, and lost Corpl. Caudwell, who had done such good work with the Transport, and two men killed and several others wounded. One of the cookers was also badly blown about by a shell in Verquigneul. We got to our position at 6.30 a.m. where we were comparatively comfortable. The enemy had actually attacked at Givenchy, but once again, thanks to the 1st and 55th Divisions, he was completely defeated, and never again did he try to get through on this part of the front. We were kept in our positions here for two days, by which time things had become normal once more, and in the afternoon of April 20th, we marched back to our billets at Vaudricourt.



CHAPTER XIII

GORRE AND ESSARS

April 21st, 1918. September 6th, 1918.

Two days after our return to Vaudricourt, the 46th Division was called upon to relieve the 3rd Division in the area North of the La Bassee Canal, afterwards known as Gorre and Essars sectors, where they had recently held up the German attack. This front extended from the 55th Division boundary on the right, near Givenchy, where the line bent now almost at a right angle, to Mesplaux Farm on the Lawe Canal, on the left, this line being more or less parallel with the La Bassee Canal, and at the nearest point about two and-a-half miles from Bethune.

Leaving Vaudricourt on the evening of April 23rd, we marched the short journey to Bethune, where after some rearrangement, we were eventually allotted billets in one of the French Barracks. How changed was our favourite old town of Bethune! From the earliest days of the war a resting place for the traveller, the chief shopping centre for a very wide area, probably the most popular and best known town to British Troops on the whole of the Western Front, full of life, and to a certain extent gaiety, although within such a short distance of the line, she had now been deserted by all her inhabitants, and was like a city of the dead. Previously only hit by a few stray shells on odd occasions, she was now being bombarded regularly, as the enemy had brought up his guns much closer, and they had already made their presence known in no uncertain manner. Everywhere notices had been put up warning troops against the crime of looting, but is it not more than human nature can stand to see houses, as they were here, often open for anyone to walk straight into, filled with all kinds of valuables, many quite easy to carry away, and all liable at any instant to be destroyed by shell or fire?

At the moment, however, we had little time to trouble about the town ourselves, as on April 24th, we moved out again. After a novel and amusing cricket match—if such it could be called—in the Barrack Square in the afternoon, we relieved at night the 2nd Royal Scots in the right sub-sector of the Essars sector, with two Companies in the front line and two in support, Battalion Headquarters being at Le Hamel, in the cellar of a farmhouse. Company Commanders at this time were: A, Capt. Andrews; B, Capt. C. P. Elliott; C, 2nd Lieut. Kent, who had taken over command when Major Cursham went to hospital; D, Capt. Simonet. It was fortunate that they had been up to reconnoitre the day before, for when platoons reached the appointed rendezvous, the guides were not there. We had had sufficient experience by this time to know that, although all possible precautions were taken, it was a most difficult problem to make certain that every guide was a picked man, knew exactly where he was to meet his party, what that party was, and where it was to be guided to, and to be able to do all this by night without a hitch. Ian Hay has classified guides in two grades (a) the guide who doesn't know the way and tells you so; (b) the guide who doesn't know the way and doesn't tell you so until he has lost both you and himself. We might add to this (c) the guide who doesn't turn up! In this case however, nothing desperate happened, and in due course the relief was carried out.

The conditions here were indeed novel, and more like those of "open warfare" than any we had yet experienced. It might almost be said that we had now bidden farewell to real trenches, for, though the line in the Gorre and Essars sectors, remained stationary for nearly four months and trenches certainly were dug, from now onwards we never had quite the same type of front line as we had hitherto been accustomed to. The German rush had been brought to a halt, not many days before we took over, so that there were practically no defences of any kind. The outpost line consisted of a few shell-holes, and small slits dug in the ground at intervals with a very small amount of barbed wire in front. The support line, known as the "Liverpool Line," consisted mainly of a few slits, but was protected for a great portion of its length by the Beuvry River, and a fair barbed wire entanglement. A few shelters had already been made in both lines, by putting sheets of corrugated iron over some of the small trenches which had been dug, and camouflaging them with earth. Some distance behind the Liverpool Line there were some old breastworks, forming part of a reserve line, which some of us remembered seeing the French constructing in the Autumn of 1915, when we were in the Vieille Chapelle area, just North of this. In some of these there were small concrete shelters very much like old-fashioned pigsties, which on the left of the Essars sector, were used for Battalion Headquarters. There were of course no communication trenches whatever, all communication to the front posts being over the top, mostly by tracks through the growing crops.

The whole area was perfectly flat, and almost entirely under observation, so that by day no movement was possible, and no work could be done, and as the nights were now getting shorter and shorter, very few hours in every 24 could be utilised for doing the work we were so anxious to get on with. There was nothing to be done by day, apart from ordinary sentry duty, except to keep out of sight and make ourselves as comfortable as very cramped quarters would allow.

A further disadvantage was that the water level in the ground was very near the surface, so that dug-outs were impossible, and the most we could do was to put up small corrugated iron shelters, mainly in T-shaped saps running back from the trenches. These we pushed on with as rapidly as possible, in order to afford some protection in case of bad weather. In this respect we were extremely lucky, and for a very great part of our stay the weather was delightful, days and sometimes weeks together passing without a single drop of rain.

The first tour of four days was quiet, except for some gas shelling, which the Boche was doing much more extensively now, especially about sunrise and sunset, when he was particularly fond of dosing Battalion Headquarters at Le Hamel, and Essars and Gorre. At the latter place the chateau and the wood were the favourite targets, and on several occasions were absolutely drenched with gas. At this time it was mainly "yellow cross" or "mustard" gas that was used, a very deadly gas, affecting any part of the body exposed to it, and particularly dangerous when the sun was up. A certain amount of "green cross" or "phosgene" which was decidedly dangerous, was also used, as well as a little "blue cross," which apart from making one sneeze had no very ill effect, unless inhaled in large quantities. During this tour we did little except get used to the new conditions, and try to find our way about. It was the simplest thing in the world to get in front of the outpost line without knowing you were there, and on occasions people were even discovered in No Man's Land asking for the support line! Visiting the posts in the front line was also at first more or less a matter of conjecture, but in course of time most of them were joined up by a continuous trench. At first the novelty of it all amused us, and after all it was a very welcome change from ordinary trench life.

It was during the first tour that we had the great misfortune to lose a very gallant Officer and sportsman—H. K. Simonet. He had moved his Company Headquarters from an unprotected shell-hole to a cottage at Les Facons, in the outpost line itself, only to get a direct hit on it almost immediately which resulted in Simonet and his runner, Pvte. Garratt, one of the most reliable and gallant men in the Battalion, being badly wounded. Neither recovered, and they were buried near each other in the Cemetery at Lapugnoy. A most capable Officer, of fine leadership and magnificent character, "Simmy" was liked by all and his loss was felt most keenly throughout the Battalion. He was succeeded in command of D Company by Lieut. Warner, whose place as Signalling Officer was taken by 2nd Lieut. Stephenson.

On April 28th, we were relieved by the 5th Leicesters, and moved back into Divisional Reserve at Fouquieres, where we stayed four days, during which the chief excitement was that we had to stand to in the early hours of May 1st, as there were rumours of another German attack, which fortunately did not mature.

We took over from the 6th South Staffords in support in the Gorre sector, on May 2nd, and had something of a shock on finding that they had lost nearly 50 per cent. of their numbers during their tour by mustard gas poisoning, with which the Boche had literally drenched the whole of Gorre Wood and chateau, and most of the village. It was not a comfortable introduction to the sector! Fortunately most of the casualties proved to be slight, and the greater part were able to rejoin a few days later.



There was nothing fresh about the kind of work required of us in support. It was as ever, and was for several more months, the carrying of Royal Engineers' and other material to front line Battalions, and the provision of working parties for Royal Engineers. How we blessed them and their working parties! It would fill a book much larger than the present one to attempt to put down half what one thought, and what one heard and said about them, but this shall be our last uncivil remark! They had a splendid dump at Le Quesnoy, known as "Kantara." Situated next door to the station and canal, almost adjoining the road, and having a branch from the tramline running into it, this dump could not very well have been in a more suitable position, though the same advantages made it a most convenient target for the Hun gunners. Almost next door to it was Gorre Brewery, also very well situated, and having the additional attraction of a tall chimney which gave the Boche the line of the bridge over the canal a few yards behind it. Though they did some quite good shooting at these targets and damaged the canal bridge, the chimney in the end was blown up by our own Sappers. In view of these facts it seemed at first rather curious that this spot should have been chosen for the Headquarters of the support Battalion and the Aid Post. Perhaps the first people went there to find the beer; if so they certainly took it all, for there was none left when we got there!

On May 4th, we relieved the 6th Battalion in the right or "Route A Keep" sub-sector, undoubtedly the unhealthiest part of the whole Divisional front. The so-called "Keep" was merely the highest ground in the locality, overlooking the Boche to a certain extent, and so an important tactical feature, though having nothing in the way of defences to warrant the term "Keep." There had been considerable fighting over its possession during the time the 55th Division held this area, and counter-attacks were made time and again by the enemy to get them out. Eventually they got tired, and in the end, after its capture by the Stafford Brigade on April 29th, they made no further efforts to retake it. Corpses lay on all sides, both of our own troops and of the enemy, and made the place distinctly offensive. Life was made still more unpleasant by constant trench mortaring and shelling, whilst protection was of the scantiest. We tried to improve this during our first tour by digging an advanced trench well in front of the outpost line, and so as to conform with the front lines of flank battalions. Though the trench was dug with little interruption on the part of the enemy, we did not exactly look upon it as a masterpiece, nor by any means our best piece of work in France, but it served its purpose very well, and in time was considerably improved.

On May 10th, we went back to bivouacs in Vaudricourt Park, in Divisional Reserve. These bivouacs and the villages of Fouquieres and Verquin, were from now onwards allotted in rotation to the three Battalions of the Brigade out at rest.

The atmosphere during the greater part of May was again very "breezy." From various sources, including prisoners' statements, our Intelligence Department were led to believe that another big attack was going to be made, and might begin at any moment, with the object of getting Bethune, and the rest of the coalfield. In fact, so great was the general anxiety on the occasion of our relief on May 10th, that we had to remain in the Bethune "Locality" all night. The attack passed off without happening, as did several others! The bridges over the La Bassee Canal were mined and guarded by Sapper and Infantry sentries, with instructions as to blowing them up in case a further withdrawal became necessary. We felt quite certain that they would be blown up alright should the occasion arise, but had grave doubts as to what might befall those who happened to be on the wrong side of the Canal! That well-known landmark, Bethune Church Tower, which commanded views for miles in all directions, had also had a powerful charge laid at its base, so that it might be blown up in the event of our retirement. Ultimately it was blown up, not on account of any retirement on our part, but by the enemy shelling the town. Having brought up numbers of guns into the newly-formed Merville salient, they shelled Bethune daily, until on May 17th, a shell landed near enough to the base of the Church Tower to explode the charge, and the remnants of the tower disappeared with the most appalling explosion, followed by an enormous cloud of dust and debris, bricks and stones being thrown for hundreds of yards. Numerous incendiary shells were also fired into the town, and with the delightful weather we were then having it did not take long to set fire to the whole of the central congested part, which blazed away for days. It was a glorious sight to watch the flames and the smoke rolling away, but sad to see so much useless destruction.

The constant fear of further enemy attacks, coupled with the absolute impossibility of our thinking of any offensive action for some considerable time, decided the authorities that a really strong line of resistance was of first importance. Work of Battalions holding the line was, therefore, concentrated on strengthening the Liverpool Line, whilst Divisional troops, Royal Engineers, Monmouths, and special working parties found by the Brigade in reserve, were engaged in building lines behind, known as the "Manchester" and "Newcastle" lines. To build a double line of breastworks protected by barbed wire entanglements along the whole Divisional front was a colossal task. The wire was put up, and long sections of breastwork were more or less completed, but by that time things had fortunately so altered that no further defensive work was necessary. The other important work was the improvement of billets in the forward area, which was destitute of buildings, except for a few farm houses and cottages, mostly knocked about by shell fire. With the possible prospect of having to winter here, efforts were made to improve these buildings, by putting inside them "Elephant" shelters, covered with concrete. The Royal Engineers made considerable progress with this work, and before we left, several comfortable billets had been thus improvised.

Another work in which all could help—no matter what their rank—and which took a prominent part in our daily life in these days, was "Salvage." Undoubtedly there was apt to be great waste by allowing material to be left lying about, and at this time there was a pressing need to retrieve everything that could possibly be found. We did our best and endeavoured to rescue such articles as 18-pounder guns and limbers, which we thought might come in useful, but judging from the screeds that were received as to "the true spirit of salvage" we were wrong, and found that the returns of salvage that got the most marks were those containing such items as "socks 200" (got generally from derelict Quarter-Master's Stores found in the forward area, and packed into a limber in about half-a-minute), but the work entailed in hauling 18-pounders and limbers out of dangerous parts of the front, apparently counted for little. Towards the end of our stay, when we moved into the XIII Corps (Lieut.-General Morland) and Fifth Army (General Birdwood), even greater attention was paid to salvage, and every scrap of paper had to be returned to the Paper Dump, bottles to the Bottle Dump, tins to special incinerators, to have the solder melted out and collected, and so on, all no doubt of vital necessity, though seeming at the time rather a bore to carry out.

By the end of May several changes had taken place in the personnel of the Battalion, not the least important being that of the Quarter-Master. Torrance, who had not been well for some time, went to England for a tour of home duty at the end of April. Lieut. Dale, who acted in his place for a few days, managed to get wounded, and then Regimental Quarter-Master Sergt. Pritchard carried on until May 26th, when Lieut. J. Brewer from the "Pool" of Quarter-Masters at the Base joined for duty. Kent, in command of C Company, had a very brief period in which to enjoy the Company Commander's well-earned privilege of being granted the rank and pay of Captain, for he got badly wounded by a machine gun bullet on May 31st, in the Gorre sector, and was succeeded by Capt. Miners. We also lost 2nd Lieuts. Christian, Judd, Jewel, and Fairbrother—all wounded—and 2nd Lieut. Russell, sick. Reinforcement Officers who joined were 2nd Lieuts. A. D. H. Dunkin and H. Hallam.

Trench reliefs continued more or less according to schedule, 12 days being spent in the line to six out at rest, and though there were minor excitements now and then, nothing exceptional happened on our part of the front for many weeks, although on May 27th, the enemy renewed his attacks near Rheims in the South, and Locre in the North, and made some further progress. Of the Brigade sectors, Essars was looked upon as the more preferable, if only on account of the excellent vegetables which grew there in large quantities, and needless to say, found their way to the messes of Officers and men alike, where they were a most welcome addition to rations. There were also numbers of livestock left behind by the French, which owing to the rapid onrush of the Boche they had been unable to take with them. It is reported that two pigs found at "Tank" or "Portuguese" farm, by a certain Company Commander were not unconnected with a noticeable improvement in the rations the next time we were out at rest! A cow which was kept at Battalion Headquarters for a few days, came to an unfortunate end by dying of gas poisoning!

In order that the men might do a little cooking for themselves in the trenches, as it was impossible to take hot meals up to them by day, special issues of "Tommies' Cookers" were made, with which they were able to make hot drinks, and warm their savoury "Maconochies," "Meat and Vegetables," "Pork and Beans," and other delicacies, whilst during the night hot porridge and tea were made at Battalion Headquarters, and sent round in food containers.

Rations were taken up each night in the early days by our own Transport, which had been provided with lines in a rather low lying field at Fouquieres, but later moved to the back of Divisional Headquarters at Gosnay, where timber and corrugated iron brought back from derelict horse lines in the forward area, made useful huts and shelters. There was little to choose between the sectors so far as transport was concerned, for the shelling of roads was a regular feature of the enemy's offensive action, particularly during the night. It seemed of little use trying to avoid it by going earlier or later, for at whatever time transport was about, there were sure to be shells, mostly gas. The most lively spots were Gorre and Le Quesnoy villages on the right, and the road between Bethune Cemetery Corner and Le Hamel on the left, and it was always advisable to "get a move on" at night along these particular roads. Later on the trench tramway system, which already existed on the right, was improved and extended to the Essars sector, and eventually stores of all kinds were taken up each night to both sectors in that way, the trains being loaded up at "Speedwell Spur," near Fouquieres. The engine was taken off at Essars on the left, and at Le Quesnoy on the right, and from there the trucks were man-handled forward to Battalion Headquarters, or other points.

During the first three and a half months of this period we were not called upon to carry out a raid or attack of any kind. Gunners and Trench Mortar people carried out shoots on various occasions, and our machine gunners, who were now formed into one Battalion for the Division, made the most horrible noise every night with their "barrages," but we were let off with nothing more serious than patrolling. The country was admirably adapted to this form of reconnaissance, and patrols were out by day almost as much as by night. The corn crops which covered much of the area, were of course left untouched (except just in front of our lines, where they were cut so as to afford a field of fire), and provided excellent cover, as did also the hedges and ditches, which were fairly frequent, and by these means it was possible to get right up to the German outpost line by daylight, and at times even past it. The enemy, of course, played the same game, and unfortunately on one occasion managed to snaffle the N.C.O. and two men from one of our posts. Sometimes patrols went out just before dawn, and remained out the whole of the day, observing from some ditch or other place of concealment, returning to our lines again when darkness fell. Of the many splendid patrols carried out, probably the most daring were those by Capt. Andrews, who had previously got a good "chit" from the Corps and Divisional Commanders, for an excellent daylight patrol at "Hairpin Craters," in the St. Elie sector. It is reported that on one occasion, when trying to get back to our line he was mistaken for an enemy patrol, and fired on by his own Lewis gunners, and that when he did eventually get safely back, the No. 1 of the team got severely straffed for his poor shooting! Others who did most excellent work in connection with patrolling were Lieuts. Elphick and G. G. Elliott; 2nd Lieuts. Spinney, C. M. Bedford, Hallam, Seymour, Sellis, and Fairbrother; Comp. Sergt.-Major Rawding; Sergts. Brett, Teece and Sharrock; Corpls. T. H. Johnson, Foster, Brooks and Hurt; L.-Corpl. Beech, and Pvtes. Stanley and Hinton (A Company), Curley, Walker and Elliott (B Company), Green (a Stretcher Bearer), and Miller (C Company), and Huckerby, Wildsmith, and Stubbings (D Company).



So far as training was concerned, an important change was made during this period by the formation of the "Battle Details," into what became known as the "Divisional Wing." As the periods out of the line, were too short for any satisfactory Battalion training, to be carried out, a number of Officers and men selected from each Battalion were left out of the line at regular intervals, to undergo a short course of general training. These courses usually lasted for twelve days. The first assembly was at Bruay, but later more permanent quarters were found at the aerodrome at Hesdigneul. Each Brigade had its own "Wing," and each Battalion had a Senior Officer on the spot to supervise the training. Lieut. C. H. Powell of our Battalion was for some time a most efficient Adjutant of the 139th Brigade Wing. Lewis gun training and instruction in the meaning of "Chain of Command" were at this time perhaps the most important points. Every man in the Battalion had to be taught to load and fire the Lewis gun, and to know not only who his commanders were, but how the command might descend to him in case of casualties. Fresh issues of Lewis guns, which were made from time to time, allowed each Company to have eight. Their transport was provided by the allotment of two limbered wagons per Company, which carried, in addition to the guns, their ammunition "drums," spare parts, some boxed ammunition, and other paraphernalia. Lieut. Bradish, a most conscientious Lewis gun Officer, both in and out of the line, was responsible for the Lewis gun work, in which he was ably helped by Sergts. King, Teece, and Milne.

There were two Brigade Ceremonial parades during this period, both of which were held at Gosnay. On May 28th, the Divisional Commander inspected us and presented medals, and on June 10th, General Horne, commanding the First Army, honoured us in a similar way. Both inspections went off well, and without any adverse criticisms.

For entertainments we had the "Whizz-bangs," who seldom gave better shows than we got almost every night in the hut in Vaudricourt Wood, and the Cinema at Divisional Headquarters at Gosnay. There were the additional attractions of estaminets and shops in the neighbouring villages, especially Verquin, where we had many a good dinner, and drank many bottles of Veuve Cliquot at the estaminet of a great favourite of the Battalion, Mlle. Bertha.

On July 18th, a whole day was given up to Battalion Sports, on the aerodrome at Hesdigneul. Beginning at 9 a.m. they were not over until 7.30 p.m., after a most successful day, which was mainly due to the excellent arrangements made by Major Gingell, and Sergt. Major Mounteney. At the Brigade Horse Show and Sports held two days later, we won first prize for a good type of Officer's Charger, a chestnut, at one time ridden by Capt. Whitton, and later by the Second-in-Command (this horse won again a little later at the Divisional Show), whilst the first three places in the Cross-country Run also fell to the Battalion, and firsts in the 100 yards and quarter mile races. Whilst we were not quite so successful at these shows with Transport turnouts, their smartness reflected great credit on the Transport Officer, Lieut. Tomlinson, and that veteran N.C.O. Sergt. Blunt. As they had got the Transport satisfactorily through one of Major-General Thwaites's critical inspections early in June, we felt sure there could be little cause for complaint.

What was, perhaps, from a rather selfish point of view, a drawback to the long spells of fine weather and brilliant moonlight nights that we had during this period, was that it enabled the enemy to make frequent night bombing raids. Our own bombing squadrons of course, did precisely the same thing, but it was not pleasant to be disturbed at night when out at rest, by aeroplanes, cruising around and dropping bombs. Fortunately we escaped with little harm, but the billets and Transport Lines of many Units suffered severely. For our better protection in this respect, a regular system of anti-aircraft defence was devised, and a special allotment of Lewis guns made for the purpose. These were mounted on poles, fixed at various points in the trenches, at the Transport Lines, and in the vicinity of the more important villages behind the line. Though perhaps in a general way they added to our protection against aeroplanes, for which we had hitherto relied almost entirely on our anti-aircraft guns, known as "Archies," we seldom saw them bring anything down, and were inclined to look upon them as likely to give away the positions they were supposed to be protecting.

As the months went by several changes took place in personnel. We lost Capt. Whitton, who after being Adjutant for 14 months, went for duty to the First Army Rest Camp at the end of June, and was succeeded by 2nd Lieut. Martin. Capt. Warner went to the Divisional Signal Company early in July, and D Company was then taken over by Capt. White. Second Lieuts. Bromham and Russell went down sick, and 2nd Lieut. Elphick to the Machine Gun Corps. New Officers who joined were 2nd Lieuts. E. J. Taylor, James Howard Smith, T. J. Sellis, H. M. Toyne, F. L. Harrap, J. F. Shackleton, F. T. W. Saunders, W. Pennington, S. A. Tebbutt, and S. Bradwell, D.C.M., and we were given a new Padre in the person of D. E. Sturt. Sergt. Bescoby, who had done excellent work in charge of the Stretcher Bearers, became Comp. Quarter-Master Sergt. of A Company, in place of Godfrey, who left to train for a commission. Our strength was kept fairly level by drafts, and we averaged throughout this period about 40 Officers, and 920 other ranks.

Our somewhat humdrum existence eventually came to an end about the middle of August. By this time the German offensive had finally ceased, having received its knock-out blow in the fruitless attack made against the French near Rheims on July 15th. On this occasion the French had received ample warning of the attack, and were consequently able to dispose their forces in such a manner as to inflict appalling casualties on the enemy with insignificant losses to themselves. This was followed up by a series of attacks by French, Americans, British, and Italians, which began on July 18th and finally drove the enemy out of the Marne Valley. Even before that time it had been realised that the Germans were not likely to make any further attacks on our part of the front, and about the middle of July we had gone so far as to contemplate an offensive in the Merville salient. Preliminary plans were actually made for the attack to be made on July 15th, by the Canadians and our own Division, but eventually the scheme was cancelled.

The offensive in the South met with extraordinary success at all points, and soon extended to the Third Army area, nearly as far North as Lens, with the result that in the end the Boche decided that he must take steps to withdraw from the Merville salient. His offensive on this front was, undoubtedly, from the first a serious strategic error. The unexpected ease with which the enemy had advanced on the Portugese front had induced him to push forward further than had been the first intention. Consequently, in holding the inner portion of a most pronounced salient on flat ground, overlooked from the high land south of the La Bassee Canal, he had at last experienced some of those difficulties and losses which had been for so long our experience in the Ypres salient. The many destroyed guns which we ultimately found on our subsequent advance bore witness, not only to the remarkable accuracy and efficiency of our own artillery, but to the folly of attempting to hold the salient when once the possibility of capturing Bethune and the area South of the Canal had disappeared. Owing to this mistake of tactics and strategy there is no question that the enemy's losses had been extremely heavy since his advance in April.

During the second week in August, whilst we were in the Gorre sector, we heard that the enemy were carrying out extensive demolitions behind the line, and our patrols were constantly out, so as to ensure keeping touch, should he begin to move back. He had already begun to do so on our left, but we were not actually affected until August 19th, by which time we had moved across to the Essars right sub-sector. About noon on that day, our left Company reported that the enemy had evacuated several of the front line posts astride the Rue-du-Bois. A and D Companies, which were in the front line, accordingly sent out strong patrols to keep touch, the remainder moving forward to the old German front line. Some 600 yards in front of our old line, lay the hamlet of Le Touret. This was cleared by the leading Companies with little opposition, except for a few snipers left to harass our advance, and by evening the line ran East of that place, a total advance of about 1,000 yards. The same night we handed over to the 6th North Staffords. On August 26th, the Battalion moved up to support in the Gorre sector, and was disposed about the Tuning Fork Breastworks, with Battalion Headquarters by the canal side, near Le Preol. Lieut. G. G. Elliott was badly wounded here during a bombardment of the position held by A Company, of which he was then in command. A battery of guns had been put in the orchard adjoining his Headquarters, in spite of many protests, and naturally drew a considerable amount of shelling. Several men were wounded at the same time. "G.G." had succeeded Capt. Andrews, who had recently been appointed Second-in-Command on Major Gingell's departure for a tour of duty at home, and the command of A Company now passed to Lieut. Thomas.

Re-adjustments of the Divisional front became necessary, owing to the continued withdrawal of the enemy, and on September 1st, we crossed over to relieve our 6th Battalion in the left Brigade sector. Here the withdrawal had been fairly rapid, Lacouture and Vieille Chapelle both having been evacuated, and the enemy were now holding a line roughly running from Richebourg St. Vaast through "Windy Corner" to Richebourg L'Avoue, the general direction of our advance being North-East. At the time we relieved them, the 6th Battalion were engaged in sharp encounters trying to dislodge the enemy from a number of posts just West of Windy Corner. We continued this hole and corner fighting, and on September 3rd, C Company occupied "Hens Post," Windy Corner, and "Edward's Post," after some sharp scrapping, taking one wounded prisoner, whilst B Company occupied "Dogs Post" without opposition.

Very gallant work was done during this fighting by Corpl. Mosgrove, who in spite of heavy fire established liaison with the Company on his right which was held up, thereby enabling the advance to continue; by Pvte. Stamford, a Stretcher Bearer, who on two separate occasions went forward into the open, in full view of enemy snipers at close range to help wounded comrades, and by L.-Corpl. Beech, who did exceptionally good work in charge of a Lewis gun team.

Those who had been with the Battalion in the Autumn of 1915, were now on familiar ground, as the fighting was taking place on what was then the area just behind the line that we held in the Richebourg sector. The capture of the posts about Windy Corner straightened out the line, and enabled us to obtain suitable jumping-off positions for an attack which was to take place the following day, as it had been decided to speed up the enemy's retreat in this part, and drive him back far enough to enable us to retake the old British front line near Neuve Chapelle, the enemy being at this moment about 2,000 yards West of that line.

Instructions for the attack were issued somewhat hurriedly during the night. B and C were to be the leading Companies, with A and D in support. The 5th Leicesters were attacking on our right, and the 19th Division on the left. There was little or no time to make any reconnaissance. Zero was 5.15 a.m. on September 4th, and the barrage came down on the stroke 200 yards East of a line through "Haystack," "Orchard," "Albert," "Dogs" and "Edward's" Posts. Having remained on this line four minutes it moved forward at the rate of 100 yards in two minutes, closely followed by the leading troops. The enemy made little resistance, and had evidently decided not to offer any serious defence to operations on a large scale, but to get out of the way as quickly as possible. The result was that within a couple of hours we had regained possession of the old British front line, and the "contact aeroplane" which cruised round a little later, saw our ground flares burning in the identical trenches we held in November, 1915. The 5th Leicesters met with equal success, and were abreast of us on the same line. The 19th Division on our left had met with considerable resistance at Neuve Chapelle, and did not get the whole of their objective until later in the day. The enemy had decided for the moment to stand on his old line running through the Bois-du-Biez, a strong position, from which it would be difficult to dislodge him. The troops on our left suffered several casualties in a fruitless endeavour to push platoons forward into the wood. Our casualties were negligible owing to the feeble resistance offered, and the weak counter-barrage put down. Battalion Headquarters moved immediately after the attack to "Lansdowne Post."

Communication had been well maintained during this and other recent advances, and we were seldom out of touch by telephone, either with advanced Companies or with Brigade Headquarters. In fact, on the advance into Le Touret, there was so much cover available, on or near the Rue du Bois that a forward Signalling Station, supplied by a South and a North line, was established only a few hundred yards behind the front line, within a few minutes of that line being consolidated, and of these two lines the North line was not a mere ground line, but a poled cable. We owed it to the untiring efforts of the Signal Section, under Lieut. Stephenson, ably backed by Sergt. Templeman, Corpl. Osborne and others, that communications were kept up so well.

The peace that we enjoyed for the rest of the day, was unfortunately not maintained, for on September 5th, the Boche made things unpleasant by shelling the various posts we were holding, which were nothing but isolated shallow trenches with a few corrugated iron shelters covered with earth. One of these, which was used as Battalion Headquarters, got a direct hit with a 4.2 whilst the whole of the Headquarters' staff, except the Medical Officer were in it. The result was disastrous. Every Officer in it was wounded, though "Andy" escaped with nothing worse than a few scratches. Col. Currin got a leg damaged, Martin the Adjutant, and Elly, Intelligence Officer, both got broken legs, and several other wounds. Stephenson and Taylor (Works Officer) were also wounded in the leg, whilst Spinney (Assistant Adjutant) and Salmon (Artillery Liaison Officer), sustained serious head and face wounds. Elly died the following day at the Casualty Clearing Station, at Pernes.

Owing to the continuance of the shelling, Battalion Headquarters moved to Hens Post near Windy Corner, but again were not left alone, as the enemy put over some eight-inch and gas shells in the vicinity. Altogether it was a decidedly unpleasant day, and we were not sorry to hear that the 19th Division were to relieve us the same night. The relieving Battalion, the 9th Cheshires, fortunately for them did not arrive until things had quietened down, and the relief, if somewhat lengthy, was carried out more or less in peace. The lucky ones got a ride from Le Touret on the light railway, but the trains for the rest failed to turn up, and they had to foot it back to Beuvry, where the Battalion was billeted, with Major Andrews in temporary command.



CHAPTER XIV

AUCHEL TO PONTRUET

Sept. 7th, 1918. Sept. 26th, 1918.

We left Beuvry on the morning of Sept. 7th and were taken back on the light railway to Ferfay. On this occasion, much to our surprise, the trains moved off at the scheduled time. From Ferfay it was but a short march to Auchel, another mining village, where we found very good billets, and were welcomed in their usual hospitable way by the French miners and their families. Thanks to a most generous Town Major we got all sorts of little billet comforts, of which he seemed to have an unlimited supply, whilst opposite the Headquarters Mess was a very comfortable little restaurant, bearing the sign, "Cosy Corner," where we found helping to run the show, an old friend known to us in earlier days at Bethune as "Lily."

On the day after our arrival Lieut.-Col. J. F. Dempster, D.S.O., 2nd Manchesters, took over command of the Battalion, Major Andrews resuming the duties of Second-in-Command, and Lieut. C. H. Powell temporarily acting as Adjutant. Changes had also taken place in the Higher Commands in the Division. Brigadier-General John Harington, D.S.O., from the 46th Machine Gun Battalion, had succeeded General Wood in command of the 139th Brigade, and Major-General Thwaites, who had laboured so assiduously to keep the Division up to the highest pitch of perfection in every respect, had gone to England to take up the duties of Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office, and we now had the pleasure of meeting his successor, Major-General G. F. Boyd, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M., who was to command the Division for the rest of the war. He came to see us at Auchel, and we soon realised that under his leadership, given ordinary luck, we could not help doing well. Fresh from the battles of the South, he had much to tell us about the latest forms of attack, particularly those carried out in conjunction with Tanks, and we were not long in finding out that what he could not tell us about the kind of fighting that was going on was not worth knowing. He introduced to us the system of advancing in the early stages of the attack in the "Blob" formation, that is, with Companies on wide frontages, echelonned in depth, with each Platoon in a line of sections in "blobs," or small and somewhat open groups. With this formation there was less likelihood of severe casualties from shelling or machine guns, whilst it was a most simple formation from which extensions could be carried out, and at the same time it allowed the Section Commander to retain control of his men up to the last possible moment. This system we at once set about practising, and later on used it in all the battles in which we took part. Very little training was possible during the few days spent at Auchel owing to the bad weather.

It was, of course, general knowledge that we were shortly to take an active part in the fighting in the South, and therefore no surprise when we received orders to entrain. This was carried out in the early hours of Sept. 12th, at Calonne-Ricouart Station, and was rendered extremely uncomfortable by a torrential downpour, which made it specially difficult to get the transport vehicles up the steep ramps on to the trucks. C Company had to do the loading for the whole Brigade, and were at the station for nearly twenty-four hours, working in shifts. They left by the last train at 12.40 p.m., the main body having left at 3.16 a.m. This was our farewell to a district of which we had got to know practically every inch, and of which we shall always retain most happy recollections. We had been there for seventeen months without a break.

Slowly but surely we wended our way Southwards, until we reached Amiens. At one period the town had been emptied of all civilians, but they were just beginning to come back and the streets were now showing slight signs of life again. A certain amount of damage had been done by shell-fire, and as we moved Eastward from Amiens, signs of the one-time proximity of the front line became more marked. Eventually we came to a stop at Corbie Station, where we detrained during the afternoon, after a journey of about twelve hours. After most welcome and refreshing tea, which we owed to the forethought of Capt. Salter, the Acting Staff-Captain, we marched to billets at La Houssoye, some five miles away, where C Company joined us early the following morning. We were now in the IX Corps, which formed part of General Rawlinson's Fourth Army. We were soon able to make ourselves comfortable, though the village was somewhat battered and contained very few inhabitants. When we moved further forward, it was, from a purely military point of view, a decided advantage to find no civilians at all. All around was a delightfully free rolling country, and we could wander anywhere according to our own sweet will, those lucky enough to have horses getting some lovely gallops across the chalk downs. This area had been too near the front line for the past few months for any work to be carried out on the land, and such crops as there were were now being harvested by soldier labour, mostly Canadian.

The enemy had been driven back from the neighbourhood during August by the Australians, who had had particularly hard fighting about Villers-Bretonneux, not many miles distant from where we were billeted, and the work of clearing the battlefield was already in hand. Gangs of Chinese were employed in the task, but we were not impressed by their industry. Everything had to be carried to dumps by the roadside, and no matter what the burden the only authorised way of carrying it was by putting it on the end of a pole, which the "Chink" carried over his shoulder. It seemed decidedly comical, to say the least, to see a man walk several hundred yards to retrieve a coat, for example, hang it on the pole, and walk several more hundred yards with it to a dump! Nevertheless, this seemed to be the recognised way of working.

Such training as we carried out was mostly in the attack and other operations, such as advanced guards, likely to be required in open warfare. Little was done in the way of bombing, which had had its day. There was a good deal of Lewis gun work, and "field-firing" practice in the shape of Platoon attacks on strong points. Flags to represent Tanks were introduced into the scheme with a view to giving some idea of how to follow up a Tank and take possession of the ground it gained. A good deal of practice in Map Reading and Compass work was carried out by Officers and N.C.O.'s, which proved most useful in the days to come. Several Officers and N.C.O.'s here enjoyed their first aeroplane flight through the kindness of the Officer commanding a Bombing Squadron in the vicinity.

Orders for a move came after little delay, but with unexpected suddenness. We had to break off in the middle of a practice attack on September 18th, to prepare for our departure, and at 9 p.m. on the same day we left La Houssoye and marched to Bonnay, where we embussed for the forward area once more. Transport marched brigaded and was now under Lieut. Toyne, who took charge when Lieut. Tomlinson broke his collar-bone in a jumping competition a little while before at Vaudricourt. Somewhere about midnight the long procession of lorries moved off. The other two Brigades of the Division were being moved by the same means, and there is no doubt that the Auxiliary 'Bus Companies were having a pretty busy time! In the darkness the journey seemed endless. It was too bumpy to allow even a doze, sleepy as most of us felt. The whole area was a desolate ruin, but in the darkness we were, of course, able to see little or nothing of it. For something like 40 miles, the Somme area, through which we were passing, was nothing but an immense wilderness—every village practically in ruins, and hardly sufficient remains in many cases to identify their position. In one case a signboard had been put up to mark the site of the village, and on maps they were usually described as "—— ruins of." Old trenches and barbed wire entanglements existed at various points. Not a scrap of ground was cultivated—all was wild and uncared for. Not a living soul was there except a few odd troops of our own, working mostly on roads or guarding dumps, and French, Italians, Portuguese and "Chinks" working on the railways. A few odd woods and shattered trees were practically the only things standing in this enormous tract of country. Later on we saw all this for ourselves when we used to cross this devastated area going on leave or for trips to Amiens, which a generous staff permitted us to indulge in occasionally. Much of the area had been fought over four times—firstly, when captured by the enemy in the original advance; secondly, when he withdrew to the Hindenburg Line early in 1917 and laid the whole place waste; thirdly, during his offensive of 1918; and, lastly, when he was driven out once and for all by British and other troops just before our arrival.

Eventually, about dawn on September 19th, the long train of lorries came to a halt, and we were dumped on the road about a mile West of a one-time village known as Poeuilly, to which we marched, and where we were told we had to bivouac.

It was a cheerless prospect to be turned loose into a bare field at 4.0 a.m. on a late September morning. Poeuilly, however, was found to contain a certain amount of useful material which very soon found its way to our field, and with the aid of a few "trench shelters," and taking advantage of some trenches which were there, it was not long before we had put up some quite useful protection. Though chilly in the early morning the weather was quite seasonable, and on the whole we did not fare badly. Our Transport arrived late the same day.

The Hindenburg Line lay a few miles in front of us, and some of its outer defences were already in our hands. On the afternoon of September 20th, we left Poeuilly and relieved the 2nd Royal Sussex in Brigade Reserve in trenches and dug-outs about Pontru, with Battalion Headquarters at "Cooker" Quarry, the 5th and 6th Battalions taking over the front line. At this point we were some seven miles North-West of St. Quentin, and two to three miles West of Bellenglise, on the St. Quentin Canal. There was no great excitement during the three days we spent there except that we had rather bad luck with the Transport. As the idea was rather pressed on us that we were now taking part in "moving warfare," some of the horses and Company limbers of bombs and small arm ammunition were taken forward to the edge of a small wood just behind Battalion Headquarters. Unfortunately this wood got shelled and several mules were knocked out, with the result that the ammunition was dumped, and the limbers and rest of the animals were sent back to Poeuilly.

On September 23rd we received orders for certain action to be carried out by us in connection with an attack which was to be launched the next day, when the 46th Division were to carry out a "minor operation" in conjunction with the 1st Division on their right. The Australians had pushed forward considerably on the left, and the line now bent back sharply, where the troops we had relieved had been held up by the village of Pontruet. The attack was planned both to straighten out the line and to get possession of the high ground on the right. The 138th Brigade, who had taken over from the Australians on the left, were ordered to capture the village of Pontruet, and for this purpose detailed the 5th Leicesters. The attack was to be carried out by an enveloping movement from the North, and the village was to be rushed from the East. Our 5th and 6th Battalions were to co-operate by occupying some trenches about Pontruet, and, on the night following, the 8th Battalion was to relieve the 5th Leicesters as far North as the inter-Brigade boundary.

The attack was launched at 5 a.m. on September 24th, and though the 5th Leicesters made most strenuous efforts to attain their objectives, they just failed to achieve the full purpose for which they set out, and at the end of the day Pontruet was not ours. Our 5th Battalion on the right also had some stiff fighting, and suffered several casualties, taking their objective on the high ground South of Pontruet, and capturing about 100 prisoners. Late in the day our orders to relieve the 5th Leicesters were cancelled, and we had to take over from our own 5th Battalion, who were holding the Western edge of Pontruet. This operation was completed just before dawn on the 25th, Battalion Headquarters being in a dug-out in the high ground South of Pontru. Fortunately we were there only two days, for the discomfort was very great, the dug-outs and cellars swarming with flies and vermin, and there was little other protection from the enemy shelling, which was fairly frequent. On September 26th we were relieved on an intensely dark night by the 1st Black Watch and went back to bivouacs just off the Vendelles-Bihecourt Road, put up for us by the Battle Details, who had moved up from Poeuilly. They, together with the Transport and Quar.-Master's stores, had had none too peaceful a time during the last few days. Having moved to Vendelles they were shelled out of it almost at the moment they arrived, but eventually found a quiet resting-place for a brief space at Bernes, where, in addition to ordinary stores, there were piled all the men's packs and spare kit, and numbers of Lewis gun boxes. All moves now were done in light "fighting order" and the Quar.-Master and Quar.-Master-Sergts. had their time fully occupied in thinking how all the spare kit was to be got forward when it was wanted.

During our recent moves we had received a regular influx of new Officers, no fewer than nine having joined between September 3rd and September 26th. They were 2nd Lieuts. G. Newton, John Henry Smith, A. N. Davis, R. N. Barker, T. F. Mitchell, W. J. Winter, R. S. Plant, P. A. Turner, and W. G. Jacques. We had lost 2nd Lieut. Morris, who had gone to the 139th Trench Mortar Battery; and Comp. Sergt.-Major Slater and five N.C.O.'s who were sent to England as Instructors. Slater was succeeded as Comp.-Sergt.-Major of A Company, by Sergt. Attenborough. Our battle casualties at Pontruet amounted to five killed and 24 wounded.

The men were now very fit and the Battalion was on the top of its form. Our chief anxiety was whether after all we were to be in a real good push. We suspected that we might have been brought here to be whittled away in minor trench attacks, and that the opportunity of really showing what stuff the Battalion was made of would never present itself. Our fears were not lessened when we saw how the 5th Leicesters and 5th Sherwood Foresters suffered at Pontruet, and we saw looming ahead what we imagined to be the never-ending luck of the 46th Division. Our fears were ill-founded. Better things were before us and arrived sooner than we expected.



CHAPTER XV

BELLENGLISE

Sept. 26th, 1918. Sept. 29th, 1918.

A great effort was to be made to break the Hindenburg Line. Preliminary orders received on September 26th were to the effect that the 46th Division, as part of a major operation (simultaneous attacks by the British and French taking place at several other points), would at an early date cross the St. Quentin Canal between Bellenglise and Riquerval Bridge, and capture the Hindenburg Line. The general scheme was that the 137th Brigade were to capture the canal and hold the crossings, advancing as far as the "Brown Line" shown on the map, whilst the 139th Brigade on the right and 138th Brigade on the left, were to pass through them and consolidate up to and including the "Green Line." If all went well the 32nd Division were to pass through and make further progress. The 1st Division were to protect our right flank, where the enemy were still occupying a large area of ground which might be decidedly dangerous to us, and in the event of the enemy withdrawing, they were to follow up and, if possible, capture Thorigny and the high ground round about it. On our left the 30th American Division, attached to the Australian Corps, were to seize the Bellicourt Tunnel (where the canal ran underground) and continue the attack in that direction. Tanks were to cross the canal by passing over the tunnel and come down to operate with the 138th and 139th Brigades and help them to reach their objectives.

In order to improve our position the 138th Brigade, who were holding the line running along the high ground just East of "Victoria Cross Roads," carried out an attack on September 27th against the German trenches on the high ground North-East of "Chopper Ravine." This was successful and the trenches were handed over to the 137th Brigade. Unfortunately, the following morning the enemy delivered a heavy counter-attack against the Staffords, and recovered so much ground that at night the latter had to withdraw from the portions still held and come back to our original line. This set-back, however, had no ill result.

Our preparations had to be made on the assumption that the attack would take place on the early morning of Sunday, September 29th, as it did.

From the line held by the Division it was possible to get a good view of the canal and the ground beyond for some distance, and such reconnaissance as could be carried out in the time at our disposal was made by observation from this line.



Running diagonally across the front, through No Man's Land, down the slope to the Riquerval Bridge, on the left, was a narrow road known as "Watling Street." Immediately in front of our trenches was the ridge which we had had to evacuate, and from there the land again sloped down to the canal. Immediately the other side of the canal was the village of Bellenglise, about three-quarters-of-a-mile from our present front line, but looking much closer. The canal ran in a cutting, into which it was not possible to see, but from descriptions obtained from various sources it appeared that it had steep banks twelve to eighteen yards deep, and we were told that where there was water we might expect it to be seven to eight feet deep. As a matter of fact the canal in some parts was quite dry, and in other parts the water was held up by big dams of concrete. When we did properly see it, it appeared to be more or less derelict. On the right towards Bellenglise it was mostly dry. Rising from the canal on the other side was a fairly gradual, but none the less decided, slope for some distance, fortified with lines of trenches, barbed wire and concrete machine gun emplacements, apparently a most unpromising position to attack—indeed, we thought it impregnable, and no doubt the Boche did so, too. It was an ideal spot for concealed dug-outs all along the canal banks. Many were found there, and Bellenglise itself contained a wonderfully constructed tunnel, estimated to be capable of holding at least a thousand men.

The problem of dealing with any water that might be found in the canal was a difficult but important one, as every preparation had to be made for getting across on the assumption that all the bridges would be destroyed. Accordingly the 137th Brigade were equipped with a number of collapsible boats and rafts, also mats for getting across any soft mud they might encounter, whilst almost at the last moment, numbers of lifebelts were sent up for their use, taken from the leave boats.

As it was doubtless realised that this great stronghold would require pounding almost to atoms, arrangements were made for getting together what must have been the largest array of guns that ever was collected, at any rate in such a short space of time. Battery after battery of every known calibre took up positions in one or other of the ravines and valleys behind the line. Indeed, there seemed no room for them all and many of them were practically in the open.

Behind the line an immense amount of railway and road work was being carried out in order to maintain supplies. Probably the most interesting piece of work was the relaying of the railway line from Roizel to Vermand, preparatory to its being continued into St. Quentin as soon as the latter should be liberated. We enjoyed watching the Canadian Engineers at work rebuilding bridges and bringing up and relaying fresh sleepers and metals, all the old ones having been removed by the enemy for several miles. The rapid reconstruction of the line was of vital importance, as it would form the main source of transport for all our supplies.

On the night of September 27/28th, we moved from bivouacs near Vendelles, and marched to our preliminary assembly position in some trenches near "Red Wood," about half-a-mile North-West of that well-known landmark "The Tumulus," a high chalk mound from which an excellent view could be obtained, but where it was not wise to pause to admire the scenery. Battalion Headquarters was in a dug-out at "Hudson's Post," between Red Wood and the "Twin Craters." This move was carried out without casualty, but the very dark night, coupled with a certain amount of gas shelling, and the absence of good guiding marks, made going somewhat difficult. A section from the 139th Trench Mortar Battery, which was to be attached to us for the battle, joined us just before the move.

The attack was to be carried out under a creeping barrage, and the objective allotted to us was the "Yellow Line" East of Bellenglise. The frontage allotted to the Battalion was about 1,200 yards, and the advance in its final stages was to be carried out with two Companies in the front line and two in support. In each case there were to be three Platoons leading, with one in support, each front Platoon thus having a frontage of about 200 yards. The distance between front and support Companies was to be 200 to 250 yards. The Artillery barrage was to move at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes, making long pauses after each objective had been gained in order to allow time for the rear troops to continue the advance. A machine gun barrage also was to be fired during the opening stages of the attack, and for this purpose our Divisional Battalion was strengthened by the addition of the 2nd Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion and the 100th Machine Gun Battalion. By a happy coincidence some South Notts. Yeomanry were included amongst these Machine Gunners. The Royal Engineers and Monmouth Pioneers, detailed to put emergency bridges on cork piers across the canal for foot traffic and artillery, were to follow in rear of the 137th Brigade, and immediately in front of us. Second Lieut. Davis with ten men was to keep touch with the last Battalion of the 137th Brigade, whilst 2nd Lieut. Plant was detailed to act as Liaison Officer with the 137th Brigade Headquarters. Second Lieut. Bradish was to do similar duty with the 139th Brigade, and 2nd Lieut. Winter with the 6th Battalion, who were to follow immediately behind us, the 5th Battalion bringing up the rear. Guides from each Company were detailed to follow the 137th Brigade and direct their Companies to the canal crossings. Flags were to be carried to mark Battalion and Company Headquarters. In addition to red flares for notifying the position of the advanced troops to our 'contact aeroplanes,' a number of tin discs were issued, which were to be waved by the men carrying them so as to catch the eye of the Observers. "Success Signals"—rifle grenades bursting into "white over white over white"—were to be fired by the leading Companies as soon as they reached their objective. Pack transport was arranged in readiness for taking forward ammunition, water and other supplies, if required, as soon as it was possible to get them across the canal.