"There are such," I replied.

It had the effect of making him look at me in a most startled manner.

"How do you know that? On what grounds do you make that assertion?" His agitation was ill-concealed.

"I have no specific proof," I replied—(which I had)—"but from information that has been gained, from plans that have been secured—plans like those of your battleships Queen Mary and Ajax—it is obvious that these things have been done with the cooperation of high officials of your country."

He pressed me for further details, but I withheld them. I could have told him a pretty story about the plans of the Queen Mary and Ajax. He fell to studying a rather voluminous report; then he began anew with his innuendoes. I guessed what was coming. Although his speech was more prolonged than I shall now present it, this is the gist of what he asked:

"Were you ever present at conferences attended by high officials? Were you, for instance, at the Schlangenbad meeting? Have you any data? Any documentary evidence of having been there?"

I was not a bit startled. I had guessed it would be that. His very question showed that it was useless for me to deny that I had been at the Black Forest conference. Possibly Churchill, recalling my meeting him during the Boer War, had dropped a word about this coincidence to his Lordship. Naturally I told him I possessed no such data. Still I did not like the trend of his talk. I began to suspect that this British Minister was doing one of two things. Either he did not know everything about the Black Forest meeting—(not at all improbable with the conditions existing in England's cabinet at that time)—or else he wanted to learn if I knew the tenor of that conference. In either ease it was one of those occasions where I deemed it wise to keep my own counsel.

After many searching questions upon the French system and her army and navy, he began to try to lead me to make comparisons between their strength and England's, these being based upon my personal observations. This, and the whole trend of his thought, led me to suspect that Sir Edward Grey was in noways sure in his own mind or favorable to the German-English alliance. With men like his Lordship, personal antipathy plays a powerful part in such matters.

He then began to try to make me divulge the contents of any personal dispatches I had carried for the German Emperor.

"Do you know," he asked abruptly, "if the German Emperor ever communicates with Viscount Haldane?"

"Yes, sir."

He leaned forward eagerly.

"How and under what circumstances?"

"Why, I thought it common knowledge that they often correspond. They are good friends."

"Not that. I mean direct secret communications between them, concerning affairs of the state."

I denied any knowledge of this, although I knew it to be so.

He began his fishing around again and his hints found me very stupid.

My unsatisfactory answers seemed to displease Sir Edward Grey, for with true British discourtesy he abruptly began working at something on his desk and without even saying good day, let a commissaire bow me out.

A few days later I received definite instructions from Captain Robinson. I was to go on my first mission in the interests of the British Secret Service and subsequently another mission brought me to New York, where I resigned from service permanently.

Chapter XI. To New York for England

It was in December, 1912, that I again felt the thrill of the old game as I moved about London under the plausible name of "Trenton Snell," engaged in guarding or obtaining state secrets, but this time for a new master. English secret agents are allowed liberal expense money and my work in London and other points in the British Isles was not so arduous as to prevent my taking frequent holidays. I judged that Downing Street was holding me for something big should the occasion arise. In London, my chief work for a time was counteracting the machinations and influences of German agents, forever infesting the British capital. Many a neat little plan inspired by the gentlemen of the Wilhelmstrasse went wrong during those next few weeks and back in Berlin they began to think that their spies had lost their cunning.

During this period I was under the direct orders of Captain Robinson, who, you will recall, had been the go-between for Downing Street in closing the bargain for my release from Barlinney Prison. Robinson, an ex-captain of the Hussars, was well up in subterranean affairs and to him Sir Edward Grey was no stranger.

Along in January there came to the ear of Downing Street rumors of a possible meeting between German and Japanese envoys. Moreover, the meeting ground was to be the United States. It may surprise Americans to learn that of late years their country has become a favorite meeting place for European diplomats, secret and otherwise. These men invariably sail from Europe, remarking something about taking a trip to the Rockies or visiting some noted fishing streams. They may be going into Canada or the Western States for the shooting; and when these gentlemen leave Europe on these little "vacations" they are generally shadowed, or attempts are made to shadow them. In the course of a few days after the English foreign office learned of the supposed meeting of German and Japanese agents to be held in America, I received official instructions. They were sharp and very much to the point. I was to find out what the meeting in the United States was about, and, if possible, to learn the nature of the diplomatic proposals likely to be considered by Japan and Germany. England herself having an alliance pending with Germany, was decidedly wary of this new diplomatic conversation with the yellow empire of the Pacific. What was in the wind? Why was Germany conniving secretly with Japan? What effect would it have on the English-Austrian-German alliance secretly discussed in the Taunus Hills only the autumn before. Obviously the mission was an important one.

The first step was to locate one of the German envoys. To do this I had to cross to the Continent, a dangerous proceeding, at best, for there were abundant possibilities of recognition. Especially was it sticking one's head in the mouth of danger to be seen in Germany. Nevertheless to Germany I had to go to locate my man. It must be understood that the big missions of Secret Service are accomplished by many coöperating agencies. True, Great Britain had been rather slow in perfecting a continental system of espionage, but by 1913 the machinery was operating well. Downing Street had special lines of intelligence from all the European capitals. I lost no time in making use of the resources of these lesser agents, in fact a system of spying on spies, and soon had information at my disposal that led me to go to Berlin.

It was in Berlin that I learned that a man known as Carl Schmidt would be the messenger for the Wilhelmstrasse, bearing the instructions too important to be trusted to transatlantic cable cipher. Exercising infinite care and tremendous patience—for should I be recognized in Berlin, the German Foreign Office would have been thrown into consternation: "What's this? A man we believed safely looking through the bars of an English prison is at large in our own capital. Hm"—completely effacing myself so far as possible, I managed to keep track of the whereabouts of Carl Schmidt.

It was drawing near to February 4, the sailing day of the Kaiser Wilhelm II, and I kept the quarry in sight night and day. It was with the most satisfied of smiles therefore that I ascertained the purchase of railroad accommodations by Carl Schmidt for Bremen, the sailing port of the big North German Lloyd liner. Taking care to secure a seat in the same compartment with Herr Schmidt, I watched him all the way from Berlin to Bremen. Now, whenever I have carried a document of any description while traveling for any length of time, I have always let my hand wander toward its hiding place to assure myself that it was still there. Sometimes I fished in my pockets for a match, or used any pretext to locate the paper without betraying myself. There is not a human being who will not give some little sign of concern, perhaps only once an hour, but often enough to betray himself to the trained observer. Accordingly I set myself to watch Carl Schmidt's hands. Not for a minute did I relax my vigilance, yet not once on the way to Bremen did the German envoy betray himself by an apparent motion. Whereupon I became positive that Herr Schmidt had not the document upon his person. Where then was it?

It was an easy matter at the steamship offices to find out the number of Schmidt's stateroom. He had engaged room 48 on the first promenade deck. I immediately asked for the rooms on the other side, and by a judicious use of my favorite "palm oil" I secured them. It was imperative now to board the steamer and keeping out of sight until she left port. I had made up my mind to try and obtain the document between Bremen and Cherbourg. This being successful I should be able to leave the ship at the latter port and return at once to London.

From the moment the big North German Lloyd liner steamed out of port, I kept a close watch on Schmidt, still to no purpose. There was only one moment day or night, when the messenger left his dispatch box unguarded and when I finally got at it, I found no document. Obviously the dispatch box was a blind. Herr Schmidt was not guilty of a single piece of carelessness that would betray the hiding place of the dossier. All this had to be done between Bremen and Cherbourg, and when the liner pulled into the French harbor nothing had been accomplished. It was a question of remaining on board and solving the problem before reaching New York.

Now it was risky business to attempt anything for the next few days for I was traveling on a ship of a line that was subsidized by the German government. Once Herr Schmidt realized that there was anything in the wind, it would mean a check to my activities. Schmidt could send a wireless message to the Wilhelmstrasse, and back would be flashed a message to the captain of the Kaiser Wilhelm II authorizing any action Schmidt deemed advisable. Thus could he easily put me under custody on some trumped-up charge. Still, there was no risk involved in watching Schmidt to locate a possible confederate who was carrying the dossier. I watched him unceasingly but confederates there were none. Only one play remained and to make it I must wait patiently until the ship was almost at its dock in New York. Then Herr Schmidt could use the wireless and command the captain's assistance to his heart's content. It would be too late.

During the few days immediately following, I kept my activities well concealed. In fact, I made it my business to avoid Schmidt. My method of handling the situation did not necessitate my striking up an acquaintance with the man. On the contrary to disarm him of all possible suspicions I shunned him. I even contrived not to sit at Herr Schmidt's table in the dining salon. Meanwhile, Robinson, back in Downing Street, kept his hands on the situation, sending me two wireless messages on board the steamer.

All dispatches sent to "Buzzing" London, find their way to Downing Street. It was very probable that being in the diplomatic service, Herr Schmidt would know this term "Buzzing." I thought it unwise to risk a reply. So I kept in the dark waiting for my chance. During the voyage nothing had occurred to arouse the suspicions of Herr Schmidt and he began to relax his vigilance after the ship was four days out. But I was careful not to take the slightest advantage of his ease at this point. I would wait until the ship was almost in port; then make my play.

To prepare for this I had days ago begun to cultivate the acquaintance of one of the baggage men. This man at once attracted me by his shifty eyes and unhealthy red complexion. It hag often been a Secret Service precept with me: "Give me a hard drinker or a man who is fast and I'll land him nine times out of ten." Well, the baggage master was no exception. I decided to ply him with liquor to make his tongue run away. I made it my business to see that this particular baggage man was in an incompetent state afternoon and night. One night as he was chin-chucking a stewardess with whom he was infatuated, this red-faced gentleman said:

"Well, Doctor, we're going to get married, the little lady and I. We're going to set up in business. Do you know of any small hotel that we could bug cheap?"

At this I was all attention; I had been waiting for some lead of this sort.

"Ho, friend," I said; "ready to buy a hotel eh? There must be plenty of gold in your job."

The lout winked heavily.

"Sure," he said. "Just as we are about to reach port we ask everybody on board to prepare for us a statement of the things they have to declare. We give it to the customs officers when they come on board in the Lower Bay of New York. Well, some of those fancy rich people always want to do a bit of smuggling and don't declare lots of things. I have known that for years. What do I do?" Becoming boastful, he patted the stewardess on the shoulder, at which she glanced at me a little frightened. She seemed to realize that her future spouse was talking too much. She tried to remonstrate with him but he was too full of his theme and good spirits.

"Nonsense, my girl; I will tell my friend. Aren't we all drinking together?"

Turning once more to me he said:

"What do I do, Doctor. Well, first I look over the lot of declarations. Then I pick out two or three that look pretty good. I make a list of the things they claim to have in their trunks. Then I get at their baggage and give it a smash, accidentally of course—things are apt to be broken in the hold you know, the boat pitching, carelessness by the porters and all that. So the luggage of my fancy folks is broken open. We look it over. If my lady has held out anything from her declaration, out of the trunk that comes and into my private quarters."

I winked knowingly as if to praise his cleverness.

"We reach the bay; the customs officers come on board. We give them all the declarations. The fancy folks are standing round their baggage waiting for the customs man to get through. Suddenly one of them cries:

"'Oh, my sealskin coat is gone!'

"I step up and politely say:

"'But you must be mistaken. Madame said nothing about a sealskin coat on her declaration so she could not have had one.'

"Ha! Ha! The customs man hears this so she can say nothing. Finish! Ah yes, your old friend baggage man knows a thing or two."

Needless to say this was all grist to my mill. It was just what I wanted. When the ship was a day from New York, I said to the rascal:

"My friend, I want to look at the luggage of Carl Schmidt for ten minutes. It is check number 31694 and is a kiste."

The baggage man was very sorry but that could not be done. If it were found out he would lose his position.

"Either I get at that kiste," I said, "or up you go."

The baggage man attempted to bluster.

"No heroics now, my friend," I smiled. "I know enough about you and your little ingenious piece of graft to tell a pretty story at the North German Lloyd offices in New York. Now do I get a look at Herr Schmidt's kiste?"

With a growl the baggage man yielded, whereupon I gave him $75 to bind the bargain and handed the stewardess $25 so as to assure her support. Still, it would not do to meddle with the chest until the liner was steaming into port, for were Schmidt to discover that his luggage had been tampered with and the dispatch abstracted, since by the process of elimination I concluded it must be there, the alarm would go throughout the ship and every passenger would be searched. Remember this was a German reserve ship.

The chance came after the Kaiser Wilhelm II had steamed past Sandy Hook and was moving up the Lower Bay of New York. With his destination in sight, with no signs in any way suspicious during the trip over, Herr Schmidt had become very easy in mind. With many of the other passengers be went forward and from the deck watched the looming horizon of New York's skyscrapers. A most interesting sight the skyline, something to engross your attention. I was interested in something else.

I was interested in the luggage that was being prepared for the customs officers. On a lower deck the kiste of Carl Schmidt had been conveniently set apart from the other trunks and boxes and the German agent himself was waiting for the customs man to pass upon it. This done, Schmidt was guilty of an unwarrantable piece of carelessness. He tipped the baggage master and left him to lock up the kiste while he went up on the promenade deck to enjoy the view. This did not surprise me, for I had been expecting some such blunder to make my way easier. I had conjectured as nothing had occurred during the entire voyage to excite Schmidt's suspicions that he would be careless as his destination was neared.

Accordingly, when I saw him leave his luggage to the mercies of the baggage man, I stepped forward. Quite unconcernedly in view of the other passengers who were still standing waiting their turn, acting entirely as if it were my own, I opened the unlocked kiste and rummaging among its contents soon brought to light a plain, large envelope sealed with wax. Breaking the seal I took out the only paper it contained, glanced at it, smiled to myself and went to work—swift work, for at any moment Schmidt might return.

If I had not made my plans long ahead, the simple taking of the document would only have added to the problem. Understand, I did not want to steal the document, merely its contents. Now, in the brief minutes that I had beside the luggage, it was impossible to memorize all the contents of the document. So I judged would be the case and I had come prepared.

Under my arm was a popular novel and between the pages of this lay a sheet of special lotion paper, chemically treated in a way known only to the German Secret Service and capable of taking a quick clean print of anything written in pencil or ink. As I lifted the dossier from the kiste I noticed that it was embossed on a greenish white paper, not unlike a bank of England note in color. It was written in German and signed with a foreign office cipher, the letters W and B intertwined. Following this was the numeral 24, the Wilhelmstrasse serial number of the document.

Taking a chance that Herr Schmidt would be fascinated just a minute longer by the magic skyline of New York, I slipped the dossier against the special lotion paper and took an accurate print by sitting on it for two minutes. I then replaced the document in the dispatch envelope and being sure to leave everything appearing as it was, even to fixing the broken seal as best I could, lest by chance Herr Schmidt should return and glance at his kiste.

It was a case now of getting safely off the ship and reaching the nearest cable office for had Schmidt suspected anything, the boat would never have docked until everybody on board had been searched. There was small danger of this, however, for nothing had occurred to alarm Herr Schmidt. The lotion paper used by the German Secret Service has been perfected to such an extent that when taking the print it does not leave any signs on the original. Accordingly, there would likely not have been a clew—only on close scrutiny would it be seen that the seal had been tampered with—even had Schmidt examined his kiste again before landing.

My luggage passed, I made my way to the nearest cable office outside the zone of the steamship offices. At Fourteenth Street and Broadway I entered a Western Union office and wrote out this message to "Buzzing" London. A copy of this being herewith reproduced:

February 12, 1913. Buzzing, London.

Obtained sample. Letter most important. Not safe writing. Will take to-morrow night's steamer Queenstown. Not sufficient fare. Wire twenty-five pounds W. Union, Broadway 14th.

Trenton Snell.

It may be of interest to note that at the time of my announcing my presence in this country through the medium of the New York American that a copy of this dispatch was secured from the cable company; also that Hearst reporters identided me at the cable office as "Trenton Snell."

When I presented myself at the Fourteenth Street office the next day I received this message:

London, Eng., February 13, 1913.

Trenton Snell, W. U. 14 Bway.

Cable some details if possible, come London, can't meet you Queenstown.

Robinson.

(The above message accompanies Cable remittance this date.)

The British Foreign Office replying to my request for further funds had cabled the twenty-five pounds which less exchange came to $121.75. At the Western Union office at Fourteenth Street I was paid cheek number 962 to the order of Trenton Snell from "Rob Robinson" London. Now being on alien territory, I refrained from sending a copy of the stolen dispatch by cable. There would be no aid of secrecy from the cable company. I had planned to enclose the copy by registered mail; sending it to Box 356, G. P. O., London, which was the address of the department of the Foreign Office for which I worked, but Robinson demanded immediate details. Accordingly I sent back this wire:

Buzzing, London.

Right. Will wire from Canada. British Territory.

Trenton Snell

That was imperative, for only in Canada could I secure a guarantee of secrecy for so important a message as that which I would send. Before cabling the details and mailing the original, I made a copy of the document. It was not worded in the official diplomatic form. Rather it appeared to be a note of memoranda and instruction that was to guide the German envoys in their meeting with the Japanese—which meeting was subsequently held at the Hotel Astor, in New York City, and to which meeting went the German envoys, instructed by the document which Herr Schmidt thought he delivered so secretly and trustworthily. This is it; word for word, as it was copied from the print taken in the Herr Schmidt's stateroom:

Germany sanctions and will not obstruct Japan in any colonization intention Japan entertained as regards the Far East, and would not obstruct the acquiring of coaling stations in the South Seas other than New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago. Germany would not prevent the acquisition of Germany vessels by Japan providing such vessels were not auxiliary cruisers of the Imperial German Navy.

Germany wishes it understood that in the event of a conflict between Japan and another nation, Germany will maintain a strict neutrality in any event not affecting Germany itself. Germany expresses a higher regard for the Japanese nation and desires closer contact with Japan.

This document, as has been stated, was initialed with the letters W and R, which is sometimes the way the Kaiser O. K.'s any diplomatic document. In any event it had a regular serial number; in this instance number twenty-four of the German Foreign Office.

Of course the acquisition of this document by Great Britain relieved the minds of the English statesman. There was not as they had feared a possible menace in understanding between Germany and Japan. It was simply an agreement by Germany not to intervene in any colonization scheme of the Japanese in the islands of the Pacific. In return for this it was understood that Japan was to do even more thoroughly what she has done in the past. In other words, she must go on playing the rôle of bogieman for the United States. A word about this may not be out of place.

Germany, that is official Germany, is rather friendly toward the United States. Japan, the "yellow peril" is a great war dirigible that is inflated with war scares and hysteria. This aims to keep the United States preoccupied on their Western coastline, so they will not have any desire to meddle with certain plans that may eventuate in Europe within the next few years. The Japanese question is fostered by Europe to keep America's hands full in the event of the coming European war. It is all bluff and occasionally Japan must be rewarded for keeping up the bluff. In this instance Germany permitted Japan to colonize and permitted her to buy all the German ships she wanted with the exception of those big transatlantic liners that are auxiliary cruisers of the German navy, ships which in time of war may be transformed at short notice into good fighting machines. Let me emphasize with all due knowledge of the alarmist's fears that United States need never fear the "Yellow Peril" as long as she does not antagonize the dominant powers of Europe.

Chapter XII. "The German War Machine"

The numerical strength, disposition and efficiency of the German army are more or less well known. The brain and all prevailing power controlling its fighting force of four and half a million men—or taking the Triple Alliance into consideration—the forces of which would in the event of war be controlled from Berlin—a force in round numbers of 9,000,000 men is, however, not known. Here for the first time is published an account of the inside workings of the German War Machine as far as is possible for any one man to give. Through my intimate connections with the German and other Secret Service systems; through constant contact with prominent army and navy officers, I had special facilities of which I availed myself to the full, to gain the inside knowledge which I here commit to paper.

The most efficient and elaborate system ever devised by the ingenuity of man, used not only for war and destruction but as an intelligence clearing house for the whole of the Empire, is the German War Machine. Conceived by General Stein in the days of the Napoleonic wars, added to and elaborated by successive administrations, solely under the control of the ruling house; its efficiency, perfect and smooth working is due to the total absence of political machinations or preferences. Brains, ability, and thorough scientific knowledge are the only passports for entrance in the Grosser General Stab, the General Staff of the German Empire. You will find blooded young officers and gray-haired generals past active efficiency, experts ranking from an ordinary mechanic to the highest engineering expert, all working harmoniously together with one end in view, the acme of efficiency. Controlled and directed by the War Lord in person through the Chef des Grossen General Stabs, in my time General Field Marshal von Heeringen, this immense machine, the pulsing brain of a fighting force of four and half a millions of men, is composed of from 180 to 200 officials.

At the Peace of Tilsit, after the crushing defeat of the Prussian armies at Prussian Eylau and Friedland, Bonaparte had Prussia and the whole of Central Europe at his mercy. Contrary to the advice of his generals, especially the succinct advice of his often unheeded mentor Talleyrand, to completely disintegrate Prussia, Napoleon through his fondness for pretty women let himself be tricked by Louise of Prussia. The interesting historical story of this incident may be apropos here, showing how the world's history can be changed through a kiss. At the Peace Conference in Tilsit, Napoleon, on the verge of disintegrating Prussia, met the beautiful Queen Louise of Prussia. Through her pleadings and the imprint of Napoleon's kiss on her classic arm Bonaparte granted Prussia the right to maintain a standing army of 12,000 men. That in itself did not mean much but it gave able and shrewd Prussian patriots the opportunity to circumvent and hoodwink Bonaparte's policy.

Prussia has always been fortunate in producing able men at the most needed moments. A man arose with a gift for military organization. He had every province, district, town, and village in Prussia carefully scheduled and the able-bodied men thereof put on record. He selected the 12,000 men permitted Prussia under the Napoleonic decree and drilled them. No sooner were those men drilled than they were dismissed and another 12,000 called in. From this point dates modern conscription—the father of which was General Stein—and this also inaugurated the birth of the War Machine. In the three years Prussia had 180,000 well-drilled men and 120,000 reserves, quite a different proposition from the 12,000 men Napoleon thought he had to face on his retreat from Moscow, and which played a decisive factor in the overthrow of the dictator of Europe.

Through the wars of 1864 and 1866 to 1870, the Franco-Prussian War, the War Machine of Prussia was merged into that of the German Empire and is a record of increasing efforts, entailing unbelievable hard work and a compilation of the minutest details. The modern system of organization, especially the mobilization schedules, are Helmuth von Moltke's, the "Grosse Schweiger," the Great Silent, the strategist of the 1871 campaign.

It is curious that there is a great similarity between the late Moltke and Heeringen. They have the same aquiline features, tall, thin, dried-up body, the same taciturn disposition, even to their hobbies—Moltke being an incessant chess player, Heeringen using every one of his spare moments to play with lead soldiers. He is reputed to have an army of 30,000 lead soldiers with which he plays the moment he opens his eyes—much in the same manner as Moltke, who used to request his chess-board the first thing in the morning. In military circles Heeringen is looked upon with the same respect and accredited with quite as much strategical knowledge as Moltke was. It is a significant fact, that, whenever there is any tension in Europe, especially between Germany and France, General von Heeringen or his comrade in arms, General von Thulsen Haeseler—also a great strategist and iron disciplinarian, immediately takes command of Metz, the most important base and military post in the Emperor's domain.

There is no man alive who knows one-half as much about the strategical position of Metz and the surrounding country as General von Heeringen. Often on stormy, bitter cold winter nights, sentries on outposts stationed and guarding the approaches of Metz are startled to find a gaunt, limping figure, covered in a gray army greatcoat with no distinguishing marks, stalking along. Accompanied by orderlies carrying camp stools and table; night glasses and electric torches, halting repeatedly, hidden men taking down in writing the short, croaking sentences escaping between the thin compressed lips, the "Geist of Metz" prowls round measuring every foot of ground fifty miles east, west, north, and south of his beloved Metz. The steel tipped arrow ever pointing at the heart of France is safe in the hands of such guardians.

The visible head of this vast organization is called Der Grosse General Stab with headquarters in Berlin. Each army corps has a "kleine General Stab" who sends its most able officers to Berlin. These officers in conjunction with the most able scientists, engineers and architects the Empire can produce, compose the Great General Staff. The virtual head is the German Emperor. The actual executive is called "Chef des Grossen General Stabs."

There is a small, dingy, unpretentious room in the General Staff Gebaude where at moments of stress and tension or international complications, assemble five men. His Majesty, at the head of the table; to the right the Chef of Grossen General Stab; to the left his Minister of War; then the Minister of Railways, and the Chief of Admiral Stab. You will notice the total absence of the Ministers of Finance and Diplomacy. When those five men meet the influence of diplomatic and financial affairs has ceased. They are there to act. The scratching of the Emperor's pen in that room means war, the setting in motion of a fighting force of 5,000,000 men.

Here is another instance:

When the feeling and stress over the Moroccan question was at its height General von Heeringen on leaving his quarters for his usual drive in the Thiergarten was eagerly questioned by a score of officers, awaiting his exit.

"Excellency! Geht's los?" ("Do we begin?")

Grimly smiling, returning their salutes and without pause, limping to his waiting carriage came his answer:

"Sieben Buchstaben, meine Herren!" ("Seven letters, gentlemen!")

In Germany military parlance this means the Emperor's signature, Wilhelm II, to the mobilization orders.

In order to give the reader a fairly correct view of this mighty organization, I have to explain each group separately. The whole system rests on the question of mobilization, meaning the ability to arm, transport, clothe. and feed a fighting force of four and one-half million men, in the shortest possible time on any given point in either eastern or western Europe. For let it be clearly understood that the main point of the training of the German armies is the readiness to launch the entire fighting force like a thunderbolt on any given point of the compass. Germany knows through past experience the advisability and necessity of conducting war in an enemy's country. The German army is built for aggression. There are four main groups:

1. Organization.

2. Transportation.

3. Victualization.

4. Intelligence.

Each of these groups is, of course, subdivided into numerous branches which we shall go into under each individual head.

ORGANIZATION

First comes organization. The German army is composed of three distinct parts: the standing army, the reserves, and Landwehr.

The standing arm comprises 790,000 officers and men. This body of men is ready at an instant. It is the reserves who need an elaborate system of mobilization. The reserves are divided into two classes, first and second reserves. So is the Landwehr, having two levies—the first and second Aufgebot. Every able-bodied man on reaching the age of twenty-one can be called upon to serve the colors. One in five only is taken, as there is more material than the country needs—the fifth being selected for one of five branches: infantry, cavalry, artillery, Genie corps, or the navy. The time of service in the infantry is two years; in the cavalry three, in the artillery three, in the Genie corps two, and in the navy three. Well-conducted men get from two to four months of their time. This is by no means a charity on the part of the authorities, but a well-thrashed and deep-laid scheme to circumvent the Reichstag as it gives the Emperor another 75,000 men. A certain class of men passing an examination called Einjahriges Zeugniss or possessing a diploma called Abiturienten Examen (the equivalent of a B. A.) serve only one year in each branch. This class provides most of the reserve officers. The active officers, usually the scions of an aristocratic house or the sons of the old military or feudal families in Germany, are mostly educated in one of the state Kadetten-Anstalten, military academies, of which Gross-Lichterfelde bei Berlin is the most famous. The real backbone and stiffening of the German army and navy is the noncommissioned officers recruited from the rank and file. In fact, this body of men is the mainstay of the thrones in the German Empire, especially of Prussia. These men, after about twelve years of service in an army where discipline, obedience, and efficiency are the first and last word, are then drafted into all the minor administrative officers of the state, such as minor railway, post, excise, municipal, and police. The reader will see the significance of this when it is pointed out that not only the Empire but the War Machine has these well-trained men at its beck and call. The same thing applies to the drafting of officers to hold the highest administrative positions in the state.

There are twenty-five army corps all placed in strategical position. The strongest is in Alsace-Lorraine and along the Rhine; the second in importance garrisoning the Prussian-Russian border. The whole country is subdivided into Bezirks commandos (districts posts) whose business is to have on record not only every able-bodied man—reservists—but every motor, horse, and vehicle available; also food and coal supply—in fact, everything likely to be wanted or useful to the army. Every German reservist, or otherwise, knows the reporting place of his district and has to report there when notified within twenty-four hours. The penalties for noncompliance are high even in peace times. In the event of war or martial law they are absolutely stringent. The commandos are so placed that they could forward their drafts of men and material to their provincial concentration points at the quickest possible notice. These provincial concentration points, being railway centers, are so located that the masses of men and materials pouring in from all sides can be handled and sent in the wanted and needed direction without any congestion. How this is done I shall explain when I come to transportation. In each of those district commandos are depots, Montirungs-Kammern (arsenals), where a full equipment for each individual on the roll is kept. The marvelous quickness with which a civilian is transferred into a fully equipped military unit must be seen to be believed, and is only made possible through systematic training and constant maneuvers. These maneuvers are costly, but have long been recognized in German military circles as essential in training the units and familiarizing the commanders with the handling of enormous masses of men. In the last Kaiser maneuvers over half a million men were concentrated and massed; in fact, shuttlecocked from one end of the Empire to the other without a hitch.

The control of the army in peace or in war lies with the Emperor. He is the sole arbiter and head. No political or social body of men has any control in army matters. No political jealousies would be permitted. Obedience and efficiency are demanded. Mutual jealousies and political tricks such as we have seen in the Russian campaign in the East and lately in France are impossible in the German system, for the Emperor would break instantly, in fact has done so, any general guilty of even the faintest indication of such an offense. And there is no appeal to a Congress, a Chamber of Deputies, or political organ against the Emperor's decision.

Last but not least, under the heading of the organization comes the financial aspect. Out of the five milliards of francs, the war indemnity paid by France to Germany in 1871, 200,000,000 marks in gold coin, mostly French, were put away as the nucleus of a ready war chest. In a little medieval-looking watch tower, the Julius Thurm near Spandau, lies this ever-increasing driving force of the mightiest war engine the world has ever seen. Ever increasing, for quietly and unobtrusively 6,000,000 marks in newly minted gold coins are taken year by year and added to the store. On the first of October each year since 1871, three ammunition wagons full of bright and glittering twenty-mark pieces clatter over the drawbridge and these pieces are stored away in the steel-plate subterranean chambers of the Julius Thurm, ready at an instant's notice to furnish the sinews to the man wielding this force. This is a tremendous power in itself, for there are now close to 500,000,000 marks ($120,000,000) in minted gold coinage in storage there. This provides the necessary funds for the German army for ten calendar months. The authorities have no necessity to ask the country, warring politicians—in this instance the Reichstag—for money to start a campaign. They have got it ready to hand. Once war is declared and started, if needed they'll get the rest.

This money is under the sole control of military authorities. It has often been declared a myth. I know it to be a fact. Notwithstanding the financial straits Germany has gone through at times or may go through, this money will never be touched. It is there for one purpose only and that purpose is war. Needless to say, it is amply guarded. Triple posts in this garrison town, devices to flood instantly the whole under fifteen feet of water from the river Havel, are but items in the system of protection. Twice a year the Emperor in person, or his heir apparent, personally inspects his war chest. Mechanical-balanced devices are employed to check the correct weight. It is a marvelously simple mechanism by means of which in less than two hours the whole of this vast hoard of gold can be accurately checked and the absence of a single gold piece detected.

TRANSPORTATION

One of the most important parts of the organization is the question of transportation. Hannibal's campaigns against Cæsar and Napoleon's central European wars owed their success in a great measure, if not wholly, to their quickness of motion. This applies about tenfold in modern warfare. In actual armament the leading powers in Europe are practically on a par. The personnel, as regards personal courage, stamina, elan, or whatever you wish to call it, is fairly equal also. There is little difference in the individual prowess of French, Russian, English, and German soldiers. This is well known to military experts. The difference is mainly a question of discipline, technique, and preparedness, the main factor being, as indicated, the ability to throw the greater number of troops in the shortest possible time against the enemy at any given point, without exhausting man and beast unnecessarily and enervating the country to be traversed. It is therefore necessary to have numerous arteries of traffic at disposal. This will lead us later to the question of victualization, Germany following closely one of Moltke's axioms: "March separately, but fight conjointly."

Only in a country where all railroads, highways, and waterways, and where post and telegraph are owned and controlled by the state, is it possible to evolve and perfect a system of transportation such as is at the disposal of the German General Staff. Every mile of German railroads, especially the ones built within the last twenty years, has been constructed mainly for strategical reasons. Taking Berlin as the center you will find on looking at a German, more especially a Prussian, railroad map, close similarity to a spider's web. From Berlin you will see trunk lines extending in an almost direct route to her French and Russian frontiers. Not single or double, but treble and quadruple lines of steel converging with other strategic lines at certain points such as Magdeburg, Hanover, Nordhausen, Kassel, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Cologne, or Strassburg—to name but a few. Places such as enumerated are invariably provincial commandos, having garrisons, arsenals, and depots on a large scale.

The capacity of the railroad yards for handling large bodies of men and vast amounts of goods swiftly is judiciously studied. At any given time, especially at tense political moments, at every large strategical railway center in Germany there are a certain number of trucks and engines kept for military purposes only—sometimes, as in the Rhine division during the acute period of the Morocco question, with steam up.

As previously related, 90 per cent. of all the railway officials are ex-soldiers. Five minutes after the signing of the mobilization orders by the Emperor, the whole of the railway system would be under direct military control. Specially trained transportation and railway experts on the General Staff would take over the direction of affairs. Besides this, there exists in the German standing army a number of Eisenbahn Regimenter (railway corps)—all trained railroad builders and mechanics. Elaborate time-tables and transportation cards are in readiness to be put into operation on the instant of mobilization, superseding the civil time-tables of peace. Theoretically and practically the schedules are tested twice a year during the big maneuvers.

The same applies to the waterways and highroads of the Empire. A keen observer will often wonder at the broadness, solidness, and excellent state of repair of the chaussees and country roads, out of all proportion to the little traffic passing along. They are simply strategical arteries kept up by the state for military purposes. The heads of the transportation and railway corps in Berlin sit before the huge glass-covered tables where the whole of the German railway system to its minutest detail is shown in relief, and they by pressing various single buttons can conduct an endless chain of trains to any given point of the Empire.

To show the accurate workings of this system I shall relate an incident. During the Kaiser maneuvers in West Prussia a few years ago I happened to be at headquarters in Berlin delivering some plans and records of the English Midland Railway system when a General Staff Officer entered the signal hall and made inquiries as to the whereabouts of a certain train having a regiment on board destined to a certain part of the maneuver field. One of the operators through the simple manipulation of some ivory keys in the short space of two and a half minutes (as I was keenly interested, I timed it) could show the exact spot of the train between two stations, the train being over 310 miles distant from Berlin.

As every class A1 vessel in the merchant marine of Germany, especially the passenger boats of the big steamship lines, can be pressed into government service, so can all motor vehicles, taxis, and trucks owned either privately or by corporations be called upon if considered necessary. Through this vast and far-reaching system of transportation Germany is enabled to throw a million fully equipped men on to either of her frontiers within forty-eight hours. She can double this host in sixty hours more.

VICTUALIZATION

Napoleon's dictum that an army marches on its stomach is as true to-day as it was then, adequate provisions for man and beast being the most important factor in military science. The economic feeding of three-quarters of a million men in peace time is work enough. It becomes a serious problem in the event of war, especially to a country like Germany which is somewhat dependent on outside sources for the feeding of her millions. The authorities, quite aware of a possible blockading and consequent stoppage of imports, have made preparations with their usual thorough German completeness. At any given time there is sufficient foodstuff for man and beast stored in state storehouses and the large private concerns to feed the entire German army for twelve months. This might seem inadequate, but is not so, the authorities being well aware that war in Europe at the present time could and would not last longer than such a period.

Once a year these storehouses are overhauled and perishable or deteriorating provisions replaced. Tens of thousands of tons of foodstuffs, especially fodder, are sold far below their usual market prices to the poorer classes, notably farmers. Likewise the material used by the army is as far as possible supplied by the farmer direct. The total absence of bloated, pudgy-fingered army contractors in Germany is pleasant to the eyes of those who know the conditions in some other countries I could mention.

Besides, the whole of the German fighting machine is so organized that in all probability decisive battles would be fought in the enemy's country, in which case the onus of feeding the troops would fall on the enemy, called in military parlance "requisitioning and commandeering." In this, German, and especially Prussian, quartermasters are in no way behind their English confrères of whose activity in the Boer War I know from personal experience.

To give but another instance of the scientific thoroughness in detail, take a single food preparation—the Erbswurst (pea-meal sausage), a preparation of peas, meal, bacon, salt and seasoning, compressed in a dry state into air- and water-tight tubes in the form of a sausage, each weighing a quarter of a pound. Highly nutritious, light in weight, practically indestructible, wholesome, this is easily prepared into a palatable meal with the simple addition of hot water. Of this preparation huge quantities are always kept in stock for the army.

INTELLIGENCE

Without doubt the most important division of the General Staff and upon whose information and efforts the whole machine hinges is the Intelligence Department—really covering many different fields—for instance, general science, especially strategy, topography, ballistics, but mainly the procuring of information data, plans, maps, etc., kept more or less secret by other powers. In this division the brightest young officers and general officials are found. The training and knowledge required of the men in this service are exacting to a degree. It requires in most cases the undivided attention—often a life study—to a single subject.

It has been the unswerving policy of the Prussian military authorities to know as much of the rest of the European countries as they know of their own. In the war of 1870-71, German commanders down to a lieutenant leading a small detachment had accurate information, charts and data of every province in France, giving them more accurate knowledge of a foreign country than that country had of itself. It is a notorious fact that, after the defeat of the French armies at Weissenburg and Worth and later at Metz, the French commanders and officers lost valuable time and strategical positions through sheer ignorance of their own country. This is impossible under the Prussian system. To-day there is not a country in Europe but of which there are the most elaborate charts and maps, topographically exact to the minutest detail docketed in the archives of the General Staff. This applies as a rule to the General Staff of most nations, but not to such painstaking details.

While undergoing instructions in the Admiral Stab in the Koenigergratzerstrasse 70, previous to my being sent on an English mission, a controversy arose between my instructor and myself as to the distance between two towns on the Lincolnshire coast. He pushed a button and requested the answering orderly to bring map 64 and the officer in charge. With the usual promptness both map and officer appeared. The officer, who could not have been more than twenty-five years of age, discussed with me in fluent colloquial English the whole of this section of Lincolnshire. Not a hummock, road, road-house, even to farmers' residences and blacksmith's shop of which he did not have exact knowledge. I expressed astonishment at this most unusual acquaintance with the locality, and suggested that he must have spent considerable time in residence there. Conceive my astonishment when informed that he had never been out of Germany and the only voyage ever taken by him led him as far as Helgoland. Subsequently through careful inquiries and research—my work bringing me into constant contact with the various divisions—I found that the whole of England, France and Russia was carefully cut into sections, each of those sections being in charge of two officers and a secretary whose duty it was to acquaint and make themselves perfectly familiar with everything in that particular locality. Through the far-reaching system of espionage, the latest and most up-to-date information is always forthcoming, and time and again I myself, often returning from a mission like one of those to the naval base in Scotland, have sat by the hour verbally amplifying my previous reports.

A part of the intelligence system is the personality squad, whose duty it is to acquaint themselves with the personality of every army and navy officer of the leading powers. I have seen reports as to the environments, habits, hobbies, and general proclivities of men such as Admiral Fisher, commanding the Channel Squadron of the British Navy, down to Colonel Ribault, in charge of a battery in Toulouse. To military or naval officers and men of affairs, the reason and benefit of such a system are obvious. The general reader, however, may not quite see the point. The position of a commander in the field is analogous to the executive head of a big selling concern. A semi-personal knowledge of the foibles and characteristics of his customers without doubt gives him an advantage over a rival concern, neglecting the personal equation being really more important than is generally understood. This has long been recognized and fully taken advantage of by the German Army author ities.

AËRIAL

Within the last few years an entirely new and according to German ideas most important factor has entered and disturbed the relative military power of European nations. This is the aerial weapon.

Since the days of Otto Lilienthal and his glider it has been the policy of Germany to keep track of all inventions likely to be embodied and made use of in the War Machine. It is a far cry from Lilienthal's glider to the last word in aërial construction such as the mysterious Zeppelin-Parseval sky monster that, carrying a complement of twenty-five men and twelve tons of explosives, sailed across the North Sea, circled over London, and returned to Germany. Lilienthal's glider kept aloft four minutes, but this new dread-naught of Germany's dying navy was aloft ninety-six hours, maintaining a speed of thirty-eight miles an hour, this even in the face of a storm pressure of almost eighty meters. Such feats as these are significant. They are at the same time the outcome and the cause for the development of this part of the War Machine.

It is my purpose here to tell you how far Germany has advanced and progressed in this struggle for mastery of the sky. I shall disclose facts about her system that have never appeared in print—that have never been heard in conversation. They are known only to the General Staff at Berlin, not even in the cabinets of Europe.

Germany without doubt has the most up-to-date aërial fleet in the world. The Budget of the Reichstag of 1908-1909 allows and provides for the building and maintenance of twelve dirigibles of Zeppelin type. As far as the knowledge of the rest of the world is concerned this is all the sky navy that Germany possesses. It is a fact, though, that she has three times the number which she officially acknowledges.

The dirigible balloon centers in Germany are five and they are situated at vitally strategic points. There are two on the French border, one on the Russian border, one on the Atlantic Coast, and a central station near Berlin. The exact places are Strassburg, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Posen, Wilhelmshafen, and Berlin. This does not include the marvelous station at Helgoland in the North Sea, this being a strategic point in relation to Great Britain. Nothing is known about this Helgoland station. No one but those on official business are permitted within a thousand yards of it. I shall tell things concerning it.

Besides these purely military posts, there are a number of commercial stations necessary as depots of the regular transportation aerial lines that operate for the convenience of the public. Like Germany's commercial steamers, however, they are controlled and subsidized by the Government. At a few hours' notice they can be converted and made use of for Government purposes. Taking these transportation lines into consideration, it is safe to state that by summer of the present year Germany could send fifty huge airships to war.

It may be a puzzle to Americans why, in the face of disasters and accidents to these Zeppelins, Germany is spending about $4,000,000 on her aerial fleet. Now we come to a very significant point. I know and certain members of the German General Staff know, as well as trusted men in the aërial corps, that there are two conditions under which airships are operated in Germany. One is the ordinary more or less well-known system which characterizes the operation of all the passenger lines now in service in the Empire. It is the system under which all the disasters that appear in the newspapers occur. Airships that are used in the general army flights and maneuvers are also run under the same system as the passenger dirigibles—for a reason.

The other system is an absolute secret of the German General Staff. It is not used in the general maneuvers, only in specific cases, and these always secretly. It has been proved to be effective in eliminating 75 per cent. of the accidents which have characterized all of Germany's adventures in dirigibles and heavier-than-air machines. These statistics are known only by the German General Staff office.

Let us go into this further. Critics of the German dirigible who foolishly rate the French aëroplane superior point out that the Zeppelins have three serious defects—bulk and heaviness of structure, inflammability of the gas that floats them, and inability to store enough gas to stay in the air the desirable length of time without coming down. The secret devices of the German War Office have eliminated all these objectionable features. They have overcome the condition of bulk and heaviness of structure by their government chemists devising the formula of a material that is lighter than aluminum, yet which possesses all of that metal's density and which has also the flexibility of steel. Airships not among the twelve that Germany admits officially are made of this material. Its formula is a government secret and England or France would give thousands of dollars to possess it.

The objection of inflammability of the lifting power has also been overcome. The power of the ordinary hydrogen gas in all its various forms has been multiplied threefold by a new dioxygen gas discovered at the Spandau government chemical laboratory. This gas has also the enormous advantages of being absolutely noninflammable. I have seen experiments made with it. It cannot be used for illuminating purposes. Dirigibles that are equipped with it are not liable to the awful explosions that have characterized flights under the ordinary system. The new gas has also the enormous advantage of having a liquid form. To produce the gas it is only necessary to let the ordinary atmosphere come in contact with the liquid. Carried in cylinders two feet long and with a diameter of six inches it is obvious that enough of this liquid can be carried aboard the big war dirigibles to permit their refilling in midair. So, you see, all the objections to the commonly known system of operation have been overcome by the War Office.

The last dirigible tried by the War Office in 1912, the mysterious Zeppelin X, made a continuous trip from Stettin over the Baltic to Upsala in Sweden, thence across the Baltic again to Riga in the Gulf of Finland, where it doubled and sailed back to Stettin. This was a journey of 976 miles. The airship had a complement of twenty-five men and five tons of dead weight. It traveled under severe weather conditions, the month being March, and snow-storms, hail and rain occurring throughout the voyage. The significance of this flight can be easily understood if you consider the distance from Strassburg or Dusseldorf to Paris or other strategical points to France is approximately 298 miles. A ship like the Zeppelin X could sail over the French border, dynamite the fortifications around Paris and return, the journey being roughly 900 miles—76 miles less than the actual trip made by the Zeppelin X. Moreover, the German military trials have shown the possibility of an aerial fleet leaving their home ports and cruising to foreign lands and returning without the necessity of landing to replenish their gas tanks or fuel.

Let me show you how the German aërial corps is made up. It is called the Luftschiffer Abteilung and is composed of ten battalions, each consisting of 350 men. They are all trained absolutely for this branch of the service. Only the smartest mechanics and artificers are selected. In the higher branches the most intelligent and bravest officers hold command. Considering the usual pay in continental armies, the wages of the men in the General aërial corps are exceptionally high. In fact they are the highest paid in the German army. They are not ordinary enlisted men, meaning that they serve only their two years' time. Most of them have agreed to serve a lengthy term. Married men are not encouraged to enroll in this branch of the service. It is obvious from the nature of the work that the hazards are often great. The wonderful system of the German War Machine has been installed with rare detail in the aërial corps. The equipment of the different stations is really marvelous. For everything human ingenuity has been able to devise concerning the dirigible you will find in application. Each station is fully equipped and is an absolutely independent center in itself. Take the base at Helgoland. It is the newest and the one that is always cloaked with secrecy.

At the extreme eastern corner of the island of Helgoland one sees, amid the sandy dunes, three vast oblong, iron-gray structures. At a distance they are not unlike overgrown gasometers. I say at a distance, for it is impossible for any visitor to get within a thousand yards of the station. The solitary approach is guarded by a triple post of the marine guard. If you walk toward the station, before you come within a hundred yards of the guard, you will find large signs setting forth in unmistakable and terse language that dire and swift penalties follow any further exploration in that direction. Not only English but German visitors to Helgoland have found out through their course that even the slightest infringement of the rules of these signs is dangerous. I shall however, take you a little closer.

Walking on until you are within fifty yards of the great balloon sheds, you pause before a tall fence of barbed wire, this connected with an elaborate alarm-bell system that sounds in the two guard houses. For instance, if an enterprising secret agent of France were to try to steal up on the station, if he came by night and cut through the barbed wire, a series of bells would immediately sound the general alarm. Having passed through the six strands of barbed wire a tall octagonal tower meets the eye. In this tower are installed two powerful searchlights as well as a complete wireless outfit. All the Zeppelins carry wireless. By means of elaborate reflectors, it is possible with the searchlights to flood the whole place with daylight in the middle of the night. Thus ascensions can be made safely at any hour of the twenty-four. The three oblong sheds stand in a row, the middle being the largest, having spaces for two complete dirigibles, while the other sheds house but one each. They are about 800 feet long, 200 feet broad and 120 feet high. The whole structure itself can be shifted to about an angle of forty degrees, this being worked on a plan similar to the railroad engine turntable. The reason for it is that with the veering of the wind the sheds are turned so that the doors will be placed advantageously for the removal of the airship from its place of shelter.

The whole layout and the vast area of space show that it is the Government's intention to still further increase the plant. In fact, on my last visit to Helgoland—and it was more than two years ago—I saw the evidence of another shed about to be built. At the station is the most efficient meteorological department of all the stations. The most up-to-date and sensitive instruments connected with this science are there in duplicates and the highest experts such as only Germany can produce are in charge of the department.

When I was at Helgoland I noticed a vast difference in the strength of the fortifications compared to what they had been. They used to be tremendous, but since the addition of the naval base they have become secondary. Half the soldiers on duty there have been transferred elsewhere; so with the big guns. There is no longer any need for them. As I stated, I saw a fourth big balloon shed in the course of construction. I have not been on the island for two years. Nobody has been near the extreme eastern end except those closely identified with the service. Considering that Germany has not built more than one extra shed, that means five dirigibles, and there is nothing on earth that could stand up against them. Helgoland does not need forts any more. The new forts float in the sky and can rain death.

Helgoland has always been a sore spot of British diplomacy. Originally England owned the island; now it is a menace to England. When Lord Salisbury was Prime Minister of England, he conceived what he believed to be a shrewd diplomatic move. He offered Bismarck the island of Helgoland in exchange for some East African concessions. Helgoland is now the key and guard of Germany's main artery of commerce, being the key to Hamburg. With the dirigible station of Helgoland to guard her, Hamburg is impregnable and on England's northern coast they have a way of looking out across the North Sea with troubled eyes, for who knows when those terrible cartridge-shaped monsters will rise into the air and sweep over the sea? Stranger things have happened, even though the countries have their secret diplomatic understandings.

Let us consider one of these new war monsters, the latest and most powerful, the X 15. The lateat Zeppelins, charged with the newly discovered dioxygenous gas, giving these sky battleships triple lifting capacity; the perfecting of the Diesel motor, giving enormous consumption (fifty of these Diesel engines, their workings secret to the German Government, are stored under guard at the big navy yards at Wilhelmshafen and Kiel, ready to be installed at the break of war into submarines and dirigibles), have given the German type of aircraft an importance undreamed of and unsuspected by the rest of the world.

The operating sphere of the new balloons has extended from 100 to 1,200-1,400 kilometers. Secret trial trips of a fully equipped Zeppelin like X 15, carrying a crew of twenty-four men, six quick-firing guns, seven tons of explosive, have extended from Stettin, over the Baltic, over Swedenburg in Sweden, recrossing the Baltic and landing at Swinemunde, with enough gas, fuel, and provisions left to keep aloft another thirty-six hours. The distance all told covered on one of these trips was 1,180 kilometers. This fact speaks for itself. The return distance from Helgoland to London, or any midland towns in England, corresponds with the mileage covered on recent trips. In the event of hostilities between England and Germany, this statement needs no explanation. That is why I mentioned that the latter-day Zeppelins were a powerful factor in bringing about an amiable understanding between those two powerful countries. For neither the historic wooden walls of Nelson's day nor the steel plates of her modern navy could help England or any other nation against the inroads of the monsters of the air.

The capacity of seven tons of explosive does not exhaust the resources of this type of weapon. I have it on good authority that the new Zeppelins can carry double that quantity of explosive if necessary. As the size of these vessels increases, so does the ratio of their carrying capacity.

Picture the havoc a dozen such vultures could create attacking a city like London or Paris. Present-day defense against these ships is totally inadequate. In attacking large places, the Zeppelins would rise to a height of from 6,000 to 8,000 feet, at which distance these huge cigar-shaped engines of death, 700 feet long, would appear the size of a football, and no bigger. I know that Zeppelins have successfully sailed aloft at an altitude of 10,000 feet. Picture them at that elevation, everybody aboard in warm, comfortable quarters, ready to drop explosives to the ground. The half informed man—and there appear to be many such in European cabinets, which recalls the proverb about a little knowledge being a dangerous thing—likes to say that a flock of aëroplanes can put a dirigible out of business. Consider now an aëroplane at an elevation of 6,000 feet and remember that the new Zeppelins have gone thousands of feet higher. An aviator at 6,000 feet is so cold that he is practically useless for anything but guiding his machine. How in the world is he or his seat-mate going to do harm to a big craft the size of the Zeppelin that is far above him? An aviator who has ever gone up, say 8,000 feet, will tell you when he comes down what a harrowing experience he has had. What good can an individual be, exposed to the temperature and the elements at such an altitude, in doing harm to the calm, comfortable gentlemen in the heated compartments of the Zeppelin?—Quatsch! which is a German army term for piffle!

At 8,000 feet the small target a Zeppelin affords would move at a rate of speed of from thirty-five to sixty miles an hour. The possible chances of being hit by terrestrial gunfire are infinitesimally small. This does not take into account the vast opportunities that a dirigible has for night attacks or the possibility of hiding among the clouds. The X 15, sailing over London, could drop explosives down and create terrible havoc. They don't have to aim. They are not like aviators trying to drop a bomb on the deck of a warship. They simply dump overboard some of the new explosive of the German Government, these new chemicals having the property of setting on fire anything that they hit, and they sail on. They do not have to worry about hitting the mark. Consider the size of their target. They are simply throwing something at the City of London. If they do not hit Buckingham Palace they are apt to hit Knightsbridge. And remember that whatever one of the new German explosives strikes, conflagration begins.

Aëroplanes, biplanes, monoplanes, and the other innumerable host of small craft so often quoted as a possible counterdefense against the Zeppelin, are overrated, and are in any case theoretical. The German authorities have made vast and exhaustive trials in these matters. The strenuous efforts on the part of this Empire to increase its dirigible fleet is to my way of thinking answer enough. The German General Staff at Berlin tries out more thoroughly than any nation in the world every new device of warfare. They have tried the aëroplane and the dirigible. I have heard the leading experts and aviators who have been assigned to both types agreeing that the Zeppelins of the X 15 type have nothing to fear from any present-day flying machine—and that is good enough for me.

Chapter XIII. Arming for Peace or War

The map of Europe is certain to undergo some very decided changes within the next decade, very possibly in less time. Social and economic conditions, let alone the paramount political ambitions of the individual rulers, must bring about a decided alteration in state boundaries in Central Europe. This will be accomplished either with or without war—with bloodshed most likely. History and human propensities have shown the inability to settle any vital points by peaceful arbitration and the more one comes in contact with the forces, obvious and otherwise, directing human affairs, the more one learns the rather disheartening fact that the millennium is as far off as ever. The prophecies of the old Biblical prophets about wars and rumors of wars are as pertinent to-day as before the advent of Christ. The methods may have changed since the conception of the Christian religion but the results will be attained now as ever by the right of a mighty sword arm.

The most virile and aggressive power in the center of Europe is Germany proper—this term of Germany, including the whole of the Teutonic races, such as the German-speaking portion of Austria, Hungary (for your true Hungarian is a keen admirer of strength and force), Holland, Switzerland and in all probability the Norsemen and Viking branches of the Teutonic clan, meaning Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Social and commercial aims and aspirations in Sweden, Norway and Denmark, independent as they are and probably always will be, still show a decided trend to Central Germanic cohesion. The whole of Europe is roughly divided into three dominant races—the Teutonic, the Latin and the Slavish. The Teutonic has Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and Norse subdivisions. The Latin, Gallic, has the French, Italian and Spanish nations; and the Slavonic comprises the Slavs and Romanic races with their innumerable subdivisions such as Moscovite, Chech, Pole, Croat, Serb, Bulgar, Bojar, etc. These three groups are distinctly different in habits, thoughts, manners and ambitions. Through race and religion they are also deeply antagonistic by reason of its higher commercial development (I do not say education, and art, music or literature, for there your Latin or Slav excels), the Teutonic races have outstripped the other two. Commercialism means consolidation and concentration and since the Napoleonic wars the Germanic races—at the beginning slowly but within the last twenty-five years rapidly—have drawn together at an astonishing pace. In countries such as Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Switzerland, each possessing their own petty machinery of expensive government; existent only through the mutual jealousies of their bigger neighbors, there has grown up a decidedly incorporating spirit. Notwithstanding the natural disinclination of the ruling factions of that country, the general mass of the people are by no means averse to become members of a vast central European empire, the unswerving ambition of the house of the Hohenzollerns.

Since the days when the Counts of Nuremburg became electors of Brandenburg, from the grosse Kurfurst, Frederick the Great, to the present Emperor, the house of Hohenzollern has shown itself to be the most virile dynasty in modern history. Not always clever, they possessed the rare faculty of finding, developing and using men having the necessary ability to execute their current policies.

In thoroughly feudal and aristocratic countries such as comprise Central Europe, especially Germany, decided, unswerving aims are necessary. If these policies are conducted in a clear, level-headed manner, judiciously developing the wealth and culture of the general masses, the stability of such a government or throne is well-nigh unshakable.

It has often been spoken and written that in countries such as Germany and Austria, Socialism, to quote but one of the numerous "isms," has undermined existing governmental powers. To a close student, these assertions are absolutely wrong. Teutonic Germanic races have ever been given to deeply analytical, philosophical studies, criticising and dissecting, the policies of their rulers. But underlying, you will find a deeply practical sense and appreciation of material benefits. The German Socialist is in fact a practical dreamer, quite in contrast to his mercurial, effervescent Latin prototype. The rulers of Germany have learned the lesson that the stability of a throne rests in the welfare of her people and everyone must admit that they have succeeded in this respect better than any other dynasty known to history. Germany without doubt is the most uniformly prosperous and civilized country in the world. And therein lies the danger, as no sane and prosperous business can afford to stand still. Neither can a solvent virile nation such as Germany, mark time. For this reason: Two things must happen in the near future. Germany must expand peacefully in Europe, to the northeast and west; or there will be war. The reasons for this I gave in the chapter on "The Isolation of France."

And that the chances of peaceful and really sensible adjustment are thoroughly discounted among German men of affairs, must be pretty obvious to the careful reader. An intensely practical and saving people such as the Germans would not spend billions in money, a vast amount of time and labor, in perfecting and keeping up a fighting machine without being thoroughly convinced of the necessity of this investment. Strong, wealthy and powerful as Germany is to-day, the strain is tremendous and for this reason alone existing political and geographical conditions in Europe must undergo a decided change.

These changes are bound to occur but it is hard to set a correct time. It may be to-morrow; it certainly will not be more than a decade hence. The death of the Emperor Francis Joseph will precipitate it at once—and he is old and feeble.

Secondly, the Church. The mainstay of the Catholic Church rests with the Austrian monarchy and with the death of the old Emperor, it would—in fact have to—look to some other country and ruler for protection. There is no Catholic ruler in a Catholic country to-day able to support and protect the dignity of the Church. The German Emperor is a Protestant monarch, but he is first and last a Christian, and thanks to his usual keen and far-sighted policy, backed up by strong spiritual convictions, religious dissensions are almost unknown in his empire. The Catholic religion enjoys in no country, save the United States, more real freedom from persecution than it does in Germany. And the Emperor's personal standing with the Vatican is excellent. I need only remind the reader of his perennial visits to the King of Italy when he never fails to visit the Vatican, paying his respects as the ruler of twenty-seven millions of Catholics, if you please, to the keeper of Peter's keys.

In my work, I have met eminent dignitaries and princes of the Catholic Church who voiced pretty freely—that is for churchmen—their confidences, willingness of their support to the Emperor's general policies.

THE BUFFER STATE OF THE NORTH

As Germany has provided herself with a buffer state and ally in Southern Europe, meaning Turkey, so she has cleverly succeeded in creating a similar condition in the extreme north of Europe. Sweden and Norway, at no time friendly to the Moscovite—you need only recall the days of Charles XII—have within the last few years developed a strong martial feeling against Russian aggression. Both countries are intensely patriotic and independent and would not on any account tolerate incorporation. Germany does not want Norway and Sweden, and Scandinavia knows that. They also know that Russia, having a free hand, does want them. Hence they are looking towards Germany to keep a national independence. With German help, Sweden and Norway could maintain, transport and place three-quarters of a million of first-class fighting men in the field and that at strategical and crucial points of the Russian Empire.

The personal domination of the house of Hohenzollern even outside political matters is tremendous, by virtue of great wealth and marriages,—the Emperor's sons having married the most wealthy princesses in Europe—besides the privately invested fortunes of the Emperor, giving him a tremendous in fluence in commercial affairs. Wilhelm holds the thunderbolt that will shake the world.

THE END