"Thirdly, Dunkirk to be demolished.

"Fourthly, Gibraltar and Port-Mahon to continue in the hands of those who now possess them.

"Fifthly, The Assiento (or liberty of selling negroes to the Spanish West Indies) to be granted to the English, in as full a manner as the French possess it at present; and such places in the said West Indies to be assigned to the persons concerned in this trade, for the refreshment and sale of their negroes, as shall be found necessary and convenient.

"Sixthly, Whatever advantages, privileges, and rights are already, or may hereafter be, granted by Spain to the subjects of France, or any other nation, shall be equally granted to the subjects of Great Britain.

"Seventhly, For better protecting their trade in the Spanish West Indies, the English shall be put into possession of such places as shall be named in the treaty of peace.

"Or, as an equivalent for this article, that the Assiento be granted to Britain for the term of thirty years.

"That the isle of St. Christopher's be likewise secured to the English.

"That the advantages and exemption from duties, promised by Monsieur Mesnager, which he affirms will amount to fifteen per cent. upon all goods of the growth and manufacture of Great Britain, be effectually allowed.

"That whereas, on the side of the river of Plate, the English are not in possession of any colony, a certain extent of territory be allowed them on the said river, for refreshing and keeping their negroes, till they are sold to the Spaniards; subject, nevertheless, to the inspection of an officer appointed by Spain.

"Eighthly, Newfoundland and the Bay and Straits of Hudson, shall be entirely restored to the English; and Great Britain and France shall respectively keep whatever dominions in North America each of them shall be in possession of, when the ratification of this treaty shall be published in those parts of the world."

The six first articles were allowed without any difficulty, except that about Dunkirk, where France was to have an equivalent, to be settled in a general treaty.

Difficulty arising upon the seventh article, the proposed equivalent was allowed instead thereof.

The last article was referred to the general treaty of peace, only the French insisted to have the power of fishing for cod, and drying them on the island of Newfoundland.

These articles were to be looked upon as conditions, which the Most Christian King consented to allow; and whenever a general peace should be signed, they were to be digested into the usual form of a treaty, to the satisfaction of both crowns.

The Queen having thus provided for the security and advantage of her kingdoms, whenever a peace should be made, and upon terms no way interfering with the interest of her allies; the next thing in order, was to procure from France such preliminary articles, as might be a ground upon which to commence a general treaty. These were adjusted, and signed the same day with the former; and having been delivered to the several ministers residing here from the powers in alliance with England, were quickly made public. But the various constructions and censures which passed upon them, have made it necessary to give the reader the following transcript:

"The King being willing to contribute all that is in his power, to the re-establishing of the general peace. His Majesty declares,

"I. That he will acknowledge the Queen of Great Britain in that quality, as also the succession of that crown, according to the settlement,

"II. That he will freely, and bona fide, consent to the taking all just and reasonable measures, for hindering that the crowns of France and Spain may ever be united on the head of the same prince; His Majesty being persuaded, that this excess of power would be contrary to the good and quiet of Europe.

"III. The King's intention is, that all the parties engaged in the present war, without excepting any of them, may find their reasonable satisfaction in the treaty of peace, which shall be made: That commerce may be re-established and maintained for the future, to the advantage of Great Britain, of Holland, and of the other nations, who have been accustomed to exercise commerce.

"IV. As the King will likewise maintain exactly the observance of the peace, when it shall be concluded, and the object, the King proposes to himself, being to secure the frontiers of his kingdom, without disturbing in any manner whatever the neighbouring states, he promises to agree, by the treaty which shall be made, that the Dutch shall be put in possession of the fortified places, which shall be mentioned, in the Netherlands, to serve hereafter for a barrier; which may secure the quiet of the republic of Holland against any enterprise from the part of France.

"V. The King consents likewise, that a secure and convenient barrier should be formed for the empire, and for the house of Austria.

"VI. Notwithstanding Dunkirk cost the King very great sums, as well to purchase it, as to fortify it; and that it is further necessary to be at very considerable expense for razing the works. His Majesty is willing however to engage to cause them to be demolished, immediately after the conclusion of the peace, on condition, that, for the fortifications of that place, a proper equivalent, that may content him, be given him: And, as England cannot furnish that equivalent, the discussion of it shall be referred to the conferences to be held for the negotiation of the peace.

"VII. When the conferences for the negotiation of the peace shall be formed, all the pretensions of the princes and states, engaged in the present war, shall be therein discussed bona fide, and amicably: And nothing shall be omitted to regulate and terminate them, to the satisfaction of all the parties.

"MESNAGER."

These overtures are founded upon the eighth article of the Grand Alliance, made in one thousand seven hundred and one; wherein are contained the conditions, without which a peace is not to be made; and whoever compares both, will find the preliminaries to reach every point proposed in that article, which those who censured them at home, if they spoke their thoughts, did not understand: for nothing can be plainer, than what the public hath often been told, that the recovery of Spain from the house of Bourbon was a thing never imagined, when the war began, but a just and reasonable satisfaction to the Emperor. Much less ought such a condition to be held necessary at present, not only because it is allowed on all hands to be impracticable, but likewise because, by the changes in the Austrian and Bourbon families, it would not be safe: neither did those, who were loudest in blaming the French preliminaries, know any thing of the advantages privately stipulated for Britain, whose interests, they assured us, were all made a sacrifice to the corruption or folly of the managers; and therefore, because the opposers of peace have been better informed by what they have since heard and seen, they have changed their battery, and accused the ministers for betraying the Dutch.

The Lord Raby, Her Majesty's ambassador at The Hague, having made a short journey to England, where he was created Earl of Strafford, went back to Holland about the beginning of October, one thousand seven hundred and eleven, with the above preliminaries, in order to communicate them to the Pensionary, and other ministers of the States. The Earl was instructed to let them know, "That the Queen had, according to their desire, returned an answer to the first propositions signed by Mons. Torcy, signifying, that the French offers were thought, both by Her Majesty and the States, neither so particular nor so full as they ought to be; and insisting to have a distinct project formed, of such a peace as the Most Christian King would be willing to conclude: that this affair having been for some time transacted by papers, and thereby subject to delays, Mons. Mesnager was at length sent over by France, and had signed those preliminaries now communicated to them: that the several articles did not, indeed, contain such particular concessions as France must and will make in the course of a treaty; but that, however, Her Majesty thought them a sufficient foundation whereon to open the general conferences.

"That Her Majesty was unwilling to be charged with determining the several interests of her allies, and therefore contented herself with such general offers as might include all the particular demands, proper to be made during the treaty; where the confederates must resolve to adhere firmly together, in order to obtain from the enemy the utmost that could be hoped for, in the present circumstances of affairs; which rule, Her Majesty assured the States, she would, on her part, firmly observe."

If the ministers of Holland should express any uneasiness, that Her Majesty may have settled the interests of her own kingdoms, in a future peace, by any private agreement, the ambassador was ordered to say, "That the Queen had hitherto refused to have the treaty carried on in her own kingdom, and would continue to do so, unless they (the Dutch) constrained her to take another measure: That by these means the States, and the rest of the allies, would have the opportunity of treating and adjusting their different pretensions; which Her Majesty would promote with all the zeal she had shewn for the common good, and the particular advantage of that republic (as they must do her the justice to confess), in the whole course of her reign: That the Queen had made no stipulation for herself, which might clash with the interests of Holland; and that the articles to be inserted in a future treaty, for the benefit of Britain, were, for the most part, such as contained advantages, which must either be continued to the enemy, or be obtained by Her Majesty; but, however, that no concession should tempt her to hearken to a peace, unless her good friends and allies the States General had all reasonable satisfaction, as to their trade and barrier, as well as in all other respects."

After these assurances given in the Queen's name, the Earl was to insinuate, "That Her Majesty should have just reason to be offended, and to think the proceeding between her and the States very unequal, if they should pretend to have any further uneasiness upon this head: That being determined to accept no advantages to herself, repugnant to their interests, nor any peace, without their reasonable satisfaction, the figure she had made during the whole course of the war, and the part she had acted, superior to any of the allies, who were more concerned in danger and interest, might justly entitle her to settle the concerns of Great Britain, before she would consent to a general negotiation."

If the States should object the engagements the Queen was under, by treaties, of making no peace but in concert with them, or the particular obligations of the Barrier Treaty, the ambassador was to answer, "That, as to the former, Her Majesty had not in any sort acted contrary thereto; That she was so far from making a peace without their consent, as to declare her firm resolution not to make it without their satisfaction; and that what had passed between France and her, amounted to no more than an introduction to a general treaty." As to the latter, the Earl had orders to represent very earnestly, "How much it was even for the interest of Holland itself, rather to compound the advantage of the Barrier Treaty, than to insist upon the whole, which the house of Austria, and several other allies, would never consent to: That nothing could be more odious to the people of England than many parts of this treaty; which would have raised universal indignation, if the utmost care had not been taken to quiet the minds of those who were acquainted with the terms of that guaranty, and to conceal them from those who were not: That it was absolutely necessary to maintain a good harmony between both nations, without which it would be impossible at any time to form a strength for reducing an exorbitant power, or preserving the balance of Europe: from whence it followed, that it could not be the true interest of either country to insist upon any conditions, which might give just apprehension to the other.

"That France had proposed Utrecht, Nimeguen, Aix, or Liege, wherein to hold the general treaty; and Her Majesty was ready to send her plenipotentiaries, to whichever of those towns the States should approve."

If the imperial ministers, or those of the other allies, should object against the preliminaries as no sufficient ground for opening the conferences, and insist that France should consent to such articles as were signed on the part of the allies in the year one thousand seven hundred and nine, the Earl of Strafford was in answer directed to insinuate, "That the French might have probably been brought to explain themselves more particularly, had they not perceived the uneasiness, impatience, and jealousy among the allies, during our transactions with that court." However, he should declare to them, in the Queen's name, "That if they were determined to accept of peace upon no terms inferior to what was formerly demanded, Her Majesty was ready to concur with them; but would no longer bear those disproportions of expense, yearly increased upon her, nor the deficiency of the confederates in every part of the war: That it was therefore incumbent upon them to furnish, for the future, such quotas of ships and forces as they were now wanting in, and to increase their expense, while Her Majesty reduced hers to a reasonable and just proportion."

That if the ministers of Vienna and Holland should urge their inability upon this head, the Queen insisted, "They ought to comply with her in war or in peace; Her Majesty desiring nothing, as to the first, but what they ought to perform, and what is absolutely necessary: and as to the latter, that she had done, and would continue to do, the utmost in her power towards obtaining such a peace as might be to the satisfaction of all her allies."

Some days after the Earl of Stafford's departure to Holland, Mons. Buys, pensionary of Amsterdam, arrived here from thence with instructions from his masters, to treat upon the subject of the French preliminaries, and the methods for carrying on the war. In his first conference with a committee of council, he objected against all the articles, as too general and uncertain; and against some of them, as prejudicial. He said, "The French promising that trade should be re-established and maintained for the future, was meant in order to deprive the Dutch of their tariff of one thousand six hundred and sixty-four; for the plenipotentiaries of that crown would certainly expound the word retablir, to signify no more than restoring the trade of the States to the condition it was in immediately before the commencement of the present war." He said, "That in the article of Dunkirk, the destruction of the harbour was not mentioned; and that the fortifications were only to be razed upon condition of an equivalent, which might occasion a difference between Her Majesty and the States, since Holland would think it hard to have a town less in their barrier for the demolition of Dunkirk; and England would complain to have this thorn continue in their side, for the sake of giving one town more to the Dutch."

Lastly, he objected, "That where the French promised effectual methods should be taken to prevent the union of France and Spain under the same king, they offered nothing at all for the cession of Spain, which was the most important point of the war.

"For these reasons, Mons. Buys hoped Her Majesty would alter her measures, and demand specific articles, upon which the allies might debate whether they would consent to a negotiation or no."

The Queen, who looked upon all these difficulties, raised about the method of treating, as endeavours to wrest the negotiation out of her hands, commanded the lords of the committee to let Mons. Buys know, "That the experience she formerly had of proceeding by particular preliminaries towards a general treaty, gave her no encouragement to repeat the same method any more: That such a preliminary treaty must be negotiated either by some particular allies, or by all. The first, Her Majesty could never suffer, since she would neither take upon her to settle the interests of others, nor submit that others should settle those of her own kingdoms. As to the second, it was liable to Mons. Buys's objection, because the ministers of France would have as fair an opportunity of sowing division among the allies, when they were all assembled upon a preliminary treaty, as when the conferences were open for a negotiation of peace: That this method could therefore have no other effect than to delay the treaty, without any advantage: That Her Majesty was heartily disposed, both then and during the negotiation, to insist on every thing necessary for securing the barrier and commerce of the States; and therefore hoped the conferences might be opened, without farther difficulties.

"That Her Majesty did not only consent, but desire to have a plan settled for carrying on the war, as soon as the negotiation of peace should begin; but expected to have the burthen more equally laid, and more agreeable to treaties; and would join with the States in pressing the allies to perform their parts, as she had endeavoured to animate them by her example."

Mons. Buys seemed to know little of his masters' mind, and pretended he had no power to conclude upon any thing.[1] Her Majesty's minister proposed to him an alliance between the two nations, to subsist after a peace. To this he hearkened very readily, and offered to take the matter ad referendum, having authority to do no more. His intention was, that he might appear to negotiate, in order to gain time to pick out, if possible, the whole secret of the transactions between Britain and France; to disclose nothing himself, nor bind his masters to any conditions; to seek delays till the Parliament met, and then observe what turn it took, and what would be the issue of those frequent cabals between himself and some other foreign ministers, in conjunction with the chief leaders of the discontented faction.

[Footnote 1: Buys's mission seemed to have been to act on behalf of the States General for the purpose of preventing England obtaining any commercial advantage which the States did not share, and for causing delays. He certainly had no powers to treat definitely, and Swift's remark is emphasized by the statement in the Bolingbroke Correspondence (vol. ii. p. 25) about him, he could "only speak as Monsieur Buys." [T.S.]]

The Dutch hoped, that the clamours raised against the proceedings of the Queen's ministers towards a peace, would make the Parliament disapprove what had been done; whereby the States would be at the head of the negotiation, which the Queen did not think fit to have any more in their hands, where it had miscarried twice already; although Prince Eugene himself owned, "that France was then disposed to conclude a peace upon such conditions, as it was not worth the life of a grenadier to refuse them." As to insisting upon specific preliminaries, Her Majesty thought her own method much better, for each ally, in the course of the negotiation, to advance and manage his own pretensions, wherein she would support and assist them, rather than for two ministers of one ally to treat solely with the enemy, and report what they pleased to the rest, as was practised by the Dutch at Gertruydenberg.

One part of Mons. Buys's instructions was to desire the Queen not to be so far amused by a treaty of peace, as to neglect her preparation for war against the next campaign. Her Majesty, who was firmly resolved against submitting any longer to that unequal burthen of expense she had hitherto lain under, commanded Mr. Secretary St. John to debate the matter with that minister, who said he had no power to treat; only insisted, that his masters had fully done their part, and that nothing but exhortations could be used to prevail on the other allies to act with greater vigour.

On the other side, the Queen refused to concert any plan for the prosecution of the war, till the States would join with her in agreeing to open the conferences of peace; which therefore, by Mons. Buys's application to them, was accordingly done, by a resolution taken in Holland upon the twenty first of November, one thousand seven hundred and eleven, NS.

About this time the Count de Gallas[7] was forbid the court, by order from the Queen, who sent him word, that she looked upon him no longer as a public minister.

[Footnote 7: The Austrian ambassador [T.S.]]

This gentleman thought fit to act a very dishonourable part here in England, altogether inconsistent with the character he bore of envoy from the late and present emperors, two princes under the strictest ties of gratitude to the Queen, especially the latter, who had then the title of King of Spain. Count Gallas, about the end of August, one thousand seven hundred and eleven, with the utmost privacy, dispatched an Italian, one of his clerks, to Frankfort, where the Earl of Peterborough was then expected. This man was instructed to pass for a Spaniard, and insinuate himself into the Earl's service, which he accordingly did, and gave constant information to the last emperor's secretary at Frankfort of all he could gather up in his lordship's family, as well as copies of several letters he had transcribed. It was likewise discovered that Gallas had, in his dispatches to the present emperor, then in Spain, represented the Queen and her ministers as not to be confided in, that when Her Majesty had dismissed the Earl of Sunderland, she promised to proceed no farther in the change of her servants, yet soon after turned them all out, and thereby ruined the public credit, as well as abandoned Spain, that the present ministers wanted the abilities and good dispositions of the former, were persons of ill designs, and enemies to the common cause, and he (Gallas) could not trust them. In his letters to Count Zinzendorf[8] he said, "That Mr. Secretary St John complained of the house of Austria's backwardness, only to make the King of Spain odious to England, and the people here desirous of a peace, although it were ever so bad one," to prevent which, Count Gallas drew up a memorial which he intended to give the Queen, and transmitted a draught of it to Zinzendorf for his advice and approbation. This memorial, among other great promises to encourage the continuance of the war, proposed the detaching a good body of troops from Hungary to serve in Italy or Spain, as the Queen should think fit.

[Footnote 8: The Austrian envoy at The Hague, characterized by Mr Walter Sichel as "a martyr to etiquette, and devoured by zeal for the Holy Roman Empire" ("Bolingbroke and his Times," p 392) [T.S.]]

Zinzendorf thought this too bold a step, without consulting the Emperor: to which Gallas replied, that his design was only to engage the Queen to go on with the war; that Zinzendorf knew how earnestly the English and Dutch had pressed to have these troops from Hungary, and therefore they ought to be promised, in order to quiet those two nations, after which several ways might be found to elude that promise; and, in the mean time, the great point would be gained of bringing the English to declare for continuing the war: that the Emperor might afterwards excuse himself, by the apprehension of a war in Hungary, or of that between the Turks and Muscovites: that if these excuses should be at an end, a detachment of one or two regiments might be sent, and the rest deferred, by pretending want of money; by which the Queen would probably be brought to maintain some part of those troops, and perhaps the whole body. He added, that this way of management was very common among the allies; and gave for an example, the forces which the Dutch had promised for the service of Spain, but were never sent; with several other instances of the same kind, which he said might be produced.

Her Majesty, who had long suspected that Count Gallas was engaged in these and the like practices, having at last received authentic proofs of this whole intrigue, from original letters, and the voluntary confession of those who were principally concerned in carrying it on, thought it necessary to show her resentment, by refusing the count any more access to her person or her court.

Although the Queen, as it hath been already observed, was resolved to open the conferences upon the general preliminaries, yet she thought it would very much forward the peace to know what were the utmost concessions which France would make to the several allies, but especially to the States General and the Duke of Savoy: therefore, while Her Majesty was pressing the former to agree to a general treaty, the Abbe Gaultier was sent to France with a memorial, to desire that the Most Christian King would explain himself upon those preliminaries, particularly with relation to Savoy and Holland, whose satisfaction the Queen had most at heart, as well from her friendship to both these powers, as because, if she might engage to them that their just pretensions would be allowed, few difficulties would remain, of any moment, to retard the general peace.

The French answer to this memorial contained several schemes and proposals for the satisfaction of each ally, coming up very near to what Her Majesty and her ministers thought reasonable. The greatest difficulties seemed to be about the Elector of Bavaria, for whose interests France appeared to be as much concerned, as the Queen was for those of the Duke of Savoy: however, those were judged not very hard to be surmounted.

The States having at length agreed to a general treaty, the following particulars were concerted between Her Majesty and that republic:

"That the congress should be held at Utrecht.

"That the opening of the congress should be upon the twelfth of January, N.S. one thousand seven hundred and eleven-twelve.

"That, for avoiding all inconveniences of ceremony, the ministers of the Queen and States, during the treaty, should only have the characters of plenipotentiaries, and not take that of ambassadors, till the day on which the peace should be signed.

"Lastly, The Queen and States insisted, that the ministers of the Duke of Anjou, and the late Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, should not appear at the congress, until the points relating to their masters were adjusted; and were firmly resolved not to send their passports for the ministers of France, till the Most Christian King declared, that the absence of the forementioned ministers should not delay the progress of the negotiation."

Pursuant to the three former articles, Her Majesty wrote circular letters to all the allies engaged with her in the present war: and France had notice, that as soon as the King declared his compliance with the last article, the blank passports should be filled up with the names of the Marechal d'Uxelles,[9] the Abbe de Polignac, and Mons. Mesnager, who were appointed plenipotentiaries for that crown.

[Footnote 9: In his "Letter to Sir William Windham," Bolingbroke thus refers to M. d'Uxelles: "The minister who had the principal direction of foreign affairs I lived in friendship with, and I must own to his honour, that he never encouraged a design which he knew that his court had no intention of supporting" (p. 141). This was written of the time when Bolingbroke was in Paris, an adherent of the Pretender. [T.S.]]

From what I have hitherto deduced, the reader sees the plan which the Queen thought the most effectual for advancing a peace. As the conferences were to begin upon the general preliminaries, the Queen was to be empowered by France to offer separately to the allies what might be reasonable for each to accept; and her own interests being previously settled, she was to act as a general mediator: a figure that became her best, from the part she had in the war, and more useful to the great end at which she aimed, of giving a safe and honourable peace to Europe.

Besides, it was absolutely necessary, for the interests of Britain, that the Queen should be at the head of the negotiation, without which Her Majesty could find no expedient to redress the injuries her kingdoms were sure to suffer by the Barrier Treaty. In order to settle this point with the States, the ministers here had a conference with Mons. Buys, a few days before the Parliament met. He was told, how necessary it was, by previous concert between the Emperor, the Queen, and the States, to prevent any difference which might arise in the course of the treaty at Utrecht: That, under pretence of a barrier for the States General, as their security against France, infinite prejudice might arise to the trade of Britain in the Spanish Netherlands; for, by the fifteenth article of the Barrier Treaty, in consequence of what was stipulated by that of Minister, the Queen was brought to engage that commerce shall not be rendered more easy, in point of duties, by the sea-ports of Flanders, than it is by the river Scheldt, and by the canals on the side of the Seven Provinces, which, as things now stood, was very unjust; for, while the towns in Flanders were in the hands of France or Spain, the Dutch and we traded to them upon equal foot; but now, since by the Barrier Treaty those towns were to be possessed by the States, that republic might lay what duties they pleased upon British goods, after passing by Ostend, and make their own custom-free, which would utterly ruin our whole trade with Flanders.

Upon this, the lords told Mons. Buys very frankly, "That if the States expected the Queen should support their barrier, as well as their demands from France and the house of Austria upon that head, they ought to agree, that the subjects of Britain should trade as freely to all the countries and places, which, by virtue of any former or future treaty, were to become the barrier of the States, as they did in the time of the late King Charles the Second of Spain; or as the subjects of the States General themselves shall do: and that it was hoped, their High Mightinesses would never scruple to rectify a mistake so injurious to that nation, without whose blood and treasure they would have had no barrier at all." Mons. Buys had nothing to answer against these objections, but said, he had already wrote to his masters for further instructions.

Greater difficulties occurred about settling what should be the barrier to the States after a peace: the envoy insisting to have all the towns that were named in the Treaty of Barrier and Succession; and the Queen's ministers excepting those towns, which, if they continued in the hands of the Dutch, would render the trade of Britain to Flanders precarious. At length it was agreed in general, that the States ought to have what is really essential to the security of their barrier against France; and that some amicable expedient should be found, for removing the fears both of Britain and Holland upon this point.

But at the same time Mons. Buys was told, "That although the Queen would certainly insist to obtain all those points from France, in behalf of her allies the States, yet she hoped his masters were too reasonable to break off the treaty, rather than not obtain the very utmost of their demands, which could not be settled here, unless he were fully instructed to speak and conclude upon that subject: That Her Majesty thought the best way of securing the common interest, and preventing the division of the allies, by the artifices of France, in the course of a long negotiation, would be to concert between the Queen's ministers and those of the States, with a due regard to the other confederates, such a plan as might amount to a safe and honourable peace." After which the Abbe Polignac, who of the French plenipotentiaries was most in the secret of his court, might be told, "That it was in vain to amuse each other any longer; that on such terms the peace would be immediately concluded; and that the conferences must cease, if those conditions were not, without delay, and with expedition, granted."

A treaty between Her Majesty and the States, to subsist after a peace, was now signed, Mons. Buys having received full powers to that purpose. His masters were desirous to have a private article added, sub spe rati, concerning those terms of peace; without the granting of which, we should stipulate not to agree with the enemy. But neither the character of Buys, nor the manner in which he was empowered to treat, would allow the Queen to enter into such an engagement. The congress likewise approaching, there was not time to settle a point of so great importance. Neither, lastly, would Her Majesty be tied down by Holland, without previous satisfaction upon several articles in the Barrier Treaty, so inconsistent with her engagements to other powers in the alliance, and so injurious to her own kingdoms.

The lord privy seal, and the Earl of Stafford, having, about the time the Parliament met, been appointed Her Majesty's plenipotentiaries for treating a general peace, I shall here break off the account of any further progress made in that great affair, until I resume it in the last book of this History.

***** ***** ***** ***** *****



THE HISTORY OF THE FOUR LAST

YEARS OF THE QUEEN.

BOOK III.

The House of Commons seemed resolved, from the beginning of the session, to inquire strictly not only into all abuses relating to the accounts of the army, but likewise into the several treaties between us and our allies, upon what articles and conditions they were first agreed to, and how these had been since observed. In the first week of their sitting, they sent an address to the Queen, to desire that the treaty, whereby Her Majesty was obliged to furnish forty thousand men, to act in conjunction with the forces of her allies in the Low Countries, might be laid before the House. To which the secretary of state brought an answer, "That search had been made, but no footsteps could be found of any treaty or convention for that purpose." It was this unaccountable neglect in the former ministry, which first gave a pretence to the allies for lessening their quotas, so much to the disadvantage of Her Majesty, her kingdoms, and the common cause, in the course of the war. It had been stipulated by the Grand Alliance, between the Emperor, Britain, and the States, that those three powers should assist each other with their whole force, and that the several proportions should be specified in a particular convention. But if any such convention were made, it was never ratified; only the parties agreed, by common consent, to take each a certain share of the burthen upon themselves, which the late King William communicated to the House of Commons by his secretary of state; and which afterwards the other two powers, observing the mighty zeal in our ministry for prolonging the war, eluded as they pleased.

The commissioners for stating the public accounts of the kingdom, had, in executing their office the preceding summer, discovered several practices relating to the affairs of the army, which they drew up in a report, and delivered to the House.

The Commons began their examination of the report with a member of their own, Mr. Robert Walpole, already mentioned; who, during his being secretary at war, had received five hundred guineas, and taken a note for five hundred pounds more, on account of two contracts for forage of the queen's troops quartered in Scotland. He endeavoured to excuse the first contract; but had nothing to say about the second. The first appeared so plain and so scandalous to the Commons, that they voted the author of it guilty of a high breach of trust, and notorious corruption, committed him prisoner to the Tower, where he continued to the end of the session, and expelled him the House.[1] He was a person much caressed by the opposers of the Queen and ministry, having been first drawn into their party by his indifference to any principles, and afterwards kept steady by the loss of his place. His bold, forward countenance, altogether a stranger to that infirmity which makes men bashful, joined to a readiness of speaking in public, hath justly entitled him, among those of his faction, to be a sort of leader of the second form. The reader must excuse me for being so particular about one, who is otherwise altogether obscure.[2]

[Footnote 1: See "Part Hist," vi. 1071. [T.S.]]

[Footnote 2: Walpole was not too obscure, however, to be then the object of Bolingbroke's attack; and in 1726, when Bolingbroke had again attacked Walpole, this time in a letter, the latter replied: "Whatever contradictions these gentlemen may have observed in my character; there is one which I'll venture to assure you, you will never discover, which is my ever being alarmed at an opposition from one in the impotence of disgrace, who could never terrify me in the zenith of his prosperity." "An Answer to the Occasional Writer." [T.S.]]

Another part of the report concerned the Duke of Marlborough, who had received large sums of money, by way of gratuity, from those who were the undertakers for providing the army with bread.[3] This the Duke excused, in a letter to the commissioners, from the like practice of other generals: but that excuse appeared to be of little weight, and the mischievous consequences of such a corruption were visible enough; since the money given by these undertakers were but bribes for connivance at their indirect dealings with the army. And as frauds, that begin at the top, are apt to spread through all the subordinate ranks of those who have any share in the management, and to increase as they circulate: so, in this case, for every thousand pounds given to the general, the soldiers at least suffered fourfold.

[Footnote 3: See "The Examiner," Nos. 17 and 28, in vol. ix. of this edition. [W.S.J.]]

Another article of this report, relating to the Duke, was yet of more importance. The greatest part of Her Majesty's forces in Flanders were mercenary troops, hired from several princes of Europe. It was found that the Queen's general subtracted two and a half per cent, out of the pay of those troops, for his own use, which amounted to a great annual sum. The Duke of Marlborough, in his letter already mentioned, endeavouring to extenuate the matter, told the commissioners, "That this deduction was a free gift from the foreign troops, which he had negotiated with them by the late King's orders, and had obtained the Queen's warrant for reserving and receiving it: That it was intended for secret service, the ten thousand pounds a year given by Parliament not proving sufficient, and had all been laid out that way." The commissioners observed, in answer, "That the warrant was kept dormant for nine years, as indeed no entry of it appeared in the secretary of state's books, and the deduction of it concealed all that time from the knowledge of Parliament: That, if it had been a free gift from the foreign troops, it would not have been stipulated by agreement, as the Duke's letter confessed, and as his warrant declared, which latter affirmed this stoppage to be intended for defraying extraordinary contingent expenses of the troops, and therefore should not have been applied to secret services." They submitted to the House, whether the warrant itself were legal, or duly countersigned. The commissioners added, "That no receipt was ever given for this deducted money, nor was it mentioned in any receipts from the foreign troops, which were always taken in full. And lastly, That the whole sum, on computation, amounted to near three hundred thousand pounds."

The House, after a long debate, resolved, "That the taking several sums from the contractors for bread by the Duke of Marlborough, was unwarrantable and illegal; and that the two and a half per cent, deducted from the foreign troops, was public money, and ought to be accounted for:" which resolutions were laid before the Queen by the whole House, and Her Majesty promised to do her part in redressing what was complained of. The Duke and his friends had, about the beginning of the war, by their credit with the Queen, procured a warrant from Her Majesty for this perquisite of two and a half per cent. The warrant was directed to the Duke of Marlborough, and countersigned by Sir Charles Hedges, then secretary of state; by virtue of which the paymaster-general of the army was to pay the said deducted money to the general, and take a receipt in full from the foreign troops.

It was observed, as very commendable and becoming the dignity of such an assembly, that this debate was managed with great temper, and with few personal reflections upon the Duke of Marlborough. They seemed only desirous to come at the truth, without which they could not answer the trust reposed in them by those whom they represented, and left the rest to Her Majesty's prudence. The attorney-general was ordered to commence an action against the Duke for the subtracted money, which would have amounted to a great sum, enough to ruin any private person, except himself. This process is still depending, although very moderately pursued, either by the Queen's indulgence to one whom she had formerly so much trusted, or perhaps to be revived or slackened, according to the future demeanour of the defendant.[4]

[Footnote 4: Marlborough's defence of himself may be found in the "Parliamentary History," vol. vi., 1079. Writing to the Earl of Strafford, under date January 27, 1711, Bolingbroke speaking of this debate on Marlborough says: "What passed on Thursday in the House of Commons, will, I hope, show people abroad, as well as at home, that no merit, no grandeur, no riches can excuse, or save any one, who sets himself up in opposition to the Queen;" and, he might have added, to Mrs. Masham. It is to be questioned if Marlborough would have had to undergo the ordeal of this debate had it not been for the animosity against him on the part of this lady and her royal mistress, so deftly aroused by Harley. [T.S.]]

Some time after, Mr. Cardonnell,[5] a Member of Parliament, and secretary to the general in Flanders, was expelled the House, for the offence of receiving yearly bribes from those who had contracted to furnish bread for the army; and met with no further punishment for a practice, voted to be unwarrantable and corrupt.

These were all the censures of any moment which the Commons, under so great a weight of business, thought fit to make, upon the reports of their commissioners for inspecting the public accounts. But having promised, in the beginning of this History, to examine the state of the nation, with respect to its debts; by what negligence or corruption they first began, and in process of time made such a prodigious increase; and, lastly, what courses have been taken, under the present administration, to find out funds for answering so many unprovided incumbrances, as well as put a stop to new ones; I shall endeavour to satisfy the reader upon this important article.

By all I have yet read of the history of our own country, it appears to me, that the national debts, secured upon parliamentary funds of interest, were things unknown in England before the last Revolution under the Prince of Orange. It is true, that in the grand rebellion the king's enemies borrowed money of particular persons, upon what they called the public faith; but this was only for short periods, and the sums no more than what they could pay at once, as they constantly did. Some of our kings have been very profuse in peace and war, and are blamed in history for their oppressions of the people by severe taxes, and for borrowing money which they never paid:[6] but national debts was a style, which, I doubt, would hardly then be understood. When the Prince of Orange was raised to the throne, and a general war began in these parts of Europe, the King and his counsellors thought it would be ill policy to commence his reign with heavy taxes upon the people, who had lived long in ease and plenty, and might be apt to think their deliverance too dearly bought: wherefore one of the first actions of the new government was to take off the tax upon chimneys, as a burthen very ungrateful to the commonalty. But money being wanted to support the war (which even the convention-parliament, that put the crown upon his head, were very unwilling he should engage in), the present Bishop of Salisbury[7] is said to have found out that expedient (which he had learned in Holland) of raising money upon the security of taxes, that were only sufficient to pay a large interest. The motives which prevailed on people to fall in with this project were many, and plausible; for supposing, as the ministers industriously gave out, that the war could not last above one or two campaigns at most, it might be carried on with very moderate taxes; and the debts accruing would, in process of time, be easily cleared after a peace. Then the bait of large interest would draw in a great number of those whose money, by the dangers and difficulties of trade, lay dead upon their hands; and whoever were lenders to the government, would, by surest principle, be obliged to support it. Besides, the men of estates could not be persuaded, without time and difficulty, to have those taxes laid on their lands, which custom hath since made so familiar; and it was the business of such as were then in power to cultivate a moneyed interest; because the gentry of the kingdom did not very much relish those new notions in government, to which the King, who had imbibed his politics in his own country, was thought to give too much way. Neither perhaps did that Prince think national incumbrances to be any evil at all, since the flourishing republic, where he was born, is thought to owe more than ever it will be able or willing to pay. And I remember, when I mentioned to Mons. Buys the many millions we owed, he would advance it as a maxim, that it was for the interest of the public to be in debt: which perhaps may be true in a commonwealth so crazily instituted, where the governors cannot have too many pledges of their subjects' fidelity, and where a great majority must inevitably be undone by any revolution, however brought about: but to prescribe the same rules to a monarchy, whose wealth ariseth from the rents and improvements of lands, as well as trade and manufactures, is the mark of a confined and cramped understanding.

[Footnote 5: Adam Cardonnell, Esq., secretary to the Duke of Marlborough, shared in his disgrace. See "The Examiner," No. 28. [W.S.J.]]

[Footnote 6: P. Fitzgerald says "which they have not been able or willing to pay." [W.S.J.]]

[Footnote 7: Dr. Gilbert Burnet. [ORIGINAL NOTE.]]

I was moved to speak thus, because I am very well satisfied, that the pernicious counsels of borrowing money upon public funds of interest, as well as some other state lessons, were taken indigested from the like practices among the Dutch, without allowing in the least for any difference in government, religion, law, custom, extent of country, or manners and dispositions of the people.

But when this expedient of anticipations and mortgages was first put in practice, artful men, in office and credit, began to consider what uses it might be applied to; and soon found it was likely to prove the most fruitful seminary, not only to establish a faction they intended to set up for their own support, but likewise to raise vast wealth for themselves in particular, who were to be the managers and directors in it. It was manifest, that nothing could promote these two designs so much, as burthening the nation with debts, and giving encouragement to lenders: for, as to the first, it was not to be doubted, that moneyed men would be always firm to the party of those who advised the borrowing upon such good security, and with such exorbitant premiums and interest; and every new sum that was lent, took away as much power from the landed men, as it added to theirs: so that the deeper the kingdom was engaged, it was still the better for them. Thus a new estate and property sprung up in the hands of mortgagees, to whom every house and foot of land in England paid a rent-charge, free of all taxes and defalcations, and purchased at less than half value. So that the gentlemen of estates were, in effect, but tenants to these new landlords; many of whom were able, in time, to force the election of boroughs out of the hands of those who had been the old proprietors and inhabitants. This was arrived at such a height, that a very few years more of war and funds would have clearly cast the balance on the moneyed side.

As to the second, this project of borrowing upon funds, was of mighty advantage to those who were in the management of it, as well as to their friends and dependants; for, funds proving often deficient, the government was obliged to strike tallies for making up the rest, which tallies were sometimes (to speak in the merchants' phrase) at above forty per cent, discount. At this price those who were in the secret bought them up, and then took care to have that deficiency supplied in the next session of Parliament, by which they doubled their principal in a few months; and, for the encouragement of lenders, every new project of lotteries or annuities proposed some farther advantage, either as to interest or premium.

In the year one thousand six hundred and ninety-seven, a general mortgage was made of certain revenues and taxes already settled, which amounted to near a million a year. This mortgage was to continue till one thousand seven hundred and six, to be a fund for the payment of about five millions one hundred thousand pounds. In the first Parliament of the Queen, the said mortgage was continued till one thousand seven hundred and ten, to supply a deficiency of two millions three hundred thousand pounds, and interest of above a million; and in the intermediate years a great part of that fund was branched out into annuities for ninety-nine years; so that the late ministry raised all their money to one thousand seven hundred and ten, only by continuing funds which were already granted to their hands. This deceived the people in general, who were satisfied to continue the payments they had been accustomed to, and made the administration seem easy, since the war went on without any new taxes raised, except the very last year they were in power; not considering what a mighty fund was exhausted, and must be perpetuated, although extremely injurious to trade, and to the true interest of the nation.

This great fund of the general mortgage was not only loaded, year after year, by mighty sums borrowed upon it, but with the interests due upon those sums; for which the treasury was forced to strike tallies, payable out of that fund, after all the money already borrowed upon it, there being no other provision of interest for three or four years: till at last the fund was so overloaded, that it could neither pay principal nor interest, and tallies were struck for both, which occasioned their great discount.

But to avoid mistakes upon a subject, where I am not very well versed either in the style or matter, I will transcribe an account sent me by a person[8] who is thoroughly instructed in these affairs.

[Footnote 8: Sir John Blunt. [ORIGINAL NOTE.] He was one of the first projectors of the South Sea Company, and died in January, 1733. [W.S.J.]]

"In the year one thousand seven hundred and seven, the sum of eight hundred twenty-two thousand three hundred and eighty one pounds, fifteen shillings and sixpence, was raised, by continuing part of the general mortgage from one thousand seven hundred and ten to one thousand seven hundred and twelve; but with no provision of interest till August the first, one thousand seven hundred and ten, otherwise than by striking tallies for it on that fund, payable after all the other money borrowed.

"In one thousand seven hundred and eight, the same funds were continued from one thousand seven hundred and twelve to one thousand seven hundred and fourteen, to raise seven hundred twenty-nine thousand sixty-seven pounds fifteen shillings and sixpence; but no provision for interest till August the first, one thousand seven hundred and twelve, otherwise than as before, by striking tallies for it on the same fund, payable after all the rest of the money borrowed. And the discount of tallies then beginning to rise, great part of that money remains still unraised; and there is nothing to pay interest for the money lent, till August the first, one thousand seven hundred and twelve. But the late lord treasurer struck tallies for the full sum directed by the act to be borrowed, great part of which have been delivered in payment to the navy and victualling offices, and some are still in the hands of the government.

"In one thousand seven hundred and nine, part of the same fund was continued from August the first, one thousand seven hundred and fourteen, to August the first, one thousand seven hundred and sixteen, to raise six hundred and forty-five thousand pounds; and no provision for interest till August the first, one thousand seven hundred and fourteen (which was about five years), but by borrowing money on the same fund, payable after the sums before lent; so that little of that money was lent But the tallies were struck for what was unlent, some of which were given out for the payment of the navy and victualling, and some still remain in the hands of the government.

"In one thousand seven hundred and ten, the sums which were before given from one thousand seven hundred and fourteen, to one thousand seven hundred and sixteen, were continued from thence to one thousand seven hundred and twenty, to raise one million two hundred and ninety-six thousand five hundred and fifty-two pounds nine shillings and elevenpence three farthings; and no immediate provision for interest till August the first, one thousand seven hundred and sixteen; only, after the duty of one shilling per bushel on salt should be cleared from the money it was then charged with, and which was not so cleared till Midsummer one thousand seven hundred and twelve last, then that fund was to be applied to pay the interest till August the first, one thousand seven hundred and sixteen, which interest amounted to about seventy-seven thousand seven hundred and ninety-three pounds per annum: and the said salt fund produceth but about fifty-five thousand pounds per annum; so that no money was borrowed upon the general mortgage in one thousand seven hundred and ten, except one hundred and fifty thousand pounds lent by the Swiss cantons; but tallies were struck for the whole sum. These all remained in the late treasurer's hands at the time of his removal, yet the money was expended, which occasioned those great demands upon the commissioners of the treasury who succeeded him, and were forced to pawn those tallies to the bank, or to remitters, rather than sell them at twenty or twenty-five per cent. discount, as the price then was. About two hundred thousand pounds of them they paid to clothiers of the army, and others; and all the rest, being above ninety thousand pounds, have been subscribed into the South Sea Company for the use of the public."

When the Earl of Godolphin was removed from his employment, he left a debt upon the navy of —— millions,[9] all contracted under his administration,[10] which had no Parliament-security, and was daily increased. Neither could I ever learn, whether that lord had the smallest prospect of clearing this incumbrance, or whether there were policy, negligence, or despair at the bottom of this unaccountable management. But the consequences were visible and ruinous; for by this means navy-bills grew to be forty per cent. discount, and upwards; and almost every kind of stores, bought by the navy and victualling offices, cost the government double rates, and sometimes more: so that the public hath directly lost several millions upon this one article, without any sort of necessity, that I could ever hear assigned by the ablest vindicators of that party.

[Footnote 9: "Of millions" in original. "Of —— millions" in 1775. [W.S.J.]]

[Footnote 10: See "The Examiner," No. 45, and note in vol. ix. of this edition, p. 295. [W.S.J.]]

In this oppressed and entangled state was the kingdom, with relation to its debts, when the Queen removed the Earl of Godolphin from his office, and put it into commission, of which the present treasurer was one. This person had been chosen speaker successively to three Parliaments, was afterwards secretary of state, and always in great esteem with the Queen for his wisdom and fidelity. The late ministry, about two years before their fall, had prevailed with Her Majesty, much against her inclination, to dismiss him from her service; for which they cannot be justly blamed, since he had endeavoured the same thing against them, and very narrowly failed; which makes it the more extraordinary that he should succeed in a second attempt against those very adversaries, who had such fair warning by the first. He is firm and steady in his resolutions, not easily diverted from them after he hath once possessed himself of an opinion that they are right, nor very communicative where he can act by himself, being taught by experience, that a secret is seldom safe in more than one breast. That which occurs to other men after mature deliberation, offers to him as his first thoughts; so that he decides immediately what is best to be done, and therefore is seldom at a loss upon sudden exigencies. He thinks it a more easy and safe rule in politics to watch incidents as they come, and then turn them to the advantage of what he pursues, than pretend to foresee them at a great distance. Fear, cruelty, avarice, and pride, are wholly strangers to his nature; but he is not without ambition. There is one thing peculiar in his temper, which I altogether disapprove, and do not remember to have heard or met with in any other man's character: I mean, an easiness and indifference under any imputation, although he be never so innocent, and although the strongest probabilities and appearance are against him; so that I have known him often suspected by his nearest friends, for some months, in points of the highest importance, to a degree, that they were ready to break with him, and only undeceived by time and accident. His detractors, who charge him with cunning, are but ill acquainted with his character; for, in the sense they take the word, and as it is usually understood, I know no man to whom that mean talent could be with less justice applied, as the conduct of affairs, while he hath been at the helm, doth clearly demonstrate, very contrary to the nature and principles of cunning, which is always employed in serving little turns, proposing little ends, and supplying daily exigencies by little shifts and expedients. But to rescue a prince out of the hands of insolent subjects, bent upon such designs as must probably end in the ruin of the government; to find out means for paying such exorbitant debts as this nation hath been involved in, and reduce it to a better management; to make a potent enemy offer advantageous terms of peace, and deliver up the most important fortress of his kingdom, as a security;[11] and this against all the opposition, mutually raised and inflamed by parties and allies; such performances can only be called cunning by those whose want of understanding, or of candour, puts them upon finding ill names for great qualities of the mind, which themselves do neither possess, nor can form any just conception of. However, it must be allowed, that an obstinate love of secrecy in this minister seems, at distance, to have some resemblance of cunning; for he is not only very retentive of secrets, but appears to be so too, which I number amongst his defects. He hath been blamed by his friends for refusing to discover his intentions, even in those points where the wisest man may have need of advice and assistance, and some have censured him, upon that account, as if he were jealous of power but he hath been heard to answer, "That he seldom did otherwise, without cause to repent"

[Footnote 11: This is surely a piece of Swift's partiality for Oxford; since it practically deprives Bolingbroke of whatever credit was his for the Peace of Utrecht, and that was not a little; certainly more than may be given to Oxford. [T.S.]]

However, so undistinguished a caution cannot, in my opinion, be justified, by which the owner loseth many advantages, and whereof all men, who deserved to be confided in, may with some reason complain. His love of procrastination (wherein doubtless nature hath her share) may probably be increased by the same means, but this is an imputation laid upon many other great ministers, who, like men under too heavy a load, let fall that which is of the least consequence, and go back to fetch it when their shoulders are free, for time is often gained, as well as lost, by delay, which at worst is a fault on the securer side.[12] Neither probably is this minister answerable for half the clamour raised against him upon that article: his endeavours are wholly turned upon the general welfare of his country, but perhaps with too little regard to that of particular persons, which renders him less amiable, than he would otherwise have been from the goodness of his humour, and agreeable conversation in a private capacity, and with few dependers. Yet some allowance may perhaps be given to this failing, which is one of the greatest he hath, since he cannot be more careless of other men's fortunes than he is of his own. He is master of a very great and faithful memory, which is of mighty use in the management of public affairs; and I believe there are few examples to be produced in any age, of a person who hath passed through so many employments in the state, endowed with a great share, both of divine and human learning.

[Footnote 12: Unfortunately, procrastination too often ended for Harley in very unpleasant results, and it is not too much to say, this failing was the indirect cause of his downfall. Swift's character of Oxford, as given in this "History," should be compared with that given of him in "An Enquiry into the Behaviour of the Queen's Last Ministry" (vol v, pp 431-434, of present edition). Dr William King, to whom Swift had written in 1736, for certain dates and official extracts to be included in this "History," wrote to Swift (December 7th, 1736), referring to this very matter of Oxford's character. As the letter applies to some other portions of this "History," it will be better if it be given here.

"London, December 7th, 1736

SIR,

I arrived here yesterday [King had been on a visit to Paris], and I am now ready to obey your commands. I hope you are come to a positive resolution concerning the History. You need not hesitate about the dates, or the references which are to be made to any public papers, for I can supply them without the least trouble. As well as I remember, there is but one of those public pieces which you determined should be inserted at length; I mean Sir Thomas Hanmer's Representation; this I have now by me. If you incline to publish the two tracts as an Appendix to the History, you will be pleased to see if the character given of the Earl of Oxford in the pamphlet of 1715 agrees with the character given of the same person in the History. Perhaps on a review, you may think proper to leave one of them quite out. You have (I think) barely mentioned the attempt of Guiscard, and the quarrel between Rechteren and Mesnager. But as these are facts which are probably now forgot or unknown, it would not be amiss if they were related at large in the notes, which may be done from the Gazettes, or any other newspapers of those times," etc. See Sir W. Scott's edit, vol xix, pp 20-21 [T.S.]]

I am persuaded that foreigners, as well as those at home, who live too remote from the scene of business to be rightly informed, will not be displeased with this account of a person, who in the space of two years, hath been so highly instrumental in changing the face of affairs in Europe, and hath deserved so well of his own Prince and country.[13]

[Footnote 13: See also Swift's "Enquiry" (vol. v., pp. 425-476). [W.S.J.]]

In that perplexed condition of the public debts, which I have already described, this minister was brought into the treasury and exchequer, and had the chief direction of affairs. His first regulation was that of exchequer bills, which, to the great discouragement of public credit, and scandal to the crown, were three per cent. less in value than the sums specified in them. The present treasurer, being then chancellor of the exchequer, procured an Act of Parliament, by which the Bank of England should be obliged, in consideration of forty-five thousand pounds, to accept and circulate those bills without any discount. He then proceeded to stop the depredations of those who dealt in remittances of money to the army, who, by unheard of exactions in that kind of traffic, had amassed prodigious wealth at the public cost, to which the Earl of Godolphin had given too much way,[14] possibly by neglect; for I think he cannot be accused of corruption.

[Footnote 14: Added in the author's own handwriting. [ORIGINAL NOTE.] P. Fitzgerald gives the addition as "either through ignorance, connivance, or neglect." [W.S.J.]]

But the new treasurer's chief concern was to restore the credit of the nation, by finding some settlement for unprovided debts, amounting in the whole to ten millions, which hung on the public as a load equally heavy and disgraceful, without any prospect of being removed, and which former ministers never had the care or courage to inspect. He resolved to go at once to the bottom of this evil; and having computed and summed up the debt of the navy, and victualling, ordnance, and transport of the army, and transport debentures made out for the service of the last war, of the general mortgage tallies for the year one thousand seven hundred and ten, and some other deficiencies, he then found out a fund of interest sufficient to answer all this, which, being applied to other uses, could not raise present money for the war, but in a very few years would clear the debt it was engaged for. The intermediate accruing interest was to be paid by the treasurer of the navy; and, as a farther advantage to the creditors, they should be erected into a company for trading to the South Seas, and for encouragement of fishery. When all this was fully prepared and digested, he made a motion in the House of Commons (who deferred extremely to his judgment and abilities) for paying the debts of the navy, and other unprovided deficiencies, without entering into particulars, which was immediately voted. But a sudden stop was put to this affair by an unforeseen accident. The chancellor of the exchequer (which was then his title) being stabbed with a penknife, the following day, at the Cockpit, in the midst of a dozen lords of the council, by the Sieur de Guiscard, a French papist; the circumstances of which fact being not within the compass of this History, I shall only observe, that after two months' confinement, and frequent danger of his life, he returned to his seat in Parliament.[15]

[Footnote 15: See the particular account in "The Examiner." [ORIGINAL NOTE.] The reference is to Nos. 33, 41, and 42 of that paper (see vol. ix, of this edition). [W.S.J.]]

The overtures made by this minister, of paying so vast a debt, under the pressures of a long war, and the difficulty of finding supplies for continuing it, was, during the time of his illness, ridiculed by his enemies as an impracticable and visionary project: and when, upon his return to the House, he had explained his proposal, the very proprietors of the debt were, many of them, prevailed on to oppose it; although the obtaining this trade, either through Old Spain, or directly to the Spanish West Indies, had been one principal end we aimed at by this war. However, the bill passed; and, as an immediate consequence, the naval bills rose to about twenty per cent., nor ever fell within ten of their discount. Another good effect of this work appeared by the parliamentary lotteries, which have been since erected. The last of that kind, under the former ministry, was eleven weeks in filling; whereas the first, under the present, was filled in a very few hours, although it cost the government less; and the others, which followed, were full before the Acts concerning them could pass. And to prevent incumbrances of this kind from growing for the future, he took care, by the utmost parsimony, or by suspending payments, where they seemed less to press, that all stores for the navy should be bought with ready money; by which cent. per cent. hath been saved in that mighty article of our expense, as will appear from an account taken at the victualling office on the 9th of August, one thousand seven hundred and twelve. And the payment of the interest was less a burthen upon the navy, by the stores being bought at so cheap a rate.

It might look invidious to enter into farther particulars upon this head, but of smaller moment. What I have above related, may serve to shew in how ill a condition the kingdom stood, with relation to its debts, by the corruption as well as negligence of former management; and what prudent, effectual measures have since been taken to provide for old incumbrances, and hinder the running into new. This may be sufficient for the information of the reader, perhaps already tired with a subject so little entertaining as that of accounts: I shall therefore now return to relate some of the principal matters that passed in Parliament, during this session.

Upon the eighteenth of January the House of Lords sent down a bill to the Commons, for fixing the precedence of the Hanover family, which probably had been forgot in the Acts for settling the succession of the crown. That of Henry VIII. which gives the rank to princes of the blood, carries it no farther than to nephews, nieces, and grandchildren of the crown, by virtue of which the Princess Sophia is a princess of the blood, as niece to King Charles I of England, and precedes accordingly, but this privilege doth not descend to her son the Elector, or the electoral prince. To supply which defect, and pay a compliment to the presumptive heirs of the crown, this bill, as appeareth by the preamble, was recommended by Her Majesty to the House of Lords, which the Commons, to shew their zeal for every thing that might be thought to concern the interest or honour of that illustrious family, ordered to be read thrice, passed nemine contradicente and returned to the Lords, without any amendment, on the very day it was sent down.

But the House seemed to have nothing more at heart than a strict inquiry into the state of the nation, with respect to foreign alliances. Some discourses had been published in print, about the beginning of the session, boldly complaining of certain articles in the Barrier Treaty, concluded about three years since by the Lord Viscount Townshend, between Great Britain and the States General, and shewing, in many particulars, the unequal conduct of these powers in our alliance, in furnishing their quotas and supplies. It was asserted by the same writers, "That these hardships, put upon England, had been countenanced and encouraged by a party here at home, in order to preserve their power, which could be no otherwise maintained than by continuing the war, as well as by Her Majesty's general abroad, upon account of his own peculiar interest and grandeur." These loud accusations spreading themselves throughout the kingdom, delivered in facts directly charged, and thought, whether true or not, to be but weakly confuted, had sufficiently prepared the minds of the people, and, by putting arguments into every body's mouth, had filled the town and country with controversies, both in writing and discourse. The point appeared to be of great consequence, whether the war continued or not for, in the former case, it was necessary that the allies should be brought to a more equal regulation, and that the States in particular, for whom Her Majesty had done such great things, should explain and correct those articles in the Barrier Treaty which were prejudicial to Britain, and, in either case, it was fit the people should have at least the satisfaction of knowing by whose counsels, and for what designs, they had been so hardly treated.

In order to this great inquiry, the Barrier Treaty, with all other treaties and agreements entered into between Her Majesty and her allies, during the present war, for the raising and augmenting the proportions for the service thereof, were, by the Queen's directions, laid before the House.

Several resolutions were drawn up, and reported at different times, upon the deficiencies of the allies in furnishing their quotas, upon certain articles in the Barrier Treaty, and upon the state of the war; by all which it appeared, that whatever had been charged by public discourses in print against the late ministry, and the conduct of the allies, was much less than the truth. Upon these resolutions (by one of which the Lord Viscount Townshend, who negotiated and signed the Barrier Treaty, was declared an enemy to the Queen and kingdom), and upon some farther directions to the committee, a Representation was formed; and soon after the Commons in a body presented it to the Queen, the endeavours of the adverse party not prevailing to have it re-committed.

This Representation (supposed to be the work of Sir Thomas Hanmer's[16] pen) is written with much energy and spirit, and will be a very useful authentic record, for the assistance of those who at any time shall undertake to write the history of the present times.

[Footnote 16: But to which the Dean himself contributed a large share. Ṣ Swift writes in his "Journal," under date February 21st: "I left them at 7, being engaged to go to Sir Tho. Hanmer, who desired I would see him at that hour. His business was, that I would help him to draw up the representation, which I consented to do" (vol. ii., p. 340). [W.S.J.]]

I did intend, for brevity sake, to have given the reader only an abstract of it; but, upon trial, found myself unequal to such a task, without injuring so excellent a piece. And although I think historical relations are but ill patched up with long transcripts already printed, which, upon that account, I have hitherto avoided; yet this being the sum of all debates and resolutions of the House of Commons in that great affair of the war, I conceived it could not well be omitted.[1]

[Footnote 17: This "Representation" was printed by S. Keble by order of the Speaker, and is also to be found in the "Journals of the House of Commons," vol. xvii., pp. 119-123. [W.S.J.]]

"MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN,

"We your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled, having nothing so much at heart, as to enable your Majesty to bring this long and expensive war to an honourable and happy conclusion, have taken it into our most serious consideration, how the necessary supplies to be provided by us may be best applied, and the common cause may in the most effectual manner be carried on, by the united force of the whole confederacy; we have thought ourselves obliged, in duty to your Majesty, and in discharge of the trust reposed in us, to inquire into the true state of the war, in all its parts; we have examined what stipulations have been entered into between your Majesty and your allies; and how far such engagements have on each side been made good. We have considered the different interests which the confederates have in the success of this war, and the different shares they have contributed to its support: we have with our utmost care and diligence endeavoured to discover the nature, extent, and charge of it, to the end, that by comparing the weight thereof with our own strength, we might adapt the one to the other in such measure, as neither to continue your Majesty's subjects under a heavier burden, than in reason and justice they ought to bear; nor deceive your Majesty, your allies, and ourselves, by undertaking more than the nation in its present circumstances is able to perform.

"Your Majesty has been graciously pleased, upon our humble applications, to order such materials to be laid before us, as have furnished us with the necessary information upon the particulars we have inquired into; and when we shall have laid before your Majesty our observations, and humble advice upon this subject, we promise to ourselves this happy fruit from it, that if your Majesty's generous and good purposes, for the procuring a safe and lasting peace, should, through the obstinacy of the enemy, or by any other means, be unhappily defeated, a true knowledge and understanding of the past conduct of the war will be the best foundation for a more frugal and equal management of it for the time to come.

"In order to take the more perfect view of what we proposed, and that we might be able to set the whole before your Majesty in a true light, we have thought it necessary to go back to the beginning of the war, and beg leave to observe the motives and reasons, upon which his late Majesty King William engaged first in it. The treaty of the Grand Alliance, explains those reasons to be for the supporting the pretensions of his Imperial Majesty, then actually engaged in a war with the French King, who had usurped the entire Spanish monarchy for his grandson the Duke of Anjou; and for the assisting the States General, who, by the loss of their barrier against France, were then in the same, or a more dangerous condition, than if they were actually invaded. As these were the just and necessary motives for undertaking this war, so the ends proposed to be obtained by it, were equally wise and honourable; for as they are set forth in the eighth article of the same treaty, they appear to have been the procuring an equitable and reasonable satisfaction to his Imperial Majesty, and sufficient securities for the dominions, provinces, navigation, and commerce of the King of Great Britain, and the States General, and the making effectual provision, that the two kingdoms of France and Spain should never be united under the same government; and particularly, that the French should never get into the possession of the Spanish West Indies, or be permitted to sail thither, upon the account of traffic, under any pretence whatsoever; and lastly, the securing to the subjects of the King of Great Britain, and the States General, all the same privileges, and rights of commerce, throughout the whole dominions of Spain, as they enjoyed before the death of Charles the Second King of Spain, by virtue of any treaty, agreement, or custom, or any other way whatsoever. For the obtaining these ends, the three confederated powers engaged to assist one another with their whole force, according to such proportions as should be specified in a particular convention, afterwards to be made for that purpose: we do not find that any such convention was ever ratified; but it appears, that there was an agreement concluded, which, by common consent, was understood to be binding upon each party respectively, and according to which the proportions of Great Britain were from the beginning regulated and founded. The terms of that agreement were, That for the service at land, his Imperial Majesty should furnish ninety thousand men, the King of Great Britain forty thousand, and the States General one hundred and two thousand, of which there were forty-two thousand intended to supply their garrisons, and sixty thousand to act against the common enemy in the field; and with regard to the operations of the war at sea, they were agreed to be performed jointly by Great Britain and the States General, the quota of ships to be furnished for that service being five-eighths on the part of Great Britain, and three-eighths on the part of the States General.

"Upon this foot, the war began in the year one thousand seven hundred and two, at which time the whole yearly expense of it to England amounted to three millions, seven hundred and six thousand four hundred ninety-four pounds; a very great charge, as it was then thought by your Majesty's subjects, after the short interval of ease they had enjoyed from the burden of the former war, but yet a very moderate proportion, in comparison with the load which hath since been laid upon them: for it appears, by estimates given in to your Commons, that the sums necessary to carry on the service for this present year, in the same manner as it was performed the last year, amount to more than six millions nine hundred and sixty thousand pounds, besides interest for the public debts, and the deficiencies accruing the last year, which two articles require one million one hundred and forty-three thousand pounds more: so that the whole demands upon your Commons are arisen to more than eight millions for the present annual supply. We know your Majesty's tender regard for the welfare of your people, will make it uneasy to you to hear of so great a pressure as this upon them; and as we are assured, it will fully convince your Majesty of the necessity of our present inquiry; so we beg leave to represent to you, from what causes, and by what steps, this immense charge appears to have grown upon us.

"The service at sea, as it has been very large and extensive in itself, so it has been carried on, through the whole course of the war, in a manner highly disadvantageous to your Majesty and your kingdom: for the necessity of affairs requiring that great fleets should be fitted out every year, as well for the maintaining a superiority in the Mediterranean, as for opposing any force which the enemy might prepare, either at Dunkirk, or in the ports of West France, your Majesty's example and readiness in fitting out your proportion of ships, for all parts of that service, have been so far from prevailing with the States General to keep pace with you, that they have been deficient every year to a great degree, in proportion to what your Majesty hath furnished; sometimes no less than two-thirds, and generally more than half of their quota: from hence your Majesty has been obliged, for the preventing disappointments in the most pressing services, to supply those deficiencies by additional reinforcements of your own ships; nor hath the single increase of such a charge been the only ill consequence that attended it; for by this means the debt of the navy hath been enhanced, so that the discounts arising upon the credit of it have affected all other parts of the service. From the same cause, your Majesty's ships of war have been forced in greater numbers to continue in remote seas, and at unseasonable times of the year, to the great damage and decay of the British navy. This also hath been the occasion that your Majesty hath been straitened in your convoys for trade; your coasts have been exposed, for want of a sufficient number of cruisers to guard them; and you have been disabled from annoying the enemy, in their most beneficial commerce with the West Indies, from whence they received those vast supplies of treasure, without which they could not have supported the expenses of this war.

"That part of the war which hath been carried on in Flanders, was at first immediately necessary to the security of the States General, and hath since brought them great acquisitions, both of revenue and dominion; yet even there the original proportions have been departed from, and, during the course of the war, have been sinking by degrees on the part of Holland; so that in this last year, we find the number in which they fell short of their three-fifths, to your Majesty's two-fifths, have been twenty thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven men: we are not unmindful, that in the year one thousand seven hundred and three, a treaty was made between the two nations, for a joint augmentation of twenty thousand men, wherein the proportions were varied, and England consented to take half upon itself. But it having been annexed as an express condition to the grant of the said augmentation in Parliament, that the States General should prohibit all trade and commerce with France, and that condition having not been performed by them, the Commons think it reasonable, that the first rule of three to two ought to have taken place again, as well in that as in other subsequent augmentations, more especially when they consider, that the revenues of those rich provinces which have been conquered, would, if they were duly applied, maintain a great number of new additional forces against the common enemy; notwithstanding which, the States General have raised none upon that account, but make use of those fresh supplies of money, only to ease themselves in the charge of their first established quota.

"As in the progress of the war in Flanders, a disproportion was soon created to the prejudice of England; so the very beginning of the war in Portugal, brought an unequal share of burden upon us; for although the Emperor and the States General were equally parties with your Majesty in the treaty with the King of Portugal, yet the Emperor neither furnishing his third part of the troops and subsidies stipulated for, nor the Dutch consenting to take an equal share of his Imperial Majesty's defect upon themselves, your Majesty hath been obliged to furnish two-thirds of the entire expense created by that service. Nor has the inequality stopped there; for ever since the year one thousand seven hundred and six, when the English and Dutch forces marched out of Portugal into Castile, the States General have entirely abandoned the war in Portugal, and left your Majesty to prosecute it singly at your own charge, which you have accordingly done, by replacing a greater number of troops there, than even at first you took upon you to provide. At the same time your Majesty's generous endeavours for the support and defence of the King of Portugal, have been but ill seconded by that Prince himself; for notwithstanding that by his treaty he had obliged himself to furnish twelve thousand foot, and three thousand horse, upon his own account, besides eleven thousand foot, and two thousand horse more, in consideration of a subsidy paid him; yet, according to the best information your Commons can procure, it appears, that he hath scarce at any time furnished thirteen thousand men in the whole.

"In Spain the war hath been yet more unequal, and burdensome to your Majesty, than in any other branch of it; for being commenced without any treaty whatsoever, the allies have almost wholly declined taking any part of it upon themselves. A small body of English and Dutch troops were sent thither in the year one thousand seven hundred and five, not as being thought sufficient to support a regular war, or to make the conquest of so large a country; but with a view only of assisting the Spaniards to set King Charles upon the throne; occasioned by the great assurances which were given of their inclinations to the House of Austria: but this expectation failing, England was insensibly drawn into an established war, under all the disadvantages of the distance of the place, and the feeble efforts of the other allies. The account we have to lay before your Majesty, upon this head, is, that although the undertaking was entered upon at the particular and earnest request of the imperial court, and for a cause of no less importance and concern to them, than the reducing the Spanish monarchy to the House of Austria; yet neither the late emperors, nor his present Imperial Majesty, have ever had any forces there on their own account, till the last year; and then, only one regiment of foot, consisting of two thousand men. Though the States General have contributed something more to this service, yet their share also hath been inconsiderable; for in the space of four years, from one thousand seven hundred and five, to one thousand seven hundred and eight, both inclusive, all the forces they have sent into that country have not exceeded twelve thousand two hundred men; and from the year one thousand seven hundred and eight to this time, they have not sent any forces or recruits whatsoever. To your Majesty's care and charge the recovery of that kingdom hath been in a manner wholly left, as if none else were interested or concerned in it. And the forces which your Majesty hath sent into Spain, in the space of seven years, from one thousand seven hundred and five to one thousand seven hundred and eleven, both inclusive, have amounted to no less than fifty-seven thousand nine hundred seventy-three men; besides thirteen battalions and eighteen squadrons, for which your Majesty hath paid a subsidy to the Emperor.

"How great the established expense of such a number of men hath been, your Majesty very well knows, and your Commons very sensibly feel; but the weight will be found much greater, when it is considered how many heavy articles of unusual and extraordinary charge have attended this remote and difficult service, all which have been entirely defrayed by your Majesty, except that one of transporting the few forces, which were sent by the States General, and the victualling of them during their transportation only. The accounts delivered to your Commons shew, that the charge of your Majesty's ships and vessels, employed in the service of the war in Spain and Portugal, reckoned after the rate of four pounds a man per month, from the time they sailed from hence, till they returned, were lost, or put upon other services, hath amounted to six millions five hundred and forty thousand nine hundred and sixty-six pounds fourteen shillings: the charge of transports on the part of Great Britain, for carrying on the war in Spain and Portugal, from the beginning of it till this time, hath amounted to one million three hundred thirty-six thousand seven hundred and nineteen pounds, nineteen shillings, and elevenpence; that of victualling land forces for the same service, to five hundred eighty-three thousand seven hundred and seventy pounds, eight shillings, and sixpence; and that of contingencies, and other extraordinaries for the same service, to one million eight hundred and forty thousand three hundred and fifty-three pounds.