"And, curiously, you never mentioned to me anything of the agreement as having taken place then, nor in the paper you communicated to me was there any mention of one, nor did Pratt know of any. It is only more recently that the fiction took shape. 'The wish father to the thought,' or the statement repeated till it has become believed by the—, [37] this is common.

"Now I would like to urge you, from the practical point of view, to drop any such foolishness. The vital thing, and nothing else counts, is what Dewey said and did when he at last met Aguinaldo. That, that, that, is the thing, all else is empty wind.

"Supposing that Pratt and Wildman had covered inches of paper with 'Clauses' and put on a ton of sealing wax as consular seals, what, pray, to any common sense mind would all that have been worth? Nothing!! Nothing!! And yet, where is the agreement, where is the seal? Where are there any signatures? And if you had them—waste paper—believe me, that all this potter about Pratt and Wildman is energy misdirected. The sole thing to have impressed upon the public in America would be the chaining of Dewey and Aguinaldo together as participants in common action; you surely comprehend this means! Think and think again; it means success as far as it is possible. The other work is not only lost, but does not gain much sympathy, especially this criticism of the conduct of American troops; things may be true that are not expedient to say. Sink everything into Dewey-Aguinaldo cooeperation, that was on both sides honest even if it did not imply any actual arrangement, which, of course, Dewey himself could not make. That here you have the facts,—undenied—incontrovertible." [38]

The following letter of Bray to Aguinaldo, dated January 12, 1899, seems to me to throw much light on the question of how these claims relative to the promised recognition of Filipino independence sometimes originated and were bolstered up:—

"With regard to your proclamation, there is still a trump card to be played. Did you not say that the basis of any negotiation in Singapore was the Independence of the Philippines under an American protectorate? This is what Consul Pratt telegraphed and to which Dewey and Washington agreed; as I figured up the 'price' of the telegram, I know very well what occurred, and I am ready to state it and to swear to it when the proper time comes. There are five of us against one in the event of Consul Pratt receiving instructions to deny it. Furthermore, Mr. St. Clair knows what happened and I am certain that he also would testify. St. Clair still has the rough draft as an histerical relic, and St. Clair is a true and loyal friend of yours, as is your humble servant." [39]

The utter unscrupulousness of Bray is shown by his claim that St. Clair would confirm his false statements, made as it was after receiving St. Clair's letter above quoted.

But Bray did not wait for Aguinaldo to play this trump card. He tried to play it himself by cabling Senator Hoar, on the same day, that as the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American government through the consul at Singapore he was prepared to swear that the conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey were independence under a protectorate. [40]

Let us now trace Aguinaldo's subsequent movements, and see what promises, if any, were made to him by Wildman and Dewey. He had returned to Hongkong with two companions, all travelling under assumed names. Only his most trusted friends among the members of the junta were at first allowed to know where he was living.

His situation was a difficult one. It was necessary for him to come to some sort of a temporary arrangement with Artacho, if he was to avoid legal difficulties, and to reestablish himself with some of his companions, who had accused him of deserting with the intention of going to Europe to live on money which belonged to them. When harmony had been temporarily restored through the good offices of Sandico, Aguinaldo had an interview with Consul General Wildman. He has since claimed that Wildman, too, promised him independence, but the truth seems to be that he himself said he was anxious to become an American citizen. This being impossible, he wanted to return to the Philippines and place himself under Dewey's orders. He wanted to help throw off the yoke of Spain, and this done, would abide by the decision of the United States as to the fate of the Philippines. [41]

Any claim that Aguinaldo had been promised independence by Wildman, or, indeed, that the latter had been allowed to know that the Filipinos desired it, seems to me to be negatived, not only by Wildman's own statements, but by a letter from Agoncillo to Aguinaldo written on August 5, 1908, in which he says:—

"The American consul left my house to-day at 3 o'clock, as I had requested an interview with him before his departure, and I was unable to go to the Consulate on account of the swelling of my feet. From our conversation I infer that independence will be given to us. I did not, however, disclose to him our true desires.... Said consul approved my telegram to McKinley, which has been sent to-day through him, a copy of which is herewith enclosed. If they accept our representative in the commission, we may arrive at a friendly understanding, and it will enable us to prepare for the fight in case they refuse to listen to our request. On the other hand, if at the very beginning they refuse to admit our representative, we will at once be in a position to know what should be done, i.e. to prepare for war." [42]

On May 4, 1898, the Hongkong junta voted that Aguinaldo ought to go to the Philippines, and go he did. It would seem that he at first gave up the idea of joining Dewey, for on May 11 he wrote a cipher letter, giving minute directions for the preparation of signals to assist his ship in making land, by day or by night, at Dingalan Bay on the east coast of Luzon; directing the capture of the town of San Antonio, just back of Capones Islands, in Zambales, and ending with the words: "We will surely arrive at one of the two places above mentioned, so you must be prepared."

Something led him again to change his mind, and he finally sailed on the McCulloch.

In his "Resena Veridica" written later for political purposes, Aguinaldo has definitely claimed that Dewey promised him that the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipino people. I will let him tell his own story, confronting his statements with those of the admiral.

"May 19, 1898.

"The McCulloch started at eleven o'clock on the morning of the 17th of May for the Philippines; we anchored, between twelve and one o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th, in the waters of Cavite, and immediately the launch of the Admiral—with his aid and private secretary—came to convey me to the Olympia, where I was received, with my aid, Sr. Leyva, with the honors of a general, by a section of marine guards." [43]

Relative to this matter, Admiral Dewey has testified: [44]

"The Chairman. You, of course, never saluted the flag?

Admiral Dewey. Certainly not; and I do not think I ever called Aguinaldo anything but Don Emilio; I don't think I ever called him 'General.'

The Chairman. And when he came on board ship was he received with any special honors at the side?

Admiral Dewey. Never."

The "Resena Veridica" continues:—

"The Admiral received me in a salon, and after greetings of courtesy I asked him 'if all the telegrams relative to myself which he had addressed to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt, were true.' He replied in the affirmative, and added, 'that the United States had come to the Philippines to protect its natives and free them from the yoke of Spain.'

"He said, moreover, that 'America was rich in territory and money, and needed no colonies,' concluding by assuring me, 'to have no doubt whatever about the recognition of Philippine independence by the United States.' Thereupon he asked me if I could get the people to arise against the Spaniards and carry on a rapid campaign." [45]

As we have seen, Dewey sent only one telegram to Pratt about Aguinaldo. It merely directed that the latter be sent.

"I then expressed to him my profound acknowledgement for the generous help which the United States was giving the Filipino people, as well as my admiration for the magnificence and goodness of the American people. I also stated to him that 'before leaving Hongkong, the Filipino Colony had held a meeting, at which was discussed and considered the possibility that—after defeating the Spaniards—the Filipinos might have a war with the Americans, if they should refuse to recognize our independence, who were sure to defeat us because they should find us tired out, poor in ammunitions and worn out in the war against the Spaniards,' requesting that he pardon my frankness.

"The Admiral replied that he 'was delighted at my sincerity, and believed that both Filipinos and Americans should treat each other as allies and friends, clearly explaining all doubts for the better understanding between both parties,' and added that, 'so he had been informed, the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipino people, guaranteed by the word of honor of the Americans,—more binding than documents which may remain unfulfilled when it is desired to fail in them as happened with the compacts signed by the Spaniards, advising me to form at once a Filipino national flag, offering in virtue thereof to recognize and protect it before the other nations, which were represented by the various squadrons then in the Bay; although he said we should conquer the power from the Spaniards before floating said flag, so that the act should be more honourable in the sight of the whole world, and, above all, before the United States, in order that when the Filipino ships with their national flag would pass before the foreign squadrons they should inspire respect and esteem.'

"Again I thanked the Admiral for his good advice and generous offers, informing him that if the sacrifice of my life was necessary to honor the Admiral before the United States, I was then ready to sacrifice it.

"I added that under such conditions I could assure him that all the Filipino people would unite in the revolution to shake off the yoke of Spain; that it was not strange that some few were not yet on his side on account of lack of arms or because of personal expediency.

"Thus ended this first conference with Admiral Dewey, to whom I announced that I would take up my residence at the Naval Headquarters in the Cavite Arsenal." [46]

Further on, in the same document, Aguinaldo advances the claim that on the occasion of the visit of General Anderson and Admiral Dewey the latter again promised him independence.

He says:—

"In the same month of July, the Admiral, accompanied by General Anderson, presented himself, and after greetings of courtesy said to me: 'You have seen confirmed all of what I promised and said to you. How pretty your flag is. It has a triangle, and it looks like Cuba's. Will you give me one as a reminder when I return to America?'

"I replied to him that I was convinced of his word of honour and that there was no necessity whatever to draw up in documentary form his agreements, and as for the flag, that he could count on it, even at that very moment.

"Dewey continued: 'Documents are not complied with when there is no honour, as has happened with your agreement with the Spaniards, who have failed in what was written and signed. Trust in my word for I hold myself responsible that the United States will recognize the independence of the country. But I recommend to you [plural.—TR.] to keep everything which we have talked about and agreed upon with a great deal of secrecy for the present. And, moreover, I entreat you [plural.—TR.] to be patient if our soldiers should insult some Filipino, because, as volunteers, they are yet lacking in discipline.'" [47]

Admiral Dewey has testified as follows, concerning the recognition of Philippine independence by him:—

"The Chairman. You remember the question of your recognizing his republic was a good deal discussed and you wrote me a letter, which I read in the senate. Of course, I am only asking now about what you said in the letter. There was no recognition of the republic?

"Admiral Dewey. Never. I did not think I had any authority to do it and it never occurred to me to do it. There was a sort of a reign of terror; there was no government. These people had got power for the first time in their lives and they were riding roughshod over the community. The acts of cruelty which were brought to my notice were hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treat his prisoners kindly, and he said he would."

He has further testified that he never as much as heard of independence until the appearance of Aguinaldo's proclamation of June 15, 1898:—

"Admiral Dewey.... Then when I heard that our troops were coming I asked him to withdraw his troops from Cavite and make room for our men. He demurred at this, but finally withdrew and established headquarters across the bay at a place called Bacoor, from which place on the 15th of June he sent me a proclamation declaring the independence of the Philippines.

"The Chairman. Was that the first?

"Admiral Dewey. That was the first intimation; the first I had ever heard of independence of the Philippines.

"The Chairman. He had said something to you—

"Admiral Dewey. Not a word. He had done what I told him. He was most obedient; whatever I told him to do he did. I attached so little importance to this proclamation that I did not even cable its contents to Washington, but forwarded it through the mails. I never dreamed that they wanted independence."

Remembering that Admiral Dewey was not being interrogated as to the statements of the "Resena Veridica," it will be seen that he has, nevertheless, covered them fully.

It was my good fortune to be long and intimately associated with Admiral Dewey while serving on the first Philippine commission. He always grew indignant when the subject of any promises relative to independence said to have been made by him was so much as mentioned, and gave to the commission in writing the following:—

"The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, under date of Sept. 23, published in the Springfield Republican, so far as it relates to reported conversations with me, or actions of mine, is a tissue of falsehood. I never, directly or indirectly, promised the Filipinos independence. I never received Aguinaldo with military honors, or recognized or saluted the so-called Filipino flag. I never considered him as an ally, although I did make use of him and the natives to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards." [48]

As Dewey's allegations flatly contradict those of Aguinaldo, we must choose between the two. While I have no doubt as to where the choice will fall, I will now submit some additional matter of interest. Let us first consider the history of the "Resena Veridica" in which Aguinaldo makes the charges above quoted. On September 12, 1899, Buencamino wrote of it to Apacible in Hongkong, saying:—

"This work is entitled 'Resena Veridica de la Revolucion Filipina' in which Don Emilio relates in detail his acts with Admiral Dewey. It has been distributed to the Consuls and you are ordered to reprint it there translated into English and send some copies to the United States, even though only a thousand, if you deem it advisable. Send copies also to Europe, Senor Agoncillo taking charge of the publication. If the Agent you may have selected for the United States should still be there, it would be advisable for him to take a copy of the pamphlet with him for its publication.

"This is an order of the Government which I take pleasure in transmitting to you for due execution." [49]

But there was a change of heart about giving the pamphlet to the consuls, for under date of September 30 Buencamino wrote:—

"We have not distributed them here in order that Otis may not counteract the effects that we desire to produce with this publication, through his usual machinations. Nor do we believe it advisable to make this pamphlet public in those colonies before your arrival in the United States." [50]

To this letter he added in cipher the following postscript to Pablo Ocampo, in charge of Aguinaldo's correspondence in Manila:—

"At last moment—Nota bene:

"Don't deliver any copy of the 'Resena Veridica' to the Consuls, even though it was so directed in the beginning of the letter. All except one, which is for you, will be sent to Hong-kong, Don Pedro de la Vina being bearer of the same, as also of the other documents. The copy intended for you is neither to be divulged nor published, for strict reserve is required until those which are being sent arrive at their destination." [51]

The reason for preserving such secrecy relative to this document until it could reach its destination and work its harm is of course obvious. Its statements were so outrageously false that they would have been instantly and authoritatively contradicted had it been issued seasonably at Manila.

The truth is that Aguinaldo's claim that he had been promised independence was a gradual growth. Let us trace it.

On May 21, he wrote a circular letter to "My dear brother," inviting the recipients and their companions to meet him at once, and arrange the best way to entrap all the enemy in their homes.

In this he says that he has promised the American admiral that they will "carry on modern war" and adds: "Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned and treated well, and then you will see that our reputation will be very good in all Europe, which will declare for our independence; but if we do not conduct ourselves thus, the Americans will decide to sell us or else divide up our territory. As they will hold us incapable of governing our land, we shall not secure our liberty, rather the contrary; our own soil will be delivered over to other hands." [52]

In this letter, written on the very day of the interview at which he subsequently claimed that Admiral Dewey had promised independence, does he make any claim that this had occurred? No, he very distinctly implies the contrary. Is it believable that if he could truly have said "The United States, through its representatives Dewey and Pratt, has promised to recognize our independence" he would have failed to do so when this would instantly have secured him the vigorous support which he was then uncertain of obtaining? I think not.

In this letter Aguinaldo specifically directs that deceit be employed and that Spanish officers be treacherously attacked. The practising of deceit was a carefully considered part of the insurgent policy. In a letter from Hongkong dated July 21, 1898, Agoncillo writes as follows to Mabini: [53]—

* * * * *

"the time will come when disguises must be set aside and we will see who is deceiving whom. The statements made by some of the commanders of the fleet here to Don Emilio and myself were to the effect that the exclusive purpose of the Government at Washington with regard to the Filipinos, is to grant this country independence, without any conditions, although I said to myself that such a purpose was too philanthropical. Don Emilio knew what I thought then, and I still think the same; that is to say that we are the ones who must secure the independence of our country by means of unheard of sacrifices and thus work out its happiness." [54]

Aguinaldo himself frankly advocated the use of deceit. He practised what he preached. Simeon Villa, one of his companions on his subsequent flight through Northern Luzon, before he finally took refuge at Palanan, kept a diary, which constitutes an official record of this long journey. In it he has inserted some bits of history of other days, of which none is more interesting than his account of the beginning of hostilities against the Spaniards, in August, 1896. From it we learn that Aguinaldo, who was known to the friar of his town to be both a mason and a chief of the Katipunan, was in danger during August, and on the night of the 29th of that month called a meeting of all the compromised persons of the place, who agreed that on the following day he should "make representations to the governor of the province." Villa says that he was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife. Early on the following morning, he "presented himself to the governor, and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo, offered him their respects and their loyalty to Spain," at the same time asking a garrison of a hundred men for his town, which the governor promised to send at once if the captain-general approved.

That afternoon he reported the results of his efforts to his fellow-conspirators, "and told them that then was the opportune moment for rising against the Spaniards." He initiated the uprising himself the next morning. [55]

Could deceit be more deliberately practised or treachery more frankly employed?

I have indulged in this digression to show that Aguinaldo could hardly have complained had the methods which he used against others been employed against him. He was never deceived by the Americans, but his claims relative to independence grew rapidly, and he was soon deceiving his own people.

On May 24th, he issued no less than four proclamations. One of these, doubtless intended to be seen by Americans, made no mention of Independence, but said: [56]—

"The great powerful North American nation has offered its disinterested protection to secure the liberty of this country."

In another proclamation, doubtless intended for a different use, he made the statement that the great North American nation had come to give decisive and disinterested protection, "considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of governing ourselves." [57]

On June 5, having practically gained control of Cavite Province, he felt strong enough to announce that independence would be proclaimed on June 12, and on that date he did proclaim it in a decree.

The Admiral of the American Squadron, with the commanders and officers of his command, was invited to the ceremonies, but none of them went. As it was important for Aguinaldo to have some one there to pose as a representative of the United States, he utilized for this purpose a certain "Colonel" Johnson, an ex-hotel keeper of Shanghai, who was running a cinematograph show. He appeared as Aguinaldo's chief of artillery and the representative of the North American nation. [58]



Even as late as October 3, 1898, Agoncillo in a memorandum addressed to President McKinley did not claim that independence had been promised, but said:—

"As soon as the Spanish-American war began, the American representatives and officials in Singapore, Hongkong and Manila, invited the natives of the Philippines to assist the American arms, which they did gladly and loyally, as allies, with the conviction that their personality would be recognized, as well as their political, autonomous and sovereign rights." [59]

In it he does, however, claim that the organization of a government independent of America and Spain was accomplished with the tacit consent of the admiral commanding the fleet and with that of the general and military and political commanders of the United States of North America in the Philippines.

"Who, knowing these facts, not only did not object but accepted them as a consummated legal act, and maintained official relations with the new organization, making use thereof in its subsequent actions and for the subsequent development of the campaign, which was consequently brought to such a happy end." [60]

This is a second illustration of the stereotyped insurgent procedure of announcing a policy and then claiming that failure to attack it meant acquiescence in it. Admiral Dewey says that he did not even read this proclamation. There was no reason why he should have done so, as it did not deal with matters which he was authorized to settle. He had no instructions relative to the recognition of new governments, and he sent this document to Washington without comment, as he should have done. [61]

Apropos of this claim that American officers tacitly recognized the Insurgent government, certain passages from an unsigned document in the handwriting of Mabini, prepared about July 15, 1898, are of interest. Mabini, speaking of the attitude of the Americans, says, "Notwithstanding all this and in spite of their protestations of friendship, they have always refused to recognize that government." Also, "If they persist in refusing to recognize our government, we shall see ourselves compelled to come to an agreement with any other government that will consent to recognize us on friendly terms." [62]

This statement is certainly sufficiently specific as to whether Americans had recognized the Insurgent government on or before the date when it was written.

Let us now consider the relations between Aguinaldo and General Anderson.

Blount attempts to make much of a cablegram, sent by the latter, in which, after describing the Filipinos, he adds, "The people expect independence." Blount says:—

"That cablegram of July 22nd, above quoted, in which the commanding general of our forces in the Philippines advises the Washington Government, 'The people expect independence' is the hardest thing in the public archives of our government covering that momentous period for those who love the memory of Mr. McKinley to get around. After the war with the Filipinos broke out, McKinley said repeatedly in public speeches, 'I never dreamed they would turn against us.'" [63]

If there is nothing harder than this to get around the memory of President McKinley will not suffer, as the important thing is not what Aguinaldo had led his people to expect, but what the American officials had promised him. The President was certainly not bound to believe that the Filipinos would turn against us even if they did then expect independence. Blount has seen fit to leave unmentioned certain other facts which are very pertinent in this connection.

Apparently sometime during September, 1898, Sandico made the following statement in a letter to Aguinaldo:—

"I also have to inform you that Senores Basa, Cortes and Co. have congratulated the Government of the United States upon the capture of Manila, stating at the same time that now that Filipino soil had been soaked with American blood, the Islands must remain American. I believe that a telegram should be sent immediately, to counteract that sent by them." [64]

Probably Sandico did not know that on August 15, 1898, Agoncillo had transmitted another telegram to President McKinley through Consul-General Wildman, reading as follows:—

"Agoncillo, my Commissioner and Ambassador-Extraordinary, representing the provisional government of the Philippine Islands, in its name and the name of its President, Emilio Aguinaldo, congratulates you on the successful termination of the war, and commends the occupancy of Manila. I assure the United States of the allegiance and unquestioning support of our people, and petition that we be granted one or more representatives on the commission that is to decide the future of our Islands." [65]

It would appear, therefore, that the President had more information on this subject than was transmitted by General Anderson!

Not only did the latter passively refrain from recognizing Aguinaldo's pretensions, but on July 22, 1898, he wrote to him as follows:—

"I observe that your Excellency has announced yourself Dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize such an assumption. I have no orders from my government on the subject." [66]

The effort to keep Americans in ignorance of the true state of affairs was kept up until further deception was useless. Consul Williams, for instance, wrote on June 16, 1898:—

"For future advantage, I am maintaining cordial relations with General Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to our forces when treating for their return here. Last Sunday, 12th, they held a council to form provisional government. I was urged to attend, but thought best to decline. A form of government was adopted, but General Aguinaldo told me today that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony of the United States of America." [67]

Yet on Sunday, June 12, Aguinaldo had in reality proclaimed the independence of the Philippines. Few Americans at this time knew any Spanish and none understood Tagalog, so that it was comparatively easy to deceive them. What Consul Williams reported was what Aguinaldo considered it expedient to have him believe.

The following undated letter from Aguinaldo to Mabini, supposed to have been sent at this time, is of especial interest in this connection:—

"My dear Brother: I do not want to go there [where the addressee is] until after the visit of the American Consul, because I do not wish the negotiations to end in an ultimatum, and in order that you may tell him all that is favourable for the cause of our Nation. I charge you with the task of giving him a reply, and if he should ask about me tell him that since the time of his last visit there I have not recovered from my illness. If anything important should happen we can communicate with each other by telegraph, using a code in matters that require secrecy." [68]

In a letter supposed to have been written during November, 1898, prepared for Aguinaldo's signature and addressed to Senor McKinley, President of the Republic of the United States of North America, but apparently never sent, Aguinaldo renews the charge [69] previously made in his "Resenia Veridica," that Pratt and Dewey promised independence. It need not be further discussed.

The climax was finally reached in an official protest against the Paris Treaty written by Agoncillo in Paris on the 12th of December, 1898, in which occurs the following:—

"The United States of America, on their part, cannot allege a better right to constitute themselves as arbitrators as to the future of the Philippines.

"On the contrary, the demands of honour and good faith impose on them the explicit recognition of the political status of the people, who, loyal to their conventions, were a devoted ally of their forces in the moments of danger and strife. The noble general Emilio Aguinaldo and the other Filipino chiefs were solicited to place themselves at the head of the suffering and heroic sons of that country, to fight against Spain and to second the action of the brave and skilful Admiral Dewey.

"At the time of employing their armed cooeperation, both the Commander of the Petrel and Captain Wood in Hongkong, before the declaration of war, the American Consuls-General Mr. Pratt in Singapore, Mr. Wildman, in Hongkong, and Mr. Williams in Cavite, acting as international agents of the great American nation, at a moment of great anxiety offered to recognize the independence of the Filipino nation, as soon as triumph was obtained.

"Under the faith of such promises, an American man-of-war, the McCulloch was placed at the disposal of the said leaders and which took them to their native shores; and Admiral Dewey himself, by sending the man-of-war; by not denying to General Aguinaldo and his companions the exacting of his promises, when they were presented to him on board his flag-ship in the Bay of Manila; by receiving the said General Aguinaldo before and after his victories and notable deeds of arms, with the honours due the Commander-in-Chief of an allied army, and chief of an independent state; by accepting the efficacious cooeperation of that Army and of those Generals; by recognizing the Filipino flag, and permitting it to be hoisted on sea and land, consenting that their ships should sail with the said flag within the places which were blockaded; by receiving a solemn notification of the formal proclamation of the Philippine nation, without protesting against it, nor opposing in any way its existence; by entering into relations with those Generals and with the national Filipino authorities recently established, recognized without question the corporated body and autonomous sovereignty of the people who had just succeeded in breaking their fetters and freeing themselves by the impulse of their own force." [70]

It will be noted that the claim constantly grows. The commander of the Petrel Captain Wood, Consul Wildman and Consul Williams are now included among those alleged to have promised independence, and it is claimed that Aguinaldo was received with the honours due the chief of an independent state when he visited Admiral Dewey, whereas his own original claim was that he was received with the honours due a general, which is quite a different matter.

As a matter of fact, American officers usually addressed and treated Aguinaldo as a general. The extent to which they were able to use his organization to further the ends of their government will be set forth later.

In a letter to Wildman, dated August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo admits that there is no agreement, but says that he cannot tell the peoples that it does not exist, "fearing that I may not be able to restrain the popular excitement." [71] He begs Wildman to use his influence on his government so that it will realize the inadvisability of deciding the fate of the people "without considering their will duly represented by my government." Is it conceivable that, if there had been any ground for claiming a promise of independence, Aguinaldo would have failed to mention it at this time?

We may summarize the well-established facts as follows:—

Consul-General Pratt was, or professed to be, in hearty sympathy with the ambition of the Filipino leaders to obtain independence, and would personally have profited from such a result, but he refrained from compromising his government and made no promises in its behalf.

Admiral Dewey never even discussed with Aguinaldo the possibility of independence.

There is no reason to believe that any subordinate of the Admiral ever discussed independence with any Filipino, much less made any promise concerning it.

Neither Consul Wildman nor Consul Williams promised it, and both were kept in ignorance of the fact that it was desired up to the last possible moment.

It is not claimed that either General Anderson or General Merritt made any promise concerning it.

The conclusion that no such promise was ever made by any of these men is fully justified by well-established facts.

Aguinaldo himself carefully refrained at the outset from saying, in any document which Americans could read, that independence had been promised, and advanced this claim only when the growing strength of his land force had given him confidence. He repeated it, with increasing emphasis, as his army increased in size, ultimately openly threatening war if his pretensions were not recognized. In doing this, he was merely carrying out a carefully prearranged plan, agreed upon by the Hongkong junta.

And now let us examine the claim that the insurgents were our "faithful allies" and "cooeperated" with us in the taking of Manila. We shall find that this subject richly repays investigation.



CHAPTER III

Insurgent "Cooeperation"

I have previously [72] called attention to the minutes of a session of the Hongkong junta held on May 4, 1898, from which it indirectly appears that the Filipino leaders at that time hoped to secure arms at the expense of the Americans and purposed to attack them later if it seemed advisable.

The treacherous policy then outlined was never departed from by Aguinaldo and his associates, who sailed for Manila with their eyes wide open, knowing full well that they had been promised nothing; prepared to match their wits against those of Admiral Dewey, and intent on deceiving him and on securing from him arms to be used first against the Spaniards and later against the Americans, after they had been employed to help bring about the downfall of Spain.

There exists a significant circular signed "J.M.B." [73] believed to have been an outright forgery, both from its tenor and from the fact that the signature "J.M.B." is not in the handwriting of Basa's letter hereinbefore quoted.

It contains the following statements:—

"The true patriots have organized a committee to which I belong, naming Aguinaldo as President and Agoncillo as Vice-President. The latter and three others have commenced diplomatic negotiations with the Admiral and American Consul, and we infer that they are trying to make colonies of us, although they said they would give us independence. The Committee deemed it advisable to simulate belief, at the same time equipping ourselves with arms.

"We have accepted arms offered by the Admiral which will be disembarked in the Philippines by the squadron.

"A part of our forces will aid the Americans by fighting with them in order to conceal our real intentions, and part will be held in reserve. If America triumphs and proposes a colony, we shall reject such offer and rise in arms.

"A separate expedition will disembark at whatever point may be considered suitable.

"Jose Alejandrino embarked with the American squadron in order to give secret instructions to the Chiefs.

"Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate point; you will communicate with prudent and intelligent chiefs who will recognize the gravity of the subject." [74]

Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa's initials were forged in order to gain the prestige of his name for this treacherous plan, we have definitely set forth the purpose of the Filipinos to deceive the Americans by allowing a part of the Insurgent force to fight with them, and then to attack them.

Reference has already been made to Agoncillo's advice to Aguinaldo, given under date of August 26, 1898, to the effect that friendly relations should be maintained with the Americans until the diplomatic negotiations at Paris should end; that an effort should be made to find out the future status of the islands "by deceitful means," and that confidence should never be put in the Americans.

Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutshell in a postscript to this letter, saying:—

"You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs should employ a policy of friendship toward the Americans until our status is defined; but said order should be confidentially given. Try to mislead them." [75]

Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of the Paris conference. [76]

Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty of Paris would leave their country to them as it left Cuba to the Cubans, [77] and adds that having helped us take the city of Manila, they "felt that they had been 'given the double cross,'" "believed that the Americans had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian, and that was the cause of the war." [78]

The quotations already given from Insurgent records show plainly that the principal thing for which the Filipinos were waiting was the ousting of Spain from the Philippines by the United States; those which follow show that war was by no means inevitable as a result of a a decision at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the question of whether a United States protectorate, or even annexation to the United States, might be considered, was left open to a very late date. [79]

It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents whipped the Spaniards without our assistance, but whipped them so thoroughly that Spanish sovereignty had practically disappeared from the islands at the time Manila surrendered. It has further been alleged that "decrepit" Spain "could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have 'eaten them up.'" [80]

But the Filipinos had fought Spain before and were by no means sanguine. Their more intelligent and reasonable men clearly foresaw that they could not win unaided. Senor Antonio Regidor was at the time residing in London. He was a Filipino of unusual intelligence and exceptionally good education. He took a keen interest in the situation, and on July 28, 1898, telegraphed Agoncillo as follows:—

"In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send a telegraphic message to MacKinley, requesting him not to abandon the islands, after having fought as brothers for a common cause. Pledge him our unconditional adhesion, especially of well-to-do people. To return to Spain, in whatever form, would mean annihilation, perpetual anarchy. Filipinos en masse should visit the consuls at Hongkong, Singapore. London commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo to accept American flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to remain." [81]

This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor's views, but Agoncillo did not share them. He replied on July 29:—

"Provisional government's aspiration is independence. Make this campaign." [82]

Regidor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he replied as follows, addressing his communication to Basa:

"America vacillating as to remaining fears conflicts later with natives international question other difficulties necessary to encourage her all of you submit united unconditionally raising American flag great demonstrations necessary to influence outside opinion show islands resolved united America high circles advise in view present circumstances only feasible programme is protectorate." [83]

Obviously, Agoncillo was somewhat impressed by this cablegram, for on August 1 in a letter to Aguinaldo he made the following statements and inquiries:—

"If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions which will arise are these: Have we sufficient arms to maintain the war against Spain in order to secure our independence? If the other nations are opposed to our independence and wish that we should continue under the Spanish sovereignty, have we sufficient strength to wage a war and obtain victory over Spain and over them in the future? If you think that we have not sufficient strength to fight against them, should we accept independence under the American protectorate? And if so, what conditions or advantages should we give to the United States? You should carefully consider the preceding questions, and I suggest that you should, in a confidential manner, consult them with your cabinet-in-banc, as well as with your private secretary and military chiefs of rank; and your decision be notified to our representatives abroad in order that they may know what they must do in their negotiations. You will see from the telegram addressed to me by Regidor that he suggests to me to send a message to MacKinley requesting him not to abandon us, and to submit to them [the U. S.] unconditionally. As I do not agree with him and as I cannot take any action which is against the instructions of the government, I replied to him that the only desire of our government is independence. This may be seen from the enclosed telegram. On account of this reply, he was, I think, somewhat offended, as he afterwards sent a telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter, upon receiving the telegram, convened all the boastful patriots, and they adopted a resolution to send a message to MacKinley requesting annexation. Fortunately, in the meeting there was present Dr. Justo Lucban, who protested against such measure. In view of this protest, they again agreed that I should be present in the meeting, since I am the representative of our government. At the meeting where I was present, I pointed out the inadvisability of their resolution, stating, as one of the reasons, that we should await your instructions in regard to the matter before sending any message of that character. So the message was not sent; but I was later informed that Basa had, after all, sent it yesterday, because he believed that it would not injure our cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by passion and went so far as to say to Basa the following: 'Many of us, especially myself, think ourselves to be wise, without being so; politicians for what we hear from others; we claim to be patriots, but we are only so in words; we wish to be chiefs, but none of us act in a way worthy of a chief.' To this he did not reply. Perhaps his conscience accused him of an act of treachery, since we agreed in the meeting to await your letter. What union can you expect from this people?" [84]

Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose initials were forged on the letter quoted on page 67.

In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo came back once more to the question of independence under a protectorate and made it very clear that at this late day he did not know whether this was or was not what the Filipinos desired. [85]

On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that it would be an easy matter to escape from Spanish domination, much less that the islands were already rid of it, for he wrote to Mabini that the United States were likely again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands of Spain. He said that "if events will be what their telegrams indicate, we have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether the end will be favourable to us... Spain free from Cuba and her other colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba." [86] Apacible thought that the best thing was independence under an American protectorate.

On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that in the United States he should "not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain independence." [87]

Even annexation to the United States was not excluded by Aguinaldo from the possible accepted solutions, for in outlining the policy of the Philippine government to Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote:—

"The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To struggle for the independence of 'the Philippines' as far as our strength and our means will permit. Protection or annexation will be acceptable only when it can be clearly seen that the recognition of our Independence, either by force of arms or diplomacy, is impossible." [88]

On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to consider annexation if necessary. [89] He was apparently not sanguine at this time as to the result of a continued struggle with Spain. At all events, he wanted the help of the Americans if such a struggle was to come, and desired to know on what terms it could be had. [90]

Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured annexation made themselves heard.

On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote from that place:—

"I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders and of the moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are fighting for annexation to the United States first, and for independence secondly, if the United States decides to decline the sovereignty of the Islands. In fact, I have had the most prominent leaders call on me and say they would not raise one finger unless I could assure them that the United States intended to give them United States citizenship if they wished it." [91]

We have already noted the action of Basa and the Cortez family who insisted that the Islands must remain American, [92] and that of Agoncillo, who cabled President McKinley in Aguinaldo's name and his own, congratulating him on the outcome of the war, commending the occupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United States of the allegiance and unquestioning support of the Filipinos, [93] but it is to be feared that the sending of this cablegram was only one more move in the Insurgent game of deceit.

There were annexationists in Manila as well as in Hongkong. [94] Indeed we know that some of the strongest and best of the Filipinos there were in favour of it.

Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said:—

"In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano [95] addressed to Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista a letter written from the town of Pagsanjan, province of Laguna, in reply to one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In this letter Don Cayetano outlined the idea of union with the United States and said: 'Avoid all doing and undoing, and when America has established a stable order of affairs, then it will be time enough to make laws.' Mabini, whose influence at that time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo's government, paid no heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while the Philippine government was established in Malolos, and before congress had promulgated a Philippine constitution, Messrs. Arellano and Pardo [96] still more earnestly advocated union with America, the first as secretary of foreign affairs and the latter as chief diplomat. Their plan consisted in asking the United States to acknowledge the independence of the country under a protectorate through the mediation of General Otis, and this plan was accepted at a cabinet meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But on the following day Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he had had a conference with the Japanese consul and had been told by him: 'that if Aguinaldo would support absolute independence the Japanese Government would help.' Aguinaldo believed Sandico's story (which turned out to be absolutely false) and did not carry out the resolution adopted by the cabinet. Messrs. Arellano and Pardo, after this affront, separated themselves from the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me afterwards that he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated Washington, assuring him that a majority of the American people were inclined to acknowledge the independence of the Philippines and of Cuba." [97]

But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, to the vicinity of Manila.

As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported that a delegation from four thousand Visayan soldiers, a delegation which also represented southern business interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty to annexation. [98]

Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as follows: All were agreed that the assistance of the United States was necessary in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty.

Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly relations were to be maintained with the United States, if possible, until Spain was ousted from her Philippine territory, and then they were to "show their teeth," and see "who was deceiving whom," resorting to "force of arms" if necessary. Protection or annexation would be accepted only when it could be clearly seen that the recognition of independence, won either by force of arms or by diplomacy, was impossible.

Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored annexation to the United States or a United States protectorate, but their views were in the end ignored by Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latter had the guns their ideas prevailed.

The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, was signed on December 10, 1898. It is important to bear this date in mind later, when considering the Insurgent records relative to the preparations which were so carefully made for attacking the American troops.

And now let us consider the actual facts as to the cooeperation alleged to have been asked by Americans and given by Filipinos. The following points are not in dispute:—

Pratt asked Aguinaldo to cooeperate with Dewey.

Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding that he would do so.

Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main Spanish fleet; by bringing him and his associates back to the Philippines; by furnishing them arms and ammunition; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have made dangerous, or impossible, the landing of the arms subsequently imported by the Insurgents.

Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons in the provinces and used the arms and ammunition captured, or brought in by deserters, to equip a force which surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large numbers of people into the walled city, thus rendering the position of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a possible bombardment, and prevented this garrison from betaking itself to the provinces, as it might otherwise have done, leaving Manila to shift for itself.

Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault.

It lay at the mercy of Dewey's guns, and it would have been possible for the Admiral to take it at any time, but he could not at first have garrisoned it with United States forces, and never thought of attempting to use Insurgent forces for this purpose.

Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo's help? Let us consider his testimony on the subject:—

"Senator Carmack. You did want a man there who could organize and rouse the people?

"Admiral Dewey. I didn't want anybody. I would like to say now that Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by Consul Pratt and Consul Wildman; I didn't do anything—

"Senator Carmack. Did they have any power to force him upon you?

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; they had in a way. They had not the official power, but one will yield after a while to constant pressure. I did not expect anything of them; I did not think they would do anything. I would not have taken them; I did not want them; I did not believe in them; because, when I left Hongkong, I was led to suppose that the country was in a state of insurrection, and that at my first gun, as Mr. Williams put it, there would be a general uprising, and I thought these half dozen or dozen refugees at Hongkong would play a very small part in it." [99]

The picture of the poor admiral, busy getting his fleet ready for battle, pestered by officious consuls on the one hand and by irresponsible Filipinos on the other, is pathetic; but it had its humorous features, which were not lost on the Admiral himself. I quote the following:—

"Senator Patterson. Was there any communication between you and Pratt in which the matter of a written pledge or agreement with Aguinaldo was discussed with reference to the Philippine Islands?

"Admiral Dewey. No.

"Senator Patterson. What became of the correspondence, Admiral, if you know?

"Admiral Dewey. It is all in the Navy Department. When I turned over my command my official correspondence was all sent to the Navy Department.

"Senator Patterson. You retained all of your letters from any United States officials?

"Admiral Dewey. No; they went to the Department.

"Senator Patterson. I mean you did not destroy them.

"Admiral Dewey. No; I did not destroy them.

"Senator Patterson. And you turned them over to the Navy Department?

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; our regulations require that. I may say that for my own information I kept copies of certain telegrams and cablegrams. I don't think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt's letters, as I did not consider them of much value. He seemed to be a sort of busybody there and interfering in other people's business and I don't think his letters impressed me.

"Senator Patterson. He was the consul-general?

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; but he had nothing to do with the attack on Manila, you know.

"Senator Patterson. I understand that.

"Admiral Dewey. I received lots of advice, you understand, from many irresponsible people.

"Senator Patterson. But Pratt was the consul-general of the Government there?

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; he was consul-general.

"Senator Patterson. And he communicated with you, giving you such information as he thought you might be interested in, and among other information he gave you was this concerning Aguinaldo?

"Admiral Dewey. I don't remember; no, I really don't remember his telling me anything about Aguinaldo more than that cablegram there, and I said he might come. And you see how much importance I attached to him; I did not wait for him.

"Senator Patterson. What you said was: 'Tell Aguinaldo to come as soon as possible.'

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; but I did not wait a moment for him.

"Senator Patterson. Yes; but there was a reason for that.

"Admiral Dewey. I think more to get rid of him than anything else.

"Senator Carmack. Rid of whom?

"Admiral Dewey. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They were bothering me. I was very busy getting my squadron ready for battle, and these little men were coming on board my ship at Hongkong and taking a good deal of my time, and I did not attach the slightest importance to anything they could do, and they did nothing; that is, none of them went with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal of talk, but when the time came they did not go. One of them didn't go because he didn't have any toothbrush.

"Senator Burrows. Did he give that as a reason?

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; he said, 'I have no toothbrush.'" [100]

However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure exercised on him by Pratt and Wildman, and allowed Aguinaldo and some of his associates to be brought to Manila. Having them there he proposed to get assistance from them, not as allies, but as a friendly force attacking a common enemy, in its own way.

Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation between Aguinaldo and the naval forces of the United States:—

"Senator Patterson. Then, Admiral, until you knew that they were going to send land forces to your assistance you thought there was a necessity to organize the Filipinos into land forces, did you?

"Admiral Dewey. No; not a necessity.

"Senator Patterson. You thought it might prove of value to you?

"Admiral Dewey. I testified here, I think, in a way that answers that. I said to Aguinaldo, 'There is our enemy; now, you go your way and I will go mine; we had better act independently.' That was the wisest thing I ever said.

"Senator Patterson. But you stated that you were using these people and they were permitted to organize, that you might use them.

"Admiral Dewey. They were assisting us.

"Senator Patterson. Very well, they were to assist you. Did you not either permit them or encourage them—I do not care which term you use—to organize into an army, such as it was, that they might render you such assistance as you needed?

"Admiral Dewey. They were assisting us, but incidentally they were fighting their enemy; they were fighting an enemy which had been their enemy for three hundred years.

"Senator Patterson. I understand that, Admiral.

"Admiral Dewey. While assisting us they were fighting their own battles, too.

"The Chairman. You were encouraging insurrection against a common enemy with which you were at war?

"Admiral Dewey. I think so. I had in my mind an illustration furnished by the civil war. I was in the South in the civil war, and the only friends we had in the South were the negroes, and we made use of them; they assisted us on many occasions. I had that in mind; I said these people were our friends, and 'we have come here and they will help us just exactly as the negroes helped us in the civil war.'

"Senator Patterson. The negroes were expecting their freedom—

"Admiral Dewey. The Filipinos were slaves, too.

"Senator Patterson. What were the Filipinos expecting?

"Admiral Dewey. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards; I do not think they looked much beyond that. I cannot recall but I have in mind that the one thing they had in their minds was to get rid of the Spaniards and then to accept us, and that would have occurred—I have thought that many times—if we had had troops to occupy Manila on the 1st day of May before the insurrection got started; these people would have accepted us as their friends, and they would have been our loyal friends—I don't know for how long, but they would have been our friends then.

"Senator Patterson. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman, or Williams, very early, did you not, that the Filipinos wanted their own country and to rule their own country; that that is what they were expecting?

"Admiral Dewey. I heard from Williams that there was an insurrection there against the Spaniards. The Spaniards were very cruel to them, and I think they did not look much beyond getting rid of them. There was one, Dr. Rizal, who had the idea of independence, but I don't think that Aguinaldo had much idea of it.

"Senator Carmack. Then what useful purpose did the Filipino army serve; why did you want the Filipino army at all?

"Admiral Dewey. I did not want them.

"Senator Carmack. Did you not want the Filipino forces?

"Admiral Dewey. No, not really. It was their own idea coming over there. We could have taken the city at any moment we had the troops to occupy it."

Admiral Dewey has made the following statements relative to the importance of Aguinaldo's military operations:—

"Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonderfully well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle, and finally put one of those old smoothbore guns on a barge, and he wanted to take this up—wanted me to tow it up so he could attack the city with it. I said, 'Oh, no, no; we can do nothing until our troops come.' I knew he could not take the city without the assistance of the navy, without my assistance, and I knew that what he was doing—driving the Spaniards in—was saving our own troops, because our own men perhaps would have had to do that same thing. He and I were always on the most friendly terms; we had never had any differences. He considered me as his liberator, as his friend. I think he had the highest admiration for us because we had whipped the Spaniards who had been riding them down for three hundred years.

* * * * *

"Senator Patterson (continuing). You sent this short dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy:—

"'Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the Olympia yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt his ability to succeed. Situation remains unchanged.'

"Do you recall that visit?

"Admiral Dewey. Yes.

"Senator Patterson. He came to tell you, did he, that he was going to make a general attack, and you—

"Admiral Dewey. Yes.

"Senator Patterson. And you doubted his ability to succeed?

"Admiral Dewey. And he wanted me to assist him. He wanted me to tow one of his guns up into position. I knew he could not take the city; of course he could not.

"Senator Patterson. Did you urge that he should not make the attack?

"Admiral Dewey. I do not remember that; very likely I did.

"Senator Patterson. And was he not persuaded or restrained by you from doing so?

"Admiral Dewey. I do not remember; but it is very likely. I did not want to see a lot of them killed unnecessarily, because I knew they could not take that walled city. They had no artillery, and they could not take it, I knew very well, and I wanted the situation to remain as it was until our troops came to occupy it.

"Senator Patterson. But you found that whenever you expressed a strong objection to anything being done at that time that Aguinaldo yielded to your request?

"Admiral Dewey. Up to the time the army came he did everything I requested. I had not much to do with him after the army came." [101]

But Dewey's influence over Aguinaldo was not sufficient to prevent his looting, as the following extracts from his testimony show:—

"Senator Patterson. Is that what you mean when you say he looted—that he made reprisals for his army, took provisions and whatever was necessary? That is what you meant?

"Admiral Dewey. That is one part of it.

"Senator Carmack. This was taking provisions for the use of the army?

"Admiral Dewey. That is one thing he did.

"Senator Carmack. You said you did not object to that at the time?

"Admiral Dewey. No. It would have been useless; he got beyond me very soon—he got out of my hands very soon. [102]

"Senator Carmack. You said yesterday you suspected that Aguinaldo took the lion's share of the provisions that were gathered for the army. What was the ground upon which you made that accusation?

"Admiral Dewey. Because he was living in Malolos like a prince, like a king, in a way that could only have come about by his taking the lion's share. Then, in regard to his looting, I repeat what I said yesterday. He began within forty-eight hours after he landed in Cavite to capture and take everything he wanted. I know these things of my own knowledge, because I saw the loot brought in; and I know that every dollar that was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yard was taken at the threat of death. [103]

* * * * *

"Senator Patterson. Do you believe in this proclamation he was uttering falsehoods to the Filipino people?

"Admiral Dewey. Yes; I do absolutely. I think he was there for gain—for money—that independence had never up to that time entered his head. He was there for loot and money. That is what I believe, since you ask me my belief; I believe that implicitly. [104]

* * * * *

"Senator Patterson. And you found nothing to cause any doubt as to his loyalty up to the time until after Manila surrendered?

"Admiral Dewey. His loyalty to whom?

"Senator Patterson. To you and to the cause for which he was fighting?

"Admiral Dewey. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us about the time our troops arrived, when he demurred at moving out of Cavite to make room for our troops.

"Senator Patterson. Do you mean by that that you feared that he was commencing to think more of independence than the success of the American cause?

"Admiral Dewey. Yes." [105]

We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo cooeperated with the marine forces of the United States. Now let us examine the claim that he cooperated with the land forces after their arrival.

One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have accomplished was the maintenance of an effective land blockade which prevented the entrance of provisions, and produced a very serious food shortage. Both Otis and Dewey have stated that they did this, but we learn from the Insurgent records how erroneous was this conclusion. [106]

The landing of the American troops for the attack on Manila was not actively opposed by the Filipinos, but it was narrowly and distrustfully watched.

Necessary transportation requested by General Anderson was ultimately furnished by Aguinaldo, but only grudgingly after a three weeks' delay, and as a result of threats that it would be seized if not voluntarily supplied.

The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila from which to make the attack on that city were, in part at least, yielded to the Americans by the Filipinos upon the request of the former.

The Insurgents twice informed the Spaniards in advance of projected American attacks.

They carried out their own attack on the city without regard to the plans, or the requests, of the Americans. They secretly treated with the Spaniards in the endeavour to secure the surrender of the city to themselves.

After the capitulation to the Americans had been agreed upon, and on the very morning of the day of the surrender, they endeavoured to push home an attack. Disregarding the request that they keep out of the final assault, they crowded into the city with, and after, the American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the city wall while a flag of truce was flying, provoking a return fire which killed and wounded American soldiers.

They demanded for themselves Malacanang palace and other buildings and a share in "the war booty." They promptly looted the parts of the city which they occupied, and ultimately retired from their positions within the city limits on the evening of their last day of grace after being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so they would be driven out.

I will now quote from the records in support of these statements.

The following is the programme of "cooeperation" outlined to Aguinaldo by Bray in a letter dated June 30, 1898:—

"I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation of Manila and I hope that General Augustin will be obliged to turn over his sword to you in person and not to the Americans. You are by right entitled to it and I should like to see it so from a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should declare the independence of the Philippines before the arrival of General Merritt, appointed by the President to be Governor with full powers to establish a provisional government.

* * * * *

Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the interior towns with their troops or any other act which might be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance.

* * * * *

"After having written these lines, I had another conference with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regarding the question of independence. He has had a consultation with the Supreme Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that you should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding what Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams say against it, and this should be done before General Merritt can arrive. A Government having been thus constituted in due form, the Americans would have no right to invade the Philippines without committing a violation of international law. They are no longer fighting against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. The advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic play to gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he is well aware of the false position said General would find himself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands; do not permit any one to take it away from you. The Americans have done nothing but bombard and destroy the Spanish fleet on the high seas; they have not conquered any land, but in the meantime the control of the Philippines has passed by conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans have no right to enter further. Under certain conditions and guarantees, permit the landing of American troops; but be very careful, they must not be permitted to land until they execute an agreement with the duly constituted government of the Philippines, respecting all its institutions, and they must under no pretext whatever be permitted to garrison any place except the municipal limits of Manila, Cebu, and Iloilo, and even therein care should be observed ... You must not permit a single soldier to land without having these guarantees." [107]

When General Anderson, with the first United States troops of occupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him, as an "ally" might have been expected to do. Later, however, Admiral Dewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without any of the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying to General Anderson:—

"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." [108]

And they went in that way.

On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requesting his cooeperation in the following words:—

"For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your force cooeperate with us in the military operations against the Spanish forces." [109]

On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the

"amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire in the Great North American nation," [110]

and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinos and treat them with justice, courtesy and kindness. There is, however, not a word relative to cooeperation in his reply, and Anderson apparently never renewed his request for cooeperation in military operations.

On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying:—

"I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by Your Excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant, to endeavour to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For this I would like to have Your Excellency's advice and cooeperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of the country." [111]

To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July 9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, General Anderson says of Aguinaldo:—

"When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to cooeperate. But he has declared himself Dictator and President, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a provisional government." [112]

Evidently, however, cooeperation, even in the matter of getting necessary transportation, did not materialize, for on July 17 S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:—

"We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions in money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

"General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner."

Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Anderson inquiring whether it was sent by authority of the latter, who then indorsed on it in a statement that it was. Nevertheless, Major Jones reported on July 20 that it was impossible to secure transportation except upon Aguinaldo's order and that the natives had removed their cart wheels and hidden them, from which it is to be inferred that the transportation requested had not been furnished.

Obviously General Anderson was informed that Aguinaldo had given orders against furnishing the transportation desired, for on July 21 he wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army as follows:—

"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his assumed authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As Go this last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled."

On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows:—

"General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested Your Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.

"As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition on you for five hundred horses and fifty oxen and ox carts. If you cannot secure these I will have to pass you and make requisition directly on the people.

"I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.

"I remain with great respect, etc." [113]

To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows:—

"Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to manifest to Your Excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt of any response relative to the assistance that you have asked of me in the way of horses, carabaos, and carts, because I did reply through the bearer that I was disposed to issue proper orders whenever you advised me of the number of these, giving me notice in advance.

"I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that within the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I cannot assure Your Excellency that we will have the number of 500 that you need, because there are not many horses in this vicinity, owing to deaths from epizooetic diseases in January, February, and March last.

"Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleasure to advise Your Excellency.

"I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall place at your disposition when you need them, provided you give me previous notice four days in advance." [114]

General Anderson replied:—

"Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory I regret that there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we applied even for the hiring of carromatas, etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part." [115]

From this series of communications it appears that it took three weeks, and a very direct threat to seize transportation, to bring about Aguinaldo's promise of assistance in securing it. What help had he given, meanwhile, in other matters?

On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to assist American officers in making reconnaissance of the approaches to Manila, and to favor them with his advice. [116]

On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him to allow Major J. F. Bell, [117] who was gathering information for General Merritt, to see maps, and further requesting him to place at Bell's disposal any available information about the force of the enemy and the topography of the country. [118]

On July 21 he wrote again asking for passes for a Lieutenant E. I. Bryan and party, who were making a reconnaissance. [119]

Such records as I have been able to find do not show what response, if any, Aguinaldo made to these several requests, but General Anderson's original views as to the willingness of the Insurgents to cooeperate with him underwent an early change, for on July 18, 1898, in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army he makes the following statement:—

"The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator and self-appointed President. He has declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration under it.

"We have observed all official military courtesies, and he and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to the great American republic of the north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take Manila without us.

"I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aide is in Manila." [120]

This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later.

On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effect warning him not to disembark American troops in places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spaniards without first communicating in writing the places to be occupied and the object of the occupation. [121]

Aguinaldo's assumption of civil authority on July 15, 1899, did not pass unnoticed. On July 21 General Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General of the army concerning it:—

"His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not recognize him as a military leader. It may seem strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as Dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the Dictatorship. These people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers."

Because he was invited as general rather than as president, Aguinaldo refused to attend a parade and review on the 4th of July. This fact is, in itself, an answer to his claim that the Americans were tacitly recognizing his pretensions.

After referring to this incident, Blount says:—

"On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our declaration before gatherings of the Filipino people. It saved discussion." [122]

This statement is incorrect. I myself was present the following year when the declaration was read on the Luneta to a considerable gathering of Filipinos among whom were many school children, and it has often been read since.

The landing of American troops at Paranaque and their going into camp near that town on July 15 caused much excitement, and a lively interchange of telegrams between Insurgent officers followed. [123]

They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans, [124] and trouble soon began.

On July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

"An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel of the Army whom we should obey; and that it is your desire. We did not listen to him, awaiting your order."

On the back of the telegram is written the following:—

"Reply.—You should not obey. What this American Colonel says is a lie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived. You should require from him proof. Be always vigilant, but upright, also all of the officers and soldiers must be strict and not timid." [125]

Obviously there was no real cooeperation between American and Filipino troops at this time. General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo's request for information as to places where American troops were to land in Filipino territory and the objects of disembarking them.

The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila, and it became desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. On July 29 Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

"In conference with General Greene I asked for an official letter, a copy of which I send you: 'Headquarters 2nd Brigade, U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th, 1898. El Senor Noriel, General de Brigade. Sir: In pursuance of our conversation of yesterday and the message which Captain Arevalo brought to me during the night, I beg to inform you that my troops will occupy the intrenchments between the Camino Real and the beach, leaving camp for that purpose at 8.00 o'clock this morning. I will be obliged if you will give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thanking you for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, F. V. Greene, Brigadier General, commanding.'" [126]

This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the actual transaction referred to by Blount as "Jockeying the Insurgents out of their trenches." He bases his statements concerning the matter on a newspaper report.

The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission to occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the assault on the city could not have been more correct.

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions relative to the matter:—

"No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask Insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, but if refused not to use force."

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order to place artillery to destroy it. The permission was granted on the following day.

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided conferences with American officers. On the second of the month Mabini wrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey's aid with a false statement that he did not know Aguinaldo's whereabouts. [127]

The landing of American troops at Paranaque for the assault on Manila led to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town of Bacoor. [128]

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo [129] wrote to General Pio del Pilar that the Americans were going to attack the next day and that,—

"It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them, sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will again without fail, in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio; and convince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do this; and when it is done the whole world will wonder and say that we have done well, and will not be able to give out that the people here are fools spending the time sucking their fingers." [130]

Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following letter:—

"(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)

"Senor Don Artemio Ricarte: [131]

"My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I assure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely,

"Luis Martinez Alcobendas.

"Singalon, August 10, 1898." [132]

According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this sort. He says:—

"The officers of the United States Army who believed that the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American movements were right. Sastron has printed a letter from Pio del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2 and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo's information was correct, and on August 2 eight American soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire." [133]

Taylor continues:—

"And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It is not probable that these were the only two such letters written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although he could defeat the scattered Spanish detachments, he could not defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila. He did not want the Americans in the Philippines. They were in his way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both among Spaniards and Americans would, from Aguinaldo's point of view, inure to his benefit. The best possible thing for him would be to hold his own force intact while they wore each other out. The Spanish losses, small as they were, occurred in front of the American lines, not in front of the Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the Spaniards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo; but it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally." [134]

The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown by a telegram from General Pio del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati on August 10, 1898:—

"Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about to surrender because they want to turn over the place; the Americans want them to leave only the batteries and say that they will station themselves in said batteries. It appears that they want to deceive us; they do not want to give us arms, and if they do not give us arms, we shall attack them and drive them out. I await your reply." [135]

This is perhaps not quite the kind of cooeperation that Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt had expected.

The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to capture Manila for themselves, not only because of the "war booty," for which they were hungry, but because of the status which they felt that the taking of the capital of the Philippines would assure them. The great importance which they attached to this plan is shown in communications written by Agoncillo, Aguinaldo and others. [136]

Of conditions at this time, Taylor says:—

"On July 7, Aguinaldo appointed Artemio Ricarte and Pantaleon Garcia to negotiate the surrender of Manila by the Spaniards to him (Exhibit 155). On July 5 Pantaleon Garcia was planning to enter Manila by way of Tondo or of Santa Cruz (P.I.R., 243.7). On the 9th Aguinaldo ordered that rice should be gathered from the towns of Manila Province for the use of his troops in the decisive attack upon Manila which he intended making in a few days (P.I.R., 1087. 5).

"Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtaining Manila for himself was growing steadily less, now determined to force himself into the city with the Americans and demand a consideration for the assistance he had rendered them during the siege. It is true he had assisted them, but his assistance had not been intentional. It was the result of the operations he was carrying on for his own ends. The operations of the Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common enemy of both; but the operations were not joint operations, and although their purpose was a common purpose, it was not a mutual one. On August 8 Aguinaldo appointed General Ricarte commander in the operations about Manila, ordered him to respect the property of all foreigners, and told him that in case his troops succeeded in entering Manila they were to carry their flag and plant it there (P.I.R., 703. 2). Judging from an unsigned draft of a letter, he must have warned the foreign consuls in Manila about the same time to gather under the protection of their flags all of their fellow-citizens who had not taken refuge on the vessels in the bay, so that when his troops entered the city no foreign lives would be taken, and no foreign property would be injured. The earnestness with which he urged that all foreigners not Spaniards should take steps to identify themselves and their property shows that he considered the persons and property of Spanish civilians as fair booty of war." [137]