Much reference is made to the American War of Independence, but this war cannot be compared to that one. The enemy had only 40,000 troops in America, whereas they have 240,000 here. And then Americans a large country, and had harbours through which to import, and had in addition the assistance of France. I am convinced that our struggle cannot be maintained.

Commandant VAN NIEKERK (Kroonstad): With reference to the Cape Colonists, I wish to say that we expected much help from them, and they did assist us largely. Must we now jump out of the door and leave them in the lurch? Many of them have already been banished, some shot, and others hanged. It is sad to think of laying down our arms. The promise that landed proprietors can retain their arms is more of a comfort than a reality. If I consider everything I must say—let us rather offer passive resistance, but concede nothing.

General BOTHA was the next speaker. He first explained his attitude at the various meetings of the people, and said that he had caused them to elect Delegates with power to act. He continued: When the war began, we had about 60,000 burghers, and we further relied upon help from the Cape Colony. We expected that that Colony would not allow her railways to be used to convey troops to fight against us. I also hoped that the Powers would interfere, but they were silent spectators of how Britain waged war against us, and how she introduced all kinds of new methods into that warfare—methods contrary to international law. Further, we had provisions in abundance, and commandos could be supported for weeks in the same place. However, matters have now so changed that a man must consider himself fortunate if his family is away. It is argued that to save the families still with us, the husbands of such families can surrender with their families. The husbands, however, of most are unfortunately already in the hands of the enemy. Whom can I send to care for those whose natural protectors are already prisoners of war? These families are thus thrown upon us, and we must care for them. As long as we had plenty of food, the enemy gladly received our families into their Camps, but now that they are in want, and they (the enemy) can do something for them, their kindness has come to an end. What shall we now do with these families? That is the great difficulty.

It is stated that we do not rely on help through the medium of the Deputation in Europe, but when the enemy refuses to let the Members of the Deputation come out to see us, it is at once said that that is a proof that the Deputation are doing something to our advantage. Reliance is thus placed upon the Deputation, because they can only tell us that there is hope of intervention. The Deputation have already been in Europe for more than two years, and our State President is there too, and up to this day the Deputation have not yet succeeded in getting itself acknowledged by any other Power than the Netherlands Government. They were accredited by us to all the Powers, but it appears that they did not consider it advisable to hand in their credentials to any Power except to Holland, naturally because they were given to understand that they would not be acknowledged. Now, if a Power refuses to acknowledge our Deputation, what help can we as a nation expect from such a Power? There is another point. Before President Kruger left us we received letters from the Deputation, from which it clearly appeared that they could do nothing for us, and in which they informed us that they would return and land in Delagoa Bay. The Government, however, in consultation with President Steyn, who was with us then, decided to ask the Deputation not to return, even though they could effect nothing, because, if they came back, it would be a death blow to our people, who were always still expecting something good from the efforts of the Deputation. I say these things, so that the people may not be misled. In my opinion, we have nothing else than the sympathy of the European nations, and than that we shall get nothing else, but that will not save us. A year ago we were in communication with the Deputation, and all they could then tell us was that we should persevere, on the ground of all the personal and material sacrifices which had already been made, until all means of resistance were exhausted. Well, we have done that, and it is very plain to me that there is no hope of any help from the Deputation. But I wish to go further. We know that there is one friendly Power, and that it wishes to help us as much as possible. That Power is the Netherlands Government. What did the Netherlands Minister write to the British Government on the 1st of January, 1902? He wrote as follows:—

"The Government of her Majesty the Queen is of opinion that the exceptional circumstances, in which one of the belligerent parties in South Africa is situated, and which prevents it from putting itself into communication with the other party by direct means, constitutes one of the causes of the prolongation of the war, which continuously, without interruption or termination, harasses that country, and is the cause of so much misery."

Thus wrote the Power in Europe who is best disposed towards us, a few months ago; and in that same letter they suggested that our Deputation should come out here with the object of meeting the leaders of the people, in order to bring about peace. It was certainly never the intention that peace would be concluded on the basis of the independence of the Republics. Can we thus cherish any hopes of assistance from European nations? I am convinced that we can arrive at a decision in this matter without worrying ourselves for a moment with the idea that we shall obtain help elsewhere. A war in Europe is, of course, possible, but the war we are engaged in has opened the eyes of all the Powers, so that every European Government now avoids war as much as possible. I will even go so far as to say that it is in the interest of more than one Power that this war continues.

A great difficulty is also the unfaithfulness of our own burghers, and much injury is done us by those who lay down their arms. A year ago we took a resolution at Waterval, in the Standerton district, to continue the war vigorously. We kept it up for a year, and fought and sacrificed. What have we gained by it? I say we are now so broken up and weakened that if matters go on like this a little longer we shall no more be able to assert ourselves as a party. It is maintained that this proposal goes further than the proposal made to us at Middelburg in March, 1901, but I do not think that that argument is correct, because we did not negotiate on that proposal. We simply replied that we could not negotiate on the basis proposed. If we had negotiated then we might perhaps have obtained better terms than now. But even granted that the present proposals are more favourable, what have we not sacrificed for such improvement? Twenty thousand women and children have been laid in their graves in the Concentration Camps. Almost the half of our burghers are prisoners of war; we have had to bury hundreds of our comrades. When I review the past year, I must say that we have lost ground tremendously. We can only gauge the future by the past. We now stand face to face with the fact that we shall have to abandon a large tract of our country, and I do not see any chance of retaining our independence in that way. We commenced with 60,000 men, and now we have only 15,000 in the field. Our Information-bureau in Pretoria informs me that the enemy has already 31,400 of our burghers as prisoners of war, and that 600 have already died in the prisoner-of-war camps. Three thousand eight hundred of our burghers have fallen during the war. Is it not a serious matter that so many fell in the course of two and a half years? What must not the sufferings of our women and children in the Concentration Camps have been at the death of so many of their number?

The question is asked, and rightly too: What about the Cape Colonists who have thrown in their lot with us? I have always said that if we lose our independence it will be our first and foremost duty to care for them because they have got into trouble through us. I was always prepared to say: "Banish me, but give terms to the Cape Colonists." And now there is a chance for us to-day to save those comrades. Would it therefore be advisable to miss that chance, and simply to say that we must persevere in the struggle? I say it is not advisable. The other members of our Commission and I did our best at Pretoria for those Colonists. Let us now take what we can get. If we decide to continue, it would only be honest to these Colonists to say that they must stop fighting and accept these terms. A few thousand men become free with the temporary loss of the franchise. If we can get no better terms for them they cannot blame us, nor will they do so if the facts are put before them.

I am referred to what I said about a year ago at the Warmbaths, but let me remind you that, when I spoke there, the commando of that division was 2,000 men strong. What is the situation there to-day? The commando consists of only 480 men. I said then that the war must continue till famine stared us in the face. Now I do not stand here to dishearten anyone, but I must acquaint you fully with all circumstances, and I tell you that there are districts in our country where famine truly and actually stares the commandos in the face, and many of the Delegates can testify to this. Our great strength always lay in this, that we could keep a commando, however small, in each district, which compelled the enemy to divide its enormous armies over the entire country. But if we must give up portions of our country we must trek to other parts; in other words, we must concentrate, and therein lies great danger for us, because that will enable the enemy to concentrate their large forces against us, and our fall will speedily follow. Some say we can go to the Cape Colony. I also know something about that. Chief Commandant de Wet could not get into the Cape Colony in good times with good horses and with a large force. How shall we get there, now that winter is approaching and our horses are so poor that we can only ride at a walk, and the distance for most of us is so much further? I tell you we shall not get there. On the way there, most of the commandos will dwindle away.

The question is asked: "What will the future bring us if we surrender?" Well, that is a most vital question, and for every Africander who has done his duty, surrender is a terribly bitter cup. But we must take the situation as it is, and, however bitter, we must choose the better of two bad roads. It is maintained that we must persevere, but unless we can do so for ten or twelve years, I do not see any grounds for hoping that we shall be able to retain our independence, and I do not see any chance whatever of keeping up the struggle so long. What chance have we of persevering so long? If in two years' time we have been reduced from 60,000 men to a fourth of that number, to what number shall we have sunk in another two years? A hopeless perseverance may also later bring us to a forced surrender, which will be very fatal to us. Let us use our reason, and not stand in relation to each other as two parties. Let us try to find a common way. I shall remain in the field as long as fighting goes on. Personally, I have no objection to persevere.

It is further asked: What will become of our widows and orphans if we make peace? But I in turn ask: Who will care for them if we are later forced to surrender? Even though we conclude peace now we remain in existence as a people, though under the British flag, and if we in surrendering stand by each other we can, after the surrender, also stand by each other, and devise means to assist the widows and orphans. If, on the other hand, we entirely cease to exist, we can do nothing more. We cannot, for instance, even send people to Europe to seek financial help to build up the fortunes of our people again.

There are three ways open to us, and I shall submit to the decision of the majority, but I shall feel it keenly if we are not unanimous in our decision. I must say I can see no salvation for us in the continuance of the war, but only the extermination of our people. The other two ways are: Surrender with, and surrender without conditions.

I always held the opinion that when the day dawned that we could not maintain the struggle any longer, it would be best to stop without making any terms, and to say to the enemy: "Here we are. We cannot go on any longer. Banish the leaders, deal with the people as you wish; we refuse to submit." But the question is whether we can to-day adopt that course and act accordingly. I think we cannot. Our people have been totally ruined, and will therefore be entirely exposed to the mercy of the enemy. They must be financially assisted, and if the enemy do so they can stipulate what they like and demand an oath to their taste from every one they help. The enemy will then also be able to carry out all their proclamations, and so destroy our national existence. They can banish all the leaders, and further, they can refuse to let the prisoners of war return until such time as it suits them. In these terms the return of all prisoners of war is at least stipulated, and all the enemy's proclamations against our persons and property nullified. I am thus of opinion that it will be better for us to accept these terms than to surrender unconditionally. Our cup is bitter, but do not let us make it more bitter still. If we are convinced that our cause is hopeless, it is a question whether we have the right to allow one more burgher to be shot. Our object must be to act in the interest of our people.

General HERTZOG remarked that in his opinion the extract from the letter from the Netherlands Government to Lord Lansdowne read by General Botha had not been well translated. Instead of "... the war which raged in the country without object or termination," the translation should be: "... the war, which without interruption or termination rages in that country," and that this made a difference.

The meeting was adjourned till two o'clock that afternoon.

At two o'clock the meeting resumed.

General MULLER (Boksburg) said: The burghers suspect something from Lord Kitchener's refusal to allow the Deputation to come out, and have instructed me to try and come into communication with the Deputation. Some of my burghers commissioned me to stand for our independence, but others gave me a free hand, to act according to circumstances, and, if there was no other course, to accept the best possible terms. I have always pointed my burghers to the Lord, and told them that as we were at present situated it was impossible for us to succeed in the struggle in our own strength and by means of our own arms, but that we should trust in God, and that He would help us in His own way and in His own fashion. If I now return to my burghers and inform them that I have not been in communication with the Deputation, and that the proposal before us has been accepted, there will be awful dissension—I cannot think of surrender. It will be a painful matter for me, if I must vote for making peace on these terms, but, taking into consideration what I have heard here about the situation in the other districts and from the Commandant General, it will be difficult for me to go and continue the fight alone, although I and my burghers are still prepared to go on. They also have a hard time of it, and all necessaries are scarce, but provision is always forthcoming. If we cannot agree with reference to the terms before us, I can suggest only one course, and that is, that we all together make a compact with the Lord. Then we shall have something to stand on, which we can make clear to the people. We commenced the war with faith in the Lord. Where then shall we stand with regard to Him if our faith now forsakes us?

I wish to say, further, that the three million pounds, which the enemy offers, will go only to the burghers who have remained in the field, and to the prisoners of war. What will become of all the other thousands of poor in the country? I represent some of the poorest in the land. They have lost everything in the war, and no provision is made for them. With the instructions I have and according to the dictates of my conscience I do not know whether I can vote for this proposal.

Commandant DE KOCK (Vrede) pointed out that the 30 Free State Delegates represented 5,000 or 6,000 burghers, and the 30 Transvaal Delegates 10,000, and General Smuts' 3,000 burghers of the Cape Colony, and asked what the position would be if the 30 Free Staters, who represented a minority, decided to continue the war? Would those representing the majority have to submit?

The CHAIRMAN replied that although the Free State Delegates represented a smaller number of burghers, the Free State had an equal vote with the Transvaal in this matter.

General J. C. SMUTS spoke as follows: Hitherto I have not taken part in the discussion, although my views are not unknown to my Government. We have arrived at a dark stage in the development of the war, and our cause is all the darker and more painful to me because I, as a member of the Government of the South African Republic, was one of the persons who entered into the war with England. A man may, however, not shrink from the consequences of his acts, and on an occasion like this, we must restrain all private feelings, and decide only and exclusively with a view to the permanent interests of the Africander people. These are great moments for us, perhaps the last time when we meet as a free people, and a free Government. Let us thus rise to the magnitude of the opportunity and arrive at a decision for which the future Africander generation will bless and not curse us. The great danger before this meeting is, that it will come to a decision from a purely military point of view. Almost all the representatives here are officers who do not know fear, who have never been afraid, nor will ever become afraid of the overwhelming strength of the enemy, and who are prepared to give their last drop of blood for their country and their people. Now, if we view the matter merely from a military standpoint, if we consider it only as a military matter, then I must admit that we can still go on with the struggle. We are still an unvanquished military force. We have still 18,000 men in the field, veterans, with whom you can do almost any work. We can thus push our cause, from a military point of view, still further. But we are not here as an army, but as a people; we have not only a military question, but also a national matter to deal with. No one here represents his own commando. Everyone here represents the Africander people, and not only that portion which is still in the field, but also those who are already under the sod and those who will live after we have gone. We represent, not only ourselves, but also the thousands who are dead, and have made the last sacrifice for their people, the prisoners of war scattered all over the world, and the women and children who are dying out by thousands in the Concentration Camps of the enemy; we represent the blood and the tears of an entire nation.

They all call upon us, from the prisoner-of-war camps, from the Concentration Camps, from the grave, from the field, and from the womb of the future, to decide wisely and to avoid all measures which may lead to the decadence and extermination of the Africander people, and thus frustrate the objects for which they made all their sacrifices. Hitherto we have not continued the struggle aimlessly. We did not fight merely to be shot. We commenced the struggle, and continued it to this moment, because we wished to maintain our independence, and were prepared to sacrifice everything for it. But we may not sacrifice the Africander people for that independence. As soon as we are convinced that, humanly speaking, there is no reasonable chance to retain our independence as Republics, it clearly becomes our duty to stop the struggle in order that we may not perhaps sacrifice our people and our future for a mere idea, which cannot be realised. What reasonable chance is there still to retain our independence? We have now fought for almost three years without a break. Without deceiving ourselves we can say that we have exerted all our powers and employed every means to further our cause. We have given thousands of lives, we have sacrificed all our earthly goods; our cherished country is one continuous desert; more than 20,000 women and children have already died in the Concentration Camps of the enemy. Has all this brought us nearer to our independence? On the contrary, we are getting ever further from it, and the longer we continue, the greater will be the gap between us and the object for which we have fought. The manner in which the enemy has carried on this war and still carries it on has reduced us to a condition of exhaustion which will ultimately make the continuance of the war a physical impossibility. If no deliverance comes from elsewhere, we must certainly succumb. When a year ago I, on behalf of my Government, communicated our condition to His Honour President Kruger in Europe, he expressed the opinion that, with a view to the situation in the Cape Colony, and to the feelings of the European peoples, we should continue with the struggle till the last means of resistance was exhausted. With reference to foreign politics, I only wish to direct your attention to the indisputable facts. (The speaker here discussed fully the political developments in America and of the principal European Powers during the last two years, and then proceeded.) For us the foreign situation is and remains that we enjoy much sympathy, for which we are, of course, heartily thankful. That is all we get, nor shall we receive anything more for many years. Europe will sympathise with us till the last Boer hero lies in his last resting-place, till the last Boer woman has gone to her grave with a broken heart, till our entire nation shall have been sacrificed on the altar of history and of humanity.

With reference to the situation in the Cape Colony, I have stated fully on a former occasion what that is. We have made mistakes, and the Cape Colony was perhaps not ripe for these events. In any case we cannot expect any general rising there. The 3,000 men who have joined us are heroes, whom we cannot sufficiently honour, for having sacrificed their all for us, but they will not regain our independence.

We have now for twelve months acted on the advice of President Kruger, and have tried both the means indicated by him, and in both cases we have become convinced that, if we still wish to fight, we have only ourselves to depend upon.

The facts laid before this meeting by the Delegates from both the Republics convince me that it will be a crime for us to continue this struggle without the assurance of help from elsewhere. Our country has already been ruined to its foundations, and by our continuance, without any reasonable prospect of success, we shall hopelessly ruin our people also.

Now the enemy approaches us with a proposal which, however unacceptable, is coupled with the promise of amnesty for the Colonial comrades who have joined us. I fear that the day will come when we shall no more be able to rescue the so-called rebels, and then they will have just grounds to reproach us that we have sacrificed their interests also for our already hopeless cause. And I am afraid that the rejection of the proposal of the British Government will cause us to lose much sympathy abroad and greatly weaken our position.

Comrades, we decided to stand to the bitter end. Let us now, like men, admit that that end has come for us, come in a more bitter shape than we ever thought. For each one of us death would have been a sweeter and a more welcome end than the step which we shall now have to take. But we bow to God's will. The future is dark, but we shall not relinquish courage and our hope and our faith in God. No one will ever convince me that the unparalleled sacrifices laid on the altar of Freedom by the Africander people will be vain and futile. The war of freedom of South Africa has been fought, not only for the Boers, but for the entire people of South Africa. The result of that struggle we leave in God's hand. Perhaps it is His will to lead the people of South Africa through defeat and humiliation, yea, even through the valley of the shadow of death, to a better future and a brighter day.

Commandant A. J. BESTER (Bloemfontein) said: I have been delegated by a commando of 800 men, and although General de Wet clearly explained our position to them, these 800 men declared that they would not submit to England. My commando has been taking part in the war since the commencement, and we have sacrificed everything already that was dear to us, all for our national existence and independence. Eight months ago my commando was in very bad circumstances. We were badly supplied with horses and clothing, but now we are furnished with all we want, almost as well as when we commenced the war. Every burgher has at least two horses, and some have five, and they are all full of courage. Where they get the courage from is a riddle to me, because dark days have passed over them.

Arguments with reference to our circumstances are piled up, but I must point out that we did not commence with arguments. In 1880 the South African Republic dared to rise against the powerful England. The view then taken was that the Africander, who had settled here, and who had shed his blood for his country, had a just claim to this country, and by the London Convention the enemy had acknowledged that right, that claim. Now the enemy has broken that Convention, and we took up arms in the hope that right would triumph. The war was forced upon the South African Republic and her confederate, the Orange Free State, and why? For the sake of the franchise? No, but for the gold of Johannesburg. That is what England wished to have, just as formerly she wanted the diamond fields of Kimberley and scooped them in.

We commenced the war knowing that London alone had about 5,600,000 inhabitants, and we barely 200,000, but we relied on the justness of our cause, and on the firm conviction that a just cause could never be put down. The facts which have been summed up against the continuance of the war cannot be reasoned away, but neither can the fact be reasoned away that for two years and eight months we had pitted against us the greatest Power, with unheard-of forces, with Kaffirs and with even our own people against us, and yet they cannot exterminate us. And how does the enemy fare? A force or 500 or even of 1,000 men dare not trek out, or 200 burghers make mincemeat of them. We have already performed such deeds that they cannot be otherwise described than as miracles. We must only be unanimous. I stand or fall with my freedom.

Mr. C. BIRKENSTOCK asked whether the proposal of the British could not be accepted under protest.

General J. C. SMUTS replied that the meeting could authorise the Governments to sign the proposal under certain conditions.

Commandant A. J. BESTER was of opinion that it was not necessary to discuss the matter further, and proposed that the discussion be closed.

His proposal received no seconder.

Commandant J. E. MENTZ (Heilbron) said: I represent the Vechtkop division of the Heilbron district. I believe there is nothing else for us to discuss than the questions: Shall we continue the war, or shall we accept the terms before us? In my opinion, unconditional surrender is out of the question, and I must say that after my experiences, and taking into consideration the general condition in which, according to the communications made to us here, we are in, I do not see a chance of going on further with the struggle. The conditions in Heilbron, Kroonstad, and parts of Vrede and Bloemfontein are most pitiable. Not five cattle have remained over in these districts for the families to slaughter. In my division, there are between 200 and 300 women and children, and the husbands of most of them are prisoners-of-war. Many are widows, whose husbands have sacrificed their lives, and now they are helpless. If the war must continue I shall have to leave my district; but will it be right and honest of me to leave the families there to the mercy of the enemy? There is, indeed, a chance of getting cattle through the block house lines of the enemy, but in about half a day the cattle are retaken from us. I can assure you that when I left my commando they had nothing to live on except a little mealies. Our horses are also poor, and we have no forage for them. Since March the enemy has continually been surrounding us, and we have been very much harassed. We are beginning to be so hard pressed that we are obliged even by day to break through the cordon which the enemy draws round us. A week before I came here I had to fight my way twice through a cordon, and 40 of my burghers, whose horses were poor, were captured.

I was surprised to learn that our Deputation wished to return, because we were always hoping that they would be able to do something for us. I am afraid that if we do not accept these terms we shall crumble away bit by bit. I see no other prospect for us if we continue the struggle, and fear that the longer we continue the worse we shall fare.

General J. KEMP (Krugersdorp) spoke as follows: Although I have already expressed my opinion, I wish to do so again. This is a grave moment for every Africander, because if we take a wrong step, it can have fatal consequences for our people. As far as my division is concerned, I still see a chance of going on with the struggle, and the instruction of my burghers was: "Stand for the independence." In spite of the legal opinion given here, I must ask: Where shall I stand, if I vote for this proposal, and my burghers do not approve of it, since they gave me a definite instruction? The document before us is so vague and unintelligible, that it will enable the enemy to suppress us altogether. The three millions for payment of Government Notes and receipts will not cover a third of the amounts owing. I say that the enemy will make the payment of these three millions so troublesome that the poor will see very little or nothing of it. The Dutch language will be allowed where the parents of the children desire it, but what does that avail against the declaration of Lord Milner, that he wants only one language in South Africa? It is plain that it is intended to entirely suppress and Anglicise the whole Africanderdom. We have struggled so long for our independence, and although our situation is difficult and dark we may not give up the fight. Two years ago everything was just as dark. If we accept these terms, our people will go under entirely, while by continuing we may still be able to right matters. If we stand together we are invincible; if we accept these terms, then all our suffering and struggling and sacrifices will have been in vain. I must carry out my instruction and stand for our independence.

Acting State President S. W. BURGER said: I intended not to say a single word more on this question, because I have already expressed my opinion, but in these grave moments there are a few points I wish to put forward. There are in this meeting two parties, as it were, and that is to be regretted. We must stand together as one man, one in heart, one in opinion, and with only one object in view—the future salvation and welfare of our people.

I notice that most of those speakers who plead for the continuance of the war are still young men, and it is perhaps the first time that they have had to decide on such a weighty matter. I ask you: Can we under the existing circumstances prosecute the war? And to that I must reply that, according to my views, based on what I have seen, on what I have heard here, on what I have experienced myself, there is no reasonable possibility for us to prosecute the war with the expectation that the result will be favourable to us. We are referred to the war of 1880-1881, but that cannot be compared with the present struggle. I took part in it from beginning to end. We were then a small people, and we triumphed—yes, but not with our arms. There were other circumstances, which gave us the victory. President Brand, of our sister State, who remained neutral, assisted us, and Gladstone in England stood by us, and did us justice. There were then better men in England than now. It was not by the sword that we gained the victory.

It is argued that we have carried on the struggle for more than two years, and that we can still go on. But if we observe with what we commenced, and how we are situate now, it must be seen that we are going to certain ruin, as has already been explained. If I take into consideration the means we had and our numerical strength when we commenced, and our present condition, then I can cherish no hope of gaining the victory. Every man we lose makes the enemy stronger, and the troops against us have not been reduced, but increased, since Lord Roberts entered Pretoria, and the enemy is being taught by us, and by our people who fight for them, how to carry on war against us. I do not even wish to mention all the Kaffirs which the enemy have on their side and who help them. If you do not see facts it is impossible for me and others to open your eyes to them.

It is stated that we commenced the war with faith and trust in God, but is that quite correct? Let each one ask himself whether he had such faith and trust only. Was there not also a spirit of self-confidence, of trust in our own arms, and our efficiency to handle those arms? Was there not also a contempt of our great enemy? There was also a spirit of war amongst the people without considering what war could bring us. Only victory and not defeat was thought of. No one may deny this. But the question is, what must we do now? I do not think much of the document that lies before us. What is offered us in it does not urge me to make peace. On me, as acting Head of the Transvaal, there rests a great responsibility, especially towards all those who with me have hitherto tried to do their duty to their country and people, and if I am convinced that by the continuance of the war we dig a grave for our people for ever and aye, can I then vote for the continuance of it? Am I not called upon to guard the interests of that people committed to my guidance by my reason? I say it is my holy duty to stop this struggle now that it has become hopeless, and not to allow one more man to be shot, and not to allow the innocent, helpless women and children to remain any longer in their misery in the plague-stricken Concentration Camps. We are now called upon to sacrifice our freedom, just as Abraham was called upon to sacrifice his son; and faith is to walk on the path on which we are led, however dark it may be.

If we decide to continue, two facts stare us in the face. The one is, that many burghers will be compelled to lay down their arms, and the other, that we shall have to abandon parts of the South African Republic, as well as of the Orange Free State. Is that progress? If parts of the country are abandoned by us, they, of course, fall entirely into the hands of the enemy, who will certainly make use of that circumstance.

It is asked whether we shall not later on get an opportunity again for negotiating if we desire to do so. I say: No. We must not lose sight of the position in which the enemy stands towards us, and their power. If we separate now without making peace, the enemy will never again acknowledge us as a party, and a later opportunity for negotiation will in my opinion be out of the question. This is probably our last meeting. The time for unconditional surrender is past, and in reply to the question, What will become of our people if we accept these terms? I say: "There remains a root, and that root will again sprout up as a child, and the time will arrive when we shall again have the right to speak in the government of our country. Let us thus preserve the root, because, if that is eradicated, it is all over with us. Chop off a tree, and it will sprout again; but root it out, and it is no more. And surely our people have not deserved to be rooted out.

Other speakers have clearly pointed out what the continuance of the war will bring us. Those who are in favour of its prosecution speak only of hope. But on what do they build that hope? On our arms? No one says that. On intervention? No, every one declares he does not believe in that. Upon what, then, is the hope founded? Speaking of intervention, I wish to say that I do not believe or expect that any Power will help us. My experience is that the Powers make use of the difficulty in which England is situated in South Africa to settle all their outstanding questions with that country. They profit by this war, and will therefore not lift a finger for us.

There are men among you who will not hear of giving up the struggle. But they follow the dictates of their hearts, and not of their heads. However painful it is, I must say, with the facts before us, we must give up the fight.

I very much regret that, since the Orange Free State, our confederate, threw in her lot with us, the Transvaal should to-day exhibit the greater weakness, and is obliged to say that she cannot go on any more, while many of our Free State comrades still wish to maintain the struggle. But you must know that the enemy have latterly specially applied themselves to subjugate the Transvaal first, and for that purpose have concentrated all their forces upon us. However painful it is to me, my reason tells me that we cannot go on any further, but that it is better to bow to a foreign flag and to save our people, than to continue and to allow our people to be entirely exterminated."

Mr. L. J. JACOBSZ (Acting State Attorney of the South African Republic) said: I have not yet expressed an opinion, because I am not a fighting burgher. I have, indeed, suffered great privations and been in great danger, but I consider that as nothing compared to what others have suffered. I also maintained silence from fear that my views might make a wrong impression on others, and in that way prejudice our cause, while those who do the actual fighting know what they can still effect.

I have heard all the discussions, but I have heard nothing that has made me change the opinion which I have long held and which I expressed at Klerksdorp, viz., that we cannot continue the struggle any longer. My opinions have been voiced by our military leaders. We have heard the opinions of Generals de la Rey, Louis Botha, and J. C. Smuts, and also of some of the Free State Delegates, and I fail to see how it will be possible for us, if we should decide to continue and return to our burghers, not to convey to them the impression made on us by these opinions. And if these opinions become known, what will the result be? Dissatisfaction and paralysis will at once follow, with the result that the burghers will not be able to prosecute the struggle any further. Those opinions are based on facts, and will undoubtedly dissipate the courage which so many still had. We all know what the condition of our country is. The country cannot support the commandos any longer. This has been proved. And, further, what is the condition of our women and children? We have officially been informed that over 20,000 have already died, and there is another more important matter, viz., the immorality in the Concentration Camps, about which we hear from various sources. This is the worst cancer which can attack a people. Our female sex stands under the influence of the enemy, and is beginning to deviate from the morals of their and our forefathers, and that deviation touches the root of our national existence. No one can argue that away.

If we were more or less certain that by perseverance we should succeed in our object, then let us persevere and defy all privations and dangers. Many of us have hoped for and built on intervention, but personally I see no ground for such hope.

I have great sympathy for men like Commandant Bester, who do not even think of laying down their arms, but we stand face to face with facts, and we must not proceed with our head against the wall. It is argued that we must have faith, but faith must have grounds, and what grounds have we? We cannot compare our people to the Israelites of old. Israel had definite promises. General de Wet has attempted to adduce some grounds, but they were, in my opinion, not satisfactory or sufficient.

The idea of accepting terms from the enemy never occurred to our Government at first, and an unconditional surrender is what will be agreeable to our feelings, but what our reason dissuades us from. For the sake of our people, we must take what we can get in order to help them, even though the three millions is so trifling and the terms before us so disappointing. The Commission delegated by us did what they could, and all the members have our perfect confidence. Our people are longing for peace, and if they know that we did our best, they will be satisfied.

I want to add further that I am of the same opinion as Advocates Hertzog and Smuts with reference to the difficulty of some of the Delegates, that they have a definite instruction, and must vote accordingly.

Commandant J. J. ALBERTS (Standerton) spoke more or less in the strain of his former speech. He was in favour of terminating the war by sacrificing some territory, but if that was impossible, the war should in any case be concluded.

General DE WET was of opinion, with a view to the limited time within which the Meeting had to decide, that, if possible, proposals should be submitted to the Meeting.

General G. A. BRAND held the same view.

Field Cornet D. J. E. OPPERMAN (Pretoria) said: I have no definite instruction from my burghers, except that I must make the best of the situation when we have considered all the circumstances. It is well that in this important matter we have men of different opinions, which they express, because in that way we become well posted on all matters, and are thus enabled to arrive at a good decision.

Unconditional surrender we can put out of our minds, because, in my opinion, we have gone too far for that. It is as difficult for me to decide to continue the war as to accept these terms before us. Before I came here I was of opinion that we should continue the struggle because we have already experienced too many hardships and too much bitterness to have to give up our country to the enemy after all. My burghers will stand by me if I tell them that we must go on, but if they are informed of the condition of affairs over the entire country as we know them now, then I do not believe that they will follow me or any officer in maintaining the fight. My great difficulty is the condition of the families with us. Formerly, when we still had food in abundance, the enemy gladly took the families into their Concentration Camps, but now that they know that our supply of food is almost entirely exhausted, they refuse to receive any more families, in order to force us to surrender on account of their fatal condition. All provisions with which we supply them are looted by the enemy, who leave them deprived of everything. My conscience will therefore not allow me to say that we must continue the war, because that will mean that the families will have to die of hunger. We men can make some arrangement to help ourselves, for we can move about from one place to another to look for food, and if it came to a push, we could take provisions from the enemy; but the women and children are helpless victims. According to the dictates of my conscience, therefore, I must vote for the acceptance of these terms before us in order to save our families, but I shall record my vote only under protest and with notification that I give it thus for the said reasons.

On the motion of Field Cornet B. J. VAN HEERDEN, seconded by Field Cornet B. J. ROOS, it was unanimously resolved to close the discussion, after which the Meeting was closed with Prayer till the following morning.

SATURDAY, MAY 31ST, 1902.

At 9.30 o'clock in the morning the Meeting was opened with Prayer.

The following two proposals were handed in:—

(1) By General NIEUWOUDT, seconded by General BRAND:—

"This Meeting of special Delegates from both the Republics having considered the proposal by His Britannic Majesty's Government for the restoration of peace, and considering—

"(a) The wishes and the instructions of the Burghers in the Field;

"(b) That they do not feel themselves justified to conclude a peace on the basis laid down by His Majesty's Government before having been placed in communication with the Delegates of the Republics at present in Europe, Resolves—

"That they cannot accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government, and instructs the Governments to communicate this Resolution to His Britannic Majesty's Government through their Representatives here."

(2) By General P. R. VILJOEN, seconded by General H. A. ALBERTS:—

"That this Meeting resolves to accept the Proposal of the British Government."

State Secretary F. W. REITZ now addressed the Meeting, and said: I consider it a duty to myself, as State Secretary and as burgher, to my nation, and to posterity, to say that if this Meeting decides to conclude the war and to accept the British terms, they will have to make provision for the signing thereof, because I shall affix my signature to no document by which our independence is relinquished. But I must also say that if this Meeting does not see its way clear to go on with the war, they ought not to accept any terms from the enemy, but should simply say: "Here we are, here are our people. We cannot continue the war any further; take us." I do not wish to hurt anybody's feelings. On the contrary, I have the greatest respect for the feelings of those brave men here who have fought so well and so faithfully for their country and people, but I consider that it would be wrong of us to make terms with England.

The CHAIRMAN remarked that the State Secretary was out of order.

General P. R. VILJOEN said: I have prayed that God may grant that I shall not trample on the precious blood that has been shed, on the blood of my own son, but after all that I have heard here I have become convinced that we must terminate this war. I have tabled a proposal from which the future generations can see that we are obliged and forced to sacrifice our independence. I only trust that we shall be unanimous in our resolution.



General DE WET said: The time is too short to admit of further discussion on these proposals, and we must arrive at a decision. I propose that we appoint a committee, consisting of Advocates Smuts and Hertzog, to draft a proposal embodying the views of this Meeting. I do not say what the proposal must embrace. Let us then adjourn for an hour, and let the Delegates of the South African Republic and of the Orange Free State meet each other separately, in order to try to come to unanimity. We must arrive at a unanimous decision, because that will be of incalculable value to us for the future.

General BOTHA: I think we must adopt General de Wet's suggestion. We have fought and suffered together; let us now decide together. In this matter we can and must devise means to be unanimous.

General DE WET'S proposal was unanimously adopted by the Meeting, and the Orange Free State Delegates withdrew to the tent of General de Wet, while those of the South African Republic remained in the tent in which the meeting was held.

Fully an hour later all the Delegates met again, and the following resolution drafted by Generals HERTZOG and SMUTS was read:—

"This Meeting of Representatives of the people of both the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, held at Vereeniging from May 15 to 31, 1902, has with regret taken cognisance of the proposal made by His Majesty's Government relative to the termination of the existing hostilities, and of its communication that this proposal must be accepted or rejected without alteration. It deplores the fact that His Majesty's Government has absolutely refused to negotiate with the Governments of the Republics on the basis of their independence, or to permit their Governments to communicate with their Deputation. Our People have, indeed, always been of opinion that not only on the ground of Right, but also of the great material and personal sacrifices made for their independence, they had a well-founded claim to that Independence.

"This Meeting has seriously weighed the condition of their Country and People, and has specially noted the following facts:—

"1. That the Military policy followed by the British Military Authorities has led to the entire devastation of the territory of both the Republics with the burning of farms and villages, the destruction of all means of subsistence, and the exhaustion of all sources necessary for the support of our families, for the existence of our troops, and for the continuation of the war.

"2. That the placing of our captured families in the Concentration Camps has led to an unheard-of condition of suffering and disease, so that in a comparatively short time about 20,000 of our dear ones have perished in those camps, and the horrible prospect has arisen that by the continuance of the war our entire race may in that way die out.

"3. That the Kaffir tribes within and without the boundaries of the territory of both Republics have almost all been armed, and have taken part in the struggle against us, and, by perpetrating murders and committing all kinds of atrocities, have brought about an impossible state of affairs in many districts of both the Republics, as has only been recently proved in the Vrijheid district, where on a single occasion 56 burghers were murdered and mutilated in an awful manner.

"4. That by the proclamations of the enemy to which they have already begun to give effect the burghers who are still fighting are menaced with the loss of all their movable and immovable property, and thus with entire material ruin.

"5. That through the circumstances of the war it has long ago become impossible for us to retain the many thousands of prisoners of war taken by our forces, and that we can thus do comparatively little damage to the British Forces while the burghers who are captured by the British are sent out of the country, and that after the war has been raging for almost three years there remains only an insignificant portion of the fighting force with which we commenced the war.

"6. That this struggling remnant, which constitutes only a small minority of our entire people, has to fight against overwhelming odds of the enemy, and is, moreover, practically in a state of famine and privation, wanting even the indispensable necessaries of life, and that in spite of the application of our utmost endeavours and the sacrifice of all that was dear and precious to us, we cannot reasonably expect ultimate victory.

"This Meeting is therefore of opinion that there is no reasonable ground to expect that by carrying on the war the People will be able to retain their independence, and considers that, under the circumstances, the People are not justified in proceeding with the war, since such can only tend to the social and material ruin, not only of ourselves, but also of our posterity.

"Forced by the above-mentioned circumstances and motives, this Meeting instructs both Governments to accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government, and to sign the same on behalf of the People of both the Republics.

"This Meeting of Delegates expresses the belief that the conditions thus created by the acceptance of the proposal of His Majesty's Government may speedily be so ameliorated that our People will thereby attain the enjoyment of those privileges to which they consider they can justly lay claim, on the ground not only of their past history, but also of their sacrifices in this war.

"This Meeting has noted with satisfaction the decision of His Majesty's Government to grant a large measure of amnesty to those British subjects who took up arms on our side, and to whom we are bound by ties of blood and honour, and expresses the wish that it may please His Majesty to extend this amnesty still further."

This proposal was moved by Commandant H. P. J. PRETORIUS (Jacobsdal), and seconded by General Chris. BOTHA.

General NIEUWOUDT withdrew his proposal, which was, however, immediately adopted by General C. C. J. BADENHORST (Boshof), and seconded by Commander A. BESTER (Bloemfontein).

The Meeting then adjourned till two o'clock.

At two o'clock the Meeting was resumed.

The proposal of Commandant H. P. J. PRETORIUS, seconded by General Chris. BOTHA, was then put to the vote.

The voting was as follows:—

FOR.

H. A. Alberts. A. J. Bester (Bethlehem). L. P. H. Botha. G. A. Brand. H. J. Bruwer. J. F. de Beer. C. J. Brits. H. J. Bosman. Chris. Botha. C. Birkenstock. C. F. Beyers. B. H. Breytenbach. F. R. Cronje. D. H. van Coller. J. de Clercq. J. G. Cilliers. T. A. Doenges. C. C. Froneman. D. F. H. Flemming. H. S. Grobler. J. L. Grobler. J. N. H. Grobler. F. J. W. J. Hattingh. J. A. M. Hertzog. B. J. van Heerden. J. N. Jacobs. F. P. Jacobsz. J. F. Jordaan. J. J. Koen. H. J. Kritzinger. A. J. de Kock. P. J. Liebenberg. J. A. P. Van der Merwe. F. E. Mentz. C. H. Muller. T. K. Nieuwoudt. H. van Niekerk. J. J. van Niekerk. D. J. E. Opperman. A. M. Prinsloo. H. P. J. Pretorius. A. Ross. L. J. Rautenbach. P. D. Roux. F. J. Rheeder. B. Roos. D. J. Schoeman. T. Stofberg. S. P. du Toit. P. L. Uijs. W. J. Viljoen. P. W. de Vos. W. J. Wessels. P. R. Viljoen.

AGAINST.

J. J. Alberts (S.A.R.). J. Kemp (S.A.R.). J. Naude (S.A.R.). A. J. Bester (Bloemfontein), (O.F.S.). C. C. J. Badenhorst (O.F.S.). C. A. van Niekerk (O.F.S.).

By 54 votes to 6 the proposal was adopted.

When this resolution had been passed there were not many tearless eyes in the tent.

Acting President S. W. BURGER then addressed the following words to the Meeting: We stand here at the graveside of the two Republics. Much remains for us to do, even though we cannot do what lies before us in the official positions which we have hitherto occupied. Let us not withdraw our hands from doing what is our duty. Let us pray God to guide us and to direct us how to keep our people together. We must also be inclined to forgive and to forget when we meet our brothers. We may not cast off that portion of our people who were unfaithful. With these words I wish officially to bid farewell to you, our respected Commandant General, General de Wet, Members of both Executive Councils, and Delegates.

With this the last meeting of the two Republics terminated. It was closed with Prayer.



The Secretary, Mr. D. E. van Velden, was then instructed to request Lord Kitchener's representatives in the camp—namely, Captain P. J. Marker and Major Henderson—to come to the tent in which the meeting was held in order that the decision of the Meeting might be communicated to them.

They speedily arrived, and under a death-like silence General Botha informed them that the Meeting had accepted the peace proposals of the British Government.

Immediately afterwards the British Authorities made the necessary arrangements for the conveyance by rail to Pretoria of the members of both Republican Governments to sign the Treaty of Peace in accordance with the instruction of the Meeting.

That night, shortly before 11 o'clock, the said Governments duly arrived at Pretoria.

On arrival at the Railway Station they were conveyed in great haste to the residence of Mr. George Heys in Mare Street, which was occupied by Lord Kitchener, and served as the Army Headquarters in South Africa.

For a few moments the members of the two Republican Governments, who were accompanied by the two Secretaries, Rev. J. D. Kestell and Mr. D. E. van Velden, were left alone in the spacious dining-room, as they wished to read the resolution of the Delegates once more in order to satisfy themselves that it was correct.

When this had been done, Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner entered.

The two Representatives of the British Government sat at the head of the table next to each other at the south side of the apartment. On the left of Lord Milner sat Acting President S. W. Burger, State Secretary F. W. Reitz, Commandant General Louis Botha, General J. H. de la Rey, Mr. J. C. Krogh, and General L. J. Meyer. On Lord Kitchener's right sat Acting President C. R. de Wet, General C. H. Olivier, General J. B. M. Hertzog, and Acting Government Secretary Mr. W. J. C. Brebner.

The Peace Treaty had been typed in quadruple on parchment. One copy was intended for the King of England, one for Lord Kitchener, one to be preserved in the Archives in Pretoria, and one in the Archives in Bloemfontein.

There was perfect silence when Acting President S. W. Burger took up the pen.

It was five minutes past eleven on May 31, 1902.

Acting President Burger signed. After him the members of the Government of the South African Republic. Then Acting President de Wet and the Members of the Orange Free State Government. Lord Kitchener followed, and last of all Lord Milner signed.

Before signing State Secretary Reitz rose in his seat, pen in hand, and stated that he signed only in his official capacity, and not as F. W. Reitz.

President Steyn was not there. Physical prostration due to his serious illness prevented him from doing what he had always said he would never do, viz., put his hand on paper to sign away the Independence of his People.

The document was signed.

Everything was silent in the apartment where so much had taken place.

For a few moments everyone sat still.

As the members of the Governments of the now late Republics stood up, as men stupefied, to leave the apartment, Lord Kitchener rose, and, going up to each of them, offered his hand, saying, "We are good friends now."

They then left the apartment and proceeded to the adjoining house (the residence of Mr. Carl Rood), which had been placed at their disposal.

* * * * *

After the resolution of the meeting had been communicated to the British Representatives, the Delegates met again, when the following proposal by Commandant Jacobsz, seconded by General Muller, was unanimously adopted:—

"This meeting of Delegates, considering the pressing necessity to collect means to provide for the wants of the suffering women and children, widows and orphans, and other necessitous persons who have been reduced to a state of indigency by the war,

"And considering the desirability of appointing a Head Committee, whose duty it shall be to take the necessary steps to make provision herein and to decide finally about the Administration and application of the means to be collected,

"Resolves to appoint Messrs. M. T. Steijn, S. W. Burger, L. Botha, C. R. de Wet, J. H. de la Rey, Rev. A. P. Kriel, and Rev. J. D. Kestell (Secretary), a Head Committee, to make all such further arrangements for carrying out the said objects as may appear desirable and practical to them, and especially to add new members to their number, to appoint Sub-Committees and an Executive Committee, which is authorised to draw up Statutes and amend the same whenever necessary."

It was further proposed by Commandant Jacobsz, seconded by General Muller, and carried by the meeting:—

"This meeting further resolves to delegate General C. R. de Wet, General Louis Botha, and General J. H. de la Rey, of the said Head Committee, to proceed to Europe to collect the said funds."



APPENDIX

THE MIDDELBURG PROPOSALS.

Pretoria, March 7, 1901.

YOUR HONOUR,

With reference to your conversation at Middelburg on February 28, I have the honour to inform you that, in the event of a general and complete cessation of hostilities, and the surrender of all rifles, ammunition, cannon, and other munitions of war in the hands of the burghers, or in Government depots or elsewhere, His Majesty's Government is prepared to adopt the following measures:—

His Majesty's Government will at once grant an amnesty in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony for all bona fide acts of war committed during the recent hostilities. British Subjects belonging to Natal and Cape Colony, while they will not be compelled to return to those Colonies, will, if they do so, be liable to be dealt with by the laws of those Colonies specially passed to meet the circumstances arising out of the present war. As you are doubtless aware, the special law in the Cape Colony has greatly mitigated the ordinary penalties for High Treason in the present case.

All prisoners of war now in St. Helena, Ceylon, or elsewhere, being burghers or Colonists, will, on the completion of the surrender, be brought back to their country as quickly as arrangements can be made for their transport.

At the earliest practicable date military administration will cease, and will be replaced by civil administration in the form of Crown Colony Government. There will, therefore, be, in the first instance, in each of the new Colonies, a Governor and an Executive Council, composed of the principal officials, with a Legislative Council consisting of a certain number of official members to whom a nominated unofficial element will be added. But it is the desire of His Majesty's Government, as soon as circumstances permit, to introduce a representative element, and ultimately to concede to the new Colonies the privilege of self-government. Moreover, on the cessation of hostilities, a High Court will be established in each of the new Colonies to administrate the laws of the land, and this Court will be independent of the Executive.

Church property, public trusts, and orphan funds will be respected. Both the English and Dutch languages will be used and taught in public schools when the parents of the children desire it, and allowed in Courts of Law.

As regards the debts of the late Republican Governments, His Majesty's Government cannot undertake any liability. It is, however, prepared, as an act of grace, to set aside a sum not exceeding one million pounds sterling to repay inhabitants of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony for goods requisitioned from them by the Republican Governments, or subsequent to annexation, by Commandants in the field being in a position to inforce such requisitions. But such claims will have to be established to the satisfaction of a Judge or Judicial Commission, appointed by the Government, to investigate and assess them, and, if exceeding in the aggregate one million pounds, they will be liable to reduction pro rata.

I also beg to inform your Honour that the new Government will take into immediate consideration the possibility of assisting by loan the occupants of farms, who will take the oath of allegiance, to repair any injuries sustained by destruction of buildings or loss of stock during the war, and that no special war tax will be imposed upon farms to defray the expense of the war.

When Burghers require the protection of firearms, such will be allowed to them by licence, and on due registration, provided they take the oath of allegiance. Licences will also be issued for sporting rifles, guns, &c., but military firearms will only be allowed for purposes of protection.

As regards the extension of the franchise to Kaffirs in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty's Government to give such franchise before representative Government is granted to those Colonies, and if then given it will be so limited as to secure the just predominance of the white race. The legal position of coloured persons will, however, be similar to that which they hold in the Cape Colony.

In conclusion, I must inform your Honour that, if the terms now offered are not accepted after a reasonable delay for consideration, they must be regarded as cancelled.

I have, &c., KITCHENER, GENERAL, Commander-in-Chief, British Forces, South Africa.

To his Honour COMMANDANT-GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA.

THE END