This was done later on, and the time was fixed for Saturday evening, May 31, 1902, at the latest.

General Botha asked whether there would be any objection to the Delegates deleting some clause or other from the proposal now submitted by the British Government?

Lord MILNER: There can be no alteration. There must simply be a reply of "yes" or "no."

General Botha thought that they had the right to alter one or more of the clauses, because the burghers in the field had the right to surrender unconditionally.

Lord Milner said that the burghers could naturally do so. But the document from the British Government could not be altered.

THE COLONIAL REBELS.

Privately, much discussion had already taken place in the interests of the Colonials who had fought on the Republican side, and an informal conversation now followed on this subject.

Lord Milner communicated what the British Government intended to do with these Colonists, which intention appears from the following document which he read:—

"HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT must place it on record that the treatment of CAPE and NATAL Colonials who have been in Rebellion, and who now surrender, will, if they return to their Colonies, be determined by the Colonial Governments and in accordance with the Laws of the Colonies, and that any BRITISH Subjects who have joined the Enemy will be liable to trial under the Law of that part of the BRITISH EMPIRE to which they belong.

"HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT are informed by the Cape Government that the following are their views as to the terms which should be granted to BRITISH Subjects of the Cape Colony who are now in the Field or who have surrendered or have been captured since April 12, 1901. With regard to Rank and File, that they should all upon surrender after giving up their Arms sign a document before the Resident Magistrate of the District in which surrender takes place acknowledging themselves guilty of High Treason, and that the Punishment to be awarded to them, provided they shall not have been guilty of Murder or other acts contrary to the usages of Civilised Warfare, should be that they shall not be entitled for life to be registered as Voters or to vote at any Parliamentary, Divisional Council, or Municipal Election.

"With reference to Justices of the Peace, and Field Cornets of the Cape Colony and all other persons holding an Official Position under the Government of the Cape Colony, or who may occupy the Position of Commandant of Rebel or Burgher Forces, they should be tried for High Treason before the ordinary Court of the Country or such special Courts as may be hereafter constituted by Law, the Punishments for their Offence to be left to the discretion of the Court, with this proviso, that in no case shall the penalty of Death be inflicted.

"The NATAL Government are of opinion that Rebels should be dealt with according to the Law of the Colony."

The Conference then broke up. The secretaries, assisted by Advocates N. J. de Wet and Igns. S. Ferreira immediately commenced with the task of making copies and translations of the proposals of the British Government for the use of the Meeting of the Delegates at Vereeniging. This work occupied them till the evening.

At 9 o'clock p.m. the Commission left for Vereeniging by special train.



CHAPTER VI.

VEREENIGING AND PEACE.

MINUTES

of the meeting of the Special Delegates at Vereeniging, South African Republic, on Thursday, May 29, 1902, and following days.

The Meeting commenced at 9 a.m., and, at the request of the Chairman, was opened with Prayer by the Rev. J. D. Kestell.

Having declared the Meeting open, the Chairman requested the Commission, which had been delegated to negotiate with Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, to report on what they had done.

The acting State President S. W. Burger, on rising to do so, first requested the Secretary of the Meeting (Mr. D. E. van Velden) to read the following report of the COMMISSION:—

Pretoria, May 28, 1902.

To the Governments of the Orange Free State and South African Republic.

GENTLEMEN,

In accordance with the instructions received by us from the two Governments, we proceeded to Pretoria to negotiate with the British Representatives on the question of peace, and have the honour to report as follows:—

Our meetings with the British Authorities lasted from Monday, May 19, till Wednesday, May 28, and the delay was principally due to the long time required for cable correspondence with the British Government.

At first we made a proposal[5] in which we tried to establish a restricted independence by the surrender of a portion of our territory as a basis of negotiation. Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner, however, decidedly refused to negotiate on that basis, and informed us that if that proposal were cabled to the British Government, it would be detrimental to the negotiations.

[Footnote 5: See p. 98.]

At the same time we were informed that, as had already been intimated to both Governments, the British Government were prepared to negotiate only on the basis of the Middelburg proposals, subject to alterations as to details.

In order to prepare this proposal in a final form, Lord Milner requested the assistance of some members of our Committee, to which we acceded, with the understanding that the assistance of these members of the Commission would be rendered without prejudice.

As the result of the labours of this Sub-Committee, Lord Milner submitted a draft proposal, in which we insisted in the incorporation of a new clause, which was embodied therein (Clause No. 11). The draft proposal which is attached to this[6] was then cabled to the British Government, and was altered by them and communicated to us in a final form. This final proposal is attached hereto.[7]

[Footnote 6: See p. 116.]

[Footnote 7: See p. 133.]

We were informed on behalf of the British Government that this proposal could not be further altered, but must be accepted or rejected in its entirety by the Delegates of both Republics. At the same time, we were informed that this acceptance or rejection must take place within a definite time.

We thereupon informed Lord Kitchener that this final decision would be communicated to him by next Saturday evening at the latest.

During the formal negotiations some informal discussions also took place with reference to the British subjects in the Cape Colony and Natal who had fought on our side. As the result of these informal discussions, we received a communication from the British Government which we attach hereto.[8]

[Footnote 8: See p. 136.]

We have, &c.,

(Signed)

LOUIS BOTHA, C. R. DE WET, J. H. DE LA REY, J. B. M. HERTZOG, J. C. SMUTS.

Acting President S. W. BURGER said: If some point or other in the documents that have just been read to you is not clear, one or other of the members of the Commission will give the necessary explanations. You will observe that the Commission tried to negotiate more or less in the spirit of this meeting. The Representatives of the British Government declared that they could not negotiate on any other basis than the surrender of the independence. We have now before us a document upon which the British Government thinks peace can be concluded. The question before us now is: how must we set to work? I think there are three courses open to us upon which we must decide before Saturday evening. The three courses are:—

(1) To continue the struggle. Is this possible for us under the circumstances in which we find ourselves; what are the prospects; and what will the consequences be? This we must consider.

(2) Accept the proposal of the British Government and conclude peace thereon.

(3) Surrender unconditionally.

On these questions the Meeting must now decide.

On the proposal of General S. P. du Toit, seconded by Commandant Mentz, it was resolved that minutes of the discussions be kept as briefly as possible, and also that all proposals and resolutions be recorded.

Mr. J. DE CLERCQ (Middelburg): I would like to have some elucidation of Clause 2. Whom does it include?

General SMUTS: The words are: "in the veld." It is thus plain that other persons are not included in it.

Mr. DE CLERCQ: What, then, becomes of persons who have been banished?

General SMUTS: Clause 3 provides for persons who, according to the British, have been banished.

Commandant JACOBSZ: Clause 2 deals with "burghers." I should like to know whether officers are also included.

General SMUTS: "Burghers" includes officers also. "Rebels" is the term in contra-distinction to "burghers."

General S. P. DU TOIT: In clause 4, I read: "The benefit of this clause will not extend to certain acts." May I know what acts are here referred to?

General BOTHA: As communicated by Lord Kitchener to the Commission, three persons are excluded from the benefit of Clause 4 of the peace proposals. They are namely: Mr. van Aswegen for the shooting of Captain Mears; Mr. Cilliers for the shooting of Capt. Boyle; and a certain Muller for the alleged murder of a certain Rademeyer in the district of Vrede. These three persons will have to stand their trial on the conclusion of peace.

Chief Commandant DE WET: Lord Kitchener arranged this matter informally with General Botha without reference to me, as I think he should have done, because two of the cases mentioned are of Free Staters. It is not down in black and white, that the three persons mentioned will be the only exceptions, and if more exceptions are made later I do not wish to be held responsible.

General BOTHA: I should like further to explain this matter. This point in Clause 4 was raised by the British representatives. Lord Kitchener asked to see me personally and informally, and at the suggestion of General de la Rey I went to him. Lord Kitchener then informed me that certain three alleged murders in the course of the war had attracted much attention in England, and that the British Government, on account of the feelings of the English people, did not see their way open to leave these three cases untried. The three cases already mentioned here were then communicated to me by Lord Kitchener. On a later occasion I took General Smuts with me, and Lord Kitchener repeated in the presence of both of us that only these three persons would be excluded from the benefit of Clause 4.

General HERTZOG: I am quite prepared to accept Lord Kitchener's word given to Generals Botha and Smuts.

General BRAND: Why are the names of these cases not inserted in the peace proposal?

General HERTZOG: They could not be inserted because as laid down by the British Government it could not be altered.

General DE LA REY: Only the three persons mentioned are excluded from the benefit of Clause 4, and because we were afraid that there might be more cases General Botha went and satisfied himself.

Chief Commandant DE WET: I did not wish to remain silent on this point, because there was only the word of Lord Kitchener and no other guarantee that other persons will not be prosecuted. I, of course, entirely believe what Generals Botha and Smuts have stated.

General HERTZOG: I am fully satisfied on this point.

Mr. C. BIRKENSTOCK (Vryheid) asked with reference to Clause 1 whether having regard to the large number of Kaffirs in many districts it would not be dangerous for the burghers to part with all their arms.

General BOTHA replied that the Commission had seen Lord Kitchener informally on this point, and pointed out this danger to him, and he had then agreed that in the districts on the boundaries where there were many Kaffirs, the landed proprietors and their sons could retain their arms under a licence, and that if there was a laying down of arms, he would send persons immediately to return the arms to these landed proprietors under a licence.

General DE LA REY: On this point I spoke out freely to Lord Kitchener. I said that I would never agree that burghers in the frontier districts should be entirely disarmed, and thus made lower than the Kaffirs. Lord Kitchener then said that he would take the arms from landed proprietors with one hand and return them immediately with the other.

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: Clause 2 says: "The prisoners of war will gradually be brought back to their homes." Has a time been fixed, or will it be done in the course of years? I have heard that the British have an objection to sending back 30,000 persons.

General SMUTS: The Committee tried to get a time fixed within which all prisoners of war must be brought back, but the British had a great objection to binding themselves, because it would depend upon the number of transport ships they would be able to obtain to convey the 30,000 prisoners of war back, and also because it would not be advisable on account of the scarcity of food in the two Republics to bring back so many people at once.

The meeting then adjourned till two o'clock in the afternoon, when the proceedings were resumed.

Mr. L. JACOBSZ: Does Clause 2 provide for the return of the deputation and other persons in Europe?

General SMUTS: The members of our deputation and other burghers in Europe, if they wish to return, also fall under this Clause.

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: What property is referred to in Clause 3?

General SMUTS: The word "property" includes every form of property.

Commandant VAN NIEKERK (Kroonstad): What course will be pursued with reference to the farms which have been sold?

Mr. J. L. GROBLER (Carolina): How many farms have been sold?

General SMUTS: Twenty farms, as stated unofficially.

Mr. J. L. GROBLER: Where?

General SMUTS: In the Orange Free State.

General HERTZOG: The Commission spoke informally to Lord Milner about the farms which have already been sold or confiscated by the British. He replied that they could not be returned to the former owners, but that the purchase-price would be refunded to them. About twenty farms had been thus sold, all situate in the Orange Free State.

Landdrost STOFBERG: Does Clause 5 signify that the medium of instruction will be Dutch?

General SMUTS: There is nothing against it in this Clause. According to this Clause the Dutch language will be taught, but it is not stipulated that Dutch will be the medium of instruction. My own impression is that the language in the schools will be English, but if the parents desire it, Dutch.

Landdrost STOFBERG: It means therefore that the language medium will be English, but that Dutch will also be allowed.

General HERTZOG: Lord Milner declared that he wanted only one language in South Africa, and that was English. English will be the medium.

Landdrost STOFBERG: A foreign language therefore?

General DU TOIT: What will be the Constitution of the Civil Government?

General BOTHA: It will be that of a Crown Colony.

General KEMP: Is no time fixed within which Civil Government must be introduced?

General BOTHA: No.

General DU TOIT: In Clause 9 mention is made of war taxes. Will there be no other taxes?

General BOTHA: The British Government says that they will not defray their expenses out of a tax on the farms.

Commandant ALBERTS: No war tax—therefore there will be other taxes?

General SMUTS: Yes, certainly, but they will be imposed on all inhabitants.

Mr. P. R. VILJOEN: If anyone has a Government note or receipt must he prove how he obtained it?

General SMUTS: Clause 10 is directed against speculators who have bought up notes.

Commandant JACOBSZ: What course will be pursued in cases where notes have passed from hand to hand?

General BOTHA: The Clause is directed only against speculators.

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: Do the words: "to assist those who are not able to assist themselves," mean that widows, orphans and maimed will be assisted?

General BOTHA: Yes.

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK: A pension, for instance?

General BOTHA: No pension.

Commandant FLEMMING: Was nothing said about receipts issued by the British themselves?

General DE WET: Lord Kitchener said that they would not be paid out till after the war, but not to speculators.

Commandant FLEMMING: There is therefore hope for British receipts?

General DE WET: Yes.

Mr. NAUDE: Is a man a burgher who became such after the commencement of the war?

Advocate L. J. JACOBSZ: No one is a burgher who became such after the war had begun.

Mr. BIRKENSTOCK asked a question with reference to creditors.

General BOTHA: In reply to Mr. Birkenstock I may say that we discussed that question formally, but the British representatives would not bind themselves with reference to the new Government's future policy, but asked us to trust that new Government to protect debtors.

General DU TOIT: Does Natal hold another view regarding the rebels?

General DE WET: Yes.

General DU TOIT: If the rebels remain outside the boundaries of their Colonies will they then be free?

General SMUTS: Yes, if they remain outside the Cape Colony and Natal.

Commandant OPPERMAN: Will their property be confiscated?

General SMUTS: In the Cape Colony there is no law providing for confiscation.

General BOTHA: Lord Kitchener said to me that at the coronation of the King he would recommend a general amnesty.

The Chairman at this stage asked the meeting to confine itself to the following questions:—

(1) Whether it would accept the document at present before them.

(2) Whether it would decide to continue the war.

(3) Or, whether it would decide to surrender unconditionally.

Mr. J. DE CLERCQ (Middelburg) said: I have already expressed my opinion on the question as to whether we shall continue the war. If we cannot proceed, then the question is whether we shall accept the proposals of the British Government, or whether we shall surrender unconditionally. It cannot be denied that these proposals are not so good as we wished, but the question is whether in the circumstances we can get anything better. If we surrender unconditionally and return to the burghers and they ask us: "What have you obtained for us on surrendering?" and we reply: "We have done nothing except surrendering you and ourselves unconditionally to the enemy," then we shall be in difficulties, and how shall we be able to justify ourselves? The burghers expect that we shall obtain the best terms possible for them, and I say that it is a greater honour for a people to negotiate than to surrender themselves unconditionally. If we get terms we shall be better able to satisfy the people than if we can only inform them that we have handed them over to the mercy of the enemy. I do not believe that anyone will be able to convince me that unconditional surrender will be better for the burghers. Unless I can be convinced of the contrary, I think it will be best to accept the proposal of the British Government.

General NIEUWOUDT: I think that the matter is now plain, and propose that we immediately proceed to vote whether we shall continue the war or not. If the majority is not in favour of continuing the struggle, then we can discuss the question whether we shall accept terms or surrender ourselves unconditionally.

This proposal was seconded by General Froneman.

Mr. C. BIRKENSTOCK: We must not act with undue haste in this important matter. Every Republican knows what the sentiment of freedom is, for which everything has already been sacrificed, and therefore it is not so easy to approve of, or to reject, a document such as the one now before us. I cannot agree with General Nieuwoudt that we should immediately decide as to whether we shall or shall not continue the war. We must consider the question of our independence as something sacred. We should consider whether we can continue the war, or whether we cannot continue it, and whether by proceeding we can obtain better terms. Are we now able to continue the war? Are there not at least two or three districts that cannot proceed with the struggle? Co-operation is the all-important matter for us. To think that a portion of the country can continue the war alone is certainly wrong. Let us calmly consider whether our strength and resources are such that we can maintain the struggle for a year. If we cannot do so, let us rather accept terms, for half a loaf is better than no bread. With my heart I cannot part with our independence, and it is hard for me to make our people so unhappy, but for the sake of the people and of the widows and orphans we must make the best we can of the matter.

Commandant JACOBSZ also could not agree with the proposal of General Nieuwoudt, because the matter was far too weighty to be disposed of so hastily.

Mr. P. R. VILJOEN (Heidelberg): The document that lies before us is painful. We are so tied up by it, so "knee-haltered," that it appears to me that we shall never get loose again. But I must admit that if we continue the war we may later be hobbled instead of "knee-haltered." I have already been informed that all my properties have been confiscated. If this had happened to my properties only I would not mention it, but I fear there are more people whose properties are threatened in the same way. I think we must instruct the Governments to conclude peace on the best terms.

General S. P. DU TOIT (Wolmaransstad): We are passing through critical moments. We must respect each other's opinion because everyone thinks that he has grounds for his views, and here especially it is expected that everyone will express his opinion honestly and freely. If that is done we shall be able to decide what course to pursue. We must not be over-hasty, because we are on the eve of a most important decision, and if a delegate declares that he is not able to prosecute the war any further we must not consider him cowardly or unfaithful. His Honour the Acting State President S. W. BURGER, said: There are three questions before us, but I think that we must for the present put aside the question of unconditional surrender, and only discuss the document before us or the continuance of the war. When I left my commandos it was my opinion, and that of my burghers, that unless we retain our independence we must continue to fight, and my instructions were to that effect. But my burghers gave me those instructions because they were not acquainted with the true conditions of the country, as I have learnt them here now. We received but few reliable reports from other parts. We fixed our eyes on God and on the leading commandos in the Eastern portions of the country. If the burghers had known that those leading commandos cannot continue the war they would have thought differently. We cannot deny that there are commandos which, if the war must proceed, must take some great step or other. We always expect that when it comes to voting the minority must submit to the majority. This is the general principle, and also the best in times of peace. But we are here under other circumstances. If it were decided here by a majority of say, twenty, to continue the war, then I ask: why do the others vote in the minority? Is it because they are afraid, or tired out, or do not wish to co-operate? No; it is because they cannot proceed any further. And can the majority then go on alone? No, they are too weak for that. If we cannot all continue to co-operate, it means that we cannot continue with the struggle. And therefore I say that here to-day the majority must bow to the minority. We must speak out freely, for no one of us here stands now under the orders of General Botha or of General de la Rey. Everyone stands here with his own vote, and is himself responsible. I am of opinion that if we continue the war our people will die a national death, and also run a great risk of dying a moral death. On what grounds can we hope to prosecute the war to a successful issue? If such grounds can be pointed out to me, I shall very willingly decide to go on manfully, but as far as I can see there is no hope for us. I feel that we cannot continue, and if I had to continue now I would do so in a very disheartened manner. If I return to my commando and inform them that the British proposal has been rejected, they will ask me on what grounds have we done so, and what reasons have we for hoping for better results. Then I must be able to state our grounds, and I cannot say that I have read this or that in a cutting from a newspaper, or that the opinion or this one or that one is so or so, or that there is hope that war will break out in Europe. If I were to do that they will say: "You have built on sand." I do not see my way open to do that, and if it were done, what I fear with heart and soul will come to pass, namely, that small parties of burghers will make terms for themselves with the enemy, and surrender, and where shall we then stand? Almost all the burghers of some districts have already been captured, and our position becomes daily worse, and it depends upon us whether our people will be preserved, or whether we shall later be so reduced that there will be an unconditional surrender. What will then become of us and of our officers? Will they not be banished? I am not thinking of myself. If I knew that by being banished I could save my people, I, and many with me, would willingly sacrifice ourselves. It is plain to me that if we decide to continue, unconditional surrender will follow of itself, and the Lord preserve us from that. Our people will then simply die as such, because there will be no one to help them. I will never lay down my arms if the majority decides to prosecute the struggle. No. I will occupy myself somewhere, and operate here or there with other Generals. But we cannot take such a decision unless we have good grounds. Mention is made of faith. Yes, and we had faith, but in my opinion faith must have its grounds. When Abraham went to sacrifice Isaac he knew that, even if Isaac were killed, God's promise would nevertheless be carried out. If we believe that God will ultimately deliver us, we must use our brains.

I do not see a chance of continuing the war, but must associate myself with those who say: "I have done what I could for my people and myself, and now I can do no more." I see no other course open to us than to accept the proposal before us.

Commandant RHEEDER (Rouxville): The British refuse to allow our Deputation to come out to see us. Many ask on what grounds we can continue the war, and to them I reply that this refusal is one of the grounds, because, on the face of it, it is obvious that something good is brewing for us. Let us take everything into consideration. If we accept these terms we have a dismal future. And what can we expect from the coming generation, who cannot now understand what is being done? Later they will read that there were still so many burghers in the field, and that the conditions were such and such, and then they will read that a free people surrendered. If the next generation should say: "There were so many burghers in the field, and yet we are not free; where is our country?" we shall have to reply: "We laid down our arms when we should have fought." We shall have to say that we did that because our faith deserted us, because we feared the enemy's strength. I think that we have better prospects now of good results from the continuance of our struggle than when we commenced. When we are forced as a People to lay down our arms, then I shall be satisfied to bow to the will of the Lord, but I cannot be satisfied to proceed to surrender as a divided people. Our families are prepared to suffer for another year to retain our freedom, and how shall we meet them if we now make peace on these terms? Our State President is so indispensable to us, and now the Lord lays His hand upon him, but this trial is a proof to me that the Lord is still with us. If a commando cannot remain in its district, it can go somewhere else where it can exist. We must not give up the struggle until we get back our independence.

Acting State President S. W. BURGER remarked: Commandant Rheeder says that we must go on with the struggle, but he has not pointed out the way to us, nor mentioned any ground upon which we can continue.

Commandant RHEEDER: The time for surrender is past. If we wished to surrender, we should have done so while the burghers still had all their possessions. Now they have nothing more, but we have still space enough, and, therefore, we must fight until we have our country back.

Commandant P. L. UIJS (Pretoria): So much is said about our Deputation and about what they have perhaps done for us or can still do, but we must remember that they are in continuous communication with the Netherlands Government, and I am convinced that the correspondence between the Netherlands Minister and Lord Lansdowne was sent to our Government with the cognisance of the Deputation. I think that we must banish from our minds the hope of obtaining any benefit through the mediation of our Deputation. The correspondence in question between the Netherlands and British Governments probably took place with their co-operation.

The Meeting was adjourned till 7.15 that evening.

At 7.15 the Meeting resumed, and was opened with Prayer.

Commandant CRONJE (Winburg) said: I only wish to say a few words. It has been rightly stated that we are passing through a serious stage—in my opinion the most important stage—in the history of the South African people. The Delegates represent the South African people, and we must now decide for that people. It is asked: "What are our prospects?" but I ask, "What were our prospects when we commenced the war? Were there grounds then?" It was indeed believed that right was might, and trust was put in God. And God helped us. If we want grounds, we must look back. When the enemy entered our country, everything was dark and gloomy. There was a time when more than 4,000 men surrendered. They said: "Our struggle is hopeless." Those who would not surrender with the 4,000, but continued the struggle, were called mad. Two years ago the difficulty was raised that there was no more food. A year ago the same difficulty was raised, with the addition that the enemy was too strong, and that we would have to give in. And yet the fight was continued. We, as representatives of a free people, must not act hastily to repent a few days later of a step we have taken and upon which we cannot go back. I never had hopes of intervention, and it was never said by the Government or by the Generals that they had hopes of intervention. I have always said that we must put our trust in God. When I return from here I shall be able to say to my burghers that the ground upon which we are going on with the struggle still is: Trust in God. We have no right to give up the struggle now. In some parts of the Free State, also, there was no food, and yet deliverance was always at hand. We have sent our Deputation to Europe, and President Kruger is there now, too. I ask: "Have we, then, no more faith in them?" If they find that there is no chance for help for us in Europe, will they not inform us to that effect soon enough? I ask you, who would acquaint us thereof sooner than they? And we must note that the enemy will not allow us to have any communication with our Deputation, or that one of the members should come out here. It is said that by continuing the struggle we shall exterminate our people, but I say that by accepting this proposal we shall utterly destroy our people. We have nothing more to lose now, but everything to gain. We may be able to retain our independence yet, which is so dear to us. In the verbal message from our Deputation they say we must not treat with the enemy without giving them notice. And when President Kruger left, it was his request also that we should not negotiate without his cognisance. I say we have no right to conclude peace on this basis. By doing so we shall deliver a death-blow to the Africander race. I think that there is something brewing in Europe. Five years ago there was an Armenian question, and it took five years before the Powers stepped in and made them conclude peace. I wish to ask you not to take a step which you may regret later. Let us ponder before we part with our freedom. I must also point out that our comrades in the Cape Colony are not safeguarded by the terms offered. They will have to leave their country, and they have lost all they have. Those who remain with us will have to be supported by the British, their enemies. Then the farms of some burghers have been sold, for which they will receive nothing. With reference to the L3,000,000 offered for compensation, that is not even sufficient to cover a fifth or even a tenth part of our losses. For these and many other reasons the British proposals are quite unacceptable to me, and we cannot and may not do anything else but vigorously continue the struggle.

General FRONEMAN (Ladybrand): What I wish to say breathes the same spirit as the words of the last speaker. My country is dear to me, and I cannot think of parting with it. An answer is insisted upon to the question: "What grounds have we for continuing the war?" But I ask in turn: "What grounds had we when we commenced the war?" I have taken part in the struggle since it began, and have never had more grounds for continuing it than now. My division was also entirely exhausted, but the Lord has made provision again. I was present when 4,000 burghers gave up the struggle in despair, and I was also present at the surrender of General Cronje, and all I can say is that we commenced the war with prayer and with faith in God. We have suffered, but it was the Lord Who allowed this war to come over us. We prayed that the war might be warded off, but God disposed otherwise. One of our Generals has rightly said that the Lord would reveal Himself only after all human resources have been exhausted. Although we only number hundreds where the enemy has millions, we must nevertheless stand firm in our trust in God. If we accept this proposal, our name as "Republicans" is lost for ever and always. We, two small Republics, are offering resistance only to defend the possession which we have received from our forefathers, and I can never think of giving up our dearly bought rights. Even if I were the only one, I would never give my vote for that. I have consulted my burghers and also their wives, and they said to me: "Bring us peace." I then asked what kind of peace they desired, and their reply was that our independence was not to be sacrificed. I thus have a clear instruction, and before I can part with our independence, I shall first have to return to my burghers to consult them.

Field Cornet B. H. BREYTENBACH (Utrecht) said: On the question whether the war must be continued a reply of "yes" or "no" must be given. The general condition of our country has been laid before us by the Delegates, and the Meeting now stands before the stubborn fact that the war cannot be continued. Hitherto not one of the facts which indicate that we cannot prosecute the war has been removed or controverted. The facts still stand, and I thus ask on what grounds can we decide to go on with the war? I am not going to proceed blindly or in the dark. We, as responsible persons, cannot step blindly over facts. If we are going to continue, we must have good grounds for believing that the future will bring us light. If not, my instruction is to vote for a settlement for peace. It would, in my opinion, be criminal of me to vote for the continuance of the war, if our circumstances remain as laid before us here. Our attention is directed to the grounds we had when we commenced the war, and we are asked what our hopes and prospects were then. I say, whatever they may have been, what have we gained? We must now declare that there is no progress in our cause. On the contrary, are we not gradually going backwards? I say "Yes," and we may not go on unless the facts and difficulties laid before this meeting are removed. It is plain that at least 11, and perhaps 14, commandos cannot continue the struggle, and if we decide to continue, it speaks for itself what the consequences will be. What will it profit us to resolve to go on if we have no people to fight? Who can take the people by the throat and say to them: "Do this or that"?—especially if we ourselves see the true state of affairs. If we decide to continue, the war will in any case cease of itself in the course of a few months, and the end will be far more fatal and pitiful than if we make peace now.

Commandant W. J. VILJOEN (Witwatersrand): Some are in favour of continuing the war, others are against it. I do not stand here with a ready-made opinion, but with a mind that is open to be convinced by facts. Those who are for peace have given facts and grounds upon which they base their opinions. The others only speak of faith. A year ago we decided to continue the war on faith, and now, having fought for another year, we are convinced that we must make peace. If it is desired to proceed, the way must be indicated and the grounds stated which can convince us that we act wisely. Otherwise we must make peace now.

General DE LA REY: It is my custom to speak briefly. I do not use three words where one is sufficient. I went to meet the people with definite instructions neither to approve of nor to reject what might be said at the meetings, and I have adhered to them. There are now here 8 representatives from my districts, with one from the Cape Colony, and they represent almost the half of the South African Republic. I need not say anything about the spirit of my burghers, but everyone can understand that after the recent victories they are courageous, as all the Delegates can testify.

With reference to our cause, I do not wish to shut my ears and eyes to facts. If there is deliverance for the Africander people, then I am with them, and if a grave must be dug for that people, then I go into it with them. You can talk and decide here as you choose, but I tell you that this meeting is the end of the war. But the end may come in an honourable or in a dishonourable way. If we decide to continue the war without grounds before us, the end will be a dishonourable one.

You speak of faith. What is faith? Faith is: "Lord, Thy will be done—not my will to be the victor." I must kill my will, and I must act and think as He directs and leads me. That is what I understand by the faith in which God's children must live.

There are three courses open to us this evening, and one of these must be chosen by the Delegates. Which course must be chosen? You may accept the proposal of the British, or you may decide on unconditional surrender. If you do the latter, know, then, that the matter is not disposed of, for then the question arises: "What will become of our people?" After those people have fought so faithfully, after all the sacrifices they have made, to hand them over now unconditionally into the hands of the enemy? That must not be! Do consider clearly where the decision you may take will lead you to. If it was desired to surrender unconditionally, the time for that would have been while the people still had all their possessions with which they could help themselves, but not now that the people have been deprived of everything. There is not one in a hundred who can help himself now. It is therefore hard for me to think of unconditional surrender.

There is another course which can be followed: to go on with the struggle. But I am convinced that if we do that, one district after the other will lay down their arms—will have to lay down their arms—and the war will thus terminate in a dishonourable manner. If you can indicate a way to me, or show me grounds upon which we can hope for good results, I am prepared to go and fight again.

I have a responsibility, a very great responsibility, resting upon me. The proposal before us, the terms which the British wish to grant us, are not of great value, but yet they stipulate a few things. The prisoners of war must be brought back, the Government must provide the families with food and other necessaries, until they can care for themselves. The terms also provide that many hundreds will not be considered as criminals and be convicted as such. If any one can say: "We can go on," I and my officers can do so, but I shall never allow such words to pass over my lips, because I may not decide for one part of the country only. I must consider our condition as a whole. We have had some successful encounters, but I put myself the question: "What have I actually effected by these victories?" Since they have been fought, the enemy has sent down about 40,000 mounted troops against me, which have deprived me of all my cattle. During the last three months I have lost more than 600 men, killed, wounded, or captured. It is plain to me that the enemy wish to attain their object at whatever cost.

Many speak of hope from the Deputation in Europe. About a year ago the Deputation wrote us that they expected our deliverance only from our own perseverance, and now a year later we must not continue saying that we have hope from the Deputation, who themselves had no hope of intervention. If they have not been able to do anything in two years, they will never be able to effect anything.

When I speak thus you must not think that I do so from cowardice, because I can assure you that I fear no man or power in the whole world. Neither do I wish to take it amiss in anyone here who thinks or speaks differently. There are some who have come with a definite instruction to hold out for independence only. But I am now well informed on the condition of affairs over the whole country, and I challenge any Delegate to go with me on a platform before the people. I am convinced that, out of the three courses open to us, the people will approve of the course which I am going to choose, because I shall prove to them that in following that course I have done or obtained something for them at the last moment. And is that not better than to say to the people: "You must continue fighting, but the future is dark and without hope, and I cannot point out to you even a small ray of light"? By deciding differently, we shall force our people who were so faithful to become "handsuppers," and in that way the war will come to a dishonourable end. Therefore, Delegates, reflect on what you are about to do.

Landdrost BOSMAN (Wakkerstroom): I am thankful that General de la Rey has spoken out so frankly. It will give more than one of us light on what we have to decide. As several speakers have already remarked, the matter before us is very important and difficult, because not only does the future of our people rest upon us, but that future depends upon what we shall decide.

I must say frankly that I am against the continuance of the war, and my reasons are briefly these: It is stated that we did not commence the war with the hope of intervention, but with faith in the Lord. I cannot quite agree with that, and I say that we did begin the war with the hope of intervention, and now we find that that hope will not be realised. If we did not cherish that hope, why did we send the Deputation to Europe? And why, while we were still in Natal, was it stated in war reports that the Deputation were doing good work? That was said to encourage the Burghers. Many took up arms in that hope. Who was the cause of that hope originating amongst the people I do not know, but many Volksraad members spoke as if our independence had been guaranteed by European Powers. The truth of what I say was proved when the meetings to elect delegates for this meeting were held. I was present at several of those meetings, and at each one of them the burghers insisted that we should try to get into communication with our Deputation. Why should they have done that if there was no hope of intervention? That hope dwindled away when we noticed that there was no ground for it. It is thus plain that we did not commence the war with faith in God alone. A further proof of this is that we hoped and expected much from what our comrades in the Cape Colony would accomplish. That hope has also vanished, now that General Smuts has declared that we must not expect much from the Cape Colony, and that there will be no general rising there.

Another reason why I am in favour of peace is because our commandos have been much weakened. From 50,000 men our number has fallen to 15,000, and that number is fast decreasing. Another reason is the scarcity of foodstuffs. Last year this scarcity was also spoken of, but that was nonsense. Now it is only too true. You can now ride from Vereeniging to Piet Relief, and only here and there will you come across a few cattle. I may say that you will see scarcely any cattle. Then we must think of the suffering of the women and children still with us, and especially of those in the Concentration Camps.

If we decide to continue, many of the 15,000 men still under arms will be lost to us, and our numbers will decrease month by month. Many say we may not so trample on the blood already shed as to make peace by surrendering our independence, but that for the sake of that blood we must continue the struggle. This is a serious matter, and I hope that I shall never be guilty of trampling on such costly blood. But there is something more costly than the blood which has already been shed, and about which we can do nothing now, and that is the blood of burghers and of women and children which will still have to be shed if we decide to continue. And that blood will be given for a cause, which, so far as human beings can see, is hopeless. That is a much more serious matter to me. If we continue the war, we become the cause of still more widows and orphans who will have no one to care for them.

I did not intend to speak on the religious side of the question, but it has been touched upon, and for that reason I also wish to say something upon it. It is difficult for us to find out what course God wishes us to pursue in this matter. We do not know whether it is God's decree that we must retain our independence or not. It may be God's will that we should give it up. What we know for certain is that God desires us to do right. Everyone who does right is on the right road. There is no doubt about that. I am convinced that if I vote for the continuance of the struggle under the existing circumstances, and in that way cause more suffering, then I am not on the right road, and thus not on God's way. On the other hand, when I see no hope or prospect of prosecuting the war with good results, and I vote for giving up the struggle, then I am on the right road, and thus also on God's road.

There is another course open to us—namely, unconditional surrender—but I cannot vote for that. If we do that, then one of the first things that the enemy will do after the restoration of peace will be to represent to our people that their leaders did not do what they could have done, and I am of opinion that thereby mistrust and suspicion will be raised in the minds of many of our burghers. Therefore, after all that we have suffered and done, I think that, however hard it may be, we can now do nothing else but choose what is best and most acceptable to us. Our feelings and love for our country and people rise up against that, but if we allow ourselves to be led by our feelings, and by our love, without using our reason, we shall find ourselves on the wrong road. Everything will work together for our good.

I conclude by warning all that we can only too easily mistake a will-o'-the-wisp for a star, and that we should thus decide very honestly and carefully.

Commandant H. S. GROBLER (Bethel): There are three courses open to us, and if ever an important choice had to be made, it is now. As far as I am concerned, I must say that it is in my opinion impossible for us to continue the war. My district must be abandoned, and if I, as an officer, cannot state other reasons to my burghers upon which we can go on, how can I expect them to continue? There are about 12 districts in the South African Republic which must be evacuated if the war is to go on. That means that we shall have to resort to our furthermost boundaries and leave the enemy in possession of the heart of our country. But by fleeing about we shall not be able to retain our independence. We must fight for that. It is asked what prospects we had when we commenced the war, and it is answered: Faith. Yes, we must have faith, but the means must be there too. Then we had burghers, cannon, food, and war material, but now we lack all those means. It appears to me that the time for fighting is past, and that we must think about the people. I am a born son of the soil, and have once before fought for my independence, so that it is very hard for me now to think of giving it up; but with the facts before us, I shall have to vote for the acceptance of the British proposals. Our families are in a pitiable condition, and the enemy uses those families to force us to surrender. The burghers who have sent us to this meeting are in an equally pitiable condition. What will it avail us to resolve to continue the struggle if the burghers cannot hold out any longer? We must also not lose sight of the fact that, by accepting this proposal, we get our prisoners of war back. What would otherwise become of them? And we burghers in the field are threatened with the sale of our properties, which hangs as a sword over our heads. If that threat were carried into execution, what would become of us? Further, our burghers and families in the Concentration Camps are dying a moral death. These are all facts which force me to accept the proposal before us. If we can prosecute the war vigorously and with a chance of success, I shall be the first to say: let us do so for the sake of our burghers, our families, and ourselves.

Commandant VAN NIEKERK (Ficksburg): It is impossible for me to vote for the acceptance of this proposal. The last word of my burghers to me was: "Do not part with our independence; we are prepared to die for that," and that is our opinion still. Grounds are asked for the continuance of the struggle, and it is difficult for me to state such grounds, but I can point out that there is a difference between this proposal and the Middelburg proposal of a year ago, and that is a proof to me that the enemy is now more prepared to meet us, and the longer we hold out, the better terms we shall get, until we obtain what we want. Let us thus not be too hurried, but stand firm as men and hold on. I am convinced that if we hold out for our independence we shall soon be in a better position, and that the enemy will again approach us for the purpose of opening negotiations.

General J. G. CILLIERS (Lichtenburg): I have already informed the meeting what my instructions were from the burghers with reference to our independence. Naturally, I do not feel myself bound by those instructions, because I am here to make the best of the circumstances for my people, and I am sure that I have the confidence of my burghers.

The other evening it was asked whether we are justified in continuing the struggle. I then answered: Yes, if we considered the justness of our cause, we are indeed justified. But when we consider our cause further and take our general position into consideration, then the question arises whether we are not perpetrating a murder on our people if we continue the war. The position in both the Republics has been made clear to us, and that condition is very pitiful. As far as my district and burghers are concerned, we with some other districts are still in a position to continue the war, but must I not consider the situation in other districts? And shall we accuse those men who have up till now stood faithfully with us of cowardice because they cannot go on any longer? No, we may not do that. I, of course, long for peace with the retention of our independence, but we cannot get that, and nobody can get that for us. We have delegated a Commission who enjoy our fullest confidence, and they have tried to get all that they possibly could from the British Government, and there lie the terms now upon which we can conclude peace. Who of us is in a position to-night to say we can continue the struggle and thereby obtain something better for our people than these terms now before us? It is thought that the Deputation are doing good work because the enemy will not allow us to get into communication with them, but the last we heard from our Deputation was to the effect that our salvation lay in our having to fight to the utmost, and till our last cartridge has been fired. If, now, we were to go so far as to sacrifice the last man and to fire our last cartridge, what have we then? Is such a message from the Deputation encouraging to you? To me it is by no means encouraging.

Further, some argue about Faith, and it is said that we commenced the war in faith. To that I wish to say that we must not believe one thing and not the other. We must not believe that if we persevere we shall obtain the victory. We must also believe that it is possibly God's will that we must for a time bow to the power of the enemy. Our Commission to the Representatives of the British Government have done their best to obtain as much as possible for the people, and I see no other way than to accept the proposal before us. It is indeed true that the voices of our families call to us: "Do not give up the struggle on our account." But they also say: "Do not go on if the future becomes dark to you." If my burghers had known what I know now they would have given me a different instruction. Must we demand more sacrifices from the burghers and families if we see no light for the future? However hard it may be, we cannot fight against impossibilities. We must only consider what is best for our people and take care that we give no one the opportunity to say: "You could have saved us, but you have left us in the lurch." Just because our cause is dark and difficult, we must use our minds and keep only the welfare of our people in view. I can only agree to accept the proposals that lie before us.

Chief Commandant DE WET then said: I feel myself compelled to express my feelings too. The last speaker declared that the last word we had from our Deputation was that we must fight till the last man was dead and the last cartridge fired. I must say that I never heard of such a message. What I know is that the Deputation let us know last year that they saw no hope of intervention, but that we should hold out till the last means of resistance had been exhausted. But I did not understand from that that we must continue till the last man was dead and the last cartridge fired.

I wish to express my feelings briefly but candidly, and I must go back to the beginning of the war. I must say that when we began the war I had not so much hope of intervention as now. In saying this, I do not wish to intimate that I now have hope of intervention, but that we did not then know whether we had the slightest sympathy in England or in Europe. And now we have found out that we have indeed sympathy, and although no one intervenes on our behalf, our cause is nevertheless strongly supported, so that even English newspapers give reports of "pro-Boer" meetings over the whole world. This information we obtain from Europe through a man sent hither by the Deputation, and I have no reason to say or to think that our informant is not trust-worthy. He brought the last letter from the Deputation, and thus certainly enjoys their confidence. This man is acquainted with public feeling in Europe towards the two Republics, and informs us that our cause is daily gaining ground in Europe and even in England. The question may now be asked: Why have the Deputation not sent us a report on these conditions? The reason is clear as daylight to me. We sent the Deputation to seek help for us. They went to ascertain from the other Powers what could be done for us, and thus came to know what the policy of those Powers was. Will they now be able to lay bare that policy to us? No, certainly not, because there is a great danger that their letters will fall into the hands of the enemy. Even though the Members of the Deputation were here themselves, I doubt whether they would be free to explain to us the future policy of the European Powers. It is therefore significant to me that the Deputation is silent, and this should not discourage, but rather encourage us.

If there is any man who feels the pitiful condition of our country, then I am that man. And I believe every word that has been said here about the conditions in the various divisions. It is asked: What prospect have we of continuing the fight with success? To reply to that I must go back to the beginning of the war, and ask what hope and prospects had we then? My reply is: Only Faith, nothing more. And that Faith we still have. How weak we were in comparison with that Power, our enemy, with its three-quarters of a million of soldiers, of which it has sent some 250,000 to fight us! How could we have entered into such a struggle if we had not done so in Faith? We could only speculate on help from Natal and the Cape Colony. Some said that Natal and the Cape Colony would stand by us, but now we miss the persons who said that. They are lost to us, but we have not lost them on the battlefield, for they sit amongst the enemy, and many of them are even in arms against us. However, I never built on that help, although I hoped from what history teaches us that we should not stand alone to defend our rights by force of arms.

I feel why some, taking into consideration our position, seek for tangible grounds upon which we can justify a continuance of the struggle; but then the question arises again: What tangible grounds had we when we began? Has the way become darker or lighter to us? It is still all Faith, and we know what a small people can by Faith triumph over the most powerful enemy. And if we, a small people, overcome by Faith, we shall not be the only people that has done so. Those who say that the struggle must be given up want tangible grounds from us for the continuance of it, but what grounds had we at the commencement? Has it become darker now? On the contrary, the history of the last 22 months has given me strength. A year ago General Botha wrote to me, and correctly too, that the scarcity of ammunition gave him anxiety. We also had that anxiety, because our ammunition was exhausted as well. There was a time when I feared and trembled when a burgher came to me with an empty bandolier and asked me for ammunition. But what happened? Since September last ammunition in large and small quantities has miraculously poured in, so that, to use an expression of the late General Joubert's, I was agreeably surprised (Ik met een blijde schaamte moest staan). And what happened with ammunition occurred also with horses. We always obtained a supply from the enemy. I do not take it amiss in those who want grounds for our Faith. I have mentioned some grounds, but those are only a thousandth part of what might be mentioned. I may add this further reason. The enemy has approached us. I agree that this proposal is an improvement on the Middelburg proposal of last year. The enemy have made further advances. How have they not approached us since the commencement of the war, when they forced themselves into our country? When our Governments negotiated with Lord Salisbury at the beginning of the war in April, 1900, the British Government would hear of nothing but unconditional surrender. To-day England is negotiating with us. Before we accept this proposal, let us once more take up this struggle, and do our duty—do what our hands find to do, and I have no doubt that the enemy will afterwards approach us again with more favourable proposals, if they do not leave us our entire independence. The Deputation said to us: "Persevere," but I do not think that they can lay bare to us on what grounds this advice was based. Remember, too, that in the first (Boer) war the South African Republic stood alone against the powerful England, without any assistance. There were wavering ones then also—the so-called loyalists. It was then also a struggle in Faith only, and what was the result? They fought in Faith only and won. Is our Faith, then, going to be so much weaker than that of our forefathers?

It is asked: What about our families? Certainly we must care for them, but only as far, and as well, as we can. More we cannot do. It has been said that we must let the men lay down their arms to save the families, but it is a hard matter to say to a Boer: "Take your family, go to the enemy, and lay down your arms." However, we could do that rather than to see an entire people fall.

We can learn much from the history of America. It has been said that our circumstances cannot be compared with those of the Americans, and yet a comparison is not out of place. Even the powerful England had to give in to them. It may be said that America is much larger than the two Republics, but we are not bound to the territories of the two Republics. The Orange Free State offers many difficulties on account of her situation. The railway passes through the entire country, and on the borders we have the Basutos, a powerful nation. We have no Bushveld like the South African Republic, and have thus to find our way through the British forces.

The matter is a very grave one for us, but we cannot part with our arms. Everything else is of minor importance to me, but if we give up our arms we are no longer men. Let us persevere. Three or six or twelve months hence or later, a time may dawn when we may be able to do everything with our arms. But if we give up our arms and such a time dawns, we shall all stand as women.

Now, I wish to ask you: Why has Lord Kitchener refused to allow our deputation to come out? And why did he say that we could see from the papers that there was nothing brewing in Europe? Which papers, however, did he refer to? The Star, The Cape Times, The Natal Witness, and other Jingo papers, which, you must moreover bear in mind, are all censored. If we can accept his word that the deputation can bring us no favourable news it would have been to the interest of England to let the deputation come out, or to allow all newspapers through. But there is no question of allowing certain European and even certain English newspapers through. If we therefore give up the struggle now, we do so in the dark. We do not know what is going on in the outside world. We cannot say that the enemy are making their terms more and more onerous, because that is not so. They are conceding.

Considering all this, and also the fact that the tension in England can be looked upon as an indirect intervention, I believe that we should continue with the bitter struggle. By standing manfully we shall get our just rights. When the time arrives that we cannot go on any further, we can again open negotiations. Let us keep up this bitter struggle and say as one man: We persevere—it does not matter how long—but until we obtain the establishment of our independence!

General C. F. BEYERS (Waterberg) said: The matter presents itself to me thus: Which must I follow: my conscience or my reason? To that I have only one reply—I must follow my conscience, because if I fall, and I have followed my reason and not my conscience, I do not know whither I go. But if I follow my conscience I am at any time prepared for my death. History, as you all know, tells us about many men who have been martyrs, and who have been burnt for the sake of their faith, but it seems to me that only in books do we read of such great things, and that they do not occur any more in our time. I respect everyone's opinion on our great cause, which is most important and serious, but we must not forget to observe how much welfare and salvation was born out of all the great sufferings of the heroes of old, although when the martyrs died it seemed as if everything was lost with them. But observe how much welfare and salvation arose from the circumstance that those men laid down their lives for what they considered right. Are we not convinced that our cause is right? If we did not have this conviction at the beginning of the war we would not have taken up arms. Then we were all prepared to give our lives for our cause, but now that the hour of death has arrived we recoil. I cannot express myself differently.

Our national existence is spoken of, but the Lord will care for that. That is not a matter for us. Our cause was right, and will remain right, and might shall not triumph over right. For that reason I wish to persevere in the struggle. I wish to see that right triumphs, even though that triumph is realised only after my death.

It is said that we shall never get such an opportunity again for negotiating. General de Wet has touched upon this matter, and I agree with him, and others, that we shall always be able to negotiate again. This is proved by what has already taken place, and I may further point out that there was a time when General Botha wished to see Lord Roberts, and when the latter replied that it was not necessary. And now the British are negotiating with us; in fact, they opened up these negotiations.

I am open to conviction, but if I had to vote how I should be able to vote only for the continuance of the war. Facts are stated, but none of the difficulties mentioned are to my mind insurmountable. The difficulty about the women and families we can surmount. Similarly the difficulty about food, horses, ammunition, &c. But there is one matter that troubles me, and that is the spirit that seems to be animating our people. From the speeches it appears that there is a large portion of our people who will go over to the enemy, and surrender; and when such a spirit animates the burghers it is impossible to take them by the neck and say: Go and fight. What I want is that if the majority decide to continue the war, that decision must be taken with enthusiasm. The great danger, however, that I foresee is that such a decision will lack enthusiasm. I will even go so far as to say that some of our brothers in the Free State, although they declare that it is a matter of faith, and in spite of what General de Wet and others may say, are also animated by a spirit which will drive them to go over to the enemy, however good and brave they may be.

General de la Rey challenges anyone to come on a platform with him and to put the true condition of the country before the people and to induce them to reject this proposal of the enemy. That is so. The spirit of which I speak is infectious, and if burghers on Commando learn that the spirit of their fellow-burghers elsewhere is in favour of giving up the struggle, many will become disheartened. When once a spirit gets hold of a people it works marvels, and this fact we must take into consideration. I know it will be of no use to continue the war if everybody around me lays down his arms. It would be ridiculous for me to go on. We must be very sensible in this matter, and have no disunion. You know repentance always comes too late.

I repeat, my conscience is Number 1 with me, and as long as that remains so I must vote against this proposal.

After Prayer the meeting was adjourned to the following day.

FRIDAY, MAY 30TH, 1902.

At nine o'clock the meeting resumed after a Prayer by the Rev. J. D. Kestell.

Acting State President S. W. BURGER said: Before we begin I consider it my duty to inform the Delegates and the members of both Governments, that President Steyn had to tender his resignation as President of the Orange Free State yesterday, on account of illness, and that he was forced to give the enemy his parole to enable him to obtain medical treatment. General de Wet has been appointed in his place as Acting State President, and, on behalf of the members of my Government, on behalf of you all, and on behalf of myself, I wish to assure him of our deep sympathy, and to express our heartfelt regret at the loss of a man who has hitherto been the support and the rock of our good cause. His retirement is a great loss to us all.

Chief Commandant de Wet thanked the Acting State President of the South African Republic for his sympathetic references, and assured the meeting that as far as his poor powers enabled him he would do everything in his power for the Africanders.

Mr. J. NAUDE (Detached Commando under General Kemp) desired some information about the rebels, and an explanation of the document in which the British set forth how they would treat the rebels, if their peace proposals were accepted.

General Smuts furnished the desired information.

Mr. NAUDE further asked whether it rested with the Delegates to decide to surrender the independence, or whether they could only carry out their instructions.

General BOTHA replied, that from the documents before the meeting it was very clear in the opinion of the Governments, as expressed to Lord Kitchener and to Lord Milner at their first meeting, that only the people or their special Delegates had the power to decide on the independence. They had gone to the people, and the people were now represented by the Delegates here in this meeting.

Mr. NAUDE said: I thus understand that, when the members of the Governments left Pretoria to have the special Delegates elected they knew that the persons elected would have to decide whether the independence would have to be given up or not. I find myself now in a difficulty, and I must say that some Delegates have (by an oversight, perhaps) been misled. I have been chosen with a definite instruction, and with all respect for the explanation of our legal advisers, who say that we can speak and act here according to circumstances, I must say that I have come here with a definite instruction from my burghers to instruct the Governments not to sacrifice the independence. Further, the burghers gave the Government the right to negotiate, but then it was to be stipulated in the negotiations that they could retain their arms, that the rights of the Dutch language should be guaranteed, which rights are of such great significance to the people, and a means by which they could again become a people. But in the terms offered these questions are entirely ignored. I also notice that provision is made for those burghers who have property, but very little provision is made for the poor man. And the burghers whom I represent are not rich. They are not landowners. Three million pounds are indeed offered, but how much is that among so many? Nor is it stipulated that the Government notes which have been issued must be paid, so that the poor will get very little. I cannot therefore vote for the acceptance of the proposals before us.

As regards our prospects, I wish to bring to your recollection the address which the Commandant General delivered to the burghers at the Warmbaths towards the end of 1900. The situation was very gloomy then. He said: "We have nothing more to lose and everything to gain. Let us thus go on." No ground for perseverance were then given or asked. And to say now that we are not going a step further without grounds and facts before us is in conflict with what we have hitherto done. We have seen how in the past relief was always at hand. When Pretoria fell the outlook was darker than now, but there was then a spirit which animated the people. There was faith and a trust that we must persevere. And there is no one now who has been put to shame because he maintained the struggle. I can state no definite grounds upon which we can build, but when I consider the past, I can say to my burghers that we can still continue the struggle, and we will do that too. There is nothing more for us to lose, whereas we have the opportunity of persevering with our arms in our hands till better days dawn.

General DE LA REY: I must remark that I never misled anyone at any meeting. Every document that was handed to me by the Government I caused to be read out at every meeting, and on that the people had to decide. The last speaker asks whether the responsibility rests on him to-day to decide on the question of independence. My answer is: "Yes, and not only on him, but on every one of you." The responsibility rests upon you generally. You do not represent a certain village or district, but the whole country, and it is the duty of everyone to decide according to the general condition of circumstances all over the country.

Mr. NAUDE: I am not indifferent in this matter, and I do not wish to shirk my responsibility; on the contrary, I will gladly bear it. But I am not here in the same position as a member of the Volksraad, who is entrusted to deal with all matters. I have a definite commission to submit the views of my burghers, and do not feel myself justified to take upon myself the responsibility of deciding upon the surrender of our independence.

General HERTZOG: Although I am not a delegate, I wish to state which course I would pursue if I were one. The Delegate is here for the people, and what he should ask himself is: Suppose that that portion of the people which has delegated me was fully acquainted with the situation in both Republics, how would that portion decide? That appears to me to be the point upon which the Delegates must decide.

As regards the great question before us, I wish to be fair and view it as clearly as possible from both sides. The one party says: "Stop the war," and they continually ask on what grounds can the struggle be continued? But I think it is for you, who say: "Stop the war," to state your grounds. Those who wish to go on say: "We are at war; show us why we are to stop." It is also asked what prospects have we if we go on. This would have been a very good question when we commenced the war. It is argued: We have grown weaker. On that I ask: "Has the enemy not grown weaker too?" That is clearly the case, especially financially. England has already spent over 200 million pounds, and she can spend another 100 million. Yes, if the people wish it. But how long will the people wish it? Have we not the right to assume that England is already in difficulties financially? No one who is acquainted with English history can do otherwise than feel the significance of an imposition of a tax on wheat. That is not done unless matters are serious. In 1831 there was a revolution over this tax. It presses very severely on the people, and the people are beginning to feel that they are incurring debt for which they will have to suffer later.

With reference to the Deputation it is said: "They have been away two years now, and have effected nothing yet; how can we still hope that they will be able to effect something for our good?" But I say just because they have already been two years in Europe, we are nearer the time when a great war must break out. It is a known fact that the nations are arming themselves more and more and building ships of war, which is all done in preparation for the day when war will break out in Europe. A year ago the Deputation sent us a telegram which amounted to this: "Keep on." Why will the enemy not allow us to hear from our Deputation? It would have taken the members of the Deputation only a fortnight to come out and be with us. It is said that it would constitute an irregular military procedure. But is this meeting not also an irregular military procedure? I am thus forced to the conclusion that there is something behind this refusal. We know who the three members of the Deputation are. Mr. Fischer is a man who fought against the war up to the last. He even went to the South African Republic for that object. So is Mr. Wessels. They are both men in whom you can place your full confidence; and have all their interests, and large interests, in this country. Mr. Wolmarans I do not know personally, but it is generally known that he is a man upon whom you can depend. I am convinced of it, that these men will give the fullest attention to our interests. If they saw that we were being ruined by holding out, they would inform us to that effect. But they let us continue. What their reasons are for doing so I do not know, but I depend upon them.

I am open to conviction, and if I can be convinced that our struggle is hopeless, I shall side with those who wish to give it up. There is another aspect to the question; but let me first say that it grieves me that on every public meeting the question of religion is touched upon. It is continually said that this or that is God's finger. Now, although I also have my belief, I say that neither you nor I know in the least what is the finger of God! God has given each one of us reason and a conscience, and if these lead us we need not follow anything else.

I must further say that we are undeniably in a pitiful condition. Food is scarce. We are exhausted, but still we all live. Almost all our horses have been taken, so that what we require we have to take from the enemy. Thousands of our people are prisoners-of-war. We have some thousands of our own people, who are in arms against us. Our women and children have been cooped up for almost two years in the Concentration Camps, where they die by thousands. Not only do they die, but they are exposed to destructive moral influences. The Kaffirs are armed against us, and only recently 56 burghers were murdered by Kaffirs. Truly, our prospects are not bright. In how far all this must weigh with the Delegates, I leave to you. As far as I am concerned, I must confess that all these things have made a tremendous impression on me. No one with a heart can feel differently. I shall always respect Commandant General Botha, because he has proved to have a heart that feels all these matters, and because he has had the courage to lay before his people and before us with great honesty precisely how matters stand.

We are here under exceptional circumstances. Awful wars have already been fought, but I do not believe that a war has ever been waged in which the people have proportionally suffered so much and sacrificed so much as our people have done in this war. In the American War of Independence the people did not suffer a third of what we have suffered. But all this has not yet turned the scales as far as I am concerned. We consider all these matters, but we must consider particularly what awaits us if we give up our country. What will our future be? Will there then be such satisfaction in the Orange Free State and in the South African Republic that we shall be able to say: We will await the day of deliverance from God's hand? If I knew that there would be a rising in a few years, I would rather fight on till I am dead. If I conclude peace I want a lasting peace.

There is a matter that weighs more heavily with me than all this, and that is the holding of this meeting. I regret from the bottom of my heart that it ever took place. This meeting gives us a death blow. I also experienced hard times, when my burghers surrendered in hundreds, but I always found comfort in the thought that I was not fighting alone, and I knew that when I had a hard time of it, my comrades in the struggle elsewhere had an easy time. However, I do not wish to blame anyone for the holding of this meeting, because I am convinced that everything was done with the best intentions. Now, what has been the result of this meeting? The Commandant General has had to express his views, and expose the situation, and this has had the effect of disheartening some of our burghers. If we now decide to continue, hundreds and thousands will go over to the enemy who would otherwise have remained with us. I would have suggested that the discouraged ones leave us, but now those who were not discouraged have also become so.

Although all these facts have made me dubious, I am not yet convinced that we should stop the war. If I were a delegate, I should say: "Go on," because I think that if we are in doubt we should lay down this as an axiom: "Proceed on the road we are on." In the proposal before us we get nothing at all of what we have the right to lay claim to.

General L. J. MEYER (Member of the S.A.R. Government) said: According to General Hertzog, the persons who went to the various commandos to have delegates elected explained the situation of the country to the people. But that was not done. We said to the burghers: "You must elect someone whom you can trust as a delegate to the meeting at Vereeniging. To him the situation of the country as a whole will be laid bare, and then he must act according to circumstances."

Now I want to express my views also. The question of independence is so dear to every Africander that this word can hardly be spoken. Our condition, however, has now become such that we must express our opinions on this matter. I am well acquainted with the condition of the commandos north of the Eastern Railway to the other side of the Sabi River, and I can assure you that every commando finds it very difficult to obtain food. All officers complain that clothing, horses, and food are scarce. All burghers long for peace, if they can retain their flag and their Mauser, but after the accounts which have been given us here, every responsible person must feel that a great portion, if not the half, of the South African Republic is not able to continue the war. Now if half of the South African Republic must be abandoned, the burghers must move from there to the other districts, and it is clear that those districts which still have food have only barely sufficient for their own commandos. What will happen if the burghers from the other parts of the Transvaal resort to those districts also?

Our burghers have done what almost no other nation has ever done. Our bitterest enemies acknowledge this. Then we still have to contend with the large hordes of Kaffirs who go about to murder and plunder. The people expect from us that we will save what can still be saved. Everyone takes the matter up seriously, and it is so serious that if we pass an ill-considered resolution we shall exterminate the Africander people. It has rightly been remarked that everything is dark. If I was sure what to do I would be very glad. The Lord, however, has given us reason, and in my opinion we have now got to such a stage that we must do what we can to keep the head of the Africander people above water, so that later on they can develop again.

The position of our families is a very tender point with me. They are dying out in the Concentration Camps, and must submit to much misery. We have already sacrificed much blood, and if we had hopes and ground for a favourable result we could sacrifice still more. My blood, which is no better than the blood of so many others that has been shed, can also be shed, but my conscience tells me that we may not allow one more man to be shot, if there is no hope for us.

If we were to decide now to go on, we should never get the opportunity to negotiate again. The end would be that we should all be dead or captured or shall have surrendered to the enemy. It is asked what will future generations say, if they read that we decided to make peace and to give up our independence? My reply is: We do not fight for name and honour, but for our people. What will future generations say, if we do not save what can still be saved? They will say that we fought bravely, but without wisdom.

With reference to the terms offered, I must say that I expected more. The three millions are nothing, but yet there is a promise that our people will later have a vote again, and be allowed to govern themselves, and further—God will help us. Some are of opinion that we must show our manliness by continuing the struggle. It may, however, be more manly to conclude peace. In the Volksraad I was in favour of granting the franchise, after a five years' residence, but that proposal was rejected by twenty-one votes to seven, and three of those seven persons are now here with us. We did not vote as we did because we were afraid, but because we did not wish to drench the soil with blood, and we knew that England sought cause for war. Shall we now continue to shed blood?

Before Lord Roberts entered Pretoria the Government considered whether the time had not arrived to put an end to the war. That was, of course, a secret. But the Orange Free State would not agree, and I am convinced that we would have obtained better terms then than now. The people were then not so ruined and exterminated. The Government in its wisdom decided to continue the war. A year later the two Governments met each other again at Waterval, in the Standerton district. It was again resolved to go on with the war. Later we again suggested that we should make peace proposals to the British. President Steyn agreed, but no agreement had yet been arrived at with reference to the time and conditions, and the enemy operated against us with such great forces that we could not make any progress in the matter. Now, as far as human judgment goes, there is no chance for us to continue the war. There is no hope of intervention, for the big Powers do not make war so easily. We have now come to such a pass that we must save the seedling, otherwise I fear it is all over with the Africander people. It is argued that we must go on because so many have already given their lives for their country, but everyone must admit that unless a miracle is worked, we shall not get the enemy out of our country by force of arms. We have taught the British how to wage war. Our own people are with them, and show them how to trek in the night, and where the footpaths are.