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A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WASHINGTON, D.C. July 2, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
Your several despatches of yesterday to Secretary of War and myself received. I did say, and now repeat, I would be exceedingly glad for some reinforcements from you. Still do not send a man if in your judgment it will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or will force you to give up or weaken or delay the Chattanooga expedition.
Please tell me could you not make me a flying visit for consultation without endangering the Service in your department.
A. LINCOLN.
MESSAGE TO THE SENATE.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, July 2, 1862.
TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:
I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, an act entitled "An act to provide for additional medical officers of the volunteer service," without my approval.
My reason for so doing is that I have approved an act of the same title passed by Congress after the passage of the one first mentioned for the express purpose of correcting errors in and superseding the same, as I am informed.
A. LINCOLN.
CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS.
(Private and Confidential.)
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 3, 1862.10.30 A.M.
GOVERNOR WASHBURN, Maine [and other governors] I should not want the half of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now. If I had 50,000 additional troops here now, I believe I could substantially close the war in two weeks. But time is everything, and if I get 50,000 new men in a month, I shall have lost 20,000 old ones during the same month, having gained only 30,000, with the difference between old and new troops still against me. The quicker you send, the fewer you will have to send. Time is everything. Please act in view of this. The enemy having given up Corinth, it is not wonderful that he is thereby enabled to check us for a time at Richmond.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D.C., JULY 3, 1862
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:
Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it.
On the 28th we sent General Burnside an order to send all the force he could spare to you. We then learned that you had requested him to go to Goldsborough; upon which we said to him our order was intended for your benefit, and we did not wish to be in conflict with your views.
We hope you will have help from him soon. Today we have ordered General Hunter to send you all he can spare. At last advices General Halleck thinks he cannot send reinforcements without endangering all he has gained.
A. LINCOLN, President
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., July 4, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
I understand your position as stated in your letter and by General Marcy. To reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac (about 10,000 men, I suppose), and about 10,000 I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and about 5000 from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances the defensive for the present must be your only care. Save the army first, where you are, if you can; secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion that with the aid of the gunboats and the reinforcements mentioned above you can hold your present position—provided, and so long as, you can keep the James River open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remember that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
P.S.—If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you are not restrained from doing so. A.L.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 4, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
You do not know how much you would oblige us if, without abandoning any of your positions or plans, you could promptly send us even 10,000 infantry. Can you not? Some part of the Corinth army is certainly fighting McClellan in front of Richmond. Prisoners are in our hands from the late Corinth army.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. A. DIX.
WASHINGTON CITY, July 4,1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL Dix, Fort Monroe:
Send forward the despatch to Colonel Hawkins and this also. Our order and General McClellan's to General Burnside being the same, of course we wish it executed as promptly as possible.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON, July 5, 1862. 9 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:
A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches of 12 and 1 P.M. yesterday gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of yourself and officers and men is, and forever will be, appreciated.
If you can hold your present position, we shall have the enemy yet.
A. LINCOLN
TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., July 6, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi.
MY DEAR SIR:—This introduces Governor William Sprague, of Rhode Island. He is now Governor for the third time, and senator-elect of the United States.
I know the object of his visit to you. He has my cheerful consent to go, but not my direction. He wishes to get you and part of your force, one or both, to come here. You already know I should be exceedingly glad of this if, in your judgment, it could be without endangering positions and operations in the southwest; and I now repeat what I have more than once said by telegraph: "Do not come or send a man if, in your judgment, it will endanger any point you deem important to hold, or endangers or delays the Chattanooga expedition."
Still, please give my friend, Governor Sprague, a full and fair hearing.
Yours very truly,
A. LINCOLN.
MEMORANDUM OF AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL McCLELLAN
AND OTHER OFFICERS DURING A VISIT TO THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AT HARRISON'S LANDING, VIRGINIA.
July 9, 1862.
THE PRESIDENT: What amount of force have you now?
GENERAL McCLELLAN: About 80,000, can't vary much, certainly 75,000.
THE PRESIDENT:[to the corps commanders] What is the whole amount of your corps with you now.
GENERAL SUMNER: About 15,000. GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: 15,000 for duty. GENERAL KEYES: About 12,500. GENERAL PORTER: About 23,000—fully 20,000 fit for duty. GENERAL FRANKLIN: About 15,000.
THE PRESIDENT: What is likely to be your condition as to health in this camp?
GENERAL McCLELLAN: Better than in any encampment since landing at Fortress Monroe.
PRESIDENT LINCOLN:[to the corps commanders] In your present encampment what is the present and prospective condition as to health?
GENERAL SUMNER: As good as any part of Western Virginia.
GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Excellent for health, and present health improving.
GENERAL KEYES: A little improved, but think camp is getting worse.
GENERAL PORTER: Very good.
GENERAL FRANKLIN: Not good.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the enemy now?
GENERAL McCLELLAN: From four to five miles from us on all the roads—I think nearly the whole army—both Hills, Longstreet, Jackson, Magruder, Huger.
THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] Where and in what condition do you believe the enemy to be now?
GENERAL SUMNER: I think they have retired from our front; were very much damaged, especially in their best troops, in the late actions, from superiority of arms.
GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Don't think they are in force in our vicinity.
GENERAL KEYES: Think he has withdrawn, and think preparing to go to WASHINGTON.
GENERAL PORTER: Believe he is mainly near Richmond. He feels he dare not attack us here.
GENERAL FRANKLIN: I learn he has withdrawn from our front and think that is probable.
THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] What is the aggregate of your killed, wounded, and missing from the attack on the 26th ultimo till now?
GENERAL SUMNER: 1175. GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Not large 745. GENERAL KEYES: Less than 500. GENERAL PORTER: Over 5000. GENERAL FRANKLIN: Not over 3000.
THE PRESIDENT: If you desired could you remove the army safely?
GENERAL McCLELLAN: It would be a delicate and very difficult matter.
THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] If it were desired to get the army away, could it be safely effected?
GENERAL SUMNER: I think we could, but I think we give up the cause if we do.
GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: Perhaps we could, but I think it would be ruinous to the country.
GENERAL KEYES: I think it could if done quickly.
GENERAL PORTER: Impossible—move the army and ruin the country.
GENERAL FRANKLIN: I think we could, and that we had better—think Rappahannock the true line.
THE PRESIDENT: [to the corps commanders] Is the army secure in its present position?
GENERAL SUMNER: Perfectly so, in my judgment. GENERAL HEINTZELMAN: I think it is safe. GENERAL KEYES: With help of General B. [Burnside] can hold position. GENERAL PORTER: Perfectly so. Not only, but we are ready to begin moving forward. GENERAL FRANKLIN: Unless river can be closed it is.
ORDER MAKING HALLECK GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 11,1862.
Ordered, That Major-General Henry W. Halleck be assigned to command the whole land forces of the United States, as general-in-chief, and that he repair to this capital so soon as he can with safety to the positions and operations within the department now under his charge.
A. LINCOLN
ORDER CONCERNING THE SOUTHWEST BRANCH OF THE PACIFIC RAILROAD.
Whereas, in the judgment of the President, the public safety does require that the railroad line called and known as the Southwest Branch of the Pacific Railroad in the State of Missouri be repaired, extended, and completed from Rolla to Lebanon, in the direction to Springfield, in the said State, the same being necessary to the successful and economical conduct of the war and to the maintenance of the authority of the government in the Southwest:
Therefore, under and in virtue of the act of Congress entitled "An act to authorize the President of the United States in certain cases to take possession of railroad and telegraph lines, and for other purposes," approved January 31, 1862, it is ordered, That the portion of the said railroad line which reaches from Rolla to Lebanon be repaired, extended, and completed, so as to be made available for the military uses of the government, as speedily as may be. And, inasmuch as upon the part of the said line from Rolla to the stream called Little Piney a considerable portion of the necessary work has already been done by the railroad company, and the road to this extent may be completed at comparatively small cost, it is ordered that the said line from Rolla to and across Little Piney be first completed, and as soon as possible.
The Secretary of War is charged with the execution of this order. And to facilitate the speedy execution of the work, he is directed, at his discretion, to take possession and control of the whole or such part of the said railroad line, and the whole or such part of the rolling stock, offices, shops, buildings, and all their appendages and appurtenances, as he may judge necessary or convenient for the early completion of the road from Rolla to Lebanon.
Done at the city of WASHINGTON, July 11, 1862.
A. LINCOLN.
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.
WASHINGTON, D C., July 11, 1862
TO THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
I recommend that the thanks of Congress be given to the following officers of the United States Navy:
Captain James L. Lardner, for meritorious conduct at the battle of Port Royal and distinguished services on the coast of the United States against the enemy.
Captain Charles Henry Davis, for distinguished services in conflict with the enemy at Fort Pillow, at Memphis, and for successful operations at other points in the waters of the Mississippi River.
Commander John A. Dahlgren, for distinguished services in the line of his profession, improvements in ordnance, and zealous and efficient labors in the ordnance branch of the service.
Commander Stephen C. Rowan, for distinguished services in the waters of North Carolina, and particularly in the capture of Newbern, being in chief command of the naval forces.
Commander David D. Porter, for distinguished services in the conception and preparation of the means used for the capture of the forts below New Orleans, and for highly meritorious conduct in the management of the mortar flotilla during the bombardment of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.
Captain Silas H. Stringharn, now on the retired list, for distinguished services in the capture of Forts Hatteras and Clark.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR JOHNSON. WAR DEPARTMENT, July 11, 1862.
HON. ANDREW JOHNSON.
MY DEAR SIR:—Yours of yesterday is received. Do you not, my good friend, perceive that what you ask is simply to put you in command in the West? I do not suppose you desire this. You only wish to control in your own localities; but this you must know may derange all other posts. Can you not, and will you not, have a full conference with General Halleck? Telegraph him, and meet him at such place as he and you can agree upon. I telegraph him to meet you and confer fully with you.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK. WAR DEPARTMENT, July 11, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth:
Governor Johnson, at Nashville, is in great trouble and anxiety about a raid into Kentucky. The governor is a true and valuable man—indispensable to us in Tennessee. Will you please get in communication with him, and have a full conference with him before you leave for here? I have telegraphed him on the subject.
A. LINCOLN.
APPEAL TO BORDER-STATES IN FAVOR OF COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION.
July 12, 1862.
GENTLEMEN:—After the adjournment of Congress now very near, I shall have no opportunity of seeing you for several months. Believing that you of the border States hold more power for good than any other equal number of members, I feel it a duty which I cannot justifiably waive to make this appeal to you. I intend no reproach or complaint when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradual-emancipation message of last March, the war would now be substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is yet one of the most potent and swift means of ending it. Let the States which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever join their proposed confederacy, and they cannot much longer maintain the contest. But you cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them so long as you show a determination to perpetuate the institution within your own States. Beat them at elections, as you have overwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break that lever before their faces, and they can shake you no more forever. Most of you have treated me with kindness and consideration and I trust you will not now think I improperly touch what is exclusively your own, when, for the sake of the whole country, I ask, Can you, for your States, do better than to take the course I urge? Discarding punctilio and maxims adapted to more manageable times, and looking only to the unprecedentedly stern facts of our case, can you do better in any possible event? You prefer that the constitutional relation of the States to the nation shall be practically restored without disturbance of the institution; and if this were done, my whole duty in this respect, under the Constitution and my oath of office, would be performed. But it is not done, and we are trying to accomplish it by war. The incidents of the war cannot be avoided. If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion—by the mere incidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. How much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event! How much better to thus save the money which else we sink forever in war! How much better to do it while we can, lest the war ere long render us pecuniarily unable to do it! How much better for you as seller, and the nation as buyer, to sell out and buy out that without which the war could never have been, than to sink both the thing to be sold and the price of it in cutting one another's throats! I do not speak of emancipation at once, but of a decision at once to emancipate gradually. Room in South America for colonization can be obtained cheaply and in abundance, and when numbers shall be large enough to be company and encouragement for one another, the freed people will not be so reluctant to go.
I am pressed with a difficulty not yet mentioned—one which threatens division among those who, united, are none too strong. An instance of it is known to you. General Hunter is an honest man. He was, and I hope still is, my friend. I valued him none the less for his agreeing with me in the general wish that all men everywhere could be free. He proclaimed all men free within certain States, and I repudiated the proclamation. He expected more good and less harm from the measure than I could believe would follow. Yet, in repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction, if not offence, to many whose support the country cannot afford to lose. And this is not the end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is increasing. By conceding what I now ask you can relieve me, and, much more, can relieve the country in this important point.
Upon these considerations, I have again begged your attention to the message of March last. Before leaving the Capital, consider and discuss it among yourselves. You are patriots and statesmen, and as such I pray you consider this proposition; and, at the least, commend it to the consideration of your States and people. As you would perpetuate popular government for the best people in the world, I beseech you that you do in nowise omit this. Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring a speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world; its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewith forever.
TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 13, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
MY DEAR SIR:—I am told that over 160,000 men have gone into your army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day we made out 86,500 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be accounted for. I believe 23,500 will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left otherwise. No more than 5000 of these have died, leaving 45,000 of your army still alive and not with it. I believe half or two-thirds of them are fit for duty to-day. Have you any more perfect knowledge of this than I have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you, and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers for the future?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 13, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
They are having a stampede in Kentucky. Please look to it.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE.
WASHINGTON, July 13, 1862.
GENERAL J. T. BOYLE, Louisville, Kentucky:
Your several despatches received. You should call on General Halleck. Telegraph him at once. I have telegraphed him that you are in trouble.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 13, 1862.
GENERAL J. T. BOYLE, Louisville, Kentucky:
We cannot venture to order troops from General Buell. We know not what condition he is in. He maybe attacked himself. You must call on General Halleck, who commands, and whose business it is to understand and care for the whole field If you cannot telegraph to him, send a messenger to him. A dispatch has this moment come from Halleck at Tuscombia, Alabama.
A. LINCOLN.
ACT OF COMPENSATED EMANCIPATION
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.
July 4, 1862.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
Herewith is the draft of the bill to compensate any State which may abolish slavery within its limits, the passage of which, substantially as presented, I respectfully and earnestly recommend.
A. LINCOLN.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:—That whenever the President of the United States shall be satisfied that any State shall have lawfully abolished slavery within and through-out such State, either immediately or gradually, it shall be the duty of the President, assisted by the Secretary of the Treasury, to prepare and deliver to each State an amount of six per cent. interest-bearing bonds of the United States equal to the aggregate value at ——— dollars per head of all the slaves within such State, as reported by the census of 1860; the whole amount for any one State to be delivered at once if the abolishment be immediate, or in equal annual instalments if it be gradual, interest to begin running on each bond at the time of delivery, and not before.
And be it further enacted, That if any State, having so received any such bonds, shall at any time afterwards by law reintroduce or tolerate slavery within its limits, contrary to the act of abolishment upon which such bonds shall have been received, said bonds so received by said State shall at once be null and void, in whosesoever hands they may be, and such State shall refund to the United States all interest which may have been paid on such bonds.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 14, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Corinth, Mississippi:
I am very anxious—almost impatient—to have you here. Have due regard to what you leave behind. When can you reach here?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, July 14, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
General Burnside's force is at Newport News, ready to move, on short notice, one way or the other, when ordered.
A. LINCOLN.
TO SOLOMON FOOT.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 15, 1862.
HON. SOLOMON FOOT, President pro tempore of the Senate.
SIR:—Please inform the Senate that I shall be obliged if they will postpone the adjournment at least one day beyond the time which I understand to be now fixed for it.
Your obedient servant,
A. LINCOLN.
[The same message was addressed to Hon. Galusha A. Grow Speaker of the House of Representatives.]
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS. July 17, 1862.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
I have inadvertently omitted so long to inform you that in March last Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt, of New York, gratuitously presented to the United States the ocean steamer Vanderbilt, by many esteemed the finest merchant ship in the world. She has ever since been and still is doing valuable service to the government. For the patriotic act of making this magnificent and valuable present to the country I recommend that some suitable acknowledgment be made.
A. LINCOLN.
MESSAGE TO CONGRESS. July 17, 1862.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
Considering the bill for "An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes," and the joint resolution explanatory of said act as being substantially one, I have approved and signed both.
Before I was informed of the passage of the resolution I had prepared the draft of a message stating objections to the bill becoming a law, a copy of which draft is herewith transmitted.
A. LINCOLN.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
I herewith return to your honorable body, in which it originated, the bill for an act entitled "An act to suppress treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes," together with my objections to its becoming a law.
There is much in the bill to which I perceive no objection. It is wholly prospective, and touches neither person nor property of any loyal citizen, in which particulars it is just and proper. The first and second sections provide for the conviction and punishment of persons Who shall be guilty of treason and persons who shall "incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or shall give aid and comfort thereto, or shall engage in or give aid and comfort to any such existing rebellion or insurrection." By fair construction persons within these sections are not to be punished without regular trials in duly constituted courts, under the forms and all the substantial provisions of law and of the Constitution applicable to their several cases. To this I perceive no objection, especially as such persons would be within the general pardoning power and also the special provision for pardon and amnesty contained in this act.
It is also provided that the slaves of persons convicted under these sections shall be free. I think there is an unfortunate form of expression rather than a substantial objection in this. It is startling to say that Congress can free a slave within a State, and yet if it were said the ownership of the slave had first been transferred to the nation and that Congress had then liberated him the difficulty would at once vanish. And this is the real case. The traitor against the General Government forfeits his slave at least as justly as he does any other property, and he forfeits both to the government against which be offends. The government, so far as there can be ownership, thus owns the forfeited slaves, and the question for Congress in regard to them is, "Shall they be made free or be sold to new masters?" I perceive no objection to Congress deciding in advance that they shall be free. To the high honor of Kentucky, as I am informed, she is the owner of some slaves by escheat, and has sold none, but liberated all. I hope the same is true of some other States. Indeed, I do not believe it will be physically possible for the General Government to return persons so circumstanced to actual slavery. I believe there would be physical resistance to it which could neither be turned aside by argument nor driven away by force. In this view I have no objection to this feature of the bill. Another matter involved in these two sections, and running through other parts of the act, will be noticed hereafter.
I perceive no objection to the third or fourth sections.
So far as I wish to notice the fifth and sixth sections, they may be considered together. That the enforcement of these sections would do no injustice to the persons embraced within them, is clear. That those who make a causeless war should be compelled to pay the cost of it, is too obviously just to be called in question. To give governmental protection to the property of persons who have abandoned it, and gone on a crusade to overthrow the same government, is absurd, if considered in the mere light of justice. The severest justice may not always be the best policy. The principle of seizing and appropriating the property of the persons embraced within these sections is certainly not very objectionable, but a justly discriminating application of it would be very difficult and, to a great extent, impossible. And would it not be wise to place a power of remission somewhere, so that these persons may know they have something to lose by persisting and something to gain by desisting?
[A man without hope is a most dangerous man—he has nothing to lose!]
I am not sure whether such power of remission is or is not in section thirteen. Without any special act of Congress, I think our military commanders, when—in military phrase, "they are within the enemy's country," should, in an orderly manner, seize and use whatever of real or personal property may be necessary or convenient for their commands; at the same time preserving, in some way, the evidence of what they do.
What I have said in regard to slaves, while commenting on the first and second sections, is applicable to the ninth, with the difference that no provision is made in the whole act for determining whether a particular individual slave does or does not fall within the classes defined in that section. He is to be free upon certain conditions but whether those conditions do or do not pertain to him no mode of ascertaining is provided. This could be easily supplied.
To the tenth section I make no objection. The oath therein required seems to be proper, and the remainder of the section is substantially identical with a law already existing.
The eleventh section simply assumes to confer discretionary power upon the executive. Without the law, I have no hesitation to go as far in the direction indicated as I may at any time deem expedient. And I am ready to say now—I think it is proper for our military commanders to employ, as laborers, as many persons of African descent as can be used to advantage.
The twelfth and thirteenth sections are something better than unobjectionable; and the fourteenth is entirely proper, if all other parts of the act shall stand.
That to which I chiefly object pervades most parts of the act, but more distinctly appears in the first, second, seventh, and eighth sections. It is the sum of those provisions which results in the divesting of title forever.
For the causes of treason and ingredients of treason, not amounting to the full crime, it declares forfeiture extending beyond the lives of the guilty parties; whereas the Constitution of the United States declares that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted." True, there is to be no formal attainder in this case; still, I think the greater punishment cannot be constitutionally inflicted, in a different form, for the same offence.
With great respect I am constrained to say I think this feature of the act is unconstitutional. It would not be difficult to modify it.
I may remark that the provision of the Constitution, put in language borrowed from Great Britain, applies only in this country, as I understand, to real or landed estate.
Again, this act in rem forfeits property for the ingredients of treason without a conviction of the supposed criminal, or a personal hearing given him in any proceeding. That we may not touch property lying within our reach, because we cannot give personal notice to an owner who is absent endeavoring to destroy the government, is certainly not satisfactory. Still, the owner may not be thus engaged; and I think a reasonable time should be provided for such parties to appear and have personal hearings. Similar provisions are not uncommon in connection with proceedings in rem.
For the reasons stated, I return the bill to the House in which it originated.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., July 21, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
This is Monday. I hope to be able to tell you on Thursday what is to be done with Burnside.
A. LINCOLN.
ORDER IN REGARD TO BEHAVIOR OF ALIENS
WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 21, 1862.
The following order has been received from the President of the United States:
Representations have been made to the President by the ministers of various foreign powers in amity with the United States that subjects of such powers have during the present insurrection been obliged or required by military authorities to take an oath of general or qualified allegiance to this government. It is the duty of all aliens residing in the United States to submit to and obey the laws and respect the authority of the government. For any proceeding or conduct inconsistent with this obligation and subversive of that authority they may rightfully be subjected to military restraints when this may be necessary. But they cannot be required to take an oath of allegiance to this government, because it conflicts with the duty they owe to their own sovereigns. All such obligations heretofore taken are therefore remitted and annulled. Military commanders will abstain from imposing similar obligations in future, and will in lieu thereof adopt such other restraints of the character indicated as they shall find necessary, convenient, and effectual for the public safety. It is further directed that whenever any order shall be made affecting the personal liberty of an alien reports of the same and of the causes thereof shall be made to the War Department for the consideration of the Department of State.
By order of the Secretary of War:
L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.
ORDER AUTHORIZING EMPLOYMENT OF "CONTRABANDS."
WAR DEPARTMENT, July 22, 1862.
Ordered:
1. That military commanders within the States of Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas in an orderly manner seize and use any property, real or personal, which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands as supplies or for other military purposes; and that while property may be destroyed for proper military objects, none shall be destroyed in wantonness or malice.
2. That military and naval commanders shall employ as laborers within and from said States so many persons of African descent as can be advantageously used for military or naval purposes, giving them reasonable wages for their labor.
3. That as to both property and persons of African descent accounts shall be kept sufficiently accurate and in detail to show quantities and amounts and from whom both property and such persons shall have come, as a basis upon which compensation can be made in proper cases; and the several departments of this government shall attend to and perform their appropriate parts toward the execution of these orders.
By order of the President: EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
WARNING TO REBEL SYMPATHIZERS
PROCLAMATION, JULY 25, 1862.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A Proclamation.
In pursuance of the sixth section of the act of Congress entitled "An act to suppress insurrection and to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes," approved July 17, 1862, and which act and the joint resolution explanatory thereof are herewith published, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby proclaim to and warn all persons within the contemplation of said sixth section to cease participating in, aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion or any rebellion against the Government of the United States and to return to their proper allegiance to the United States, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures as within and by said sixth section provided.
In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, this twenty-fifth day of July, A.D. 1862, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.
A. LINCOLN.
By the President: WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
HOLD MY HAND WHILST THE ENEMY STABS ME
TO REVERDY JOHNSON.
(Private.)
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 26, 1862.
HON. REVERDY JOHNSON.
MY DEAR SIR:—Yours of the 16th is received...........
You are ready to say I apply to friends what is due only to enemies. I distrust the wisdom if not the sincerity of friends who would hold my hands while my enemies stab me. This appeal of professed friends has paralyzed me more in this struggle than any other one thing. You remember telling me, the day after the Baltimore mob in April, 1861, that it would crush all Union feeling in Maryland for me to attempt bringing troops over Maryland soil to Washington. I brought the troops notwithstanding, and yet there was Union feeling enough left to elect a Legislature the next autumn, which in turn elected a very excellent Union United States senator! I am a patient man—always willing to forgive on the Christian terms of repentance, and also to give ample time for repentance. Still, I must save this government, if possible. What I cannot do, of course, I will not do; but it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO CUTHBERT BULLITT.
(Private.)
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 28, 1862.
CUTHBERT BULLITT, Esq., New Orleans, Louisiana.
SIR:—The copy of a letter addressed to yourself by Mr. Thomas J. Durant has been shown to me. The writer appears to be an able, a dispassionate, and an entirely sincere man. The first part of the letter is devoted to an effort to show that the secession ordinance of Louisiana was adopted against the will of a majority of the people. This is probably true, and in that fact may be found some instruction. Why did they allow the ordinance to go into effect? Why did they not assert themselves? Why stand passive and allow themselves to be trodden down by minority? Why did they not hold popular meetings and have a convention of their own to express and enforce the true sentiment of the State? If preorganization was against them then, why not do this now that the United States army is present to protect them? The paralysis—the dead palsy—of the government in this whole struggle is that this class of men will do nothing for the government, nothing for themselves, except demanding that the government shall not strike its open enemies, lest they be struck by accident!
Mr. Durant complains that in various ways the relation of master and slave is disturbed by the presence of our army, and he considers it particularly vexatious that this, in part, is done under cover of an act of Congress, while constitutional guaranties are suspended on the plea of military necessity. The truth is, that what is done and omitted about slaves is done and omitted on the same military necessity. It is a military necessity to have men and money; and we can get neither in sufficient numbers or amounts if we keep from or drive from our lines slaves coming to them. Mr. Durant cannot be ignorant of the pressure in this direction, nor of my efforts to hold it within bounds till he and such as he shall have time to help themselves.
I am not posted to speak understandingly on all the police regulations of which Mr. Durant complains. If experience shows any one of them to be wrong, let them be set right. I think I can perceive in the freedom of trade which Mr. Durant urges that he would relieve both friends and enemies from the pressure of the blockade. By this he would serve the enemy more effectively than the enemy is able to serve himself. I do not say or believe that to serve the enemy is the purpose, of Mr. Durant, or that he is conscious of any purpose other than national and patriotic ones. Still, if there were a class of men who, having no choice of sides in the contest, were anxious only to have quiet and comfort for themselves while it rages, and to fall in with the victorious side at the end of it without loss to themselves, their advice as to the mode of conducting the contest would be precisely such as his is. He speaks of no duty—apparently thinks of none—resting upon Union men. He even thinks it injurious to the Union cause that they should be restrained in trade and passage without taking sides. They are to touch neither a sail nor a pump, but to be merely passengers—deadheads at that—to be carried snug and dry throughout the storm, and safely landed right side up. Nay, more: even a mutineer is to go untouched, lest these sacred passengers receive an accidental wound. Of course the rebellion will never be suppressed in Louisiana if the professed Union men there will neither help to do it nor permit the government to do it without their help. Now, I think the true remedy is very different from what is suggested by Mr. Durant. It does not lie in rounding the rough angles of the war, but in removing the necessity for the war. The people of Louisiana who wish protection to person and property have but to reach forth their hands and take it. Let them in good faith reinaugurate the national authority, and set up a State government conforming thereto under the Constitution. They know how to do it and can have the protection of the army while doing it. The army will be withdrawn so soon as such State government can dispense with its presence; and the people of the State can then, upon the old constitutional terms, govern themselves to their own liking. This is very simple and easy.
If they will not do this—if they prefer to hazard all for the sake of destroying the government—it is for them to consider whether it is probable I will surrender the government to save them from losing all. If they decline what I suggest, you scarcely need to ask what I will do. What would you do in my position? Would you drop the war where it is? Or would you prosecute it in future with elder-stalk squirts charged with rose water? Would you deal lighter blows rather than heavier ones? Would you give up the contest, leaving any available means unapplied? I am in no boastful mood. I shall not do more than I can, and I shall do all I can, to save the government, which is my sworn duty as well as my personal inclination. I shall do nothing in malice. What I deal with is too vast for malicious dealing.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO LOYAL GOVERNORS.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
July 28, 1862.
GOVERNORS OF ALL LOYAL STATES:
It would be of great service here for us to know, as fully as you can tell, what progress is made and making in recruiting for old regiments in your State. Also about what day the first regiments can move with you, what the second, what the third, and so on. This information is important to us in making calculations. Please give it as promptly and accurately as you call.
A. LINCOLN.
BROKEN EGGS CANNOT BE MENDED
EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO AUGUST BELMONT.
July 31, 1862.
Broken eggs cannot be mended; but Louisiana has nothing to do now but to take her place in the Union as it was, barring the already broken eggs. The sooner she does so, the smaller will be the amount of that which will be past mending. This government cannot much longer play a game in which it stakes all, and its enemies stake nothing. Those enemies must understand that they cannot experiment for ten years trying to destroy the government, and if they fail, still come back into the Union unhurt. If they expect in any contingency to ever have the Union as it was, I join with the writer in saying, "Now is the time."
How much better it would have been for the writer to have gone at this, under the protection of the army at New Orleans, than to have sat down in a closet writing complaining letters northward!
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TO COUNT GASPARIN.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,
August 4, 1863.
TO COUNT A. DE GASPARIN.
DEAR SIR—Your very acceptable letter, dated Orbe, Canton de Vaud, Switzerland, 18th of July, 1862, is received. The moral effect was the worst of the affair before Richmond, and that has run its course downward. We are now at a stand, and shall soon be rising again, as we hope. I believe it is true that, in men and material, the enemy suffered more than we in that series of conflicts, while it is certain that he is less able to bear it.
With us every soldier is a man of character, and must be treated with more consideration than is customary in Europe. Hence our great army, for slighter causes than could have prevailed there, has dwindled rapidly, bringing the necessity for a new call earlier than was anticipated. We shall easily obtain the new levy, however. Be not alarmed if you shall learn that we shall have resorted to a draft for part of this. It seems strange even to me, but it is true, that the government is now pressed to this course by a popular demand. Thousands who wish not to personally enter the service are nevertheless anxious to pay and send substitutes, provided they can have assurance that unwilling persons, similarly situated, will be compelled to do likewise. Besides this, volunteers mostly choose to enter newly forming regiments, while drafted men can be sent to fill up the old ones, wherein man for man they are quite doubly as valuable.
You ask, "Why is it that the North with her great armies so often is found with inferiority of numbers face to face with the armies of the South?" While I painfully know the fact, a military man, which I am not, would better answer the question. The fact I know has not been overlooked, and I suppose the cause of its continuance lies mainly in the other facts that the enemy holds the interior and we the exterior lines, and that we operate where the people convey information to the enemy, while he operates where they convey none to us.
I have received the volume and letter which you did me the honor of addressing to me, and for which please accept my sincere thanks. You are much admired in America for the ability of your writings, and much loved for your generosity to us and your devotion to liberal principles generally.
You are quite right as to the importance to us, for its bearing upon Europe, that we should achieve military successes, and the same is true for us at home as well as abroad. Yet it seems unreasonable that a series of successes, extending through half a year, and clearing more than 100,000 square miles of country, should help us so little, while a single half-defeat should hurt us so much. But let us be patient.
I am very happy to know that my course has not conflicted with your judgment of propriety and policy I can only say that I have acted upon my best convictions, without selfishness or malice, and that by the help of God I shall continue to do so.
Please be assured of my highest respect and esteem.
A. LINCOLN.
SPEECH AT A WAR MEETING, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 6, 1862
FELLOW CITIZENS: I believe there is no precedent for my appearing before you on this occasion, but it is also true that there is no precedent for your being here yourselves, and I offer in justification of myself and of you that, upon examination, I have found nothing in the Constitution against it. I, however, have an impression that; there are younger gentlemen who will entertain you better and better address your understanding than I will or could, and therefore I propose but to detain you a moment longer. I am very little inclined on any occasion to say anything unless I hope to produce some good by it. The only thing I think of just now not likely to be better said by some one else is a matter in which we have heard some other persons blamed for what I did myself There has been a very widespread attempt to have a quarrel between General McClellan and the Secretary of War Now, I occupy a position that enables me to believe that these two gentlemen are not nearly so deep in the quarrel as some presuming to be their friends. General McClellan's attitude is such that in the very selfishness of his nature he cannot but wish to be successful—and I hope he will—and the Secretary of War is precisely in the same situation. If the military commanders in the field cannot be successful, not only the Secretary of War, but myself, for the time being the master of both, cannot but be failures. I know General McClellan wishes to be successful, and I know he does not wish it any more than the Secretary of War for him, and both of them together no more than I wish it. Sometimes we have a dispute about how many men General McClellan has had, and those who would disparage him say he has had a very large number, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War insist that General McClellan has had a very small number. The basis for this is, there is always a wide difference, and on this occasion perhaps a wider one, between the grand total on McClellan's rolls and the men actually fit for duty; and those who would disparage him talk of the grand total on paper, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War talk of those at present fit for duty. General McClellan has sometimes asked for things that the Secretary of War did not give him. General McClellan is not to blame for asking for what he wanted and needed, and the Secretary of War is not to blame for not giving when he had none to give. And I say here, so far as I know, the Secretary of War has withheld no one thing at any time in my power to give him. I have no accusation against him. I believe he is a brave and able man, and I stand here, as justice requires me to do, to take upon myself what has been charged on the Secretary of War as withholding from him. I have talked longer than I expected to do, and now I avail myself of my privilege of saying no more.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR ANDREW. August 12, 1862.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, D.C.
GOVERNOR ANDREW, Boston, Mass.:
Your despatch saying "I can't get those regiments off because I can't get quick work out of the V. S. disbursing officer and the paymaster" is received. Please say to these gentlemen that if they do not work quickly I will make quick work with them. In the name of all that is reasonable, how long does it take to pay a couple of regiments? We were never more in need of the arrival of regiments than now—even to-day.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR CURTIN. August 12, 1862.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
GOVERNOR CURTIN, Harrisburg, Penn.:
It is very important for some regiments to arrive here at once. What lack you from us? What can we do to expedite matters? Answer.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL S. R. CURTIS. August 12, 1862.
WASHINGTON, D. C.
MAJOR-GENERAL CURTIS, St. Louis, Missouri:
Would the completion of the railroad some distance farther in the direction of Springfield, Mo., be of any military advantage to you? Please answer.
A. LINCOLN.
ADDRESS ON COLONIZATION TO A DEPUTATION OF COLORED MEN.
WASHINGTON, Thursday, August 14, 1862.
This afternoon the President of the United States gave an audience to a committee of colored men at the White House. They were introduced by Rev. J. Mitchell, Commissioner of Emigration, E. M. Thomas, the chairman, remarked that they were there by invitation to hear what the Executive had to say to them.
Having all been seated, the President, after a few preliminary observations, informed them that a sum of money had been appropriated by Congress, and placed at his disposition, for the purpose of aiding the colonization, in some country, of the people, or a portion of them, of African descent, thereby making it his duty, as it had for a long time been his inclination, to favor that cause. And why, he asked, should the people of your race be colonized, and where? Why should they leave this country? This is, perhaps, the first question for proper consideration. You and we are different races. We have between us a broader difference than exists between almost any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong I need not discuss; but this physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think. Your race suffer very greatly, many of them, by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence. In a word, we suffer on each side. If this is admitted, it affords a reason, at least, why we should be separated. You here are free men, I suppose.
[A voice—"Yes, sir!"]
Perhaps you have long been free, or all your lives. Your race are suffering, in my judgment, the greatest wrong inflicted on any people. But even when you cease to be slaves, you are yet far removed from being placed on an equality with the white race. You are cut off from many of the advantages which the other race enjoys. The aspiration of men is to enjoy equality with the best when free, but on this broad continent not a single man of your race is made the equal of a single man of ours. Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is still upon you. I do not propose to discuss this, but to present it as a fact, with which we have to deal. I cannot alter it if I would. It is a fact about which we all think and feel alike, I and you. We look to our condition. Owing to the existence of the two races on this continent, I need not recount to you the effects upon white men, growing out of the institution of slavery.
I believe in its general evil effects on the white race. See our present condition—the country engaged in war—white men cutting one another's throats—none knowing how far it will extend—and then consider what we know to be the truth: But for your race among us there could not be war, although many men engaged on either side do not care for you one way or the other. Nevertheless I repeat, without the institution of slavery and the colored race as a basis, the war could not have an existence. It is better for us both, therefore, to be separated. I know that there are free men among you, who, even if they could better their condition, are not as much inclined to go out of the country as those who, being slaves, could obtain their freedom on this condition. I suppose one of the principal difficulties in the way of colonization is that the free colored man cannot see that his comfort would be advanced by it. You may believe that you can live in WASHINGTON, or elsewhere in the United States, the remainder of your life, as easily, perhaps more so, than you can in any foreign Country; and hence you may come to the conclusion that you have nothing to do with the idea of going to a foreign country.
This is (I speak in no unkind sense) an extremely selfish view of the case. You ought to do something to help those who are not so fortunate as yourselves. There is an unwillingness on the part of our people, harsh as it may be, for you free colored people to remain with us. Now, if you could give a start to the white people, you would open a wide door for many to be made free. If we deal with those who are not free at the beginning, and whose intellects are clouded by slavery, we have very poor material to start with. If intelligent colored men, such as are before me, would move in this matter, much might be accomplished.
It is exceedingly important that we have men at the beginning capable of thinking as white men, and not those who have been systematically oppressed. There is much to encourage you. For the sake of your race you should sacrifice something of your present comfort for the purpose of being as grand in that respect as the white people. It is a cheering thought throughout life that something can be done to ameliorate the condition of those who have been subject to the hard usages of the world. It is difficult to make a man miserable while he feels he is worthy of himself and claims kindred to the great God who made him. In the American Revolutionary war sacrifices were made by men engaged in it, but they were cheered by the future. General WASHINGTON himself endured greater physical hardships than if he had remained a British subject, yet he was a happy man because he had engaged in benefiting his race, in doing something for the children of his neighbors, having none of his own.
The colony of Liberia has been in existence a long time. In a certain sense it is a success. The old President of Liberia, Roberts, has just been with me—the first time I ever saw him. He says they have within the bounds of that colony between three and four hundred thousand people, or more than in some of our old States, such as Rhode Island or Delaware, or in some of our newer States, and less than in some of our larger ones. They are not all American colonists or their descendants. Something less than 12,000 have been sent thither from this country. Many of the original settlers have died; yet, like people else-where, their offspring outnumber those deceased. The question is, if the colored people are persuaded to go anywhere, why not there?
One reason for unwillingness to do so is that some of you would rather remain within reach of the country of your nativity. I do not know how much attachment you may have toward our race. It does not strike me that you have the greatest reason to love them. But still you are attached to them, at all events.
The place I am thinking about for a colony is in Central America. It is nearer to us than Liberia not much more than one fourth as far as Liberia, and within seven days' run by steamers. Unlike Liberia, it is a great line of travel—it is a highway. The country is a very excellent one for any people, and with great natural resources and advantages, and especially because of the similarity of climate with your native soil, thus being suited to your physical condition. The particular place I have in view is to be a great highway from the Atlantic or Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean, and this particular place has all the advantages for a colony. On both sides there are harbors—among the finest in the world. Again, there is evidence of very rich coal-mines. A certain amount of coal is valuable in any country. Why I attach so much importance to coal is, it will afford an opportunity to the inhabitants for immediate employment till they get ready to settle permanently in their homes. If you take colonists where there is no good landing, there is a bad show; and so where there is nothing to cultivate and of which to make a farm. But if something is started so that you can get your daily bread as soon as reach you there, it is a great advantage. Coal land is the best thing I know of with which to commence an enterprise. To return—you have been talked to upon this subject, and told that a speculation is intended by gentlemen who have an interest in the country, including the coal-mines. We have been mistaken all our lives if we do not know whites, as well as blacks, look to their self-interest. Unless among those deficient of intellect, everybody you trade with makes something. You meet with these things here and everywhere. If such persons have what will be an advantage to them, the question is whether it cannot be made of advantage to you. You are intelligent, and know that success does not so much depend on external help as on self-reliance. Much, therefore, depends upon yourselves. As to the coal-mines, I think I see the means available for your self-reliance. I shall, if I get a sufficient number of you engaged, have provision made that you shall not be wronged. If you will engage in the enterprise, I will spend some of the money intrusted to me. I am not sure you will succeed. The government may lose the money; but we cannot succeed unless we try, and we think with care we can succeed. The political affairs in Central America are not in quite as satisfactory a condition as I wish. There are contending factions in that quarter, but it is true all the factions are agreed alike on the subject of colonization, and want it, and are more generous than we are here.
To your colored race they have no objection I would endeavor to have you made the equals, and have the best assurance that you should be the equals, of the best.
The practical thing I want to ascertain is whether I can get a number of able-bodied men, with their wives and children, who are willing to go when I present evidence of encouragement and protection. Could I get a hundred tolerably intelligent men, with their wives and children, and able to "cut their own fodder," so to speak? Can I have fifty? If I could find twenty-five able-bodied men, with a mixture of women and children—good things in the family relation, I think,—I could make a successful commencement. I want you to let me know whether this can be done or not. This is the practical part of my wish to see you. These are subjects of very great importance, worthy of a month's study, instead of a speech delivered in an hour. I ask you, then, to consider seriously, not pertaining to yourselves merely, nor for your race and ours for the present time, but as one of the things, if successfully managed, the good of mankind—not confined to the present generation, but as
"From age to age descends the lay To millions yet to be, Till far its echoes roll away Into eternity."
The above is merely given as the substance of the President's remarks.
The chairman of the delegation briefly replied that they would hold a consultation, and in a short time give an answer.
The President said: Take your full time-no hurry at all.
The delegation then withdrew.
TELEGRAM TO OFFICER AT CAMP CHASE, OHIO.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., August 14, 1862.
OFFICER in charge of Confederate prisoners at Camp Chase, Ohio:
It is believed that a Dr. J. J. Williams is a prisoner in your charge, and if so tell him his wife is here and allow him to telegraph to her.
A. LINCOLN.
TO HIRAM BARNEY.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 16, 1862.
HON. HIRAM BARNEY, New York:
Mrs. L. has $1000 for the benefit of the hospitals and she will be obliged, and send the pay, if you will be so good as to select and send her $200 worth of good lemons and $100 worth of good oranges.
A. LINCOLN.
NOTE OF INTRODUCTION.
The Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will please see Mr. Talcott, one of the best men there is, and, if any difference, one they would like better than they do me.
August 18, 1862
A. LINCOLN
TELEGRAM TO S. B. MOODY
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON August 18, 1862
S. B. MOODY, Springfield, Ill.:
Which do you prefer—commissary or quartermaster? If appointed it must be without conditions.
A. LINCOLN.
Operator please send above for President. JOHN HAY
TO Mrs. PRESTON.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., August 21, 1862.
Mrs. MARGARET PRESTON, Lexington, Ky.:
Your despatch to Mrs. L. received yesterday. She is not well. Owing to her early and strong friendship for you, I would gladly oblige you, but I cannot absolutely do it. If General Boyle and Hon. James Guthrie, one or both, in their discretion see fit to give you the passes, this is my authority to them for doing so.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL BURNSIDE OR GENERAL PARKE.
WASHINGTON, August 21.
TO GENERAL BURNSIDE OR GENERAL PARKE:
What news about arrival of troops?
A. LINCOLN.
TO G. P. WATSON.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C., August 21, 1862.
GILLET F. WATSON, Williamsburg, Va.:
Your telegram in regard to the lunatic asylum has been received. It is certainly a case of difficulty, but if you cannot remain, I cannot conceive who under my authority can. Remain as long as you safely can and provide as well as you can for the poor inmates of the institution.
A. LINCOLN.
TO HORACE GREELEY.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 22, 1862.
HON. HORACE GREELEY.
DEAR SIR:—I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself through the New York Tribune. If there be in it any statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be erroneous, I do not now and here controvert them. If there be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely drawn, I do not now and here argue against them. If there be perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend, whose heart I have always supposed to be right.
As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt.
I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be, "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty, and I intend no modification of my oft expressed personal wish that all men, everywhere, could be free.
Yours,
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR YATES.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C., August 13.1862. 8 A.M.
HON. R. YATES, Springfield, Ill.:
I am pained to hear that you reject the service of an officer we sent to assist in organizing and getting off troops. Pennsylvania and Indiana accepted such officers kindly, and they now have more than twice as many new troops in the field as all the other States together. If Illinois had got forward as many troops as Indiana, Cumberland Gap would soon be relieved from its present peril. Please do not ruin us on punctilio.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR RAMSEY.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, August 27, 1862
GOVERNOR RAMSEY, St. Paul, Minnesota:
Yours received. Attend to the Indians. If the draft cannot proceed, of course it will not proceed. Necessity knows no law. The government cannot extend the time.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON CITY, August 27, 1862 4 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN, Alexandria, Virginia:
What news from the front?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.
August 27, 1862 4.30 p.m.
MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Falmouth, Virginia:
Do you hear anything from Pope?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.
August 28, 1862. 2.40 P. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Falmouth, Virginia:
Any news from General Pope?
A. LINCOLN
TELEGRAM TO COLONEL HAUPT.
August 28, 1862. 2.40 p. m.
COLONEL HAUPT, Alexandria, Virginia:
Yours received. How do you learn that the rebel forces at Manassas are large and commanded by several of their best generals?
A. LINCOLN,
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 29, 1862. 2.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE, Falmouth, Virginia:
Any further news? Does Colonel Devon mean that sound of firing was heard in direction of Warrenton, as stated, or in direction of Warrenton Junction?
A. LINCOLN
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862. 2.30 p.m.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN
What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generally?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON, August 29, 1862. 4.10 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN: Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative—to wit, "to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope"—is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO COLONEL HAUPT.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., August 30, 1862. 10.20 A.M.
COLONEL HAUPT Alexandria, Virginia:
What news?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO COLONEL HAUPT.
WAR DEPARTMENT, August 30, 1862. 3.50 P.M. COLONEL HAUPT, Alexandria, Virginia
Please send me the latest news.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL BANKS.
August 30, 1862. 8.35 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL BANKS, Manassas Junction, Virginia:
Please tell me what news.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE.
WAR DEPARTMENT, August 31, 1862.
GENERAL BOYLE, Louisville, Kentucky:
What force, and what the numbers of it, which General Nelson had in the engagement near Richmond yesterday?
A. LINCOLN.
ORDER TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.
WASHINGTON, D. C., September 3, 1862.
Ordered, That the general-in-chief, Major-General Halleck, immediately commence, and proceed with all possible despatch; to organize an army, for active operations, from all the material within and coming within his control, independent of the forces he may deem necessary for the defense of Washington when such active army shall take the field.
By order of the President:
EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.
[Indorsement.]
Copy delivered to Major-General Halleck, September 3, 1862, at 10 p.m.
E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant-Adjutant General.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., September 7, 1862.
GENERAL WRIGHT, Cincinnati, Ohio:
Do you know to any certainty where General Bragg is? May he not be in Virginia?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., September 7, 1862.
GENERAL BOYLE, Louisville, Kentucky:
Where is General Bragg? What do you know on the subject?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. E. WOOL.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
September 7, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL Wool, Baltimore:
What about Harper's Ferry? Do you know anything about it? How certain is your information about Bragg being in the valley of the Shenandoah?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B, McCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON, September 8, 1862. 5 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN, Rockville, Maryland:
How does it look now?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, September 8, 1862. 7.20 P.M.
GENERAL BUELL:
What degree of certainty have you that Bragg, with his command, is not now in the valley of the Shenandoah, Virginia?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO T. WEBSTER.
WASHINGTON, September 9, 1862.
THOMAS WEBSTER, Philadelphia:
Your despatch received, and referred to General Halleck, who must control the questions presented. While I am not surprised at your anxiety, I do not think you are in any danger. If half our troops were in Philadelphia, the enemy could take it, because he would not fear to leave the other half in his rear; but with the whole of them here, he dares not leave them in his rear.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, September 10, 1862. 10.15 AM.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN, Rockville, Maryland:
How does it look now?
A. LINCOLN.
TO GOVERNOR CURTIN. September 11, 1862.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
HIS EXCELLENCY ANDREW G. CURTIN, Governor of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
SIR:—The application made to me by your adjutant general for authority to call out the militia of the State of Pennsylvania has received careful consideration. It is my anxious desire to afford, as far as possible, the means and power of the Federal Government to protect the State of Pennsylvania from invasion by the rebel forces; and since, in your judgment, the militia of the State are required, and have been called upon by you, to organize for home defense and protection, I sanction the call that you have made, and will receive them into the service and pay of the United States to the extent they can be armed, equipped, and usefully employed. The arms and equipments now belonging to the General Government will be needed for the troops called out for the national armies, so that arms can only be furnished for the quota of militia furnished by the draft of nine months' men, heretofore ordered. But as arms may be supplied by the militia under your call, these, with the 30,000 in your arsenal, will probably be sufficient for the purpose contemplated by your call. You will be authorized to provide such equipments as may be required, according to the regulations of the United States service, which, upon being turned over to the United States Quartermaster's Department, will be paid for at regulation prices, or the rates allowed by the department for such articles. Railroad transportation will also be paid for, as in other cases. Such general officers will be supplied as the exigencies of the service will permit.
Yours truly,
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR CURTIN.
WASHINGTON, September 11, 1862 12M
HON. ANDREW G. CURTIN:
Please tell me at once what is your latest news from or toward Hagerstown, or of the enemy's movement in any direction.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL C. B. McCLELLAN.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, SEPTEMBER 11, 1862. 6 PM
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
This is explanatory. If Porter, Heintzelman, and Sigel were sent you, it would sweep everything from the other side of the river, because the new troops have been distributed among them, as I understand. Porter reports himself 21,000 strong, which can only be by the addition of new troops. He is ordered tonight to join you as quickly as possible. I am for sending you all that can be spared, and I hope others can follow Porter very soon,
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., SEPTEMBER 12, 1862
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN, Clarksburg, Maryland:
How does it look now?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR CURTIN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON D.C., SEPTEMBER 12, 1862 10.35 AM
HON. ANDREW G. CURTIN, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania:
Your despatch asking for 80,000 disciplined troops to be sent to Pennsylvania is received. Please consider we have not to exceed 80,000 disciplined troops, properly so called, this side of the mountains; and most of them, with many of the new regiments, are now close in the rear of the enemy supposed to be invading Pennsylvania. Start half of them to Harrisburg, and the enemy will turn upon and beat the remaining half, and then reach Harrisburg before the part going there, and beat it too when it comes. The best possible security for Pennsylvania is putting the strongest force possible in rear of the enemy.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT.
MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WASHINGTON, September 12, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL WRIGHT, Cincinnati, Ohio:
I am being appealed to from Louisville against your withdrawing troops from that place. While I cannot pretend to judge of the propriety of what you are doing, you would much oblige me by furnishing me a rational answer to make to the governor and others at Louisville.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE.
WASHINGTON, September 12, 1862.
MAJOR-GENERAL BOYLE, Louisville, Kentucky:
Your despatch of last evening received. Where is the enemy which you dread in Louisville? How near to you? What is General Gilbert's opinion? With all possible respect for you, I must think General Wright's military opinion is the better. He is as much responsible for Louisville as for Cincinnati. General Halleck telegraphed him on this very subject yesterday, and I telegraph him now; but for us here to control him there on the ground would be a babel of confusion which would be utterly ruinous. Where do you understand Buell to be, and what is he doing?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO A. HENRY.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C, September 12, 1862.
HON. ALEXANDER HENRY, Philadelphia:
Yours of to-day received. General Halleck has made the best provision he can for generals in Pennsylvania. Please do not be offended when I assure you that in my confident belief Philadelphia is in no danger. Governor Curtin has just telegraphed me: "I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland." At all events, Philadelphia is more than 150 miles from Hagerstown, and could not be reached by the rebel army in ten days, if no hindrance was interposed.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON CITY, D.C., September 12, 1862. 5.45 PM
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
Governor Curtin telegraphs me:
"I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be down from Maryland."
Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is crossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt.
A. LINCOLN.
[But he did! D.W.]
REPLY TO REQUEST THE PRESIDENT ISSUE A PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION.
A COMMITTEE FROM THE RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS OF CHICAGO,
September 13,1862.
The subject presented in the memorial is one upon which I have thought much for weeks past, and I may even say for months. I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men, who are equally certain that they represent the Divine will. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken in that belief, and perhaps in some respects both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others, on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is I will do it! These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right.
The subject is difficult, and good men do not agree. For instance, the other day, four gentlemen of standing and intelligence from New York called as a delegation on business connected with the war; but before leaving two of them earnestly besought me to proclaim general emancipation, upon which the other two at once attacked them. You know also that the last session of Congress had a decided majority of antislavery men, yet they could not unite on this policy. And the same is true of the religious people. Why, the rebel soldiers are praying with a great deal more earnestness, I fear, than our own troops, and expecting God to favor their side: for one of our soldiers who had been taken prisoner told Senator Wilson a few days since that he met nothing so discouraging as the evident sincerity of those he was among in their prayers. But we will talk over the merits of the case.
What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet! Would my word free the slaves, when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate or individual that would be influenced by it there? And what reason is there to think it would have any greater effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress, which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who come within our lines? Yet I cannot learn that that law has caused a single slave to come over to us. And suppose they could be induced by a proclamation of freedom from me to throw themselves upon us, what should we do with them? How can we feed and care for such a multitude? General Butler wrote me a few days since that he was issuing more rations to the slaves who have rushed to him than to all the white troops under his command. They eat, and that is all; though it is true General Butler is feeding the whites also by the thousand; for it nearly amounts to a famine there. If, now, the pressure of the war should call off our forces from New Orleans to defend some other point, what is to prevent the masters from reducing the blacks to slavery again? for I am told that whenever the rebels take any black prisoners, free or slave, they immediately auction them off. They did so with those they took from a boat that was aground in the Tennessee River a few days ago. And then I am very ungenerously attacked for it! For instance, when, after the late battles at and near Bull Run, an expedition went out from Washington under a flag of truce to bury the dead and bring in the wounded, and the rebels seized the blacks who went along to help, and sent them into slavery, Horace Greeley said in his paper that the government would probably do nothing about it. What could I do?
Now, then, tell me, if you please, what possible result of good would follow the issuing of such a proclamation as you desire? Understand, I raise no objections against it on legal or constitutional grounds; for, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, in time of war I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy; nor do I urge objections of a moral nature, in view of possible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South. I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion.
I admit that slavery is the root of the rebellion, or at least its sine qua non. The ambition of politicians may have instigated them to act, but they would have been impotent without slavery as their instrument. I will also concede that emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by something more than ambition. I grant, further, that it would help somewhat at the North, though not so much, I fear, as you and those you represent imagine. Still, some additional strength would be added in that way to the war, and then, unquestionably, it would weaken the rebels by drawing off their laborers, which is of great importance; but I am not so sure we could do much with the blacks. If we were to arm them, I fear that in a few weeks the arms would be in the hands of the rebels; and, indeed, thus far we have not had arms enough to equip our white troops. I will mention another thing, though it meet only your scorn and contempt. There are fifty thousand bayonets in the Union armies from the border slave States. It would be a serious matter if, in consequence of a proclamation such as you desire, they should go over to the rebels. I do not think they all would—not so many, indeed, as a year ago, or as six months ago—not so many to-day as yesterday. Every day increases their Union feeling. They are also getting their pride enlisted, and want to beat the rebels. Let me say one thing more: I think you should admit that we already have an important principle to rally and unite the people, in the fact that constitutional government is at stake. This is a fundamental idea going down about as deep as anything.
Do not misunderstand me because I have mentioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that have thus far prevented my action in some such way as you desire. I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement; and I can assure you that the subject is on my mind, by day and night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be God's will, I will do. I trust that in the freedom with which I have canvassed your views I have not in any respect injured your feelings.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C., September 14, 1862.
GENERAL WRIGHT, Cincinnati, Ohio:
Thanks for your despatch. Can you not pursue the retreating enemy, and relieve Cumberland Gap?
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON,
September 15, 1862. 2.45 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN:
Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you, and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO J. K. DUBOIS. WASHINGTON, D.C.,
September 15, 1862. 3 P.M.
HON. K. DUBOIS, Springfield, Illinois:
I now consider it safe to say that General McClellan has gained a great victory over the great rebel army in Maryland, between Fredericktown and Hagerstown. He is now pursuing the flying foe.
A. LINCOLN.
[But not very fast—and he did not catch them! D.W.]
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR CURTIN,
WASHINGTON, D. C., September 16, 1862. Noon.
GOVERNOR CURTIN, Harrisburg:
What do you hear from General McClellan's army? We have nothing from him to-day.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR MORTON.
WASHINGTON, D.C., September 17, 1862.
GOVERNOR O. P. MORTON, Indianapolis, Indiana:
I have received your despatch in regard to recommendations of General Wright. I have received no such despatch from him, at least not that I can remember. I refer yours for General Halleck's consideration.
A. LINCOLN.
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL KETCHUM.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, September 20, 1862.
GENERAL KETCHUM, Springfield, Illinois:
How many regiments are there in Illinois, ready for service but for want of arms? How many arms have you there ready for distribution?
A. LINCOLN.
PRELIMINARY EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION, SEPTEMBER 22, 1862.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
A Proclamation.
I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States and each of the States and the people thereof in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed.
That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all slave States, so called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent with their consent upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued. |
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