The nature of the general situation after the operations of the 18th, 19th, and 20th cannot better be summarized than as expressed recently by a neighboring French commander to his corps: "Having repulsed repeated and violent counter-attacks made by the enemy, we have a feeling that we have been victorious."

So far as the British are concerned, the course of events during these three days can be described in a few words. During Friday, the 18th, artillery fire was kept up intermittently by both sides during daylight. At night the German centre attacked certain portions of our line, supporting the advance of their infantry, as always, by a heavy bombardment. But the strokes were not delivered with great vigor, and ceased about 2 A.M. During the day's fighting an aircraft gun of the Third Army Corps succeeded in bringing down a German aeroplane.

News also was received that a body of French cavalry had demolished part of the railway to the north, so cutting, at least temporarily, one line of communication which is of particular importance to the enemy.

On Saturday, the 19th, the bombardment was resumed by the Germans at an early hour and continued intermittently under reply from our own guns. Some of their infantry advanced from cover, apparently with the intention of attacking, but on coming under fire they retired. Otherwise the day was uneventful, except for the activity of the artillery, which is a matter of normal routine rather than an event.

Another hostile aeroplane was brought down by us, and one of our aviators succeeded in dropping several bombs over the German line, one incendiary bomb falling with considerable effect on a transport park near La Fere.

A buried store of the enemy's munitions of war was also found, not far from the Aisne, ten wagon loads of live shell and two wagon loads of cable being dug up. Traces were discovered of large quantities of stores having been burned—all tending to show that as far back as the Aisne the German retirement was hurried.

There was a strong wind during the day, accompanied by a driving rain. This militated against the aerial reconnoissance.

On Sunday, the 20th, nothing of importance occurred until the afternoon, when there was a break in the clouds and an interval of feeble sunshine, which was hardly powerful enough to warm the soaking troops. The Germans took advantage of this brief spell of fine weather to make several counter-attacks against different points. These were all repulsed with loss to the enemy, but the casualties incurred by us were by no means light.

In one section of our firing line the occupants of the trenches were under the impression that they heard a military band in the enemy's lines just before the attack developed. It is now known that the German infantry started their advance with bands playing.

The offensive against one or two points was renewed at dusk, with no greater success. The brunt of the resistance has naturally fallen upon the infantry. In spite of the fact that they have been drenched to the skin for some days and their trenches have been deep in mud and water, and in spite of the incessant night alarms and the almost continuous bombardment to which they have been subjected, they have on every occasion been ready for the enemy's infantry when the latter attempted to assault, and they have beaten them back with great loss. Indeed, the sight of the Pickelhauben [German spiked helmets] coming up has been a positive relief after long, trying hours of inaction under shell fire.

The object of the great proportion of artillery the Germans employ is to beat down the resistance of their enemy by concentrated and prolonged fire, to shatter their nerves with high explosives, before the infantry attack is launched. They seem to have relied on doing this with us, but they have not done so, though it has taken them several costly experiments to discover this fact.

From statements of prisoners it appears that they have been greatly disappointed by the moral effect produced by their heavy guns, which, despite the actual losses inflicted, has not been at all commensurate with the colossal expenditure of ammunition, which has really been wasted. By this it is not implied that their artillery fire is not good; it is more than good—it is excellent. But the British soldier is a difficult person to impress or depress, even by immense shells filled with a high explosive which detonate with terrific violence and form craters large enough to act as graves for five horses.

The German howitzer shells are from 8 to 9 inches in calibre, and on impact they send up columns of greasy black smoke. On account of this they are irreverently dubbed "coal boxes," "black Marias," or "Jack Johnsons" by the soldiers. Men who take things in this spirit are, it seems, likely to throw out the calculations based on the loss of morale so carefully framed by the German military philosophers.

A considerable amount of information has been gleaned from prisoners. It has been gathered that our bombardment on the 15th produced a great impression. The opinion is also reported that our infantry make such good use of ground that the German companies are decimated by our rifle fire before the British soldier can be seen.

From an official diary captured by the First Army Corps it appears that one of the German corps contains an extraordinary mixture of units. If the composition of the other corps is similar, it may be assumed that the present efficiency of the enemy's forces is in no way comparable with what it was when the war commenced.

The losses in officers are noted as having been especially severe. A brigade is stated to be commanded by a Major; some companies of food guards by one-year volunteers; while after the battle of Montmirail one regiment lost fifty-five out of sixty officers. The prisoners recently captured appreciate the fact that the march on Paris has failed and that their forces are retreating, but state that the object of this movement is explained by the officers as being to withdraw into closer touch with the supports, which have stayed too far in the rear.

The officers are also endeavoring to encourage the troops by telling them that they will be at home by Christmas. A large number of the men believe that they are beaten. Following is an extract from one document:

"With the English troops we have great difficulties. They have a queer way of causing losses to the enemy. They make good trenches, in which they wait patiently; they carefully measure the ranges for their rifle fire, and they open a truly hellish fire on the unsuspecting cavalry. This was the reason that we had such heavy losses.

"According to our officers, the English striking forces are exhausted; the English people really never wanted war."

From another source: "The English are very brave and fight to the last man. One of our companies has lost 130 men out of 240."

The following letter, which refers to the fighting on the Aisne, has been printed and circulated to the troops:

LETTER FOUND ON GERMAN OFFICER OF SEVENTH RESERVE CORPS:

Cerny, South of Laon, Sept 14, 1914.

My Dear Parents: Our corps has the task of holding the heights south of Cerny in all circumstances until the Fourteenth Corps on our left flank can grip the enemy's flank. On our right are other corps. We are fighting with the English Guards, Highlanders, and Zouaves. The losses on both sides have been enormous. For the most part this is due to the too brilliant French artillery.

The English are marvelously trained in making use of ground. One never sees them, and one is constantly under fire. The French airmen perform wonderful feats. We cannot get rid of them. As soon as an airman has flown over us, ten minutes later we get their shrapnel fire in our positions. We have little artillery in our corps; without it we cannot get forward.

Three days ago our division took possession of these heights and dug itself in. Two days ago, early in the morning, we were attacked by an immensely superior English force, one brigade and two battalions, and were turned out of our positions. The fellows took five guns from us. It was a tremendous hand-to-hand fight.

How I escaped myself I am not clear. I then had to bring up supports on foot. My horse was wounded, and the others were too far in the rear. Then came up the Guards Jager Battalion, Fourth Jager, Sixth Regiment, Reserve Regiment Thirteen, and Landwehr Regiments Thirteen and Sixteen, and with the help of the artillery we drove the fellows out of the position again. Our machine guns did excellent work; the English fell in heaps.

In our battalion three Iron Crosses have been given, one to C.O., one to Capt. ——, and one to Surgeon ——. [Names probably deleted.] Let us hope that we shall be the lucky ones next time.

During the first two days of the battle I had only one piece of bread and no water. I spent the night in the rain without my overcoat. The rest of my kit was on the horses which had been left behind with the baggage and which cannot come up into the battle because as soon as you put your nose up from behind cover the bullets whistle.

War is terrible. We are all hoping that a decisive battle will end the war, as our troops already have got round Paris. If we beat the English the French resistance will soon be broken. Russia will be very quickly dealt with; of this there is no doubt.

We received splendid help from the Austrian [Transcriber: original 'Austrain'] heavy artillery at Maubeuge. They bombarded Fort Cerfontaine in such a way that there was not ten meters a parapet which did not show enormous craters made by the shells. The armored turrets were found upside down.

Yesterday evening, about 6, in the valley in which our reserves stood there was such a terrible cannonade that we saw nothing of the sky but a cloud of smoke. We had few casualties.

Recently a pilot and observer of the Royal Flying Corps were forced by a breakage in their aeroplane to descend in the enemy's lines. The pilot managed to pancake his machine down to earth, and the two escaped into some thick under-growth in the woods.

The enemy came up and seized and smashed the machine, but did not search for our men with much zeal. The latter lay hid till dark and then found their way to the Aisne, across which they swam, reaching camp in safety, but barefooted.

Numerous floating bridges have been thrown across the Aisne and some of the pontoon bridges have been repaired under fire. On the 20th, Lieut. [name deleted] of the Third Signal Corps, Royal Engineers, was unfortunately drowned while attempting to swim across the river with a cable in order to open up fresh telegraphic communication on the north side.

Espionage is still carried on by the enemy to a considerable extent. Recently the suspicions of some of the French troops were aroused by coming across a farm from which the horses had been removed. After some search they discovered a telephone which was connected by an underground cable with the German lines, and the owner of the farm paid the penalty in the usual way in war for his treachery.

After some cases of village fighting which occurred earlier in the war it was reported by some of our officers that the Germans had attempted to approach to close quarters by forcing prisoners to march in front of them. The Germans have recently repeated the same trick on a larger scale against the French, as is shown by the copy of an order printed below. It is therein referred to as a ruse, but, if that term can be accepted, a distinctly illegal ruse.

"During a recent night attack," the order reads, "the Germans drove a column of French prisoners in front of them. This action is to be brought to the notice of all our troops (1) in order to put them on their guard against such a dastardly ruse; (2) in order that every soldier may know how the Germans treat their prisoners. Our troops must not forget if they allow themselves to be taken prisoners the Germans will not fail to expose them to French bullets."

Further evidence has now been collected of the misuse of the white flag and other signs of surrender. During an action on the 17th, owing to this, one officer was shot. During recent fighting, also, some German ambulance wagons advanced in order to collect the wounded. An order to cease firing was consequently given to our guns, which were firing on this particular section of ground. The German battery commanders at once took advantage of the lull in the action to climb up their observation ladders and on to a haystack to locate our guns, which soon afterward came under a far more accurate fire than any to which they had been subjected up to that time.

A British officer, who was captured by the Germans and has since escaped, reports that while a prisoner he saw men who had been fighting subsequently put on Red Cross brassards.

That irregular use of the protection afforded by the Geneva Convention is not uncommon is confirmed by the fact that on one occasion men in the uniform of combatant units have been captured wearing a Red Cross brassard hastily slipped over the arm. The excuse given has been that they had been detailed after the fight to look after the wounded.

It is reported by a cavalry officer that the driver of a motor car with a machine gun mounted on it, which was captured, was wearing a Red Cross.

Full details of the actual damage done to the cathedral at Rheims will doubtless have been cabled home, so that no description of it is necessary. The Germans bombarded the cathedral twice with their heavy artillery.

One reason it caught alight so quickly was that on one side of it was some scaffolding which had been erected for restoration work. Straw had also been laid on the floor for the reception of the German wounded. It is to the credit of the French that practically all the German wounded were successfully extricated from the burning building.

There was no justification on military grounds for this act of vandalism, which seems to have been caused by exasperation born of failure—a sign of impotence rather than strength. It is noteworthy that a well-known hotel not far from the cathedral, which was kept by a German, was not touched.



III.

*Two September Days.*

[Made Public Sept. 28.]

For four days there has been a comparative lull all along our front. This has been accompanied [Transcriber: original 'acompanied'] by a spell of fine weather, though the nights have been much colder. One cannot have everything, however, and one evil result of the sunshine has been the release of flies, which were torpid during the wet days.

Advantage has been taken of the arrival of reinforcements to relieve by fresh troops the men who have been on the firing line for some time. Several units, therefore, have received their baptism of fire during the week.

Since the last letter left headquarters evidence has been received which points to the fact that during the counter attacks on the night of Sept. 20 German detachments of infantry fired into each other. This was the result of an attempt to carry out the dangerous expedient of a converging advance in the dark. Opposite one portion of our position considerable massing of hostile forces was observed before dark. Some hours later a furious fusillade [Transcriber: original 'fusilade'] was heard in front of our line, though no bullets came over our trenches.

This narrative begins with Sept. 21 and covers only two days. There was but little rain on Sept. 21 and the weather took a turn for the better, which has been maintained. The action has been practically confined to the artillery, our guns at one point shelling and driving the enemy, who endeavored to construct a redoubt.

The Germans expended a large number of heavy shells in a long range bombardment of the village of Missy (Department of the Aisne). Reconnoitring parties sent out during the night of Sept. 21-22 discovered some deserted trenches. In them or in the woods over 100 dead and wounded were picked up. A number of rifles, ammunition and equipment were also found. There were other signs that portions of the enemy's forces had withdrawn some distance.

The weather was also fine on Sept. 22 with less wind, and it was one of the most uneventful days we have passed since we reached the Aisne, that is, uneventful for the British. There was less artillery work on either side, the Germans giving the village of Paissy (Aisne) a taste of the "Jack Johnsons." The spot thus honored is not far from the ridge where there has been some of the most severe close fighting in which we have taken part. All over this No Man's Land, between the lines, bodies of German infantrymen were still lying in heaps where they had fallen at different times.

Espionage plays so large a part in the conduct of the war by the Germans that it is difficult to avoid further reference to the subject. They have evidently never forgotten the saying of Frederick the Great: "When Marshall Soubise goes to war he is followed by a hundred cooks. When I take the field I am preceded by a hundred spies." Indeed until about twenty years ago there was a paragraph in their field service regulations directing that the service of protection in the field, such as outposts and advance guards, should always be supplemented by a system of espionage. Although such instructions are no longer made public the Germans, as is well known, still carry them into effect.

Apart from the more elaborate arrangements which were made in peace time for obtaining information by paid agents some of the methods which are being employed for the collection or conveyance of intelligence are as follows:

Men in plain clothes signal the German lines from points in the hands of the enemy by means of colored lights at nights and puffs of smoke from chimneys in the day time. Pseudo laborers working in the fields between the armies have been detected conveying information. Persons in plain clothes have acted as advanced scouts to the German cavalry when advancing.

German officers or soldiers in plain clothes or French or British uniforms have remained in localities evacuated by the Germans in order to furnish them with intelligence. One spy of this kind was found by our troops hidden in a church tower. His presence was only discovered through the erratic movements of the hands of the church clock, which he was using to signal his friends by an improvised semaphore code. Had this man not been seized it is probable he would have signalled the time of arrival and the exact position of the headquarters staff of the force and a high explosive shell would then have mysteriously dropped on the building.

Women spies have also been caught. Secret agents have been found at rail heads observing entrainments and detrainments. It is a simple matter for spies to mix with refugees who are moving about to and from their homes, and it is difficult for our troops, who speak neither French nor German, to detect them. The French have also found it necessary to search villages and casual wayfarers on the roads and to search for carrier pigeons.

Among the precautions taken by us against spying is the following notice printed in French, posted up:

"Motor cars and bicycles other than those; carrying soldiers in uniform may not circulate on the roads. Inhabitants may not leave the localities in which they reside between 6 P.M. and 6 A.M. Inhabitants may not quit their homes after 8 P.M. No person may on any pretext pass through the British lines without an authorization countersigned by a British officer."

Events have moved so quietly for the last two months that anything connected with the mobilization of the British expeditionary force is now ancient history. Nevertheless, the following extract from a German order is evidence of the mystification of the army and a tribute to the value of the secrecy which was so well and so loyally maintained in England at the time:

"Tenth Reserve Army Corps Headquarters,

"Mont St. Guibert, Aug. 20, 1914.

"Corps Order, Aug. 20.

"The French troops in front of the Tenth Army Corps have retreated south across the Sambre. Part of the Belgium army has been withdrawn from Antwerp. It is reported that an English army has disembarked at Calais and Boulogne, en route to Brussels."



IV.

*Fighting in the Air.*

[Made Public Sept. 29.]

Wednesday, Sept. 23, was a perfect Autumn day. It passed without incident as regards major operations. Although the enemy concentrated their heavy artillery upon the, plateau near Passy, nothing more than inconvenience was caused.

The welcome absence of wind gave our airmen a chance of which they took full advantage by gathering much information. Unfortunately, one of our aviators, who had been particularly active in annoying the enemy by dropping bombs, was wounded in a duel in the air.

Being alone on a single-seated monoplane, he was not able to use his rifle, and while circling above a German two-seated machine in an endeavor to get within pistol shot he was hit by the observer of the German machine, who was armed with a rifle. He managed to fly back over our lines, and by great good luck he descended close to a motor ambulance, which at once conveyed him to a hospital.

Against this may be set off the fact that another of our flyers exploded a bomb among some led artillery horses, killing several and stampeding the others.

On Thursday, Sept. 21, the fine weather continued, as did the lull in the action, the heavy German shells falling mostly near Pargnan, twelve miles south-southeast of Laon.

On both Wednesday and Thursday the weather was so fine that many flights were made by the aviators, French, British, and German. These produced a corresponding activity among the anti-aircraft guns.

So still and clear was the atmosphere toward evening on Wednesday and during the whole of Thursday that to those not especially on the lookout the presence of aeroplanes high up above them was first made known by the bursting of the projectiles aimed at them. The puffs of smoke from the detonation shell hung in the air for minutes on end, like balls of fleece cotton, before they slowly expanded and were dissipated.

From the places mentioned as being the chief targets for the enemy's heavy howitzers, it will be seen that the Germans are not inclined to concentrate their fire systematically upon definite areas in which their aviators think they have located our guns, or upon villages where it is imagined our troops may be billeted. The result will be to give work to local builders.

The growing resemblance of this battle to siege warfare has already been pointed out. The fact that the later actions of the Russo-Japanese war assumed a similar character was thought by many to have been due to exceptional causes, such as the narrowness of the theatre of operations between the Chinese frontier on the west and the mountainous country of Northern Korea on the east; the lack of roads, which limited the extent of ground over which it was possible for the rival armies to manoeuvre, and the fact that both forces were tied to one line of railroad.

Such factors are not exerting any influence on the present battle. Nevertheless, a similar situation has been produced, owing firstly to the immense power of resistance possessed by an army which is amply equipped with heavy artillery and has sufficient time to fortify itself, and, secondly, to the vast size of the forces engaged, which at the present time stretch more than half way across France.

The extent of the country covered is so great as to render slow any efforts to manoeuvre and march around to a flank in order to escape the costly expedient of a frontal attack against heavily fortified positions.

To state that the methods of attack must approximate more closely to those of siege warfare the greater the resemblance of the defenses to those of a fortress is a platitude, but it is one which will bear repetition if it in any way assists to make the present situation clear.

There is no doubt that the position on the Aisne was not hastily selected by the German Staff after the retreat had begun. From the choice of ground, and the care with which the fields of fire had been arranged to cover all possible avenues of approach, and from the amount of work already carried out, it is clear that the contingency of having to act on the defensive was not overlooked when the details of the strategically offensive campaign were arranged.



V.

*Technique of This Warfare.*

[Made Public Oct. 9.]

Wednesday, Sept. 30, merely marked another day's progress in the gradual development of the situation, and was distinguished by no activity beyond slight attacks by the enemy. There was also artillery fire at intervals. One of our airmen succeeded in dropping nine bombs, some of which fell on the enemy's rolling stock collected on the railway near Laon. Some of the enemy's front trenches were found empty at night; but nothing much can be deduced from this fact, for they are frequently evacuated in this way, no doubt to prevent the men in the back lines firing on their comrades in front of them.

Thursday, Oct. 1, was a most perfect Autumn day, and the most peaceful that there has been since the two forces engaged on the Aisne. There was only desultory gunfire as targets offered. During the night the enemy made a few new trenches. A French aviator dropped one bomb on a railway station and three bombs on troops massed near it.

The weather on Friday, the 2d, was very misty in the early hours, and it continued hazy until the late afternoon, becoming thicker again at night. The Germans were driven out of a mill which they had occupied as an advanced post, their guns and machine guns which supported it being knocked out one by one by well-directed artillery fire from a flank. During the night they made the usual two attacks on the customary spot in our lines, and as on previous occasions were repulsed. Two of their trenches were captured and filled in. Our loss was six men wounded.

Up to Sept, 21 the air mileage made by our airmen since the beginning of the war amounted to 87,000 miles, an average of 2,000 miles per day, the total equaling nearly four times the circuit of the world. The total time spent in the air was 1,400 hours.

There are many points connected with the fighting methods of either side that may be of interest. The following description was given by a battalion commander who has been at the front since the commencement of hostilities and has fought both in the open and behind intrenchments. It must, however, be borne in mind that it only represents the experiences of a particular unit. It deals with the tactics of the enemy's infantry:

The important points to watch are the heads of valleys and ravines, woods—especially those on the sides of hollow ground—and all dead ground to the front and flanks. The German officers are skilled in leading troops forward under cover, in closed bodies, but once the latter are deployed and there is no longer direct personal leadership the men will not face heavy fire. Sometimes the advance is made in a series of lines, with the men well opened out at five or six paces interval; at other times it is made in a line, with the men almost shoulder to shoulder, followed in all cases by supports in close formation. The latter either waver when the front line is checked, or crowd on to it, moving forward under the orders of their officers, and the mass forms a magnificent target. Prisoners have described the fire of our troops as pinning them to the ground, and this is certainly borne out by their action.

When the Germans are not heavily intrenched no great losses are incurred in advancing against them by the methods in which the British Army has been instructed. For instance, in one attack over fairly open ground against about an equal force of infantry sheltered in a sunken road and in ditches we lost only 10 killed and 60 wounded, while over 400 of the enemy surrendered after about 50 had been killed. Each side had the support of a battery, but the fight for superiority from infantry fire took place at about 700 yards and lasted only half an hour. When the Germans were wavering some of them put up the white flag, but others went on firing, and our men continued to do the same. Eventually a large number of white flags, improvised from handkerchiefs, pieces of shirt, white biscuit bags, &c., were exhibited all along the line, and many men hoisted their helmets on their rifles.

In the fighting behind intrenchments the Germans endeavor to gain ground by making advances in line at dusk or just before dawn, and then digging themselves in, in the hope, no doubt, that they may eventually get so near as to be able, as at manoeuvres, to reach the hostile trenches in a single rush. They have never succeeded in doing this against us. If by creeping up in dead ground they do succeed in gaining ground by night, they are easily driven back by fire in the morning. A few of the braver men sometimes remain behind, at ranges of even 300 or 400 yards, and endeavor to inflict losses by sniping. Sharpshooters, also, are often noticed in trees or wriggling about until they get good cover. The remedy is to take the initiative and detail men to deal with the enemy's sharpshooters.

A few night attacks have been made against us. Before one of them a party crept up close to the British line and set alight a hayrick, so that it should form a beacon on which the centre of the attacking line marched. Generally, however, in the night and early morning attacks, groups of forty or fifty men have come on, the groups sometimes widely separated from one another and making every endeavor to obtain any advantage from cover. Light balls and searchlights have on some occasions been used. Latterly the attacks have become more and more half-hearted. Against us the enemy has never closed with the bayonet. The German trenches I have seen were deep enough to shelter a man when firing standing, and had a step down in rear for the supports to sit in.

As regards our own men, there was at first considerable reluctance to intrench, as has always been the case at the commencement of a war. Now, however, having bought experience dearly, their defenses are such that they can defy the German artillery fire.



VI.

*Becomes an Artillery Duel*.

[Made Public Oct. 10.]

Comparative calm on our front has continued through the fine and considerably warmer weather. The last six days have been slightly misty with clouds hanging low, so that conditions have not been very favorable for aerial reconnoissance.

In regard to the latter, it is astonishing how quickly the habit is acquired, even by those who are not aviators, of thinking of the weather in terms of its suitability for flying. There has been a bright moon also, which has militated against night attacks.

On Saturday, Oct. 3, practically nothing happened, except that each side shelled the other.

Toward evening on Sunday, Oct. 4, there was a similar absence of activity. Opposite one portion of our line the enemy's bands played patriotic airs, and the audiences which gathered gave a chance to our waiting howitzers.

Not only do their regimental bands perform occasionally, but with their proverbial fondness for music the Germans have in some places gramophones [Transcriber: original 'gramaphones'] in their trenches.

On Monday, the 5th, there were three separate duels in the air between French and German aviators, one of which was visible from our trenches. Two of the struggles were, so far as could be seen, indecisive, but in the third the French airmen were victorious, and brought down their opponents, both of whom were killed by machine gun fire. The observer was so burned as to be unrecognizable.

During the day some men of the Landwehr were taken prisoners by us. They were in very poor condition and wept copiously when captured. One, on being asked what he was crying for, explained that though they had been advised to surrender to the English, they believed that they would be shot.

On that evening our airmen had an unusual amount of attention paid to them, both by the German aviators and their artillery of every description.

One of our infantry patrols discovered 150 dead Germans in a wood, one and a half miles from our front. We sent a party out to bury them, but it was fired upon and had to withdraw.

On Tuesday, the 6th, the enemy's guns were active in the afternoon. It is believed that the bombardment was due to anger because two of our howitzer shells had detonated right in one of the enemy's trenches, which was full of men. Three horses were killed by the German fire.

Wednesday, the 7th, was uneventful.

On Thursday, the 8th, the shelling by the enemy of a locality on our front, which has so far been the scene of their greatest efforts, was again continuous. Opposite one or two points the Germans have attempted to gain ground by sapping in some places with the view of secretly pushing forward machine guns in advance of their trenches, so that they can suddenly sweep with crossfire the space between our line and theirs, and so take any advance of ours on the flank.

It is reported that at one point where the French were much annoyed by the fire of a German machine gun, which was otherwise inaccessible, they drove a mine gallery, 50 meters (about 164 feet) long, up to and under the emplacement, and blew up the gun. The man who drove the gallery belonged to a corps which was recruited in one of the coal-mining districts of France.

The German machine guns are mounted on low sledges, and are inconspicuous and evidently easily moved.

The fighting now consists mostly of shelling by the artillery of both sides and in front a line of fire from the machine guns as an occasional target offers. Our Maxims have been doing excellent work and have proved most efficient weapons for the sort of fighting in which we are now engaged.

At times there are so many outbursts of their fire in different directions that it is possible for an expert to tell by comparison which of the guns have their springs adjusted and are well tuned up for the day. The amount of practice that our officers are now getting in the use of this weapon is proving most valuable in teaching them how to maintain it at concert pitch as an instrument and how to derive the best tactical results from its employment.

Against us the Germans are not now expending so much gun ammunition as they have been, but they continue to fire at insignificant targets. They have the habit of suddenly dropping heavy shells without warning in localities of villages far behind our front line, possibly on the chance of catching some of our troops in bivouac or billets. They also fire a few rounds at night.

The artillery has up to now played so great a part in the war that a few general remarks descriptive of the methods of its employment by the enemy are justified. Their field artillery armament consists of 15-pounder quick-fire guns for horse and field batteries of divisions and there are, in addition, with each corps three to six batteries of 4.3-inch field howitzers and about two batteries of 5.9-inch howitzers. With an army there are some 8.2-inch heavy howitzers.

The accuracy of their fire is apt at first to cause some alarm, more especially as the guns are usually well concealed and the position and the direction from which the fire is proceeding are difficult of detection. But accurate as is their shooting, the German gunners have on the whole had little luck, and during the past three weeks an astonishingly small proportion of the number of shells fired by them have been really effective.

Quite the most striking feature of their handling of the artillery is the speed with which they concentrate the fire upon any selected point. They dispense to a great extent with the method of ranging known by us as bracketing, especially when acting on the defensive, and direct their fire by means of squared maps and the telephone. Thus, when the target is found, its position on the map is telephoned to such batteries as it is desired to employ against that particular square.

In addition to the guns employed to fire on the targets as they are picked up, others are told off to watch particular roads, and to deal with any of the enemy using them.

Both for the location of targets and the communication of the effect of the fire, reliance is placed on observation from aeroplanes and balloons and on information supplied by special observers and secret agents, who are sent out ahead or left behind in the enemy's lines to communicate by telephone or signal. These observers have been found in haystacks, barns, and other buildings well in advance of the German lines. Balloons of the so-called sausage pattern remain up in the air for long periods for the purpose of discovering targets, and until our aviators made their influence felt by chasing all hostile aeroplanes on sight the latter were continually hovering over our troops in order to register their positions and to note where the headquarters, reserves, gun teams, &c., were located.

If suitable targets are discovered the airman drops a smoke ball directly over it or lets fall some strips of tinsel, which glitter in the sun as they slowly descend to the earth. The range to the target is apparently ascertained by those near the guns by a large telemeter, or other range finder, which is kept trained on the aeroplane, so that when the signal is made the distance to the target vertically below is at once obtained. A few rounds are then fired, and the result is signalled back by the aviator according to some prearranged code.



VII.

*A Fight in the Clouds.*

[Dated Oct. 13.]

From Friday the 9th of October until Monday the 12th so little occurred that a narrative of the events can be given in a few words. There has been the usual sporadic shelling of our trenches which has resulted in but little harm, so well dug in are our men, and on the night of the 10th the Germans made yet a fresh assault, supported by artillery fire, against the point which has all along attracted most of their attention.

The attempt was again a costly failure toward which our guns were able to contribute with great effect.

Details have been received of an exciting encounter in midair. One of our aviators on a fast scouting monoplane sighted a hostile machine. He had two rifles, fixed one on either side of his engines, and at once gave chase, but lost sight of his opponent among the clouds. Soon, however, another machine hove into view which turned out to be a German Otto biplane, a type of machine which is not nearly so fast as our scouts. Our officer once again started a pursuit. He knew that owing to the position of the propeller of the hostile machine he could not be fired at when astern of his opponent. At sixty yards range he fired one rifle without apparent result. Then as his pace was carrying him ahead of his quarry he turned round, and, again coming to about the same distance behind, emptied his magazine at the German.

The latter began at once to descend as if either he or his machine were hit, and shutting off his engine and volplaning to free his hands, the pursuer recharged his magazine. Unfortunately it jammed, but he managed to insert four cartridges and to fire them at his descending opponent, who disappeared into a cloud bank with dramatic suddenness. When the British officer emerged below the clouds he could see no sign of the other. He, therefore, climbed to an altitude of some 7,000 feet and came to the conclusion that the German must have come to earth in the French lines.

The French airmen, too, have been very successful during the last three days, having dropped several bombs among the German cavalry and caused considerable loss and disorder, and having by similar means silenced a battery of field howitzers.

The German anti-aircraft guns recently have been unusually active. From their rate of fire they seem to be nearly automatic, but so far they have not had much effect in reducing the air reconnoissances carried out by us.

A striking feature of our line—to use the conventional term which so seldom expresses accurately the position taken up by an army—is that it consists really of a series of trenches not all placed alongside each other, but some more advanced than others, and many facing in different directions. At one place they run east and west along one side of a valley. At another almost north and south up some subsidiary valley. Here they line the edge of woods, and there they are on the reverse slope of a hill, or possibly along a sunken road, and at different points both the German and the British trenches jut out like promontories into what might be regarded as the opponents' territory.

Though both sides have moved forward at certain points, and withdrawn at others, no very important change has been effected in their dispositions, in spite of the enemy's repeated counter attacks. These have been directed principally against one portion of the position won by us, but in spite of the lavish expenditure of life they have not so far succeeded in driving us back.

The situation of the works in the German front line as a whole has been a matter of deliberate selection, for they have had the advantage of previous reconnaissance, being first in the field.

Behind the front they now have several lines prepared for a step-by-step defense. Another point which might cause astonishment to a visitor to our intrenchments is the evident indifference displayed to the provision of an extended field of frontal rifle fire, which is generally accepted as being one of the great requirements of a defensive position. It is still desirable, if it can be obtained without the usually accompanying drawback of exposure to the direct fire of hostile artillery, but experience has shown that a short field of fire is sufficient to beat back the infantry assaults of the enemy, and by giving up direct fire at long or medium ranges and placing our trenches on the reverse slope of a hill or behind the crest, it is in many places possible to gain shelter from the frontal fire of the German guns, for the men are well trained in musketry and under good fire control, and the dead ground beyond the short range from their position has comparatively small terrors.

Many of the front trenches of the Germans equally lack a distant field of fire, but if lost they would be rendered untenable by us by the fact that they would be exposed to a fire from the German guns in the rear and to cross-rifle fire from neighboring works.

The extent to which cross-fire of all kinds is employed is also remarkable. Many localities and areas along the Aisne are not swept from the works directly in front of them, but are rendered untenable by rifle fire from neighboring features or by that of guns that are out of sight. So much is this the case that among these hills and valleys it is a difficult matter for troops to find out whence they are being shot at.

There is a perpetual triangular duel. A's infantry can see nothing to shoot at, but are under fire from B's guns. The action of B's guns then brings upon them the attention of some of A's artillery waiting for a target, the latter being in their turn assailed by other batteries. And so it goes on. In a wooded country in spite of aeroplanes and balloons smokeless powder has made the localization and identification of targets a matter of supreme difficulty.



VIII.

*The Men in the Trenches.*

[Dated Oct. 13.]

On the firing line the men sleep and obtain shelter in dug-outs they have hollowed or cut under the sides of the trenches. These refuges are raised slightly above the bottom of the trench, so as to remain dry in wet weather. The floor of the trench also is sloped for purposes of draining. Some of the trenches are provided with overhead cover which gives protection from the weather as well as from shrapnel balls and splinters of shells. Considerable ingenuity has been exercised by the men in naming these shelters. Among the favorite designations are the "Hotel Cecil," the "Ritz Hotel," the "Billet-Doux Hotel," and the "Rue Dormir."

On the road barricades also are to be found boards bearing this notice: "This way to the Prussians."

Obstacles of every kind abound, and at night each side can hear the enemy driving pickets for entanglements, digging trous-de-loup, or working forward by sapping. In some places obstacles have been constructed by both sides so close together that some wag suggested that each side provide working parties to perform this fatigue duty alternately, inasmuch as the work of the enemy is now almost indistinguishable from ours, and serves the same purpose.

Quarries and caves, to which allusion already has been made, provide ample accommodation for whole battalions, and most comfortable are these shelters which have been constructed in them. The northern slopes of the Aisne Valley fortunately are very steep, and this to a great extent protects us from the enemy's shells, many of which pass harmlessly over our heads, to burst in the meadows along the river bank.

At all points subject to shell fire access to the firing line from behind is provided by communication trenches. These are now so good that it is possible to cross in safety a fire-swept zone to the advance trenches from billets in villages, bivouacs in quarries, or other places where the headquarters of units happen to be.

It already has been mentioned that according to information obtained from the enemy fifteen Germans were killed by a bomb dropped upon the ammunition wagon of a cavalry column. It was thought at the time that this might have been the work of one of our airmen, who reported that he had dropped a hand grenade on this convoy, and had then got a bird's-eye view of the finest display of fireworks he had ever seen. From corroborative evidence it now appears that this was the case; that the grenade thrown by him probably was the cause of the destruction of a small convoy carrying field-gun and howitzer ammunition, which now has been found a total wreck.

Along the road lie fourteen motor lorries, their iron skeletons twisted and broken. Everything inflammable has been burned, as have the stripped trees—some with split trunks—on either side of the road. Of the drivers, nothing remains except tattered boots and charred scraps of clothing, while the ground within a radius of fifty yards of the wagons is littered with pieces of iron, split brass cartridge cases, which have exploded, and some fixed-gun ammunition with live shells.

If it were possible to reconstruct this incident, if it was, in fact, brought about as supposed, the grenade from the aeroplane must have detonated on the leading lorry, on one side of the road, and caused the cartridges carried by it to explode. Three vehicles immediately in the rear must then have been set on fire, with a similar result. Behind these are groups of four and two vehicles so jammed together as to suggest that they must have collided in desperate attempts to stop. On the other side of the road, almost level with the leading wagon, are found more vehicles, which probably were fired by the explosion of the first.

If this appalling destruction was due to one hand grenade, it is an illustration of the potentialities of a small amount of high explosive detonated in the right spot, while the nature of the place where the disaster occurred, a narrow forest road between high trees, is a testimony to the skill of the airmen.

It is only fair to add that some French newspapers claim this damage to the enemy was caused by the action of a detachment of their dragoons.



IX.

*1,100 Dead in a Single Trench.*

[Official Summary, Dated Oct. 27.]

The Official Bureau makes public today the story of an eye-witness, supplementing the account issued on Oct. 24, and bringing the story of the general course of operations in France up to Oct. 20. The arrival of reinforcements, it says, enabled the British troops to assist in the extension of the Allies' line where the Germans advanced from the northeast and east, holding a front extending from Mont Descats, about ten miles northeast of Hazebrouck, through Meteren, five miles south of that point, and thence to Estaires, thirteen miles west of Lille, on the River Lys. The statement continues:

"South of the Lys the German line extended to three miles east of Bethune to Vermelles. The Allies encountered resistance all along the line on the 12th and 13th, when the enemy's right fell back hastily. Bailleul, seventeen miles northwest by west of Lille, which had been occupied by the foe for eight days, was abandoned without a shot being fired.



"On the 14th our left wing advanced, driving the enemy back, and on the night of the 15th we were in possession of all the country on the left bank of the Lys to a point five miles below Armentieres. The enemy retired from that town on the 16th, and the river line, to within a short distance of Frelinghien, fell into our hands.

"The state of the crossings over the Lys indicated that no organized scheme of defense had been executed, some of the bridges being in a state of repair, others merely barricaded, while one was not even defended or broken.

"The resistance offered to our advance on the 15th was of a most determined character. The fighting consisted of fiercely contested encounters, infantry attacks on the villages being unavailing until our howitzers reduced the houses to ruins. Other villages were taken and retaken three times before they were finally secured.

"The French cavalry here gave welcome support, and on the evening of the 16th the resistance was overcome, the enemy retiring five miles to the eastward."

Describing an incident of the fighting on this night, the narrative says that the important crossing of the Lys at Warneton was strongly held by the Germans with a barricade loopholed at the bottom to enable the men to fire while lying down.

"Our cavalry, with the artillery, blew the barricade to pieces and scattered the defenders," the narrative continues. "Advancing three-quarters of a mile our troops reached the square, when one of the buildings appeared to leap skyward. A sheet of flame and a shower of star shells at the same time made the place as light as day and enabled the enemy, ensconced in surrounding houses, to pour a devastating fire from rifles and machine guns. Our cavalry extricated themselves with the loss of one officer wounded and nine men killed and wounded, but a party of volunteers went back and carried off their wounded comrades from the inferno.

"During the 17th, 18th, and 19th of October our right encountered strong opposition from the enemy about La Bassee, where they had established themselves behind embankments. On the centre and the left we made better progress, although the Germans were everywhere intrenched, and, in spite of the bombardment, held some villages on the Lys. At the close of each day a night counter stroke was delivered against one or another part of our line, but they were all repulsed.

"Tuesday, Oct. 20, a determined but unsuccessful attack was made against virtually the whole of our line. At one point where one of our brigades made a counter attack 1,100 German dead were found in a trench and forty prisoners were taken."

The narrative points out that the advance of the Allies has been hindered by the weather and the nature of the ground, together with the impossibility of knowing beforehand the reception that advance detachments were likely to meet in approaching any village or town. "One place may be evacuated hastily as untenable," the recital continues, "while another in the same general line will continue to resist for a considerable time. In some villages the inhabitants meet our cyclists with kisses, while at the next one the roads will, in all probability, have trenches cut across them and blocked with barricades and machine guns. Under these circumstances an incautious advance is severely punished, and it is impossible for large bodies of troops to push on until the front has been thoroughly reconnoitred. This work requires the highest qualities from our cavalry, our cyclists, and our advanced guards.

Armored motor cars equipped with machine guns are now playing a part in the war, and have been most successful in dealing with small parties of German mounted troops. In their employment our gallant allies, the Belgians, who are now fighting with us and acquitting themselves nobly, have shown themselves to be experts. They appear to regard Uhlan hunting as a form of sport. The crews display the utmost dash and skill in this form of warfare, often going out several miles ahead of their own advanced troops and seldom failing to return loaded with spoils in the shape of lancers' caps, busbies, helmets, lances, rifles, and other trophies, which they distribute as souvenirs to the crowds in the market places of the frontier towns.

Although the struggle in the northern area naturally attracts more attention than the one in the Aisne, the fighting in this region still continues. Although there has been no alteration in the general situation, the enemy has made certain changes in the positions of his heavy artillery, with the result that one or two places which formerly were safe are now subject to bombardment, while others which were approachable only at night or by crawling on hands and knees now serve as recreation grounds. At one point even a marquee tent has been erected.

A story from this quarter illustrates a new use for the craters made by the explosions of the "Black Marias," the name given by the men to the projectiles of the big German howitzers. An officer on patrol stumbled in the dark on the German trenches. He turned and made for the British lines, but the fire directed at him was so heavy that he had to throw himself on the ground and crawl. There was no cover at hand, and his chances looked desperate, when he saw close by an enormous hole in the ground made by one of these large shells. Into this he scrambled and remained there for a night and a day. When night again came he succeeded in reaching our lines in safety.

Official casualty lists of recent date which have been captured show that the losses of the Germans continue to be heavy. One single list shows that a company of German infantry had 139 men killed and wounded, or more than half of its war establishment. Other companies suffered almost as heavily. It further appears that the number of men reported missing—that is, those who have fallen into the hands of the enemy or who have become marauders—is much greater in the reserve battalions than in the first line units. This is evidence of the inferior quality of some of the reserves now being brought up to reinforce the enemy field army, and it is all the more encouraging, since every day adds to our first line strength.

The arrival of the Indian contingents caused every one to realize that while the enemy was filling his depleted ranks with immature levies, we have large reserves of perfectly fresh and thoroughly trained troops to draw upon.



X.

*Nature of Fighting Changes.*

[Dated Oct. 26.]

Before the narrative [Transcriber: original 'narative'] of the progress of the fighting near the Franco-Belgian frontier subsequent to Oct. 20 is continued a brief description will be given of the movement of a certain fraction of our troops from its former line facing north, on the east of Paris, to its present position facing east, in the northwest corner of France, by which a portion of the British Army has been enabled to join hands with the incoming and growing stream of reinforcements.

This is now an accomplished fact, as is generally known, and can therefore be explained in some detail without detriment. Mention will also be made of the gradual development up to Oct. 20 in the nature of the operations in this quarter of the theatre of war, which has recently come into such prominence.

In its broad lines the transfer of strength by one combatant during the course of a great battle which has just been accomplished is somewhat remarkable. It can best be compared with the action of the Japanese during the battle of Mukden, when Gen. Oku withdrew a portion of his force from his front, moved it northward behind the line, and threw it into the fight again near the extreme left of the Japanese armies.

In general direction, though not in scope or possible results, owing to the coast line being reached by the Allies, the parallel [Transcriber: original 'parellel'] is complete. The Japanese force concerned, however, was much smaller than ours and the distance covered by it was less than that from the Aisne to the Franco-Belgian frontier. Gen. Oku's troops, moreover, marched, whereas ours were moved by march, rail, and motor.

What was implied in the actual withdrawal from contact with the enemy along the Aisne will be appreciated when the conditions under which we were then situated are recalled.

In places the two lines were not one hundred yards apart, and for us no movement was possible during daylight. In some of the trenches which were under enfilade fire our men had to sit all day long close under the traverses—as are called those mounds of earth which stretch like partitions at intervals across a trench so as to give protection from lateral fire. Even where there was cover, such as that afforded by depressions or sunken roads, on the hillside below and behind our firing line, any attempt to cross the intervening space was met by fierce bursts of machine gun and shell fire.

The men in the firing line were on duty for twenty-four hours at a time, and brought rations and water with them when they came on duty, for none could be sent up to them during the day. Even the wounded could not be removed until dark.

The preliminary retirement of the units was therefore carried out gradually, under cover of darkness. That the Germans only once opened fire on them while so engaged was due to the care with which the operation was conducted, and also, probably, to the fact that the enemy were so accustomed to the recurrence of the sounds made by the reliefs of the men in the firing line and by the movement of the supply trains below that they were misled as to what was actually taking place.

What the operation amounted to on our part was the evacuation of the trenches, under carefully made arrangements with the French who had to take our place in the trenches; the retirement to the river below—in many cases down a steep slope; the crossing of the river over the noisy plank roadways of floating or repaired bridges, which were mostly commanded by the enemy's guns—and the climb up to the top of the plateau on the south side.

The rest of the move was a complicated feat of transportation which cut across some of the lines of communication of our allies; but it requires no description here. In spite of the various difficulties, the whole strategic operation of transferring the large number of troops from the Aisne was carried out without loss and practically without a hitch.

As regards the change in the nature of the fighting in which we have recently been engaged, it has already been pointed out that the operations had up till then been of a preparatory nature and that the Germans were obviously seeking to delay us by advanced troops while heavier forces were being got ready and brought up to the scene of action. It was known that they were raising a new army, consisting of corps formed of Ersatz, (supernumerary reserves), volunteers, and other material which had not yet been drawn upon, and that part of it would in all probability be sent to the western theatre, either to cover the troops laying siege to Antwerp, in case that place should hold out, or, in the event of the capture of the fortress, to act in conjunction with the besieging force in a violent offensive movement toward the coast.

After the fall of Antwerp and the release of the besieging troops there was a gradual increase in the strength of the opposition met with by us.

The resistance of the detachments—which beyond the right extreme of the German fortified line near Bethune a fortnight ago consisted almost entirely of cavalry—grew more and more determined as more infantry and guns came into the front line, until Tuesday, Oct. 20, when the arrival opposite us of a large portion of the new formations and a considerable number of heavy guns enabled the enemy to assume the offensive practically against the whole of our line at the same time that they attacked the Belgians between us and the coast.

The operations then really assumed a fresh complexion.

Since that date, up to the 25th, apart from the operations on either side of us, there has been plenty of action to chronicle on our immediate front, where some of the heaviest fighting in which we have yet been engaged has taken place, resulting in immense loss to the Germans.

On Wednesday, the 21st, the new German formations again pressed forward in force vigorously all along our line. On our right, south of the Lys, an attack on Violaines was repulsed with loss to the assailants.

On the other hand, we were driven from some ground close by, to the north, but regained it by a counter attack.

Still further north the Germans gained and retained some points.

Their total casualties to the southeast of Armentieres are estimated at over 6,000.

On the north of the Lys, in our centre, a fiercely contested action took place near La Gheir, which village was captured in the morning by the enemy and then retaken by us. In this direction the German casualties were also extremely heavy. They came on with the greatest bravery, in swarms, only to be swept away by our fire. One battalion of their 104th Regiment was practically wiped out, some 400 dead being picked up by us in our lines alone.

Incidentally, by our counter attack, we took 130 prisoners and released some forty of our own men who had been surrounded and captured, including a subaltern of artillery who had been cut off while observing from a point of vantage.

It is agreeable to record that our men were very well treated by their captors, who were Saxons, being placed in cellars for protection from the bombardment of our own guns.

On our left our troops advanced against the German 26th Reserve Corps near Passchendaele, and were met by a determined counter offensive, which was driven back with great loss. At night the Germans renewed their efforts unsuccessfully in this quarter.

At one point they tried a ruse which is no longer new. As they came up in a solid line two deep they shouted out: "Don't fire; we are the Coldstream Guards."

But our men are getting used to tricks of this kind, and the only result of this "slimness" was that they allowed the enemy's infantry to approach, quite close before they swept them down with magazine fire.

Apart from the 400 dead found near our lines in our centre, our patrols afterwards discovered some 300 dead further out in front of our left, killed by our artillery.

Thursday, the 22d, saw a renewal of the pressure against us. We succeeded, however, in holding our ground in nearly every quarter.

South of the Lys the enemy attacked from La Bassee, and gained Violaines and another point, but their effort against a third village was repulsed by artillery fire alone, the French and British guns working together very effectively. On the north of the river it was a day of minor attacks against us, which were all beaten back.

The Germans advanced in the evening against our centre and left, and were again hurled back, though they gained some of our trenches in the latter quarter. By this time the enemy had succeeded in bringing up several heavy howitzers, and our casualties were considerable.

On Friday, the 23d, all action south of the Lys on our right was confined to that of the artillery, several of the hostile batteries being silenced by our fire? In the centre their infantry again endeavored to force their way forward, and were only repulsed after determined fighting, leaving many dead on the ground and several prisoners in our hands. North of the Lys attacks at different points were repulsed.

On our left the 23d was a bad day for the Germans. Advancing in our turn, we drove them from some of the trenches out of which they had turned us on the previous evening, captured 150 prisoners, and released some of our men whom they had taken.

As the Germans retreated our guns did great execution among them.

They afterwards made five desperate assaults on our trenches, advancing in mass and singing "Die Wacht am Rhein" as they came on. Each assault was easily beaten back, our troops waiting until the enemy came to very close range before they opened fire with rifles and Maxims, causing terrible havoc in the solid masses.

During the fighting in this quarter on the night of the 22d and on the 23d the German losses were again extremely heavy. We made over 600 prisoners during that time and picked up 1,500 dead, killed on the latter day alone.

Much of the slaughter was due to the point blank magazine fire of our men against the German assaults, while our field guns and howitzers, working in perfect combination, did their share when the enemy were repulsed. As they fell back they were subjected to a shower of shrapnel. When they sought shelter in villages or buildings they were shattered and driven out by high-explosive shells and then again caught by shrapnel as they came into the open.

The troops to suffer so severely were mostly of Twenty-third Corps, one of their new formations.

Certainly the way their advance was conducted showed a lack of training and faults in leading which the almost superhuman bravery of the soldiers could not counterbalance. It was a holocaust.

The spectacle of these devoted men chanting a national song as they marched on to certain death was inspiring. It was at the same time pitiable.

And if any proof were needed that untrained valor alone cannot gain the day in modern war, the advance of the Twenty-third German Corps on Oct. 23 most assuredly furnished it.

Besides doing its share of execution on the hostile infantry, our artillery in this quarter brought down a German captive balloon.

As some gauge of the rate at which the guns were firing at what was for them an ideal target, it may be mentioned that one field battery expended 1,800 rounds of ammunition during the day.

On Saturday, the 24th, action on our right was once more confined to that of artillery, except at night, when the Germans pressed on, only to be repulsed.

In the centre, near Armentieres, our troops withstood three separate attempts of the enemy to push forward, our guns coming into play with good effect. Against our left the German Twenty-seventh Corps made a violent effort with no success.

On Sunday, the 25th, it was our turn to take the offensive. This was carried out by a portion of our left wing, which advanced, gained some ground, and took two guns and eighty prisoners. It is believed that six machine guns fell to the French.

In the centre the fighting was severe, though generally indecisive in result, and the troops in some places were engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Toward evening we captured 200 prisoners.

On the right action was again confined to that of the guns.

Up to the night of the 25th, therefore, not only have we maintained our position against the great effort on the part of the enemy to break through to the west, or to force us back, which started on the 20th; we have on our left passed to the offensive.

These six days, as may be gathered, have been spent by us in repelling a succession of desperate onslaughts. It is true that the efforts against us have been made to a great extent by partially trained men, some of whom appear to be suffering from lack of food. But it must not be forgotten that these troops, which are in great force, have only recently been brought into the field, and are therefore comparatively fresh. They are fighting also with the utmost determination, in spite of the fact that many of them are heartily sick of the war.

The struggle has been of the most severe and sanguinary nature, and it seems that success will favor that side which is possessed of most endurance, or can bring up and fling fresh forces into the fray. Though we have undoubtedly inflicted immense loss upon the enemy, they have so far been able to fill up the gaps in their ranks and to return to the charge, and we have suffered heavily ourselves.

One feature of the tactics now employed has been the use of cavalry in dismounted action, for on both sides many of the mounted troops are fighting in the trenches alongside the infantry.

Armored motor cars, armed with Maxims and light quick-firing guns, also have recently played a useful part on our side, especially in helping to eject the enemy lurking in villages and isolated buildings. Against such parties the combined action of the quick-firer against the snipers in buildings, and the Maxim against them when they are driven into the open, is most efficacious.



XI.

*The British Defense at Ypres.*

[Dated Nov. 13.]

The diminution in the force of the German rush to the west has not lasted long. The section of the front to the north of our forces was the first to meet the recrudescence of violence in the shape of an attack in the neighborhood of Dixmude and Bixschoote.

Our turn came next. After eight days of comparative relaxation we were under constant pressure from Tuesday, Nov. 3, to Tuesday, the 10th. The next day saw a repetition of the great attempt of the Germans to break through our lines to the French coast.

What was realized might happen did happen. In spite of the immense losses suffered by the enemy during the five-day attack against Ypres, which lasted from Oct. 29 to the 2d of this month, the cessation of their more violent efforts on the latter day did not signalize the abandonment of the whole project, but merely the temporary relinquishment of the main offensive until fresh troops had been massed to carry on what was proving to be a costly and difficult operation.

Meanwhile the interval was employed in endeavoring to wear out the Allies by repeated local attacks of varying force and to shatter them by a prolonged and concentrated bombardment. By the 11th, therefore, it seems that they considered they had attained both objects, for on that day they recommenced the desperate battle for the possession of Ypres and its neighborhood.

Though the struggle has not yet come to an end, this much can be said: The Germans have gained some ground, but they have not captured Ypres.

In repulsing the enemy so far we have suffered heavy casualties, but battles of this fierce and prolonged nature cannot but be costly to both sides. We have the satisfaction of knowing that we have foiled the enemy in what appears to be at present his main object in the western theatre of operations, and have inflicted immensely greater losses on him than those we have suffered ourselves.

To carry on the narrative for the three days of the 10th, 11th, and 12th of November:

Tuesday, the 10th, was uneventful for us. At some distance beyond our left flank the enemy advanced in force against the French and were repulsed. Directly on our left, however, along the greater part of the front, shelling was less severe, and no infantry attacks took place.

To the southeast of Ypres the enemy kept up a very heavy bombardment against our line, as well as that of the French. On our left centre the situation remained unchanged, both sides contenting themselves with furious cannonading. In our centre the Germans retained their hold on the small amount of ground which they had gained from us, but in doing so incurred a heavy loss from our artillery and machine gun fire.

Incidentally, one of the houses held by the enemy was so knocked about by our fire that its defenders bolted. On their way to the rear they were met by reinforcements under an officer who halted them, evidently in an endeavor to persuade them to return. While the parley Was going on one of our machine guns was quietly moved to a position of vantage, whence it opened a most effective fire on the group.

On our right one of the enemy's saps, which was being pushed toward our line, was attacked by us. All the men in it were captured.

Wednesday, the 11th, was another day of desperate fighting. As day broke the Germans opened fire on our trenches to the north and south of the road from Menin to Ypres. This was probably the most furious artillery fire which they have yet employed against us.

A few hours later they followed this by an infantry assault in force. This attack was carried out by the First and Fourth brigades of the Guard Corps, which, as we now know from prisoners, have been sent for to make a supreme effort to capture Ypres, since that task had proved too heavy for the infantry of the line.

As the attackers surged forward they were met by our frontal fire, and since they were moving diagonally across part of our front they were also attacked on the flank by artillery, rifles, and machine guns. Though their casualties before they reached our line must have been enormous, such was their resolution and the momentum of the mass that in spite of the splendid resistance of our troops they succeeded in breaking through our line in three places near the road. They penetrated some distance into the woods behind our trenches, but were counter-attacked again, enfiladed by machine guns and driven back to their line of trenches, a certain portion of which they succeeded in holding, in spite of our efforts to expel them.

What their total losses must have been during this advance may be gauged to some extent from the fact that the number of dead left in the woods behind our line alone amounted to 700.

A simultaneous effort made to the south, a part of the same operation although not carried out by the Guard Corps, failed entirely, for when the attacking infantry massed in the woods close to our line, our guns opened on them with such effect that they did not push the assault home.

As generally happens in operations in wooded country, the fighting to a great extent was carried on at close quarters. It was most desperate and confused. Scattered bodies of the enemy who had penetrated into the woods in the rear of our position could neither go backward nor forward, and were nearly all killed or captured.

The portion of the line to the southeast of Ypres held by us was heavily shelled, but did not undergo any very serious infantry attack. That occupied by the French, however, was both bombarded and fiercely assaulted. On the rest of our front, save for the usual bombardment, all was comparatively quiet.

On the right one of our trenches was mined and then abandoned. As soon as it was occupied by the enemy the charges were fired and several Germans were blown to pieces.

Thursday, Nov. 12, was marked by a partial lull in the fighting all along our line. To the north a German force which had crossed the Yser and intrenched on the left bank was annihilated by a night attack with the bayonet, executed by the French. Slightly to the south the enemy was forced back for three-quarters of a mile. Immediately on our left the French were strongly attacked and driven back a short distance, our extreme left having to conform to this movement. Our allies soon recovered the ground they had lost, however, and this enabled us to advance also.

To the southeast of Ypres the enemy's snipers were very active. On our centre and right the enemy's bombardment was maintained, but nothing worthy of special note occurred.

The fact that on this day the advance against our line in front of Ypres was not pushed home after such an effort as that of Wednesday tends to show that for the moment the attacking troops had had enough.

Although the failure of this great attack by the Guard Corps to accomplish their object cannot be described as a decisive event, it possibly marks the culmination if not the close of the second stage in the attempt to capture Ypres, arid it is not without significance. It has also a dramatic interest of its own. Having once definitely failed to achieve this object by means of the sheer weight of numbers, and having done their best to wear us down, the Germans brought in fresh picked troops to carry the Ypres salient by an assault from the north, the south and the east. That the Guard Corps should have been selected to act against the eastern edge of the salient may be taken as proof of the necessity felt by the Germans to gain this point in the line.

Their dogged perseverance in pursuance of their objective claims whole-hearted admiration. The failure of one great attack, heralded as it was by an impassioned appeal to the troops made in the presence of the Emperor himself, but carried out by partially trained men, has been only the signal for another desperate effort in which the place of honor was assigned to the corps d'elite of the German Army.

It must be admitted that the Guard Corps has retained that reputation for courage and contempt of death which it earned in 1870, when Emperor William I., after the battle of Gravelotte, wrote: "My Guard has found its grave in front of St. Privat," and the swarms of men who came up bravely to the British rifles in the woods around Ypres repeated the tactics of forty-four years ago when their dense columns, toiling up the slopes of St. Privat, melted away under the fire of the French.

That the Germans are cunning fighters, and well up in all the tricks of the trade, has frequently been pointed out. For instance, they often succeed in ascertaining what regiment or brigade is opposed to them, and because of their knowledge of English, they are able to employ the information to some purpose. On a recent occasion, having by some means discovered the name of the commander of the company holding the trench they were attacking, they called him by name, asking if Captain —— was there. Fortunately the pronunciation of the spokesman was somewhat defective, and their curiosity was rewarded by discovering that both the officer in question and his men were very much there.

There have been reports from so many different quarters of the enemy having been seen wearing British and French uniforms that it is impossible to doubt their truth. One absolutely authentic case occurred during the fighting near Ypres. A man dressed in a uniform closely resembling that of a British staff officer suddenly appeared near our trenches and walked along the line. He asked if many casualties had been suffered, stated that the situation was serious, and that a general retirement had been ordered. A similar visit having been reported by several men in different trenches, orders were issued that this strange officer was to be detained if seen again. Unluckily he did not make another appearance.

The following remarks taken from the diary of a German soldier are published not because there is reason to believe they are justified with regard to the conduct of German officers but because of their interest as a human document. Under date of Nov. 2 this German soldier wrote:

Previous to noon we were sent out in a regular storm of bullets on the order of the Major. These gentlemen, the officers, send their men forward in a most ridiculous way. They themselves remain far behind, safely under cover. Our leadership is really scandalous. Enormous losses on our side are partly from the fire of our own people, for our leaders neither know where the enemy lies nor where our own troops are, so that we often are fired on by our own men. It is a marvel to me that we have got on as far as we have done.

Our Captain fell, as did also all our section leaders and a large number of our men. Moreover, no purpose was served by this advance, for we remained the rest of the day under cover; we could go neither forward nor back, nor even shoot.

The trench we had taken was not occupied by us. The English naturally took it back at night. That was the sole result. Then when the enemy had intrenched themselves another attack was made, costing us many lives and fifty prisoners. It is simply ridiculous, this leadership. If only I had known it before! My opinion of German officers has changed.

An Adjutant shouted to us from a trench far to the rear to cut down a hedge in front of us. Bullets were whistling round from in front and from behind. The gentleman himself, of course, remained behind.

The Fourth Company has now no leaders but a couple of non-coms. When will my turn come! I hope to goodness I shall get home again.

In the trenches shells and shrapnel burst without ceasing. In the evening we get a cup of rice and one-third of an apple per man. Let us hope peace will soon come. Such a war is really too awful. The English shoot like mad. If no reinforcements come up, especially heavy artillery, we shall have a poor lookout and must retire.

The first day I went quietly into the fight with an indifference which astonished me. Today, for the first time, in advancing, when my comrades on the right and left were falling, I felt rather nervous. But I lost that feeling again soon. One becomes horribly indifferent.

I picked up a piece of bread by chance. Thank God! At least I have something to eat.

There are about 70,000 English who must be attacked from all four sides and destroyed. However, they defend themselves obstinately.



XII.

*Attacked by 750,000 Germans.*

[Official Summary, Dated Dec. 3.]

Col. E.D. Swinton of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium, in a narrative dated Nov. 26, gives a general review of the development of the situation of the force for six weeks preceding that date.

There has recently been a lull in the active operations, he says. No progress has been made by either side, and yet there has come about an important modification comprising a readjustment in the scope of the part played by the British Army as a whole. He explains the movement from the River Aisne to the Belgian frontier to prolong the left flank of the French Army, and says that in attempting this the British force was compelled to assume responsibility for a very extended section of the front. He points out, as did Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander in Chief of the British forces, that the British held only one-twelfth of the line, so that the greater share of the common task of opposing the enemy fell and still falls to the French, while the Belgians played an almost vital part.

With the fall of Antwerp the Germans made every effort to push forward a besieging force toward the west and hastened to bring up a new army corps which had been hastily raised and trained, their object being to drive the Allies out of Belgium and break through to Dunkirk and Calais. Altogether they had a quarter of a million of fresh men. Eventually the Germans had north of La Bassee about fourteen corps and eight cavalry divisions, that is, "a force of three-quarters of a million of men with which to attempt to drive the Allies into the sea. In addition, there was immensely powerful armament and heavy siege artillery, which also had been brought up from around Antwerp."

The official eye-witness tells of the blows delivered by the Germans at Nieuport, Dixmude, and Ypres, where "at first the Allies were greatly outnumbered." For a whole month the British army around Ypres succeeded in holding its ground against repeated onslaughts made by vastly superior forces. The writer goes into details of the German attacks and describes how they were frustrated by the Allies.

The British force, says Col. Swinton, which consisted all along of the same units, had "to withstand an almost continuous bombardment and to meet one desperate assault after another, each carried out by fresh units from the large numbers which the Germans were devoting to the operation." Finally the French came to their assistance, and "never was help more welcome; for by then our small local reserves had again and again been thrown into the fight in the execution of counter-attacks, and our men were exhausted by the incessant fighting."

The British front now has been considerably shortened and in addition has been reinforced, while a lull in the activity has enabled the British to readjust their forces, strengthen their positions, and bring up reserves. There has, therefore, "been a great general improvement in the conditions under which we are carrying on the fight". Of the fighting which preceded this reorganization the writer says it is due solely to the resource, initiative, and endurance of the regimental officers and men that success has lain with the British. He continues:

"As the struggle swayed backward and forward through wood and hamlet, the fighting assumed a most confused and desperate character. The units became inextricably mixed, and in many cases, in order to strengthen some threatened point or to fill a gap in the line, the officers had to collect and throw into the fight what men they could, regardless of the units to which they belonged. Our casualties have been severe; but we have been fighting a battle, and a battle implies casualties, and, heavy as they have been, it must be remembered that they have not been suffered in vain.

"The duty of the French, Belgians, and British in the western theatre of operations has been to act as a containing force; in other words, to hold on to and to keep occupied as many of the enemy as possible while the Russians were attacking in the east. In this we have succeeded in playing our part, and by our resistance have contributed materially toward the success of the campaign. Moreover, our losses have not impaired our fighting efficiency. The troops have required only a slight respite in order to be able to continue the action with as much determination as ever. They are physically fit and well fed and have suffered merely from the fatigue which is inseparable from a protracted struggle such as they have been through. The severest handling by the enemy has never had more than a temporary effect on their spirits, which they have soon recovered, owing to the years of discipline and training to which the officers and men have been accustomed.

"The value of such preparation is as noticeable on the side of the enemy as on our own. The phenomenal losses suffered by the Germans' new formations have been remarked, and they were in part due to their lack of training. Moreover, though at the first onset these formations advanced to the attack as gravely as their active corps, they have not by any means, shown the same recuperative powers. The Twenty-seventh Corps, for instance, which is a new formation composed principally of men with from only seven to twelve weeks' training, has not yet recovered from its first encounter with the British infantry around Becelaere, to the northeast of Ypres, a month ago. On the other hand, the Guards Corps, in spite of having suffered severely in Belgium, of having been thrown headlong across the Oise River at Guise and of having lost large numbers on the plains of Compiegne and on the banks of the Aisne River, advanced against Ypres on the 11th of November as bravely as they did on the 20th of August."