The wonderful effectiveness of our seamen at the date of which I am writing as well as long subsequently to it was largely due to the curious condition of things in Europe. For thirty years all the European nations had been in a state of continuous and very complicated warfare, during the course of which each nation in turn fought almost every other, England being usually at loggerheads with all. One effect of this was to force an enormous proportion of the carrying trade of the world into American bottoms. The old Massachusetts town of Salem was then one of the main depots of the East India trade; the Baltimore clippers carried goods into the French and German ports with small regard to the blockade; New Bedford and Sag Harbor fitted out whalers for the Arctic seas as well as for the South Pacific; the rich merchants of Philadelphia and New York sent their ships to all parts of the world; and every small port had some craft in the coasting trade. On the New England seaboard but few of the boys would reach manhood without having made at least one voyage to the Newfoundland Banks after codfish; and in the whaling towns of Long Island it used to be an old saying that no man could marry till he struck his whale. The wealthy merchants of the large cities would often send their sons on a voyage or two before they let them enter their counting-houses. Thus it came about that a large portion of our population was engaged in seafaring pursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a resolute and hardy character in the men that followed them. The British merchant-men sailed in huge convoys, guarded by men-of-war, while, as said before, our vessels went alone, and relied for protection on themselves. If a fishing smack went to the Banks it knew that it ran a chance of falling in with some not over-scrupulous Nova Scotian privateer. The barques that sailed from Salem to the Spice Islands kept their men well trained both at great guns and musketry, so as to be able to beat off either Malay proas, or Chinese junks. The New York ships, loaded for the West Indies, were prepared to do battle with the picaroons that swarmed in the Spanish main; while the fast craft from Baltimore could fight as well as they could run. Wherever an American seaman went, he not only had to contend with all the legitimate perils of the sea, but he had also to regard almost every stranger as a foe. Whether this foe called himself pirate or privateer mattered but little. French, Spaniards, Algerines, Malays, from all alike our commerce suffered, and against all, our merchants were forced to defend themselves. The effect of such a state of things, which made commerce so remunerative that the bolder spirits could hardly keep out of it, and so hazardous that only the most skilful and daring could succeed in it, was to raise up as fine a set of seamen as ever manned a navy. The stern school in which the American was brought up, forced him into habits of independent thought and action which it was impossible that the more protected Briton could possess. He worked more intelligently and less from routine, and while perfectly obedient and amenable to discipline, was yet able to judge for himself in an emergency. He was more easily managed than most of his kind—being shrewd, quiet, and, in fact, comparatively speaking, rather moral than otherwise; if he was a New Englander, when he retired from a sea life he was not unapt to end his days as a deacon. Altogether there could not have been better material for a fighting crew than cool, gritty American Jack. Moreover, there was a good nucleus of veterans to begin with, who were well fitted to fill the more responsible positions, such as captains of guns, etc. These were men who had cruised in the little Enterprise after French privateers, who had been in the Constellation in her two victorious fights, or who, perhaps, had followed Decatur when with only eighty men he cut out the Philadelphia, manned by fivefold his force and surrounded by hostile batteries and war vessels,—one of the boldest expeditions of the kind on record.

It is to be noted, furthermore, in this connection, that by a singular turn of fortune, Great Britain, whose system of impressing American sailors had been one of the chief causes of the war, herself became, in consequence of that very system, in some sort, a nursery for the seamen of the young Republican navy. The American sailor feared nothing more than being impressed on a British ship—dreading beyond measure the hard life and cruel discipline aboard of her; but once there, he usually did well enough, and in course of time often rose to be of some little consequence. For years before 1812, the number of these impressed sailors was in reality greater than the entire number serving in the American navy, from which it will readily be seen that they formed a good stock to draw upon. Very much to their credit, they never lost their devotion to the home of their birth, more than two thousand of them being imprisoned at the beginning of the war because they refused to serve against their country. When Commodore Decatur captured the Macedonian, that officer, as we learn from Marshall's "Naval Biography" (ii. 1019), stated that most of the seamen of his own frigate, the United States, had served in British war vessels, and that some had been with Lord Nelson in the Victory, and had even been bargemen to the great Admiral,—a pretty sure proof that the American sailors did not show a disadvantage when compared with others. [Footnote: With perfect gravity, James and his followers assume Decatur's statement to be equivalent to saying that he had chiefly British seamen on board; whereas, even as quoted by Marshall, Decatur merely said that "his seamen had served on board a British man-of-war," and that some "had served under Lord Nelson." Like the Constitution, the United States had rid herself of most of the British subjects on board, before sailing. Decatur's remark simply referred to the number of his American seamen who had been impressed on board British ships. Whenever James says that an American ship had a large proportion of British sailors aboard, the explanation is that a large number of the crew were Americans who had been impressed on British ships. It would be no more absurd to claim Trafalgar as an American victory because there was a certain number of Americans in Nelson's fleet, than it is to assert that the Americans were victorious in 1812, because there were a few renegade British on board their ships.]

Good seaman as the impressed American proved to be, yet he seldom missed an opportunity to escape from the British service, by desertion or otherwise. In the first place, the life was very hard, and, in the second, the American seaman was very patriotic. He had an honest and deep affection for his own flag; while, on the contrary, he felt a curiously strong hatred for England, as distinguished from Englishmen. This hatred was partly an abstract feeling, cherished through a vague traditional respect for Bunker Hill, and partly something very real and vivid, owing to the injuries he, and others like him, had received. Whether he lived in Maryland or Massachusetts, he certainly knew men whose ships had been seized by British cruisers, their goods confiscated, and the vessels condemned. Some of his friends had fallen victims to the odious right of search, and had never been heard of afterward. He had suffered many an injury to friend, fortune, or person, and some day he hoped to repay them all; and when the war did come, he fought all the better because he knew it was in his own quarrel. But, as I have said, this hatred was against England, not against Englishmen. Then, as now, sailors were scattered about over the world without any great regard for nationality; and the resulting intermingling of natives and foreigners in every mercantile marine was especially great in those of Britain and America, whose people spoke the same tongue and wore the same aspect. When chance drifted the American into Liverpool or London, he was ready enough to ship in an Indiaman or whaler, caring little for the fact that he served under the British flag; and the Briton, in turn, who found himself in New York or Philadelphia, willingly sailed in one of the clipper-built barques, whether it floated the stars and stripes or not. When Captain Porter wrought such havoc among the British whalers in the South Seas, he found that no inconsiderable portion of their crews consisted of Americans, some of whom enlisted on board his own vessel; and among the crews of the American whalers were many British. In fact, though the skipper of each ship might brag loudly of his nationality, yet in practical life he knew well enough that there was very little to choose between a Yankee and a Briton. [Footnote: What choice there was, was in favor of the American. In point of courage there was no difference whatever. The Essex and the Lawrence, as well as the Frolic and the Reindeer, were defended with the same stubborn, desperate, cool bravery that marks the English race on both sides of the Atlantic. But the American was a free citizen, any one's equal, a voter with a personal interest in his country's welfare, and, above all, without having perpetually before his eyes the degrading fear of the press-gang. In consequence, he was more tractable than the Englishman, more self-reliant, and possessed greater judgment. In the fight between the Wasp and the Frolic, the latter's crew had apparently been well trained at the guns, for they aimed well; but they fired at the wrong time, and never corrected the error; while their antagonists, delivering their broadsides far more slowly, by intelligently waiting until the proper moment, worked frightful havoc. But though there was a certain slight difference between the seamen of the two nations, it must never be forgotten that it was very much less than that between the various individuals of the same nation; and when the British had been trained for a few years by such commanders as Broke and Manners, it was impossible to surpass them, and it needed our best men to equal them.] Both were bold and hardy, cool and intelligent, quick with their hands, and showing at their best in an emergency. They looked alike and spoke alike; when they took the trouble to think, they thought alike; and when they got drunk, which was not an infrequent occurrence, they quarrelled alike.

Mingled with them were a few seamen of other nationalities. The Irishman, if he came from the old Dano-Irish towns of Waterford, Dublin, and Wexford, or from the Ulster coast, was very much like the two chief combatants; the Celto-Turanian kern of the west did not often appear on shipboard. The French, Danes, and Dutch were hemmed in at home; they had enough to do on their own seaboard, and could not send men into foreign fleets. A few Norse, however, did come in, and excellent sailors and fighters they made. With the Portuguese and Italians, of whom some were to be found serving under the union-jack, and others under the stars and stripes, it was different; although there were many excellent exceptions they did not, as a rule, make the best of seamen. They were treacherous, fond of the knife, less ready with their hands, and likely to lose either their wits or their courage when in a tight place.

In the American navy, unlike the British, there was no impressment; the sailor was a volunteer, and he shipped in whatever craft his fancy selected. Throughout the war there were no "picked crews" on the American side, [Footnote: James' statements to the contrary being in every case utterly without foundation. He is also wrong in his assertion that the American ships had no boys; they had nearly as many in proportion as the British. The Constitution had 31, the Adams 15, etc. So, when he states that our midshipmen were generally masters and mates of merchantmen; they were generally from eleven to seventeen years old at the beginning of the war, and besides, had rarely or never been in the merchant marine.] excepting on the last two cruises of the Constitution. In fact (as seen by the letter of Captains Stewart and Bainbridge to Secretary Hamilton), there was often much difficulty in getting enough men. [Footnote: Reading through the volumes of official letters about this war, which are preserved in the office of the Secretary of the Navy, one of the most noticeable things is the continual complaints about the difficulty of getting men. The Adams at one time had a crew of but nineteen men—"fourteen of whom are marines," adds the aggrieved commander. A log-book of one of the gun-boats records the fact that after much difficulty two men were enlisted—from the jail, with a parenthetical memorandum to the effect that they were both very drunk. British ships were much more easily manned, as they could always have recourse to impressment.

The Constitution on starting out her last cruises had an extraordinary number of able seamen aboard, viz., 218, with but 92 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 44 marines, making, with the officers, a total of 440 men. (See letter of Captain Bainbridge, Oct. 16, 1814; it is letter No. 51, in the fortieth volume of "Captains' Letters," in the clerk's office of the Secretary of the Navy.)] Many sailors preferred to serve in the innumerable privateers, and, the two above-mentioned officers, in urging the necessity of building line-of-battle ships, state that it was hard work to recruit men for vessels of an inferior grade, so long as the enemy had ships of the line.

One of the standard statements made by the British historians about this war is that our ships were mainly or largely manned by British sailors. This, if true, would not interfere with the lessons which it teaches; and, besides that, it is not true.

In this, as in every thing else, all the modern writers have merely followed James or Brenton, and I shall accordingly confine myself to examining their assertions. The former begins (vol. iv, p. 470) by diffidently stating that there is a "similarity" of language between the inhabitants of the two countries—an interesting philological discovery that but few will attempt to controvert. In vol. vi, p. 154, he mentions that a number of blanks occur in the American Navy List in the column "Where Born"; and in proof of the fact that these blanks are there because the men were not Americans, he says that their names "are all English and Irish." [Footnote: For example, James writes: "Out of the 32 captains one only, Thomas Tingey, had England marked as his birthplace.... Three blanks occur, and we consider it rather creditable to Captains John Shaw, Daniel S. Patterson, and John Ord Creighton, that they were ashamed to tell where they were born." I have not been able to find out the latter's birth-place, but Captain Shaw was born in New York, and I have seen Captain Patterson incidentally alluded to as "born and bred in America." Generally, whenever I have been able to fill up the vacancies in the column "Where Born," I have found that it was in America. From these facts it would appear that James was somewhat hasty in concluding that the omission of the birth-place proved the owner of the name to be a native of Great Britain.] They certainly are; and so are all the other names in the list. It could not well be otherwise, as the United States Navy was not officered by Indians. In looking over this same Navy List (of 1816) it will be seen that but a little over 5 per cent, of the officers were born abroad—a smaller proportion by far than would exist in the population of the country at large—and most of these had come to America when under ten years of age. On p. 155 James adds that the British sailors composed "one third in number and one half in point of effectiveness" of the American crews. Brenton in his "Naval History" writes: "It was said, and I have no reason to doubt the fact, that there were 200 British seamen aboard the Constitution." [Footnote: New edition, London, 1837, vol. ii, p. 456.] These statements are mere assertions unsupported by proof, and of such a loose character as to be difficult to refute. As our navy was small, it may be best to take each ship in turn. The only ones of which the British could write authoritatively were, of course, those which they captured. The first one taken was the Wasp. James says many British were discovered among her crew, instancing especially one sailor named Jack Lang; now Jack Lang was born in the town of Brunswick, New Jersey, but had been impressed and forced to serve in the British Navy. The same was doubtless true of the rest of the "many British" seamen of her crew; at any rate, as the only instance James mentions (Jack Lang) was an American, he can hardly be trusted for those whom he does not name.

Of the 95 men composing the crew of the Nautilus when she was captured, "6 were detained and sent to England to await examination as being suspected of being British subjects." [Footnote: Quoted from letter of Commodore Rodgers of September 12, 1812 (in Naval Archives, "Captains' Letters," vol xxv, No. 43), enclosing a "List of American prisoners of war discharged out of custody of Lieutenant William Miller, agent at the port of Halifax," in exchange for some of the British captured by Porter. This list, by the way, shows the crew of the Nautilus (counting the six men detained as British) to have been 95 in number, instead of 106, as stated by James. Commodore Rodgers adds that he has detained 12 men of the Guerriere's crew as an offset to the 6 men belonging to the Nautilus.] Of the other small brigs, the Viper, Vixen, Rattlesnake, and Syren, James does not mention the composition of the crew, and I do not know that any were claimed as British. Of the crew of the Argus "about 10 or 12 were believed to be British subjects; the American officers swore the crew contained none" (James, "Naval Occurrences," p. 278). From 0 to 10 per cent can be allowed. When the Frolic was captured "her crew consisted of native Americans" (do, p. 340). James speaks ("History," p. 418) of "a portion of the British subjects on board the Essex," but without giving a word of proof or stating his grounds of belief. One man was claimed as a deserter by the British, but he turned out to be a New Yorker. There were certainly a certain number of British aboard, but the number probably did not exceed thirty. Of the President's crew he says ("Naval Occurrences," p. 448): "In the opinion of several British officers there were among them many British seamen" but Commodore Decatur, Lieutenant Gallagher, and the other officers swore that there were none. Of the crew of the Chesapeake, he says, "about 32" were British subjects, or about 10 per cent. One or two of these were afterward shot, and some 25, together with a Portuguese boatswain's mate, entered into the British service. So that of the vessels captured by the British, the Chesapeake had the largest number of British (about 10 per cent. of her crew) on board, the others ranging from that number down to none at all, as in the case of the Wasp. As these eleven ships would probably represent a fair average, this proportion, of 0 to 10 per cent., should be taken as the proper one. James, however, is of the opinion that those ships manned by Americans were more apt to be captured than those manned by the braver British; which calls for an examination of the crews of the remaining vessels. Of the American sloop Peacock, James says ("Naval Occurrences," p. 348) that "several of her men were recognized as British seamen"; even if this were true, "several" could not probably mean more than sixteen, or 10 per cent. Of the second Wasp he says, "Captain Blakely was a native of Dublin, and, along with some English and Scotch, did not, it may be certain, neglect to have in his crew a great many Irish." Now Captain Blakely left Ireland when he was but 16 months old, and the rest of James' statement is avowedly mere conjecture. It was asserted positively in the American newspapers that the Wasp, which sailed from Portsmouth, was manned exclusively by New Englanders, except a small draft of men from a Baltimore privateer, and that there was not a foreigner in her crew. Of the Hornet James states that "some of her men were natives of the United Kingdom"; but he gives no authority, and the men he refers to were in all probability those spoken of in the journal of one of the Hornet's officers, which says that "Many of our men (Americans) had been impressed in the British service." As regards the gun-boats, James asserts that they were commanded by "Commodore Joshua Barney, a native of Ireland." This officer, however, was born at Baltimore on July 6, 1759. As to the Constitution, Brenton, as already mentioned, supposes the number of British sailors in her crew to have been 200; James makes it less, or about 150. Respecting this, the only definite statements I can find in British works are the following: In the "Naval Chronicle," vol. xxix, p. 452, an officer of the Java states that most of the Constitution's men were British, many being from the Guerriere; which should be read in connection with James' statement (vol. vi, p. 156) that but eight of the Guerriere's crew deserted, and but two shipped on board the Constitution. Moreover, as a matter of fact, these eight men were all impressed Americans. In the "Naval Chronicle" it is also said that the Chesapeake's surgeon was an Irishman, formerly of the British navy; he was born in Baltimore, and was never in the British navy in his life. The third lieutenant "was supposed to be an Irishman" (Brenton, ii, 456). The first lieutenant "was a native of Great Britain, we have been informed" (James, vi, 194); he was Mr. George Parker, born and bred in Virginia. The remaining three citations, if true, prove nothing. "One man had served under Mr. Kent" of the Guerriere (James, vi, p. 153). "One had been in the Achille" and "one in the Eurydice" (Brenton, ii, 456). These three men were most probably American seamen who had been impressed on British ships. From Cooper (in "Putnam's Magazine," vol. I, p. 593) as well as from several places in the Constitution's log, [Footnote: See her log-book (vol. ii, Feb. 1, 1812 to Dec. 13, 1813); especially on July 12th, when twelve men were discharged. In some of Hull's letters he alludes to the desire of the British part of the crew to serve on the gun boats or in the ports; and then writes that "in accordance with the instructions sent him by the Secretary of the Navy," he had allowed the British-born portion to leave the ship. The log-books are in the Bureau of Navigation.] we learn that several of the crew who were British deserters were discharged from the Constitution before she left port, as they were afraid to serve in a war against Great Britain. That this fear was justifiable may be seen by reading James, vol. iv, p. 483. Of the four men taken by the Leopard from the Chesapeake, as deserters, one was hung and three scourged. In reality the crew of the Constitution probably did not contain a dozen British sailors; in her last cruises she was manned almost exclusively by New Englanders. The only remainder vessel is the United States, respecting whose crew some remarkable statements have been made. Marshall (vol. ii, p. 1019) writes that Commodore Decatur "declared there was not a seaman in his ship who had not served from 5 to 12 years in a British man-of-war," from which he concludes that they were British themselves. It may be questioned whether Decatur ever made such an assertion; or if he did, it is safe to assume again that his men were long-impressed Americans. [Footnote: At the beginning of the war there were on record in the American State Department 6,257 cases of impressed American seamen. These could represent but a small part of the whole, which must have amounted to 20,000 men, or more than sufficient to man our entire navy five times over. According to the British Admiralty Report to the House of Commons, February 1, 1815, 2,548 impressed American seamen, who refused to serve against their country, were imprisoned in 1812. According to Lord Castlereagh's speech in the House, February 18, 1813, 3,300 men claiming to be American subjects were serving in the British navy in January, 1811, and he certainly did not give any thing like the whole number. In the American service the term of enlistment extended for two years, and the frigate, United States, referred to, had not had her crew for any very great length of time as yet. If such a crew were selected at random from American sailors, among them there would be, owing to the small number serving in our own navy and the enormous number impressed into the British navy, probably but one of the former to two of the latter. As already mentioned the American always left a British man-of-war as soon as he could, by desertion or discharge; but he had no unwillingness to serve in the home navy, where the pay was larger, and the discipline far more humane, not to speak of motives of patriotism. Even if the ex-British man-of-war's man kept out of service for some time, he would be very apt to enlist when a war broke out, which his country undertook largely to avenge his own wrongs.]

Of the Carolina's crew of 70 men, five were British. This fact was not found out till three deserted, when an investigation was made and the two other British discharged. Captain Henly, in reporting these facts, made no concealment of his surprise that there should be any British at all in his crew. [Footnote: See his letter in "Letters of Masters' Commandant," 1814, I. No. 116.]

From these facts and citations we may accordingly conclude that the proportion of British seamen serving on American ships after the war broke out, varied between none, as on the Wasp and Constitution, to ten per cent., as on the Chesapeake and Essex. On the average, nine tenths of each of our crews were American seamen, and about one twentieth British, the remainder being a mixture of various nationalities.

On the other hand, it is to be said that the British frigate Guerriere had ten Americans among her crew, who were permitted to go below during action, and the Macedonian eight, who were not allowed that privilege, three of them being killed. Three of the British sloop Peacock's men were Americans, who were forced to fight against the Hornet: one of them was killed. Two of the Epervier's men were Americans, who were also forced to fight. When the crew of the Nautilus was exchanged, a number of other American prisoners were sent with them; among these were a number of American seamen who had been serving in the Shannon, Acasta, Africa, and various other vessels. So there was also a certain proportion of Americans among the British crews, although forming a smaller percentage of them than the British did on board the American ships. In neither case was the number sufficient to at all affect the result.

The crews of our ships being thus mainly native Americans, it may be interesting to try to find out the proportions that were furnished by the different sections of the country. There is not much difficulty about the officers. The captains, masters commandant, lieutenants, marine officers, whose birthplaces are given in the Navy List of 1816,—240 in all,—came from the various States as follows:

.- N.H.. 5-. Mass.. 20 New England - R.I. 11 - 42 '- Conn.. 6-'

.- N.Y.. 17-. N.J.. 22 Middle States- Penn.. 35 - 78 '- Del.. 4-'

District of Columbia -[D.C.. 4]- 4

.- Md.. 46-. Va.. 42 N.C.. 4 Southern States- S.C.. 16 -116 Ga.. 2 La.. 4 '- Ky.. 2-' - Total of given birthplaces 240

Thus, Maryland furnished, both absolutely and proportionately, the greatest number of officers, Virginia, then the most populous of all the States, coming next; four fifths of the remainder came from the Northern States.

It is more difficult to get at the birthplaces of the sailors. Something can be inferred from the number of privateers and letters of marque fitted out. Here Baltimore again headed the list; following closely came New York, Philadelphia, and the New England coast towns, with, alone among the Southern ports, Charleston, S.C. A more accurate idea of the quotas of sailors furnished by the different sections can be arrived at by comparing the total amount of tonnage the country possessed at the outbreak of the war. Speaking roughly, 44 per cent, of it belonged to New England, 32 per cent, to the Middle States, and 11 per cent, to Maryland. This makes it probable (but of course not certain) that three fourths of the common sailors hailed from the Northern States, half the remainder from Maryland, and the rest chiefly from Virginia and South Carolina.

Having thus discussed somewhat at length the character of our officers and crews, it will now be necessary to present some statistical tables to give a more accurate idea of the composition of the navy; the tonnage, complements, and armaments of the ships, etc.

At the beginning of the war the Government possessed six navy-yards (all but the last established in 1801) as follows: [Footnote: Report of Naval Secretary Jones, Nov. 30. 1814.]

Place Original Cost. Minimum number of men employed.

1. Portsmouth. N. H., $ 5,500 10

2. Charleston, Mass., 39,214 20

3. New York, 40,000 102

4. Philadelphia, 37,000 13

5. Washington, 4,000 36

6. Gosport, 12,000 16

In 1812 the following was the number of officers in the navy: [Footnote: "List of Vessels" etc., by Gen. H Preble U.S.N (1874)]

12 captains 10 masters commandant 73 lieutenants 53 masters 310 midshipmen 42 marine officers ——- 500

At the opening of the year, the number of seamen, ordinary seamen, and boys in service was 4,010, and enough more were recruited to increase it to 5,230, of whom only 2,346 were destined for the cruising war vessels, the remainder being detailed for forts, gun-boats, navy yards, the lakes, etc. [Footnote: Report of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812.] The marine corps was already ample, consisting of 1,523 men. [Footnote: Ibid.]

No regular navy lists were published till 1816, and I have been able to get very little information respecting the increase in officers and men during 1813 and 1814; but we have full returns for 1815, which may be summarized as follows: [Footnote: Seybert's "Statistical Annals," p. 676 (Philadelphia, 1818)]

30 captains, 25 masters commandant, 141 lieutenants, 24 commanders, 510 midshipmen, 230 sailing-masters, 50 surgeons, 12 chaplains, 50 pursers, 10 coast pilots, 45 captain's clerks, 80 surgeon's mates, 530 boatswains, gunners, carpenters, and sailmakers, 268 boatswain's mates, gunner's mates, etc., 1,106 quarter gunners, etc., 5,000 able seamen, 6,849 ordinary seamen and boys. Making a total of 14,960, with 2,715 marines. [Footnote: Report of Secretary B. W. Crowninshield, April 18, 1816.]

Comparing this list with the figures given before, it can be seen that during the course of the war our navy grew enormously, increasing to between three and four times its original size.

At the beginning of the year 1812, the navy of the United States on the ocean consisted of the following vessels, which either were, or could have been, made available during the war. [Footnote: Letter of Secretary Benjamin Stoddart to Fifth Congress, Dec. 24, 1798; Letter of Secretary Paul Hamilton, Feb. 21, 1812; "American State Papers," vol. xix, p. 149. See also The "History of the Navy of the United States," by Lieut. G. E. Emmons, U. S. N. (published in Washington, MDCCCLIII, under the authority of the Navy Department.)]

Rate When (Guns). Name. Where Built. Built. Tonnage. Cost. 44 United States, Philadelphia, 1797 1576 $299,336 44 Constitution, Boston, 1797 1576 302,718 44 President, New York, 1800 1576 220,910 38 Constellation, Baltimore, 1797 1265 314,212 38 Congress, Portsmouth, 1799 1268 197,246 38 Chesapeake, Norfolk, 1799 1244 220,677 32 Essex, Salem, 1799 860 139,362 28 Adams, New York, 1799 560 76,622 18 Hornet, Baltimore, 1805 480 52,603 18 Wasp, Washington, 1806 450 40,000 16 Argus, Boston, 1803 298 37,428 16 Syren, Philadelphia, 1803 250 32,521 14 Nautilus, Baltimore, 1803 185 18,763 14 Vixen, Baltimore, 1803 185 20,872 12 Enterprise, Baltimore, 1799 165 16,240 12 Viper, Purchased, 1810 148

There also appeared on the lists the New York, 36, Boston, 28, and John Adams, 28. The two former were condemned hulks; the latter was entirely rebuilt after the war. The Hornet was originally a brig of 440 tons, and 18 guns; having been transformed into a ship, she was pierced for 20 guns, and in size was of an intermediate grade between the Wasp and the heavy sloops, built somewhat later, of 509 tons. Her armament consisted of 32-pound carronades, with the exception of the two bow-guns, which were long 12's. The whole broadside was in nominal weight just 300 pounds; in actual weight about 277 pounds. Her complement of men was 140, but during the war she generally left port with 150. [Footnote: In the Hornet's log of Oct. 25, 1812, while in port, it is mentioned that she had 158 men; four men who were sick were left behind before she started. (See, in the Navy Archives, the Log-book, Hornet, Wasp, and Argus, July 20, 1809, to Oct. 6, 1813.)] The Wasp had been a ship from the beginning, mounted the number of guns she rated (of the same calibres as the Hornet's) and carried some ten men less. She was about the same length as the British 18-gun brig-sloop, but, being narrower, measured nearly 30 tons less. The Argus and Syren were similar and very fine brigs, the former being the longer. Each carried two more guns than she rated; and the Argus, in addition, had a couple thrust through the bridle-ports. The guns were 24-pound carronades, with two long 12's for bow-chasers. The proper complement of men was 100, but each sailed usually with about 125. The four smaller craft were originally schooners, armed with the same number of light long guns as they rated, and carrying some 70 men apiece; but they had been very effectually ruined by being changed into brigs, with crews increased to a hundred men. Each was armed with 18-pound carronades, carrying two more than she rated. The Enterprise, in fact, mounted 16 guns, having two long nines thrust through the bridle-ports. These little brigs were slow, not very seaworthy, and overcrowded with men and guns; they all fell into the enemy's hands without doing any good whatever, with the single exception of the Enterprise, which escaped capture by sheer good luck, and in her only battle happened to be pitted against one of the corresponding and equally bad class of British gun-brigs. The Adams after several changes of form finally became a flush-decked corvette. The Essex had originally mounted twenty-six long 12's on her main-deck, and sixteen 24-pound carronades on her spar-deck; but official wisdom changed this, giving her 46 guns, twenty-four 32-pound carronades, and two long 12's on the main-deck, and sixteen 32-pound carronades with four long 12's on the spar-deck. When Captain Porter had command of her he was deeply sensible of the disadvantages of an armament which put him at the mercy of any ordinary antagonist who could choose his distance; accordingly he petitioned several times, but always without success, to have his long 12's returned to him.

The American 38's were about the size of the British frigates of the same rate, and armed almost exactly in the same way, each having 28 long 18's on the main-deck and 20 32-pound carronades on the spar-deck. The proper complement was 300 men, but each carried from 30 to 80 more. [Footnote: The Chesapeake, by some curious mistake, was frequently rated as a 44, and this drew in its train a number of attendant errors. When she was captured, James says that in one of her lockers was found a letter, dated in February, 1811, from Robert Smith, the Secretary of War, to Captain Evans, at Boston, directing him to open houses of rendezvous for manning the Chesapeake, and enumerating her crew at a total of 443. Naturally this gave British historians the idea that such was the ordinary complement of our 38-gun frigates. But the ordering so large a crew was merely a mistake, as may be seen by a letter from Captain Bainbridge to the Secretary of the Navy, which is given in full in the "Captains' Letters," vol. xxv. No. 19 (Navy Archives). In it he mentions the extraordinary number of men ordered for the Chesapeake, saying, "There is a mistake in the crew ordered for the Chesapeake, as it equals in number the crews of our 44-gun frigates, whereas the Chesapeake is of the class of the Congress and Constellation."]

Our three 44-gun ships were the finest frigates then afloat (although the British possessed some as heavy, such as the Egyptienne, 44). They were beautifully modelled, with very thick scantling, extremely stout masts, and heavy cannon. Each carried on her main-deck thirty long 24's, and on her spar-deck two long bow-chasers, and twenty or twenty-two carronades—42-pounders on the President and United States, 32-pounders on the Constitution. Each sailed with a crew of about 450 men—50 in excess of the regular complement. [Footnote: The President when in action with the Endymion had 450 men aboard, as sworn by Decatur; the muster-roll of the Constitution, a few days before her action with the Guerriere contains 464 names (including 51 marines); 8 men were absent in a prize, so she had aboard in the action 456. Her muster-roll just before the action with the Cyane and Levant shows 461 names.]

It may be as well to mention here the only other class of vessels that we employed during the war. This was composed of the ship-sloops built in 1813, which got to sea in 1814. They were very fine vessels, measuring 509 tons apiece, [Footnote: The dimensions were 117 feet 11 inches upon the gun-deck, 97 feet 6 inches keel for tonnage, measuring from one foot before the forward perpendicular and along the base line to the front of the rabbet of the port, deducting 3/5 of the moulded breadth of the beam, which is 31 feet 6 inches; making 509 21/95 tons. (See in Navy Archives, "Contracts," vol. ii. p. 137.)] with very thick scantling and stout masts and spars. Each carried twenty 32-pound carronades and two long 12's with a crew nominally of 160 men, but with usually a few supernumeraries. [Footnote: The Peacock had 166 men, as we learn from her commander Warrington's letter of June 1st (Letter No. 140 in "Masters' Commandant Letters," 1814, vol. i). The Frolic took aboard "10 or 12 men beyond her regular complement" (see letter of Joseph Bainbridge, No. 51, in same vol.). Accordingly when she was captured by the Orpheus, the commander of the latter, Captain Hugh Pigot, reported the number of men aboard to be 171. The Wasp left port with 173 men, with which she fought her first action; she had a much smaller number aboard in her second.]

The British vessels encountered were similar, but generally inferior, to our own. The only 24-pounder frigate we encountered was the Endymion of about a fifth less force than the President. Their 38-gun frigates were almost exactly like ours, but with fewer men in crew as a rule. They were three times matched against our 44-gun frigates, to which they were inferior about as three is to four. Their 36-gun frigates were larger than the Essex, with a more numerous crew, but the same number of guns; carrying on the lower deck, however, long 18's instead of 32-pound carronades,—a much more effective armament. The 32-gun frigates were smaller, with long 12's on the main-deck. The largest sloops were also frigate-built, carrying twenty-two 32-pound carronades on the main-deck, and twelve lighter guns on the quarter-deck and forecastle, with a crew of 180. The large flush-decked ship-sloops carried 21 or 23 guns, with a crew of 140 men. But our vessels most often came in contact with the British 18-gun brig-sloop; this was a tubby craft, heavier than any of our brigs, being about the size of the Hornet. The crew consisted of from 110 to 135 men; ordinarily each was armed with sixteen 32-pound carronades, two long 6's, and a shifting 12-pound carronade; often with a light long gun as a stern-chaser, making 20 in all. The Reindeer and Peacock had only 24-pound carronades; the Epervier had but eighteen guns, all carronades. [Footnote: The Epervier was taken into our service under the same name and rate. Both Preble and Emmons describe her as of 477 tons. Warrington, her captor, however, says: "The surveyor of the port has just measured the Epervier and reports her 467 tons." (In the Navy Archives, "Masters' Commandant Letters," 1814, i. No. 125.) For a full discussion of tonnage, see Appendix, A.]

Among the stock accusations against our navy of 1812, were, and are, statements that our vessels were rated at less than their real force, and in particular that our large frigates were "disguised line-of-battle ships." As regards the ratings, most vessels of that time carried more guns than they rated; the disparity was less in the French than in either the British or American navies. Our 38-gun frigates carried 48 guns, the exact number the British 38's possessed. The worst case of underrating in our navy was the Essex, which rated 32, and carried 46 guns, so that her real was 44 per cent, in excess of her nominal force; but this was not as bad as the British sloop Cyane, which was rated a 20 or 22, and carried 34 guns, so that she had either 55 or 70 per cent, greater real than nominal force. At the beginning of the war we owned two 18-gun ship-sloops, one mounting 18 and the other 20 guns; the 18-gun brig-sloops they captured mounted each 19 guns, so the average was the same. Later we built sloops that rated 18 and mounted 22 guns, but when one was captured it was also put down in the British navy list as an 18-gun ship-sloop. During all the combats of the war there were but four vessels that carried as few guns as they rated. Two were British, the Epervier and Levant, and two American, the Wasp and Adams. One navy was certainly as deceptive as another, as far as underrating went.

The force of the statement that our large frigates were disguised line-of-battle ships, of course depends entirely upon what the words "frigate" and "line-of-battle ship" mean. When on the 10th of August, 1653, De Ruyter saved a great convoy by beating off Sir George Ayscough's fleet of 38 sail, the largest of the Dutch admiral's "33 sail of the line" carried but 30 guns and 150 men, and his own flag-ship but 28 guns and 134 men. [Footnote: La Vie et les Actions Memorables du Sr. Michel de Ruyter, a Amsterdam, Chez Henry et Theodore Boom. MDCLXXVII. The work is by Barthelemy Pielat, a surgeon in de Ruyter's fleet, and personally present during many of his battles. It is written in French, but is in tone more strongly anti-French than anti-English.] The Dutch book from which this statement is taken speaks indifferently of frigates of 18, 40, and 58 guns. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the terms had crystallized. Frigate then meant a so-called single-decked ship; it in reality possessed two decks, the main- or gun-deck, and the upper one, which had no name at all, until our sailors christened it spar-deck. The gun-deck possessed a complete battery, and the spar-deck an interrupted one, mounting guns on the forecastle and quarter-deck. At that time all "two-decked" or "three-decked" (in reality three- and four-decked) ships were liners. But in 1812 this had changed somewhat; as the various nations built more and more powerful vessels, the lower rates of the different divisions were dropped. Thus the British ship Cyane, captured by the Constitution, was in reality a small frigate, with a main-deck battery of 22 guns, and 12 guns on the spar-deck; a few years before she would have been called a 24-gun frigate, but she then ranked merely as a 22-gun sloop. Similarly the 50- and 64-gun ships that had fought in the line at the Doggerbank, Camperdown, and even at Aboukir, were now no longer deemed fit for the purpose, and the 74 was the lowest line-of-battle ship.

The Constitution, President, and States must then be compared with the existing European vessels that were classed as frigates. The French in 1812 had no 24-pounder frigates, for the very good reason that they had all fallen victims to the English 18-pounder's; but in July of that year a Danish frigate, the Nayaden, which carried long 24's, was destroyed by the English ship Dictator, 64.

The British frigates were of several rates. The lowest rated 32, carrying in all 40 guns, 26 long 12's on the main-deck and 14 24-pound carronades on the spar-deck—a broadside of 324 pounds. [Footnote: In all these vessels there were generally two long 6's or 9's substituted for the bow-chase carronades.] The 36-gun frigates, like the Phoebe, carried 46 guns, 26 long 18's on the gun-deck and 32-pound carronades above. The 38-gun frigates, like the Macedonian, carried 48 or 49 guns, long 18's below and 32-pound carronades above. The 32-gun frigates, then, presented in broadside 13 long 12's below and 7 24-pound carronades above; the 38-gun frigates, 14 long 18's below and 10 32-pound carronades above; so that a 44-gun frigate would naturally present 15 long 24's and 12 42-pound carronades above, as the United States did at first. The rate was perfectly proper, for French, British, and Danes already possessed 24-pounder frigates; and there was really less disparity between the force and rate of a 44 that carried 54 guns than there was in a 38 that carried 49, or, like the Shannon, 52. Nor was this all. Two of our three victories were won by the Constitution, which only carried 32-pound carronades, and once 54 and once 52 guns; and as two thirds of the work was thus done by this vessel, I shall now compare her with the largest British frigates. Her broadside force consisted of 15 long 24's on the main-deck, and on the spar-deck one long 24, and in one case 10, in the other 11 32-pound carronades—a broadside of 704 or 736 pounds. [Footnote: Nominally; in reality about 7 per cent, less on account of the short weight in the metal.] There was then in the British navy the Acasta, 40, carrying in broadside 15 long 18's and 11 32-pound carronades; when the spar-deck batteries are equal, the addition of 90 pounds to the main-deck broadside (which is all the superiority of the Constitution over the Acasta) is certainly not enough to make the distinction between a frigate and a disguised 74. But not considering the Acasta, there were in the British navy three 24-pounder frigates, the Cornwallis, Indefatigable, and Endymion. We only came in contact with the latter in 1815, when the Constitution had but 52 guns. The Endymion then had an armament of 28 long 24's, 2 long 18's, and 20 32-pound carronades, making a broadside of 674 pounds, [Footnote: According to James 664 pounds; he omits the chase guns for no reason.] or including a shifting 24-pound carronade, of 698 pounds—just six pounds, or 1 per cent, less than the force of that "disguised line-of-battle ship" the Constitution! As the Endymion only rated as a 40, and the Constitution as a 44, it was in reality the former and not the latter which was underrated. I have taken the Constitution, because the British had more to do with her than they did with our other two 44's taken together. The latter were both of heavier metal than the Constitution, carrying 42-pound carronades. In 1812 the United States carried her full 54 guns, throwing a broadside of 846 pounds; when captured, the President carried 53, having substituted a 24-pound carronade for two of her 42's, and her broadside amounted to 828 pounds, or 16 per cent nominal, and, on account of the short weight of her shot, 9 per cent, real excess over the Endymion. If this difference made her a line-of-battle ship, then the Endymion was doubly a line-of-battle ship compared to the Congress or Constellation. Moreover, the American commanders found their 42-pound carronades too heavy; as I have said the Constitution only mounted 32's, and the United States landed 6 of her guns. When, in 1813, she attempted to break the blockade, she carried but 48 guns, throwing a broadside of 720 pounds—just 3 per cent more than the Endymion. [Footnote: It was on account of this difference of 3 per cent that Captain Hardy refused to allow the Endymion to meet the States (James, vi. p. 470). This was during the course of some challenges and counter-challenges which ended in nothing, Decatur in his turn being unwilling to have the Macedonian meet the Statira, unless the latter should agree not to take on a picked crew. He was perfectly right in this; but he ought never to have sent the challenge at all, as two ships but an hour or two out of port would be at a frightful disadvantage in a fight.] If our frigates were line-of-battle ships the disguise was certainly marvellously complete, and they had a number of companions equally disguised in the British ranks.

The 44's were thus true frigates, with one complete battery of long guns and one interrupted one of carronades. That they were better than any other frigates was highly creditable to our ingenuity and national skill. We cannot, perhaps, lay claim to the invention and first use of the heavy frigate, for 24-pounder frigates were already in the service of at least three nations, and the French 36-pound carronnade, in use on their spar-decks, threw a heavier ball than our 42-pounder. But we had enlarged and perfected the heavy frigate, and were the first nation that ever used it effectively. The French Forte and the Danish Nayaden shared the fate of ships carrying guns of lighter calibre; and the British 24-pounders, like the Endymion, had never accomplished any thing. Hitherto there had been a strong feeling, especially in England, that an 18-pound gun was as effective as a 24- in arming a frigate; we made a complete revolution in this respect. England had been building only 18-pounder vessels when she ought to have been building 24-pounders. It was greatly to our credit that our average frigate was superior to the average British frigate; exactly as it was to our discredit that the Essex was so ineffectively armed. Captain Porter owed his defeat chiefly to his ineffective guns, but also to having lost his topmast, to the weather being unfavorable, and, still more, to the admirable skill with which Hilyar used his superior armament. The Java, Macedonian, and Guerriere owed their defeat partly to their lighter guns, but much more to the fact that their captains and seamen did not display either as good seamanship or as good gunnery as their foes. Inferiority in armament was a factor to be taken into account in all the four cases, but it was more marked in that of the Essex than in the other three; it would have been fairer for Porter to say that he had been captured by a line-of-battle ship, than for the captain of the Java to make that assertion. In this last case the forces of the two ships compared almost exactly as their rates. A 44 was matched against a 38; it was not surprising that she should win, but it was surprising that she should win with ease and impunity. The long 24's on the Constitution's gun-deck no more made her a line-of-battle ship than the 32-pound carronades mounted on an English frigate's quarter-deck and forecastle made her a line-of-battle ship when opposed to a Frenchman with only 8's and 6's on his spar-deck. When, a few years before, the English Phoebe had captured the French Nereide, their broadsides were respectively 407 and 258 pounds, a greater disparity than in any of our successful fights; yet no author thought of claiming that the Phoebe was any thing but a frigate. So with the Clyde, throwing 425 lbs., which took the Vestale, throwing but 246. The facts were that 18-pounder frigates had captured 12-pounders, exactly as our 24-pounders in turn captured the 18-pounders.

Shortly before Great Britain declared war on us, one of her 18-pounder frigates, the San Florenzo, throwing 476 lbs. in a broadside, captured the 12-pounder French frigate Psyche, whose broadside was only 246 lbs. The force of the former was thus almost double that of the latter, yet the battle was long and desperate, the English losing 48 and the French 124 men. This conflict, then, reflected as much credit on the skill and seamanship of the defeated as of the victorious side; the difference in loss could fairly be ascribed to the difference in weight of metal. But where, as in the famous ship-duels of 1812, the difference in force is only a fifth, instead of a half and yet the slaughter, instead of being as five is to two, is as six to one, then the victory is certainly to be ascribed as much to superiority in skill as to superiority in force. But, on the other hand, it should always be remembered that there was a very decided superiority in force. It is a very discreditable feature of many of our naval histories that they utterly ignore this superiority, seeming ashamed to confess that it existed. In reality it was something to be proud of. It was highly to the credit of the United States that her frigates were of better make and armament than any others; it always speaks well for a nation's energy and capacity that any of her implements of warfare are of superior kind. This is a perfectly legitimate reason for pride.

It spoke well for the Prussians in 1866 that they opposed breech-loaders to the muzzle-loaders of the Austrians; but it would be folly to give all the credit of the victory to the breech-loaders and none to Moltke and his lieutenants. Thus, it must remembered that two things contributed to our victories. One was the excellent make and armament of our ships; the other was the skilful seamanship, excellent discipline, and superb gunnery of the men who were in them. British writers are apt only to speak of the first, and Americans only of the last, whereas both should be taken into consideration.

To sum up: the American 44-gun frigate was a true frigate, in build and armament, properly rated, stronger than a 38-gun frigate just about in the proportion of 44 to 38, and not exceeding in strength an 18-pounder frigate as much as the latter exceeded one carrying 12-pounders. They were in no way whatever line-of-battle ships; but they were superior to any other frigates afloat, and, what is still more important, they were better manned and commanded than the average frigate of any other navy. Lord Codrington says ("Memoirs," i, p. 310): "But I well know the system of favoritism and borough corruption prevails so very much that many people are promoted and kept in command that should be dismissed the service, and while such is the case the few Americans chosen for their merit may be expected to follow up their successes except where they meet with our best officers on even terms." [Footnote: To show that I am not quoting an authority biassed in our favor I will give Sir Edward Codrington's opinion of our rural better class (i, 318). "It is curious to observe the animosity which prevails here among what is called the better order of people, which I think is more a misnomer here than in any other country I have ever been. Their whig and tory are democrat and federalist, and it would seem for the sake of giving vent to that bitterness of hatred which marks the Yankee character, every gentleman (God save the term) who takes possession of a property adopts the opposite political creed to that of his nearest neighbor."] The small size of our navy was probably to a certain extent effective in keeping it up to a high standard; but this is not the only explanation, as can be seen by Portugal's small and poor navy. On the other hand, the champions or pick of a large navy ought to be better than the champions of a small one. [Footnote: In speaking of tonnage I wish I could have got better authority than James for the British side of the question. He is so bitter that it involuntarily gives one a distrust of his judgment. Thus, in speaking of the Penguin's capture, he, in endeavoring to show that the Hornet's loss was greater than she acknowledged, says, "several of the dangerously wounded were thrown overboard because the surgeon was afraid to amputate, owing to his want of experience" ("Naval Occurrences," 492). Now what could persuade a writer to make such a foolish accusation? No matter how utterly depraved and brutal Captain Biddle might be, he would certainly not throw his wounded over alive because he feared they might die. Again, in vol. vi, p. 546, he says: "Captain Stewart had caused the Cyane to be painted to resemble a 36-gun frigate. The object of this was to aggrandize his exploit in the eyes of the gaping citizens of Boston." No matter how skilful an artist Captain Stewart was, and no matter how great the gaping capacities of the Bostonians, the Cyane (which by the way went to New York and not Boston) could no more be painted to look like a 36-gun frigate than a schooner could be painted to look like a brig. Instances of rancor like these two occur constantly in his work, and make it very difficult to separate what is matter of fact from what is matter of opinion. I always rely on the British official accounts when they can be reached, except in the case of the Java, which seem garbled. That such was sometimes the case with British officials is testified to by both James (vol. iv, p. 17) and Brenton (vol. ii, p. 454, note). From the "Memoir of Admiral Broke" we learn that his public letter was wrong in a number of particulars. See also any one of the numerous biographies of Lord Dundonald, the hero of the little Speedy's fight. It is very unfortunate that the British stopped publishing official accounts of their defeats; it could not well help giving rise to unpleasant suspicions.

It may be as well to mention here, again, that James' accusations do not really detract from the interest attaching to the war, and its value for purposes of study. If, as he says, the American commanders were cowards, and their crews renegades, it is well worth while to learn the lesson that good training will make such men able to beat brave officers with loyal crews. And why did the British have such bad average crews as he makes out? He says, for instance, that the Java's was unusually bad; yet Brenton says (vol. ii, p. 461) it was like "the generality of our crews." It is worth while explaining the reason that such a crew was generally better than a French and worse than an American one.]

Again, the armaments of the American as well as of the British ships were composed of three very different styles of guns. The first, or long gun, was enormously long and thick-barrelled in comparison to its bore, and in consequence very heavy; it possessed a very long range, and varied in calibre from two to forty-two pounds. The ordinary calibres in our navy were 6, 9, 12, 18, and 24. The second style was the carronade, a short, light gun of large bore; compared to a long gun of the same weight it carried a much heavier ball for a much shorter distance. The chief calibres were 9, 12, 18, 24, 32, 42, and 68-pounders, the first and the last being hardly in use in our navy. The third style was the columbiad, of an intermediate grade between the first two. Thus it is seen that a gun of one style by no means corresponds to a gun of another style of the same calibre. As a rough example, a long 12, a columbiad 18, and a 32-pound carronade would be about equivalent to one another. These guns were mounted on two different types of vessel. The first was flush-decked; that is, it had a single straight open deck on which all the guns were mounted. This class included one heavy corvette, (the Adams), the ship-sloops, and the brig-sloops. Through the bow-chase port, on each side, each of these mounted a long gun; the rest of their guns were carronades, except in the case of the Adams, which had all long guns. Above these came the frigates, whose gun-deck was covered above by another deck; on the fore and aft parts (forecastle and quarter-deck) of this upper, open deck were also mounted guns. The main-deck guns were all long, except on the Essex, which had carronades; on the quarter-deck were mounted carronades, and on the forecastle also carronades, with two long bow-chasers.

Where two ships of similar armament fought one another, it is easy to get the comparative force by simply comparing the weight in broadsides, each side presenting very nearly the same proportion of long guns to carronades. For such a broadside we take half the guns mounted in the ordinary way; and all guns mounted on pivots or shifting. Thus Perry's force in guns was 54 to Barclay's 63; yet each presented 34 in broadside. Again, each of the British brig-sloops mounted 19 guns, presenting 10 in broadside. Besides these, some ships mounted bow-chasers run through the bridle-ports, or stern-chasers, neither of which could be used in broadsides. Nevertheless, I include them, both because it works in about an equal number of cases against each navy, and because they were sometimes terribly effective. James excludes the Guerriere's bow-chaser; in reality he ought to have included both it and its fellow, as they worked more damage than all the broadside guns put together. Again, he excludes the Endymion's bow-chasers, though in her action they proved invaluable. Yet he includes those of the Enterprise and Argus, though the former's were probably not fired. So I shall take the half of the fixed, plus all the movable guns aboard, in comparing broadside force.

But the chief difficulty appears when guns of one style are matched against those of another. If a ship armed with long 12's, meets one armed with 32-pound carronades, which is superior in force? At long range the first, and at short range the second; and of course each captain is pretty sure to insist that "circumstances" forced him to fight at a disadvantage. The result would depend largely on the skill or luck of each commander in choosing position.

One thing is certain; long guns are more formidable than carronades of the same calibre. There are exemplifications of this rule on both sides; of course, American writers, as a rule, only pay attention to one set of cases, and British to the others. The Cyane and Levant threw a heavier broadside than the Constitution but were certainly less formidably armed; and the Essex threw a heavier broadside than the Phoebe, yet was also less formidable. On Lake Ontario the American ship General Pike threw less metal at a broadside than either of her two chief antagonists, but neither could be called her equal; while on Lake Champlain a parallel case is afforded by the British ship Confiance. Supposing that two ships throw the same broadside weight of metal, one from long guns, the other from carronades, at short range they are equal; at long, one has it all her own way. Her captain thus certainly has a great superiority of force, and if he does not take advantage of it it is owing to his adversary's skill or his own mismanagement. As a mere approximation, it may be assumed, in comparing the broadsides of two vessels or squadrons, that long guns count for at least twice as much as carronades of the same calibre. Thus on Lake Champlain Captain Downie possessed an immense advantage in his long guns, which Commodore Macdonough's exceedingly good arrangements nullified. Sometimes part of the advantage may be willingly foregone, so as to acquire some other. Had the Constitution kept at long bowls with the Cyane and Levant she could have probably captured one without any loss to herself, while the other would have escaped; she preferred to run down close so as to insure the capture of both, knowing that even at close quarters long guns are somewhat better than short ones (not to mention her other advantages in thick scantling, speed, etc.). The British carronades often upset in action; this was either owing to their having been insufficiently secured, and to this remaining undiscovered because the men were not exercised at the guns, or else it was because the unpractised sailors would greatly overcharge them. Our better-trained sailors on the ocean rarely committed these blunders, but the less-skilled crews on the lakes did so as often as their antagonists.

But while the Americans thus, as a rule, had heavier and better-fitted guns, they labored under one or two disadvantages. Our foundries were generally not as good as those of the British, and our guns, in consequence, more likely to burst; it was an accident of this nature which saved the British Belvidera; and the General Pike, under Commodore Chauncy, and the new American frigate Guerriere suffered in the same way; while often the muzzles of the guns would crack. A more universal disadvantage was in the short weight of our shot. When Captain Blakely sunk the Avon he officially reported that her four shot which came aboard weighed just 32 pounds apiece, a pound and three quarters more than his heaviest; this would make his average shot about 2 1/2 pounds less, or rather over 7 per cent. Exactly similar statements were made by the officers of the Constitution in her three engagements. Thus when she fought the Java, she threw at a broadside, as already stated, 704 pounds; the Java mounted 28 long 18's, 18 32-pound carronades, 2 long 12's, and one shifting 24-pound carronade, a broadside of 576 pounds. Yet by the actual weighing of all the different shot on both sides it was found that the difference in broadside force was only about 77 pounds, or the Constitution's shot were about 7 per cent, short weight. The long 24's of the United States each threw a shot but 4 1/4 pounds heavier than the long 18's of the Macedonian; here again the difference was about 7 per cent. The same difference existed in favor of the Penguin and Epervier compared with the Wasp and Hornet. Mr. Fenimore Cooper [Footnote: See "Naval History," i, p. 380.] weighed a great number of shot some time after the war. The later castings, even weighed nearly 5 per cent, less than the British shot, and some of the older ones, about 9 per cent. The average is safe to take at 7 per cent. less, and I shall throughout make this allowance for ocean cruisers. The deficit was sometimes owing to windage, but more often the shot was of full size but defective in density. The effect of this can be gathered from the following quotation from the work of a British artillerist: "The greater the density of shot of like calibres, projected with equal velocity and elevation, the greater the range, accuracy, and penetration." [Footnote: "Heavy Ordnance," Captain T. F. Simmons, R. A., London, 1837. James supposes that the "Yankee captains" have in each case hunted round till they could get particularly small American shot to weigh; and also denies that short weight is a disadvantage. The last proposition carried out logically would lead to some rather astonishing results.] This defectiveness in density might be a serious injury in a contest at a long distance, but would make but little difference at close quarters (although it may have been partly owing to their short weight that so many of the Chesapeake's shot failed to penetrate the Shannon's hull). Thus in the actions with the Macedonian and Java the American frigates showed excellent practice when the contest was carried on within fair distance, while their first broadsides at long range went very wild; but in the case of the Guerriere, the Constitution reserved her fire for close quarters, and was probably not at all affected by the short weight of her shot.

As to the officers and crew of a 44-gun frigate, the following was the regular complement established by law: [Footnote: See State Papers, vol. xiv, 159 (Washington, 1834).]

1 captain, 4 lieutenants, 2 lieutenants of marines, 2 sailing-masters, 2 master's mates, 7 midshipmen, 1 purser, 1 surgeon, 2 surgeon's mates, 1 clerk, 1 carpenter, 2 carpenter's mates, 1 boatswain, 2 boatswain's mates, 1 yeoman of gun-room, 1 gunner, 11 quarter gunners, 1 coxswain, 1 sailmaker, 1 cooper, 1 steward, 1 armorer, 1 master of arms, 1 cook, 1 chaplain. _ 50

120 able seamen, 150 ordinary seamen, 30 boys, 50 marines. _ 400 in all.

An 18-gun ship had 32 officers and petty officers, 30 able seamen, 46 ordinary seamen, 12 boys, and 20 marines—140 in all. Sometimes ships put to sea without their full complements (as in the case of the first Wasp), but more often with supernumeraries aboard. The weapons for close quarters were pikes, cutlasses, and a few axes; while the marines and some of the topmen had muskets, and occasionally rifles.

In comparing the forces of the contestants I have always given the number of men in crew; but this in most cases was unnecessary. When there were plenty of men to handle the guns, trim the sails, make repairs, act as marines, etc., any additional number simply served to increase the slaughter on board. The Guerriere undoubtedly suffered from being short-handed, but neither the Macedonian nor Java would have been benefited by the presence of a hundred additional men. Barclay possessed about as many men as Perry, but this did not give him an equality of force. The Penguin and Frolic would have been taken just as surely had the Hornet and Wasp had a dozen men less apiece than they did. The principal case where numbers would help would be in a hand-to-hand fight. Thus the Chesapeake having fifty more men than the Shannon ought to have been successful; but she was not, because the superiority of her crew in numbers was more than counterbalanced by the superiority of the Shannon's crew in other respects. The result of the battle of Lake Champlain, which was fought at anchor, with the fleets too far apart for musketry to reach, was not in the slightest degree affected by the number of men on either side, as both combatants had amply enough to manage the guns and perform every other service.

In all these conflicts the courage of both parties is taken for granted: it was not so much a factor in gaining the victory, as one which if lacking was fatal to all chances of success. In the engagements between regular cruisers, not a single one was gained by superiority in courage. The crews of both the Argus and Epervier certainly flinched; but had they fought never so bravely they were too unskilful to win. The Chesapeake's crew could hardly be said to lack courage; it was more that they were inferior to their opponents in discipline as well as in skill.

There was but one conflict during the war where the victory could be said to be owing to superiority in pluck. This was when the Neufchatel privateer beat off the boats of the Endymion. The privateersmen suffered a heavier proportional loss than their assailants, and they gained the victory by sheer ability to stand punishment.

For convenience in comparing them I give in tabulated form the force of the three British 38's taken by American 44's (allowing for short weight of metal of latter).

CONSTITUTION. GUERRIERE. 30 long 24's, 30 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 22 short 32's. 16 short 32's, 1 short 18. Broadside, nominal, 736 lbs. real. 684 lbs. Broadside, 556 lbs.

UNITED STATES MACEDONIAN 30 long 24's, 28 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 22 short 42's. 2 long 9's, _____ 16 short 32's, Broadside, nominal, 846 lbs. 1 short 18. real, 786 lbs. ____ Broadside, 547 lbs.

CONSTITUTION JAVA 30 long 24's, 28 long 18's, 2 long 24's, 2 long 12's, 20 short 32's. 18 short 32's, _____ 1 short 24. Broadside, nominal, 704 lbs. ____ real. 654 lbs. Broadside. 576 lbs.

The smallest line-of-battle ship, the 74, with only long 18's on the second deck, was armed as follows:

28 long 32's, 28 " 18's, 6 " 12's. 14 short 32's 7 " 18's

or a broadside of 1,032 lbs., 736 from long guns, 296 from carronades; while the Constitution threw (in reality) 684 lbs., 356 from long guns, and 328 from her carronades, and the United States 102 lbs. more from her carronades. Remembering the difference between long guns and carronades, and considering sixteen of the 74's long 18's as being replaced by 42-pound carronades [Footnote: That this change would leave the force about as it was, can be gathered from the fact that the Adams and John Adams both of which had been armed with 42 pound carronades (which were sent to Sackett's Harbor), had them replaced by long and medium 18 pounders, these being considered to be formidable: so that the substitution of 42-pound carronades would, if any thing, reduce the force of the 74] (so as to get the metal on the ships distributed in similar proportions between the two styles of cannon), we get as the 74's broadside 592 lbs from long guns, and 632 from carronades. The United States threw nominally 360 and 486, and the Constitution nominally 360 and 352; so the 74 was superior even to the former nominally about as three is to two; while the Constitution, if "a line-of-battle ship," was disguised to such a degree that she was in reality of but little more than one half the force of one of the smallest true liners England possessed!



Chapter III

1812

ON THE OCEAN

Commodore Rodgers' cruise and unsuccessful chase of the Belvidera—Cruise of the Essex—Captain Hull's cruise, and escape from the squadron of Commodore Broke—Constitution captures Guerriere—Wasp captures Frolic—Second unsuccessful cruise of Commodore Rodgers—United States captures Macedonian—Constitution captures Java—Essex starts on a cruise—Summary

At the time of the declaration of war, June 18, 1812, the American navy was but partially prepared for effective service. The Wasp, 18, was still at sea, on her return voyage from France; the Constellation, 38, was lying in the Chesapeake river, unable to receive a crew for several months to come; the Chesapeake, 38, was lying in a similar condition in Boston harbor; the Adams, 28, was at Washington, being cut down and lengthened from a frigate into a corvette. These three cruisers were none of them fit to go to sea till after the end of the year. The Essex, 32, was in New York harbor, but, having some repairs to make, was not yet ready to put out. The Constitution, 44, was at Annapolis, without all of her stores, and engaged in shipping a new crew, the time of the old one being up. The Nautilus, 14, was cruising off New Jersey, and the other small brigs were also off the coast. The only vessels immediately available were those under the command of Commodore Rodgers, at New York, consisting of his own ship, the President, 44, and of the United States, 44, Commodore Decatur, Congress, 38, Captain Smith, Hornet, 18, Captain Lawrence, and Argus, 16, Lieut. Sinclair. It seems marvellous that any nation should have permitted its ships to be so scattered, and many of them in such an unfit condition, at the beginning of hostilities. The British vessels cruising off the coast were not at that time very numerous or formidable, consisting of the Africa, 64, Acasta, 40, Shannon, 38, Guerriere, 38, Belvidera, 36, Aeolus, 32, Southampton, 32, and Minerva, 32, with a number of corvettes and sloops; their force was, however, strong enough to render it impossible for Commodore Rodgers to make any attempt on the coast towns of Canada or the West Indies. But the homeward bound plate fleet had sailed from Jamaica on May 20th, and was only protected by the Thalia, 36, Capt. Vashon, and Reindeer, 18, Capt. Manners. Its capture or destruction would have been a serious blow, and one which there seemed a good chance of striking, as the fleet would have to pass along the American coast, running with the Gulf Stream. Commodore Rodgers had made every preparation, in expectation of war being declared, and an hour after official intelligence of it, together with his instructions, had been received, his squadron put to sea, on June 21st, and ran off toward the south-east [Footnote: Letter of Commodore John Rodgers to the Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 1, 1812.] to get at the Jamaica ships. Having learned from an American brig that she had passed the plate fleet four days before in lat. 36 deg. N., long. 67 deg. W., the Commodore made all sail in that direction. At 6 A.M. on June 23d a sail was made out in the N. E., which proved to be the British frigate Belvidera, 36, Capt. Richard Byron. [Footnote: Brenton, v. 46.] The latter had sighted some of Commodore Rodgers' squadron some time before, and stood toward them, till at 6.30 she made out the three largest ships to be frigates. Having been informed of the likelihood of war by a New York pilot boat, the Belvidera now stood away, going N. E. by E., the wind being fresh from the west. The Americans made all sail in chase, the President, a very fast ship off the wind, leading, and the Congress coming next. At noon the President bore S. W., distant 2 3/4 miles from the Belvidera, Nantucket shoals bearing 100 miles N. and 48 miles E [Footnote: Log of Belvidera, June 23, 1812.]. The wind grew lighter, shifting more toward the south-west, while the ships continued steadily in their course, going N.E. by E. As the President kept gaining, Captain Byron cleared his ship for action, and shifted to the stern ports two long eighteen-pounders on the main-deck and two thirty-two pound carronades on the quarter-deck.

At 4:30 [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 151. According to James, vi, 117, the President was then 600 yards distant from the Belvidera, half a point on her weather or port quarter.] the President's starboard forecastle bowgun was fired by Commodore Rodgers himself; the corresponding main-deck gun was next discharged, and then Commodore Rodgers fired again. These three shots all struck the stern of the Belvidera, killing and wounding nine men,—one of them went through the rudder coat, into the after gun-room, the other two into the captain's cabin. A few more such shots would have rendered the Belvidera's capture certain, but when the President's main-deck gun was discharged for the second time it burst, blowing up the forecastle deck and killing and wounding 16 men, among them the Commodore himself, whose leg was broken. This saved the British frigate. Such an explosion always causes a half panic, every gun being at once suspected. In the midst of the confusion Captain Byron's stern-chasers opened with spirit and effect, killing or wounding six men more. Had the President still pushed steadily on, only using her bow-chasers until she closed abreast, which she could probably have done, the Belvidera could still have been taken; but, instead, the former now bore up and fired her port broadside, cutting her antagonist's rigging slightly, but doing no other damage, while the Belvidera kept up a brisk and galling fire, although the long bolts, breeching-hooks, and breechings of the guns now broke continually, wounding several of the men, including Captain Byron. The President had lost ground by yawing, but she soon regained it, and, coming up closer than before, again opened from her bow-chasers a well-directed fire, which severely wounded her opponent's main-top mast, cross-jack yard, and one or two other spars; [Footnote: James, vi, 119. He says the President was within 400 yards.] but shortly afterward she repeated her former tactics and again lost ground by yawing to discharge another broadside, even more ineffectual than the first. Once more she came up closer than ever, and once more yawed; the single shots from her bow-chasers doing considerable damage, but her raking broadsides none. [Footnote: Lord Howard Douglass, "Naval Gunnery," p. 419 (third edition).] Meanwhile the active crew of the Belvidera repaired every thing as fast as it was damaged, while under the superintendence of Lieutenants Sykes, Bruce, and Campbell, no less than 300 shot were fired from her stern guns. [Footnote: James, vi, 118.] Finding that if the President ceased yawing she could easily run alongside, Captain Byron cut away one bower, one stream, and two sheet anchors, the barge, yawl, gig, and jolly boat, and started 14 tons of water. The effect of this was at once apparent, and she began to gain; meanwhile the damage the sails of the combatants had received had enabled the Congress to close, and when abreast of his consort Captain Smith opened with his bow-chasers, but the shot fell short. The Belvidera soon altered her course to east by south, set her starboard studding-sails, and by midnight was out of danger; and three days afterward reached Halifax harbor.

Lord Howard Douglass' criticisms on this encounter seem very just. He says that the President opened very well with her bow-chasers (in fact the Americans seem to have aimed better and to have done more execution with these guns than the British with their stern-chasers); but that she lost so much ground by yawing and delivering harmless broadsides as to enable her antagonist to escape. Certainly if it had not been for the time thus lost to no purpose, the Commodore would have run alongside his opponent, and the fate of the little 36 would have been sealed. On the other hand it must be remembered that it was only the bursting of the gun on board the President, causing such direful confusion and loss, and especially harmful in disabling her commander, that gave the Belvidera any chance of escape at all. At any rate, whether the American frigate does, or does not, deserve blame, Captain Byron and his crew do most emphatically deserve praise for the skill with which their guns were served and repairs made, the coolness with which measures to escape were adopted, and the courage with which they resisted so superior a force. On this occasion Captain Byron showed himself as good a seaman and as brave a man as he subsequently proved a humane and generous enemy when engaged in the blockade of the Chesapeake. [Footnote: Even Niles, unscrupulously bitter as he is toward the British, does justice to the humanity of Captains Byron and Hardy—which certainly shone in comparison to some of the rather buccaneering exploits of Cockburn's followers in Chesapeake Bay.]

This was not a very auspicious opening of hostilities for America. The loss of the Belvidera was not the only thing to be regretted, for the distance the chase took the pursuers out of their course probably saved the plate fleet. When the Belvidera was first made out, Commodore Rodgers was in latitude 39 deg. 26' N., and longitude 71 deg. 10' W.; at noon the same day the Thalia and her convoy were in latitude 39 deg. N., longitude 62 deg. W. Had they not chased the Belvidera the Americans would probably have run across the plate fleet.

The American squadron reached the western edge of the Newfoundland Banks on June 29th, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 1st.] and on July 1st, a little to the east of the Banks, fell in with large quantities of cocoa-nut shells, orange peels, etc., which filled every one with great hopes of overtaking the quarry. On July 9th, the Hornet captured a British privateer, in latitude 45 deg. 30' N., and longitude 23 deg. W., and her master reported that he had seen the Jamaica-men the previous evening; but nothing further was heard or seen of them, and on July 13th, being within twenty hours' sail of the English Channel, Commodore Rodgers reluctantly turned southward, reaching Madeira July 21st. Thence he cruised toward the Azores and by the Grand Banks home, there being considerable sickness on the ships. On August 31st he reached Boston after a very unfortunate cruise, in which he had made but seven prizes, all merchant-men, and had recaptured one American vessel.

On July 3d the Essex, 32, Captain David Porter, put out of New York. As has been already explained she was most inefficiently armed, almost entirely with carronades. This placed her at the mercy of any frigate with long guns which could keep at a distance of a few hundred yards; but in spite of Captain Porter's petitions and remonstrances he was not allowed to change his armament. On the 11th of July at 2 A. M., latitude 33 deg. N., longitude 66 deg. W., the Essex fell in with the Minerva, 32, Captain Richard Hawkins, convoying seven transports, each containing about 200 troops, bound from Barbadoes to Quebec. The convoy was sailing in open order, and, there being a dull moon, the Essex ran in and cut out transport No. 299, with 197 soldiers aboard. Having taken out the soldiers, Captain Porter stood back to the convoy, expecting Captain Hawkins to come out and fight him; but this the latter would not do, keeping the convoy in close order around him. The transports were all armed and still contained in the aggregate 1,200 soldiers. As the Essex could only fight at close quarters these heavy odds rendered it hopeless for her to try to cut out the Minerva. Her carronades would have to be used at short range to be effective, and it would of course have been folly to run in right among the convoy, and expose herself to the certainty of being boarded by five times as many men as she possessed. The Minerva had three less guns a side, and on her spar-deck carried 24-pound carronades instead of 32's, and, moreover, had fifty men less than the Essex, which had about 270 men this cruise; on the other hand, her main-deck was armed with long 12's, so that it is hard to say whether she did right or not in refusing to fight. She was of the same force as the Southampton whose captain, Sir James Lucas Yeo, subsequently challenged Porter, but never appointed a meeting-place. In the event of a meeting, the advantage, in ships of such radically different armaments, would have been with that captain who succeeded in outmanoeuvring the other and in making the fight come off at the distance best suited to himself. At long range either the Minerva or Southampton would possess an immense superiority; but if Porter could have contrived to run up within a couple of hundred yards, or still better, to board, his superiority in weight of metal and number of men would have enabled him to carry either of them. Porter's crew was better trained for boarding than almost any other American commander's; and probably none of the British frigates on the American station, except the Shannon and Tenedos, would have stood a chance with the Essex in a hand-to-hand struggle. Among her youngest midshipmen was one, by name David Glasgow Farragut, then but thirteen years old, who afterward became the first and greatest admiral of the United States. His own words on this point will be read with interest. "Every day," he says, [Footnote: "Life of Farragut" (embodying his journal and letters), p. 31. By his son, Loyall Farragut, New York. 1879.] "the crew were exercised at the great guns, small arms, and single stick. And I may here mention the fact that I have never been on a ship where the crew of the old Essex was represented but that I found them to be the best swordsmen on board. They had been so thoroughly trained as boarders that every man was prepared for such an emergency, with his cutlass as sharp as a razor, a dirk made by the ship's armorer out of a file, and a pistol." [Footnote: James says: "Had Captain Porter really endeavored to bring the Minerva to action we do not see what could have prevented the Essex with her superiority of sailing, from coming alongside of her. But no such thought, we are sure, entered into Captain Porter's head." What "prevented the Essex" was the Minerva's not venturing out of the convoy. Farragut, in his journal writes: "The captured British officers were very anxious for us to have a fight with the Minerva, as they considered her a good match for the Essex, and Captain Porter replied that he should gratify them with pleasure if his majesty's commander was of their taste. So we stood toward the convoy and when within gunshot hove to, and awaited the Minerva, but she tacked and stood in among the convoy, to the utter amazement of our prisoners, who denounced the commander as a base coward, and expressed their determination to report him to the Admiralty." An incident of reported "flinching" like this is not worth mentioning; I allude to it only to show the value of James' sneers.]

On August 13th a sail was made out to windward, which proved to be the British ship-sloop Alert, 16, Captain T. L. O. Laugharne, carrying 20 eighteen-pound carronades and 100 men. [Footnote: James (History, vi, p. 128) says "86 men." In the Naval Archives at Washington in the "Captains' Letters" for 1812 (vol. n. No. 182) can be found enclosed in Porter's letter the parole of the officers and crew of the Alert signed by Captain Laugharne; it contains either 100 or 101 names of the crew of the Alert besides those of a number of other prisoners sent back in the same cartel.] As soon as the Essex discovered the Alert she put out drags astern, and led the enemy to believe she was trying to escape by sending a few men aloft to shake out the reefs and make sail. Concluding the frigate to be a merchant-man, the Alert bore down on her; while the Americans went to quarters and cleared for action, although the tompions were left in the guns, and the ports kept closed. [Footnote: "Life of Farragut," p. 16.] The Alert fired a gun and the Essex hove to, when the former passed under her stern, and when on her lee quarter poured in a broadside of grape and canister; but the sloop was so far abaft the frigate's beam that her shot did not enter the ports and caused no damage. Thereupon Porter put up his helm and opened as soon as his guns would bear, tompions and all. The Alert now discovered her error and made off, but too late, for in eight minutes the Essex was along side, and the Alert fired a musket and struck, three men being wounded and several feet of water in the hold. She was disarmed and sent as a cartel into St. Johns. It has been the fashion among American writers to speak of her as if she were "unworthily" given up, but such an accusation is entirely groundless. The Essex was four times her force, and all that could possibly be expected of her was to do as she did—exchange broadsides and strike, having suffered some loss and damage. The Essex returned to New York on September 7th, having made 10 prizes, containing 423 men. [Footnote: Before entering New York the Essex fell in with a British force which, in both Porter's and Farragut's works, is said to have been composed of the Acasta and Shannon, each of fifty guns, and Ringdove, of twenty. James says it was the Shannon, accompanied by a merchant vessel. It is not a point of much importance, as nothing came of the meeting, and the Shannon, alone, with her immensely superior armament, ought to have been a match twice over for the Essex: although, if James is right, as seems probable, it gives rather a comical turn to Porter's account of his "extraordinary escape."]

The Belvidera, as has been stated, carried the news of the war to Halifax. On July 5th Vice-Admiral Sawyer despatched a squadron to cruise against the United States, commanded by Philip Vere Broke, of the Shannon, 38, having under him the Belvidera, 36, Captain Richard Byron, Africa, 64, Captain John Bastard, and Aeolus. 32, Captain Lord James Townsend. On the 9th, while off Nantucket, they were joined by the Guerriere, 38, Captain James Richard Dacres. On the 16th the squadron fell in with and captured the United States brig Nautilus, 14, Lieutenant Crane, which, like all the little brigs, was overloaded with guns and men. She threw her lee guns overboard and made use of every expedient to escape, but to no purpose. At 3 P.M. of the following day, when the British ships were abreast of Barnegat, about four leagues off shore, a strange sail was seen and immediately chased, in the south by east, or windward quarter, standing to the northeast. This was the United States frigate Constitution, 44, Captain Isaac Hull. [Footnote: For the ensuing chase I have relied mainly on Cooper; see also "Memoir of Admiral Broke," p. 240; James, vi, 133: and Marshall's "Naval Biography" (London, 1825), ii. 625.] When the war broke out he was in the Chesapeake River getting a new crew aboard. Having shipped over 450 men (counting officers), he put out of harbor on the 12th of July. His crew was entirely new, drafts of men coming on board up to the last moment. [Footnote: In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy ("Captains' Letters." 1812. ii, No. 85), Hull, after speaking of the way his men were arriving, says: "The crew are as yet unacquainted with a ship of war, as many have but lately joined and have never been on an armed ship before. * * * We are doing all that we can to make them acquainted with their duty, and in a few days we shall have nothing to fear from any single-decked ship."] On the 17th, at 2 P.M., Hull discovered four sail, in the northern board, heading to the westward. At 3, the wind being very light, the Constitution made sail and tacked, in 18-1/2 fathoms. At 4, in the N. E., a fifth sail appeared, which afterward proved to be the Guerriere, The first four ships bore N. N. W., and were all on the starboard tack; while by 6 o'clock the fifth bore E. N. E. At 6.15 the wind shifted and blew lightly from the south, bringing the American ship to wind-ward. She then wore round with her head to the eastward, set her light studding-sails and stay-sails, and at 7.30 beat to action, intending to speak the nearest vessel, the Guerriere. The two frigates neared one another gradually and at 10 the Constitution began making signals, which she continued for over an hour. At 3.30 A. M. on the 18th the Guerriere, going gradually toward the Constitution on the port tack, and but one half mile distant, discovered on her lee beam the Belvidera and the other British vessels, and signalled to them. They did not answer the signals, thinking she must know who they were—a circumstance which afterward gave rise to sharp recriminations among the captains—and Dacres, concluding them to be Commodore Rodgers' squadron, tacked, and then wore round and stood away from the Constitution for some time before discovering his mistake.



At 5 A. M. Hull had just enough steerage way on to keep his head to the east, on the starboard tack; on his lee quarter, bearing N. E. by N., were the Belvidera and Guerriere and astern the Shannon, Aeolus, and Africa. At 5.30 it fell entirely calm, and Hull put out his boats to tow the ship, always going southward. At the same time he whipped up a 24 from the main-deck, and got the forecastlechaser aft, cutting away the taffrail to give the two guns more freedom to work in and also running out, through the cabin windows, two of the long main-deck 24's. The British boats were towing also. At 6 A. M. a light breeze sprang up, and the Constitution set studding-sails and stay-sails; the Shannon opened at her with her bow guns, but ceased when she found she could not reach her. At 6.30, the wind having died away, the Shannon began to gain, almost all the boats of the squadron towing her. Having sounded in 26 fathoms, Lieutenant Charles Morris suggested to Hull to try kedging. All the spare rope was bent on to the cables, payed out into the cutters, and a kedge run out half a mile ahead and let go; then the crew clapped on and walked away with the ship, overrunning and tripping the kedge as she came up with the end of the line. Meanwhile, fresh lines and another kedge were carried ahead, and the frigate glided away from her pursuers. At 7.30 A. M. a little breeze sprang up, when the Constitution set her ensign and fired a shot at the Shannon. It soon fell calm again and the Shannon neared. At 9.10 a light air from the southward struck the ship, bringing her to windward. As the breeze was seen coming, her sails were trimmed, and as soon as she obeyed her helm she was brought close up on the port tack. The boats dropped in alongside; those that belonged to the davits were run up, while the others were just lifted clear of water, by purchases on the spare spars, stowed outboard, where they could be used again at a minute's notice. Meanwhile, on her lee beam, the Guerriere opened fire; but her shot fell short, and the Americans paid not the slightest heed to it. Soon it again fell calm, when Hull had 2000 gallons of water started, and again put out his boats to tow. The Shannon with some of the other boats of the squadron helping her, gained on the Constitution but by severe exertion was again left behind. Shortly afterward, a slight wind springing up, the Belvidera gained on the other British ships, and when it fell calm she was nearer to the Constitution than any of her consorts, their boats being put on to her. [Footnote: Cooper speaks as if this was the Shannon; but from Marshall's "Naval Biography" we learn that it was the Belvidera. At other times he confuses the Belvidera with the Guerriere. Captain Hull, of course, could not accurately distinguish the names of his pursuers. My account is drawn from a careful comparison of Marshall, Cooper, and James. ] At 10.30, observing the benefit that the Constitution had derived from warping, Captain Byron did the same, bending all his hawsers to one another, and working two kedge anchors at the same time by paying the warp out through one hawse-hole as it was run in through the other opposite. Having men from the other frigates aboard, and a lighter ship to work, Captain Byron at 2 P. M. was near enough to exchange bow—and stern-chasers with the Constitution, out of range however. Hull expected to be overtaken, and made every arrangement to try in such case to disable the first frigate before her consorts could close. But neither the Belvidera nor the Shannon dared to tow very near for fear of having their boats sunk by the American's stern-chasers.