The Cuban rebellion, which began in 1868, occasioned activity on the part of some of the cruisers to prevent violations of the neutrality law and to protect the interests of American citizens. A company of Cuban filibusters, encamped on Gardiner's Island, near the eastern end of Long Island, were captured by Lieutenant Breese, in command of the revenue cutter "Mahoning," and fifty marines. The prisoners, to the number of one hundred and twenty-five, were taken to New York. On the island of Cuba some outrages were perpetrated upon American citizens by the Spanish authorities. Rear-Admiral Hoff, in command of the North Atlantic squadron, was ordered to Santiago de Cuba for the better protection of American interests, and no further aggressions occurred.

Two disasters in the navy ushered in the year 1870. In the Bay of Yeddo, on January 24th, the steam-sloop "Oneida," just after leaving Yokohama for Hong Kong, was run into and sunk by the English steamer "Bombay," with the loss of twenty officers and ninety-six men. The tug "Marie" was sunk in the same month, with a loss of four men, in Long Island Sound. In October of the same year, Commander Sicard of the "Saginaw" determined to run to Ocean Island, a small island about a hundred miles west of the Midways, to rescue any sailors who might have been shipwrecked there. The "Saginaw" was herself wrecked on a reef off the perilous coast, but her men, after extreme exertions, landed safely on the shores of the uninhabited island. Here they lived for some months. They were rescued by a steamer from the Sandwich Islands, sent to their aid by the authorities of the islands, who had been informed of the accident by William Halford, one of the crew, who, with Lieutenant Talbot and three others, had volunteered to make the trip from Ocean Island to Honolulu, a distance of 1,500 miles, in an open boat. After thirty-one days of great danger and hardship, they arrived off one of the Hawaiian group of islands. In attempting to land, the boat was upset in the surf, and all but Halford were drowned.

At various times during the years 1871 and 1872, the marines of the Brooklyn Navy Yard rendered very efficient aid to the revenue officers in quelling riots in Brooklyn which grew out of the raiding of illicit distilleries. In July, 1871, Captain Gilbert was killed and several men wounded by the rioters.



The steamer "Forward," bearing the San Salvador flag, landed 200 desperadoes at Guaymas, Mexico, in June, 1870, and these outlaws took possession of the custom-house. They forced the foreign merchants to furnish them with funds and goods, and compelled the United States' consul to supply coal for their vessel, their purpose being to become pirates on a large scale. Commander Low, of the "Mohican," upon learning these facts, sailed from Mazatlan, and overtook the "Forward" while still in the Gulf of California. She was attacked in the harbor of Boca Teacapan by six boatloads of sailors and marines from the "Mohican," and was captured and burned.

It seemed desirable, in 1871, that some arrangement should be made with the people of Corea whereby sailors wrecked upon these shores should have protection. With this end in view our Minister to China, accompanied by Rear-Admiral John Rodgers, with the "Colorado," the "Alaska," the "Benicia," the "Monocacy," and the "Palos," vessels of the Asiatic squadron, sailed to Corea, anchoring in the Sale River. The local authorities were assured that the visit was a perfectly peaceful one, and they in turn gave evidences of a peaceful spirit. But when a party engaged in making surveys and soundings for the safety of commerce had got beyond a point where they could be protected by the cruisers' guns, they were fired upon by the Coreans, and were forced to re-pass the Corean forts under a fierce cannonade. Admiral Rodgers and the minister determined that an explanation should be at once demanded. No answer having been received from the Coreans after an interval of ten days, it was decided that an attack should be made upon the forts from which the shots had been fired. A party of about 700 of the sailors and marines were landed, and after a march through mud which rose to their knees, the first fort was captured without serious resistance. The next day, other forts were easily taken, and preparations were made to attack the horseshoe-shaped citadel, which was defended by a garrison of a thousand Corean soldiers. A few shells from the vessels, judiciously planted among the Coreans, frightened and disconcerted them; but they made a stubborn fight until their ammunition gave out. The attacking party swarmed over the walls. Then ensued a desperate hand-to-hand fight The Coreans expected no quarter, and fought till all who had not fled had been killed or wounded. Lieutenant Hugh McKee, who was the first man to climb over the ramparts, fell with a mortal wound. Two hundred and forty-seven dead Coreans were counted within the works. Five forts and a large number of flags and cannon had been captured. The gallant conduct of the men of the navy made a deep impression on the people of the China coast and led to the increased consideration and safety of American citizens in those localities.

On Saturday morning, November 26, 1877, occurred one of the most disastrous wrecks in the history of the navy. The steam sloop-of-war "Huron" struck the rocks near Oregon Inlet, North Carolina, in a heavy gale and was wrecked, with the loss of nearly a hundred officers and men. The boats were washed from the davits and the thirty-four persons who were saved reached the shore by swimming. Ensign Lucien Young landed on the beach after desperate efforts, and spread the alarm. His sturdy activity resulted in the saving of several lives.

The members of a naval exploring expedition, which had sailed in the "Polaris" for the Arctic regions in 1871, were rescued from boats and the floating ice in Baffin's Bay in 1873, the "Polaris" having been abandoned as a wreck.

The United States steamer "Rodgers," commanded by Lieutenant Robert M. Berry, was detailed in 1881 to search for the exploring party organized by James Gordon Bennett and headed by Lieutenant-Commander DeLong, which had embarked in the "Jeannette" for the far north and had been last heard of in August, 1879. The "Rodgers" was burned and abandoned in St. Laurence Bay, Siberia, in November, 1881; but Lieutenant Berry continued his search on the coast. In the early spring he learned that one party from the "Jeannette," that of Chief-Engineer Melville, had been saved and was searching for the other two parties which had become separated from the first in a storm while attempting to escape from the Arctic seas in open boats after the "Jeannette" had been crushed and sunk by the ice. Lieutenant Berry soon afterward met Chief-Engineer Melville's party and learned that the bodies of Lieutenant DeLong and his companions had been found. Search for the other party which had been led by Lieutenant Chipp was continued, and the Navy Department fitted out another vessel, the "Alliance," to aid in the possible rescue. But Lieutenant Chipp and his men were never found.



During the massacres by Egyptian troops under Arabi Pasha in Alexandria, in 1882, when more than two hundred European residents were killed or wounded, the flagship "Lancaster," under Captain Gherardi, was in the harbor and afforded a place of refuge for large numbers of men, women, and children. A large body of marines with a detachment of naval artillery landed in the city and were of much service in restoring order.

Another Arctic expedition was fitted out in the spring of 1883. Three vessels, the "Thetis," "Alert," and "Bear," left New York by order of the Navy Department to search for Lieutenant Greely and his party, comprising what is known as the Lady Franklin Bay Expedition. After a long voyage, in which the vessels were several times in imminent peril, they passed around Cape Sabine and found Lieutenant Greely and the seven survivors of his party. Their condition was so enfeebled that they could have lived only a little longer. On August 8th the relief squadron and the rescued party arrived in New York.

An insurrection broke out in the United States of Colombia in the spring of 1885, during which the city of Aspinwall was in great part destroyed. The affair assumed such a serious aspect that the vessels of the North Atlantic squadron, under Rear Admiral Jouett, were ordered to Aspinwall, and in addition to the fleet, the Navy Department sent a force consisting of about seven hundred and fifty from New York, for the special purpose of operating on shore. Upon his arrival at Aspinwall, on April 10th, Rear-Admiral Jouett issued orders for the landing of a force to open the transit across the isthmus, and on the 12th, trains were run as usual. On April 28th, the insurgents capitulated, and shortly afterward the United States naval force was withdrawn.

One of the most severe disasters that ever befell the United States Navy in time of peace occurred on the 16th of March, 1889, when, during a hurricane in the harbor of Apia, Samoa, the "Trenton" and "Vandalia" were totally wrecked, and the "Nipsic" was run on shore to save her from destruction. Five officers and forty-six men lost their lives in this catastrophe. Nothing that skill and experience could suggest was left undone to avert the disaster, but the vessels were equipped with old-fashioned engines, whose steam-power was not strong enough to withstand the fury of the gale. The value of high-pressure engines in war vessels was illustrated by the British ship "Calliope," which was able to steam out to sea, and thus escaped destruction on the reefs. The "Trenton" and the "Vandalia," which had been two of the best of the old wooden fleet, were abandoned. The "Nipsic" sailed for the Sandwich Islands, where she was refitted for active service. The natives of Samoa displayed great heroism in their efforts to save the shipwrecked sailors, and were afterward rewarded by the United States government. Fifteen merchant vessels which were in the harbor were either sunk or run upon the shore, and the German naval vessels "Elber," "Adler," and "Olga" were wrecked, with the loss of many men.

When the United States cruiser "Baltimore" was at anchor in the harbor off Valparaiso in October, 1891, shortly after the end of a Chilian rebellion, a number of the seamen were given liberty to go on shore. They were attacked by a mob in the streets of Valparaiso, and Petty Officer Charles Riggin was stabbed, and left to die. Another petty officer, Johnson, went to his assistance, and was attempting to carry him to an apothecary, when a squad of Chilian police, with fixed bayonets, came down the street. When at close quarters, they fired at Johnson. A shot passed through his clothes, and another entered Riggin's neck, inflicting a death-wound. Petty Officer Hamilton was dragged to jail dangerously wounded. As a result of the attack, two men, Riggin and Turnbull, died, and eighteen others were disabled by wounds. Thirty-six of the "Baltimore's" men were arrested, and treated by the Chilian police with extreme brutality. Investigation proved that all had been perfectly sober and well-behaved. The attack grew out of the bitter hostility of the Chilians toward the United States—a feeling largely due to false accusations in reference to the action of the navy during the Chilian revolution. The affair caused excitement and indignation in the United States, but was amicably settled.



The most important assemblage of naval vessels ever seen in the waters of America took place in April, 1893, in celebration of the Columbian quadricentennial. Invitations had been sent to all the important maritime powers, and at the rendezvous in Hampton Roads, on April 24th, the combined fleet, under the direction of Rear-Admiral Gherardi, of the United States Navy, comprised twelve men-of-war of the United States, four of England, three of France, two of Italy, two of Germany, two of Russia, three of Brazil, and one of Holland. At New York, the squadron was joined by one more Russian, three Spanish, one Argentine vessel, and the "Miantonomoh," of the United States Navy, making a combined fleet of thirty-five ships-of-war. The President, on board the "Dolphin," reviewed the fleet on April 27th, and the next day the armed battalions of the various nations, to the number of 3,815 men, marched through the streets of New York, and were reviewed by the Governor of the State.

The navy suffered a severe loss in 1894, in the wreck of the famous old man-of-war "Kearsarge," the conqueror of the "Alabama," which was wrecked February 2d on Roncador Reef, while on her way from Port au Prince to Bluefields, Nicaragua. Eight days later her men were rescued by the "City of Para."

One of the conspicuous features of the pageants which attended the opening of the Kiel Canal, between the North and the Baltic seas, on June 19th, 1895, was the fleet of war-vessels which assembled in the harbor at Kiel. It was the most remarkable ever seen in any waters, numbering over a hundred of the finest vessels in existence. A number of these, headed by the flagship "New York," belonged to the new navy of the United States. These ships provoked the admiration of all the naval authorities present, and their effective strength was noted and commented upon all over Europe.



CHAPTER II.

THE NAVAL MILITIA. — A VOLUNTEER SERVICE WHICH IN TIME OF WAR WILL BE EFFECTIVE. — HOW BOYS ARE TRAINED FOR THE LIFE OF A SAILOR. — CONDITIONS OF ENLISTMENT IN THE VOLUNTEER BRANCH OF THE SERVICE. — THE WORK OF THE SEAGOING MILITIA IN SUMMER.

The personnel of a navy is quite as important as its vessels. It has been said that a ship is worth what her captain and crew are worth. It is certainly true that a man-of-war, of whatever power, would be useless or worse than useless if her officers and men did not understand her wonderfully complicated construction nor know how to handle her. The officers of the United States navy are given this important instruction at the Naval Academy at Annapolis, and the rank and file of the men of the navy, those who fill the positions of seamen and petty officers, are trained at the station in Coaster's Island Harbor, near Newport, R.I., and in the training-ships when cruising.

The training-station is designed to ensure the thorough efficiency of the corps of men enlisted in the service, and to provide for the manning of the vessels by American citizens instead of by foreigners.

There was a time, and not a great while ago, when the gunners and crews of United States men-of-war were, with very few exceptions, aliens, who spoke the English language with difficulty, and who did not have, and could not be expected to have, any of the patriotic spirit which makes effective fighters in naval engagements. While this condition still exists to some extent, the growth of the apprentice system is bringing about a gradual change.

As early as 1837 an attempt was made to establish a naval apprentice system. In that year Congress passed an act making it "lawful to enlist boys for the navy, not under thirteen nor over eighteen years of age, to serve until twenty-one." Within a few months several boys were received as apprentices aboard naval vessels. Six years later, however, the system was abandoned as a failure, owing to a false impression which had gained wide currency that the apprentices would receive commissions in the navy.

Capt. S. B. Luce and the officers of the practice-ship "Macedonian" investigated the apprentice systems at Portsmouth and Plymouth, England, twenty years afterward, and made such favorable reports that Secretary Welles was induced to revive it in the United States navy. This was done, and during the civil war the system was in successful operation, but soon after the close of the war it was again abandoned.

In the following years the want of intelligent seamen of American birth in the navy was greatly felt, and in 1875 Secretary of the Navy Robeson deemed it advisable to resume the enlistment of boys under the naval apprentice law, which was still in existence. As an experiment two hundred and fifty boys were enlisted and placed on the frigates "Minnesota" and "Constitution" and the sloops of war "Portsmouth" and "Saratoga," which were commissioned as training-ships. Since 1875 the training-station and vessels have been very important features of the naval establishment.

The regulations governing the enlistment of boys are simple and few in number. The boys must be between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years, of robust form, intelligent, of perfectly sound and healthy constitution, free from all physical defect or malformation, and of good moral character. They must be able to read and write, although in special cases, when a boy shows general intelligence and is otherwise qualified, he may be enlisted notwithstanding the fact that his reading and writing are imperfect. Each boy presenting himself for enlistment must be accompanied by his father, mother, or, in case neither is living, by his legally appointed guardian, and must voluntarily sign an agreement to serve in the navy till twenty-one years of age. Upon enlistment the boys are rated as third-class apprentices, and are paid $9 a month. Deserving boys are rated second-class apprentices, and receive pay of $15 a month after they have completed their term of service on a cruising training-ship. If they have served a year on a cruising ship of war they are considered properly qualified apprentices, and receive $21 a month. As the apprentices become proficient and their services are required, they are transferred to the seagoing vessels. Upon the expiration of the enlistment of an apprentice he will, if recommended, receive an honorable discharge, and if he enlists again within three months, will be given pay for this period. The apprentices are under the immediate supervision of the Bureau of Navigation of the Navy Department, and applications for enlistment are made to the chief of that bureau at Washington, or to the officer commanding either the "Vermont," at the Brooklyn navy yard, or the "Richmond," stationed at the League Island yard, Philadelphia. These were the recruiting-ships, from which the boys were being sent to the training-station at Coaster's Island as soon as a squad of twenty were enlisted, at the period of this writing. Sometimes there have been more ships in this duty.

There are usually about one hundred boys at the station at one time. They are taught to march, handle muskets, revolvers, broadswords, and cannon; they go aloft so as to get practice with the sails, and are also made familiar with the management of boats and oars and boathooks. Two hours a day are devoted to lessons, consisting of arithmetic, reading, writing, spelling, geography and grammar. Ample time is given for recreation, and innocent social pleasures are encouraged.

There are two training-ships, besides the famous old ship "Constellation," which figured in the War of 1812, at the station devoted to the use of the boys, and every six months one of these appears at Coaster's Island, and receives the apprentices who have been at the station for half a year. The vessel then starts on a cruise to Europe if it is summer, and to the West Indies in the winter. Each boy remains aboard a year, only half of the crew being changed at a time. Practice aloft and the life in general aboard a sailing vessel give him a broad general foundation of knowledge of the sea and ships, upon which he can build the special training and instruction he afterward gets upon a regular man-of-war. When he is transferred, upon the expiration of his year on the training-ship, he begins the task of mastering the intricacies of a modern ship-of-war. Here he remains until his first term of service has expired. If he re-enlists and has shown aptitude for the service, he is sent to Washington navy yard for a course of six months' instruction in gunnery and special branches, such as electricity and torpedoes. He becomes a seaman gunner, with the billet and pay of a petty officer.

A serious defect in the apprentice system, however, and one which makes it impossible to man the vessels altogether with well-trained American citizens, is the fact that the majority of the apprentices do not re-enlist after receiving their honorable discharge at the age of twenty-one, for the reason that the special training they have received enables them to secure better-paid places in civil life than are possible to them in the navy. In the government service, too, they cannot attain the rank of officers, as there is no such provision for the promotion of enlisted men in the navy as there is in the army.

Secretary Tracy, in his report of 1889, forcibly called the attention of Congress to this condition. As a remedy he recommended that there be a statutory extension of the term of enlistment to twenty-four years of age. It was further recommended that the number of apprentices be increased from seven hundred and fifty to fifteen hundred, and that the course in the training-ships be extended by the formation of a special class for training in gunnery on board a ship devoted exclusively to this purpose. Congress has as yet taken no action upon these and numerous other recommendations which have been made for the improvement of the apprentice system, and they remain pertinent.

The navy, however, in case of war, would not have to depend entirely upon apprentices and graduates of the training-station for its skilled seamen. The Naval Militia has become an organization that would render very efficient service if called upon by the government. It is composed of about three thousand highly intelligent and well-drilled young men, and has been organized in sixteen States. It bears the same relation to the navy that the National Guard does to the regular army, and is therefore wholly under State control; but it is subject to call, of course, by the federal government.

The organization of the Naval Militia has been a growth of the last eight years, and is due in large measure to the reconstruction of the navy and the revival of activity and interest in naval affairs in the United States.

It was seen that the new vessels of modern and intricate construction and appliances should, in case of war, be manned by men skilled in the use of these appliances. The apprentice system brought to the navy a supply of apprentices, but the number would be totally inadequate in a naval war. A naval reserve force was an urgent necessity.

The first step toward meeting this necessity was made in 1887 by Senator Whitthorne, of Tennessee, who in that year introduced a bill "to create a naval reserve of auxiliary cruisers, officers, and men, from the mercantile marine of the United States." The measure did not pass, and the next year another was introduced by Senator Whitthorne, providing for the enrolment of a Naval Militia and the organization of naval reserve forces. According to this bill, it was to be lawful for States and Territories bordering on sea and lake coasts and navigable rivers to enroll and designate as the Naval Militia all seafaring men of whatever calling or occupation, and all men engaged in the navigation of the rivers, lakes, and other waters, or in the construction or management of ships and craft, together with ship-owners and their employees, yacht-owners, members of yacht clubs and other associations for aquatic sports, and all ex-officers and former enlisted men of the navy.

The bill contemplated a naval reserve artillery and a naval reserve torpedo corps. It did not become a law, but formed a basis for legislation in several of the States shortly afterward, although the original plan, as shown in the proposed measure, was modified to the extent of making the Naval Militia a State organization and forming it of volunteers irrespective of occupation.

Massachusetts was the pioneer among the States in the organization of the Naval Militia. In May, 1888, the legislature passed a bill authorizing the formation of "a naval battalion to be attached to the volunteer militia." This measure was prepared, with the assistance of others, by Lieutenant John C. Soley, a retired officer of the United States navy, and he was afterward energetic in putting it into successful operation.

The next State to provide for a Naval Militia was Pennsylvania, whose legislature made the necessary law in 1889. On the same day the legislature of Rhode Island "established a naval battalion to be attached to the Rhode Island militia." In New York, in 1889, a State Naval Militia of three battalions of naval reserve artillery and a naval reserve torpedo corps, to consist of not less than four companies to a battalion, was established.



The practical work of the Naval Militia began in 1890, when the Massachusetts battalion drilled on the receiving-ship "Wabash," and the New York battalion on the receiving-ship "Minnesota."

A very decided impetus was given to the movement in 1891 by the appropriation by Congress of $25,000 for arms and equipments for the Naval Militia, leaving the disbursement of the money to the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy. Within the year California, North Carolina, Texas, and Maryland joined the States having battalions of Naval Militia, and at its close the force numbered 1,149 men. Progress was made also in 1891 in the method of drilling and instructing the members of some of the battalions. Those of New York, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island spent several days aboard the vessels of the Squadron of Evolution, under the command of Rear-Admiral J. C. Walker, and were given practice with the guns and boats, and participated in the ship's routine duties.

Further appropriations of $25,000 each for the Naval Militia were made in 1892 and 1893. The legislatures of Vermont and South Carolina provided for battalions of the Naval Militia in 1892, and those which had been authorized, but not yet organized, in Maryland and Pennsylvania, were formed. During the summer of 1892 the members of the North Carolina Naval Militia were drilled on board the "Newark." The "Wabash," the "Chicago," and the "Atlanta" were used for drills by the Massachusetts battalions, and those of New York received their instruction on the "New Hampshire," the "Chicago," and the "Atlanta." The California Naval Militia drilled on board the "Charleston."

The Naval Militia was increased in 1893 by battalions formed in North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois, Georgia, and Connecticut, under laws of these various legislatures of that year, and the force numbered 2,376 officers and men. New Jersey and Virginia, in 1894, organized battalions of the Naval Militia, and in that year Congress passed an important act, empowering the Secretary of the Navy to lend temporarily to any State vessels "not suitable or required for the general service, together with such of her apparel, charts, books, and instruments of navigation as he may deem proper, said vessel to be used only by the regularly organized Naval Militia of the State for the purposes of drill and instruction." Even interior States, with no bodies of water other than rivers, have organized naval battalions. At Pittsburg the organization owns a small armored gunboat, of the sort that was so useful on inland waters in the civil war. This vessel was presented to the militia by a wealthy manufacturer. Few commands, however, are so fortunate. Most take advantage of the law authorizing the loan of government ships. Under this law the following vessels were lent: the "Minnesota" to Massachusetts, the "Wyandotte" to Connecticut, the "New Hampshire" to New York, the "Portsmouth" and the "Ajax" to New Jersey, the "St. Louis" to Pennsylvania, the "Dale" to Maryland, and the "Nantucket" to North Carolina. The other States have been compelled to get along without vessels, for the reason that there have been no others available.



During the summer of 1894 the Massachusetts brigade of the militia encamped for drill on Lovell's Island, Boston Harbor, and the monitor "Passaic" was lent to the State. There were also drills and target-practice on the "Miantonomoh" and the "Atlanta." The forces of Connecticut and Rhode Island received instruction on the "Miantonomoh" and the "Atlanta" respectively, and New York's battalion spent a week on board the "New York" and the "San Francisco" in Gardiner's Bay, Long Island. A part of the Pennsylvania force had target-practice at sea on board the "New York," and the North Carolina battalion received instruction on the "Montgomery."



The California division helped to man the "Olympia" for a week in 1895, taking the places of the crew; the Maryland contingent had a week's cruise on the "Dale," and the First Naval Battalion of New York carried out a scheme of reconnoissance and distant boat work along the northern shore of Long Island, encamping on Shelter Island. The party was accompanied by the torpedo boat "Cushing." Most of the other battalions had their quota of drill and instruction.

These details of the summer operations of the Naval Militia will convey an idea of the manner in which its members are being prepared for the emergencies of war. In addition to the summer work, there is drill in armories in the winter. This course of training, in conjunction with the intelligence and enthusiasm of the young men of the Naval Militia, who are of the best classes in this country, has made an organization which would doubtless be of very great value in time of war.

The uniform of the Naval Militia consists of a blue cap, blouse, and trousers of blue trimmed with white braid. The working suit is of white duck with white canvas hat.



CHAPTER III.

HOW THE NAVY HAS GROWN. — THE COST AND CHARACTER OF OUR NEW WHITE SHIPS OF WAR. — OUR PERIOD OF NAVAL WEAKNESS AND OUR ADVANCE TO A PLACE AMONG THE GREAT NAVAL POWERS. — THE NEW DEVICES OF NAVAL WARFARE. — THE TORPEDO, THE DYNAMITE GUN, AND THE MODERN RIFLE. — ARMOR AND ITS POSSIBILITIES.

At the close of the civil war the United States had one of the most formidable navies afloat. The necessities of the war had forced the Navy Department to the utmost exertion in increasing the number and power of the vessels of the fleets. This work of naval upbuilding and strengthening had been carried on, moreover, till Fort Fisher fell and hostile operations ceased. The result was that at the close of the war the United States had upon its hands a large number of ships-of-war for which it had no use. The Secretary of the Navy at once began to reduce the number, and secretaries succeeding him followed the same policy. Old vessels which had outlived their usefulness as cruisers were one by one taken out of commission and were not replaced. Thus the navy moved steadily on a downward plane. Through the seventies and into the eighties this retrogression continued. The lowest ebb was reached in 1882, when the entire naval force numbered only thirty-one vessels in commission, all but four of which were built entirely of wood. They were old-fashioned ships, which had been efficient in a past day, but were totally unfit to cope with the modern warships of foreign naval powers. Both their guns and engines were inferior. Their sole usefulness, in short, lay in displaying the national flag upon the seas and in the harbors of the commercial world in times of peace.

This condition of the navy was referred to by Secretary Chandler, in his report of 1882, as follows:

"It is not the policy of the United States to maintain a large navy, but its reputation, honor, and prosperity require that such naval vessels as it possesses shall be the best which human ingenuity can devise and modern artificers construct. Our present vessels are not such and cannot be made such. They should be gradually replaced by iron or steel cruisers, and allowed to go out of commission."

It may be of interest to add that in 1882 there was only one high-power cannon in the navy, while there were nearly nineteen hundred naval officers, making the proportion of fifty-nine officers for each ship, and one for every five seamen.

As the result of Secretary Chandler's recommendations in his report of 1882, three steel warships and an armed despatch-steamer were authorized by the next Congress. The building of these vessels, named the "Chicago," the "Boston," the "Atlanta," and the "Dolphin," may be regarded as the first movement toward the making of the new navy of the United States.

While progress in naval construction has been so rapid that these ships are a long distance behind the war-vessels of to-day in power, they were then considered to be equal to any afloat in their respective classes. All are unarmored. The "Chicago," of forty-five hundred tons displacement and a speed of fourteen knots an hour, was an example of the largest and best unarmored fighting and cruising vessel then built, and, according to Secretary Chandler, had no superior in speed, endurance, and armament. In the "Boston" and "Atlanta," each of three thousand tons displacement and a speed of thirteen knots an hour, speed and endurance were supposed to have been given their greatest development, and their fighting power was increased by placing the battery on a central superstructure on the spar-deck and adopting a brig rig, so that the extremities would be clear for a fore and aft fire. The "Dolphin," of fifteen hundred tons displacement and a speed of fifteen knots, was designed as an auxiliary in naval operations, and it was expected that she would furnish a model for high-speed commerce-destroyers to be subsequently built. These vessels were constructed at an aggregate cost of over $2,400,000, in the shipyard of John Roach, of Chester, Pa. The "Dolphin" was launched in 1884.

The Congress which authorized the building of the cruisers also directed that the double-turreted monitors, "Puritan," "Amphitrite," "Terror," and "Monadnock," whose keels had been laid several years before, be completed. In accordance with this order they were launched in 1883.

In order that the work of the reconstruction of the navy should be carried on as rapidly as possible, the secretary recommended, in 1883 and 1884, that seven unarmored cruisers, in addition to the four then in the process of construction, be built. Congress adopted his suggestion to the extent of authorizing, in 1884, the construction of two unarmored cruisers, two gunboats, and two armored cruisers.

The vessels with which the reconstruction of the navy began—namely the "Chicago," the "Boston," the "Atlanta," and the "Dolphin"—were completed about this time, and were in some measure disappointments. It was found that the "Dolphin" was better adapted for pleasure trips than for war service, because of the lack of protection against hostile fire. The engines had been so placed as to be exposed above water-line, which was condemned as a serious mistake in a war-vessel without armor-protection. It was realized, too, that the essential characteristic in an unarmored cruiser is great speed. The function she is expected to perform is to destroy commerce; and if she is slower than the merchant-vessels it is useless for her to go to sea; and if she is slower than the iron-clads, and consequently cannot escape from them, she could not long continue her service. The chief objection to the vessels was the lack of a speed equal to that of merchantmen and the cruisers of other countries. The type of protected cruiser with a maximum speed, in some cases as high as twenty knots, developed at this time as a result of the earlier experiments. The torpedo, too, was receiving constant attention, and money was freely spent for its improvement. It was found that vessels at anchor or under slow headway could be protected from torpedoes by being surrounded by a large net. This defence was generally adopted for armored vessels.

A stride forward in naval construction in the United States marked the year 1887. Before that time a serious obstacle in the way of building up the navy was the lack in the country of manufactories necessary to the construction and armament of a modern war-vessel, namely, that of steel forgings for the heavier guns, of armor for iron-clad vessels, and of secondary batteries, which are an essential portion of the armament. It was important that the country should not be dependent upon foreigners for these necessary implements of warfare, because they are contraband in time of war, and consequently could not then be obtained abroad. Secretary of the Navy Whitney, who succeeded Secretary Chandler, stipulated, in his advertisements for bids for the contracts of making the armor for the ships under construction, that this armor should be of domestic manufacture. Correspondence was also opened with the leading steel manufacturers of the country, offering them inducements to take the matter up. Interest was awakened, and it was found upon investigation that armor could be made in the United States as advantageously as abroad. A contract was drawn up with the Bethlehem Iron Company, under which a plant for the production of armor and gun steel was erected at Bethlehem, Pa., which was designed to be second to none in the world. In the matter of the second batteries, the policy of insisting upon home manufacture was also pursued, with the desired result.

Congress had authorized, in 1885, the construction of two additional cruisers and two gunboats. In 1886 there was further authorization of two armor-clad vessels, each of about six thousand tons, and each to cost, exclusive of armament, not more than $2,500,000. In 1887 the sum of $2,000,000 was appropriated for harbor and coast defence vessels. As a result of this reawakening on the part of Congress to the necessity of a respectable navy, and the manifestations of enlightenment in the form of substantial appropriations, Secretary Whitney was able to state in his report of 1888 that upon the completion of the ships under construction, the United States would rank second among the nations in the possession of unarmored cruisers or commerce-destroyers possessing the highest characteristics—namely, size of three thousand tons and upward and a speed of nineteen knots, and more. The vessels, inclusive of the monitors, completed and uncompleted, then composing the navy, were as follows: The "Dolphin," "Boston," "Atlanta," "Chicago," whose keels were laid in 1883; the "Charleston" "Baltimore," "Newark," "Philadelphia," "San Francisco," protected cruisers, whose keels were laid in 1887 and 1888; and the gunboats "Yorktown," "Petrel," "Concord," "Bennington," whose keels were laid in 1887 and 1888. In addition to these, there were under construction the dynamite cruiser "Vesuvius," with a guaranteed speed of twenty knots an hour, and a first-class torpedo-boat with a speed of twenty-three knots an hour. Besides these, five protected cruisers had been authorized, but were not yet in process of construction.



The "Baltimore," "Charlestown," "Yorktown," and "Petrel" were given their trial trips in 1889, and were accepted by the Navy Department. The trip of the "Baltimore," in particular, was a brilliant success. The horse-power proved to be in excess of the contract requirement, and her highest speed for one hour was 20.39 knots—this result being then unparalleled by any warship in the world of the "Baltimore's" displacement.

When Benjamin F. Tracy became Secretary of the Navy, in 1889 he called attention to the fact that, while the United States had secured a number of excellent vessels of the cruiser type, it did not as yet possess an efficient navy. He pointed out that the country had two widely separated ocean frontiers to protect, and that there was only one way to protect them, namely, by two separate fleets of armored battle-ships. He said further that in addition to the battle-ships, the condition of the country required at least twenty vessels for coast and harbor defence, and, moreover, that the employment of these ships as floating fortresses demanded that they be equipped with the most powerful batteries and the heaviest of armor. It may be said parenthetically that eight vessels of this type, five of which were reconstructed monitors, were under construction or had been authorized at that time. Secretary Tracy recommended the authorization by the following Congress of eight armored battle-ships. He also said that the United States could not afford to neglect torpedo-boats, with which the foreign naval powers were well supplied, and he recommended that appropriations be made for the construction of at least five of these boats of the first and second class. The year before, the keel of the first of the battle-ships, the "Texas," had been laid in the navy-yard at Norfolk, Va., and in 1889 work was begun at the Brooklyn navy yard upon another vessel of the same class, the "Maine." These vessels are respectively of 6,314 and 6,648 tons displacement. The construction of a third battle-ship, which had been provided for, had not yet been begun.

Secretary Tracy's recommendations reveal clearly the naval condition in 1889. Previous to that year the additions to the navy had consisted chiefly of cruisers of from three to four thousand tons, and of gunboats under two thousand tons; but, acting upon the secretary's report, Congress, on June 10, 1890, authorized, in addition to another armored cruiser, three seagoing coast-line battle-ships. These were an entirely new class of vessels in the United States navy, and their authorization marks another distinct step in its reconstruction.

An appropriation was made in 1891 for an additional armored cruiser, designed to be a sister ship to the one provided for in 1890. It was the purpose to make these vessels more powerful than any of their type in the navy. Their tonnage was fixed at 7,500, and their maximum speed at twenty-two knots. They were to be given coal capacity that would enable them to cruise for great distances without recoaling. This, it will be seen, is an important advantage to a navy so destitute of coaling-stations abroad as that of the United States.

The vessels under construction in 1891 were the monitors "Puritan," "Amphitrite," "Monadnock," and "Terror," which had been begun in 1874, but had been neglected in subsequent years; the "Maine," the "Texas," the coast-defence vessel "Monterey," which was launched in 1891; the "New York," "Cincinnati," "Raleigh," "Detroit," and a practice-ship, which had been authorized by the act of 1887; the harbor-defence ram "Katahdin;" and gunboats "5" and "6," authorized in 1889; the three battle-ships, "Indiana," "Massachusetts," and "Oregon," and the protected cruiser "No. 12," authorized by the act of 1890; and protected cruiser "No. 13," provided for in 1891.

Three vessels, the "Newark," the "Concord," and the "Bennington," were given their trial trips in 1890. The behavior of the "Newark" proved her to be a valuable addition to the list of cruisers. The "Concord" and the "Bennington," vessels of the gunboat class, similar to the "Yorktown," also gave evidences of power and usefulness. They carry a comparatively heavy battery, while their light draught enables them to run into shallow rivers and bays, and thus perform services for which larger vessels are incapacitated.

The subject of the organization of a naval militia or reserve had been discussed for some time before Secretary Tracy assumed his office. He forcibly urged the necessity of such an organization in his first and in following annual reports, until, in 1891, Congress appropriated $25,000 for arms for the militia. This was a decided impetus toward its development, and at the close of the year it existed in six States, an effective, well-drilled, and organized force of eleven hundred men.

The year 1892 saw considerable progress in the development of the navy. Two important vessels, the "Iowa," a first-class, seagoing battle-ship of 11,296 tons displacement, and the "Brooklyn," an armored cruiser of 9,150 tons displacement, were provided for by Congress. The cruisers "Texas," "Columbia," "Olympia," "Raleigh," and "Cincinnati," and the gunboats "Machias" and "Castine" were launched.

Secretary Tracy's administration of the affairs of the navy, which closed in 1892, was one of marked progress and development; and this development was not confined to ships alone. Experiments extending over a period of three years had resulted in the adopting of an armor of new composition, namely, nickel-steel, which had been found to be far superior to any before known. The manufacture of torpedoes had been domesticated. Since 1889 the heavy, rapid-firing guns had been developed and proved successful. The manufacture of armor-piercing shells, of which two firms in Europe had had the monopoly, was begun in this period under the care and encouragement of the Navy Department; and the shells turned out soon surpassed the foreign product. Through investigation and experiment conducted by its own agencies, the Navy Department succeeded in developing a smokeless powder, which gave better results than that made abroad. Careful and protracted experiments with high explosives were also carried on, with the result of developing an explosive that can be safely used in shells fired from high-power guns.

In 1893, the first year of the administration of Secretary Herbert, the following vessels were launched: the armored battle-ships "Indiana" and "Massachusetts;" the protected cruiser "Minneapolis;" the unarmored and very rapid cruiser "Marblehead;" and the armed coast-defence ram "Katahdin." During the same year Congress authorized the construction of three new vessels, to be of the class known as light-draft protected gunboats. These are of about twelve hundred tons displacement, and are designed for river service in China and elsewhere. Several vessels, namely, the "Monterey," "Bancroft," "Detroit," "New York," armored cruiser of 8,480 tons displacement, and the gunboat "Machias," were given their trial trips in 1893. The results were in each case satisfactory, and the vessels were added to the effective fleet of the navy.

Before 1893 the United States had been behind the other important nations in the matter of small-arms equipment. The navy was still using the old-fashioned, large-calibre rifle, employing a charge of black powder, and effectively carrying only twelve hundred yards. Under Secretary Herbert's direction, a board of naval officers investigated the improved small arms in use in foreign navies, and made recommendations which resulted in the adoption of a small-calibre magazine rifle, in which is used smokeless powder, and which has an effective range of a mile and a half. A further advantage of the new rifle is that it employs cartridges of such a weight that no less than two hundred rounds can be carried by one man. The cartridges used in the old rifle were so heavy that one man could not carry more than fifty rounds.

Secretary Herbert recommended in his report of 1893 that Congress authorize the construction of at least one new battle-ship and six torpedo-boats. He said that for the defence of ports the latter are more effective according to cost than any class of vessels. The knowledge of their existence alone will make an enemy chary about approaching within bombarding distance. The value of this boat is recognized by all naval powers, and they are being built abroad in great numbers. The next naval appropriation contained a provision authorizing the construction of three additional torpedo-boats of the general type of the "Ericsson," which was then ready for trial. The design for the new boat called for a speed of not less than twenty-four and one-half knots an hour. The battle-ships "Indiana," "Texas," and "Oregon" underwent preliminary trial trips in 1894, and were accepted by the government in 1895. It is of interest to note that until these vessels were put in commission, the navy was still in the condition that existed when President Cleveland, in his first message to Congress in 1885, made the following statement: "We have not a single vessel that could keep the seas against a first-class vessel of any important power." It is true that vessels of size and power enough to hold their own against the battle-ships of other nations had been under construction for several years, but the United States was still without an available man-of-war of the first class until the "Indiana" and the "Oregon" joined the fleet.

Considerable progress in naval affairs marked the year 1895. One of the important events was the adding to the commissioned fleet of the coast-defence monitor "Amphitrite," whose keel was laid in 1874. The work of remodelling her was begun in 1889, under the appropriation made by Congress in 1887. The "Amphitrite" is in some respects an old-fashioned type of vessel, but is nevertheless capable of important service. Her displacement is 3,990 tons. Her armor and armament are heavy, although not so powerful as that of the battle-ships. Her main advantage, as with all of the monitors, is that she presents a comparatively small target for the enemy's fire.



Adopting the spirit of Secretary Herbert's recommendations in his report of 1894, Congress, in 1895, authorized the construction of two coast-line battle-ships of most formidable equipment and power, their cost not to exceed $4,000,000 each. Further provision was made for the building of twelve torpedo-boats. An interesting feature of the bill was the stipulation that one of the battle-ships shall bear the historic name "Kearsarge," after the famous old man-of-war that was wrecked in 1894 on Roncador Reef. According to the plans of the new ships, they resemble in a general way the "Indiana," although they are longer and broader and have a greater displacement, and their batteries are more powerful. A new feature in the arrangement of the guns was decided upon. The vessels will carry two turrets of two stories each. Many objections to this plan were advanced, but it was said that all are outweighed by the opportunity which the turrets give of concentrating an enormous quantity of shot on a given point. An estimate has been made that the "Kearsarge" will carry enough ammunition to kill or disable a million persons, and that she will be able to discharge it all within a period of five hours. Accommodations will be provided for five hundred and twenty officers and men. The "Kearsarge" and her sister ship, which will be called the "Kentucky," will carry heavier armor and guns and a greater quantity of the latter than any foreign battle-ship in existence or in course of construction.

The ram "Katahdin" was rejected by the government in 1895, because, upon her official trials, she did not fulfil the speed requirements. She made 16.011 knots, while the contract called for 17 knots. Congress was asked to purchase the vessel, and finally did so.

The armored cruiser "Brooklyn," designed to be one of the fastest and most powerful vessels of her class afloat, was launched from Cramp's shipyard in Philadelphia in 1895. She is the sister ship to the "New York," which was put in commission in 1893. A matter of significance, as showing the rapid progress in the art of naval construction within a few years, was the taking out of commission in 1895 of the "Chicago," to be refitted with engines and boilers that will give her powers approaching those of the newer vessels. Two years will be required for this work, and when she is complete she will travel three knots an hour faster than heretofore, and in many respects will be substantially a new ship.

The official trial trip of the battle-ship "Massachusetts," which occurred in 1896, was a source of gratification to the Navy Department and to all others who are anxious to see the United States take respectable rank among the naval powers. The primary business of a battle-ship is to fight; hence her guns and not her speed are of the first importance. Naval experts have agreed that the "Massachusetts" and her sister ships, the "Indiana" and the "Oregon," have larger and more effective batteries than any man-of-war afloat or in progress of construction. The "Massachusetts" has now proved, by steaming at the rate of 16.15 knots for four hours, with a maximum speed of 17.03 knots, that she is superior to all other battle-ships in speed as well as in armament. Her performance is unparalleled in naval history, and makes her the foremost war-vessel of the world. The "Indiana" is a trifle slower. She steamed 15.61 knots for four hours, but under the disadvantage of a bottom that had never been cleaned. She would probably go half a knot faster with a clean bottom. As a representative specimen of the battle-ships which belong to the navy, a few details of the "Massachusetts'" armament may be of interest. She has thirty guns in all. The chief of these are four of thirteen-inch calibre, which are the largest in use in modern navies; a pair of them can be fired every three minutes. The eight-inch guns are next in size. There are four of them, and they can be fired every minute. In addition to these, there are two six-inch rifles, twenty six-pounders, and four one-pounders. The six-inch guns can be fired twice a minute, and the six-pounders twenty times in the same period. In a fight lasting thirty minutes, these guns would throw forty-one and a half tons of metal, of which forty-four thousand pounds would be the share of the thirteen-inch guns, thirty thousand pounds the share of the eight-inch, six thousand pounds of the six-inch, and thirty-six hundred pounds of the others. The total weight of the "Massachusetts'" broadside is 5,724 pounds, and of her head or astern fire 3,434 pounds.

Another of the monitors, the "Monadnock," was added to the navy in 1896. She was launched in 1883, and was then practically left alone until the acts of 1885, 1886, and 1887 provided for her completion. She is now a formidable vessel, with heavy guns which can be made to bear on a point a small boat's length from the ship's side, or can bombard at a distance of six miles.

While the successive Secretaries of the Navy, during the last fourteen years, have been chiefly active in increasing the number of ships-of-war, they have not altogether neglected defences on the coast. Some of the larger seacoast cities have succeeded in obtaining a part of the heavy gun and mortar batteries that would be necessary in repelling attacks without the aid of battle-ships. The cities of New York and San Francisco have now mounted and ready for action powerful pneumatic dynamite gun batteries, the most destructive engines of war in existence. Each of these guns is capable of hurling a projectile carrying five hundred pounds of the most powerful explosive known to man, and is able to destroy the strongest iron-clad. In the naval battle of Sinope in the Crimean War, a shell designed to explode on striking the object was used for the first time. When the high explosives, such as dynamite and gun-cotton, appeared, the idea suggested itself that they might be used in the shells with vastly greater effect than gunpowder, which had been employed. The objection, however was that these explosives are so sensitive that there was great danger of their exploding at the outset of the journey from the sudden shock of being hurled from the ordinary high-power guns and mortars. Captain Zalinski, of the United States Artillery, suggested a method of gun construction by which the shells could be projected by a steady pressure of compressed air instead of by the sudden force of powder gases. This system has been steadily improved until the pneumatic dynamite gun now works perfectly and is a marvel of destructiveness. The United States possesses six and Great Britain one of the seven dynamite guns that have thus far been manufactured for coast defence.

The "Iowa," a battle-ship of the first class whose keel was laid in 1893, was launched in March, 1895. She is the largest vessel of the navy now afloat, her displacement being 11,410 tons, which is over a thousand tons greater than that of the "Massachusetts," "Indiana," or "Oregon."

It will be seen that progress toward the building of the new navy of the United States has been steady since the first move was made in 1882. As a result of this development, the navy now consists, counting the vessels built and authorized by Congress, prior to 1896, the naval appropriations bill for that year still pending at this writing, of about seventy modern ships-of-war. These include eight battle-ships, six coast-defence steel-clads, two armored cruisers, one armored ram, thirteen protected cruisers, eighteen gunboats and unprotected cruisers, and about two dozen torpedo-boats. This fleet gives the United States sixth place in the list of naval powers, being outranked in number of vessels by England, France, Russia, Germany, or Italy, in the order named. A true idea of the comparative fighting strength of the United States navy is not conveyed, however, by its rank in the numerical strength of the fleet. The personnel of the navy and the power of the individual ships must be considered. It is generally conceded that the United States has the finest fighting men and vessels in the world. These advantages would, in all probability, enable us to whip Germany or Italy in a series of naval contests; therefore, it is thought by naval critics that we really hold fourth position among the naval powers. England is still a long way ahead of us, the English navy now numbering nearly five hundred vessels, of which one hundred and twenty are armored cruisers. But, comparing the navies ship to ship, the United States fleet, so far as it goes, is superior even to that of Great Britain. The battle-ships, while somewhat smaller, are more effective fighters. The English navy has no armored cruisers as fast or as powerful as the "New York" and "Brooklyn;" and the commerce-destroyers, "Columbia" and "Minneapolis," are the fastest vessels, either of war or peace, that have gone to sea.

That this new navy of ours will ever have to meet so stern an ordeal as that through which the sailors of '61 went is wholly improbable. In multiplying the number and the effectiveness of fighting machines the nations of the world have seemingly lessened the likelihood of war. International disputes which once would have put the territory of all Europe ablaze are now settled by the peaceful devices of diplomacy. But behind the diplomat must be the gun, and it will be a sorry day for the United States when, if ever, the sense of security bred of an avowed national policy of non-intervention in foreign affairs shall lead this people to neglect the naval arm of the republic.



PART V.



THE NAVAL WAR WITH SPAIN.



CHAPTER I.

THE STATE OF CUBA. — PERTINACITY OF THE REVOLUTIONISTS. — SPAIN'S SACRIFICES AND FAILURE. — SPANISH BARBARITIES. — THE POLICY OF RECONCENTRATION. — AMERICAN SYMPATHY AROUSED. — THE STRUGGLE IN CONGRESS. — THE ASSASSINATION OF THE "MAINE." — REPORT OF THE COMMISSION. — THE ONWARD MARCH TO BATTLE.

A short time after the inauguration of William McKinley as President of the United States in March, 1897, it became apparent that the disordered condition of Cuba under Spanish rule was destined inevitably to become an issue which the United States must help to settle. For two years a great part of the island had been in open and determined revolt against Spanish rule. Though the forces of the King had been able to hold the seaports, thus cutting off the insurgents from regular communication with the outer world and making impotent their efforts to secure recognition from foreign powers, the patriots under Maceo and Gomez held control of the interior, established a government of their own, enforced order, and levied taxes. Enormous sacrifices were made by the Spanish people to re-establish sovereignty in the island. More than 300,000 troops were sent thither to be cruelly cut down by plague and pestilence. A nation, long on the verge of bankruptcy, incurred uncomplainingly prodigious additional indebtedness to save for its boy king—Alphonso XIII. was at this time but twelve years old—its most precious possession in the west, the Pearl of the Antilles. Queen Isabella of Spain pawned her jewels that Columbus might have the means to press his voyage of discovery into unknown seas, but in the closing years of this century the people of Spain pawned their national assets, put even themselves and their posterity in pawn to hold for Spain the last relics of the empire which Columbus won for her.

Though we were forced to draw the sword upon Spain in the cause of humanity and human liberty, the man of reason, and of a sense of justice, will not withhold from the people of that sorely chastened nation admiration for their loyalty and the sacrifices they made in their national cause.

But the Spanish people were cruelly betrayed by their own rulers. The generals whom they sent to Cuba gave less thought to the suppression of the insurrection than to filling their own pockets. Out of the millions and millions of pesetas set aside by an already impoverished people for the needs of war, a great part was stolen by generals and by army contractors. The young conscripts, sent from Spain to a land where the air is pestilential to the unacclimated, were clothed and shod in shoddy; their food invited disease, and when they fell ill it was found that the greed of the generals had consumed the funds that should have provided sufficient hospital service. Comparatively few fell before the bullets or machetes of the insurgents—for, as we shall see, the revolutionists adopted the tactics of Fabius—but by thousands they succumbed to fevers of every kind. Death without glory was the hapless lot of the Spanish conscript.

The Patriot generals, Maximo Gomez and Antonio Maceo, met this situation with consummate skill. The military problem which confronted them was one which chiefly demanded self-restraint. They were lamentably destitute of arms and munitions of war. Cartridges were a dearly prized acquisition, and it is worth noting, as an indication of the venality which corrupted the Spanish army, that a considerable share of the insurgent ammunition was obtained by direct traffic with the Spanish soldiers. But in the main the Patriots were armed with heterogeneous firearms and the machete—a heavy, sword-like knife, used, in peace, for cutting cane. The latter at close quarters was a formidable weapon, and the insurgents became singularly proficient in its use; developing a style of machete play almost as exact and scientific as the school of the rapier in ancient France.

This disparity in weapons, however, made it imperative that the insurgents should avoid pitched battles with the invaders, who were armed with Mauser rifles, that do deadly work at two miles' distance. Accordingly, Gomez and Maceo confined themselves to harrying the Spanish army of occupation on every side and destroying all vestiges of Spanish authority outside the large towns. Warfare of this sort inevitably develops into the most cruel, the most barbarous of conflicts. So it was in this case. That Cuba might be made desolate, unable to pay anything toward the price of its own subjection, the insurgents relentlessly destroyed standing crops, burned great fields of standing sugar cane, destroyed mills, dynamited railroads, tore up roads, and demolished aqueducts. That the peaceful inhabitants—the pacificos—might not give aid or comfort to the revolutionists, General Weyler caused them to be driven from their farms and herded in the towns still under Spanish rule. There they stayed, in squalid huts or under thatched sheds, AND STARVED. Systematically, with devilish ingenuity, Spain planned to crush Cuba, not by fighting the revolutionists, but by starving women and children, old men and peaceful farm hands. It is estimated, and conservatively, that more than 500,000 people had been starved to death before the United States interfered.

Indeed, it was upon the hapless pacificos that the horrors of war chiefly descended. They were ruined, but that was the least. Their property, the honor of their women, and their lives were held to be the legitimate spoil of any Spanish soldier, and the tacit legalization of loot, rapine, and murder was taken full advantage of. More inhuman even than the regular soldiery were the guerrillas, licensed free companions, who roamed the island ever in search of spoil. The deeds of these wretches beggar description, and so foul was the repute of their corps that prisoners from their number taken by the Cubans were instantly put to death. It is just to say here that the testimony of Americans who served with Gomez and Maceo proves that those leaders enforced humane and orderly conduct upon their followers. The death penalty was more than once imposed upon useful and brave soldiers, who had been guilty of outrage. Nothing could more vividly indicate the moral difference between the Cuban and the Spaniard than the contrast between their methods of prosecuting the war. Though outlawed, the Revolutionists observed with scrupulous exactness the rules of civilized warfare, while the Spaniards murdered helpless prisoners, even killing the wounded in their beds, had recourse to torture and to nameless mutilation, in order to wreak their hatred, and let loose a swarm of bandits and ruffians to prey upon the defenseless people of the island.

Out of warfare such as this, waged on an island only a few hours' sail from our coast, and in which were heavy American interests, it was inevitable that invasion of American rights should proceed, and the wrath of the American people be awakened. Our citizens owned large plantations in Cuba, which were destroyed either by the Spaniards or the insurgents. Many Americans living in the island or visiting there, were arrested by the Spanish authorities, and one, at least, Dr. Ruiz, was murdered in Morro Castle, while another a newspaper correspondent, was cut to pieces by guerrillas. For Spanish outrages upon the lives or property of American citizens, claims aggregating $60,000,000 were on file with the United States Department of State before the declaration of war. The general sympathy of the American people with the insurgents, as well as the hope of profit, led to repeated efforts by our citizens to smuggle arms and munitions of war to the Cubans, and in time it became necessary to employ a great part of the United States navy in police duty on the high seas for the purpose of stopping the filibusters. This service in behalf of Spain was exceedingly repugnant to the American mind, and contributed greatly to the growing feeling of irritation toward Spain.

History in coming ages, however, will relate, to the unending horror and glory of the American people, that humanitarian considerations, rather than regard for imperiled interests, brought the United States into a war which most emphatically their people did not desire. The great New York newspapers, day by day, printed circumstantial accounts of the frightful sufferings in Cuba. One journal secured a great number of photographs of scenes amid the starving reconcentrados, which, greatly enlarged, were publicly exhibited in all parts of the Union. These pictures, showing the frightful distortions of the human body as the result of long starvation, showing little children, mere skeletons, looking mutely down on the dead bodies of their parents, brought home to the mind of the people the state of life in a neighboring land as no writing, however brilliant, could. A cry went up from every part of the United States that a Christian duty was imposed upon our nation to interfere for the alleviation of such horrible suffering. Charity came to the rescue with free contributions of provisions, and Congress made a heavy appropriation of money for the relief of the Cubans. But everywhere the opinion grew that philanthropy alone could not right this great wrong, but that the strong hand of the United States must reach forth to pluck out the Spaniard from the land he ravaged. And when a number of Senators and Representatives in Congress made journeys to Cuba, and returning, described in formal addresses at the Capitol the scenes of starvation and misery, this opinion hardened into positive conviction.

Then, almost as if planned by some all-knowing power, came a great and inexplicable disaster, which made American intervention inevitable and immediate.

During the latter years of the Cleveland administration the representatives of American interests in Cuba urged that a United States ship-of-war should be permanently stationed in Havana harbor. The request was reasonable, the act in thorough accord with the custom of nations. But, fearing to offend Spain, President Cleveland avoided taking the step and President McKinley for months imitated him. In time this act, which in itself could have had no hostile significance, came to be regarded as an expression of hostility to Spain, and all the resources of Spanish diplomacy were exerted to prevent any American warship from entering Havana harbor. Ultimately, however, the pressure of public opinion compelled the Executive to provide for representation of American authority in the disordered island, and the battle-ship "Maine"—a sister ship to the "Iowa," a picture of which appears elsewhere in this volume—was sent to Havana.

The night of February 15 the "Maine" lay quietly at her anchorage in the Havana harbor. Her great white hull, with lights shining brilliantly from the ports aft where the officers' quarters were, gleamed in the starlight. On the berth deck the men swung sleeping in their hammocks. The watch on deck breathed gratefully the cool evening air after the long tropic day. Captain Sigsbee was at work in his cabin, and the officers in the wardroom were chatting over their games or dozing over their books. The lights of the town and of the ancient fortress of Morro shone brightly through the purpling light. Not far away the Spanish man-of-war "Alfonso XIII." lay at her moorings, and an American merchantman, brightly lighted, was near. The scene was peaceful, quiet, beautiful. True, in the minds of many officers and men on the American warship there was a lurking and indefinable sense of danger. Their coming had been taken by the Spaniards in Havana as a hostile act. Though all the perfunctory requirements of international courtesy had been complied with, salutes interchanged, visits of ceremony paid and returned, there was yet in the Spanish greeting an ill-concealed tone of anger. In the cafes Spanish officers cursed the Yankees and boasted of their purpose to destroy them. On the streets American blue-jackets, on shore leave, were jostled, jeered, and insulted. Yet the ill-temper of the Spaniards, though apparent, was so ill defined that no apprehension of a positive attack was felt. As is the practice on men-of-war, however, the utmost vigilance was maintained. Only the employment of a boat patrol and the use of torpedo nettings were lacking to give the "Maine" the aspect of a ship in an enemy's harbor.

Then came the disaster that shocked the world. A disaster in which it is impossible not to suspect the element of treachery. A disaster which if purely accidental, occurring to a hated ship in a port surrounded by men who were enemies at heart, was the most extraordinary coincidence in history. The story is brief. Not until this war is ended and the authority of the United States is employed to clear up the mystery, can the real narrative of the destruction of the "Maine" be told.

This much we know: At about half-past nine those on the "Maine" who lived to tell the tale heard a sudden dull explosion, with a slight shock, then a prolonged, deep, furious roar, which shook the ship to its very vitals. The people on the other ships in the harbor saw the whole forward portion of the "Maine" suddenly become a flaming volcano belching forth fire, men, huge pieces of steel, and bursting shells. Portions of the ship's hull rained down on decks a thousand yards away. When the first fierce shock of the explosion was past, it was seen that the "Maine" was on fire and was rapidly sinking.

How wonderful is the power of discipline upon the human mind! On the great battle-ship, with hundreds of its men blown to pieces or penned down by steel debris to be drowned in the rapidly rising waters, there was no panic. Captain Sigsbee, rushing from his cabin door, is met by the sergeant of marines who serves him as orderly. Not a detail of naval etiquette is lacking. Sergeant William Anthony salutes:

"I have to report, sir, that the ship is blown up and is sinking," he says, as he would report a pilot boat in the offing.

The captain reaches the deck to find his officers already at work, the men who have not been injured all at their stations. Boats are lowered and ply about the harbor to rescue survivors. Though the flames rage fiercely, and the part of the ship which they have not yet reached is full of high explosives, there is no panic. At the first alarm every man has done what years of drill and teaching have taught him to do. The after-magazines have been flooded, the boats' crews called away. Even preparations for a fight had been attempted. Lieutenant Jenkins, hearing the first explosion, sprang so quickly for his station at a forward gun that he was caught in the second explosion and slain. Though a bolt from heaven or a shock from hell had struck the "Maine," it brought death only—not fear nor panic.

The work of rescuing survivors and caring for the wounded was pushed apace, for the ship sunk rapidly, until only her after-superstructure was above the water. Boats from the Spanish man-of-war joined in the work of mercy and her officers, as though conscious that the suspicion of treachery was first in every man's mind, exerted themselves in every way to show solicitude for the wounded and sorrow for the disaster. When all was done that could be done, and the roll of the ship's company was called, it was found that 266 brave Americans were lost in Havana harbor—a friendly port. Some lie there yet, penned down beneath the gnarled and scorched steel which formed the gallant "Maine"; others lie in lonely graves on the adjacent shore, where, before this war is ended, the American flag shall be raised above them to be their avenger and their monument.

* * * * *

It will be necessary to outline in only the most terse and condensed form the political and military events which succeeded the destruction of the "Maine" and led up to the declaration of war. The news of the great disaster was received at home with horror, speedily turning to anger. The Government, rightly desiring to proceed calmly and in accordance with regularly ascertained facts, strove to calm the public temper, but with little success. It gave out as Captain Sigsbee's first report of the disaster a cable message, which contained no charge of treachery, advised caution, and urged a suspension of judgment. But presently it became rumored about Washington that this dispatch was, in fact, sent under orders; that the captain's first report formally charged the Spaniards with blowing up the ship. In the newspapers the discussion raged and theories of the disaster were plentiful, but, after long weeks of careful study of the evidence, the Naval Board of Inquiry presented the following report:

When the "Maine" arrived at Havana, she was conducted by the regular Government pilot to buoy No. 4, to which she was moored in from five to six fathoms of water.

The state of discipline on board, and the condition of her magazines, boilers, coal-bunkers, and storage compartments, are passed in review, with the conclusion that excellent order prevailed, and that no indication of any cause for an internal explosion existed in any quarter.

At eight o'clock on the evening of February 15 everything had been reported secure, and all was quiet. At 9.40 o'clock the vessel was suddenly destroyed.

There were two distinct explosions, with a brief interval between them. The first lifted the forward part of the ship very perceptibly; the second, which was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume, is attributed by the Court to the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines.

The evidence of the divers establishes that the after-part of the ship was practically intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the explosion. The forward part was completely demolished.

Upon the evidence of a concurrent external cause the finding of the Court is as follows:

At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one-half feet from the middle line of the ship and six feet above the keel when in its natural position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water; therefore, about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured.

The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V-shape, the after-wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating extending forward.

At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plates. This break is now about six feet below the surface of the water and about thirty feet above its normal position.

In the opinion of the Court, this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship, at about frame 18, and somewhat on the port side of the ship.

The conclusions of the Court are:

That the loss of the "Maine" was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of her crew.

That the ship was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines; and,

That no evidence has been obtainable fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the "Maine" upon any person or persons.



To-day, in the midst of war with Spain, we have no more definite, no more authoritative knowledge of the cause of this disaster than this. Spain, indeed, through her official commission, decided that the explosion was wholly internal, but the American people is not convinced. Battleships are not in the habit of blowing themselves up, and it is the expectation that the establishment of American authority in Cuba will be followed by the unraveling of this murderous plot. Undoubtedly an anecdote told of Captain Robley D. Evans (Fighting Bob) of the navy expresses the popular conviction:

"The admiral in command of the United States fleet at Key West should have sailed for Havana on getting news of the 'Maine's' destruction," said Evans. "He should have reduced the forts, seized the city, discovered the assassins, and hanged them."

"But that would have been defiance of the orders of the Navy Department," responded his auditor, aghast.

"Perhaps so," admitted Evans, "but the man who did it would have been the next President of the United States."

While the "Maine" Court of Inquiry was in session measures looking toward war were rapidly taken. March 9, a bill, which had passed both houses of Congress without a dissenting voice, became a law, appropriating $50,000,000 to be expended for the national defense. Out of this sum the Navy Department bought two Brazilian cruisers building in England, which were rechristened the "New Orleans" and "Albany." A flotilla of yachts, seagoing tugs, and merchantmen was bought and refitted. The great American liners "St. Paul," "City of Paris," "City of New York," and "St. Louis" were chartered and made into auxiliary cruisers. All Europe was ransacked for purchasable warships and torpedo boats, with the result of proving that no nation, however rich, can equip itself with a navy in an emergency. Not one battle-ship was available for purchase, and only four cruisers, of doubtful quality. And while this work of preparation was going hurriedly on the country was drifting into war with what seemed at the time inexplicable slowness, but to the calmer backward glance of history will appear dangerously swift in the face of our great lack of preparation. What might be termed the milestones on the march to battle were these:

April 5.—Consul General Fitz Hugh Lee recalled from Havana.

April 11.—Message of the President on Cuba, recommending that we have power to intervene forcibly without "recognizing at this time the independence of the present insurgent government."

April 13.—The House passed a resolution directing the President to intervene in Cuba at once, and authorizing him to use the land and naval forces of the United States to stop the war.

April 16.—The Senate passed a joint resolution, as a substitute for the House resolution, declaring the island to be free, recognizing the republic, demanding relinquishment of authority in Cuba by Spain, and withdrawal of Spanish forces; directing the President to call out the militia in addition to regular land and naval forces, and, finally, disclaiming any intention to annex the island.

April 19.—Senate resolution adopted by the House, with the proviso recognizing the republic of Cuba stricken out. Both houses agreed to the report in this form.

April 20.—Ultimatum to Spain, cabled at 11 A.M.—a formal demand that Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

President signed Cuban joint resolutions at 11.24.

Senor Polo y Bernabe, the Spanish Minister, was notified. He at once requested his passports.

April 21.—General Woodford, the American Minister at Madrid, left Spain.

The President directed the Secretary of the Navy to order the vessels of the North Atlantic squadron to proceed without delay to Cuban waters to blockade Havana and other ports of the island.

April 23.—President McKinley signed the proclamation calling for 125,000 volunteers.

April 25.—Formal declaration of war recommended by the President, and a bill "declaring that war exists between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain," passed by both houses.

And so the United States embarked on its first war with any European Power, save England—a war forced upon us by every consideration of humanity—a war which shall be of great advantage or of great harm to our Republic, according as its fruits are wisely or wrongly administered.



CHAPTER II.

THE OPENING DAYS OF THE WAR. — THE FIRST BLOW STRUCK IN THE PACIFIC. — DEWEY AND HIS FLEET. — THE BATTLE AT MANILA. — AN EYE-WITNESS' STORY. — DELAY AND DOUBT IN THE EAST. — DULL TIMES FOR THE BLUE-JACKETS. — THE DISCOVERY OF CERVERA. — HOBSON'S EXPLOIT. — THE OUTLOOK.

Strangely enough the first warlike stroke at Spain was not delivered in or about Cuba, where the quarrel arose, but in the other hemisphere, in the far-away waters of the Asiatic Pacific, where the American flag is almost a stranger and the power and wealth of the great American Republic are unknown. In the Philippine Islands Spain retains one of the colonies with which she once encircled the globe. More than 7,000,000 people—a peace-loving, kindly, intelligent race—are there ruled by the Spaniards, and as the rule was of the characteristic Spanish kind, with all the accompaniments of slaughter, dishonor, and extortion, the natives—as in Cuba—were in a chronic state of rebellion. One uprising, which had assumed very considerable proportions, was reported by the Spaniards as suppressed just before our declaration of war. That event, however, aroused the revolutionists again and, as we shall see, they were of the greatest service to us as allies.

When war was declared an American squadron of six warships lay at Hong Kong. The vessels were the "Olympia," protected cruiser; "Raleigh," "Baltimore," and "Boston," cruisers; "Concord" and "Petrel," gunboats, and the revenue cutter "McCulloch." Not a very powerful fleet—not a battle-ship nor even an armored cruiser among them—but the ships carried crews of as sturdy Yankee blue-jackets as ever trained a gun, and when the time came for daring an enemy's fire the little "Petrel" was as dashing and defiant as the stoutest of steel-clads could be. In command of the squadron was Admiral George Dewey, a Vermonter, who served with Farragut and had his baptism of fire at the forts below New Orleans. In time of peace the war record of a subaltern is quickly forgotten, and Dewey patiently climbed the ladder of promotion until 1898 found him a commodore and in command of the Asiatic squadron, without anybody's remembering particularly that this officer in far Hong Kong had seen fighting and knew how to bear himself under fire. It is a significant fact that when he had won the first great victory of the war, and the newspapers were searching everywhere for stories illustrative of his character, it was discovered that he had chiefly impressed himself on the Washington mind by his excessive punctiliousness in matters of dress.

Four days after the declaration of war there was a commotion on the ships of Dewey's squadron. The signal to weigh anchor flew from the foremast of the "Olympia," and everybody knew that the admiral had received fighting orders. For some days past the ships had been in their battle rigging. The white paint had been covered by a dull greenish-gray. All woodwork, railings, and unnecessary hamper had been stripped off and sent ashore. The officers' baggage was reduced to the barest necessities. Nothing was left anywhere on board which could be turned into a cloud of flying splinters by a shell, or which cumbered the decks to the inconvenience of the gunners. The warships which, in time of peace, were as bright and sparkling as a well-kept yacht, had put on the sullen, vicious air of war.

Dewey's objective point when he set sail from the harbor of Hong Kong was the Asiatic squadron of Spain, under the command of Admiral Montojo. There was every reason to believe that he would find the enemy under the protecting guns of the forts that guarded the harbor of Manila. In themselves the Spanish ships were no match for the American fleet. Three good ships had Admiral Montojo—the "Reina Cristina," the "Castilla," and the "Don Antonio de Ulloa"; but his others were old-fashioned and lacking in modern armament. But should they take positions under the guns of the Spanish forts, at the end of a channel plentifully guarded by mines and torpedoes, the disparity in forces would disappear. As it occurred this was precisely what they did, giving Admiral Dewey opportunity to put into practice tactics which it seems he had studied for months in anticipation of exactly such an emergency.

On the night of April 30 the American ships arrived at the entrance of Manila harbor, unseen by the sentries on the forts. It was known that Montojo was inside, and every light was extinguished and every noise hushed on the Yankee ships, for the admiral had planned a midnight entrance to the stronghold. The ships were stripped for action, boats covered with canvas, nettings spread to prevent splinters from flying, partitions removed, and ammunition hoists and bullet shields put up. At midnight the entrance to the harbor began, the ships steaming in single column at about six knots an hour, with the "Olympia" leading. Strangely enough not a single torpedo or mine in the channel was exploded, though the Spaniards discovered the advance of the ships and opened fire from the forts. The first shot in answer was fired by a gunner on the "Boston," without orders. He saw the flash of a gun on a shore battery and instantly fired his piece without altering its elevation. That dismantled a gun in the Spanish works and killed thirty men.

For a few hours after passing the forts the wearied blue-jackets slept at their guns. With the approach of day came the signal from the flagship to prepare for action. In the gray dawn the Spanish fleet could be seen about two miles distant, at such a point that their fire could be re-enforced by the guns of the forts. A most graphic story of the action that followed, as seen from the view-point of "the man behind the gun," whom Captain Mahan eulogizes, is told by Chief Gunner Evans of the "Boston," from whose narrative I quote the following paragraphs:



"We were steaming very slowly, but increasing speed as the dawn increased. In the gray daylight we could make out a line of ships anchored in front of the city. Then we steamed ahead faster. The ships ahead proved to be merchantmen, and at daylight we could discern the Spanish fleet further down the bay, and then it was 'Full ahead!' The Spanish fleet did not advance to meet us, and apparently made no move on the defensive. Possibly our audacity had for the moment paralyzed them. But it was not for long. In twenty minutes or so they opened a terrific cannonading at long range. The batteries and forts around Manila opened fire at the same time. Every man on the ship was now wide awake and at his post. I knew that it would not be long before there would be some hot work, and I served my men with a cup of coffee and a piece of hardtack, and a little later gave them each a drink of whisky and water.

"According to orders, we did not respond to the Spanish guns until our ships came into position. Then the flagship opened fire, and then I followed with two hours of cannonading which I do not believe has ever been equaled in naval warfare. The shots from the 'Olympia' were the prearranged signal for the other ships to do the same.

"We soon discovered that the batteries of Cavite were very heavily mounted, and the ordnance included several ten-inch guns, and we were not long in finding out that the 'Don Antonio de Ulloa' and the 'Reina Cristina,' the flagship, carried much heavier guns than we thought. We began to fear that our ships had met their match. As hot as the battle was, the heat of the sun was equally so, and I had my men who were bringing up the ammunition throw off every vestige of clothing except their shoes.