The enemy were repelled, after a closely contested battle of several hours, in which our loss was heavy. The officers suffered out of proportion. I have not the means of determining our loss, even approximately, but it cannot fall far short of twelve hundred killed, wounded and missing. I shall retain here enough of the enemy to exchange for them, as they were immediately shipped off, and not left for recapture.

About the close of this action the ammunition and cartridge boxes gave out, which, with the loss of many of the field officers, produced great confusion in the ranks. Seeing that the enemy did not take advantage of it, convinced me that equal confusion, and, consequently, great demoralization existed with him. Taking advantage of this fact, I ordered a charge upon our left (enemy's right) with the division under General C. F. Smith, which was most brilliantly executed, and gave to our arms full assurance of victory. The battle lasted until dark, and gave us possession of part of the intrenchment. An attack was ordered from the flank after the charge by General Smith was commenced, by the divisions under McClernand and Wallace, which, notwithstanding hours of exposure to a heavy fire in the fore part of the day, was gallantly made, and the enemy further repulsed. At the points thus gained, night having come on, all the troops encamped for the night, feeling that a complete victory would crown their efforts at an early hour in the morning. This morning, at a very early hour, a note was received from General Buckner, under a flag of truce, proposing an armistice. A copy of the correspondence which ensued is herewith enclosed.

I could mention individuals who especially distinguished themselves, but will leave this to division and brigade commanders, whose reports will be forwarded as soon as received.

Of the division commanders, however, Generals Smith, McClernand and Wallace, I must do the justice to say that all of them were with their commands in the midst of danger, and were always ready to execute all orders, no matter what the exposure to themselves.

At the hour the attack was made on General McClernand's command, I was absent, having received a note from flag officer Foote, requesting me to go and see him, he being unable to call on me, in consequence of a wound received the day before.

My staff: Colonel J. D. Webster, first Illinois artillery, chief of staff; Captain J. A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant-general; first lieutenants C. B. Lagone and William S. Hillyer, aids; and Lieutenant Colonel J. B. McPherson, chief engineer and Colonel John Riggin, junior, volunteer aid, are all deserving of personal mention for their gallantry and services.

For details, see reports of engineers, medical director and commanders of divisions and brigades to follow.

I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Brigadier-General U. S. A., commanding.



[Copy.] (p. 374)

General Buckner to General Grant.

Headquarters, Fort Donelson, To February 16th, 1862. BRIGADIER-GENERAL U.S. GRANT, Commanding United States Forces near Fort Donelson.

Sir: In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until twelve o'clock to-day.

I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, S. B. BUCKNER, Brigadier-General C. S. A.



[Copy.]

General Grant to General Buckner.

Headquarters, Army in the Field, To Fort Donelson, February 16th, 1862. GENERAL S. B. BUCKNER, Confederate Army.

Sir: Yours of this date proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.

I am, Sir, very respectfully your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Brigadier-General commanding.



[Copy.]

General Buckner to General Grant.

Headquarters, Dover, Tennessee, To February 16th, 1862. BRIGADIER-GENERAL GRANT, United States Army.

Sir: The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.

I am, Sir, your very obedient servant, S. B. BUCKNER, General commanding C. S. A.



General Orders No. 2. (p. 375)

Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, Fort Donelson, February 17th, 1862.

The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratulating the troops of this command for the triumph over rebellion gained by their valor on the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant.

For four successive nights, without shelter during the most inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy in large force in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly fortified by nature, all the safeguards suggested by science were added. Without a murmur this was borne, prepared at all times to receive an attack, and with continuous skirmishing by day, resulting ultimately in forcing the enemy to surrender without conditions.

The victory achieved is not only great in breaking down rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken in one battle on this continent.

Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the maps of our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live in the memory of a grateful people.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General commanding.



General Grant to the Assistant Adjutant-General.

To Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee, COLONEL J. C. KELTON, Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 6, 1863 Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

Colonel: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Army of the Tennessee, and co-operating forces, from the date of my assuming the immediate command of the expedition against Vicksburg, Mississippi, to the reduction of that place.

From the moment of taking command in person I became satisfied that Vicksburg could only be turned from the south side, and, in accordance with this conviction, I prosecuted the work on the canal, which had been located by Brigadier-General Williams, across the peninsula, on the Louisiana side of the river, with all vigor, hoping to make a channel which would pass transports for moving the army and carrying supplies to the new base of operations thus provided. The task was much more herculean than it at first appeared, and was made much more so by the almost continuous rains that fell during the whole of the time this work was prosecuted. The river, too, continued to rise and make a large expenditure of labor necessary to keep the water out of our camps and the canal.

Finally, on the 8th of March, the rapid rise of the river (p. 376) and the consequent great pressure upon the dam across the canal, near the upper end, at the main Mississippi levee, caused it to give way and let through the low lands at the back of our camps a torrent of water that separated the north and south shores of the peninsula as effectually as if the Mississippi flowed between them. This occurred when the enterprise promised success within a short time. There was some delay in trying to repair damages. It was found, however, that with the then stage of water, some other plan would have to be adopted for getting below Vicksburg with transports.

Captain F. E. Prime, Chief Engineer, and Colonel G. G. Pride, who was acting on my staff, prospected a route through the bayous which run from near Milliken's Bend on the north and New Carthage on the south, through Roundaway Bayou into the Tensas river. Their report of the practicability of this route determined me to commence work upon it. Having three dredge boats at the time, the work of opening this work was executed with great rapidity. One small steamer and a number of barges were taken through the channel thus opened, but the river commencing about the middle of April to fall rapidly, and the roads becoming passable between Milliken's Bend and New Carthage, made it impracticable and unnecessary to open water communication between these points.

Soon after commencing the first canal spoken of, I caused a channel to be cut from the Mississippi river into Lake Providence; also one from the Mississippi river into Coldwater, by way of Yazoo Pass.

I had no great expectations of important results from the former of these, but having more troops than could be employed to advantage at Young's Point, and knowing that Lake Providence was connected by Bayou Baxter with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream through which transports might pass into the Mississippi below, through Tensas, Wachita, and Red rivers, I thought it possible that a route might be opened in that direction which would enable me to co-operate with General Banks at Port Hudson.

By the Yazoo Pass route I only expected at first to get into the Yazoo by way of Coldwater and Tallahatchie with some lighter gunboats and a few troops and destroy the enemy's transports in that stream and some gunboats which I knew he was building. The navigation, however, proved so much better than had been expected that I thought for a time of the possibility of making this the route for obtaining a foothold on high land above Haines Bluff, Mississippi, and small class steamers were accordingly ordered for transporting an army that way. Major-General J. B. McPherson, commanding seventeenth army corps, was directed to have his corps in readiness to move by this route; and one division from each the thirteenth and fifteenth corps were collected near the entrance of the Pass to be added to his command. It soon became evident that a sufficient number of boats of the right class could not be obtained for the movement of more than one division.

Whilst my forces were opening one end of the Pass the enemy was diligently closing the other end, and in this way succeeded in gaining time to strongly fortify Greenwood, below the junction of the Tallahatchie and Yallobusha. The advance of the expedition, consisting of one division of McClernand's corps from Helena, commanded by Brigadier-General L. F. Ross, and the 12th and 17th regiments of Missouri infantry, from Sherman's corps, as (p. 377) sharpshooters on the gunboats, succeeded in reaching Coldwater on the 2d day of March, after much difficulty, and the partial disabling of most of the boats. From the entrance into Coldwater to Fort Pemberton, at Greenwood, Mississippi, no great difficulty of navigation was experienced nor any interruption of magnitude from the enemy. Fort Pemberton extends from the Tallahatchie to the Yazoo at Greenwood. Here the two rivers come within a few hundred yards of each other. The land around the fort is low, and at the time of the attack was entirely overflowed. Owing to this fact, no movement could be made by the army to reduce it, but all depended upon the ability of the gunboats to silence the guns of the enemy and enable the transports to run down and land troops immediately on the fort itself. After an engagement of several hours the gunboats drew off, being unable to silence the batteries. Brigadier-General I. F. Quinby, commanding a division of McPherson's corps, met the expedition under Ross with his division on its return from Fort Pemberton, on the 21st of March, and being the senior, assumed command of the entire expedition, and returned to the position Ross had occupied.

On the 23d of March I sent orders for the withdrawal of all the forces operating in that direction, for the purpose of concentrating my army on Milliken's Bend.

On the 14th day of March, Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding Mississippi squadron, informed me that he had made a reconnoissance up Steele's Bayou, and partially through Black Bayou toward Deer Creek, and so far as explored these water courses were reported navigable for the smaller iron-clads. Information given mostly, I believe, by the negroes of the country, was to the effect that Deer Creek could be navigated to Rolling Fork, and that from there through the Sunflower to the Yazoo river there was no question about the navigation. On the following morning I accompanied Admiral Porter in the ram Price, several iron-clads preceding us, up through Steele's Bayou to near Black Bayou.

At this time our forces were at a dead-lock at Greenwood, and I looked upon the success of this enterprise as of vast importance. It would, if successful, leave Greenwood between two forces of ours, and would necessarily cause the immediate abandonment of that stronghold.

About thirty steamers of the enemy would have been destroyed or fallen into our hands. Seeing that the great obstacle to navigation, so far as I had gone, was from overhanging trees, I left Admiral Porter near Black Bayou and pushed back to Young's Point for the purpose of sending forward a Pioneer corps to remove these difficulties. Soon after my return to Young's Point Admiral Porter sent back to me for a co-operating force. Sherman was promptly sent with one division of his corps. The number of steamers suitable for the navigation of these bayous being limited, most of the force was sent up the Mississippi river to Eagle's Bend, a point where the river runs within one mile of Steele's Bayou, thus saving an important part of this difficult navigation. The expedition failed, probably more from want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this route than from any impracticability in the navigation of the streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pass. Want of this knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties were encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to Young's Point for the means of removing them. This gave the enemy time to move forces to effectually checkmate further (p. 378) progress, and the expedition was withdrawn when within a few hundred yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo.

All this may have been providential in driving us ultimately to a line of operations which has proven eminently successful.

For further particulars of Steele's Bayou expedition see report of Major-General W. T. Sherman, forwarded on the 12th of April.

As soon as I decided to open water communication from a point on the Mississippi near Milliken's Bend to New Carthage I determined to occupy the latter place, it being the first point below Vicksburg that could be reached by land at the stage of water then existing, and the occupancy of which, while it secured to us a point on the Mississippi river, would also protect the main line of communication by water. Accordingly the thirteenth army corps, Major-General J. A. McClernand commanding, was directed to take up its line of march on the 29th day of March for New Carthage, the fifteenth and seventeenth corps to follow, moving no faster than supplies and ammunition could be transported to them.

The roads though level were intolerably bad, and the movement was therefore necessarily slow. Arriving at Smith's Plantation, two miles from New Carthage, it was found that the levee of Bayou Vidal was broken in several places, thus leaving New Carthage an island.

All the boats that could be were collected from the different bayous in the vicinity, and others were built, but the transportation of an army in this way was found exceedingly tedious. Another route had to be found. This was done by making a further march around Vidal to Perkins' Plantation, a distance of twelve miles more, making the whole distance to be marched from Milliken's Bend to reach water communication on the opposite side of the point thirty-five miles. Over this distance, with bad roads to contend against, supplies of ordnance stores and provisions had to be hauled by wagons with which to commence the campaign on the opposite side of the river.

At the same time that I ordered the occupation of New Carthage, preparations were made for running transports by the Vicksburg batteries with Admiral Porter's gunboat fleet.

On the night of the 16th of April Admiral Porter's fleet and the transports Silver Wave, Forest Queen, and Henry Clay ran the Vicksburg batteries. The boilers of the transports were protected as well as possible with hay and cotton. More or less commissary stores were put on each. All three of these boats were struck more or less frequently while passing the enemy's batteries, and the Henry Clay, by the explosion of a shell or by other means, was set on fire and entirely consumed. The other two boats were somewhat injured, but not seriously disabled. No one on board of either was hurt.

As these boats succeeded in getting by so well, I ordered six more to be prepared in like manner for running the batteries. These latter, viz.: Tigress, Anglo-Saxon, Cheeseman, Empire City, Horizonia, and Moderator, left Milliken's Bend on the night of the 22d April, and five of them got by, but in a somewhat damaged condition. The Tigress received a shot in her hull below the water line, and sunk on the Louisiana shore soon after passing the last of the batteries. The crews of these steamers, with (p. 379) the exception of that of the Forest Queen, Captain D. Conway, and the Silver Wave, Captain McMillan, were composed of volunteers from the army. Upon the call for volunteers for this dangerous enterprise, officers and men presented themselves by hundreds, anxious to undertake the trip. The names of those whose services were accepted will be given in a separate report.

It is a striking feature, so far as my observation goes, of the present volunteer army of the United States, that there is nothing which men are called upon to do, mechanical or professional, that accomplished adepts cannot be found for the duty required in almost every regiment.

The transports injured in running the blockade were repaired by order of Admiral Porter, who was supplied with the material for such repairs as they required, and who was and is ever ready to afford all the assistance in his power for the furtherance of the success of our arms. In a very short time five of the transports were in running order, and the remainder were in a condition to be used as barges in the moving of troops. Twelve barges loaded with forage and rations were sent in tow of the last six boats that run the blockade; one half of them got through in a condition to be used.

Owing to the limited number of transports below Vicksburg it was found necessary to extend our line of travel to Hard Times, Louisiana, which, by the circuitous route it was necessary to take, increased the distance to about seventy miles from Milliken's Bend, our starting point.

The thirteenth army corps being all through to the Mississippi and the seventeenth army corps well on the way, so much of the thirteenth as could be got on board the transports and barges were put aboard and moved to the front of Grand Gulf on the 29th of April. The plan here was that the navy should silence the guns of the enemy, and the troops land under cover of the gunboats and carry the place by storm.

At 8 o'clock A.M. the navy made the attack, and kept it up for more than five hours in the most gallant manner. From a tug out in the stream I witnessed the whole engagement. Many times it seemed to me the gunboats were within pistol-shot of the enemy's batteries. It soon became evident that the guns of the enemy were too elevated and their fortifications too strong to be taken from the water side. The whole range of hills on that side were known to be lined with rifle-pits, besides the field artillery could be moved to any position where it could be made useful in case of an attempt at landing. This determined me to again run the enemy's batteries, turn his position by affecting a landing at Rodney, or at Bruinsburg, between Grand Gulf and Rodney. Accordingly orders were immediately given for the troops to debark at Hard Times, Louisiana, and march across to the point immediately below Grand Gulf. At dark the gunboats again engaged the batteries, and all the transports run by, receiving but two or three shots in the passage, and these without injury. I had some time previously ordered a reconnoissance to a point opposite Bruinsburg, to ascertain if possible from persons in the neighborhood the character of the road leading to the highlands back of Bruinsburg. During the night I learned from a negro man that there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, which determined me to land there.

The work of ferrying the troops to Bruinsburg was commenced (p. 380) at daylight in the morning, the gunboats as well as transports being used for the purpose.

As soon as the thirteenth army corps was landed, and could draw three days' rations to put in haversacks (no wagons were allowed to cross until the troops were all over) they were started on the road to Port Gibson. I deemed it a matter of vast importance that the highlands should be reached without resistance.

The seventeenth corps followed as rapidly as it could be put across the river.

About 2 o'clock on the 1st of May, the advance of the enemy was met eight miles from Bruinsburg, on the road to Port Gibson. He was forced to fall back, but as it was dark, he was not pursued far until daylight. Early on the morning of the 1st I went out, accompanied by members of my staff, and found McClernand with his corps engaging the enemy about four miles from Port Gibson. At this point the roads branched in exactly opposite directions, both, however, leading to Port Gibson. The enemy had taken position on both branches, thus dividing as he fell back the pursuing forces. The nature of the ground in that part of the country is such that a very small force could retard the progress of a much larger one for many hours. The roads usually run on narrow, elevated ridges, with deep and impenetrable ravines on either side. On the right were the divisions of Hovey, Carr, and Smith, and on the left the division of Osterhaus, of McClernand's corps. The three former succeeded in driving the enemy from position to position back toward Port Gibson steadily all day.

Osterhaus did not, however, move the enemy from the position occupied by him on our left until Logan's division of McPherson's corps arrived.

McClernand, who was with the right in person, sent repeated messages to me before the arrival of Logan to send Logan's and Quinby's divisions of McPherson's corps to him.

I had been on that as well as all other parts of the field, and could see how they could be used there to advantage. However, as soon as the advance of McPherson's corps (Logan's division) arrived, I sent one brigade to McClernand on the right, and sent one brigade, Brigadier-General J. E. Smith commanding, to the left to the assistance of Osterhaus.

By the judicious disposition made of this brigade, under the immediate supervision of McPherson and Logan, a position was soon obtained giving us an advantage which soon drove the enemy from that part of the field, to make no further stand south of Bayou Pierre.

The enemy was here repulsed with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The repulse of the enemy on our left took place late in the afternoon. He was pursued toward Port Gibson, but night closing in, and the enemy making the appearance of another stand, the troops slept upon their arms until daylight.

In the morning it was found that the enemy had retreated across Bayou Pierre, on the Grand Gulf road, and a brigade of Logan's division was sent to divert his attention whilst a floating bridge was being built across Bayou Pierre immediately at Port Gibson. This bridge was completed, eight miles marched by McPherson's corps to the north fork of Bayou Pierre, that stream bridged, and the advance of this corps commenced passing over it at 5 o'clock the following morning.

On the 3d the enemy was pursued to Hawkinson's Ferry, with (p. 381) slight skirmishing all day, during which we took quite a number of prisoners, mostly stragglers from the enemy.

Finding that Grand Gulf had been evacuated, and that the advance of my forces was already fifteen miles out from there, and on the road, too, they would have to take to reach either Vicksburg, Jackson, or any intermediate point on the railroad between the two places, I determined not to march them back, but taking a small escort of cavalry, some fifteen or twenty men, I went to the gulf myself, and made the necessary arrangements for changing my base of supplies from Bruinsburg to Grand Gulf.

In moving from Milliken's Bend, the fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sherman commanding, was left to be the last to start. To prevent heavy re-enforcements going from Vicksburg to the assistance of the Grand Gulf forces, I directed Sherman to make a demonstration on Haines's Bluff, and to make all the show possible. From the information since received from prisoners captured this ruse succeeded admirably.

It had been my intention, up to the time of crossing the Mississippi river, to collect all my forces at Grand Gulf, and get on hand a good supply of provisions and ordnance stores before moving, and in the meantime to detach an army corps to co-operate with General Banks on Port Hudson and effect a junction of our forces.

About this time I received a letter from General Banks giving his position west of the Mississippi river, and stating that he could return to Baton Rouge by the 10th of May; that by the reduction of Port Hudson he could join me with 12,000 men.

I learned about the same time that troops were expected at Jackson from the southern cities with General Beauregard in command. To delay until the 10th of May, and for the reduction of Port Hudson after that, the accession of 12,000 men would not leave me relatively so strong as to move promptly with what I had. Information received from day to day of the movements of the enemy also impelled me to the course pursued. Whilst lying at Hawkinson's Ferry waiting for wagons, supplies, and Sherman's corps, which had come forward in the mean time, demonstrations were made, successfully, I believe, to induce the enemy to think that route and the one by Hall's Ferry above were objects of much solicitude to me. Reconnoissances were made to the west side of the Big Black to within six miles of Warrenton. On the 7th of May an advance was ordered, McPherson's corps keeping the road nearest Black river to Rocky Springs, McClernand's corps keeping the Ridge road, with his corps divided on the two roads. All the ferries were closely guarded until our troops were well advanced. It was my intention here to hug the Black river as closely as possible, with McClernand's and Sherman's corps, and get them to the railroad, at some place between Edward's Station and Bolton. McPherson was to move by way of Utica to Raymond, and from there into Jackson, destroying the railroad, telegraph, and public stores, etc., and push west to rejoin the main force. Orders were given to McPherson accordingly. Sherman was moved forward on the Edward's Station road, crossing Fourteen Mile creek at Dillon's Plantation; McClernand was moved across the same creek, further west, sending one division of his corps by the Baldwin's Ferry road as far as the river. At the crossing of Fourteen Mile (p. 382) creek both McClernand and Sherman had considerable skirmishing with the enemy to get possession of the crossing.

McPherson met the enemy near Raymond, two brigades strong under Gregg and Walker, on the same day engaged him, and after several hours hard fighting, drove him with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Many threw down their arms and deserted.

My position at this time was with Sherman's corps, some seven miles west of Raymond, and about the centre of the army.

On the night of the 12th of May, after orders had been given for the corps of McClernand and Sherman to march toward the railroads by parallel roads, the former in the direction of Edward's Station and the latter to a point on the railroad between Edward's Station and Bolton, the order was changed and both were directed to move toward Raymond.

This was in consequence of the enemy having retreated toward Jackson after his defeat at Raymond, and of information that re-enforcements were daily arriving at Jackson, and that General Joe Johnston was hourly expected there to take command in person. I therefore determined to make sure of that place and leave no enemy in my rear.

McPherson moved on the 13th to Clinton, destroyed the railroad and telegraph, and captured some important despatches from General Pemberton to General Gregg, who had commanded the day before in the battle of Raymond. Sherman moved to a parallel position on the Mississippi Springs and Jackson road; McClernand moved to a point near Raymond.

The next day Sherman and McPherson moved their entire forces toward Jackson. The rain fell in torrents all the night before, and continued until about noon of that day making the roads at first slippery and then miry, notwithstanding, the troops marched in excellent order without straggling and in the best of spirits about fourteen miles, and engaged the enemy about 12 o'clock, M., near Jackson. McClernand occupied Clinton with one division, Mississippi Springs with another, Raymond with a third, and had his fourth division and Blair's division of Sherman's corps with a wagon train still in the rear near New Auburn, while McArthur with one brigade of his division of McPherson's corps was moving toward Raymond on the Utica road. It was not the intention to move these forces any nearer Jackson, but to have them in a position where they would be in supporting distance if the resistance at Jackson should prove more obstinate than there seemed reason to expect.

The enemy marched out the bulk of his force on the Clinton road and engaged McPherson's corps about two and a half miles from the city. A small force of artillery and infantry took a strong position in front of Sherman, about the same distance out. By a determined advance of our skirmishers these latter were soon driven within their rifle-pits just outside the city. It was impossible to ascertain the strength of the enemy at this part of the line in time to justify an immediate assault; consequently McPherson's two divisions engaged the main bulk of the rebel garrison at Jackson, without further aid than the moral support given them by the knowledge the enemy had a force to the south side of the city and the few infantry and artillery of the enemy posted there to impede Sherman's progress. Sherman soon discovered the weakness of the enemy by sending a (p. 383) reconnoitering party to his right, which also had the effect of causing the enemy to retreat from this part of his line. A few of the artillerists, however, remained in their places, firing upon Sherman's troops, until the last moment, evidently instructed to do so, with the expectation of being captured in the end. On entering the city it was found that the main body of the enemy had retreated north, after a heavy engagement of more than two hours with McPherson's corps, in which he was badly beaten. He was pursued until near night, but without further damage to him.

During that evening I learned that General Johnston, as soon as he satisfied himself that Jackson was to be attacked, had ordered Pemberton peremptorily to march out from the direction of Vicksburg and attack our rear. Availing myself of this information, I immediately issued orders to McClernand and Blair, of Sherman's corps, to face their troops towards Bolton, with a view of reaching Edward's Station, marching on different roads converging near Bolton. These troops were admirably located for such a move. McPherson was ordered to retrace his steps early in the morning of the 15th on the Clinton road. Sherman was left in Jackson to destroy the railroads, bridges, factories, workshops, arsenals, and everything valuable for the support of the enemy. This was accomplished in the most effectual manner.

On the afternoon of the 15th I proceeded as far west as Clinton, through which place McPherson's corps passed to within supporting distance of Hovey's division of McClernand's corps, which had moved that day on the same road to within one and a half mile of Bolton. On reaching Clinton, at 4.45 P.M., I ordered McClernand to move his command early the next morning toward Edward's Station, marching so as to feel the enemy, if he encountered him, but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident he was able to defeat him; and also to order Blair to move with him.

About five o'clock on the morning of the 16th, two men, employees on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, who had passed through Pemberton's army the night before, were brought to my headquarters. They stated Pemberton's force to consist of about eighty regiments, with ten batteries of artillery, and that the whole force was estimated by the enemy at about twenty-five thousand men. From them I also learned the positions being taken up by the enemy, and his intention of attacking our rear. I had determined to leave one division of Sherman's corps one day longer in Jackson, but this information determined me to bring his entire command up at once, and I accordingly dispatched him at 5.30 A.M. to move with all possible speed until he came up with the main force near Bolton. My despatch reached him at 7.10 A.M., and his advance division was in motion in one hour from that time. A despatch was sent to Blair at the same time, to push forward his division in the direction of Edward's Station with all possible dispatch. McClernand was directed to establish communication between Blair and Osterhaus, of his corps, and keep it up, moving the former to the support of the latter. McPherson was ordered forward at 5.45 A.M. to join McClernand, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, was sent forward to communicate the information received, and with verbal instructions to McClernand as to the disposition of his forces. At an early hour I left for the advance, and on arriving at the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad with the road (p. 384) from Raymond to Bolton, I found McPherson's advance and his pioneer corps engaged in rebuilding a bridge on the former road that had been destroyed by the cavalry of Osterhaus's division that had gone into Bolton the night before. The train of Hovey's division was at a halt, and blocked up the road from further advance on the Vicksburg road. I ordered all quartermasters and wagonmasters to draw their teams to one side and make room for the passage of troops. McPherson was brought up by this road. Passing to the front, I found Hovey's division of the thirteenth army corps at a halt, with our skirmishers and the enemy's pickets near each other. Hovey was bringing his troops into line, ready for battle, and could have brought on an engagement at any moment. The enemy had taken up a very strong position on a narrow ridge, his left resting on a height where the road makes a sharp turn to the left approaching Vicksburg. The top of the ridge and the precipitous hill-side to the left of the road are covered by a dense forest and undergrowth. To the right of the road the timber extends a short distance down the hill, and then opens into cultivated fields on a gentle slope and into a valley extending for a considerable distance. On the road and into the wooded ravine and hill-side Hovey's division was disposed for the attack. McPherson's two divisions, all of his corps with him on the march from Milliken's Bend (until Ransom's brigade arrived that day after the battle), were thrown to the right of the road properly speaking, the enemy's rear. But I would not permit an attack to be commenced by our troops until I could hear from McClernand, who was advancing with four divisions, two of them on a road intersecting the Jackson road about one mile from where the troops above described were placed, and about the centre of the enemy's line; the other two divisions on a road still north and nearly the same distance off.

I soon heard from McClernand, through members of his staff and my own, whom I had sent to him early in the morning, and found that by the nearest practicable route of communication he was two and a half miles distant. I sent several successive messages to him to push forward with all rapidity. There had been continuous firing between Hovey's skirmishers and the rebel advance, which by 11 o'clock grew into a battle. For some time this division bore the brunt of the conflict, but finding the enemy too strong for them, at the instance of Hovey I directed first one and then a second brigade from Crocker's division to re-enforce him. All this time Logan's division was working upon the enemy's left and rear and weakened his front attack most wonderfully. The troops here opposing us evidently far outnumbered ours. Expecting McClernand momentarily with four divisions, including Blair's, I never felt a doubt at the result. He did not arrive, however, until the enemy had been driven from the field, after a terrible contest of hours, with a heavy loss of killed, wounded and prisoners, and a number of pieces of artillery. It was found afterward that the Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a southerly direction for about one mile and to where it intersected one of the Raymond roads, turns almost to the west, down the hill and across the valley in which Logan was operating on the rear of the enemy. One brigade of Logan's division had, unconscious of this important fact, penetrated nearly to this road and compelled the enemy to retreat to prevent capture. As it was, much of his artillery and Loring's division of his army was cut off, besides the prisoners captured. On the call of Hovey for more re-enforcements, just before the rout of the enemy (p. 385) commenced, I ordered McPherson to move what troops he could by a left flank around to the enemy's front. Logan rode up at this time and told me that if Hovey could make another dash at the enemy he could come up from where he then was and capture the greater part of their force. I immediately rode forward and found the troops that had been so gallantly engaged for so many hours withdrawn from their advanced position and were filling their cartridge boxes. I directed them to use all dispatch and push forward as soon as possible, explaining to them the position of Logan's division. Proceeding still further forward, expecting every moment to see the enemy, and reaching what had been his line, I found he was retreating. Arriving at the Raymond road, I saw to my left and on the next ridge a column of troops which proved to be Can's division and McClernand with it in person; and to the left of Carr, Osterhaus's division soon afterward appeared with his skirmishers well in advance. I sent word to Osterhaus that the enemy was in full retreat, and to push up with all haste. The situation was soon explained, after which I ordered Carr to pursue with all speed to Black river, and across it if he could, and to Osterhaus to follow. Some of McPherson's troops had already got into the road in advance, but having marched and engaged the enemy all day they were fatigued, and gave the road to Carr who continued the pursuit until after dark, capturing a train of cars loaded with commissary and ordnance stores and other property.

The delay in the advance of the troops immediately with McClernand was caused, no doubt, by the enemy presenting a front of artillery and infantry where it was impossible, from the nature of the ground and the density of the forest, to discover his numbers. As it was, the battle of Champion's Hill or Baker's Creek was fought mainly by Hovey's division of McClernand's corps and Logan's and Quinby's divisions (the latter commanded by Brigadier-General M. M. Crocker) of McPherson's corps.

Ransom's brigade, of McPherson's corps, came on to the field where the main battle had been fought immediately after the enemy had begun his retreat.

Word was sent to Sherman, at Bolton, of the result of the day's engagement, with directions to turn his corps toward Bridgeport, and to Blair to join him at this latter place.

At daylight, on the 17th, the pursuit was renewed with McClernand's corps in the advance. The enemy was found strongly posted on both sides of the Black river. At this point, on Black river, the bluffs extended to the water's edge on the west bank. On the east side is an open, cultivated bottom of near one mile in width, surrounded by a bayou of stagnant water, from two to three feet in depth, and from ten to twenty feet in width, from the river above the railroad to the river below. Following the inside line of this bayou the enemy had constructed rifle-pits, with the bayou to serve as a ditch on the outside and immediately in front of them. Carr's division occupied the right in investing this place, and Lawless brigade the right of his division. After a few hours skirmishing Lawler discovered that by moving a portion of his brigade under cover of the river bank he could get a position from which that place could be successfully assaulted, and ordered a charge accordingly. Notwithstanding the level ground over which a portion of his troops had to pass without cover, and the great obstacle of the ditch in front of the enemy's works, the charge was gallantly and successfully (p. 386) made, and in a few minutes the entire garrison with seventeen pieces of artillery were the trophies of this brilliant and daring movement. The enemy on the west bank of the river immediately set fire to the railroad bridge and retreated, thus cutting off all chance of escape for any portion of his forces remaining on the east bank.

Sherman, by this time, had reached Bridgeport, on the Black river above. The only pontoon train with the expedition was with him. By the morning of the 18th he had crossed the river, and was ready to march on Walnut Hills. McClernand and McPherson built floating bridges during the night, and had them ready for crossing their commands by 8 A.M. of the 18th.

The march was commenced by Sherman at an early hour by the Bridgeport and Vicksburg road, turning to the right when within three and a half miles of Vicksburg to get possession of Walnut Hills and the Yazoo river. This was successfully accomplished before the night of the 18th. McPherson crossed Black river above the Jackson road, and came into the same road with Sherman, but to his rear. He arrived after nightfall with his advance to where Sherman turned to the right. McClernand moved by the Jackson and Vicksburg road to Mount Albans, and there turned to the left to get into Baldwin's Ferry road. By this disposition the three army corps covered all the ground their strength would admit of, and by the morning of the 19th the investment of Vicksburg was made as complete as could be by the forces at my command.

During the day there was continuous skirmishing, and I was not without hope of carrying the enemy's works. Relying upon the demoralization of the enemy in consequence of repeated defeats outside of Vicksburg, I ordered a general assault at 2 P.M. on this day.

The fifteenth army corps, from having arrived in front of the enemy's works in time on the 18th to get a good position, were enabled to make a vigorous assault. The thirteenth and seventeenth corps succeeded no further than to gain advanced positions, covered from the fire of the enemy. The 20th and 21st were spent in perfecting communications with our supplies. Most of the troops had been marching and fighting battles for twenty days, on an average of about five days' rations, drawn from the commissary department. Though they had not suffered from short rations up to this time, the want of bread to accompany the other rations was beginning to be much felt. On the 21st my arrangements for drawing supplies of every description being complete, I determined to make another effort to carry Vicksburg by assault. There were many reasons to determine me to adopt this course. I believed an assault from the position gained by this time could be made successfully. It was known that Johnston was at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, re-enforced by other troops from the east, and that more were daily reaching him. With the force I had, a short time must have enabled him to attack me in the rear, and possibly succeeded in raising the siege. Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State, and possess myself of all the railroads and practical military highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory west of the Tombigbee, and this before the season was too far advanced for campaigning in this latitude. I would have saved (p. 387) government sending large re-enforcements much needed elsewhere; and finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after the failure to carry the enemy's works. Accordingly on the 21st orders were issued for a general assault on the whole line, to commence at 11 A.M. on the 22d. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, that there should be no difference between them in movement of assault. Promptly at the hour designated, the three army corps then in front of the enemy's works commenced the assault. I had taken a commanding position near McPherson's front, and from which I could see all the advancing columns from his corps, and a part of each of Sherman's and McClernand's. A portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting their flags on the outer slopes of the enemy's bastions and maintained them there until night. Each corps had many more men than could possibly be used in the assault, over such ground as intervened between them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of breaking through the enemy's line or in repelling a sortie. The assault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops, but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken in that way. At every point assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works could cover. The assault failed, I regret to say, with much loss on our side in killed and wounded, but without weakening the confidence of the troops in their ability to ultimately succeed.

No troops succeeded in entering any of the enemy's works with the exception of Sergeant Griffith, of the 21st regiment Iowa volunteers, and some eleven privates of the same regiment. Of these none returned except the sergeant and possibly one man. The work entered by him, from its position, could give us no practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time.

About 12 M., I received a despatch from McClernand that he was hard pressed at several points, in reply to which I directed him to re-enforce the points hard pressed from such troops as he had that were not engaged. I then rode round to Sherman, and had just reached there, when I received a second despatch from McClernand stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of and still held two of the enemy's forts; that the American flag was then waved over them, and asking me to have Sherman and McPherson make a diversion in his favor. This despatch I showed to Sherman, who immediately ordered a renewal of the assault on his front. I also sent a messenger to McClernand, directing him to order up McArthur to his assistance, and started immediately to the position I had just left on McPherson's line to convey to him the information from McClernand by this last despatch, that he might make the diversion requested. Before reaching McPherson I met a messenger with a third despatch from McClernand, of which the following is a copy:

Headquarters 13th Army Corps, To In the Field near Vicksburg, Mississippi, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. May 22d, 1863.

General: We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to McArthur to re-enforce me if he can. Would it not be best to (p. 388) concentrate the whole or part of his command on this point?

John A. MCCLERNAND, Major-General commanding.

P.S. I have received your despatch, my troops are all engaged, and I cannot withdraw any to re-enforce others.

MCCLERNAND.

The position occupied by me during most of the time of the assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on in front of the thirteenth army corps than I believed it possible for the commander of it to have. I could not see his possession of forts, nor necessity for re-enforcements, as represented in his despatches, up to the time I left it, which was between 12 M. and 1 P.M., and I expressed doubts of their correctness, which doubts the facts subsequently, but too late, confirmed. At the time I could not disregard his reiterated statements, for they might possibly be true; and that no possible opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape through fault of mine, I ordered Quinby's division, which was all of McPherson's corps then present, but four brigades, to report to McClernand, and notified him of the order. I showed his despatches to McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as much force in their fronts as possible. The diversion was promptly and vigorously made and resulted in the increase of our mortality list full fifty per cent., without advancing our position or giving us other advantages.

About 3.50 P.M., I received McClernand's fourth despatch, as follows:

To Headquarters 13th Army Corps, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, May 22, 1863. Department of the Tennessee.

General: I have received your despatch in regard to General Quinby's division and General McArthur's division. As soon as they arrive I will press the enemy with all possible speed, and doubt not I will force my way through. I have lost no ground. My men are in two of the enemy's forts, but they are commanded by rifle pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken who intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment I am hard pressed.

John A. MCCLERNAND, Major-General commanding.

The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, nor other evidence of demoralization.

After the failure of the 22d, I determined upon a regular siege. The troops now being fully awake to the necessity of this worked diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and satisfactorily until the 3d of July, when all was about ready for a final assault.

There was a great scarcity of Engineer officers in the beginning, but under the skillful superintendence of Captain F. E. Prime, of the Engineer corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, (p. 389) and Captain C. B. Comstock, of the Engineer corps, who joined this command during the siege, such practical experience was gained as would enable any division of this army hereafter to conduct a siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular Engineer officers.

On the afternoon of the 3d of July a letter was received from Lieutenant-General Pemberton, commanding the Confederate forces at Vicksburg, proposing an armistice and the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms for the capitulation of the place. The correspondence, copies of which are herewith transmitted, resulted in the surrender of the city and garrison of Vicksburg at 10 o'clock A.M., July 4, 1863, on the following terms: The entire garrison, officers and men, were to be paroled, not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by the proper authorities; officers and men each to be furnished with a parole, signed by himself; officers to be allowed then side arms and private baggage, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each; the rank and file to be allowed all their clothing, but no other property; rations from their own stores sufficient to last them beyond our lines; the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food; and thirty wagons to transport such articles as could not well be carried. These terms I regarded more favorable to the government than an unconditional surrender. It saved us the transportation of them north, which at that time would have been very difficult, owing to the limited amount of river transportation on hand, and the expenses of subsisting them. It left our army free to operate against Johnston, who was threatening us from the direction of Jackson, and our river transportation to be used for the movement of troops to any point the exigency of the service might require.

I deem it proper to state here, in order that the correspondence may be fully understood, that after my answer to General Pemberton's letter of the morning of the 3d, we had a personal interview on the subject of the capitulation.

The particulars and incidents of the siege will be contained in the reports of division and corps commanders, which will be forwarded as soon as received.

I brought forward during the siege, in addition to Lauman's division and four regiments previously ordered from Memphis, Smith's and Kimball's divisions of the sixteenth army corps, and assigned Major-General C. C. Washburne to command of same. On the 11th of June, Major-General F. J. Herron's division from the Department of the Missouri arrived; and on the 14th two divisions of the ninth army corps, Major-General J. G. Parke commanding, arrived. This increase in my force enabled me to make the investment most complete, and at the same time left me a large reserve to watch the movements of Johnston. Herron's division was put into position on the extreme south of the city, and Lauman's division was placed between Herron and McClernand. Smith's and Kimball's divisions and Parke's corps were sent to Haines's Bluff. This place I had fortified to the land side and every preparation made to resist a heavy force. Johnston crossed Big Black river with a portion of his force, and everything indicated that he would make an attack about the 25th of June. Our position in front of Vicksburg having been made as strong against a sortie from the enemy as his works were against an assault, I placed Major-General Sherman in command of all the troops designated to look after Johnston. The force intended to operate against Johnston, in addition to that at Haines's Bluff, was one division from each of the thirteenth, fifteenth, and (p. 390) seventeenth army corps and Lauman's division. Johnston, however, not attacking, I determined to attack him the moment Vicksburg was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I should again make an assault on Vicksburg at daylight on the 6th, and for him to have up supplies of all descriptions ready to move upon receipt of orders if the assault should prove a success. His preparations were immediately made, and when the place surrendered on the 4th two days earlier than I fixed for the attack, Sherman was found ready, and moved at once with a force increased by the remainder of both the thirteenth and fifteenth army corps, and is at present investing Jackson where Johnston has made a stand.

In the march from Bruinsburg to Vicksburg, covering a period of twenty days, before supplies could be obtained from government stores, only five days' rations were issued, and three days' of these were taken in haversacks at the start, and were soon exhausted. All other subsistence was obtained from the country through which we passed. The march was commenced without wagons, except such as could be picked up through the country. The country was abundantly supplied with corn, bacon, beef and mutton. The troops enjoyed excellent health, and no army ever appeared in better spirits or felt more confident of success.

In accordance with previous instructions, Major-General S. A. Hurlbut started Colonel (now Brigadier-General) B. H. Grierson with a cavalry force from La Grange, Tennessee, to make a raid through the central portion of the State of Mississippi to destroy railroads and other public property, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of the army moving to the attack on Vicksburg. On the 17th of April this expedition started, and arrived at Baton Rouge on the 2d of May, having successfully traversed the whole State of Mississippi. This expedition was skillfully conducted and reflects great credit on Colonel Grierson and all of his command. The notice given the raid by the Southern press confirms our estimate of its importance. It has been one of the most brilliant cavalry exploits of the war, and will be handed down in history as an example to be imitated. Colonel Grierson's report is herewith transmitted.

I cannot close this report without an expression of thankfulness for my good fortune in being placed in co-operation with an officer of the navy who accords to every move that seems for the interest and success of our arms his hearty and energetic support. Admiral Porter and the very efficient officers under him have ever shown the greatest readiness in their co-operation, no matter what was to be done or what risk to be taken, either by their men or their vessels. Without this prompt and cordial support my movements would have been much embarrassed, if not wholly defeated.

Captain J. U. Shirk, commanding the Tuscumbia, was especially active and deserving of the highest commendation for his personal attention to the repairing of the damage done our transports by the Vicksburg batteries.

The result of this campaign has been the defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, the capital of the State of Mississippi, and the capture of Vicksburg and its garrison and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of thirty-seven thousand (37,000) prisoners, among whom were fifteen general officers; at least ten thousand men killed and (p. 391) wounded, and among the killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman and Green, and hundreds and perhaps thousands of stragglers, who can never be collected and reorganized. Arms and munitions of war for an army of sixty thousand men have fallen into our hands, besides a large amount of other public property, consisting of railroads, locomotives, cars, steamboats, cotton, &c., and much was destroyed to prevent our capturing it.

Our loss in the series of battles may be summed up as follows:

Killed. Wounded. Missing.

Port Gibson 130 718 5 Fourteen Mile creek (skirmish) 4 24 — Raymond 69 341 32 Jackson 40 240 6 Champion's Hill 426 1842 189 Big Black railroad bridge 29 242 2 Vicksburg 545 3688 303

Of the wounded many were but slightly wounded, and continued on duty; many more required but a few days or weeks for their recovery. Not more than one-half of the wounded were permanently disabled.

My personal staff and chiefs of departments have in all cases rendered prompt and efficient service.

In all former reports I have failed to make mention of company A, 4th regiment Illinois cavalry volunteers, Captain S. D. Osband commanding. This company has been on duty with me as an escort company since November, 1861, and in every engagement I have been in since that time rendered valuable service, attracting general attention for their exemplary conduct, soldierly bearings and promptness. It would not be overstating the merits of this company to say that many of them would fill with credit any position in a cavalry regiment.

For the brilliant achievements recounted in this report, the Army of the Tennessee, their comrades of the Ninth Army corps, Herron's division of the Army of the Frontier, and the navy co-operating with them, deserve the highest honors their country can award.

I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respectfully your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Major-General United States Army, commanding.



General Pemberton to General Grant.

To Headquarters, Vicksburg, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 3, 1863. Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.

General: I have the honor to propose to you an armistice for—hours, with a view of arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will (p. 392) appoint three commissioners to meet a like number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient.

I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period.

This communication will be handed you under flag of truce by Major-General J. S. Bowen.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant-General.



General Grant to General Pemberton.

Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee, To In the Field, near Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 3, 1863. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON, Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Mississippi.

General: Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc.

The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of all adversaries, and I can assure you will be treated with all respect due to prisoners of war.

I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Major-General.



General Grant to General Pemberton.

Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee, To Near Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 3, 1863. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON, Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Mississippi.

General: In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march one division as a guard and take possession at 8 A.M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out and paroles signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed (p. 393) all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons, also, counting two horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along.

The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel.

The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Major-General.



General Pemberton to General Grant.

To Headquarters, Vicksburg, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 3, 1863. Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post.

In the main your terms are accepted; but in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us.

At 10 o'clock, A.M., to-morrow, I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will take possession.

Officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant-General.



General Grant to General Pemberton.

Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee, To Before Vicksburg, July 4, 1863. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL J. C. PEMBERTON, Commanding Confederate Forces, Vicksburg, Mississippi.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every (p. 394) officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side arms, and mounted officers one horse each.

If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at 10 A.M., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it.

Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by 9 o'clock A.M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly.

Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified from firing upon your men.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Major-General.



General Pemberton to General Grant.

To Headquarter, Vicksburg, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, July 4, 1863. Commanding United States Forces before Vicksburg.

General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this day, and in reply to say that the terms proposed by you are accepted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant-General.



General Grant to the Assistant Adjutant-General.

Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi, To In the Field, Chattanooga, Tennessee, COLONEL J. C. KELTON, December 23d, 1863. Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

Colonel: In pursuance of General Orders, No. 337, War Department, of date Washington, October 16th, 1863, delivered to me by the Secretary of War, at Louisville, Kentucky, on the 18th of the same month, I assumed command of the "Military Division of the Mississippi," comprising the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and telegraphed the order (p. 395) assuming command, together with the order of the War Department, referred to, to Major-General A. E. Burnside, at Knoxville, and to Major-General W. S. Rosecrans, at Chattanooga. My action in telegraphing these orders to Chattanooga in advance of my arrival there, was induced by information furnished me by the Secretary of War, of the difficulties with which the Army of the Cumberland had to contend in supplying itself over a long, mountainous, and almost impassable road from Stevenson, Alabama, to Chattanooga, Tennessee, and his fears that General Rosecrans would fall back to the north side of the Tennessee river. To guard further against the possibility of the Secretary's fears, I also telegraphed to Major-General Thomas on the 19th of October, from Louisville, to hold Chattanooga at all hazards; that I would be there as soon as possible. To which he replied, on same date, "I will hold the town till we starve."

Proceeding directly to Chattanooga, I arrived there on the 23d of October, and found that General Thomas had immediately, on being placed in command of the Department of the Cumberland, ordered the concentration of Major-General Hooker's command at Bridgeport preparatory to securing the river and main wagon road between that place and Brown's Ferry, immediately below Lookout Mountain. The next morning after my arrival at Chattanooga, in company with Thomas and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, I made a reconnoissance of Brown's Ferry and the hills on the south side of the river, and at the mouth of Lookout Valley. After the reconnoissance, the plan agreed upon was for Hooker to cross at Bridgeport to the south side of the river with all the force that could be spared from the railroad, and move on the main wagon road by way of Whitesides to Wauhatchie, in Lookout Valley. Major-General J. M. Palmer was to proceed by the only practicable route north of the river from his position opposite Chattanooga, to a point on the north bank of the Tennessee river, and opposite Whitesides, there to cross to the south side to hold the road passed over by Hooker. In the meantime and before the enemy could be apprised of our intentions, a force under the direction of Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, was to be thrown across the river at or near Brown's Ferry to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, covering the Brown's Ferry road, and orders were given accordingly.

It was known that the enemy held the north end of Lookout Valley with a brigade of troops, and the road leading around the foot of the mountain from their main camps in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley. Holding these advantages, he would have had little difficulty in concentrating a sufficient force to have defeated or driven Hooker back. To remedy this the seizure of the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley and covering the Brown's Ferry road was deemed of the highest importance. This, by the use of pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's Ferry, would secure to us by the north bank of the river, across Moccasin Point, a shorter line by which to re-enforce our troops in Lookout Valley, than the narrow and tortuous road around the foot of Lookout Mountain afforded the enemy for re-enforcing his.

The force detailed for this expedition consisted of four thousand men, under command of General Smith, Chief Engineer, eighteen hundred of which under Brigadier-General W. B. Hagen, in sixty pontoon boats, containing thirty armed men each, floated (p. 396) quietly from Chattanooga past the enemy's pickets to the foot of Lookout Mountain on the night of the 27th of October, landed on the south side of the river at Brown's Ferry, surprised the enemy's pickets stationed there, and seized the hills covering the ferry, without the loss of a man killed and but four or five wounded. The remainder of the force, together with the material for a bridge, was moved by the north bank of the river across Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry, without attracting the attention of the enemy, and before day dawned the whole force was ferried to the south bank of the river; 2nd the almost inaccessible heights rising from Lookout Valley, at its outlet to the river and below the mouth of Lookout creek were secured. By ten o'clock A.M. an excellent pontoon bridge was laid across the river at Brown's Ferry, thus securing to us the end of the desired road nearer the enemy's forces, and the shorter line over which to pass troops if a battle became inevitable. Positions were taken up by our troops from which they could not have been driven except by vastly superior forces, and then only with great loss of the enemy. Our artillery was placed in such position as to completely command the roads leading from the enemy's main camps in Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley.

On the 28th Hooker emerged into Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie by the direct road from Bridgeport by way of Whitesides to Chattanooga, with the 11th Army Corps, under Major-General Howard, and Geary's Division of the 12th Army Corps, and proceeded to take up positions for the defence of the road from Whitesides, over which he had marched, and also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry, throwing the left of Howard's Corps forward to Brown's Ferry. The Division that started under command of Palmer for Whitesides, reached its destination, and took up the position intended in the original plan of this movement. Three movements so successfully executed, secured to us two comparatively good lines by which to obtain supplies from the terminus of the railroad at Bridgeport, namely, the main wagon road by way of Whitesides, Wauhatchie, and Brown's Ferry, distant but twenty-eight miles, and the Kelly's Ferry and Brown's Ferry road, which, by the use of the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry, reduced the distance for wagoning to but eight miles.

Up to this period our forces at Chattanooga were practically invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee river above Chattanooga to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed to near Bridgeport, his main force being fortified in Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession of the country north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles over the most impracticable of roads to any supplies. The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied on for moving anything. An attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy, occupying positions within gunshot of, and overlooking our very fortifications, would unquestionably have pursued our retreating forces. Already more than ten thousand animals had perished in supplying half rations to the troops by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga, over (p. 397) Waldron's Ridge. They could not have been supplied another week.

The enemy was evidently fully apprised of our condition in Chattanooga, and of the necessity of our establishing a new and shorter line by which to obtain supplies, if we would maintain our position, and so fully was he impressed of the importance of keeping from us these lines, lost to him by surprise, and in a manner he little dreamed of, that in order to regain possession of them, a night attack was made by a portion of Longstreet's forces on a portion of Hooker's troops (Geary's Division of the 12th Corps) the first night after Hooker's arrival in the valley. This attack failed, however, and Howard's Corps, which was moving to the assistance of Geary, finding that it was not required by him, carried the remaining heights held by the enemy west of Lookout Creek. This gave us quiet possession of the line of communication heretofore described south of the Tennessee river.

Of these operations I cannot speak more particularly, the sub-reports having been sent to Washington without passing through my hands.

By the use of two steamboats, one of which had been left at Chattanooga by the enemy and fell into our hands, and one that had been built by us at Bridgeport, plying between Bridgeport and Kelly's Ferry, we were enabled to obtain supplies with but eight miles of wagoning. The capacity of the railroad and steamboats was not sufficient, however, to supply all the wants of the army, but actual suffering was prevented.

Ascertaining from scouts and deserters that Bragg was detaching Longstreet from the front and moving him in the direction of Knoxville, Tennessee, evidently to attack Burnside, and feeling strongly the necessity of some move that would compel him to retain all his forces and recall those he had detached, directions were given for a movement against Missionary Ridge with a view of carrying it, and threatening the enemy's communication with Longstreet, of which I informed Burnside by telegraph on the 7th of November. After a thorough reconnoissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our force and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga, and I was forced to leave Burnside, for the present, to contend against superior forces of the enemy until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the meantime reconnoissances were made and plans matured for operations. Despatches were sent to Sherman, informing him of the movement of Longstreet and the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga. On the 14th of November, I telegraphed to Burnside as follows:

"To "MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.

"Your despatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment, and save the most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's forces across the river just at and below the mouth of Chicamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge (p. 398) and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack and, if he can, carry Lookout Mountain, The enemy now seem to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whitesides to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whitesides to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.

"Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th, as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired.

"Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until that time. I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution.

"Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain, if they have started and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how could they be fed after they got even one day east of here.

"U. S. GRANT, "Major-General."

On the 15th, having received from the General-in-Chief a despatch of date the 14th, in reference to Burnside's position, the danger of his abandonment of East Tennessee, unless immediate relief was afforded, and the terrible misfortune such a result would be to our arms; and also despatches from Mr. C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, and Colonel Wilson, of my Staff, sent at the instance of General Burnside, informing me more fully of the condition of affairs as detailed to them by him, I telegraphed him as follows:

"To Chattanooga, November 15th, 1863. "MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE.

"I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee in strong enough terms. According to the despatches of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson, it would seem that you should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville and that portion of the valley which you will necessarily possess, holding to that point. Should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream, even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio army. By holding on and placing Longstreet between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville, he should not be allowed to escape with an army capable of doing anything this winter. I can hardly conceive of the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I did so at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat. Kingston, looking at the map, I thought of more importance than any one point in East Tennessee. But my attention being called more closely to it, I can see that it might be passed by, and Knoxville and the rich valley about it possessed, ignoring that place entirely. I should not think it advisable to concentrate a force near the Little Tennessee; (p. 399) to resist the crossing of it would be in danger of capture, but I would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist the onward progress of the enemy.

"U. S. GRANT, "Major-General."

Previous reconnoissances, made first by Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, and afterward by Thomas Sherman, and myself in company with him, of the country opposite Chattanooga and north of the Tennessee river, extending as far east as the mouth of the North Chicamauga, and also of the mouth of the South Chicamauga, and the north end of Missionary Ridge, so far as the same could be made from the north bank of the river, without exciting suspicions on the part of the enemy, showed good roads from Brown's Ferry up the river and back of the first range of hills opposite Chattanooga, and out of view of the enemy's positions. Troops crossing the bridge at Brown's Ferry could be seen and their numbers estimated by the enemy, but not seeing anything further of them as they passed up in rear of these hills, he would necessarily be at a loss to know whether they were moving to Knoxville or held on the north side of the river for further operations at Chattanooga. It also showed that the north end of Missionary Ridge was imperfectly guarded, and that the banks of the river from the mouth of South Chicamauga Creek, westward to his main line in front of Chattanooga, were watched only by a small cavalry picket. This determined the plan of operations indicated in my despatch of the 14th to Burnside.

Upon further consideration, the great object being to mass all the force possible against one given point, namely Missionary Ridge, converging toward the north end of it, it was deemed best to change the original plan, so far as it contemplated Hooker's attack on Lookout Mountain, which would give us Howard's Corps of his command to aid in this purpose, and on the 18th the following instructions were given Thomas:

"To "MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS.

"All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee river just below the mouth of the Chicamauga, his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move whereon ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as (p. 400) possible on the most practical line for making an attack up the valley Your effort will then be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried, communication will at once be established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's Division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All the troops will be provided with two days cooked rations in haversacks and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that no ammunition is wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the Engineer Department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek.