"In Massachusetts, a person suspected of enmity to the Whig cause could be arrested under a magistrate's warrant and banished, unless he would swear fealty to the friends of liberty; and the select men of towns could prefer charges of political treachery in town meetings, and the individual accused, if convicted by a jury, could be sent into the enemy's jurisdiction (banished). Massachusetts also designated by name, and generally by occupation and residence, 380 of her people, of whom seventeen had been inhabitants of Maine, who had fled from their homes, and denounced against any one of them who should return, apprehension, imprisonment, and transportation to a place possessed by the British; and for a second voluntary return, without leave, death without the benefit of clergy. By another law, the property of twenty-nine persons who were denominated 'notorious conspirators,' was confiscated—two had been governors, one lieutenant-governor, one treasurer, one attorney-general, one chief justice, and four commissioners of customs.

"New Hampshire passed Acts similar to these, under which seventy-six of her former citizens were prohibited from coming within her borders, and the estates of twenty-eight were declared to be forfeited.

"Virginia passed a resolution to the effect that persons of a given description should be deemed and treated as aliens, and that their property should be sold, and the proceeds go into the public treasury for future disposal; and also a law prohibiting the migration of certain persons to that commonwealth, and providing penalties for the violation of its provisions.

"In New York, the County Committees were authorized to apprehend and decide upon the guilt of such inhabitants as were supposed to hold correspondence with the enemy, or had committed some other specified act; and they might punish those whom they adjudged to be guilty with imprisonment for three months, or banishment. There, too, persons opposed to liberty and independence were prohibited from practising law in the Courts; and the effects of fifty-nine persons, of whom three were women, and their rights of remainder and reversion, were to pass by confiscation from them to the people. So, also, a parent whose sons went off and adhered to the enemy was subjected to a tax of ninepence on the pound of the parents' estate for each and every such son; and until a revision of the law, Whigs were as liable to this tax as others.

"In New Jersey, one Act was passed to punish traitors and disaffected persons; another, for taking charge of and leasing the real estates, and for forfeiting the personal estates of certain fugitives and offenders; and a third for forfeiting to, and vesting in the State, the real property of the persons designated in the second statute; and a fourth, supplemental to the Act first mentioned.

"In Pennsylvania, sixty-two persons, who were designated by name, were required by the Executive Council to surrender themselves to some Judge of a Court, or Justice of the Peace, within a specified time, and abide trial for treason, or in default of appearance to stand attainted; and by an Act of a subsequent time, the estates of thirty-six other persons, who were also designated by name, and who had been previously attainted of treason, were declared to be confiscated.

"The Act of Delaware provided that the property, both real and personal, of certain persons who were named, and who were forty-six in number, should be forfeited to the State, 'subject, nevertheless, to the payment of the said offenders' just debts,' unless, as in Pennsylvania, they gave themselves up to trial for the crime of treason in adhering to the royal cause.

"Maryland seized, confiscated, and appropriated all property of persons in allegiance to the British Crown, and appointed Commissioners to carry out the terms of three statutes which were passed to effect these purposes.

"In North Carolina, the Confiscation Act embraced sixty-five specified individuals, and four mercantile firms, and by its terms not only included the 'lands' of these persons and commercial houses, but their 'negroes and other personal property.'

"The law of Georgia, which was enacted very near the close of the struggle, declared certain persons to have been guilty of treason against that State, and their estates to be forfeited for their offences."[112]

"South Carolina surpassed all the other members of the confederacy, Massachusetts excepted. The Loyalists of the State, whose rights, persons, and property were affected by legislation, were divided into four classes. The persons who had offended the least, who were forty-five in number, were allowed to retain their estates, but were amerced twelve per cent. of their value. Soon after the fall of Charleston, and when disaffection to the Whig cause was so general, 210 persons, who styled themselves to be 'principal inhabitants' of the city, signed an address to Sir Henry Clinton, in which they state that they have every inducement to return to their allegiance, and ardently hope to be re-admitted to the character and condition of British subjects. These 'addressers' formed another class. Of these 210, sixty-three were banished and lost their property by forfeiture, either for this offence or the graver one of affixing their names to a petition to the royal general, to be armed on the royal side. Another class, composed of the still larger number of eighty persons, were also banished and divested of their estates, for the crime of holding civil or military commissions under the Crown, after the conquest of South Carolina. And the same penalties were inflicted upon thirteen others, who, on the success of Lord Cornwallis at Camden, presented his lordship with congratulations. Still fourteen others were banished and deprived of their estates because they were obnoxious. Thus, then, the 'addressers,' 'petitioners,' 'congratulators,' and 'obnoxious Loyalists,' who were proscribed, and who suffered the loss of their property (in South Carolina), were 170 in number; and if to these we add the forty-five who were fined twelve pounds in the hundred of the value of their estates, the aggregate will be 215.

"Much of the legislation of the several States appears to have proceeded from the recommendations made from time to time by Congress, and that body passed several acts and resolutions of its own. Thus they subjected to martial law and to death all who should furnish provisions and certain other articles to the King's troops in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware; and they resolved that all Loyalists taken in arms should be sent to the States to which they belonged, there to be dealt with as traitors" (not as prisoners of war, as were Americans taken in arms against the British).[113]

REMARKS ON THE CONFISCATION ACTS ABOVE CITED.

The Draconian Code or the Spanish Inquisition can hardly be said to exceed in severity and intolerance, the acts of the several State Legislatures and Committees above quoted, in which mere opinions are declared to be treason, as also the refusal to renounce a solemn oath of allegiance. The very place of residence, the non-presenting one's self to be tried as a traitor, the mere suspicion of holding Loyalist opinions, involved the loss of liberty and property. Scores of persons were made criminals, not after trial by a verdict of a regularly empanelled jury, but by name, in acts or resolutions of Legislatures, and sometimes of Committees. No modern civilized country has presented such a spectacle of the wholesale disposal, by name, of the rights, liberties and properties, and even lives of citizens, by inquisition and various bodies, as was here presented against the Loyalists, guilty of no crime against their neighbours except holding to the opinions of their forefathers, and the former opinions of their present persecutors, who had usurped the power to rob, banish, and destroy them—who embodied in themselves, at one and the same time, the functions of law makers, law judges, and law executioners, and the receivers and disposers, or, as was the case, the possessors of the property which they confiscated against the Loyalists.

Is it surprising, then, that under such a system of oppression and robbery, Loyalists should be prompted to deeds of heroism, and sometimes of desperation and cruelty, to avenge themselves for the wrongs inflicted upon them, and to recover the liberties and properties of which they had thus been deprived, rendering themselves and their families homeless, and reducing them to poverty and distress? No one can justify many deeds of the Loyalists; but who could be surprised had they been more desperate than they were? And this the more so as they were, probably, superior in wealth and nearly equal in numbers to their oppressors, who had suddenly seized upon all military sources of power, disarmed the Loyalists, and erected tribunals for their ruin.[114] American writers often speak of the havoc committed by the "Tories," but the acts of Legislatures and Committees above quoted furnish ample causes and provocation for retaliation, and the most desperate enterprises and efforts to recover lawful rights and hard-earned property. Where these Confiscating Acts had been most sweeping and severe, as in the case of South Carolina, and the two parties nearly equal, this internecine war against life and property was the most relentless.[115]

It is as easy as it is unfair for American writers to narrate and magnify the murderous acts of the "Tories," and omit those perpetrated by the "Whigs," as well as the cruel laws against the liberties, property, and lives of the "Tories," which gave rise to these barbarous acts.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 102: "Committees exercised legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It is not to be doubted that, in many instances, these were improperly used, and that private resentments were often covered under the specious veil of patriotism. The sufferers, in passing over to the Royalists, carried with them a keen remembrance of the vengeance of Committees, and when opportunity presented were tempted to retaliate." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxvi., pp. 467, 468.)]

[Footnote 103: "Until the Declaration of Independence they were by far the largest party, who not only expected but prayed for a reconciliation. England was their home, and by that affectionate name was always spoken of; all the wrongs which were heaped upon the children could not make them forget their home, or entirely alienate them from their parent. The ligaments that connect nations are never less powerful, though less tender, than those which unite individuals, families, and clans. Consanguinity, affinity, alliance, operate alike on each." (Allen's History of the American War.)

"The disaffected, or rather the Loyalists, were a formidable party in the Middle States. They might be forgiven—many of them acted from principle, from a conscientious regard to their duty, from affection to their 'Sovereign,' and however mistaken they may have been, they deserve no censure. It is the infirmity of men's nature to err, and the majority cannot complain if the minority insist on the same privilege for which the predominant party are contending—the liberty of judging for themselves."—Ib., Vol. I., p. 483.]

[Footnote 104: Even in South Carolina. Mr. Hildreth remarks:

"Not, however, by armies alone were hostilities carried on. All the scattered settlements bristled in hostile array. Whigs and Tories pursued each other with little less than savage fury. Small parties, everywhere under arms, some on one side, some on the other, with very little reference to greater operations, were desperately bent on plunder and blood." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xli., p. 329.)]

[Footnote 105: Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap, xxxiii., pp. 137, 138.]

[Footnote 106: Having thus recovered their capital (Boston), one of the first acts of government exercised by the Provincial Assembly was to order the effects and the estates of those who fled with the British troops to Halifax to be publicly disposed of, and their produce applied to the use of the State. Such adherents to Britain as had risked to remain behind, were treated with great severity. They were prosecuted as enemies and betrayers of their country, and their estates were confiscated accordingly. (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. II., Chap. xix., p. 159.)]

[Footnote 107: Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. liii., pp. 127, 128.

"The American Loyalists, in arms on the side of England, had grievous cause throughout the war to complain of the merciless treatment of such among them as fell into their countrymen's hands."—Ib., Vol. VII., Chap. lxvi., p. 250.

"The Legislature of North Carolina passed a law (1780) to put a stop to the robbery of poor people under the pretence that they were Tories—a practice carried on even to the plundering of their clothes and household furniture." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xli., p. 329.)

"In New York, in 1776, a rage for plundering, under pretence of taking Tory property, infected many of the common soldiery, and even some of the officers." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xi., p. 154.)]

[Footnote 108: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xi.]

[Footnote 109: Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. II., Chap. xxvi., pp. 370, 371.]

[Footnote 110: In connection with these transactions, we have an illustration of the uniform and generous treatment of Loyalists by General Washington, although he once gave expression to ill-feeling towards them at Boston in the spring of 1775; for says Lord Mahon:

"Cornwallis, on his part, was honourably anxious to protect from harm the native Loyalists within his lines; and he proposed, as the tenth Article, that no such men were to be punished on account of having joined the British army. Washington wrote in reply: 'This cannot be assented to, being altogether of civil resort.' Means were found, however, with Washington's connivance, to obtain the same object in another form. It was stipulated that, immediately after the capitulation, the Bonetta sloop-of-war was to sail for New York, unsearched, with despatches from Lord Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton, and with as many soldiers on board as he should think fit to send; provided only that the vessel was returned, and that the soldiers were accounted for as prisoners in a future exchange. By this expedient was the British chief enabled to secure a safe conduct for his American adherents." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxiv., p. 179.)]

[Footnote 111: "The abbe was struck at seeing, from several indications, how much keener was at that time the animosity between the English and Americans than between the English and French. Thus the English officers, when they laid down their arms and were passing along the enemy's lines, courteously saluted every French officer, even of the 'lowest rank,' a compliment which they withheld from every American man of the highest." (Voyage en Amerique, par l'Abbe Robin, p. 141, ed. 1782; quoted in Lord Mahon's History, Vol. VI., Chap. lxiv., p. 181.)]

[Footnote 112: Note by the Author.—The above statement of the confiscating law of Georgia gives a very inadequate idea of that law. Savannah was taken, and General Lincoln and his army were driven out of Georgia by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, in 1778, who treated all classes with such kindness and generosity that the Legislature and Government, as previously existed, was restored and remained until 1782, when Savannah was evacuated by the British. Just at the juncture of Colonel Campbell's conquest of Georgia, the Legislature of that State was passing a Confiscation Act against "Tories" and preparing to carry it into effect. During the latter part of the nearly four years of British occupation, the Congress party elected a Governor and organized their Legislature, meeting at Augusta. Two months before the evacuation of Savannah by the British, the Legislature of the Congress party passed the Confiscation Act referred to in the text. We find a copy of this act in a pamphlet published in London in 1783, entitled The Particular Case of the Georgia Loyalists. This Act may serve as a specimen of Confiscation Acts passed in other States. We give it entire, remarking that it curiously assumes in the preamble that there had been no break in the Government of the State from 1778 to 1782, though the English had ruled the State during the whole of that period. The Act is as follows:

"Whereas on the 1st day of March, which was in the year of our Lord 1778, an Act was passed for attainting certain persons therein mentioned of treason, and confiscating their estates for the use and benefit of this State, which said Act has not yet been carried into full execution: And whereas it is necessary that the names of the said persons so attainted by the same law should be inserted in a law, with the names of various other persons who have since the aforesaid time been guilty of treason against this State, and the authority of the same, by traitorously adhering to the King of Great Britain, and by aiding, assisting, abetting, and comforting the generals and other officers, civil and military, of the said King, to enforce his authority in and over this State, and the good people of the same: And whereas the aforesaid treason, and other atrocious crimes, justly merit forfeiture of protection and property:

"Be it enacted, by the representatives and freemen of the State of Georgia in General Assembly met, and by the authority of the same, that all and each of the following persons, viz. (here follow the names of 286 persons, late inhabitants of Georgia), be and they are hereby declared to be banished from this State for ever; and if any of the aforesaid shall remain in this State sixty days after the passing of this Act, or shall return to this State, the Governor or Commander-in-Chief for the time being is hereby authorised and required to cause such persons so remaining in or returning to this State to be apprehended and committed to jail, there to remain without bail or mainprize, until a convenient opportunity shall offer for transporting the said persons beyond the seas to some part of the British King's dominions, which the Governor or Commander-in-Chief for the time being is hereby required to do; and if any of the said persons shall return to this State after such transportation, then and in such case he or they shall be adjudged and hereby declared to be guilty of felony, and shall, on conviction of their having so returned as aforesaid, suffer death without the benefit of clergy.

"And be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that all and singular the estates, real and personal, of each and every one of the aforesaid persons, which they held, possessed or were entitled to, in law or equity, on the 19th of April, 1775, or which they have held since, or do hold in possession, or others hold in trust for them, or to which they are or may be entitled in law or equity, or which they may have, hold, or be possessed of, in right of others, together with all debts, dues, and demands that are or may be owing to the aforesaid persons, or either of them, be confiscated to and for the use and benefit of this State; and the monies arising from the sales which take place by virtue of and in pursuance of this Act, to be applied to such uses and purposes as the Legislature shall hereafter direct.

"And whereas divers others persons, citizens of this State, and owing allegiance thereto (whose names are not herein recited), did, in violation of said allegiance, traitorously assist, abet, and participate in the aforesaid treasonable practices: Be it therefore enacted, by the authority of the aforesaid, that all and every of the person or persons under this description shall, on full proof and conviction of the same in a court of law, be liable and subjected to all the like pains, penalties, and forfeitures inflicted by this Act on those offenders whose names are particularly mentioned therein.

"And be it further enacted, that all debts, dues, or demands due or owing to merchants and others residing in Great Britain, be and they are hereby sequestered, and the Commissioners appointed by this Act, or a majority of them, are hereby empowered to recover, receive, and deposit the same in the Treasury of this State, in the same manner and under the same regulations as debts confiscated, there to remain for the use of this State until otherwise appropriated by this or any other House of Assembly.

"And whereas there are various persons, subjects of the King of Great Britain, possessed of or entitled to estates, real and personal, which justice and sound policy require should be applied to the benefit of this State: Be it therefore enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that all and singular the estates, real and personal, belonging to persons being British subjects, of whatever kind or nature, of which they may be possessed, or others in trust for them, or to which they are or may be entitled in law or equity, and also all debts, dues, or demands owing or accruing to them, be confiscated to and for the use and benefit of this State; and the monies arising from the sale which shall take place by virtue of and in pursuance of this Act, to be applied to such uses and purposes as the Legislature shall hereafter direct.

"And be it further enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that the State will and do guarantee and defend the Commissioners appointed by this Act, or a majority of them, in all their proceedings for carrying the powers and authorities given them by the same into full effect; and will also warrant and for ever defend all and every sale or sales which the said Commissioners, or a majority of them, shall make to any purchaser or purchasers of any part or parts of the real and personal estates confiscated by this Act.

"Augusta, State of Georgia, 4th May, 1782."]

[Footnote 113: Historical Introduction to Col. Sabine's Biographical Sketches of the American Loyalists, pp. 77-81.]

[Footnote 114: In the historical essay above quoted, the author says: "The examination now completed of the political condition of the colonies, of the state of parties, and of the divisions in particular classes in society, and avocations in life, leads to the conclusion that the number of our countrymen who wished to continue their connection with the mother country was very large. In nearly every Loyalist letter or other paper which I have examined, and in which the subject is mentioned, it is either assumed or stated in terms that the LOYAL were the majority; and this opinion, I am satisfied, was very generally entertained by those who professed to have a knowledge of public sentiment. That the adherents of the Crown were mistaken, is certain. But yet in the Carolinas, and Georgia, and possibly in Pennsylvania the two parties differed but little in point of strength, while in New York the Whigs were far weaker than their opponents." (Historical Introduction to Col. Sabine's Biographical Sketches of the American Loyalists, p. 65.)]

[Footnote 115: In the historical essay above quoted we have the following words:

"What was the nature of the conflict between the two parties in South Carolina? Did the Whigs and their opponents meet in open and fair fight, and give and take the courtesies and observe the rules of civilized warfare? Alas, no! They murdered one another. I wish it were possible to use a milder word; but murder is the only one that can be employed to express the truth. Of this, however, the reader shall judge. I shall refrain from a statement of my own, and rely on the testimony of others.

"Gen. Greene thus spoke of the hand-to-hand strifes, which I stigmatize as murderous. 'The animosity,' said he, 'between the Whigs and Tories renders their situation truly deplorable. The Whigs seem determined to extirpate the Tories, and the Tories the Whigs. Some thousands have fallen in this way in this quarter, and the evil rages with more violence than ever. If a stop cannot be soon put to these massacres, the country will be depopulated in a few months more, as neither 'Whig' nor 'Tory' can live." (Historical Introduction to Colonel Sabine's Biographical Sketches of the American Loyalists, p. 33.)]



CHAPTER XXXVII.

TREATMENT OF THE LOYALISTS BY THE AMERICANS, AT AND AFTER THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

It remains now to ascertain the reception with which the applications of Loyalists were met in the several State Legislatures. During the last three years of the war, the principal operations of the British army were directed to the Southern States; and there the exasperations of party feeling may be supposed to have been the strongest.[116]

No where had arbitrary authority been exercised more unmercifully towards the revolutionists than by Earl Cornwallis and Lord Rawdon in South and North Carolina. Dr. Ramsay says: "The troops under the command of Cornwallis had spread waste and ruin over the face of all the country, for 400 miles on the sea coast, and for 200 miles westward. Their marches from Charleston to Camden, from Camden to the River Dan, from the Dan through North Carolina to Wilmington, from Wilmington to Petersburg, and from Petersburg through many parts of Virginia, till they finally settled in Yorktown, made a route of more than 1,100 miles. Every place through which they passed in these various marches experienced the effects of their rapacity. Their numbers enabled them to go where they pleased; their rage for plunder disposed them to take whatever they had the means of removing; and their animosity to the Americans led them often to the wanton destruction of what they could neither use nor carry off. By their means, thousands had been involved in distress."[117]

It was therefore in South Carolina, more than any other State, that animosity might be expected to be intense and prolonged against the Loyalists; but among these men of the South, with their love of freedom, and dash and energy in war, there was a potent element of chivalry and British generosity which favourably contrasts with the Massachusetts school of persecuting bigotry and of hatred, from generation to generation, to England and English institutions. Accordingly we learn from Moultrie's Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 326, that "after the peace, a Joint Committee from the Senate and House of Representatives in South Carolina, chosen to hear the petitions of Loyalists who had incurred the penalties of the confiscation, banishment, and amercement laws, made a report to the separate Houses in favour of the great majority of the petitioners; and a great part of those names which were upon the confiscation, banishment and amercement lists were struck off."

"The petitions of others were afterwards presented from year to year, and ultimately almost the whole of them had their estates restored to them, and they were received as citizens."[118]

As to the proceedings of the other States, after the close of the war, in regard to the United Empire Loyalists, the following summary, from the Historical Introduction to Colonel Sabine's Biography of the American Loyalists, will be sufficient:

"At the peace, justice and good policy both required a general amnesty, and the revocation of the acts of disability and banishment, so that only those who had been guilty of flagrant crimes should be excluded from becoming citizens. Instead of this, however, the State Legislatures generally continued in a course of hostile action, and treated the conscientious and pure, and the unprincipled and corrupt, with the same indiscrimination as they had done during the struggle. In some parts of the country there really appears to have been a determination to place these misguided but then humbled men beyond the pale of human sympathy. In one legislative body, a petition from the banished, praying to be allowed to return to their homes, was rejected without a division; and a law was passed which denied to such as had remained within the State, and to all others who had opposed the revolution, the privilege of voting at the elections or of holding office. In another State, all who had sought royal protection were declared to be aliens, and to be incapable of claiming and holding property within it, and their return was forbidden. Other Legislatures refused to repeal such of their laws as conflicted with the conditions of the treaty of peace, and carried out the doctrines of the States alluded to above without material modification. But the temper of South Carolina was far more moderate. Acting on the wise principle that 'when the offenders are numerous, it is sometimes prudent to overlook their crimes,' she listened to the supplications made to her by the fallen, and restored to their civil and political rights a large portion of those who had suffered under her banishment and confiscation laws. The course pursued by New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia was different. These States were neither merciful nor just; and it is even true that Whigs, whose gallantry in the field, whose prudence in the Cabinet, and whose exertions in diplomatic stations abroad, had contributed essentially to the success of the conflict, were regarded with enmity on account of their attempts to produce a better state of feeling and more humane legislation. Had these States adopted a different line of conduct, their good example would not have been lost, probably, upon others, smaller and of less influence; and had Virginia especially been honest enough to have permitted the payment of debts which her people owed to British subjects before the war, the first years of our freedom would not have been stained with a breach of our public faith, and the long and angry controversy with Great Britain, which well-nigh involved us in a second war with her, might not have occurred.

"Eventually, popular indignation diminished; the statute book was divested of its most objectionable enactments, and numbers were permitted to occupy their old homes, and to recover the whole or part of their property; but by far the greater part of the Loyalists who quitted the country at the commencement of, or during the war, never returned; and of the many thousands who abandoned the United States after the peace, and while these enactments were in force, few, comparatively, had the desire or even the means to revisit the land from which they were expelled. Such persons and their descendants form a very considerable proportion of the population of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Upper Canada.

"It is equally to be regretted on grounds of policy that the majorities[119] in the State Legislatures did not remember, with Mr. Jefferson, that separation from England 'was contemplated with affliction by all,' and that, like Mr. Adams, many sound Whigs 'would have given everything they possessed for a restoration to the state of things before the contest began, provided they could have had sufficient security for its continuance.' Then they might have done at an early moment after the cessation of hostilities, what they actually did do in a few years afterwards—namely, have allowed the banished Loyalists to return from exile, and, excluding those against whom enormities could have been proved, have conferred upon them, and upon those who had remained to be driven away at the peace, the rights of citizens. Most of them would have easily fallen into respect for the new state of things, old friendships and intimacies would have been revived, and long before this time all would have mingled in one mass. * *

"As a matter of expediency, how unwise was it to perpetuate the feelings of the opponents of the revolution, and to keep them a distinct class for a time, and for harm yet unknown! How ill-judged the measures that caused them to settle the hitherto neglected possessions of the British Crown! Nova Scotia had been won and lost, and lost and won, in the struggle between France and England, and the blood of New England had been poured out upon its soil like water. But when the Loyalists sought refuge there, what was it? Before the war, the fisheries of its coast, for the prosecution of which Halifax itself was founded, comprised, in public estimation, its chief value; and though Great Britain had quietly possessed it for about seventy years, the emigration to it of the adherents of the Crown from the United States, in a single year, more than doubled its population. Until hostile events brought Halifax into notice, no civilized people were poorer than the inhabitants of that colony; since, in 1775, the Assembly estimated that L1,200 currency—a sum less than $5,000—was the whole amount of money which they possessed. By causing the expatriation, then, of many thousands of our countrymen, among whom were the well-educated, the ambitious, and the well-versed in politics, we became the founders of two agricultural and commercial colonies; for it is to be remembered that New Brunswick formed a part of Nova Scotia until 1784, and that the necessity of the division then made was of our own creation. In like manner we became the founders of Upper Canada. The Loyalists were the first settlers of the territory thus denominated by Act of 1791; and the principal object of the line of division of Canada, as established by Mr. Pitt's Act, was to place them, as a body, by themselves, and to allow them to be governed by laws more congenial than those which were deemed requisite for the government of the French on the St. Lawrence. Our expatriated countrymen were generally poor, and some of them were actually without the means of providing for their common wants from day to day. The Government for which they had become exiles was as liberal as they could have asked. It gave them lands, tools, materials for building, and the means of subsistence for two years; and to each of their children, as they became of age, two hundred acres of land. And besides this, of the offices created by the organization of a new Colonial Government, they were the chief recipients. The ties of kindred and suffering in a common cause created a strong bond of sympathy between them, and for years they bore the appellation of 'United Empire Loyalists.'"[120]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 116: Writing under date of January, 1782, Mr. Hildreth says: "The surrender of Cornwallis was soon felt in the Southern department. Wilmington was evacuated, thus dashing all the hopes of the North Carolina Tories. Greene approached Charleston, and distributed his troops so as to confine the enemy to the neck and adjacent islands.

"In re-establishing the State Government of South Carolina, none were allowed to vote who had taken British protection. John Matthews was elected Governor. Among the earliest proceedings of the Assembly was the passage of a law banishing the most active British partisans and confiscating their property. The services of Greene were also gratefully remembered in a vote of 10,000 guineas, or $50,000, to purchase him an estate.

"The Georgia Assembly, in meeting at Augusta, chose John Martin as Governor, and passed a law of confiscation and banishment very similar to that of South Carolina. Greene presently received from this Province, also, the present of a confiscated plantation. North Carolina acknowledged his services by a grant of wild lands." (History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xliii., p. 373.)]

[Footnote 117: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap, xxv., p. 456.

"Under the immediate eye of Cornwallis," says Mr. Bancroft, "the prisoners who had capitulated in Charleston were the subjects of perpetual persecution, unless they would exchange their paroles for oaths of allegiance. Mechanics and shopkeepers could not collect their dues except after promises of loyalty.

"Lord Rawdon, who had the very important command on the Santee, raged equally against deserters from his Irish regiment and against the inhabitants. The chain of forts for holding South Carolina consisted of Georgetown, Charleston, Beaufort, and Savannah on the sea; Augusta, Ninety-Six, and Camden in the interior. Of these, Camden was the most important, for it was the key between the north and south. On the rumour of an advancing American army, Rawdon called on all the inhabitants round Camden to join in arms. One hundred and sixty who refused he shut up during the heat of midsummer in one prison, and loaded more than twenty of them with chains, some of whom were protected by the capitulation of Charleston." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xv., pp. 311, 312, 313.)

"Peace was restored to Georgia (July, 1782), after having been four years in possession of the British. That State is supposed to have lost 1,000 of its citizens and 4,000 slaves." (Moultrie's Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 340; quoted in Holmes' American Annals, Vol. II., p. 340.)]

[Footnote 118: Quoted in Holmes' Annals, Vol. II., p. 351.]

[Footnote 119: "I say majorities, because I am satisfied that in almost every State there were minorities, more or less numerous, who desired the adoption of a more moderate course. In New York it is certain that the first political parties, after the peace, were formed in consequence of divisions which existed among the Whigs as to the lenity or severity which should be extended to their vanquished opponents."]

[Footnote 120: Historical Essay, introductory to Colonel Sabine's Sketches of the American Loyalists, pp. 86-90.]



APPENDIX A. TO CHAPTER XXXVII.

REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND REMARKS ON THE FEELINGS WHICH SHOULD NOW BE CULTIVATED BY BOTH OF THE FORMER CONTENDING PARTIES.

The entire failure of the Americans to conquer Canada in the war of 1812-1815 is an illustration of the folly of coercing the allegiance of a people against their will. Upper Canada at that time consisted of less than 100,000 inhabitants; yet, with the extra aid of only a few hundred English soldiers, she repelled for three years the forces of the United States—more than ten times their number, and separated only by a river.

Mr. J.M. Ludlow, in his brief but comprehensive "History of the War of American Independence, 1775-1783," Chapter vii., well states the folly of England in endeavouring to conquer by arms the opinions of three millions of people, and the impossibility of the American colonists achieving their independence without the aid of men and money, and ships from France, to which, in connection with Spain and Holland, the Americans are actually indebted for their independence, and not merely to their own sole strength and prowess, as American writers so universally boast. Mr. Ludlow observes:

"At a time when steam had not yet baffled the winds, to dream of conquering by force of arms, on the other side of the Atlantic, a people of the English race, numbering between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000, with something like 1,200 miles of seaboard, was surely an act of enormous folly. We have seen in our own days the difficulties experienced by the far more powerful and populous Northern States in quelling the secession of the Southern, when between the two there was no other frontier than at most a river, very often a mere ideal line, and when armies could be raised by 100,000 men at a time. England attempted a far more difficult task, with forces which, till 1781, never exceeded 35,000 men, and never afterwards exceeded 42,075, including 'Provincials,' i.e., American Loyalists." (But England, repeatedly on the verge of success, failed from the incapacity and inactivity of the English generals.)

"Yet it is impossible to doubt that not once only, but repeatedly during the course of the struggle, England was on the verge of triumph. The American armies were perpetually melting away before the enemy—directly, through the practice of short enlistments; indirectly, through desertions. These desertions, if they might be often palliated by the straits to which the men were reduced through arrears of pay and want of supplies, arose in other cases, as after the retreat from New York, from sheer loss of heart in the cause. The main army, under Washington, was seldom even equal in numbers to that opposed to him. In the winter of 1776-77, when his troops were only 4,000 strong, it is difficult to understand how it was that Sir William Howe, with more than double the number, should have failed to annihilate the American army."

"WEAKNESS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY.

"In the winter of 1777-78 the 'dreadful situation of the army for want of provisions,' made Washington 'advise' that they should not have been excited to a general mutiny and desertion. In May, 1779, he hardly knew any resource for the American cause except in reinforcements from France, and did not know what might be the consequence if the enemy had it in their power to press the troops hard in the ensuing campaign. In December of that year his forces were 'mouldering away daily,' and he considered that Sir Henry Clinton, with more than twice his numbers, could 'not justify remaining inactive with a force so superior.' A year later he was compelled, for want of clothing, to discharge the levies which he had always so much trouble in obtaining; and 'want of flour would have disbanded the whole army' if he had not adopted this expedient.

"In March, 1781, again the crisis was 'perilous,' and though he did not doubt the happy issue of the contest, he considered that the period for accomplishment might be too far distant for a person of his years. In April he wrote: 'We cannot transport provisions from the States in which they are assessed to the army, because we cannot pay the teamsters, who will no longer work for certificates. It is equally certain that our troops are approaching fast to nakedness, and that we have nothing to clothe them with; that our hospitals are without medicines, and our sick without nutriment, except such as well men eat; and that all our public works are at a stand, and the artificers disbanding. * * It may be declared in a word that we are at the end of our tether, and that now or never our deliverance must come.' Six months later, when Yorktown capitulated, the British forces remaining in North America, after the surrender of that garrison by Cornwallis, were more considerable than they had been as late as February, 1779, and Sir Henry Clinton even then declared that with a reinforcement of 10,000 he would be responsible for the conquest of America.

"The main hope of success on the English side lay in the idea that the spirit and acts of resistance to the authority of the mother country were in reality only on the part of a turbulent minority—that the bulk of the people desired to be loyal. It is certain indeed that the struggle was, in America itself, much more of a civil war than the Americans are now generally disposed to admit. In December, 1780, there were 8,954 'Provincials' among the British forces in America, and on March 7th, 1781, a letter from Lord George Germaine to Sir H. Clinton, intercepted by the Americans, says: 'The American levies in the King's service are more in number than the whole of the enlisted troops in the service of the Congress.' As late as September 1st, 1781, there were 7,241. We hear of loyal 'associations' in Massachusetts, Maryland, and Pennsylvania; of 'associated Loyalists' in New York; and everywhere of 'Tories,' whose arrest Washington is found suggesting to Governor Trumbull, of Connecticut, as early as November 12th, 1775. But New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania remained long full of Tories. By June 28th, 1776, the disaffected on Long Island had taken up arms, and after the evacuation of New York by Washington a brigade of Loyalists was raised on the island, and companies were formed in two neighbouring counties to join the King's troops. During Washington's retreat through New Jersey, 'the inhabitants, either from fear or disaffection, almost to a man refused to turn out.' In Pennsylvania, the militia, instead of giving any assistance in repelling the British, exulted at their approach and over the misfortunes of their countrymen. On the 20th of that month the British were 'daily gathering strength from the disaffected.' In 1777, the Tories who joined Burgoyne in his expedition from the North are said to have doubled his force. In 1778, Tories joined the Indians in the devastation of Wyoming and Cherry Valley; and although the indiscriminate ravages of the British, or of the Germans in their pay, seem to have aroused the three States above mentioned to self-defence, yet, as late as May, 1780, Washington still speaks of sending a small party of cavalry to escort La Fayette safely through the 'Tory settlements' of New York. Virginia, as late as the spring of 1776, was 'alarmed at the idea of independence.' Washington admitted that his countrymen (of that State), 'from their form of government, and steady attachment heretofore to royalty,' would 'come reluctantly' to that idea, but trusted to 'time and persecution.' In 1781, the ground for transferring the seat of war to the Chesapeake was the number of Loyalists in that quarter. In the Southern States the division of feeling was still greater. In the Carolinas, a royalist regiment was raised in a few days in 1776, and again in 1779. In Georgia and in South Carolina the bitterest partisan warfare was carried on between Whig and Tory bands; and a body of New York Tories contributed powerfully to the fall of Savannah in 1778, by taking the American forces in the rear.

"On the other hand, the British generals did not receive that support from the Loyalists which they had expected. They seem to have looked upon the Loyalists as an inferior class of aids to the regular soldiery; their advice seems to have been unsought, and the mode of war pursued was European, and not adapted to the peculiar circumstances of America. The Loyalist volunteers were looked upon as the rivals to rather than fellow-soldiers of the regular army; and no provincial Loyalist was promoted to lead any expedition or command any position of importance. This depreciation of the Loyalists by the English (utterly incompetent) generals exactly answered the purposes of American writers. But the real cause of its protraction, though it may be hard to an American to admit the fact, lay in the incapacity of the American politicians, and, it must be added, in the supineness and want of patriotism of the American people. If indeed importing into the views of later date, we look upon it as one between two nations, the mismanagement of the war by the Americans on all points save one—the retention of Washington in the chief command—is seen to have been so pitiable, from first to last, as to be in fact almost unintelligible."

"DESCRIPTION OF THE AMERICAN ARMY, AND THE MANNER OF RAISING IT.

"We can only understand the case when we see there was no such thing as an American nation in existence, but only a number of revolted colonies, jealous of one another, and with no tie but that of common danger. Even in the army divisions broke out. Washington, in a General Order of August, 1776, says: 'It is with great concern that the general understands that jealousies have arisen among the troops from the different provinces, and reflections are frequently thrown out which can only tend to irritate each other and injure the noble cause in which we are engaged.'"

"WANT OF PUBLIC SPIRIT AND PATRIOTISM IN THE STATES.

"It was seldom that much help could be obtained in troops from any State, unless the State were immediately threatened by the enemy; and even then these troops would be raised by that State for its own defence, irrespectively of the general or 'continental army.' 'Those at a distance from the seat of war,' wrote Washington, in April, 1778, 'live in such perfect tranquillity, that they conceive the dispute to be in a manner at an end, and those near it are so disaffected that they serve only as embarrassments.' In January, 1779, we find him remonstrating with the Governor of Rhode Island, because that State had 'ordered several battalions to be raised for the State only; and this before the proper measures are taken to fill the continental regiments.' The different bounties and rates of pay allowed by the various States were a constant source of annoyance to him."

"DECLINE OF CONGRESS.

"After the first year, the best men were not returned to Congress, and did not return to it. Whole States remained frequently unrepresented. In the winter of 1777-78, Congress was reduced to twenty-one members. But even with a full representation it could do little. 'One State will comply with a requisition,' writes Washington in 1780, 'another neglects to do it, a third executes by halves, and all differ either in the manner, the matter, or so much in point of time, that we are always working up-hill.'

"At first, Congress was really nothing more than a voluntary Committee. When the Confederation was completed, which was only, be it remembered, on March 1, 1781, it was still, as Washington wrote in 1785, 'little more than a shadow without a substance, and the Congress a nugatory body;' or, as it was described by a late writer, 'powerless for government, and a rope of sand for union.'"

"DECLINE OF ENERGY AND SPIRIT AMONG THE COLONISTS AND ARMY.

"Like politicians, like people. There was, no doubt, a brilliant display of patriotic ardour at the first flying to arms of the colonists. Lexington and Bunker's Hill were actions decidedly creditable to their raw troops. The expedition to Canada, foolhardy though it proved, was pursued up to a certain point with real heroism. But with it the heroic period of the war (individual instances excepted) may be said to have closed. There seems little reason to doubt that the revolution would never have been commenced if it had been expected to cost so tough a struggle. 'A false estimate of the power and perseverance of our enemies,' wrote James Duane to Washington, 'was friendly to the present revolution, and inspired that confidence of success in all ranks of the people which was necessary to unite them in so arduous a cause.' As early as November, 1775, Washington wrote, speaking of military arrangements: 'Such a dearth of public spirit, and such want of virtue—such stock-jobbing and fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantage of one kind or another, I never saw before, and pray God's mercy that I may never be witness to it again.' Such a 'mercenary spirit' pervaded the whole of the troops that he should not have been 'at all surprised at any disaster.' At the same date, besides desertion of thirty or forty soldiers at a time, he speaks of the practice of plundering as so rife that 'no man is secure in his effects, and scarcely in his person.' People were 'frightened out of their houses under pretence of those houses being ordered to be burnt, with a view of seizing the goods;' and to conceal the villainy more effectually, some houses were actually burned down. On February 28th, 1777, 'the scandalous loss, waste, and private appropriation of public arms during the last campaign' had been 'beyond all conception.' Officers drew 'large sums under pretence of paying their men, and appropriated them.'

"'Can we carry on the war much longer?' Washington asks in 1778, after the treaty with France and the appearance of the French fleet off the coast. 'Certainly not, unless some measures can be devised and speedily executed to restore the credit of our currency and restrain extortion and punish forestallers.' A few days later: 'To make and extort money in every shape that can be devised, and at the same time to decry its value, seems to have become a mere business and an epidemical disease.' On December 30th, 1778, 'speculation, peculation, and an insatiable thirst for riches seems to have got the better of every consideration, and almost of every order of men; * * party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day (in Congress), whilst the momentous concerns of an empire, a great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and want of credit, which in its consequences is the want of everything, are but secondary considerations."

"DECLINE OF PATRIOTIC FEELING ON THE PART OF THE AMERICANS.

"After the first loan had been obtained from France and spent, and a further one was granted in 1782, so utterly unpatriotic and selfish was known to be the temper of the people that the loan had to be kept secret, in order not to diminish such efforts as might be made by the Americans themselves. On July 10th of that year, with New York and Charleston still in British hands, Washington writes: 'That spirit of freedom which at the commencement of the contest would have gladly sacrificed everything to the attainment of its object, has long since subsided, and every selfish passion has taken its place.' But, indeed, the mere fact that from the date of the battle of Monmouth (July 28th, 1778), Washington was never supplied with sufficient means, even with the assistance of the French fleets and troops, to strike one blow at the English in New York—though these were but very sparingly reinforced during the period—shows an absence of public spirit, one might almost say of national shame, scarcely conceivable, and in singular contrast with the terrible earnestness exhibited on both sides, some eighty years later, in the Secession War."

"INCAPACITY OF ENGLISH GENERALS IN AMERICA.

"Why, then, must we ask on the other side, did the English fail at last?

"The English were prone to attribute their ill success to the incompetency of their generals. Lord North, with his quaint humour, would say, 'I do not know whether our generals will frighten the enemy, but I know they frighten me whenever I think of them.' When, in 1778, Lord Carlisle came out as Commissioner, in a letter speaking of the great scale of all things in America, he says, 'We have nothing on a great scale with us but our blunders, our losses, our disgraces and misfortunes.' No doubt, it is difficult to account for Gage's early blunders; for Howe's repeated failure to follow up his own success, or profit by his enemy's weakness; and Cornwallis's movement, justly censured by Sir Henry Clinton, in transferring the bulk of his army from the far south to Virginia, within marching distance of Washington, opened the way to that crowning disaster at Yorktown, without which it is by no means impossible that Georgia and the Carolinas might have remained British."

"INEFFECTIVE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS IN AMERICA.

"Political incapacity was, of course, charged upon Ministers as another cause of disaster; and no doubt their miscalculation of the severity of the struggle was almost childish. But no mistakes in the management of the war by British statesmen can account for their ultimate failure. However great British mismanagement may have been, it was far surpassed by the Americans. There was nothing on the British side equal to that caricature of a recruiting system in which different bounties were offered by Congress, by the States, by the separate towns, so as to make it the interest of the intended soldier to delay enlistment as long as possible, in order to sell himself to the highest bidder; to that caricature of a war establishment, the main bulk of which broke up every twelvemonth in front of the enemy, which was only paid, if at all, in worthless paper, and left continually without supplies. On the whole, no better idea can be had of the nature of the struggle on the American side, after the first heat of it had cooled down, than from the words of Count de Rochambeau, writing to Count de Vergennes, July 10th, 1780: 'They have neither money nor credit; their means of resistance are only momentary, and called forth when they are attacked in their own homes. They then assemble for the moment of immediate danger and defend themselves.'"

"FRENCH MONEY, TROOPS, AND SHIPS TURN THE SCALE IN FAVOUR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.

"A far more important cause in determining the ultimate failure of the British was the aid afforded by France to America, followed by that of Spain and Holland. It was impossible for England to re-conquer a continent and carry on a war at the same time with the three most powerful naval States of Europe. The instincts of race have tended on both the English and American side to depreciate the value of the aid given by France to the colonists. It may be true that Rochambeau's troops, which disembarked on Rhode Island in July, 1780, did not march till July, 1781; that they were blockaded soon after their arrival, threatened with attack from New York, and only disengaged by a feint of Washington's on that city. But more than two years before their arrival, Washington wrote to a member of Congress: 'France, by her supplies, has saved us from the yoke thus far.' The treaty with France alone was considered to afford a 'certain prospect of success' to 'secure' American independence. The arrival of D'Estaing's fleet, although no troops joined the American army, and nothing eventually was done, determined the evacuation of Philadelphia. The discipline of the French troops, when they landed in 1780, set an example to the Americans; chickens and pigs walked between the lines without being disturbed. The recruits of 1780 could not have been armed without fifty tons of ammunition supplied by the French. In September of that year, Washington, writing to the French envoy, speaks of the 'inability' of the Americans to expel the British from the South unassisted, or perhaps even to stop their career; and he writes in similar terms to Congress a few days later. To depend 'upon the resources of the country, unassisted by foreign loans,' he writes to a member of Congress two months later, 'will, I am confident, be to lean upon a broken reed.' In January, 1781, writing to Colonel Laurens,[121] the American envoy in Paris, he presses for 'an immediate, ample, efficacious succour in money from France,' also for the maintenance on the American coasts of 'a constant naval superiority,' and likewise for 'an additional succour in troops.' And since the assistance so requested was in fact granted in every shape, and the surrender of Yorktown was obtained by the co-operation both of the French army and fleet, we must hold that Washington's words were justified by the event."[122]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 121: War of American Independence, 1777-1783, by John Malcolm Ludlow, Chap, vii., pp. 215-227.]

[Footnote 122: Dr. Ramsay says: "Pathetic representations were made to the Ministers of his Most Christian Majesty by Washington, Dr. Franklin, and particularly by Lieutenant-Colonel John Laurens, who was sent to the Court of Versailles as a special Minister on this occasion. The King of France gave the United States a subsidy [as a present] of six millions of livres, and became their security for ten millions more, borrowed for their use in the United Netherlands." (History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxiii., p. 407.)]



APPENDIX B. TO CHAPTER XXXVII.

REFLECTIONS OF LORD MAHON ON THE AMERICAN CONTEST AND ITS RESULTS—APOLOGY FOR GEORGE THE THIRD—UNHAPPINESS OF AMERICANS SINCE THE REVOLUTION—UNITY OF THE ANGLO-SAXON RACE.

At this period (Declaration of Independence), the culminating point in the whole American war, I may be forgiven for desiring to interrupt its narrative in order to review its course and its results. That injurious and oppressive acts of power had been inflicted by England upon America, I have in many places shown, and do most fully acknowledge. That from the other side, and above all from Massachusetts, there had been strong provocation, I must continue to maintain. I should not deem it consistent with candour to deny that the Americans had sufficient ground for resisting, as they did resist, the Ministerial and Parliamentary measures. But whether these had yet attained a pitch to justify them in discarding and renouncing their allegiance to the Throne is a far more doubtful question—a question on which perhaps neither an Englishman nor yet an American could quite impartially decide.

"The time has come, however, as I believe and trust, when it is possible to do equal justice to the many good and upright men who in this great struggle embraced the opposite sides. The great mass of the people meant honestly on both shores of the Atlantic. The two chief men in both countries were alike pure-minded. On the one side there were deeds that savoured of tyranny; on the other side there were deeds that savoured of rebellion; yet at heart George the Third was never a tyrant, nor Washington ever a rebel. Of Washington I most firmly believe, that no single act appears in his whole public life proceeding from any other than public, and those the highest motives. But my persuasion is no less firm that there would be little flattery in applying the same terms of respect and commendation to the 'good old king.' I do not deny, indeed, that some degree of prejudice and pride may, though unconsciously, have mingled with his motives. I do not deny that at the outset of these troubles he lent too ready an ear to the glozing reports of his governors and deputies, the Hutchinsons or Olivers, Gateses, Dunmores, etc., assuring him that the discontents were confined to a factious few, and that measures of rigour and repression alone were needed. For such measures of rigour he may deserve, and has incurred, his share of censure. But after the insurgent colonies had proclaimed their independence, is it just to blame King George, as he often has been blamed, for his steadfast and resolute resistance to that claim? Was it for him, unless after straining every nerve against it, to forfeit a portion of his birthright and a jewel of his crown? Was it for him, though the clearest case of necessity, to allow the rending asunder his empire—to array for all time to come of several millions of his people against the rest? After calling on his loyal subjects in the colonies to rise, after requiring and employing their aid, was it for him, on any light grounds, to relinquish his cause and theirs, and yield them over, unforgiven, to the vengeance of their countrymen? Was it for him to overlook the consequences, not even yet, perhaps in their full extent unfolded, of such a precedent of victory to popular and colonial insurrection? May not the King, on the contrary, have deemed that on such a question, touching as it did both his honour and his rights, he was bound to be firm—firmer than even the firmest of his Ministers? Not, of course, that he could be justified for persevering; but in truth, he did not so persevere after every reasonable hope had failed. Not, of course, that he could be excused from continuing to demand, or to expect, unconditional submission; but, as his own letters to Lord North assure us, such an idea was never harboured in his mind. To do his duty conscientiously, as he should answer it to God hereafter, and according to the lights he had received, such was his unceasing aim and endeavour from the day when, young but superior to the frailties of youth, he first assumed the reins of government, until that dismal period, half a century later, when, bowed down by years and sorrows, and blind, doubly blind, he concluded his reign, though not, as yet, his life.

"Before the American war had commenced, and during its first period, nearly all the statesmen and writers of England argued, or rather took for granted as too plain to stand in need of argument, that separation from our colonies would most grievously impair, if not wholly ruin, the parent State. * * It is worthy of note how much our experience has run counter to the general prognostication—how little the loss was felt, or how quickly the void was supplied. An historian of high and just authority—Mr. Macaulay—has observed that England was never so rich, so great, so formidable to foreign princes, so absolutely mistress of the sea, as since the alienation of the American colonies. (Essays, Vol. II.) The true effect of that alienation upon ourselves, as time has shown, has been not positive, but by comparison it has lain not in the withdrawal of wealth and population and resources, but in raising up a rival State from the same race, and with powers and energies not inferior to our own.

"But how far, and in what degree, has the new form of government promoted the happiness of the United States themselves? * * It would be folly, or worse than folly, to deny that since their independence the prosperity of the United States has advanced with gigantic strides; that they have grown to be a first-rate power; that immense works of public utility have been achieved with marvellous speed; that the clearing of new lands and the building of new cities have been such as to outstrip the most sanguine calculations; that among them the working classes have been, in no common degree, well paid and prosperous; that a feeling for the national honour is in no country stronger; that the first elements of education have been most widely diffused; that many good and brave men have been trained and are training to the service of the Commonwealth. But have their independent institutions made them, on the whole, a happy and contented people? That, among themselves, is often proclaimed as undeniable; and certainly among themselves it may not always be safely denied. That, however, is not always the impression conveyed to him who only sojourns in their land, by the careworn faces, by the hurried steps, by the unsocial meals which he sees, or by the incessant party cries which he hears around him; by the fretful aspirations and the feverish hopes resulting from the unbounded space of competition open to them without check or barrier; and by the innumerable disappointments and heartburnings which in consequence arise. On the true condition of North America, let us mark the correspondence between two of the greatest and most highly gifted of her sons. There is now open before me a letter which, in August, 1837, and on the annexation of Texas, Dr. Channing wrote to Mr. Clay. In that letter, as published in Boston, I find the following words (and what Dr Channing said in 1837 has been illustrated in scores of instances since that time, and greatly enhanced by the events of the civil war):

"'I cannot do justice to this topic without speaking freely of our country, as freely as I should of any other; and unhappily we are so accustomed, as a people, to receive incense, to be soothed by flattery, and to account reputation a more important interest than morality, that my freedom may be construed into a kind of disloyalty. But it would be wrong to make concessions to this dangerous weakness. * * Among us a spirit of lawlessness pervades the community which, if not repressed, threatens the dissolution of our present forms of society. Even in the old States, mobs are taking the government into their hands, and a profligate newspaper finds little difficulty in stirring up multitudes to violence. * * Add to all this the invasions of the rights of speech and of the press by lawless force, the extent and toleration of which oblige us to believe that a considerable portion of our citizens have no comprehension of the first principles of liberty. It is an undeniable fact that, in consequence of these and other symptoms, the confidence of many reflecting men in our free institutions is very much impaired. Some despair. That main pillar of public liberty—mutual trust among citizens—is shaken. That we must seek security for property and life in a stronger government is a spreading conviction. Men who in public talk of the ability of our institutions, whisper their doubts, perhaps their scorn, in private.

"'Whether the people of the United States might have been as thriving and more happy had they remained British subjects, I will not presume to say. Certainly not if violent men like Lord Hillsborough, or corrupt men like Mr. Rigby, had continued to take part in the administration. With other hands at the helm the case might have been otherwise. Jefferson, at least, in his first draft of the Declaration of Independence, said of his countrymen and of the English: "We might have been a free and great people together." One thing, at all events, is plain, that had these colonies shared the fate of the other dominions of the British Crown, the main curse and shame—the plague spot of the system of slavery—would have been long since removed from them (before it was); but, as in the case of Jamaica, not without a large compensation in money to the slave owners. It is also plain that in the case supposed they would have equally shared in our pride and glory at the wondrous growth of the Anglo-Saxon race—that race undivided and entire, extending its branches as now to the furthest regions of the earth, yet all retaining their connection with the parent stem—all its members bound by the same laws, all animated by the same loyalty, and all tending to the same public-spirited aim. How great a nation should we and they be together!—how great in the arts both of peace and war! scarcely unequal now to all other nations of the world combined!" * *

"Since 1782 at the latest, views like these are merely day-dreams of the past. In place of them, let us now indulge the hope and expectation that the American people may concur with ours in desiring that no further resentment may be nourished, no further strife be stirred, between the kindred nations; so that both, mindful of their common origin, and conscious of their growing greatness, may both alike discard, as unworthy of them, all mean and petty jealousies, and be ever henceforth what nature has designed them—friends."[123]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 123: Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. liii., pp. 150-160.]



CHAPTER XXXVIII.

TREATMENT OF THE LOYALISTS BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT AFTER THE REVOLUTION.

PART I.

PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT—REFUSAL OF THE STATES TO COMPENSATE THE LOYALISTS.

It has been seen, by the fact stated in the last preceding chapter, that the promised recommendations of Congress to the several States, as agreed upon by the English and American Commissioners of the peace negotiations at Paris, were, as had been expected and predicted by Dr. Franklin at the time, without any result, the State Legislatures passing Acts to proscribe rather than compensate the Loyalists. In justification of these Acts, the American writers of that period, and largely down to the present time, assailed the character of the Loyalists in the grossest language of calumny and abuse; but the most respectable American writers of the present age bear testimony to the intelligence, wealth, and respectability of the Loyalists; and the fact, no longer questionable, that they sacrificed wealth, liberty, country, and chose poverty and exile, in support of their principles, has fully vindicated their character and presented their conduct in advantageous contrast with that of those who deprived them of their liberty, and largely profited by the confiscation of their immense property, while they and their families were pining in exile and want.

The only resource of the exiled and impoverished Loyalists, under such circumstances, was the Government and Parliament of the mother country to which they had so faithfully adhered, and nothing could be more honourable than the testimony borne in the British Parliament to their character and merits, and the consideration given to their wants and claims. The fifth Article of the Treaty of Paris, leaving the Loyalists to the recommendation of the Congress to the Legislatures of the several States, was severely reprobated in both Houses of Parliament. In the House of Commons, Mr. Wilberforce said that "when he considered the case of the Loyalists, he confessed he felt himself conquered; there he saw his country humiliated; he saw her at the feet of America; still he was induced to believe that Congress would religiously comply with the Article, and that the Loyalists would obtain redress from America. Should they not, this country was bound to afford it them. They must be compensated; Ministers, he was persuaded, meant to keep the faith of the nation with them."

Lord North (who had been Prime Minister during twelve years, including the war) said:

"And now let me, Sir, pause on a part of the treaty which awakens human sensibility in a very irresistible and lamentable degree. I cannot but lament the fate of those unhappy men, who, I conceive, were in general objects of our gratitude and protection. The Loyalists, from their attachments, surely had some claim to our affection. But what were not the claims of those who, in conformity to their allegiance, their cheerful obedience to the voice of Parliament, their confidence in the proclamation of our generals, invited under every assurance of military, parliamentary, political, and affectionate protection, espoused with the hazard of their lives, and the forfeiture of their properties, the cause of Great Britain? I cannot but feel for men thus sacrificed for their bravery and principles—men who have sacrificed all the dearest possessions of the human heart. They have exposed their lives, endured an age of hardships, deserted their interests, forfeited their possessions, lost their connections, and ruined their families in our cause. Could not all this waste of human enjoyment excite one desire of protecting them from a state of misery, with which the implacable resentment of the States has desired to punish their loyalty to their Sovereign and their attachment to their mother country? Had we not espoused their cause from a principle of affection and gratitude, we should, at least, have protected them to have preserved our own honour. If not tender of their feelings, we should have been tender of our own character. Never was the honour, the principles, the policy of a nation so grossly abused as in the desertion of those men, who are now exposed to every punishment that desertion and poverty can inflict, because they were not rebels."

Lord Mulgrave said: "The Article respecting the Loyalists he never could regard but as a lasting monument of national disgrace. Nor was this Article, in his opinion, more reproachful and derogatory to the honour and gratitude of Great Britain than it appeared to be wanton and unnecessary. The honourable gentleman who had made the motion had asked if those gentlemen who thought the present peace not sufficiently advantageous to Great Britain, considering her circumstances, could consent to pay the amount which another campaign (twenty millions) would have put us to, for the degree of advantage they might think we had a right to expect? In answer to this, he declared, for one, he had rather, large as the estimated sum in question was, have had it stipulated in the treaty, that Great Britain should apply it to making good the losses of the Loyalists, than that they should have been so shamefully deserted and the national honour so pointedly disgraced as it was by the fifth Article of the treaty with the United States."

Mr. Secretary Townsend (afterwards Lord Sydney) said "he was ready to admit that many of the Loyalists had the strongest claims upon the country; and he trusted, should the recommendation of Congress to the American States prove unsuccessful, which he flattered himself would not be the case, this country would feel itself bound in honour to make them full compensation for their losses."

Mr. Burke said: "At any rate, it must be agreed on all hands that a vast number of Loyalists had been deluded by this country, and had risked everything in our cause; to such men the nation owed protection, and its honour was pledged for their security at all hazards."

The Lord Advocate said: "With regard to the Loyalists, they merited every possible effort on the part of this country."

Mr. Sheridan "execrated the treatment of those unfortunate men, who, without the least notice taken of their civil and religious rights, were handed over as subjects to a power that would not fail to take vengeance on them for their zeal and attachment to the religion and government of this country. This was an instance of British degradation not inferior to the unmanly petitions to Congress for the wretched Loyalists. Great Britain at the feet of Congress, suing in vain, was not a humiliation or a stigma greater than the infamy of consigning over the loyal inhabitants of Florida, as we had done, without any conditions whatsoever."

"The Honourable Mr. Norton said that 'Under the circumstances, he was willing to approve of the two former (European treaties with France and Spain); but on account of the Article relating to the Loyalists, he felt it impossible to give his assent to the latter."

Sir Peter Burrell said: "The fate of the Loyalists claimed the compassion of every human breast. These helpless, forlorn men, abandoned by the Ministers of a people on whose justice, gratitude, and humanity they had the best-founded claims, were left at the mercy of a Congress highly irritated against them. He spoke not from party zeal, but as an independent country gentleman, who, unconnected with party, expressed the emotions of his heart and gave vent to his honest indignation."

Sir William Bootle said: "There was one part of the treaty at which his heart bled—the Article relative to the Loyalists. Being a man himself, he could not but feel for men so cruelly abandoned to the malice of their enemies. It was scandalous; it was disgraceful. Such an Article as that ought scarcely on any condition to have been admitted on our part. They had fought for us and run every hazard to assist our cause; and when it most behoved us to afford them protection, we deserted them."

Several other members spoke to the same effect. The treaty recognizing the Independence of America could not be reversed, as an Act passed the previous session had expressly authorized the King and his Cabinet to make it; but it was denied that a treaty sacrificing the Loyalists and making the concessions involved had been authorized; in consequence of which an express vote of censure was passed by the Commons by a majority of seventeen. The Earl of Shelburne, the Prime Minister, forthwith resigned in consequence of this vote of censure, and it was nearly three months before a new Administration could be formed; and during this administrative interregnum affairs were in great confusion.

In the House of Lords, Lord Walsingham said that "he could neither think nor speak of the dishonour of leaving these deserving people to their fate with patience." Lord Viscount Townsend considered that "to desert men who had constantly adhered to loyalty and attachment, was a circumstance of such cruelty as had never before been heard of." Lord Stormont said that "Britain was bound in justice and honour, gratitude and affection, and by every tie, to provide for and protect them." Lord Sackville regarded "the abandonment of the Loyalists as a thing of so atrocious a kind, that if it had not been painted in all its horrid colours he should have attempted the ungracious task but never should have been able to describe the cruelty in language as strong and expressive as were his feelings;" and again, that "peace on the sacrifice of these unhappy subjects must be answered in the sight of God and man." Lord Loughborough said that "the fifth Article of the treaty had excited a general and just indignation, and that neither in ancient nor modern history had there been so shameful a desertion of men who had sacrificed all to their duty and to their reliance on British faith."

In reply, Lord Shelburne, the Prime Minister, frankly admitted that the Loyalists were left without better provision being made for them "from the unhappy necessity of public affairs, which induced the extremity of submitting the fate of their property to the discretion of their enemies;" and he continued: "I have but one answer to give the House—it is the answer I gave my own bleeding heart—a part must be wounded, that the whole of the empire may not perish. If better terms could be had, think you, my lords, that I would not have embraced them? I had but the alternative either to accept the terms proposed or continue the war." The Lord Chancellor held that the stipulations of the treaty were "specific," and said: "My own conscious honour will not allow me to doubt the good faith of others, and my good wishes to the Loyalists will not let me indiscreetly doubt the disposition of Congress, since the understanding is that all these unhappy men shall be provided for; yet, if it were not so, Parliament could take cognizance of their case, and impart to each suffering individual that relief which reason, perhaps policy, certainly virtue and religion, required."

Such were the sentiments of members in both Houses of Parliament, and of both parties, as to the character and merits of the Loyalists. But there were no prospects of the States compensating them for their losses. Indeed, this idea was entertained by Lord Shelburne himself, and that compensation would have to be made to the Loyalists by Parliament when, in the speech above quoted, he said that "without one drop of blood spilt, and without one-fifth of the expense of one year's campaign, happiness and ease can be given to them in as ample a manner as these blessings were ever in their enjoyment." This was certainly a very low and mercenary view of the subject. It was one thing for the Loyalists to have their rights as British subjects maintained while they were obeying the commands of the King and maintaining their allegiance to the empire, and another thing for them to become pensioners upon the bounty of the British Parliament, to be paid in pounds, shillings, and pence for the rights and privileges which should have been secured to them by national treaty as British subjects. The House of Commons had adopted a resolution against continuing the American war for the purpose of enforcing the submission of the colonies; but it had not resolved against continuing the war to protect the rights and property of British subjects in the colonies. A campaign for this purpose, on the refusal of the American Commissioners to recognize what was sanctioned by the laws and usages of nations, would have been honourable to the British Government, would have been popular in England, and would have divided America; for there were many thousand "Whigs" in America, who believed in the equity of treating the Loyalists after the war as all others were treated who conformed to the laws, as has been the case in Holland, Ireland, and Spain. England was then mistress of the seas, held New York, Charleston, Rhode Island, Penobscot, and other military posts, and could soon have induced the Americans to do what their Peace Commissioners at Paris had refused to do—place British subjects in America upon the same footing as to property that they possessed before the war, and that they possess in the United States at this day. England could have easily and successfully refused granting to the United States a foot of land beyond the limits of the thirteen colonies, and thus have secured those vast western territories now constituting the larger part of the United States, and retained the garrisons of New York, Rhode Island, and Charleston as guarantees until the stipulated conditions in regard to the Loyalists should be fulfilled. A joint Commission in America could have settled upon equitable grounds all disputed claims in much less time than the six years occupied by a Parliamentary Commission in examining into and deciding upon the individual claims of Loyalist claimants. If the war to reduce the colonies to absolute submission had been unpopular in England, the peace upon the terms submitted to by the English Commissioners and the Ministry was equally unpopular. If England had been wrong in its war of coercion against the revolting colonists, was she not equally wrong, and more than wrong, in abandoning to their enemies those who had abided faithful to her laws and commands? The language of the speeches of members of both Houses of Parliament, above quoted, is as just as it is severe; although much could be and was said in justification of the policy of the Government in promoting peace upon almost any terms, seeing that England was at war with the three most powerful naval nations of Europe, besides that in America.