"Under these circumstances, the Cabinet determined that Mr. Oswald should go back to France and carry on the treaty with Franklin, though by no means with such concessions as the American philosopher desired."[59]

After the termination of hostilities between Great Britain and the colonies, the American Commissioners evinced a desire to treat with England alone. Mr. Oswald, as early as July, 1782, wrote privately to Lord Shelburne, "The Commissioners of the colonies have shown a desire to treat and to end with us on a separate footing from the other Powers." "The separate negotiation thus arising was delayed," says Lord Mahon, "first by the severe illness of Dr. Franklin, and next by some points of form in the commission of Mr. Oswald. When at length the more solid part of the negotiation was commenced, the hints of Franklin for the cession of Canada were quietly dropped, with greater case from their having been transmitted in a confidential form. It is also worthy of note that Lord Shelburne prevailed, in his desire of acknowledging the independence of the United States, by an article of the treaty, and not, as Mr. Fox had wished, by a previous declaration."

The two most difficult questions of the treaty related to the fishing grounds of Newfoundland, and the Loyalists or "Tories," as they were called. The English were unwilling to concede the use of the fishing grounds, but the Americans were firm; the result was, that by the provisions of the treaty it was agreed that the Americans should have the right to take fish on the banks of Newfoundland, but not to dry or cure them on any of the King's settled dominions.[60]

But the question which transcended all others in importance, with which this work has chiefly to do, was that of the Loyalists—a class which, by the testimony of American historians themselves, constituted, at the beginning of the war, a majority of the population of the colonies. Their numbers had been greatly reduced from various causes during the war; they had been plundered and scattered by the alternate ascendancy of opposite parties; they had all of them suffered in their property and liberty; many of them had suffered imprisonment, and not a few of them had been executed as criminals for preferring their oath of allegiance and connection with the mother country to a renunciation of their former profession of faith, and absolute submission to a newly self-created authority of rule and a new political creed. At the conclusion of the war, and in the treaty of peace, "the question of Loyalists or Tories," says Lord Mahon, "was, as it ought to be, a main object with the British Government to obtain, if possible, some restitution to the men who, in punishment for their continued allegiance to the King, had found their property confiscated and their persons banished. But from the first Dr. Franklin held out no hopes of any satisfaction on that point. 'The Commissioners,' he said, 'had no such power, nor had even Congress.'[61] They were willing that Congress should, with certain modifications, recommend those indemnities to the several States; and, as one of the negotiators from England tells us, they to the last 'continued to assert that the recommendation of Congress would have the effect we proposed.' The British diplomatists persevered in their original demand, and at one time there seemed a probability that the negotiations might break off, chiefly on this ground. Twice was Mr. Strachey, the Undersecretary of State, an able and experienced man, dispatched to Paris to aid Mr. Oswald with his counsel and co-operation. But at last the mind of Franklin, ever ingenious and fertile of resources, devised a counter scheme. He said that he would allow the losses which the Loyalists had suffered, provided another account were opened of the mischief they had done, as of slaves carried off, or houses burned; new Commissioners to be appointed to strike a balance between the two computations. At this formidable proposal, involving an endless train of discussions and disputes, the negotiators from England finally gave way."[62]

This account of the negotiation in regard to the United Empire Loyalists, taken from Lord Mahon's impartial history, is corroborated in all essential particulars by American historians. Mr. Bancroft says that "Franklin having already explained that nothing could be done for the Loyalists by the United States, as their estates had been confiscated by laws of particular States, which Congress had no power to repeal, he further demonstrates that Great Britain had forfeited every right to intercede for them by its conduct and example, to which end he read to Oswald the orders of the British in Carolina for confiscating and selling the lands and property of all patriots under the direction of the military; and he declared definitely that, though the separate governments might show compassion where it was deserved, the American Commissioners for Peace could not make compensation of refugees a part of the treaty."

"This last demand (adequate indemnity for the confiscated property of loyal refugees) touched alike the sympathy and the sense of honour of England. The previous answer, that the Commissioners had no power to treat on the business of the Loyalists, was regarded as an allegation that though they claimed to have full power, they were not plenipotentiaries; that they were acting under thirteen separate sovereignties, which had no common head. To meet the exigence, Shelburne proposed either an extension of Nova Scotia to the Penobscot, or Kennebec, or the Saco, so that a province might be formed for the reception of Loyalists; or that a part of the money to be received from sales of the Ohio lands might be applied to their subsistence."

"On the 29th of November, 1782, Strachey, Oswald, and Fitzherbert, on the one side, and Jay, Franklin, Adams, and for the first time Laurens, on the other, came together for their last word at the apartments of Jay. The American Commissioners agreed that there should be no future confiscations nor prosecutions of Loyalists, that all pending prosecutions should be discontinued, and that Congress should recommend to the several States and their Legislatures, on behalf of refugees, amnesty and the restitution of their confiscated property." "On the 30th, the Commissioners of both countries signed and sealed fair copies of the Convention." "The treaty was not a compromise, nor a compact imposed by force, but a free and perfect solution and perpetual settlement of all that had been called in question."[63]

Dr. Ramsay observes: "From the necessity of the case, the Loyalists were sacrificed, nothing further than a simple recommendation for restitution being stipulated in their favour. * * The case of the Loyalists was undoubtedly a hard one, but unavoidable from the complex Constitution of the United States. The American Ministers engaged, as far as they were authorized, and Congress did all they constitutionally could; but this was no more than simply to recommend their case to the several States, for the purpose of making them restitution. To have insisted on more, under such circumstances, would have been equivalent to saying that there should be no peace. It is true, much more was expected from the recommendations of Congress than resulted from them; but this was not the consequence of deception, but of misunderstanding the principles of the confederation. In conformity to the letter and spirit of the treaty, Congress urged, in strong terms, the propriety of making restitution to the Loyalists, but to procure it was beyond their power. * * There were doubtless among the Loyalists many worthy characters, friends of peace and lovers of justice. To such restitution was undoubtedly due, and to many such it was made; but it is one of the many calamities incident to war, that the innocent, from the impossibility of discrimination, are often involved in the same distress with the guilty.

"The return of the Loyalists to their former places of residence was as much disrelished by the Whig citizens of America as the proposal for reimbursing their confiscated property. In sundry places Committees were formed, who, in an arbitrary manner, opposed their peaceable residence. The sober and dispassionate citizens exerted themselves in checking these irregular measures; but such was the violence of party spirit, and so relaxed were the sinews of government, that, in opposition to legal authority and the private interference of the judicious and moderate, many indecent outrages were committed on the persons and property of the returning Loyalists.

"Nor were these all the sufferings of those Americans who had attached themselves to the royal cause. Being compelled to depart from their native country, many of them were obliged to take up their abodes in the inhospitable wilds of Nova Scotia, or on the barren shores of the Bahama Islands. Parliamentary relief was extended to them; but this was obtained with difficulty, and distributed with a partial hand. Some, who invented plausible tales of loyalty and distress, received much more than they ever possessed; while others, less artful, were not half reimbursed for their actual losses."[64]

Mr. Hildreth remarks, under date of September, 1783, "that at New York a general release of prisoners had taken place on both sides; but the necessity of finding transports for the numerous Loyalists assembled there protracted the evacuation of New York. In consequence of laws still in force against them, several thousand American Loyalists found it necessary to abandon their country. A considerable portion of these exiles belonged to the wealthier classes; they had been officials, merchants, large landholders, conspicuous members of the colonial aristocracy. Those from the North settled principally in Nova Scotia or Canada, provinces the politics of which their descendants continued to control until quite recently. Those from the South found refuge in the Bahamas and other West India islands. Still objects of great popular odium, the Loyalists had little to expect from the stipulated recommendations of Congress in their favour. Some of the States, whose territory had been longest and most recently occupied by the enemy, were even inclined to enact new confiscations."[65]

In each and all of these historical statements it is clearly admitted that the claim of the Loyalists to compensation for loss of property was founded in equity, as well as in national policy. This is sanctioned by the admission of the American Commissioners and the recommendation of Congress. The want of power in Congress to do what is admitted to be an act of justice to the Loyalists is the plea for not restoring them the property which had gone into the hands of their opponents, who were proportionally enriched thereby. It was left to local avarice and local resentment to deal with the property of banished exiles.

What was claimed by and in behalf of the Loyalists accorded with the practice of even modern nations, as well as with the sentiments of humanity. When the Dutch provinces asserted their independence of Spain, and after a long and bloody war obtained the recognition of it, they cordially agreed to an act of oblivion, and even restored to those who had adhered to the cause of Spain, their property of every denomination that had been confiscated, or the full value of it. Even Spain herself had twice thus acted towards the province of Catalonia—first, on its revolting from that Crown, and calling in the assistance of France; and secondly, on its refusing to acknowledge the Bourbon family, at the beginning of the last century. Though the inhabitants had forfeited life and property, yet, on their return to obedience, life, possessions, laws and immunities remained inviolate. England had conducted herself in the same spirit towards that party in Ireland which had taken up arms in support of James the Second. No proscriptions took place, and every man, on submitting to Government, was admitted to the undisturbed enjoyment of his property. Had this spirit actuated, and these examples, with many others of like character, influenced the Americans, how much more honourable to them, and more consistent with sound policy, to efface at once all remembrance of internal discords, than to pursue, in the execrable spirit of revenge and avarice, those of their countrymen who differed from them in opinion in the late contest, and sided with Great Britain.[66] That the plea that Congress had no power in granting amnesty and compensation to the Loyalists was a mere pretext, is manifest from the fact that the Commissioners agreed that there should be no more confiscations or proscriptions against the Loyalists; for if the laws under which these prosecutions were instituted and confiscations made were State laws, with which Congress had no power to interfere, how could the Congress Commissioners stipulate that there should be no more confiscations or proscriptions?

Dr. Franklin, the most experienced and ablest of the American diplomatists, was the most crafty and overbearing against England. At the beginning of the negotiations for peace, he demurely proposed, and half converted Mr. Oswald to his proposition, to concede Canada (which at that time meant all British North America) to the United States, though his commission related simply to the independency of the thirteen colonies; and when the British Cabinet vetoed this extra-official and extravagant proposition, Dr. Franklin and his colleagues overreached the ignorance and weakness of the British diplomatists by carefully constructed maps for the purpose of making the boundary lines between the proposed possessions of Great Britain and the United States on their northern and north-western frontiers. These lines were so ingeniously drawn as to take from Great Britain and include in the United States the immense and valuable territories, back settlements, and the whole country between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi, and which have since become the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Missouri, Michigan, Minnesota, etc.—to not one foot of which the thirteen American colonies had the slightest claim—territories ample to compensate Loyalists for their losses and banishment, but whose interests, together with these most valuable possessions, were lost to Great Britain by the subserviency of the British Commissioner, Oswald (a London and American merchant), who looked to his own interests, and was the subservient tool and echo of Dr. Franklin. The above territories were a part of the domain of Congress, irrespective of any State, and therefore at the absolute disposal of Congress. Yet, with these immense accessions of resources, the American Commissioners professed that the Congress had no power or means to compensate the United Empire Loyalists for the confiscation and destruction of their property! One knows not at which most to marvel—the boldness, skill, and success of the American Commissioners, or the cowardice, ignorance, and recklessness of the British diplomatists.

The result of these negotiations was, that the adherents to Great Britain during the civil war were deprived of the amnesty and restoration of property upon any ground of right, as had been granted at the termination of civil strife by all civilized nations—to the restoration of what had been taken from them during the war—and turned over as suppliant culprits to the several States by whose laws their property had been confiscated, and themselves declared guilty of treason, and condemned to the death of traitors. Dr. Franklin, in the beginning of his negotiations, had proposed to give all that now constitutes British North America to the United States, and thus leave to the British Loyalists not an inch of ground on which to place their feet; but all that was now left to them, as far as America was concerned, was to prostrate themselves as suppliants before the Legislatures of the several States, each of which was for the most part a seething cauldron of passion and resentment against them.[67]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 58: The new Cabinet was composed as follows: The Marquis of Rockingham, First Commissioner of the Treasury; the Earl of Shelburne and Mr. Fox, Secretaries of State; Lord Camden, President of the Council; Duke of Grafton, Privy Seal; Lord John Cavendish, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Admiral Keppel, raised to be a Viscount, First Commissioner of the Admiralty; General Conway, Commander of the Forces; Duke of Richmond, Master General of the Ordnance. Lord Thurlow was continued in the office of Lord High Chancellor, and Mr. Dunning raised to the peerage under the title of Lord Ashburton, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Mr. Burke was not made a member of the Cabinet, but was appointed to the lucrative office of Paymaster of the Forces, and was further gratified by the appointment of his son to a small office.

About six months after the formation of the new Cabinet the Marquis of Rockingham died, and the Earl of Shelburne was appointed to succeed him, when the Duke of Richmond, Mr. Fox, and Lord John Cavendish seceded from the Cabinet, and were succeeded by Mr. Thomas Townsend and Lord Graham as Secretaries of State, while the place of Lord John Cavendish, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was more than filled by Mr. Pitt.]

[Footnote 59: Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap lxvi., pp. 265, 266.

"At Paris, the negotiations had been much impeded by the resignation of Mr. Fox and the return of Grenville. These events had, in many minds, cast a shade of doubt over the true intentions of the British Government. Lord Shelburne, however, renewed the most pacific assurances, sending to Paris, in place of Mr. Grenville and conjointly with Mr. Oswald, Mr. Alleyne Fitzherbert, well known in after years as Lord St. Helens. These gentlemen acted in amity and concert with each other, although, strictly speaking, negotiation with America was, as before, the province of Mr. Oswald, and negotiation with the European Powers the province of Mr. Fitzherbert. Dr. Franklin, on the other hand, had associated with him three other American Commissioners, arriving in succession—first, Mr. Jay, from Spain; then Mr. Adams, from Holland; and finally, Mr. Laurens, from London.

"It became, ere long, apparent to the British agents that the Courts of France and Spain were by no means earnest and sincere in the wish for an immediate close of the war. With the hope of soon reducing Gibraltar, or of otherwise depressing England, they put forward at this time either inadmissible pretensions, or vague and ambiguous words. It therefore became an object of great importance to negotiate, if possible, a separate pacification with America. At first sight there appeared almost insuperable difficulties in the way of such a scheme. The treaty of alliance of February, 1778, between France and the United States, stipulated in the most positive terms that neither party should conclude a peace or truce with England, unless with the consent of the other party first obtained. Since that time the French, far from falling short of their engagement, had gone much beyond it. To say nothing of their despatch of a fleet and army, and besides their annual loans and advances to the United States, they had made, in 1781, a free gift of six millions of livres, and in the spring of 1782 granted another to the same amount.

"On the other hand, however, there was a strong temptation to treat without delay. War, if still waged, would be mainly for French and Spanish purposes. It could be made clear that when the independence of the Americans was fully established and secured, they had no interest anymore than England in continuing an unprofitable contest."—Ib., pp. 291-293.

"Moreover, there had sprung up in the minds of the American Commissioners at Paris a strong feeling of distrust and suspicion against their new allies. That feeling we find most plainly expressed by Mr. Adams in relating his own conversations with Mr. Oswald. 'You are afraid,' said Mr. Oswald to-day, 'of being made the tools of the Powers of Europe?' 'Indeed I am,' said I. 'What Powers?' said he. 'All of them,' said I.

"But in the minds of the American Commissioners, the distrust against France was more vehement than against any other State. The best American writers of the present day acknowledge that all surmises thence arising were, in truth, ill-founded; that the conduct of France towards the United States had been marked throughout not only by good faith and honour, but by generosity." (Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxvi., pp. 293, 294.)]

[Footnote 60: In the preamble of the treaty, it was provided that "The treaty was not to be concluded until terms of peace shall be agreed upon between Great Britain and France." By this limitation (which was a mere form, as the provisional articles were to be meanwhile binding and effective), the Americans were in hopes of avoiding, at least of softening, their French allies. "The first Article acknowledged in the fullest terms the independence of the United States. The second fixed their boundaries, and certainly to their advantage. The third gave their people the right to take fish on all the banks of Newfoundland, but not to dry or cure them on any of the King's settled dominions in America. By the fourth, fifth, and sixth Articles, it was engaged that Congress should earnestly recommend to the several Legislatures to provide for the restitution of all estates belonging to real British subjects who had not borne arms against them. All other persons were to be at liberty to go to any of the provinces and remain there for twelve months to wind up their affairs, the Congress also recommending the restitution of their confiscated property, on their repayment of the sums for which they had been sold. No impediment was to be put in the way of recovering bona fide debts; no further prosecutions were to be commenced, no further confiscations made. It was likewise stipulated in the seventh and eighth Articles, that the English should at once withdraw their fleets and armies from every port or place which they still possessed within the limits of the United States; and that the navigation of the Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, should be for ever free and open to both parties." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxvi., pp. 297, 298.)

"It is not to be supposed that the French Government could view with unconcern the studied secrecy of this negotiation. The appearances of amity were, indeed, for the sake of mutual interest, kept up on either side. But thus did the Comte de Vergennes (the French Minister of Foreign Affairs) unbosom himself in writing to the French Minister at Philadelphia: 'You will surely be gratified, as well as myself, with the very extensive advantages which our allies, the Americans, are to receive from the peace; but you certainly will not be less surprised than I have been with the conduct of the commissioners. * * They have cautiously kept themselves at a distance from me. Whenever I have had occasion to see any one of them, and enquire of them briefly respecting the progress of the negotiation, they have constantly clothed their speech in generalities, giving me to understand that it did not go forward, and that they had no confidence in the sincerity of the British Ministry. Judge of my surprise when, on the 30th of November, Dr. Franklin informed me that Articles were signed. The reservation retained on our account does not save the infraction of the promise which we have made to each other, not to sign except conjointly. * * This negotiation has not yet so far advanced in regard to ourselves as that of the United States; not but what the King, if he had shown as little delicacy in his proceedings as the American Commissioners, might have signed articles with England long before them.'"—Ib., pp. 298, 299.]

[Footnote 61: It was self-contradictory to say that Congress had power to confiscate property, and yet had no power to restore it when confiscated.]

[Footnote 62: Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxvi., pp 295, 296.]

[Footnote 63: History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap, xxix., pp. 555, 583, 589, 590, 591.]

[Footnote 64: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap, xxvii., pp. 489, 490, 491.]

[Footnote 65: Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap, xlv., p. 439.]

[Footnote 66: The royal historian, Dr. Andrews, remarks strongly on this subject as follows:

"The demands of restitution to the Loyalists of their property confiscated during the war, for their attachment to our cause, had been refused by the American Commissioners, on pretence that neither they, nor Congress itself, could comply with it, any farther than by recommendation of it to the different States. The demand was in itself so just, and founded on so many historical precedents, that Congress could not possibly plead a want of foresight that it would be made. It had been usual in all ages, on the cessation of civil war, to grant a general amnesty. No other motive but that of the basest and most barbarous revenge could induce men to express an averseness to so humane and necessary a measure. Next to the cruelty of such a refusal was the meanness of those who submitted to it.

"Circumstances empowered this nation to have acted with such firmness as to compel the Americans to relax their obstinacy in this particular. Until they had consented to a generous treatment of the Loyalists, we ought to have withheld the restitution of the many strong places still remaining in our hands, and made the surrender of them the price of their acquiescence in our demands in favour of the brave and faithful people who had suffered so much on our account." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. IV., pp. 401, 402.)

"All parties in the Commons unanimously demanded amnesty and indemnity for the Loyalists." (Bancroft, Vol. X., Chap, xxix., p. 586.)]

[Footnote 67: Dr. Ramsay justly remarks: "The operation of treason laws added to the calamities of the war. Individuals on both sides, while they were doing no more than they supposed to be their duty, were involved in the penal consequences of capital crimes. The Americans, in conformity to the usual policy of nations, demanded the allegiance of all who resided among them; but many preferred the late royal government, and were disposed, when opportunity offered, to support it. While they acted in conformity to these sentiments, the laws enacted for the security of the new government condemned them to death. Of all wars, civil are most to be dreaded. They are attended with the bitterest of resentments, and produce the greatest quantity of human woes. In the American war the distresses of the country were greatly aggravated from the circumstance that every man was obliged, some way or other, to be in the public service. In Europe, where the military operations are carried on by armies hired and paid for the purpose, the common people partake but little of the calamities of the war; but in America, where the whole people were enrolled as a militia, and where both sides endeavoured to strengthen themselves by oaths and by laws, denouncing the penalties of treason on those who aided or abetted the opposite party, the sufferings of individuals were renewed as often as fortune varied her standard. Each side claimed the co-operation of the inhabitants, and was ready to punish them when it was withheld.

"In the first institution of the American governments the boundaries of authority were not properly fixed. Committees exercised legislative, executive, and judicial powers. It is not to be doubted that in many instances these were improperly used, and that private resentments were often covered under the specious veil of patriotism. The sufferers, in passing over to the Loyalists, carried with them a keen remembrance of the vengeance of Committees, and when opportunity presented were tempted to retaliate. From the nature of the case, the original offenders were less frequently the objects of retaliation than those who were entirely innocent. One instance of severity begat another, and they continued to increase in a proportion that doubled the evils of common war. * * The Royalists raised the cry of persecution, and loudly complained that, merely for supporting the Government under which they were born, and to which they owed a natural allegiance, they were doomed to suffer all the penalties of capital offenders. Those of them who acted from principle felt no consciousness of guilt, and could not but look with abhorrence upon a Government which could inflict such severe punishments for what they deemed a laudable line of conduct. Humanity would shudder at a particular recital of the calamities which the Whigs inflicted on the Tories and the Tories on the Whigs. It is particularly remarkable, that many on both sides consoled themselves with the belief that they were acting and suffering in a good cause." (History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxvi., pp. 467, 468, 469.)]



CHAPTER XXXII.

ORIGIN OF REPUBLICANISM AND HATRED OF MONARCHY IN AMERICA—THOMAS PAINE: A SKETCH OF HIS LIFE, CHARACTER, AND WRITINGS, AND THEIR EFFECTS.

No social or political phenomenon in the history of nations has been more remarkable than the sudden transition of the great body of the American colonists, in 1776, from a reverence and love of monarchical institutions and of England, in which they had been trained from their forefathers, to a renunciation of those institutions and a hatred of England. Whatever influence the oppressive policy of the British Administration may have had in producing this change, was confined to comparatively few in America, was little known to the masses, and had little influence over them. This sudden and marvellous revolution in the American mind was produced chiefly by a pamphlet of forty pages, written at the suggestion of two or three leaders of the American revolutionists, over the signature of "An Englishman." This Englishman was no other than Thomas Paine, better known in after years as Tom Paine, "the blasphemous infidel and beastly drunkard," as the New York Observer, in answer to a challenge, proved him to be beyond the possibility of successful contradiction. Tom Paine was of a Quaker family; was a staymaker by trade, but an agitator by occupation. He had obtained an appointment as exciseman, but was dismissed from his office, and emigrated to America in 1774. He somehow obtained an introduction to Dr. Franklin in London, who gave him a letter of introduction to a gentleman in Philadelphia, through whom he procured employment in the service of a bookseller. Beginning forthwith to write for a leading newspaper on the agitated questions of the day, his articles attracted attention and procured him the acquaintance of some influential persons, and he at length became editor of the "Pennsylvania Magazine." He was the master of a singularly attractive, lucid, and vituperative style, scarcely inferior to that of Junius himself. At the suggestion of Franklin and one or two other leaders of the revolution, he wrote a pamphlet of forty pages in favour of Independence, entitled "Common Sense," and over the signature of "An Englishman," yet bitter against England and English institutions. It was addressed to the inhabitants of America, and was arranged under four heads: first, "Of the origin and design of government in general, with concise remarks on the English Constitution;" secondly, "Of monarchy and hereditary succession;" thirdly, "Thoughts on the present state of military affairs;" fourth, "Of the present ability of America, with some miscellaneous reflections." Mr. Frothingham says: "The portion on Government has little of permanent value; the glance at the English Constitution is superficial; and the attack on Monarchy is coarse. The treatment of the American question under the two last heads gave the pamphlet its celebrity."[68]

Mr. Gordon says that "No publication so much promoted the cause of Independence as that. The statements which are now adopted were then strange, and Paine found difficulty in procuring a publisher to undertake it."

Dr. Ramsay says: "The style, manner, and language of Thomas Paine's performance were calculated to interest the passions and to rouse all the active powers of human nature. With the view of operating on the sentiments of religious people, Scripture was pressed into his service; and the powers and name of a king were rendered odious in the eyes of numerous colonists who had read and studied the history of the Jews, as recorded in the Old Testament. Hereditary succession was turned into ridicule. The absurdity of subjecting a great continent to a small island on the other side of the globe was represented in such striking language as to interest the honour and pride of the colonists in renouncing the government of Great Britain. The necessity, the advantage and practicability of independence were forcibly demonstrated.

"Nothing could be better timed than this performance. It was addressed to freemen, who had just received convincing proof that Great Britain had thrown them out of her protection, and engaged foreign mercenaries to make war upon them, and seriously designed to compel their unconditional submission to her unlimited power. It found the colonists most thoroughly alarmed for their liberties, and disposed to do and suffer anything that promised their establishment. In union with the feelings and sentiments of the people, it produced surprising effects. Many thousands were convinced, and were led to approve and long for a separation from the mother country. Though that measure, a few months before, was not only foreign to their wishes, but the object of their abhorrence, the current suddenly became so strong in its favour that it bore down all opposition. The multitude was hurried down the stream; but some worthy men could not easily reconcile themselves to the idea of an eternal separation from a country to which they had long been bound by the most endearing ties. * * The change of the public mind of America respecting connection with Great Britain is without a parallel. In the short space of two years, nearly three millions of people passed over from the love and duty of loyal subjects to the hatred and resentment of enemies."[69]

The American press and all the American historians of that day speak of the electric and marvellous influence of Tom Paine's appeal against kings, against monarchy, against England, and in favour of American independence.

The following remarks of the London Athenaeum are quoted by the New York Observer of the 10th of April, 1879:

"A more despicable man than Tom Paine cannot be found among the ready writers of the eighteenth century. He sold himself to the highest bidder, and he could be bought at a very low price. He wrote well; sometimes as pointedly as Junius or Cobbett (who had his bones brought to England). Neither excelled him in coining telling and mischievous phrases; neither surpassed him in popularity-hunting. He had the art, which was almost equal to genius, of giving happy titles to his productions. When he denounced the British Government in the name of 'Common Sense,' he found willing readers in the rebellious American colonists, and a rich reward from their grateful representatives. When he wrote on behalf of the 'Rights of Man,' and in furtherance of the 'Age of Reason,' he convinced thousands by his title-pages who were incapable of perceiving the inconclusiveness of his arguments. His speculations have long since gone the way of all shams; and his charlatanism as a writer was not redeemed by his character as a man. Nothing could be worse than his private life; he was addicted to the most degrading vices. He was no hypocrite, however, and he cannot be charged with showing that respect for appearances which constitute the homage paid by vice to virtue. Such a man was well qualified for earning notoriety by insulting Washington. Only a thorough-paced rascal could have had the assurance to charge Washington with being unprincipled and unpatriotic."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 68: Frothingham's Rise of the Republic of the United States, Chap, xi., p. 472.

The pamphlet was called "Common Sense," and was written by Thomas Paine, an Englishman, who held and expressed extreme opinions upon the "Rights of Man." He had been a staymaker in England, and was ruined; when, in the winter of 1774, by Franklin's advice, he came to America and rapidly grasped and comprehended the position of affairs. (Elliott's History of New England, Vol. II., Chap, xxviii., p. 383.)

Referring to this demagogue of the American and French Revolution, his American biographer, Cheetham, says: "All sects have had their disgraceful members and offspring. Paine's father, a peaceful and industrious Quaker, connects him with the exemplary sect of the Friends. He received his education at the Grammar School of his native place, Thetford, in Norfolk, but attained to little beyond the rudiments of Latin. His first application to business was in the trade of his father, that of staymaker, which he followed in London, Dover, and Sandwich, where he married; afterwards he became a grocer and an exciseman, at Lewes, in Sussex. This situation he lost through some misdemeanor. After this, however, so well were the public authorities of his native country disposed to serve him, that one of the Commissioners of Excise gave him a letter of recommendation to Dr. Franklin, then a colonial agent in London, who recommended him to go to America. At this period he had first exercised his talents as a writer by drawing up a pamphlet recommending the advance of the salaries of excisemen.

"His age at this time was thirty-seven. His first engagement in Philadelphia was with Mr. Aitkin, a respectable bookseller, who, in January, 1775, commenced the 'Pennsylvania Magazine,' the editorship of which work became the business of Mr. Paine, who had a salary of L50 currency a year. When Dr. Rush, of Philadelphia, suggested to Paine the propriety of preparing the Americans for a separation from England, it seems that he seized with avidity the idea, and immediately commenced his famous pamphlet on that subject, which being shown in MS. to Doctors Franklin and Rush and Mr. Samuel Adams, was, after some discussion, entitled, at the suggestion of Dr. Rush, 'Common Sense.' For this production the Legislature of Pennsylvania voted him L500. Shortly afterwards Paine was appointed Secretary to the Committee of the United States on Foreign Affairs. His business was merely to copy papers, number and file them, and generally do the duty of what is now called a clerk in the Foreign Department. But in the title-page of his 'Rights of Man,' he styles himself 'Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Congress of the United States in the Late War.' While in this office, he published a series of appeals on the struggle between Great Britain and the colonies. In 1777 he was obliged to resign his secretaryship on account of a quarrel with Silas Deane, American agent in France. The next year, however, he obtained the appointment of Clerk to the Assembly of Pennsylvania; and in 1785, on the rejection of a motion to appoint him historiographer to the United States, the Congress granted him three thousand dollars, and the Legislature of New York granted him an estate of 500 acres of highly cultivated land, the confiscated property of a Loyalist. Having no more revolutionary occupation in the United States, he embarked for France in 1787, with a letter of recommendation from Dr. Franklin to the Duke de la Rochefoucault. From Paris he went to London, where, the following year, he was arrested for debt, but was bailed by some American merchants. He went to Paris in 1791 to publish, under the name of 'Achilles Du Chatellet,' a tract recommending the abolition of royalty. He again returned to London and wrote the first part of his 'Rights of Man,' in answer to Mr. Burke's 'Reflections on the French Revolution.' The second part was published early in 1792. He was ordered to be arrested and prosecuted for his seditious and blasphemous writings, but escaped to France, and was elected a member of the French National Convention—grateful for the honour which the bloody anarchists had conferred upon him by electing him a member of their order. His conduct, however, offended the Jacobins, and towards the close of the year 1793 he was excluded from the convention, was arrested and committed to the prison of the Luxembourg. Just before his confinement he had finished the first part of his 'Age of Reason,' and confided it to the care of his friend Joel Barlow for publication. He was now taken ill, to which circumstance he ascribed his escape from the guillotine; and on the fall of Robespierre was released. In 1795 he published, at Paris, the second part of his 'Age of Reason.' He returned to America in 1802, bringing with him a woman named Madame Bonneville, whom he had seduced away from her husband, with her two sons, and whom he seems to have treated with the utmost meanness and tyranny. His friend and American biographer, Mr. Cheetham, in continuation, gives the following account of Paine's arrival at New York in 1802: 'The writer,' says Mr. Cheetham, 'supposing him (Paine) to be a gentleman, was employed to engage a room for him at Lovett's hotel, New York. On his arrival, in 1802, about ten at night, he wrote me a note, desiring to see me immediately. I waited on him at Lovett's, in company with Mr. George Clinton, jun. We rapped at the door. A small figure opened it within, meanly dressed, having an old top-coat, without an under one; a dirty silk handkerchief loosely thrown around his neck, a long beard of more than a week's growth, a face well carbuncled as the setting sun, and the whole figure staggering under a load of inebriation. I was on the point of inquiring for Mr. Paine, when I noticed something of the portraits I had seen of him. We were desired to be seated. He had before him a small round table, on which were a beefsteak, some beer, a pint of brandy, a pitcher of water and a glass. He sat eating, drinking, and talking with as much composure as if he had lived with us all his life. I soon perceived that he had a very retentive memory, and was full of anecdote. The Bishop of Llandaff (Dr. Watson) was almost the first word he uttered, and it was followed by his informing us that he had in his trunk a manuscript reply to the bishop's 'Apology for the Bible.' He then calmly mumbled his steak, and ever and anon drinking his brandy and beer, repeated the introduction to his reply, which occupied nearly half an hour. This was done with deliberation and the utmost clearness, and a perfect apprehension, intoxicated as he was, of all that he repeated. Scarcely a word would he allow us to speak. He always, I afterwards found, in all companies, drunk or sober, would be listened to; in his regard, there were no rights of men with him—no equality, no reciprocal immunities and obligations—for he would listen to no one.'

"On the 13th of October, 1802, he arrived at Baltimore, under the protection of Mr. Jefferson. But it appears that curiosity induced no one of distinction to suffer his approach. While at his hotel he was principally visited by the lower class of emigrants from Scotland, England, and Ireland, who had read and admired his 'Rights of Man.' With them, it appears, 'he drank grog in the tap-room morning, noon, and night, admired and praised, strutting and staggering about, showing himself to all and shaking hands with all. The leaders of the party to which he had attached himself paid him no attention.'"

Paine's subsequent years, until his miserable death in 1809, were characterized by the lowest degradation, blasphemy, drunkenness, and filthiness, which rendered him unfit for any human society, as his biographies, written even by his friends, abundantly testify.

Those who knew Paine in his earlier years were, of course, not responsible for the depravity and degradation of his subsequent years; but from the beginning he was an infidel and an enemy of all settled government.

Such was the author of American republicanism and of American hatred to England, to all British institutions, to all monarchy, and the advocate of the abolition of kings.]

[Footnote 69: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xii., pp. 161, 162, 163.]



CHAPTER XXXIII.

HIRING OF FOREIGNERS AND EMPLOYMENT AND TREATMENT OF INDIANS IN THE AMERICAN WAR.

No two acts of the British Government in connection with the American war were more deprecated on both sides of the Atlantic than the employment of foreign troops and Indians against the colonists; they were among the alleged and most exciting causes of the Declaration of Independence; they weakened British influence throughout the colonies; they roused thousands to arms who would have otherwise remained peacefully at home. In England they were denounced by the highest personages both in and out of Parliament, and by the public at large.[70]

These Hessian mercenaries, though much lauded at first, and dreaded by the colonists, proved to be inferior to the British soldiers, were not reliable, deserted in large numbers, and plundered everywhere, without regard to Loyalists or Disloyalists, and strengthened the American resistance far more than they strengthened the British army.[71]

But if the hiring of foreign troops at an enormous expense was disgraceful and impolitic, the employment of Indians against the colonists was still more impolitic and unnatural an outrage upon civilization and humanity; and what is still even more to be lamented is that this enlistment of savages in the warfare of one branch of the British family against another was sanctioned if not instigated by the King himself.[72]

During the war between France and England, which commenced in 1755, both parties sought the alliance and support of the Indians, and employed them in the savage work of border warfare. The French succeeded in securing the greater number of the Indians, and used them with dreadful effect, murdering and scalping thousands of the British colonists along the inland frontiers of the several colonies. At the termination of the war by the Treaty of Paris, in 1763, and the extinction of French power in America, the French authorities commended the Indians to cultivate the friendship of England, whose great superiority and success in the war tended to turn the Indian affections and interest in favour of the British. Dr. Ramsay observes: "The dispute between Great Britain and her colonies began to grow serious, and the friendship of the Indians became a matter of consequence to both parties. Stretching for fifteen hundred miles along the whole north-western frontier of the colonies, they were to them desirable friends and formidable enemies. As terror was one of the engines by which Great Britain intended to enforce the submission of the colonies, nothing could be more conducive to the excitement of this passion than the co-operation of the Indians. Policy, not cruelty, led to the adoption of this expedient, but it was of that over refined species which counteracts itself. In the competition for the friendship of the Indians, the British had advantages far superior to any possessed by the colonists. The expulsion of the French from Canada—an event which had taken place only thirteen years before—was still fresh in the memory of many of the savages, and had inspired them with high ideas of the martial superiority of the British troops. The first steps taken by Congress to oppose Great Britain put it out of their power to gratify the Indians. Such was the effect of the non-importation agreement of 1774. While Great Britain had access to the principal Indian tribes through Canada on the north, and Florida on the south, and was abundantly able to supply their many wants, the colonists had debarred themselves from importing the articles which were necessary for the Indian trade."[73]

The employment of the Indians in this civil war was in every respect disadvantageous to England. It was disapproved and denounced throughout England and Europe, as unnatural and inhuman; it was disapproved by the English commanders and even Loyalists in America, and inflamed the colonists to the highest degree. Wherever the Indians were employed, they were a source of weakness to the English army, while their ravages and cruelties disgusted the Loyalists and brought disgrace upon the English arms and cause. Sir Guy Carleton forbade their crossing from Canada into the colonies, and was afterwards accused in England for disobedience in not employing them;[74] and General Burgoyne gave the strictest orders against their murdering and plundering. His defeat near Saratoga was largely owing to the conduct of the Indians in his army.

American historians dilate with much eloquence and justice upon the employment of Indians against the colonists, and narrate, with every possible circumstance of aggravation, every act of depredation and cruelty on the part of the Indians against the white inhabitants that espoused the cause of Congress; but they omit to state in like manner that Congress itself endeavoured to enlist the Indians in its quarrel with the mother country; that General Washington recommended their employment against the English,[75] and that the very idea of engaging the Indians in this civil war originated with the first promoters of the revolution in Massachusetts. Nor do American historians state frankly and fairly that for every aggression and outrage committed by the Indians, the American soldiers, even under the express order of Congress, retaliated with a tenfold vengeance—not in the manner of civilized warfare, but after the manner and destruction of the savages themselves. The American writers had also great advantages in representing everything in regard to the proceedings of the revolutionists in the brightest light, and everything connected with the Loyalists and the English in the darkest colours, as they had the reports, letters, and all other papers relating to these subjects in their own exclusive possession, and published only such and so much of them as answered their purpose; even the internal proceedings of Congress were secret,[76] and only became known after the close of the war. And many of the most important historical facts relating to the war have been brought to light in the biographies and correspondence of the men who figured in the revolution; and many letters and papers of great historical value in throwing light upon the events and conduct of parties during that period have only been published during the present century, and some of them for the first time during the present generation. This is true in regard to much that relates to the employment and proceedings of the Indians, as well as in regard to those of the Loyalists and various events of the American revolution. According to American historians, the idea of employing the Indians in the civil war was the wicked conception of British malignity, and everywhere reprobated in America; while the idea was actually first conceived and embodied in a resolution by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts. At Cambridge a new Provincial Congress had assembled, with the popular feeling in their favour, and with several thousands of militia or minute men under their command. But the most determined of all their measures was to enlist a company of Stockbridge Indians residing in their province. Further still, they directed a secret letter—and a secret it has been kept for more than fifty years—to a missionary much esteemed by the Indians in the western parts of New York, entreating "that you will use your influence with them to join us in the defence of our rights,"—in other words, to assail and scalp the British soldiers.[77] It is worthy of remark, that the Massachusetts delegates, the framers of this letter, were among those who expressed the highest astonishment and indignation when, at a later period, a similar policy was adopted on the British side.[78]

"Under date of the 27th of July, 1776, General Washington wrote to Congress," says Mr. Allen, "expressing respectful anxiety that the Stockbridge Indians shall be employed, and remarks that they were dissatisfied at not being included in the late order for enlisting their people, and had inquired the cause of General Putman.

"The reasons he assigns for recommending their employment are such as have influenced, and probably determined, the Americans from that time to the termination of the last war (1812-1815) with Great Britain—that is, the impossibility of keeping them neutral; the fear of their joining the enemy; while the customs of savage warfare are so repulsive to all the feelings of humanity and pride of the soldier, that it would seem no palliation could be received for the crime of having sanctioned them by example. Indians are active and serviceable when properly employed. They are the best defence against Indians. Acquainted from their birth with wiles and stratagems, they can trace the enemy, and tell its numbers, its footsteps, when the eye of the white man cannot discover a trace; and the moving of grass or rushes, which would be unregarded by a regular soldier, as the natural effect of winds, leads the Indian to be prepared for an ambush. The certainty that Indians can be restrained when it is wished, reconciles the opposite contradictions which are so often seen between the complaints made by the Americans that the enemy employed savages, at the very moment that they also employed them."[79]

It is thus clear that both parties courted the co-operation of the Indians, and employed them to the utmost of their power; and therefore one party has no just ground of reproach against or advantage over the other party for the inhuman policy of enlisting the Indians in their cause, though the British had larger means and greater facilities in securing this savage co-operation.

It has been alleged, and no doubt truly, that the American commanders restrained the cruel and plundering propensities of the Indians, and the English commanders did the same; but neither the English nor the Americans were always able to control their Indian allies on or after the day of battle. American writers have, however, charged the outrages of the Indians in the English army, and scouting parties, to the sanction of the British generals,[80] and the prompting of the British Loyalists, and some English writers have reiterated the charge. The employment of the Indians at all was against the judgment of both General Burgoyne and Sir Guy Carleton,[81] and only submitted to in obedience to the King's authority. As early as the 11th of July, 1776, Burgoyne (while pursuing his enterprise from Montreal to Albany) complains as follows of the conduct of the Indians to the Secretary of State: "Confidentially to your Lordship, I may acknowledge that in several instances I have found the Indians little more than a name. If, under the management of their conductors, they are indulged for interested reasons in all the caprices and humours of spoiled children like them, they grow more unreasonable and importunate upon every new favour. Were they left to themselves, enormities too horrid to think of would ensue; guilty and innocent, women and infants, would be a common prey."[82]

While the Indians were an incumbrance to Burgoyne's army during his whole campaign, and forsook him in the eventful hour when he most needed them, their barbarities contributed greatly to swell the revolutionary army, and to alienate great numbers of Loyalists, weakening Burgoyne's army in the very country where he expected most support from the inhabitants, and giving the American general, Gates, a great preponderance of strength over him—the army of Burgoyne being reduced to 3,500 men fit for actual service, while that of Gates was increased to upwards of 16,000 fit for actual service.[83]

But if the British exceeded the Americans in gaining the greater part of the Indians to their cause, and the corresponding disgrace and disadvantage of their accompanying the army, the Americans far outdid the English and the Indians themselves in the work of desolation and destruction. Dr. Ramsay remarks:

"The undisturbed tranquillity which took place in South Carolina and the adjacent States after the British had failed in their designs against them in the spring and summer of 1776, gave an opportunity of carrying war into the Indian country. This was done, not so much to punish what was past, as to prevent all future co-operation between the Indians and British in that quarter. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia sent about the same time a considerable force, which traversed the Indian settlements, burned their towns, and destroyed their fields of corn. Above 500 of the Cherokees were obliged, from want of provisions, to take refuge in Florida, and were fed at the expense of the British Government."[84]

It is to be observed that this was not an invasion of the white settlements by the Indians, but an invasion of the Indian settlements by the whites; it was a "carrying war into the Indian country;" it was not provoked by the Indians, but "was done to prevent all future co-operation between the Indians and British in that quarter." Yet this war of invasion, this war of precaution, was also a war more destructive to the Indians than any which they, even under the French, had inflicted on the white colonists; for not an Indian cornfield was left undestroyed, nor an Indian habitation unconsumed.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 70: The royal historian, Dr. Andrews, says:

"The colonies were particularly exasperated at the introduction of foreign troops into this quarrel. They looked upon this measure as an unanswerable proof that all regard for their character as Englishmen was fled, and that Great Britain viewed them as strangers, whom, if she could not conquer and enslave, she was determined to destroy. This persuasion excited their most violent indignation; they considered themselves as abandoned to plunder and massacre, and that Britain was unfeelingly bent on their ruin, by whatsoever means she could compass it.

"While the colonists represented this measure in so sanguinary a light, it was depicted at home in the same colour by their partisans. It was even reprobated by many individuals who were not averse to the other parts of the Ministerial plan, but who could not bring themselves to approve of the interference of foreign mercenaries in our domestic feuds.

"It was not only throughout the public at large this measure occasioned so much discontent; after having in Parliament undergone the keenest censure of the Opposition, it fell under the displeasure of a considerable number of those who sided with the Minister and were generally used to support the measures of Government; but on this occasion they loudly dissented from them. Several quitted the House without voting; others, who voted in his favour, obliged him previously to give them an assurance that he would remove all their doubts and scruples, and satisfy them clearly on this subject." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. II., Chap. xviii., pp. 76, 77.)]

[Footnote 71: "The employment of foreign troops to reduce America was an object animadverted upon by the Opposition with peculiar violence and indignation. This, indeed, of all the Ministerial measures, met with the most acrimonious notice both in and out of Parliament. * * Foreigners said the Opposition were now taught that Britain, with all its boasted greatness, could not find people at home to fight its battles. * * Who could behold so disgraceful a measure without feeling for that loss of national honour which it must occasion? * * But exclusive of the disgrace entailed upon our character, the danger of the system was no less apparent. What reason had we to trust an army of foreigners, who could possibly harbour no motives of enmity to the people against whom they were to be employed? The country where these foreigners were to wage war for us, was precisely that to which we had so often enticed numbers to emigrate from their native homes by promises of more ease and happiness than they could enjoy in their own country. * * Of all the measures that had been taken against the Americans, that of hiring foreigners to invade their country had given the highest offence. British soldiers, though acting in the capacity of foes, still retained the feelings of countrymen, and would not shed blood without some compunction. They were born and bred in a country noted for humanity, and the constitution of which inculcated mildness. But the Hessians were of a ferocious disposition; educated under a despotic Government, they knew no rights but those of force. They carried destruction wherever they were masters, plundering all before them without distinction, and committing the most barbarous ravages.

"They had, it was said, been told before their departure from Germany that they were to be put in possession of the lands of those whom they conquered, and they were full of this expectation at their arrival. But upon discovering their mistake, they resolved, however, to make themselves amends by appropriating whatever they could lay their hands upon. * * The conduct of the Hessians was extremely offensive to the British commanders, but they were too powerful a body to restrain by compulsion, as they composed almost one-half of the army. Notwithstanding the prudence and steadiness with which General Howe conducted himself upon this emergency, it was not possible to restrain their excesses, nor even prevent them from spreading among the English troops in a degree to which they would not have certainly been carried had they not such examples for a plea.

"The depredations of the Hessians grew at last, it was said, so enormous, that the spoils they were loaded with became an absolute incumbrance to them, and a frequent impediment to the discharge of their military duties.

"The desolation of the Jerseys was one of the consequences of this spirit of rapine. The Americans who adhered to Britain attributed to it the subsequent decline of the British cause in these and other parts. As the devastation was extended indiscriminately to friend and foe, it equally exasperated both parties; it confirmed the enmity of the one, and raised up a new enemy in the other; and it injured the British interest in all the colonies." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. II., Chaps. xvii. and xxii., pp. 53, 54-268, 269.)

Dr. Andrews adds, in another place, that—

"The resentment occasioned by the depredations that had been carried on in the Jerseys had left few, if any, friends to Britain in that province. The dread of seeing those plunderers return, who had spared neither friend nor foe, rendered all parties averse to the cause in which they were employed. To this it was owing that their motions were observed with such extreme vigilance, that they stood little or no chance of succeeding in any of their enterprises. So many had suffered through them, that there was no deficiency of spies to give instant information of whatever they were suspected to have in view; and as much mischief was done them by such as acted secretly from motives of private revenge, as by those who took an open part against them in the field." (Dr. Andrews' History of the American War, etc., Vol. II., Chap, xxiii., pp. 301, 302.)]

[Footnote 72: "At the north, the King called to mind that he might 'rely upon the attachment of his faithful allies, the Six Nations of Indians,' and he turned to them for immediate assistance. To insure the fulfilment of his wishes, the order to engage them was sent directly in his name to the unscrupulous Indian agent, Guy Johnson, whose functions were made independent of Carleton. 'Lose no time,' it was said; 'induce them to take up the hatchet against his Majesty's rebellious subjects in America. It is a service of very great importance; fail not to exert every effort that may tend to accomplish it; use the utmost diligence and activity.'" (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. VII., Chap. xxxiii., p. 349.)]

[Footnote 73: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xix., pp. 320, 321.

"It was unfortunate for the colonies that since the peace of Paris, 1763, the transactions with the Indians had been mostly carried on by superintendents appointed and paid by the King of Great Britain. These being under obligations to the Crown, and expectants of further favours from it, generally used their influence with the Indians in behalf of the mother country and against the colonies. * * The Americans were not unmindful of the savages on their frontier. They appointed commissioners to explain to them the grounds of their dispute, and to cultivate their friendship by treaties and presents. They first sought to persuade the Indians to join them against Great Britain, but having failed in that, they endeavoured to persuade the Indians that the quarrel was by no means relative to them, and that therefore they should take part with neither side.

"For the greater convenience of managing the intercourse between the colonies and the Indians, the latter were divided into three departments—the northern, southern, and middle—and commissioners were appointed for each. Congress also resolved to import and distribute among them a suitable assortment of goods, to the amount of L40,000 sterling, on account of the United States; but this was not executed." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xix., p. 321.)]

[Footnote 74: "Anxious (1775, October) to relieve St. John's, Carleton, after the capture of Allen, succeeded in assembling about nine hundred Canadians at Montreal; but a want of mutual confidence, and the certainty that the inhabitants generally favoured the Americans, dispirited them, and they disappeared by desertions thirty or forty of a night, till he was left almost as forlorn as before. The Indians, too, he found of little service; 'they were easily dejected, and chose to be of the strongest side, so that when they were most wanted they vanished'. But history must preserve the fact that though often urged to let them loose on the rebel provinces, in his detestation of cruelty he would not suffer a savage to pass the frontier." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. VIII., Chap. lii., p. 186.)]

[Footnote 75: "Reading at the present day, we can see how the passionate and declamatory rhetoric of the Declaration of Independence has left its stain to this hour on most of the political writing and oratory of America, and may wish that the birth of a nation had not been screamed into the world after this fashion. Nothing could have been easier than, in the like rhetorical language, to draw up a list of lawlessness and utter outrage committed by the colonists. Some of the charges will not bear examination.

"For instance, the aid of the Indians had been willingly accepted by the colonists in the Canadian expedition since September, 1775; the general question of their employment had been considered by Washington in conference with a Committee of Congress and delegates of New England Governments in October of the same year; and the main objection which Washington and other officers urged against it, as shown by a letter of his to General Schuyler, January 27, 1776, and the answer from the latter, was that of expense. He had, nevertheless (April 19, 1776), advised Congress 'to engage them on our side,' as 'they must, and no doubt soon will, take an active part either for or against us;' and the Congress itself had, on June 3rd—not a month before the Declaration of Independence was actually accepted—passed a resolution to raise 2,000 Indians for the Canadian service, which, shortly afterwards, was extended by another (referred to in a letter of Washington's of June 20), authorizing General Washington to employ such Indians as he should take into the service in any place where he might think that they would be most useful, and to offer them bounties, not indeed for scalps, but for every officer and soldier of the King's troops whom they might capture in the Indian country or on the frontiers of the colonies. When all this had been done, it needed the forgetfulness and the blind hypocrisy of passion to denounce the King to the world for having 'endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages;' yet the American people have never had the self-respect to erase this charge from a document generally printed in the fore-front of their Constitution and Laws, and with which every schoolboy is sedulously made familiar.

"Perhaps, indeed, it would have been otherwise had not the charge been one which circumstances appeared to confirm. For, in fact, owing to causes already indicated, the Americans never could make friends of the Indians in the contest, and consequently the 'merciless savages' continue in history to figure on the side of the British. Who could wonder at it? At the date of the Declaration of Independence, the Indian child had only just reached man's estate, who in the year of his birth might have escaped being a victim to the bounty of L20, held out for the scalp of every Indian woman and child, by Massachusetts, in 1775, whilst one of L40 had been offered for that of his father, raised in 1776 to L300. It did not require the retentive memory of the redskin to make him look with suspicion on solicitations of friendship from men who might have been parties to such schemes of extermination to his race." (The Ludlow's History of the War of Independence, 1777-1783, Chap. v., pp. 124-126.)

"But Jefferson's violent pamphlet should, in fact, be looked upon less as a Declaration of Independence than as a Declaration of War—less as an assertion of right than as a cry of defiance uttered in the hour of grave peril, and in the face of a formidable foe."—Ib., p. 126.]

[Footnote 76: Some of the members of Congress were, at times, not so reticent as their oaths of secrecy required, and the squabbles of Conference became known abroad. It is a curious illustration of the dignity and character of a body, when the least publication of its proceedings becomes its disgrace.

"In those days (1779), far unlike our own, the Congress resembled a Committee or a Junta, much rather than a chamber of debate. The speeches, it is said, were all in the style of private conversation. There were never more than forty members present, often no more than twenty. These small numbers, however, by no means ensured harmony, nor precluded violent and unseemly quarrels, rumours of which were not slow in passing the Atlantic. 'For God's sake,' thus wrote La Fayette from France, 'for God's sake, prevent the Congress from disputing loudly together. Nothing so much hurts the interest and reputation of America.' Thus the object of concealment, unless, perhaps, for private purposes, was most imperfectly attained, although, in name at least, the deliberations of Congress at this time were secret. Historically, even the Journal which they kept gives little light as to their true proceedings. An American gentleman, who has studied that document with care, laments that it is 'painfully meagre, the object being apparently to record as little as possible.'" (Lord Mahon's History of England, Vol. VII., Chap. lviii., pp. 420, 421; quoting as his authority, "Letter of La Fayette to Washington, June 12, 1779," and "Life of President Reed," by Mr. Wm. Reed, Vol. II., p. 18.)]

[Footnote 77: Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap, lii., pp. 52, 53.]

[Footnote 78: This letter, dated Concord, April 4, 1775, may be seen at length in the Appendix to Sparks' edition of Washington's Writings, Vol. III., p. 495. The letter, it will be seen, was written a fortnight before the affair of Concord and Lexington, which took place the 19th of April, when the first blood was shed in the revolution.]

[Footnote 79: Allen's History of the American Revolution, Vol. I., Chap, xiv., pp. 423, 424.

"Lord Suffolk, in his speech (in reply to Lord Chatham), undertook to defend the employment of the savages. 'The Congress,' he said, 'endeavoured to bring the Indians over to their side, and if we had not employed them they would most certainly have acted against us.' This statement, which at the time was doubted or denied, has been, it must be owned, in no small degree borne out by documents that have subsequently come to light. Even several months later, we find Congress in treaty to engage several parties of Indians in their service." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lvi., p. 305.)

"See Washington's Writings, Vol. V., p. 273, and Appendix to Vol. III., p. 494. 'Divesting them,' says Washington, 'of the savage customs exercised in their wars against each other, I think they may be made of excellent use as scouts and light troops, mixed with our own parties.' But what more did the English ever design or desire?" (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lvi., p. 305.)]

[Footnote 80: Even so amiable and generous a man as Burgoyne did not escape these imputations. "It may well be imagined that while Burgoyne was advancing, declamations against his and the Indians' cruelty (for no distinction was admitted) were rife on the American side. By such means, and still more, perhaps, by the natural spirit of a free-born people when threatened with invasion, a resolute energy against Burgoyne was roused in the New England States."—Ib., p. 261.]

[Footnote 81: "Carleton from the first abhorred the measure of employing the Indians, which he was yet constrained to promote." (Bancroft, Vol. VII., p. 119.)]

[Footnote 82: Quoted in Lord Mahon's History, Vol. VII., Chap. lvi., p. 259. After quoting this letter, Lord Mahon adds:

"It is due to Burgoyne to state, that from the first he had made most strenuous exertions, both by word and deed, to prevent any such enormities. The testimony, for example, of his aide-de-camp, Lord Petersham, when examined before the House of Commons, is clear and precise upon that point. (See Burgoyne's Narrative and Collection of Documents, pp. 65, 66, second edition.) But in spite of all restraints, the cruel temper and lawless habits of these savages would sometimes burst forth—sometimes not more fatally to their enemies than to their friends. The tragical fate of Miss MacRea raised one loud cry of indignation on both sides of the Atlantic. This lady, in the bloom of youth and beauty, the daughter of an American Loyalist, was betrothed to an officer in the British provincial troops. Anxious for her security, the officer engaged some Indians to escort her from her home and convey her to the British camp, where the marriage would be solemnized. As a further precaution, he promised to reward the person who should bring her safe to him with a barrel of rum. But this very precaution, as it seemed to be, was the cause of the disaster which ensued. Two of the Indians who took charge of her began a quarrel on the way, as to which of them should first present her to the bridegroom. Each was eager for the rum; each resolute that his companion should not receive it in his place. At last one of them in sudden fury raised his tomahawk, struck Miss MacRea upon the head, and laid her a corpse at his feet. General Burgoyne at this news displayed his utmost resentment and concern. He compelled the Indians to deliver up the murderer, and designed to put him to death. He was only induced to spare his life upon the Indians agreeing to terms which the General thought would be more effectual than any execution, in deterring them from similar barbarities. Deterred, indeed, they were. But when they found themselves precluded from their expected delights of plundering and scalping, they began to desert and go home. Of nearly five hundred who at the outset had joined Burgoyne, less than threescore at last remained beneath his banner."—Ib., pp. 259-261.

At the first general encampment of Burgoyne's army on the western side of Lake Champlain, he met a deputation of the Indians in alliance with Great Britain, and made an animated speech to them. "He exhorted them to behave with courage and fidelity to their friends, and to avoid all barbarity towards their enemies. He entreated them to be particularly careful in distinguishing between the adherents and foes to the British nation. He earnestly requested that they would put none to death but such as actually opposed them with arms in their hands, and to spare old men, women, children, and prisoners; to scalp only such as they had killed in action, and to treat compassionately the wounded and dying. He promised them a reward for every prisoner they brought in, but assured them he would look narrowly into every demand for scalps." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. II., Chap, xxviii., p. 383.)]

[Footnote 83: "The apprehensions of those who had been averse to the employment of the Indians in the British army began to be justified. Notwithstanding the care and precautions taken by General Burgoyne to prevent the effects of their barbarous disposition, they were sometimes carried to an excess that shocked his humanity—the more, as it was totally out of his power to control them in the degree that he had hoped and proposed. The outrages they committed were such as proved highly detrimental to the royal cause. They spared neither friend nor foe, and exercised their usual cruelties with very little attention to the threats that were held out in order to restrain and deter them.

"Several instances of this nature happened about this time, which contributed powerfully to alienate the minds of many from the cause in which they served. One was recorded, in particular, that equally struck both parties with horror. A young lady, the daughter of Mr. MacRea, a zealous royalist, being on her way to the British army, where she was to be married to an officer, unhappily fell into the hands of the Indians, who, without regarding her youth and beauty, murdered her with many circumstances of barbarity.

"Scenes of this nature served to render the royal party extremely odious. However the Americans might be conscious that the Indians were as offensive, and as much abhorred by their enemies as by themselves, still they could not forgive them the acceptance of such auxiliaries as must necessarily disgrace the best cause.

"The resentment occasioned by the conduct of the Indians, and no less the dread of being exposed to their fury, helped considerably to bring recruits from every quarter to the American army. It was considered as the only place of refuge and security at present. The inhabitants of the tracts contiguous to the British army took up arms against it almost universally. The preservation of their families was now become an object of immediate concern. As the country was populous, they flocked in multitudes to the American general's camp; and he soon found himself at the head of an army which, though composed of militia and undisciplined men, was animated with that spirit of indignation and revenge which so often supplies all military deficiencies." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. II., Chap. xxviii., pp. 393, 394.)]

[Footnote 84: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xix., p. 322.]



CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE MASSACRE OF WYOMING—FOUR VERSIONS OF IT BY ACCREDITED AMERICAN HISTORIANS, ALL DIFFERING FROM EACH OTHER—THE FACTS INVESTIGATED, AND FALSE STATEMENTS CORRECTED.

It would be useless and tedious to attempt even a condensed account of the battles and warfare in which the Indians took part between the English and the Congress; but there is one of these revengeful and murderous occurrences which must be minutely stated, and the American accounts of it thoroughly investigated, as it has been the subject of more misrepresentation, more declamation, more descriptive and poetic exaggeration, and more denunciation against the English by American historians and orators than any other transaction of the American revolution—namely, what is known as the "Massacre of Wyoming." There are four versions of it, by accredited American histories.

The account of this massacre is thus given in the words of Dr. Ramsay's history:

"A storm of Indian and Tory vengeance burst in July, 1778, with particular violence on Wyoming, a new and flourishing settlement on the eastern branch of the Susquehanna. Unfortunately for the security of the inhabitants, the soil was claimed both by Connecticut and Pennsylvania. From the collision of contradictory claims, founded on Royal Charters, the laws of neither were steadily enforced. In this remote settlement, where government was feeble, the Tories were under less control, and could easily assemble undiscovered. Nevertheless, twenty-seven of them were taken and sent to Hartford, in Connecticut, but they were afterwards released. These and others of the same description, instigated by revenge against the Americans, from whom some of them had suffered banishment and loss of property, made common cause with the Indians, and attacked the Wyoming settlement with their combined forces, estimated at 1,100 men, 900 of whom were Indians. The whole was commanded by Colonel John Butler, a Connecticut Tory. One of the forts which had been constructed for the security of the inhabitants, being very weak, surrendered to this party; but some of the garrison had retired to the principal fort at Kingston, called Forty Fort. Colonel John Butler next demanded the surrender thereof. Colonel Zebulon Butler, a continental officer, who commanded, sent a message to him, proposing a conference at a bridge without the fort. This being agreed to, Colonel Zebulon Butler, Dennison, and some other officers repaired to the place appointed, and they were followed by the whole garrison, a few invalids excepted. None of the enemy appeared. The Wyoming people advanced, and supposed that the enemy were retiring. They continued to march on till they were about three miles from the fort. They then saw a few of the enemy, with whom they exchanged a few shots; but they presently found themselves ambuscaded and attacked by the whole bodies of Indians and Tories. They fought gallantly, till their retreat to the fort was cut off. Universal confusion ensued. Out of 417 who had marched out of the fort, about 360 were instantly slain. No quarter was given. Colonel John Butler again demanded the surrender of Forty Fort. This was agreed to, under articles of capitulation, by which the effects of the people therein were secured to them. The garrison, consisting of thirty men and two hundred women, were permitted to cross the Susquehanna, and retreat through the woods to Northampton county. The most of the other scattered settlers had previously retired, some through the woods to Northampton, others down the river to Northumberland. In this retreat, some women were delivered of children in the woods, and many suffered from want of provisions. Several of the settlers at Wyoming had erected good houses and barns, and made considerable improvements. These and the other houses in the vicinity were destroyed. Their horses, cattle, sheep, and hogs were, for the most part, killed or driven away by the enemy. A large proportion of the male inhabitants were in one day slaughtered. In a single engagement, near two hundred women became widows, and a much greater number of children were left fatherless." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xix., pp. 323, 324.)