Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., pp. 376, 377.]



CHAPTER XXVIII.

COMPLETE FAILURE OF THE FRENCH FLEET AND ARMY, UNDER COUNT D'ESTAING, TO ASSIST THE CONGRESS.

The leaders of Congress were disappointed in the high expectations which they had entertained from their unnatural alliance with France. Count D'Estaing left France with a much more powerful fleet than Lord Howe commanded in America, besides bringing an army of several thousand soldiers. He had expected to surprise and capture the British ships in the River Delaware; but Lord Howe had sailed for New York several days before his arrival. Count D'Estaing pursued, and lay eleven days at anchor off Sandy Hook, not being able to get his large ships over the bar into New York harbour. He at length directed his course, by Washington's advice, to Long Island, and sailed up the Newport river, whither he was followed by Lord Howe. "An attack against the British in that quarter had been projected between the new allies. The French promised to land from their ships four thousand troops, and the Americans actually sent a detachment of ten thousand under General Sullivan. The British troops, only five thousand strong, retired within their lines at Newport.

"At these tidings, Lord Howe, whose intended successor, Admiral Byron, had not yet arrived, issued forth from the Hudson and sailed in pursuit of D'Estaing. The two fleets were on the point of engaging when separated by a violent storm; there were conflicts between individual ships only, in which the honour of the British flag was worthily maintained. D'Estaing now declared his fleet so far damaged by the storm as to compel him to put into Boston harbour and refit. In this resolution he persisted, though Sullivan, Greene, and other American officers altogether denied the necessity, and even transmitted to him a written protest against it, couched in the most acrimonious terms."[13]

Certain it is, that the course which D'Estaing pursued on this occasion not only forced the Americans to relinquish their enterprise upon Long Island, but roused up among them a bitter feeling against the French. To such an extent was this animosity carried that riots ensued in the streets of Boston[14] between the American seamen and their new allies.[15]

Even in regard to the mode of attacking the British on Long Island, differences arose between Count D'Estaing and his new American friends on questions of etiquette. Mr. Tucker says: "D'Estaing's fastidiousness on points of etiquette, and his refusal to aid in what would have given so serious a blow to the British power in America, is calculated to raise a doubt whether he was really anxious to bring the war to an immediate conclusion."[16] Early in November, Count D'Estaing, with the French squadron, quitted the port of Boston and sailed for the West Indies, there to pursue exclusively French objects. "Deep was the disappointment and loud the animadversion of the Americans in the Northern provinces. They had formed the most sanguine hopes from the French alliance. They had found that alliance as yet little better than a name."[17]

The results of Count D'Estaing's expedition, and of the French alliance thus far, are well summed up by Dr. Ramsay in the following words: "With the abortive expedition to Rhode Island there was an end to the plans which were in this first campaign projected by the allies of Congress for co-operation. The Americans had been intoxicated with hopes of the most decisive advantages; but in every instance they were disappointed. Lord Howe, with an inferiority of force, not only preserved his own fleet, but counteracted and defeated all the views and attempts of Count D'Estaing. The French fleet gained no direct advantages for the Americans; yet their arrival was of great service to their cause. Besides deranging the plans of the British, it carried conviction to their minds that his Most Christian Majesty was seriously disposed to support them. The good-will of their new allies was manifested to the Americans; and though it had failed in producing the effects expected from it, the failure was charged to winds, weather, and unavoidable incidents. Some censured Count D'Estaing; but while they attempted to console themselves by throwing blame on him, they felt and acknowledged their obligation to the French nation, and were encouraged to persevere in the war, from the hope that better fortune would attend their future co-operation."[18] Count D'Estaing proceeded with his fleet to the West Indies, where he did nothing worthy of the large fleet, reinforced by that of Count de Grasse with several thousand troops, against the English fleet under the command of Admiral Byron—much inferior in both men and metal; but the French admiral declined and evaded any general engagement, though repeatedly provoked to it. "The British fleet endeavoured in vain to compel the enemy to come to close fight; they avoided it with the utmost circumspection and dexterity."[19]

It became indispensably necessary for Admiral Byron to provide a powerful convoy to the merchant shipping now on the eve of their departure for England, and whose cargoes were of immense value. Under all the circumstances, Admiral Byron determined to convoy the homeward trade with his whole fleet, till it was out of danger of being followed by Count D'Estaing or of falling in with M. de la Motte, who was on his way from France to the French islands with a strong squadron. During Admiral Byron's absence, Count D'Estaing directed an attack to be made on the island of St. Vincent, the garrison of which was very inconsiderable, and soon surrendered to the superior strength of the French, assisted by a great multitude of the Caribbee Indians, and who seized this opportunity of revenging themselves for injuries inflicted upon them by the English during the last French war.

In the meantime Count D'Estaing was still further reinforced by the arrival of the squadron commanded by M. de la Motte. His fleet now consisted of twenty-six ships of the line and twelve frigates, and his land force amounted to ten thousand men. With this powerful armament he sailed for the island of Grenada, the strength of which consisted of about one hundred and fifty regulars and three or four hundred armed inhabitants. The garrison was compelled to yield to the prodigious superiority of force against them, after a most heroic defence, in which no less than three hundred of the French were killed and wounded.[20]

The complaints of the Americans of the failure of Count D'Estaing's expedition to America, of his abandoning the expedition against Long Island, of his leaving the coasts of the Southern colonies unprotected and exposed, and proceeding to the West Indies, reached the French Court, which sent instructions to Count D'Estaing enjoining him to return with all speed to the assistance of the colonies. For this purpose he left the West Indies on the 1st of September. Mr. Tucker remarks: "General Lincoln (commander of the colonial forces in Carolina) having informed Count D'Estaing that the British ships had gone into port to repair the damages sustained in the late engagement with his fleet in the West Indies, and that a fair opportunity was presented of destroying the British army in Georgia, with the co-operation of the French fleet, the Count immediately left the West Indies, with twenty-two sail of the line and eleven frigates. He had on board six thousand land forces, and arrived so unexpectedly on the coast that a British fifty-gun ship and three frigates fell into his hands. He then, in conjunction with General Lincoln, planned an attack on the town of Savannah."[21]

The arrangements for the attack having been made, the whole French fleet came to anchor at the mouth of the Savannah river on the 1st day of September. He was occupied ten days in landing his troops and artillery; on the 15th of September a junction was formed between the French and General Lincoln,[22] and with the utmost confidence of success.[23]

They determined to take the town by siege rather than by storm in the first instance.[24]

On the 16th of September they demanded, in a very confident and haughty tone, the surrender of the town to the arms of the King of France; but General Prevost declined surrendering on a general summons, and requested a specific statement of the terms of it. The Count replied that it was for the besieged to propose the terms. General Prevost requested and obtained twenty-four hours' suspension of hostilities to prepare his answer. Before the twenty-four hours had elapsed, Lieutenant-Colonel Maitland, with several hundred men who had been stationed at Beaufort, made their way through inland channels and swamps, and joined the royal standard at Savannah; and General Prevost gave his answer of no surrender. The French and Americans, who formed a junction the evening after, resolved to besiege the town, and consumed several days in preparing for it, while the works of the garrison were hourly strengthened by great labour and skill. From the 24th of September to the 4th of October a heavy cannonade on both sides was kept up; but the allied army, finding that they could make little or no impression on the works of the besieged, resolved on a bombardment, with a stronger cannonading than ever. On the 4th of October the besiegers opened on the town three batteries, with nine mortars, thirty-seven pieces of cannon from the land side, and fifteen from the water. The firing from these batteries lasted, with little intermission, during five days; but the damage they did was confined mostly to the town, where some houses were destroyed and some women and children killed. Soon after the commencement of the cannonade, General Prevost requested permission to remove the women and children out of the town to a place of safety; but this request was refused in offensive terms on the part of Count D'Estaing, by the advice of General Lincoln, on the pretext that a desire of secreting the plunder lately taken from the South Carolinas was covered under the veil of humanity, but the real reason was that the surrender of the town would be expedited by keeping the women and children in it.[25]

Count D'Estaing, finding that his five days' cannonading made no impression on the defensive works of the city, and his officers remonstrating against his continuing to risk so valuable a fleet on a dangerous coast, in the hurricane season, and at so great a distance from shore that it might be surprised by a British fleet, now completely repaired in the West Indies and fully manned, he decided to assault the town. The attack was commenced in three columns on the 9th, an hour before sunrise.

"Though the besieged were prepared for the assault, and their fire was very destructive, the assailants pressed on and planted (for a few minutes) the standard of both nations on the walls; but the contest being still obstinately continued, the assailants were brought to a pause by the fall of Count Pulaski (commanding an American corps), who received a mortal wound; and Major Glaziers, who commanded the garrison, rushing at the head of a body of grenadiers and marines, drove back the allied troops, who were ordered to retreat. The French lost seven hundred men; the Americans, two hundred and thirty-four. The British garrison lost only fifty-five in killed and wounded. On the 16th of October the siege was raised by the Count, who thus for the third time failed in his co-operation with the Americans, after the fairest prospects of success."[26]

Mr. Bancroft states the final struggle of this eventful contest, and the results and effects of it on the Southern colonies, in the following words:—"After an obstinate struggle of fifty-five minutes to carry the redoubt, the assailants retreated before a charge of grenadiers and marines, led gallantly by Maitland. The injury sustained by the British was trifling; the loss of the Americans was about two hundred; of the French, thrice as many. The French withdrew their ships, and sailed for France; the patriots of Georgia who had joined them fled to the backwoods or across the river.

"Lincoln repaired to Charleston, and was followed by what remained of his army; the militia of South Carolina returned to their homes; its continental regiments were melting away; and its paper money became so nearly worthless, that a bounty of twenty-five hundred dollars for twenty-one months' service had no attraction. The dwellers near the sea between Charleston and Savannah were shaken in their allegiance, not knowing where to find protection. Throughout the State the people were disheartened, and foreboded desolation."[27]

I have given a more minute account of Count D'Estaing and his abortive expeditions to America, and of his final attack upon Savannah and its results; how completely disappointed were the American revolutionists thus far in their unnatural alliance with France against England; how little mutual respect or good-will, and what quarrels occurred, whenever they came or attempted to act together, whether at Boston, or Long Island, or Charleston, or Savannah; and how much feebler the army and more gloomy the prospects of the Congress party were at the end of 1779 than they were two years before, when the alliance with France was formed. Dr. Ramsay well sums up these events as follows:

"The campaign of 1779 is remarkable for the feeble exertions of the Americans. Accidental causes, which had previously excited their activity, had in a great measure ceased to have influence. An enthusiasm for liberty made them comparatively disregard property and brave all dangers in the first years of the war. The successes of their arms near the beginning of 1777, and the hope of capturing Burgoyne's army in the close of it, together with the brisk circulation of a large quantity of paper-money, in good credit, made that year both active and decisive. The flattering prospects inspired by the alliance with France in 1778 banished all fears of the success of the revolution, but the failure of every scheme of co-operation produced a despondency of mind unfavourable to great exertions. Instead of driving the British out of the country, as the Americans vainly presumed, the campaigns of 1778 and 1779 terminated without any direct advantage from the French fleet sent to their aid. Expecting too much from their allies, and then failing in these expectations, they were less prepared to prosecute the war with their own resources than they would have been if D'Estaing had not touched on their coast. Their army was reduced in its numbers and badly clothed.

"In the first years of the war, the mercantile character was lost in the military spirit of the times; but in the progress of it the inhabitants, cooling in their enthusiasm, gradually returned to their former habits of lucrative business. This made distinctions between the army and citizens, and was unfriendly to military exertions. While several foreign events tended to the embarrassment of Great Britain,[28] and indirectly to the establishment of independence, a variety of internal causes relaxed the exertions of the Americans, and for a time made it doubtful whether they would ultimately be independent citizens or conquered subjects."[29]

Even a year later—"The military force," says Mr. Tucker, "embarked in the beginning of 1781, to maintain the cause of independence, is thus stated in (Chief Justice) Marshall's Life of Washington: The Southern troops, from Pennsylvania to Georgia, did not exceed three thousand men. Of the Northern troops, twelve hundred had been detached to Virginia, under La Fayette; with these they amounted only to three thousand effective men in April. The cavalry and artillery was less than one thousand. With some small additions, the whole reached four thousand men in May. They were ill supplied with clothing, and were seriously threatened with a want of provisions. The quartermaster's department was without means of transport," (Marshall, Vol. IV., p. 446).[30]

Such was the character and such the fruits of the alliance with France during the first two years of its existence; and such was the state of the revolutionary army in 1780, and which seems to have been largely owing to the incapacity and ill conduct of the Congress itself, which had become degenerate and corrupt—equal to that of any British Parliament, or of any Provincial Legislature, under any Royal Governor.[31]

Abundant evidence can be adduced in proof and illustration of this statement from the warmest partizans of Congress; but the testimony of Washington himself is ample and indisputable. In the winter of 1778-9 he had to concert his measures with Congress at Philadelphia, and he writes from thence as follows to his friend Benjamin Harrison:

"If I were to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and of men from what I have seen, heard, and in part known, I should in one word say that idleness, dissipation, and extravagance seem to have laid fast hold of them; that speculation, peculation, and an insatiable thirst for riches seem to have got the better of every other consideration and of every order of men; that party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day; whilst the momentous concerns of an empire, a great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money, and want of credit, which in its consequence is the want of everything, are but secondary considerations, and postponed from day to day, and from week to week, as if our affairs wore the most promising aspect. * * Our money is now sinking fifty per cent. a day in this city, and I shall not be surprised if in the course of a few months a total stop is put to the currency of it; and yet an assembly, a concert, a dinner, a supper, that will cost three or four hundred pounds, will not only take men from acting in this business, but from thinking of it; while a great part of the officers of our army, from absolute necessity, are quitting the service. * * I have no resentments, nor do I mean to point at particular characters. This I can declare upon my honour, for I have every attention paid me by Congress that I could possibly expect. * * But such is the picture which from my inmost soul I believe to be true; and I confess to you that I feel more real distress on account of the present appearances of things, than I have done at any time since the commencement of the dispute."[32]

Such is General Washington's own account of the character and occupation of the Congress of the United States in the third year of the revolutionary war, and in the second year of their alliance with France—idleness, dissipation, extravagance, speculation, peculation, avarice, party and personal quarrels, dancing, feasting; while the credit was reduced almost to nothing, and the army neglected and suffering.[33]

Such was the progress of the war; such the failure of the expeditions of the French alliance; such the state of the revolutionary army, and of the public credit; and such the degenerate character and proceedings of Congress and its surroundings in the beginning of 1780—the fifth year of the civil war.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 13: "They urged D'Estaing to return with his fleet into the harbour; but his principal officers were opposed to the measure, and protested against it. He had been instructed to go into Boston if his fleet met with any misfortune. His officers insisted on his ceasing to prosecute the expedition against Rhode Island, that he might conform to the orders of their common superiors. A protest was drawn up and sent to him, which was signed by John Sullivan, Nathaniel Greene, John Hancock, I. Glover, Ezekiel Cornel, William Whipple, John Tyler, Solomon Lovell, John Fitconnel. They protested against the Count's taking the fleet to Boston, as derogatory to the honour of France, contrary to the intention of his Christian Majesty and the interests of his nation, destructive in the highest degree to the welfare of the United States, and highly injurious to the alliance formed between the two nations. Had D'Estaing prosecuted his original plan within the harbour, either before or immediately after the pursuit of Lord Howe, the reduction of the British post on Rhode Island (which had been in the possession of the British since 1776) would have been probable; but his departure in the first instance to engage the English fleet, and in the second from Rhode Island to Boston, frustrated the whole." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xvi., p. 272.)

"Whatever were the reasons which induced Count D'Estaing to adopt that measure (of sailing with his fleet direct for Boston), the Americans were greatly dissatisfied. They complained that they had incurred great expense and danger, under the prospect of the most effective co-operation; that depending thereon, they had risked their lives on an island, where, without naval protection, they were exposed to particular dangers; that in this situation they were first deserted, and afterwards totally abandoned, at a time when, by persevering in the original plan, they had well-grounded hopes of speedy success. Under these apprehensions the discontented militia went home in such crowds that the regular army, which remained was in danger of being cut off from a retreat. In these embarrassing circumstances, General Sullivan extricated himself with judgment and ability. He began to send off his heavy artillery and baggage on the 26th, and retreated from the lines on the night of the 28th." (Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., p. 173.)]

[Footnote 14: "The inveteracy to the French, traditionally inherent in the lower classes of the New England people, could not be restrained from breaking out in Boston, in manner that might have been attended with the most serious consequences to the interests of both France and America, had not the prudence of the magistracy interposed on the one hand, and the sagacity of Count D'Estaing co-operated on the other. A desperate fray happened in that city between the populace and the French sailors, in which these were roughly handled, and had much the worse. A number of them were hurt and wounded, and some, it was reported, were killed."

"Precisely at the same time, a disturbance of a like nature happened at Charleston, in South Carolina, between the French and American seamen, but it was carried to much greater extremities; they engaged on both sides with small arms, and even with cannon. A number of people were killed and wounded" (Dr. Andrews' History of the American War, Vol. III., Chap. xxxviii., pp. 172, 173)]

[Footnote 15: Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lviii, pp. 380, 381.

"During this time Sir Henry Clinton sent out several expeditions in various quarters. Near Tappan, a body of American horsemen under Colonel Baylor were surprised and routed, or put to the sword. In Egg-Harbour, great part of Count Pulaski's foreign legion was cut to pieces. At Buzzard's Bay, and on the island called Martha's Vineyard, many American ships were taken or destroyed, store-houses burned, and contributions of sheep and oxen levied. In these expeditions the principal commander was General Charles Grey, an officer of great zeal and ardour, whom the Americans sometimes surnamed the 'No-flint General,' from his common practice of ordering the men to take the flints out of their muskets, and trust to their bayonets alone. After some twenty years of further service, the veteran was raised, by the favour of his Sovereign, to the peerage as Lord Grey of Howick, and afterwards Earl Grey. His son became Prime Minister (father of the present Earl Grey), and the greatest orator who, since the death of Chatham, had appeared in the House of Lords."—Ib., pp. 382, 383.]

[Footnote 16: Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., p. 231.]

[Footnote 17: Lord Mahon's History of England, Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., p. 384.

Mr. Tucker remarks on this subject: "On the 3rd of November D'Estaing sailed for the West Indies, and thus ended the costly and fruitless expedition which bade fair to be decisive of the contest; and which failed first by disasters from the elements, and then from misunderstandings in which the interests of the common cause seem to have been sacrificed to paltry personal feelings on both sides." (History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap, iii., p. 234.)]

[Footnote 18: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap, xvi., p. 275.]

[Footnote 19: "Early in January, 1779, reinforcements under Admiral Byron transferred maritime superiority to the British; and D'Estaing for six months sheltered his fleet in the bay of Port Royal. At the end of June, Byron having left St. Lucia to convoy a company of British merchant ships through the passage, D'Estaing detached a force against St. Vincent, which, with the aid of the oppressed and enslaved Caribs, was easily taken. At the same time the French admiral made an attack on the island of Grenada, whose garrison surrendered on the 4th of July, at discretion." (Bancroft, Vol. X., Chap, xiii., p. 295.)]

[Footnote 20: "Two days after the taking of Grenada," says Mr. Bancroft, "the fleet of Byron arrived within sight of the French, and, though reduced in number, sought a general close action, which his adversary knew how to avoid." (History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap, xiii., p. 295.)]

[Footnote 21: History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap, iii., p. 249.

"Count D'Estaing's intentions and his hopes were, as before, directed to objects of the first magnitude. The first measure of the plan and contemplation was to expel the British forces out of Georgia, and to place that province and the contiguous province of South Carolina, and in short all the Southern colonies, on a footing of perfect security from any future invasions by the British troops. After the accomplishment of this object, he next proposed no less than a total deliverance of America from the terror of the British arms. This was to be effected by the destruction of the British fleet at New York. The latter part of the plan he doubted not to accomplish through the co-operation of the American army under Washington." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. III., Chap. xlv., pp. 308, 309.)]

[Footnote 22: "A junction being formed by the French and American forces, they amounted together to between nine and ten thousand men. Count D'Estaing had five thousand regulars, and near one thousand stout mulattos and free negroes, well armed. The body of Americans that joined him under the command of General Lincoln consisted of about two thousand at first, but were soon augmented to twice that number.

"To oppose this formidable strength, General Prevost (the commander of Savannah) had no more, altogether, than three thousand men; but they were such as continual experience had shown he could place the utmost dependence on. Numbers were refugees (loyalists), whom resentment for the usage they had received exasperated to a degree that rendered them desperate."—Ib., p. 312.]

[Footnote 23: "As soon as the arrival of Count D'Estaing on the coast was known, General Lincoln, with the army under his command, marched for the vicinity of Savannah; and orders were given for the militia of Georgia and South Carolina to rendezvous near the same place. The British were equally diligent in preparing for their defence. The American militia, flushed with the hope of speedily expelling the British from their southern possessions, turned out with an alacrity which far surpassed their exertions in the previous campaign." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xvii., p. 302.)]

[Footnote 24: "The French and the Americans encamped separately. Count D'Estaing thought it most prudent to keep them apart. He knew by experience how apt they were to disagree; and he hoped that, by acting asunder from each other, a reciprocal emulation would be excited. It was agreed, accordingly, that each of them should carry on their respective approaches without interference from the other side. This method was particularly agreeable to the French, who, looking upon themselves as incomparably superior to the Americans, did not choose to divide any honour with these, to which they imagined that they alone were entitled." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. III., Chap, xlv., pp. 312, 313.)]

[Footnote 25: Count D'Estaing was afterwards so ashamed of this inhuman refusal, that after the repulse of his assault upon the garrison he apologized for it, and offered the permission requested, but which was no longer needed, and therefore refused.

General Stedman, referring to this circumstance, says: "On the morning of the 4th of October, the batteries of the besiegers having opened with a discharge from fifty-three pieces of heavy cannon and fourteen mortars, a request was made by General Prevost that the women and children might be permitted to leave the town and embark on board vessels in the river, which should be placed under the protection of Count D'Estaing, and wait the issue of the siege. But this proposal, dictated by humanity, was rejected with insult. Fortunately, however, for the inhabitants as well as the garrison, although an incessant cannonade from so many pieces of artillery was continued from the 4th to the 9th of October, less injury was done to the houses in the town than might have been expected; few lives were lost, and the defences were in no respect materially damaged." (Stedman's History of the American War, Vol. II., Chap, xxx., p. 127.)]

[Footnote 26: Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap, iii., p. 250.

This disastrous attack upon Savannah was followed by mutual recriminations between the French and American officers and soldiers.

"No good agreement, it has been said, subsisted between the French and Americans from the commencement of the siege, and their mutual dislike was now increased by disappointment. After the assault, the French could no longer conceal their contempt for their new allies; they styled them 'insurgents' in common conversation and even in written memorials." (General Stedman's History of the American War, Vol. II., Chap, xxx., p. 132.)

"While the British troops were enjoying the satisfaction resulting from the success that was due to their conduct and valour, the enemy was in a condition of discontent and sullenness which had like to have terminated fatally. The Americans could not conceal their disapprobation of the whole proceedings of Count D'Estaing, nor he the contemptuous light in which he held them. Reciprocal taunts and reproaches came to such a height between both the officers and soldiers of either party, that it was once thought they would have proceeded to actual violence.

"A motive which strongly influenced the Americans was the jealousy they had conceived against the French commander, on account of his having summoned General Prevost to surrender to the arms of France, without including those of the United States of America. They inferred from thence, that either he considered them as unworthy of the honour of being mentioned conjointly with the King of France, or that he meant to retain the province of Georgia for that Crown in case of reduction. Whichever of the two was the meaning of the French commander, it exposed him equally to the indignation of the Americans.

"To this it may be added, that the inhuman refusal of the request of General Prevost for a permission to the women and children to depart from the town of Savannah during the siege, was now by the French attributed to the Americans, whom they accused of brutality, and whose general, a French officer of rank, was loaded with the coarsest and most injurious appellations, in common with his other countrymen.

"From the day of their repulse, both the French and Americans abandoned all further prosecution of the siege.

"In this manner was the province of Georgia cleared a third time of the enemy, after the most sanguine expectations had been entertained by all America that the reduction of this province would have been a preparatory step to the expulsion of the British fleets and armies from every part of the continent." (Dr. Andrews' History of the War, etc., Vol. III., Chap. xlv., pp. 316-318.)]

[Footnote 27: Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiii., pp. 297, 298.]

[Footnote 28: "In the latter part of this year (1779), Spain decided on joining France in the war, anxious as she was to take the chance of recovering Gibraltar, Jamaica, and the Floridas." (Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., p. 251.)

Thus England had arrayed against her two of the most powerful Governments, with the two most powerful fleets in Europe, besides the war in America.]

[Footnote 29: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xvii., pp. 305, 306.]

[Footnote 30: Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., p. 282.]

[Footnote 31: "There were never more than forty members present—often no more than twenty. These small numbers, however, by no means insured harmony, nor precluded violent and unseemly quarrels, rumours of which were not slow in passing the Atlantic. 'For God's sake,' thus writes La Fayette from France, 'For God's sake prevent the Congress from disputing loudly together. Nothing so much hurts the interest and reputation of America.' (Letter of La Fayette to Washington, June 12th, 1779.) Thus the object of concealment, unless, perhaps, for private purposes, was most imperfectly attained, although, in name at least, the deliberations of Congress at this time were secret. Historically, even the Journal which they kept gives little light as to their true proceedings. An American gentleman, who has studied that document with care, laments that it is painfully meagre, the object being apparently to record as little as possible." (Life of President Reed, by Mr. William Reed, Vol. II., p. 18.)

Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., pp. 420, 421.]

[Footnote 32: Letter to Benjamin Harrison, December 30th, 1778. Washington's Writings, Vol. VI., p. 151, quoted in Lord Mahon's History, Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., pp. 419, 420.]

[Footnote 33: Dr. Ramsay, referring to this depreciation of the currency, says: "The confiscation and sale of the property of Tories, for the most part, brought but very little into the public treasury. The sales were generally made on credit, and by the progressive depreciation, what was dear at the time of the purchase, was very cheap at the time of payment. When this measure was first adopted, little or no injustice resulted from it, for at that time the paper bills were equal, or nearly equal, to gold or silver of the same nominal sum. In the progress of the war, when depreciation took place, the case was materially altered.

"The aged, who had retired from the scenes of active business to enjoy the fruits of their industry, found their substance melting away to a mere pittance, insufficient for their support. The widow who lived comfortably on the bequests of a deceased husband, experienced a frustration of all his well-meant tenderness. The laws of the country interposed and compelled her to receive a shilling, where a pound was her due. The hapless orphan, instead of receiving from the hands of an executor a competency to set out in business, was obliged to give a final discharge on the payment of sixpence in the pound." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xviii., pp. 315, 316.)

"The paper-money," says Lord Mahon, "had gradually fallen to one-twentieth, to one-thirtieth, nay, in some cases to not less than one-hundredth of its nominal value! But perhaps one practical instance may make this case clearer. In December of this year (1779), and in the State of Maryland, an English officer received an innkeeper's bill, which in his Travels he has printed at full length, amounting in paper-money to L732 and some shillings; and this bill he paid in gold with four guineas and a half." (Aubury's Travels, Vol. II., p. 492.) (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VI., Chap. lviii., p. 416.)

General Washington thus describes this state of things in regard to every man in the public service: "What officers can bear the weight of prices that every necessary article is now got to? A rat, in the shape of a horse, is not to be bought at this time for less than two hundred pounds, nor a saddle under thirty or forty pounds; boots twenty, and shoes and other articles in like proportion. How is it possible, therefore, for officers to stand this without an increase of pay? And how is it possible to advance their pay when flour is selling at different places from five to fifteen pounds per hundredweight, hay from ten to thirty pounds, and beef and other essentials in like proportion?" The depreciation still proceeding, Washington a few months afterwards says that "a waggon load of money will now scarcely purchase a waggon load of provisions." (Letters to Governor Morris, October 4th, 1778; and to the President of the Congress, April 23rd, 1779.)]



CHAPTER XXIX.

1780—A YEAR OF WEAKNESS AND DISASTER TO THE AMERICAN CAUSE, AND OF SUCCESS TO THE BRITISH ARMS.

The year 1780 was inauspicious for the revolutionary cause, but auspicious for the English. The financial embarrassments arising from the depreciation of the paper-money engaged the anxious deliberations of Congress,[34] and Washington's army was by no means able to cope with the northern division of the English army.[35]

But La Fayette, now returned from a recent visit to France, during which he had obtained from the French Court a loan of money and reinforcements of naval and land forces, Washington contemplated the recovery of New York, which had long been a favourite object with him. The French squadron of seven sail of the line, and five frigates and transports, under the command of Chevalier de Ternay, arrived at Newport harbour, Long Island, on the 10th July, having on board six thousand troops, under the command of Count de Rochambeau, who, in order to prevent the repetition of previous disputes, was directed to put himself under Washington's orders; and on all points of precedence and etiquette—this was the first division of the promised reinforcements from France—the French officers were to give place to the Americans. Washington and Count de Rochambeau agreed upon an attack on New York. The British had in New York only four ships of the line and a few frigates; but three days after the arrival of the French squadron, Admiral Graves reached New York with six ships of the line. Having now the naval superiority, the British, instead of waiting to be attacked, proposed to attack the French at Newport, and for which purpose Sir Henry Clinton embarked with six thousand men; but as Sir Henry Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot could not agree on a plan of operations, the British troops were disembarked. The fleet proceeded to blockade the French ships, and the revolutionary army was obliged to remain at Newport for their protection. "News presently arrived that the French second division was detained at Brest, blockaded there by another British squadron. Instead of being an assistance, the French auxiliaries threatened to be a burden; three thousand troops and five hundred militia were kept under arms at Newport to assist in guarding the French ships. Thus a third time—as it seemed, almost a sort of fatality—the attempt at French co-operation proved a failure."[36]

Sir Henry Clinton, on leaving the Count D'Estaing after his defeat at Savannah, had left the coast of Georgia with his fleet for France, determined to extend his military operations south, with a view of completing the submission of the Southern States. Leaving the garrison of New York under the command of General Knyphausen, he proceeded in person on an expedition against South Carolina, and besieged Charleston, the capital. Information had been obtained at Charleston of Sir Henry Clinton's intention two months before the arrival of his fleet and troops, and the city was fortified on all sides, and on its redoubts, lines, and batteries were mounted eighty pieces of cannon and mortars. The commander, General Lincoln, had a force of 7,000 men of all denominations under arms, and was expecting large reinforcements. The army of Sir Henry Clinton was increased by a reinforcement of 3,000 men—making in the whole about 9,000 men under his command.

At the commencement of the siege, the Governor of the State, by the extraordinary powers conferred upon him by the Legislature, issued a proclamation requiring such of the militia as were regularly drafted, and all the inhabitants and owners of property in the town, to repair to the American standard and join the garrison immediately, under pain of confiscation.

The siege commenced the 3rd of April, and was protracted to the 11th of May. The terms of capitulation proposed by each party in the earlier part of the siege were mutually declined. Cannonading continued on each side until the British opened batteries on the third parallel, played upon the American garrison with cannon and mortars at a distance of less than a hundred yards, advanced within twenty-five yards of the American works, and were ready for making a general assault by land and water when, on the 11th of May, "a great number of citizens addressed General Lincoln in a petition, expressing their acquiescence in the terms which Sir Henry Clinton had offered, and requested his acceptance of them. On the reception of this petition, General Lincoln wrote to Sir Henry, and offered to accept the terms before proposed. The royal commanders, wishing to avoid the extremity of storming the city, and unwilling to press to unconditional submission an enemy whose friendship they wished to conciliate, returned a favourable answer. A capitulation was signed on the 12th of May, and Major General Leslie took possession of the town the next day. Upwards of 400 pieces of artillery were surrendered.[37] By the articles of capitulation, the garrison was to march out of town and deposit their arms in front of the works, but the drums were not to beat a British march, nor the colours to be uncased. The continental troops and seamen were to keep their baggage and remain prisoners of war till exchanged. The militia were to be permitted to return to their respective homes, as prisoners on parole; and while they adhered to their parole, were not to be molested by the British troops in person or property. The inhabitants, of all conditions, were to be considered as prisoners on parole, and to hold their property on the same terms with the militia. The officers of the army and navy were to retain their servants, swords, pistols, and baggage unsearched. They were permitted to sell their horses, but not to remove them. A vessel was allowed to proceed to Philadelphia with General Lincoln's despatches unopened."[38]

Shortly after the capture of Charleston, Sir Henry Clinton embarked for New York with the principal part of his army;[39] but before his departure he performed several important acts both as Royal Commissioner and as Commander-in-Chief of the army.

After the surrender of the capital, it was proposed to awe the disaffected and secure the universal submission of the people by sending out three expeditions.

"One expedition was sent by Clinton up the Savannah, to encourage the loyal and reduce the disaffected in the neighbourhood of Augusta: another proceeded for like purpose to the district of Ninety-Six, where Williamson surrendered his post and accepted British protection. A third and larger party, under Cornwallis, moved across the Santee towards Camden."[40]

These expeditions rather weakened than strengthened the influence of the British cause, as compulsion rather than conciliation was employed to re-establish British supremacy; and the proclamations and orders issued by Sir Henry Clinton before his departure for New York, defeated rather than promoted the objects intended by them.[41]

After issuing his proclamation (for the purport of which see previous note), Sir Henry Clinton took his departure, with the major part of his army, for New York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command with four thousand troops.[42]

"Lord Cornwallis, considering South Carolina as entirely reannexed to Great Britain, would admit of no neutrality among the inhabitants; but insisted on their taking the oath of allegiance, which, however, was generally taken with reluctance by the people of the lower country. This part of the State was still further alienated by the licentious and plundering habits of the British soldiers over a conquered country, and by the seduction of many of the slaves from their masters."[43]

There can be no justification of Lord Cornwallis's policy; but there were some mitigating circumstances that palliate the severities which he inflicted. Among those who had been taken prisoners at the capture of Charleston, and professed loyalty, was, as Lord Mahon says, "One Lisle, who had not only taken the oath of allegiance, but accepted military rank as a King's officer; waited just long enough to supply his battalion with clothes, arms, and ammunition from the royal stores, and then quietly led them back to his old friends. Highly incensed at such signal acts of treachery as Lisle's, Lord Cornwallis had recourse to some severe orders in return. The penalty of death was denounced against all militiamen who, after serving with the English, went off to the insurgents. Several of the prisoners in the battle of Camden, men taken with arms in their hands and British protections in their pockets, were hanged. Other such examples were made at Augusta and elsewhere. Some who had been living on their parole at Charleston, and who, in spite of that parole, carried on a secret correspondence with their insurgent countrymen, were shipped off to St. Augustine. A proclamation was issued, sequestering the estates of those who had been the most forward to oppose the establishment of the royal authority within the province. Perhaps these measures exceeded the bounds of justice; certainly they did the bounds of policy. This was shown by the fatal event, when, on the overthrow of the royalist cause in South Carolina, the measures of Lord Cornwallis became the plea for other executions and for every act of oppression that resentment could devise."

"Within the more limited sphere of his own command, Lord Rawdon had recourse to, or at the very least announced, some measures still more severe, and far less to be justified. In a letter to one of his officers, which was intercepted, we find, for example, what follows: 'I will give the inhabitants ten guineas for the head of every deserter belonging to the volunteers of Ireland; and five guineas only if they bring him in alive.' No amount of provocation or of precedent in his enemies, no degree of youthful ardour in himself, are at all adequate to excuse these most blamable words. When, however, he was called upon to vindicate them, Lord Rawdon declared that many of his threats were meant only 'to act on the fears and prejudices of the vulgar,' and by no means to be carried into practical effect."[44]

During the latter part of the year there were various skirmishes and battles between volunteer parties of Independents, under such leaders as Sumpter and Clarke, and detachments of the British army, with various success, but nothing which affected the supremacy of the royal cause, though the moral influence of it was widely weakened by the arbitrary policy of the British commanders and the conduct of the British troops. The prospects of the revolution were very gloomy,[45] and its leaders were much disheartened. In these circumstances of depression and despondency, an earnest appeal was made to France for men and money,[46] and the transactions following show that the appeal was not made in vain, and that French ships and troops were the main instruments in deciding the battle which was followed by the acknowledgment of American Independence.[47]

Mr. Hildreth, referring to the close of this year, says: "So far, indeed, as related to America, Great Britain had good reason to be satisfied with the late campaign. Georgia was entirely subdued, and the royal government re-established. The possession of Charleston, Augusta, Ninety-Six, and Camden, supported by an army in the field, secured entire control over all the wealthy parts of South Carolina. North Carolina was full of Tories, anxiously awaiting the approach of Cornwallis. The three Southern States were incapable of helping themselves, and those further north, exhausted and penniless, were little able to send assistance. It seemed as if the promises so often made by Lord George Germaine's American correspondents were now about to be fulfilled, and the rebel colonies to sink beneath the accumulated pressure of this long-protracted struggle."[48]

Thus, at the close of 1780, the military conflicts were almost invariably successful on the side of the British; the resources of the revolutionists in both money and men were exhausted, and their hopes of success utterly extinguished without foreign aid. But though the British were successful on the fields of battle, they everywhere lost in the confidence, esteem, and affections of the people, even of the Loyalists. Yet the prospects of the war party of independence were gloomy indeed. General Washington felt that some great achievement was necessary to revive the hopes of his fellow-countrymen, and save from dissolution his daily decreasing army. His only hope was in aid from France. His words were:

"Without an immediate, ample, and efficacious succour in money, we may make a feeble and expiring effort in our next campaign, in all probability the period of our opposition. Next to a loan in money, a constant naval superiority on these coasts is the object the most interesting."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 34: "The commissaries, greatly in debt, had neither money nor credit, and starvation began to stare the soldiers in the face. To support his army, Washington was again obliged to resort to the harsh expedient of levying contributions on the surrounding country. Each county was called upon for a certain quantity of flour and meat; but as the civil authorities took the matter of supply in hand, for which certificates were given by the commissaries on the appraisement of two magistrates, the use of force did not become necessary." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 301.)]

[Footnote 35: "Washington's entire force scarcely exceeded ten thousand men, a number not equal to the (British) garrison of New York; and even of these a considerable number were militia drafts, whose terms of service were fast expiring."—Ib., p. 303.

But though New York was in possession of the British, and strongly garrisoned, apprehensions were entertained of attacks upon the several English garrison posts in the State from invasions of marauding parties of the revolutionary army, from facilities of approach on account of the freezing over of all the rivers from the extreme severity of this winter. It is singular that while Benjamin Franklin was leader of the Revolutionists, and now United States Minister to France, his son was one of the leaders of the Loyalists. "It was now," says Mr. Hildreth, "that the 'Board of Associated Loyalists' was formed, of which Franklin, late Royal Governor of New Jersey, released by exchange from his tedious confinement in Connecticut, was made president. Washington, however, was in no condition to undertake an attack, and the winter passed off with few skirmishes." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 303.)]

[Footnote 36: Ib., pp. 311, 312.]

[Footnote 37: "In the siege, the British lost seventy-six killed and one hundred and eighty-nine wounded; the Americans about an equal number. The prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to five thousand six hundred and eighteen, counting all the adult males of the town." (Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. lii., p. 253.)]

[Footnote 38: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., pp. 337, 338.

Yet in the face of the facts above stated by Dr. Ramsay, who was an officer on General Washington's staff, and afterwards member of Congress, where he had access to the official documents and letters from which he compiled his history, Mr. Bancroft makes the following statements and remarks: "The value of the spoil, which was distributed by English and Hessian commissaries of captures, amounted to about L300,000 sterling, so that the dividend of a major-general exceeded 4,000 guineas. There was no restraint on private rapine; the silver plate of the planters was carried off; all negroes that had belonged to the rebels were seized, even though they had themselves sought an asylum within the British lines; and at one embarkation 2,000 were shipped to a market in the West Indies. British officers thought more of amassing fortunes than of re-uniting the empire. The patriots were not allowed to appoint attorneys to manage or sell their estates, a sentence of confiscation hung over the whole land, and British protection was granted only in return for the unconditional promise of loyalty." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 305, 306.)]

[Footnote 39: "Sir Henry Clinton, having left about 4,000 men for Southern service, embarked early in June with the main army for New York. On his departure the command devolved on Lieutenant-General Cornwallis." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., p. 341.)

"They saw South Carolina apparently won back to the royal cause, and with some probability that North Carolina would follow the example. But at this crisis intelligence reached Sir Henry Clinton that the Americans upon the Hudson (under the command of General Washington) were on the point of receiving considerable succours; that a French fleet sent to their aid, with several French regiments on board, might soon be expected off the New England coasts. Sir Henry deemed it his duty to provide in person for the safety of his principal charge. In the first days of June he accordingly re-embarked for New York, with a portion of his army; leaving, however, about 4,000 men under Lord Cornwallis's command. The instructions given to Lord Cornwallis were to consider the maintenance of Charleston, and in general of South Carolina, as his main and indispensable objects; but consistently with these, he was left at liberty to make 'a solid move,' as it was termed, into North Carolina, if he judged it proper or found it possible." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., p. 70.)

On the eve of leaving Charleston for New York, Sir Henry reported to the British Colonial Minister, Lord Germaine: "The inhabitants from every quarter declare their allegiance to the King, and offer their services in arms. There are few men in South Carolina who are not either our prisoners or in arms with us."]

[Footnote 40: Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., p. 306.

"The universal panic consequent on the capture of Charleston had suspended all resistance to the British army. The men of Beaufort, of Ninety-Six, and of Camden, had capitulated under the promise of security. They believed that they were to be treated as neutrals or as prisoners on parole. There remained to them no possibility of flight with their families; and if they were inclined to take up arms, there was no American army around which they could rally." (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., p. 307.)

"No organized American force was now left in either of the Carolinas. The three most Southern States had not a battalion in the field, nor were the next three much better provided. The Virginia line had been mostly captured at Charleston, or dispersed in subsequent engagements. The same was the case with the North Carolina regiments. The recent battle of Camden had reduced the Maryland line to a single regiment—the Delaware line to a single company." (Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xi., p. 316.)]

[Footnote 41: "On the 22nd of May, confiscation of property and other punishments were denounced against all who should thereafter oppose the King in arms, or hinder any one from joining his forces. On the 1st of June, a proclamation by the Commissioners Clinton and Arbuthnot, offered pardon to the penitent on their immediate return to allegiance; to the loyal, the promise of their former political immunities, including freedom from taxation, except by their own Legislature. This policy of moderation might have familiarized the Carolinians once more to the British Government; but the proclamation was not communicated to Cornwallis—so that when, three weeks later, two leading men, one of whom had been in a high station, and both principally concerned in the rebellion, went to that officer to surrender themselves under its provisions, he could only answer that he had no knowledge of its existence.

"On the 3rd of June (the day of his departure from Charleston), Clinton, by a proclamation which he alone signed, cut up British authority in Carolina by the roots. He required all the inhabitants of the province, even those outside of Charleston, 'who were now prisoners on parole,' to take an active part in securing the royal government. 'Should they neglect to return to their allegiance,' so ran the proclamation, 'they will be treated as rebels to the government of the King.' He never reflected that many who accepted protection from fear or convenience, did so in the expectation of living in a state of neutrality, and that they might say, 'If we must fight, let us fight on the side of our friends, of our countrymen of America.'" (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap. xiv., pp. 307, 308.)]

[Footnote 42: "Earl (afterwards Marquis) Cornwallis was born in 1738. Early in life he had embraced the military profession, which he pursued with undeviating honour, though variable success. In him the want of any shining talents was in a great measure supplied by probity, by punctuality, by steady courage, by vigilant attention to his duties. In 1776, on the Declaratory Bill, he had shown his conciliatory temper to the colonies; denying, with Lord Camden and only three Peers besides, any right we had to tax them while they remained unrepresented in the House of Commons. When, however, the war broke forth, he acted solely as became a soldier. Under Lord Cornwallis was now serving a young officer of no common spirit and daring, destined, like himself, to attain, at another period, the highest office that an Englishman out of England can fill—the office of Governor-General of India. This was Francis Lord Rawdon, subsequently better known, first as Earl of Moira, and then as Marquis of Hastings. In the ensuing battle of Camden, where he held a second rank, he played a distinguished part; he was not yet twenty-six years of age, and he had already gained renown five years before, in the battle of Bunker's Hill." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., p. 71.)]

[Footnote 43: Tucker's History of the United States, Vol. I., Chap. iii., p. 254.

"There was no longer any armed American force in South Carolina; and Lord Cornwallis resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All those who were found in arms after they had submitted to British protection were considered as having forfeited their lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a strong reaction."—Ib., p. 256.]

[Footnote 44: Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxii., pp. 75, 76.]

[Footnote 45: "While the war raged in South Carolina, the campaign of 1780, in the Northern States, was barren of important events. The campaign of 1780 passed away in the Northern States, as has been related, in successive disappointments and reiterated distresses. The country was exhausted; the continental currency expiring. The army, for want of subsistence, was kept inactive and brooding over its calamities. While these disasters were openly menacing the ruin of the American cause, treachery was silently undermining it. A distinguished officer (General Arnold) engaged, for a stipulated sum of money, to betray into the hands of the British an important post committed to his care," etc. (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxiv., pp. 364-377.)]

[Footnote 46: "Congress could do nothing, and confessed that it could do nothing. 'We have required,' thus they wrote to the States on the 15th of January, 1781, 'aids of men, provisions and money; the States alone have authority to execute.' Since Congress itself made a public confession of its powerlessness, nothing remained but to appeal to France for rescue, not from a foreign enemy, but from the evils consequent on its own want of government. 'If France lends not a speedy aid,' wrote General Greene from the South to her Minister in Philadelphia, 'I fear the country will be for ever lost.' It was therefore resolved for the moment to despatch to Versailles, as a special minister, one who had lived in the midst of the ever-increasing distresses of the army, to set them before the Government of France in the most striking light. The choice fell on the younger Laurens, of South Carolina. To this agent Washington confided a statement of the condition of the country; and with dignity and candour avowed that it had reached a crisis out of which it could not rise by its own unassisted strength. To Franklin he wrote in the same strain; and La Fayette addressed a like memorial of ripe wisdom to Vergennes" (the French Minister for Foreign Affairs). (Bancroft's History of the United States, Vol. X., Chap., xix., pp. 417, 418.)

"Scarce any one of the States had as yet sent an eighth part of its quota into the field; and there was no prospect of a glorious offensive campaign, unless their generous allies should help them with money, and with a fleet strong enough to secure the superiority at sea."—Ib., p. 425.]

[Footnote 47: It was in the latter part of this year, 1780, that the treachery of General Arnold and the melancholy tragedy of Major Andre's execution took place.]

[Footnote 48: Hildreth's History of the United States, Vol. III., Chap. xli., p. 331.

"Though British conquests had rapidly succeeded each other, yet no advantages accrued to the victors. The minds of the people were unsubdued, or rather were alienated from every idea of returning to their former allegiance. Such was their temper, that the expense of retaining them in subjection would have exceeded all the profits of the conquest. British garrisons kept down open resistance, in the vicinity of the places where they were established; but as soon as they were withdrawn and the people left to themselves, a spirit of revolt hostile to Great Britain always displayed itself; and the standard of independence, whenever it was prudently raised, never wanted followers among the active and spirited part of the community." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xx., p. 363.)]



CHAPTER XXX.

THE FRENCH AND CONGRESS ALLIES IN 1781 RECOVER VIRGINIA—SURRENDER OF LORD CORNWALLIS—RESULTS.

Under the adverse circumstances and gloom which attended and closed the year 1780, as stated in the preceding chapter, Washington felt the necessity of doing something bold and great to revive the confidence of his countrymen and arrest the decline of his army.

Under these circumstances, a campaign of operations was devised and agreed upon by Washington and the commander of the French troops. The centres of British power in America were the army of about ten thousand men in New York, under the immediate command of Sir Henry Clinton, who was, indeed, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in North America; and secondly, the army of Virginia, about seven thousand men, under the command of Earl Cornwallis; and thirdly, the garrison of Charleston, South Carolina, under the command of Lord Rawdon; Savannah, the capital of Georgia, was also occupied by a British garrison. Washington's plan was to pretend an attack upon New York, but to make a real attack upon the army of Virginia, with the view of extinguishing British power in the Southern States. So well was the appearance of an intended attack upon New York kept up, that Sir Henry Clinton made all needful preparations for its defence, and actually ordered Lord Cornwallis to send a detachment of his men to New York to strengthen its defence; but after their embarkation for that purpose the order was countermanded, and Lord Cornwallis was allowed to retain them. Nothing could be more complete than the deception practised upon Sir Henry Clinton; nor did he suspect the real intention of the allied armies until they had crossed the Hudson and were on their way, through the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, and Maryland, to Virginia.[49]

"In the latter end of August," says Dr. Ramsay, "the American army began their march to Virginia from the neighbourhood of New York. Washington had advanced as far as Chester before he received information of the arrival of De Grasse. The French troops marched at the same time, for the same place. In the course of this summer they passed through all the extensive settlements which lie between Newport and Yorktown. It seldom if ever happened before, that an army led through a foreign country at so great a distance from their own, among a people of different principles, customs, language, and religion, behaved with so much regularity. In their march to Yorktown they had to pass through five hundred miles of a country abounding in fruit, and at a time when the most delicious productions of nature, growing on and near the public highways, presented both opportunity and temptation to gratify their appetites, yet so complete was their discipline, that in this long march scarce an instance could be produced of a peach or an apple being taken without the consent of the inhabitants."[50]

On the 14th of September, Washington and De Rochambeau, in advance of their armies and with their respective staffs of officers, arrived at Williamsburg; and with Generals Chastellux, Du Portail, and Knox, visited Count de Grasse on board his famous ship, the Ville de Paris, and agreed on the plan of operations against Earl Cornwallis at Yorktown, on York river, to which the allied armies at once proceeded, for the purpose of besieging it. On the 1st day of October, General Washington was able to report to the President of Congress that the investment of the place was completed. "Gloucester (on the opposite side of the river, not a mile wide there), which was held by Colonel Dundas, was beleaguered by some Virginian troops, and by the French legion of the Duke de Lauzun. Yorktown, where Cornwallis in person, and with his main force, commanded, saw to his left the division of La Fayette, and to his right the division of St. Simon. Other bodies of troops filled the space between them, while Washington and Rochambeau fixed their posts near together, towards the centre. They brought up fifty pieces of cannon, for the most part heavy, by aid from the French ships, as also sixteen mortars, and they lost no time in commencing their first parallel against the town.[51] By the 9th the first parallel was completed, when the town and its defences were cannonaded and shelled. Within another week a second parallel was completed within three hundred yards of the defences, two redoubts stormed and taken—one by the French and the other by the Americans—and the further defence of the town rendered impossible."

"Down to this time, the 15th of October, Lord Cornwallis had expected reinforcements of ships and troops from New York;[52] but he now despaired of aid from that quarter, and attempted to escape with his army in the night across the river, which was prevented by a storm, when the only alternative left him was to surrender on the best terms he could obtain. On the morning of the 17th he sent a flag of truce to Washington, proposing a cessation of arms, and a treaty for the capitulation of his post. Hostilities ceased; the terms of surrender were discussed and agreed upon on the 18th by four commissioners, two field officers being named on each side. The army, and all that belonged to it, was surrendered to Washington; and the ships and seamen to Count de Grasse" (Tucker).

"All the artillery and public stores in the two forts, together with the shipping and boats in the two harbours, were to be surrendered by the English. On the other hand, private property of every kind was to be respected by the Americans and French. The garrisons of York and Gloucester were to march out with the same honours of war as had been granted by Sir Henry Clinton at Charleston; the land forces to remain prisoners of the United States, and the naval forces prisoners of France. The soldiers were to be kept in Virginia, Maryland, or Pennsylvania, and as much by regiments as possible. The general staff and other officers not left with the troops to be permitted to go to New York, or to Europe, on parole."[53]

The battle of Yorktown, and the surrender of Lord Cornwallis to the arms of the French and the Americans, may be regarded as the last battle of importance of the civil war in America. American writers and orators are fond of saying that here was brought face to face on the battle-field the strength of Old England and Young America, and the latter prevailed. No statement can be more unfounded, and no boast more groundless than this. England, without an ally, was at war with three kingdoms—France, Spain, and Holland—the most potent naval and military powers of Europe; while were also arrayed against her, by an "armed neutrality," Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden. England was armed to the teeth for the defence of her own shores against threatened invasion, while her navies were maintaining in sundry battles the honour of the British flag on three seas.

A small part only of the British land and naval forces was on the coast of America; yet there were garrisons at Savannah and Charleston, and a much larger military force at New York, under the command of Sir Henry Clinton, than that of Yorktown, under Lord Cornwallis. In the following campaign the English fleet was victorious over the French fleet in the West Indies, capturing the great ship Ville de Paris, and taking Count de Grasse himself prisoner. In the siege of Yorktown there were about 18,000 of the allied army of French and Americans, besides ships of the line and sailors, while the effective men under command of Lord Cornwallis amounted to less than 4,000. It was a marvel of skill and courage that with an army so small, and in a town so exposed and so incapable of being strongly fortified, and against an allied force so overwhelming, Lord Cornwallis was able to sustain a siege for a fortnight, until he despaired of reinforcements from New York.

Be it also observed, that the greater part of the forces besieging Yorktown were not Americans, but French, who supplied the shipping and artillery; in short, all the attacking forces by water, and a duplicate land enemy—the one part under the command of Count de Rochambeau, and the other part under the command of the Marquis de La Fayette. Had it not been for the French fleet and the French land forces, Washington would not have attempted an attack upon Yorktown. The success of the siege was, therefore, more French than American, though Washington had the nominal command of the allied army.

No one can doubt the undaunted courage and matchless skill of Washington, and his great superiority over any English general ever sent against him; nor can the bravery and endurance of his army be justly questioned; nor the dash and boldness and gallantry of the French army. But it is idle to speak of the siege of Yorktown as a trial of strength between Young America and Old England. And it is equally incorrect to say that the resources of England, in men or money, in ships or land forces, were exhausted, or that England was compelled to make peace in consequence of the disaster of Lord Cornwallis. There had been a peace party, both in and out of Parliament, opposed to the American war from the beginning. That party included some of the ablest statesmen in England, and increased in strength and influence from year to year, by exposing the incompetence, extravagance, and corruption of the Administration, the failure of all their plans, and the non-fulfilment of any of their promises in regard to America; that although they could defeat the Americans in the field of battle, they had not conquered and they could not conquer the hearts of the people, who became more and more alienated from England by the very example and depredations of the British officers and soldiers. The surrender of Lord Cornwallis, the importance of which was greatly magnified, increased the intensity of English feeling against the continuance of the American war, until the peace party actually gained a majority in the House of Commons, compelled the retirement of the old and corrupt Ministry, which had been the cause of all the oppressions in the American colonies and all the miseries of the war. Session after session, the leaders of the Opposition in both the Lords and Commons moved resolutions condemning the American war and the manner of conducting it; the Duke of Richmond, the Marquis of Rockingham, the Earl of Shelburne in the Lords; and General Conway, Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, Lord John Cavendish, Mr. Hartley, Mr. Dunning (afterwards Lord Ashburton), and Sir James Lowther in the Commons. Several resolutions were introduced into the Commons condemnatory of the war in America, with a view of reducing the colonies to submission, and were defeated by small majorities—in one a majority of ten, and in another a majority of only one. At length they were censured and rejected by the Commons without a division.

On the 22nd of February, General Conway moved "That an address should be presented to his Majesty, to implore his Majesty to listen to the advice of his Commons, that the war in America might no longer be pursued for the impracticable purpose of reducing the inhabitants of that country to obedience by force, and to express their hopes that his Majesty's desire to restore the public tranquillity might be forwarded and made effectual by a happy reconciliation with the revolted colonies."

After a lengthened debate, this resolution was negatived—one hundred and ninety-three for the resolution, against it one hundred and ninety-four—a majority of one for the continuance of the war.

The motion having been objected to as vague in its terms, General Conway, on the 27th of February, introduced another motion, the same in substance with the previous one, but varied in phraseology, so as to meet the rules of the House, and more explicit in its terms. This resolution was strongly opposed by the Ministry; and after a long debate the Attorney-General moved the adjournment of the House: For the adjournment voted two hundred and fifteen; against it, two hundred and thirty-four—majority of nineteen against the Ministry—so that the original question, and an address to the King, framed upon the resolution, were then earned without a division.[54] The King returned a gracious but vague answer.

General Conway, after moving a vote of thanks to the King for his gracious answer, followed by moving a resolution: "That this House would consider as enemies to his Majesty and the country all those who should advise or by any means attempt the further prosecution of offensive war, on the continent of North America, for the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience by force." This motion, after a feeble opposition from the Ministry, was allowed to pass without a division.

It might be supposed, under these circumstances, that the Ministry would forthwith resign; but they continued to hold on to office, which they had held for twelve years, to the great injury of England and her colonies.

To bring the matter to an issue, the following resolution was moved on the 8th of March by Lord John Cavendish, seconded by Mr. Powys:

"That it appears to this House, that since the year 1775 upwards of one hundred millions of money have been expended on the army and navy in a fruitless war.

"That it appears to this House, that during the above period we have lost the thirteen colonies of America, which anciently belonged to the Crown of Great Britain (except the ports of New York, Charleston, and Savannah), the newly acquired colony of Florida, many of our valuable West India and other islands, and those that remain are in the utmost danger.

"That it appears to this House, that Great Britain is at present engaged in an expensive war with America, France, Spain, and Holland, without a single ally.

"That it appears to this House, that the chief cause of all these misfortunes has been the want of foresight and ability in his Majesty's Ministers.[55]"

The facts stated in the first three of these resolutions were admitted on all sides; the discussion, therefore, turned upon the conclusion drawn in the last resolution, the justice of which was patent to all from the uniform failure and disgrace of the policy and all the separate measures of Ministers during the whole of their administration. It was attempted to be argued, in defence of Ministers, that misfortune did not always prove misconduct; that the failure of execution of measures might depend, not on those who planned them, but on the fault of those who were to execute them. But "this ground," says the Parliamentary Register, "appeared so weak, even to the friends of the Administration, that it was almost entirely deserted, except by the Ministers themselves; and the question was taken up with great art and ingenuity on other topics, as to who would succeed the Administration they were endeavouring to remove, and the diversity of opinions among them. But the efforts on the part of Ministers and their friends to create jealousies and discords among the members of the Opposition proved fruitless; and when the final vote was proposed, the Secretary of War evaded it by moving the order of the day, which was carried by a majority of ten."

In the interval between the 8th and 14th, every intrigue was employed to create discord among the members of the Opposition, and to bring about a coalition under the presidency of Lord North, and a resolution was moved to that effect, which was lost by a majority of only nine.

The Earl of Surrey gave notice that on the morning of the 20th inst. he would move, in substance, Lord John Cavendish's resolution directly condemnatory of the Ministry. On that morning Lord North and the Earl of Surrey rose at the same moment, and neither would give way to the other. The general cry was "Lord Surrey, and no adjournment." As soon as the House could be reduced to order, it was moved "That the Earl of Surrey be now heard," when Lord North, having obtained the right to speak, said, "I rise to speak to the motion before the House." He observed that had he been suffered to proceed before, he believed much unnecessary heat and disorder would have been prevented. He meant no disrespect to the noble earl; but as notice had been given that the object of the intended motion was the removal of his Majesty's Ministers, he meant to have acquainted the House that such a motion had become unnecessary. He could assure the House with authority that the present Administration was no more, and that his Majesty had come to a full determination of changing his Ministers; and that it was for the purpose of giving necessary time for new arrangements that he meant to have moved an adjournment.

The noble lord then took leave of the House as a Minister of the Crown, and with many kind and courteous words thanked them for the honourable support they had given him during so long a course of years.[56]

By such blows following each other in the Commons, in rapid succession and with accelerated force, was driven from power an Administration which had inflicted greater evils upon the Crown, the constitution, the people of England and of the colonies, than any Administration since the Revolution of 1688.[57]

[Footnote 49: It appears, however, that in the first consultation, which "took place at Weathersfield, between Generals Washington, Knox, and Du Portail on the part of the Americans, and Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier Chastellux on the part of the French, it was agreed to lay siege to New York in concert with the French fleet, which was to arrive on the coast in the month of August. Washington addressed letters to the executive officers of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey, requiring them to fill up their battalions, and to have their quotas of six thousand two hundred militia in readiness within a week after the time they might be called for. But all these States not adding five hundred men to Washington's army, Sir Henry Clinton having received a reinforcement of three thousand Germans, and intelligence having been received that Count de Grasse, with a French fleet of twenty-eight ships and seven thousand troops (besides seamen), had sailed for the Chesapeake, Washington and Count de Rochambeau changed their plan of operations and determined to proceed to Virginia, and, in combination with the French fleet and soldiers, to capture the army under the command of Earl Cornwallis in Virginia. The appearance of an intention to attack New York was nevertheless kept up. While this deception was played off, the allied army crossed the North River on August 24th, and passed on by the way of Philadelphia through the intermediate country to Yorktown, Virginia. An attempt to reduce the British force in Virginia promised success with more expedition, and to secure an object of nearly equal importance to the reduction of New York." (Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxv., pp. 448-451.)]

[Footnote 50: Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxv., pp. 450, 451.]

[Footnote 51: Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxiv., p. 172.

"On the other hand, Lord Cornwallis is admitted to have shown most undaunted resolution. The officers under him, and the troops, German and English, all did their duty well. For some weeks they had laboured hard, and unremittingly, in raising their defences; and they were now prepared with equal spirit to maintain their half-completed works. But besides the enemy without, they had another within—an epidemic sickness, that stretched many hundreds helpless in their pallet-beds. Nor could they hinder Washington from completing his first parallel and opening his fire upon them in the evening of the 9th of October. For two days the fire was incessant from heavy cannon, and from mortars and howitzers, throwing shells in showers on the town, until, says Cornwallis, all our guns on the left were silenced, our works much damaged, and our loss of men considerable. By these shells, also, the Charon, a ship of forty-four guns, together with three British transports in the river, were set in flames and consumed."—Ib., p. 173.]

[Footnote 52: Before the investment of Yorktown, Lord Cornwallis sent a despatch to Sir Henry Clinton, informing him of the delicacy and danger of his situation, and requesting reinforcements. On the evening of the 29th of September, Lord Cornwallis was cheered by the arrival of an express, bringing despatches from Sir Henry Clinton, dated the 24th, informing him that by the 5th of October a fleet of twenty-three sail of the line, three of which were three-deckers, with 5,000 men, rank and file, would start for his assistance. The auxiliary forces at New York were ready and eager to depart by the 5th of October; but the ships were delayed by the slowness and obstinacy of Admiral Arbuthnot. Sir Henry Clinton writes: "We had the misfortune to see almost every succeeding day produce some naval obstruction or other to protract our departure; and I am sorry to add, that it was the afternoon of the 19th before the fleet was fairly at sea. This was the day of Lord Cornwallis's capitulation. Five days afterwards the fleet with the 5,000 troops arrived off the Chesapeake, when they received the news of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis, and sailed back to New York. Had these auxiliary forces started from New York at the time promised, the siege of Yorktown would have been raised, the allied army defeated, and Lord Cornwallis and his little army would have been victors instead of prisoners."]

[Footnote 53: Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxiv., pp. 177, 178.

"The officers were to retain their side arms and private property of every kind, but all property obviously belonging to inhabitants of the United States to be subject to be reclaimed; the soldiers to be supplied with the same rations as were allowed to soldiers in the service of Congress. Cornwallis endeavoured to obtain permission for the British and German troops to return to their respective countries, under no other restrictions than an engagement not to serve against France or America. He also tried to obtain an indemnity for those of the inhabitants who had joined him; but he was obliged to recede from the former, and also to consent that the loyalists in his camp should be given up to the unconditional mercy of their countrymen. His lordship, nevertheless, obtained (from Washington) permission for the Bonetta sloop of war to pass unexamined to New York. This gave an opportunity of screening such of the loyalists as were most obnoxious to the Americans." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xxv., pp. 454, 455.)

"The regular troops of France and America, employed in this siege, consisted of about 7,000 of the former (besides ships and seamen), and 5,500 of the latter; and they were assisted by about 4,000 militia. The troops of every kind that surrendered prisoners of war were about 7,000; but so great was the number of the sick and wounded, that there were only 3,800 capable of bearing arms."—Ib., p. 455.]

[Footnote 54: During the discussion on this question, it had been argued that the Americans are fed, clothed, and paid by France; they are led on by French officers; the French and the American armies are incorporated into one; it was merely a locality that should give name to a war. France had formerly been fought with success in Germany, and there could be no solid objection to fighting her in America. General Conway argued that French troops did not cost more than L40 per man a year, while the expense of the English troops cost L100 per man a year. General Conway reminded the House that though seventy-three thousand men were voted and paid for, we had never above half that number in actual service. Government had, therefore, only to complete the regiments, and they would have more men in America than ever they had before. (Annual Register of Parliament for 1782, pp. 158-161.)]

[Footnote 55: Annual Register of Parliament for 1782, Vol. XXIX., p. 173.]

[Footnote 56: Abridged from the Parliamentary Register for 1782, Vol. XXV., Chap. vii. See also Lord Mahon's History of England, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lxv.

Lord Mahon concludes his account of this Administration as follows:

"Thus ended Lord North's Administration of twelve years. It is certainly strange, on contemplating these twelve years, to find so many harsh and rigorous measures proceed from the most gentle and good-humoured of Prime Ministers. Happy, had but greater firmness in maintaining his own opinions been joined to so much ability in defending opinions even when not his own.

"Even as to the disasters and miscarriages, however, which could not be denied in his Administration, the friends of Lord North contended that in truth he was not answerable for them. The points in his favour were argued a few days before his fall by Mr. George Onslow in the House of Commons. 'Why,' said Mr. Onslow, 'have we in this war with America such ill success? Mainly,' he continued, 'from the support and countenance given in that House to American rebellion. The army of Washington had been called by the Opposition "our army;" the cause of the Americans had been called "the cause of liberty;" and one gentleman (this was Mr. Burke), while lavishing his praises on Dr. Franklin and Mr. Laurens, had declared he would prefer a prison with them to freedom in company with those who were supporting the cause of England.' But this vindication, though spirited, nay, though true, is faulty; because, though true, it is not the whole truth; because it overlooks what no statesman should—the certainty that when free principles are at stake, dissensions will always arise in a free country."—Ib., pp. 209, 210.]

[Footnote 57: I have not a shadow of doubt, that had the leaders in Congress adhered to their pretensions of contending and fighting for British constitutional rights, as aforetime, instead of renouncing those rights and declaring Independence in 1776, the changes which took place in the Administration in England in 1783 would have taken place in 1777; for the corrupt Administration showed as strong symptoms of decline, and was as manifestly "tottering to its fall" in the parliamentary session which commenced in 1776, as it did in the session which commenced in 1782. In both cases its predictions and assured successes had been completely falsified; in both cases the indignation of the nation was aroused against the Administration, and the confidence of Parliament was on the point of being withdrawn in 1776-77, as it was withdrawn in the session of 1782-83; but in 1776, the Congress, instead of adhering to its heretofore professed principles, was induced by its leaders, as related in Chapter xxvi., to renounce its former principles; to falsify all its former professions to its advocates in England and fellow-subjects in America; to renounce the maintenance of the constitutional rights of British subjects; to adopt a Declaration of Independence, of eternal separation from England; to extinguish the national life of the British empire and the unity of the Anglo-Saxon race, and seek an alliance with their own and Great Britain's hereditary enemies for a war upon their mother country, which had protected them for a hundred years against the French and Spaniards, who had also employed and rewarded the Indians to destroy them.]



CHAPTER XXXI.

CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION IN ENGLAND—CHANGE OF POLICY FOR BOTH ENGLAND AND THE COLONIES—PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS—THE CAUSE OF THE UNITED EMPIRE LOYALISTS.

During the adjournment of Parliament from the 24th to the 28th of March, the new Administration was formed, and announced in the Commons on the 28th, when the House adjourned over the Easter holidays, to give time for the re-election of such members as had accepted office. The King first sent for the Earl of Shelburne to form a new Administration, naming some members of it; but the Earl of Shelburne declined, as unable to form an Administration upon such conditions, and recommended the King to send for the Marquis of Rockingham. The King refused to see Rockingham face to face, but requested Shelburne to be the bearer of a message to him; but Shelburne only consented on the condition of "full power and full confidence." "Necessity," relates the King, "made me yield to the advice of Lord Shelburne." Before accepting the offer of First Lord of the Treasury, the Marquis of Rockingham, without neglecting some minor matters, stipulated that there should be no veto to the independence of America.[58] But it was nearly three months before an Act passed the Commons authorizing peace with America, and the acknowledgment of American Independence, and it was nearly a year before the treaty for that purpose was agreed upon.

In the meantime, "Immediately before the fall of Lord North's Ministry, in anticipation of that event, Dr. Franklin had written from Paris to Lord Shelburne with general expressions of his pacific views. On receiving that letter, Lord Shelburne, then Secretary of State, sent to Paris, as agent, Mr. Richard Oswald, a London merchant well versed in American affairs. Dr. Franklin readily conferred with Mr. Oswald, and put into his hands a paper drawn up by himself, suggesting that, in order to produce a thorough reconciliation, and to prevent any future quarrel on the North American continent, England should not only acknowledge the thirteen united States, but concede to them the Province of Canada. Such a project was not likely to find favour in the eyes of any British statesman. Mr. Oswald, however, undertook to return to England and lay it before his chief, Dr. Franklin, at his departure, expressing an earnest hope that all future communications to himself might pass through the same hands.