Lord Wolseley, still possessed with the idea that, now that an expedition had been sanctioned, the question of time was not of supreme importance, and that the relieving expedition might be carried out in a deliberate manner, which would be both more effective and less exposed to risk, did not reach Cairo till September, and had only arrived at Wady Halfa on 8th October, when his final instructions reached him in the following form:—"The primary object of your expedition is to bring away General Gordon and Colonel Stewart, and you are not to advance further south than necessary to attain that object, and when it has been secured, no further offensive operations of any kind are to be undertaken." These instructions were simple and clear enough. The Government had not discovered a policy. It had, however, determined to leave the garrisons to their fate, despite the National honour being involved, at the very moment that it sanctioned an enormous expenditure to try and save the lives of its long-neglected representatives, Gordon and Colonel Stewart. With extraordinary shrewdness, Gordon detected the hollowness of its purpose, and wrote:—"I very much doubt what is really going to be the policy of our Government, even now that the Expedition is at Dongola," and if they intend ratting out, "the troops had better not come beyond Berber till the question of what will be done is settled."

The receipt of Gordon's and Power's despatches of July showed that there were, at the time of their being written, supplies for four months, which would have carried the garrison on till the end of November. As the greater part of that period had expired when these documents reached Lord Wolseley's hands, it was quite impossible to doubt that time had become the most important factor of all in the situation. The chance of being too late would even then have presented itself to a prudent commander, and, above all, to a friend hastening to the rescue of a friend. The news that Colonel Stewart and some other Europeans had been entrapped and murdered near Merowe, which reached the English commander from different sources before Gordon confirmed it in his letters, was also calculated to stimulate, by showing that Gordon was alone, and had single-handed to conduct the defence of a populous city. Hard on the heels of that intelligence came Gordon's letter of 4th November to Lord Wolseley, who received it at Dongola on 14th of the same month. The letter was a long one, but only two passages need be quoted:—"At Metemmah, waiting your orders, are five steamers with nine guns." Did it not occur to anyone how greatly, at the worst stage of the siege, Gordon had thus weakened himself to assist the relieving expedition? Even for that reason there was not a day or an hour to be lost.

But the letter contained a worse and more alarming passage:—"We can hold out forty days with ease; after that it will be difficult." Forty days would have meant till 14th December, one month ahead of the day Lord Wolseley received the news, but the message was really more alarming than the form in which it was published, for there is no doubt that the word "difficult" is the official rendering of Gordon's, a little indistinctly written, word "desperate." In face of that alarming message, which only stated facts that ought to have been surmised, if not known, it was no longer possible to pursue the leisurely promenade up the Nile, which was timed so as to bring the whole force to Khartoum in the first week of March. Rescue by the most prominent general and swell troops of England at Easter would hardly gratify the commandant and garrison starved into surrender the previous Christmas, and that was the exact relationship between Wolseley's plans and Gordon's necessities.

The date at which Gordon's supplies would be exhausted varied not from any miscalculation, but because on two successive occasions he discovered large stores of grain and biscuits, which had been stolen from the public granaries before his arrival. The supplies that would all have disappeared in November were thus eked out, first till the middle of December, and then finally till the end of January, but there is no doubt that they would not have lasted as long as they did if in the last month of the siege he had not given the civil population permission to leave the doomed town. From any and from every point of view, there was not the shadow of an excuse for a moment's delay after the receipt of that letter on 14th November.

With the British Exchequer at a commander's back, it is easy to organise an expedition on an elaborate scale, and to carry it out with the nicety of perfection, but for the realisation of these ponderous plans there is one thing more necessary, and that is time. I have no doubt if Gordon's letter had said "granaries full, can hold out till Easter," that Lord Wolseley's deliberate march—Cairo, September 27; Wady Halfa, October 8; Dongola, November 14; Korti, December 30; Metemmah any day in February, and Khartoum, March 3, and those were the approximate dates of his grand plan of campaign—would have been fully successful, and held up for admiration as a model of skill. Unfortunately, it would not do for the occasion, as Gordon was on the verge of starvation and in desperate straits when the rescuing force reached Dongola. It is not easy to alter the plan of any campaign, nor to adapt a heavy moving machine to the work suitable for a light one. To feed 10,000 British soldiers on the middle Nile was alone a feat of organisation such as no other country could have attempted, but the effort was exhausting, and left no reserve energy to despatch that quick-moving battalion which could have reached Gordon's steamers early in December, and would have reinforced the Khartoum garrison, just as Havelock and Outram did the Lucknow Residency.

Dongola is only 100 miles below Debbeh, where the intelligence officers and a small force were on that 14th November; Ambukol, specially recommended by Gordon as the best starting-point, is less than fifty miles, and Korti, the point selected by Lord Wolseley, is exactly that distance above Debbeh. The Bayuda desert route by the Jakdul Wells to Metemmah is 170 miles. At Metemmah were the five steamers with nine guns to convoy the desperately needed succour to Khartoum. The energy expended on the despatch of 10,000 men up 150 miles of river, if concentrated on 1000 men, must have given a speedier result, but, as the affair was managed, the last day of the year 1884 was reached before there was even that small force ready to make a dash across the desert for Metemmah.

The excuses made for this, as the result proved, fatal delay of taking six weeks to do what—the forward movement from Dongola to Korti, not of the main force, but of 1000 men—ought to have been done in one week, were the dearth of camels, the imperfect drill of the camel corps, and, it must be added, the exaggerated fear of the Mahdi's power. When it was attempted to quicken the slow forward movement of the unwieldy force confusion ensued, and no greater progress was effected than if things had been left undisturbed. The erratic policy in procuring camels caused them at the critical moment to be not forthcoming in anything approaching the required numbers, and this difficulty was undoubtedly increased by the treachery of Mahmoud Khalifa, who was the chief contractor we employed. Even when the camels were procured, they had to be broken in for regular work, and the men accustomed to the strange drill and mode of locomotion. The last reason perhaps had the most weight of all, for although the Mahdi with all his hordes had been kept at bay by Gordon single-handed, Lord Wolseley would risk nothing in the field. Probably the determining reason for that decision was that the success of a small force would have revealed how absolutely unnecessary his large and costly expedition was. Yet events were to show beyond possibility of contraversion that this was the case, for not less than two-thirds of the force were never in any shape or form actively employed, and, as far as the fate of Gordon went, might just as well have been left at home. They had, however, to be fed and provided for at the end of a line of communication of over 1200 miles.

Still, notwithstanding all these delays and disadvantages, a well-equipped force of 1000 men was ready on 30th December to leave Korti to cross the 170 miles of the Bayuda desert. That route was well known and well watered. There were wells at, at least, five places, and the best of these was at Jakdul, about half-way across. The officer entrusted with the command was Major-General Sir Herbert Stewart, an officer of a gallant disposition, who was above all others impressed with the necessity of making an immediate advance, with the view of throwing some help into Khartoum. Unfortunately he was trammelled by his instructions, which were to this effect—he was to establish a fort at Jakdul; but if he found an insufficiency of water there he was at liberty to press on to Metemmah. His action was to be determined by the measure of his own necessities, not of Gordon's, and so Lord Wolseley arranged throughout. He reached that place with his 1100 fighting men, but on examining the wells and finding them full, he felt bound to obey the orders of his commander, viz. to establish the fort, and then return to Korti for a reinforcement. It was a case when Nelson's blind eye might have been called into requisition, but even the most gallant officers are not Nelsons.

The first advance of General Stewart to Jakdul, reached on 3rd January 1885, was in every respect a success. It was achieved without loss, unopposed, and was quite of the nature of a surprise. The British relieving force was at last, after many months' report, proved to be a reality, and although late, it was not too late. If General Stewart had not been tied by his instructions, but left a free hand, he would undoubtedly have pressed on, and a reinforcement of British troops would have entered Khartoum even before the fall of Omdurman. But it must be recorded also that Sir Herbert Stewart was not inspired by the required flash of genius. He paid more deference to the orders of Lord Wolseley than to the grave peril of General Gordon.

General Stewart returned to Korti on the 7th January, bringing with him the tired camels, and he found that during his absence still more urgent news had been received from Gordon, to the effect that if aid did not come within ten days from the 14th December, the place might fall, and that under the nose of the expedition. The native who brought this intimation arrived at Korti the day after General Stewart left, but a messenger could easily have caught him up and given him orders to press on at all cost. It was not realised at the time, but the neglect to give that order, and the rigid adherence to a preconceived plan, proved fatal to the success of the whole expedition.

The first advance of General Stewart had been in the nature of a surprise, but it aroused the Mahdi to a sense of the position, and the subsequent delay gave him a fortnight to complete his plans and assume the offensive.

On 12th January—that is, nine days after his first arrival at Jakdul—General Stewart reached the place a second time with the second detachment of another 1000 men—the total fighting strength of the column being raised to about 2300 men. For whatever errors had been committed, and their consequences, the band of soldiers assembled at Jakdul on that 12th of January could in no sense be held responsible. Without making any invidious comparisons, it may be truthfully said that such a splendid fighting force was never assembled in any other cause, and the temper of the men was strung to a high point of enthusiasm by the thought that at last they had reached the final stage of the long journey to rescue Gordon. A number of causes, principally the fatigue of the camels from the treble journey between Korti and Jakdul, made the advance very slow, and five days were occupied in traversing the forty-five miles between Jakdul and the wells at Abou Klea, themselves distant twenty miles from Metemmah. On the morning of 17th January it became clear that the column was in presence of an enemy.

At the time of Stewart's first arrival at Jakdul there were no hostile forces in the Bayuda desert. At Berber was a considerable body of the Mahdi's followers, and both Metemmah and Shendy were held in his name. At the latter place a battery or small fort had been erected, and in an encounter between it and Gordon's steamers one of the latter had been sunk, thus reducing their total to four. But there were none of the warrior tribes of Kordofan and Darfour at any of these places, or nearer than the six camps which had been established round Khartoum. The news of the English advance made the Mahdi bestir himself, and as it was known that the garrison of Omdurman was reduced to the lowest straits, and could not hold out many days, the Mahdi despatched some of his best warriors of the Jaalin, Degheim, and Kenana tribes to oppose the British troops in the Bayuda desert. It was these men who opposed the further advance of Sir Herbert Stewart's column at Abou Klea. It is unnecessary to describe the desperate assault these gallant warriors made on the somewhat cumbrous and ill-arranged square of the British force, or the ease and tremendous loss with which these fanatics were beaten off, and never allowed to come to close quarters, save at one point. The infantry soldiers, who formed two sides of the square, signally repulsed the onset, not a Ghazi succeeded in getting within a range of 300 yards; but on another side, cavalrymen, doing infantry soldiers' unaccustomed work, did not adhere to the strict formation necessary, and trained for the close melee, and with the gaudia certaminis firing their blood, they recklessly allowed the Ghazis to come to close quarters, and their line of the square was impinged upon. In that close fighting, with the Heavy Camel Corps men and the Naval Brigade, the Blacks suffered terribly, but they also inflicted loss in return. Of a total loss on the British side of sixty-five killed and sixty-one wounded, the Heavy Camel Corps lost fifty-two, and the Sussex Regiment, performing work to which it was thoroughly trained, inflicted immense loss on the enemy at hardly any cost to itself. Among the slain was the gallant Colonel Fred. Burnaby, one of the noblest and gentlest, as he was physically the strongest, officers in the British army. There is no doubt that signal as was this success, it shook the confidence of the force. The men were resolute to a point of ferocity, but the leaders' confidence in themselves and their task had been rudely tried; and yet the breaking of the square had been clearly due to a tactical blunder, and the inability of the cavalry to adapt themselves to a strange position.

On the 18th January the march, rendered slower by the conveyance of the wounded, was resumed, but no fighting took place on that day, although it was clear that the enemy had not been dispersed. On the 19th, when the force had reached the last wells at Abou Kru or Gubat, it became clear that another battle was to be fought. One of the first shots seriously wounded Sir Herbert Stewart, and during the whole of the affair many of our men were carried off by the heavy rifle fire of the enemy. Notwithstanding that our force fought under many disadvantages and was not skilfully handled, the Mahdists were driven off with terrible loss, while our force had thirty-six killed and one hundred and seven wounded. Notwithstanding these two defeats, the enemy were not cowed, and held on to Metemmah, in which no doubt those who had taken part in the battles were assisted by a force from Berber. The 20th January was wasted in inaction, caused by the large number of wounded, and when on 21st January Metemmah was attacked, the Mahdists showed so bold a front that Sir Charles Wilson, who succeeded to the command on Sir Herbert Stewart being incapacitated by his, as it proved, mortal wound, drew off his force. This was the more disappointing, because Gordon's four steamers arrived during the action and took a gallant part in the attack. It was a pity for the effect produced that that attack should have been distinctly unsuccessful. The information the captain of these steamers, the gallant Cassim el Mousse, gave about Gordon's position was alarming. He stated that Gordon had sent him a message informing him that if aid did not come in ten days from the 14th December his position would be desperate, and the volumes of his journal which he handed over to Sir Charles Wilson amply corroborated this statement—the very last entry under that date being these memorable words: "Now, mark this, if the Expeditionary Force—and I ask for no more than 200 men—does not come in ten days, the town may fall, and I have done my best for the honour of our country. Good-bye."

The other letters handed over by Cassim el Mousse amply bore out the view that a month before the British soldiers reached the last stretch of the Nile to Khartoum Gordon's position was desperate. In one to his sister he concluded, "I am quite happy, thank God, and, like Lawrence, have tried to do my duty," and in another to his friend Colonel Watson: "I think the game is up, and send Mrs Watson, yourself, and Graham my adieux. We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after ten days. This would not have happened (if it does happen) if our people had taken better precautions as to informing us of their movements, but this is 'spilt milk.'" In face of these documents, which were in the hands of Sir Charles Wilson on 21st January, it is impossible to agree with his conclusion in his book "Korti to Khartoum," that "the delay in the arrival of the steamers at Khartoum was unimportant" as affecting the result. Every hour, every minute, had become of vital importance. If the whole Jakdul column had been destroyed in the effort, it was justifiable to do so as the price of reinforcing Gordon, so that he could hold out until the main body under Lord Wolseley could arrive. I am not one of those who think that Sir Charles Wilson, who only came on the scene at the last moment, should be made the scapegoat for the mistakes of others in the earlier stages of the expedition, and I hold now, as strongly as when I wrote the words, the opinion that, "in the face of what he did, any suggestion that he might have done more would seem both ungenerous and untrue." Still the fact remains that on 21st January there was left a sufficient margin of time to avert what actually occurred at daybreak on the 26th, for the theory that the Mahdi could have entered the town one hour before he did was never a serious argument, while the evidence of Slatin Pasha strengthens the view that Gordon was at the last moment only overcome by the Khalifa's resorting to a surprise. On one point of fact Sir Charles Wilson seems also to have been in error. He fixes the fall of Omdurman at 6th January, whereas Slatin, whose information on the point ought to be unimpeachable, states that it did not occur until the 15th of that month.

When Sir Herbert Stewart had fought and won the battle of Abou Klea, it was his intention on reaching the Nile, as he expected to do the next day, to put Sir Charles Wilson on board one of Gordon's own steamers and send him off at once to Khartoum. The second battle and Sir Herbert Stewart's fatal wound destroyed that project. But this plan might have been adhered to so far as the altered circumstances would allow. Sir Charles Wilson had succeeded to the command, and many matters affecting the position of the force had to be settled before he was free to devote himself to the main object of the dash forward, viz. the establishment of communications with Gordon and Khartoum. As the consequence of that change in his own position, it would have been natural that he should have delegated the task to someone else, and in Lord Charles Beresford, as brave a sailor as ever led a cutting-out party, there was the very man for the occasion. Unfortunately, Sir Charles Wilson did not take this step for, as I believe, the sole reason that he was the bearer of an important official letter to General Gordon, which he did not think could be entrusted to any other hands. But for that circumstance it is permissible to say that one steamer—there was more than enough wood on the other three steamers to fit one out for the journey to Khartoum—would have sailed on the morning of the 22nd, the day after the force sheered off from Metemmah, and, at the latest, it would have reached Khartoum on Sunday, the 25th, just in time to avert the catastrophe.

But as it was done, the whole of the 22nd and 23rd were taken up in preparing two steamers for the voyage, and in collecting scarlet coats for the troops, so that the effect of real British soldiers coming up the Nile might be made more considerable. At 8 A.M. on Saturday, the 24th, Sir Charles Wilson at last sailed with the two steamers, Bordeen and Talataween, and it was then quite impossible for the steamers to cover the ninety-five miles to Khartoum in time. Moreover, the Nile had, by this time, sunk to such a point of shallowness that navigation was specially slow and even dangerous. The Shabloka cataract was passed at 3 P.M. on the afternoon of Sunday; then the Bordeen ran on a rock, and was not got clear till 9 P.M. on the fatal 26th. On the 27th, Halfiyeh, eight miles from Khartoum, was reached, and the Arabs along the banks shouted out that Gordon was killed and Khartoum had fallen. Still Sir Charles Wilson went on past Tuti Island, until he made sure that Khartoum had fallen and was in the hands of the dervishes. Then he ordered full steam down stream under as hot a fire as he ever wished to experience, Gordon's black gunners working like demons at their guns. On the 29th the Talataween ran on a rock and sank, its crew being taken on board the Bordeen. Two days later the Bordeen shared the same fate, but the whole party was finally saved on the 4th February by a third steamer, brought up by Lord Charles Beresford. But these matters, and the subsequent progress of the Expedition which had so ignominiously failed, have no interest for the reader of Gordon's life. It failed to accomplish the object which alone justified its being sent, and, it must be allowed, that it accepted its failure in a very tame and spiritless manner. Even at the moment of the British troops turning their backs on the goal which they had not won, the fate of Gordon himself was unknown, although there could be no doubt as to the main fact that the protracted siege of Khartoum had terminated in its capture by the cruel and savage foe, whom it, or rather Gordon, had so long defied.

I have referred to the official letter addressed to General Gordon, of which Sir Charles Wilson was the bearer. That letter has never been published, and it is perhaps well for its authors that it has not been, for, however softened down its language was by Lord Wolseley's intercession, it was an order to General Gordon to resign the command at Khartoum, and to leave that place without a moment's delay. Had it been delivered and obeyed (as it might have been, because Gordon's strength would probably have collapsed at the sight of English soldiers after his long incarceration), the next official step would have been to censure him for having remained at Khartoum against orders. Thus would the primary, and, indeed, sole object of the Expedition have been attained without regard for the national honour, and without the discovery of that policy, the want of which was the only cause of the calamities associated with the Soudan.

After the 14th of December there is no trustworthy, or at least, complete evidence, as to what took place in Khartoum. A copy of one of the defiant messages Gordon used to circulate for the special purpose of letting them fall into the hands of the Mahdi was dated 29th of that month, and ran to the effect, "Can hold Khartoum for years." There was also the final message to the Sovereigns of the Powers, undated, and probably written, if at all, by Gordon, during the final agony of the last few weeks, perhaps when Omdurman had fallen. It was worded as follows:—

"After salutations, I would at once, calling to mind what I have gone through, inform their Majesties, the Sovereigns, of the action of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, who appointed me as Governor-General of the Soudan for the purpose of appeasing the rebellion in that country.

"During the twelve months that I have been here, these two Powers, the one remarkable for her wealth, and the other for her military force, have remained unaffected by my situation—perhaps relying too much on the news sent by Hussein Pasha Khalifa, who surrendered of his own accord.

"Although I, personally, am too insignificant to be taken into account, the Powers were bound, nevertheless, to fulfil the engagement upon which my appointment was based, so as to shield the honour of the Governments.

"What I have gone through I cannot describe. The Almighty God will help me."

Although this copy was not in Gordon's own writing, it was brought down by one of his clerks, who escaped from Khartoum, and he declared that the original had been sent in a cartridge case to Dongola. The style is certainly the style of Gordon, and there was no one in the Soudan who could imitate it. It seems safe, as Sir Henry Gordon did, to accept it as the farewell message of his brother.

Until fresh evidence comes to light, that of Slatin Pasha, then a chained captive in the Mahdi's camp, is alone entitled to the slightest credence, and it is extremely graphic. We can well believe that up to the last moment Gordon continued to send out messages—false, to deceive the Mahdi, and true to impress Lord Wolseley. The note of 29th December was one of the former; the little French note on half a cigarette paper, brought by Abdullah Khalifa to Slatin to translate early in January, may have been one of the latter. It said:—"Can hold Khartoum at the outside till the end of January." Slatin then describes the fall of Omdurman on 15th January, with Gordon's acquiescence, which entirely disposes of the assertion that Ferratch, the gallant defender of that place during two months, was a traitor, and of how, on its surrender, Gordon's fire from the western wall of Khartoum prevented the Mahdists occupying it. He also comments on the alarm caused by the first advance of the British force into the Bayuda desert, and of the despatch of thousands of the Mahdi's best warriors to oppose it. Those forces quitted the camp at Omdurman between 10th and 15th January, and this step entirely disposes of the theory that the Mahdi held Khartoum in the hollow of his hand, and could at any moment take it. As late as the 15th of January, Gordon's fire was so vigorous and successful that the Mahdi was unable to retain possession of the fort which he had just captured.

The story had best be continued in the words used by the witness. Six days after the fall of Omdurman loud weeping and wailing filled the Mahdi's camp. As the Mahdi forbade the display of sorrow and grief it was clear that something most unusual had taken place. Then it came out that the British troops had met and utterly defeated the tribes, with a loss to the Mahdists of several thousands. Within the next two or three days came news of the other defeat at Abou Kru, and the loud lamentations of the women and children could not be checked. The Mahdi and his chief emirs, the present Khalifa Abdullah prominent among them, then held a consultation, and it was decided, sooner than lose all the fruits of the hitherto unchecked triumph of their cause, to risk an assault on Khartoum. At night on the 24th, and again on the 25th, the bulk of the rebel force was conveyed across the river to the right bank of the White Nile; the Mahdi preached them a sermon, promising them victory, and they were enjoined to receive his remarks in silence, so that no noise was heard in the beleaguered city. By this time their terror of the mines laid in front of the south wall had become much diminished, because the mines had been placed too low in the earth, and they also knew that Gordon and his diminished force were in the last stages of exhaustion. Finally, the Mahdi or his energetic lieutenant decided on one more arrangement, which was probably the true cause of their success. The Mahdists had always delivered their attack half an hour after sunrise; on this occasion they decided to attack half an hour before dawn, when the whole scene was covered in darkness. Slatin knew all these plans, and as he listened anxiously in his place of confinement he was startled, when just dropping off to sleep, by "the deafening discharge of thousands of rifles and guns; this lasted for a few minutes, then only occasional rifle shots were heard, and now all was quiet again. Could this possibly be the great attack on Khartoum? A wild discharge of firearms and cannon, and in a few minutes complete silence!" He was not left long in doubt. Some hours afterwards three black soldiers approached, carrying in a bloody cloth the head of General Gordon, which he identified. It is unnecessary to add the gruesome details which Slatin picked up as to his manner of death from the gossip of the camp. In this terrible tragedy ended that noble defence of Khartoum, which, wherever considered or discussed, and for all time, will excite the pity and admiration of the world.

There is no need to dwell further on the terrible end of one of the purest heroes our country has ever produced, whose loss was national, but most deeply felt as an irreparable shock, and as a void that can never be filled up by that small circle of men and women who might call themselves his friends. Ten years elapsed after the eventful morning when Slatin pronounced over his remains the appropriate epitaph, "A brave soldier who fell at his post; happy is he to have fallen; his sufferings are over!" before the exact manner of Gordon's death was known, and some even clung to the chance that after all he might have escaped to the Equator, and indeed it was not till long after the expedition had returned that the remarkable details of his single-handed defence of Khartoum became known. Had all these particulars come out at the moment when the public learnt that Khartoum had fallen, and that the expedition was to return without accomplishing anything, it is possible that there would have been a demand that no Minister could have resisted to avenge his fate; but it was not till the publication of the journals that the exact character of his magnificent defence and of the manner in which he was treated by those who sent him came to be understood and appreciated by the nation.

The lapse of time has been sufficient to allow of a calm judgment being passed on the whole transaction, and the considerations which I have put forward with regard to it in the chronicle of events have been dictated by the desire to treat all involved in the matter with impartiality. If they approximate to the truth, they warrant the following conclusions. The Government sent General Gordon to the Soudan on an absolutely hopeless mission for any one or two men to accomplish without that support in reinforcements on which General Gordon thought he could count. General Gordon went to the Soudan, and accepted that mission in the enthusiastic belief that he could arrest the Mahdi's progress, and treating as a certainty which did not require formal expression the personal opinion that the Government, for the national honour, would comply with whatever demands he made upon it. As a simple matter of fact, every one of those demands, some against and some with Sir Evelyn Baring's authority, were rejected. No incident could show more clearly the imperative need of definite arrangements being made even with Governments; and in this case the precipitance with which General Gordon was sent off did not admit of him or the Government knowing exactly what was in the other's mind. Ostensibly of one mind, their views on the matter in hand were really as far as the poles asunder.

There then comes the second phase of the question—the alleged abandonment of General Gordon by the Government which enlisted his services in face of an extraordinary, and indeed unexampled danger and difficulty. The evidence, while it proves conclusively and beyond dispute that Mr Gladstone's Government never had a policy with regard to the Soudan, and that even Gordon's heroism, inspiration, and success failed to induce them to throw aside their lethargy and take the course that, however much it may be postponed, is inevitable, does not justify the charge that it abandoned Gordon to his fate. It rejected the simplest and most sensible of his propositions, and by rejecting them incurred an immense expenditure of British treasure and an incalculable amount of bloodshed; but when the personal danger to its envoy became acute, it did not abandon him, but sanctioned the cost of the expedition pronounced necessary to effect his rescue. This decision, too late as it was to assist in the formation of a new administration for the Soudan, or to bring back the garrisons, was taken in ample time to ensure the personal safety and rescue of General Gordon. In the literal sense of the charge, history will therefore acquit Mr Gladstone and his colleagues of the abandonment of General Gordon personally.

With regard to the third phase of the question—viz. the failure of the attempt to rescue General Gordon, which was essentially a military, and not a political question—the responsibility passes from the Prime Minister to the military authorities who decided the scope of the campaign, and the commander who carried it out. In this case, the individual responsible was the same. Lord Wolseley not only had his own way in the route to be followed by the expedition, and the size and importance attached to it, but he was also entrusted with its personal direction. There is consequently no question of the sub-division of the responsibility for its failure, just as there could have been none of the credit for its success. Lord Wolseley decided that the route should be the long one by the Nile Valley, not the short one from Souakim to Berber. Lord Wolseley decreed that there should be no Indian troops, and that the force, instead of being an ordinary one, should be a picked special corps from the elite of the British army; and finally Lord Wolseley insisted that there should be no dash to the rescue of Gordon by a small part of his force, but a slow, impressive, and overpoweringly scientific advance of the whole body. The extremity of Gordon's distress necessitated a slight modification of his plan, when, with qualified instructions, which practically tied his hands, Sir Herbert Stewart made his first appearance at Jakdul.

It was then known to Lord Wolseley that Gordon was in extremities, yet when a fighting force of 1100 English troops, of special physique and spirit, was moved forward with sufficient transport to enable it to reach the Nile and Gordon's steamers, the commander's instructions were such as confined him to inaction, unless he disobeyed his orders, which only Nelsons and Gordons can do with impunity. It is impossible to explain this extraordinary timidity. Sir Herbert Stewart reached Jakdul on 3rd January with a force small in numbers, but in every other respect of remarkable efficiency, and with the camels sufficiently fresh to have reached the Nile on 7th or 8th January had it pressed on. The more urgent news that reached Lord Wolseley after its departure would have justified the despatch of a messenger to urge it to press on at all costs to Metemmah. In such a manner would a Havelock or Outram have acted, yet the garrison of the Lucknow Residency was in no more desperate case than Gordon at Khartoum.

It does not need to be a professor of a military academy to declare that, unless something is risked in war, and especially wars such as England has had to wage against superior numbers in the East, there will never be any successful rescues of distressed garrisons. Lord Wolseley would risk nothing in the advance from Korti to Metemmah, whence his advance guard did not reach the latter place till the 20th, instead of the 7th of January. His lieutenant and representative, Sir Charles Wilson, would not risk anything on the 21st January, whence none of the steamers appeared at Khartoum until late on the 27th, when all was over. Each of these statements cannot be impeached, and if so, the conclusion seems inevitable that in the first and highest degree Lord Wolseley was alone responsible for the failure to reach Khartoum in time, and that in a very minor degree Sir Charles Wilson might be considered blameworthy for not having sent off one of the steamers with a small reinforcement to Khartoum on the 21st January, before even he allowed Cassim el Mousse to take any part in the attack on Metemmah. He could not have done this himself, but he would have had no difficulty in finding a substitute. When, however, there were others far more blameworthy, it seems almost unjust to a gallant officer to say that by a desperate effort he might at the very last moment have snatched the chestnuts out of the fire, and converted the most ignominious failure in the military annals of this country into a creditable success.

* * * * *

The tragic end at Khartoum was not an inappropriate conclusion for the career of Charles Gordon, whose life had been far removed from the ordinary experiences of mankind. No man who ever lived was called upon to deal with a greater number of difficult military and administrative problems, and to find the solution for them with such inadequate means and inferior troops and subordinates. In the Crimea he showed as a very young man the spirit, discernment, energy, and regard for detail which were his characteristics through life. Those qualities enabled him to achieve in China military exploits which in their way have never been surpassed. The marvellous skill, confidence, and vigilance with which he supplied the shortcomings of his troops, and provided for the wants of a large population at Khartoum for the better part of a year, showed that, as a military leader, he was still the same gifted captain who had crushed the Taeping rebellion twenty years before. What he did for the Soudan and its people during six years' residence, at a personal sacrifice that never can be appreciated, has been told at length; but pages of rhetoric would not give as perfect a picture as the spontaneous cry of the blacks: "If we only had a governor like Gordon Pasha, then the country would indeed be contented."

"Such examples are fruitful in the future," said Mr Gladstone in the House of Commons; and it is as a perfect model of all that was good, brave, and true that Gordon will be enshrined in the memory of the great English nation which he really died for, and whose honour was dearer to him than his life. England may well feel proud of having produced so noble and so unapproachable a hero. She has had, and she will have again, soldiers as brave, as thoughtful, as prudent, and as successful as Gordon. She has had, and she will have again, servants of the same public spirit, with the same intense desire that not a spot should sully the national honour. But although this breed is not extinct, there will never be another Gordon. The circumstances that produced him were exceptional; the opportunities that offered themselves for the demonstration of his greatness can never fall to the lot of another; and even if by some miraculous combination the man and the occasions arose, the hero, unlike Gordon, would be spoilt by his own success and public applause. But the qualities which made Gordon superior not only to all his contemporaries, but to all the temptations and weaknesses of success, are attainable; and the student of his life will find that the guiding star he always kept before him was the duty he owed his country. In that respect, above all others, he has left future generations of his countrymen a great example.

THE END.



INDEX.

Abbas, steamer, ii. 144; loss of, 145-6. Abd-el-Kader, ii. 100, 102, 119. Abdulgassin, ii. 32. Abdullah, the present Khalifa, ii. 98, 102. Abdurrahman, ii. 45, 68. Abou Hamid, ii. 144. Abou Klea, ii. 163; battle of, 164; loss at, ibid., 166. Abouna, an, ii. 33. Abou Kru, ii. 164; battle of, 165, 169. Abou Sammat, ii. 29. Abou Saoud, i. 149. Abyssinia, the expedition to, i. 131-2; ii. 5, 32, 35, 70 passim. Academy, Royal Military, i. 5, 6, 7. Adye, Sir John, i. 137. Afghanistan, ii. 45, 68, 69, 70. Alagos, i. 40. Albert Lake, i. 155, 156. Alexandropol, i. 35. Alla-ed-Din, ii. 102. Alma, i. 8, 16. Amoy, i. 72. Anderson, W. C., i. 41. Anfina, i. 158. Ani, i. 37, 38. Arabi Pasha, ii. 97. Arabs as soldiers, i. 150. Ararat, Mount, i. 38, 39. Aras, i. 33. Arendrup, ii. 5. Arokol Bey, ii. 5. Army and Navy Gazette, ii. 70. Ashantee Expedition, i. 138. Assiout, ii. 133. Assouan, ii. 153. Athens, i. 15. Ayoob, ii. 68.

Bahr Arab, ii. 27. Bahr Gazelle, ii. 25, 105, 128. Baker, Sir S., i. 142, 143, 145, 149, 157; ii. 113, 118, 139. Baker Pasha, ii. 105, 136. Balaclava, i. 15, 16. Bara, ii. 103. Bari tribe, i. 150, 151, 153. Baring, Sir Evelyn, see Lord Cromer. Bashi-Bazouks, ii. 4, 9, 10, 141, 142, 144. Basutoland and its question, ii. 71, 72, 75 et seq.; description of, 77-82. Basutos, as cavalry, ii. 87. Bayuda desert, ii. 161, 162, 163. Bedden, i. 153. Beechy, i. 90. Bellal Bey, i. 143. Berber, i. 147; ii. 96, 139, 140, 143, 145, 159, 163. Beresford, Lord Charles, ii. 166; rescues Sir C. Wilson, 167. Berzati Bey, ii. 65. Bessarabia, i. 32. Bismarck, Prince, ii. 54, 55. Bisson, General, ii. 137. Blignieres, M. de, ii. 107. Bogos, ii. 5, 33. Bolgrad, i. 32, 33. Boma Sola, i. 32. Bombay, ii. 45. Bonham, Sir G., i. 76. Bonnefoy, Capt., i. 92, 102. Bordeen, ii. 147, 151, 167. Borgu, ii. 32. Brandt, Herr von, ii. 54-55. Brocklehurst, Colonel, ii. 95-96. Brown, General, i. 90. Brown, Major, i. 116. Bruce, Sir Frederick, i. 47, 110, 121. Brussels, ii. 92-95. Burgevine, i. 54-59, 78, 81, 89, 90, 92-93. Burgoyne, Sir John, i. 14. Burnaby, Colonel Fred., ii. 164.

Cairo, i. 145; affairs at, 145-6; ii. 159, 161. Cambridge, Duke of, i. 112, 123; ii. 96, 122. Camel, the, ii. 11, 16. Camel Corps, the, ii. 164. Campbell, Mr J. D., ii. 49. Campbell, Major, i. 147. Candahar, ii. 45, 68-69. Cape Government, ii. 39, 75-76. Cape Town, ii. 76; opinion at, 88-89. Cardew, Lieut., i. 47. Cassim el Mousse, ii. 165, 172. Cathcart, Sir George, ii. 77, 86. Cave, Mr, ii. 19. Cere, Colonel, i. 20. Chagos Group, ii. 73. Chamberlaine, Sir N., ii. 48. Chan-chia-wan, i. 45. Changchufu, i. 113, 118. Chang Kwoliang, i. 66, 72, 74. Changsha, i. 67. Chanzu, i. 79-81, 93, 94. Chatham, Engineers' Headquarters, i. 7, 45. Cherif Pasha, ii. 2, 21, 31, 107, 139. Chesney, Sir George, i. 19, 116. China, scenery of, i. 53, 60-64. Ching, General, i. 57, 82, 84, 88-89, 91-93, 96-103, 113. Chinkiangfoo, i. 69. Chippendall, Lieut., i. 148. Cholin, i. 51. Chung How, ii. 50. Chung Wang, i. 50, 55-56, 71-76, 92-99, 113, 116, 118, 121. Chunye, i. 84-87. Clarke, Miss A. M., i. 3. Clayton, Capt., i. 84. Coetlogon, Colonel de, ii. 105, 119, 134-136. Congo, the, ii. 89, 91-95, 140. Constantinople, i. 33-41, 139. Cookesley, Colonel, i. 83. Corfu, i. 14. Courbash, the, abolished in Soudan, ii. 6. Crimea, i. 8-9, 14, 16, 138. Cromer, Lord, ii. 21; Gordon's scene with, ibid.; opposes Gordon, 118-122, 125, 128, 137; his suggestion, 139, 140, 147, 153. Culloden, i. 3. Cumberland, Duke of, i. 3. Cuzzi, ii. 143. Cyprus, ii. 125.

Danube, i. 136-7. Dara, ii. 10-12, 14, 27, 104. Dar Djumna, ii. 145. Dardanelles, i. 15. Darfour, i. 143-4; ii. 9-11, 17, 30-31, 113. Davidson, Capt., i. 85. De Norman, i. 45. Debbeh, ii. 161. Debra Tabor, ii. 34. Dem Idris, ii. 27. Dem Suleiman, ii. 28. Dent, Mr H., i. 108. Derby, Earl of, ii. 23. Devonshire, Duke of, first moves to render Gordon assistance, ii. 156; his preparations for an expedition, ii. 156-7. Dilke, Sir C., ii. 96, 117, 121. Dongola, ii. 98, 139, 157, 159, 160, 161. Donnelly, General J., i. 22; ii. 66. Dubaga, i. 160. Duem, i. 103. Duncan, Colonel, ii. 143-4. Durand, Sir M., ii. 47.

Earle, Major-General, ii. 158-9. Eastern Question, the, ii. 40-42. Eden, Garden of, ii. 74. Egerton, Mr, ii. 147, 155. El Obeid, ii. 101, 103. Elphinstone, Sir Howard, ii. 72. Empress-Regents, the, i. 123, 133. Enderby, Elizabeth, Gordon's mot 3-4. See also Mrs Gordon. Enderby, Mr George, i. 94. England, her hesitating policy, ii. 8; power of, 73. Equator, the, ii. 140, 147. Equatorial Province, the, i. 147, 151. Eristaw, Prince, i. 42. Erivan, i. 38. Erzeroum, i. 34. Etchmiazin, i. 40. Ever-Victorious Army, i. 56, 58-60. Expedition, the Relief, ii. 157-8. Eyre, General, i. 24.

Fascher, ii. 10-11. Fashoda, i. 148. Ferratch Pasha, ii. 148. Firefly, the, i. 113. Fisher, Corporal, i. 39-40. Forrester, Colonel, i. 57. Forster, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii, 115. Foweira, i. 156. France, i. 62. Franco-Chinese, the, i. 92, 102. French soldiers, Gordon's opinion of, i. 17-8. Fusaiquan, i. 97. Fusham, i. 80-81, 116.

Gagarin, Prince, i. 42. Galatz, i. 32, 136-8. Gandamak, i. 45. Gara, ii. 30. Gebra, i. 103. Geographical Society, Royal, i. 156. Gessi Romulus, i. 148, 155-7; ii. 26-31. Gezireh, i. 111. Giegler Pasha, ii. 143. Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., ii. 94, 122; Gladstone and his Government, ii. 151; how they came to employ Gordon, ii. 151-2; undeceived as to Gordon's views, ii. 152-3; their indecision, ii. 153; statement in House, ii. 154; dismayed by Gordon's boldness, ii. 155; their radical fault, ii. 156; degree of responsibility, ii. 170; acquittal of personal abandonment of Gordon, ii. 171. Golden Fleece, the, i. 15. Gondar, ii. 34. Gondokoro, i. 146, 147, 155. Gordon, derivation of name, i. 1, 2. Gordon, Charles George: birth, i. 1; family history, 1-4; childhood, 4; enters Woolwich Academy, 5; early escapades, 5-6; put back six months and elects for Engineers, 6; his spirit, 7; his examinations, ibid.; gets commission, ibid.; his work at Pembroke, 8; his brothers, 9; his sisters, 10; his brother-in-law, Dr Moffitt, ibid.; personal appearance of, 11-14; his height, 11; his voice, 12; ordered to Corfu, 14; changed to Crimea, ibid.; passes Constantinople, 15; views on the Dardanelles' forts, ibid.; reaches Balaclava, 16; opinion of French soldiers, 17, 18; his first night in the trenches, 18-19; his topographical knowledge, 19; his special aptitude for war, ibid.; account of the capture of the Quarries, 21-22; of the first assault on Redan, 22-24; Kinglake's opinion of, 25; on the second assault on Redan, 26-28; praises the Russians, 28; joins Kimburn expedition, ibid.; destroying Sebastopol, 29-31; his warlike instincts, 31; appointed to Bessarabian Commission, 32; his letters on the delimitation work, 33; ordered to Armenia, ibid.; journey from Trebizonde, 34; describes Kars, 34-35; his other letters from Armenia, 35-39; ascends Ararat, 39-40; returns home, 41; again ordered to the Caucasus, 41, 42; some personal idiosyncrasies, 43, 44; gazetted captain, 45; appointment at Chatham, 45; sails for China, ibid.; too late for fighting, ibid.; describes sack of Summer Palace, 46; buys the Chinese throne, ibid.; his work at Tientsin, 47; a trip to the Great Wall, 47-49; arrives at Shanghai, 49; distinguishes himself in the field, 50; his daring, 51; gets his coat spoiled, 52; raised to rank of major, ibid.; surveys country round Shanghai, 52, 53; describes Taepings, 53; nominated for Chinese service, 54; reaches Sungkiang, 60; qualifications for the command, 78; describes his force, 79; inspects it, ibid.; first action, 79, 80; impresses Chinese, 80; described by Li Hung Chang, ibid.; made Tsungping, ibid.; forbids plunder, 81; his flotilla, ibid.; his strategy, ibid.; captures Taitsan, 82; difficulty with his officers, 83; besieges Quinsan, ibid.; reconnoitres it, 84; attacks and takes it, 85-87; removes to Quinsan, 87; deals with a mutiny, 88; incident with General Ching, 89; resigns and withdraws resignation, ibid.; contends with greater difficulties, 90; undertakes siege of Soochow, 91; negotiates with Burgevine, 92, 93; relieves garrison, 94; great victory, ibid.; describes the position round Soochow, 95; his hands tied by the Chinese, 96; his main plan of campaign, 97; his first repulse, ibid.; captures the stockades, 98; his officers, 99; his share in negotiations with Taepings, ibid.; difficulty about pay, 100; resigns command, ibid.; guards Li Hung Chang's tent, ibid.; enters Soochow, 101; scene with Ching, ibid.; asks Dr Macartney to go to Lar Wang, ibid.; questions interpreter, ibid.; detained by Taepings, ibid.; and then by Imperialists, 102; scene with Ching, ibid.; identifies the bodies of the Wangs, ibid.; what he would have done, ibid.; the fresh evidence relating to the Wangs, 103 et seq.; conversation with Ching, 103; and Macartney, ibid.; relations with Macartney, 103, 104; offers him succession to command, 104, 105; letter to Li Hung Chang, 106; Li sends Macartney to Gordon, ibid.; contents of Gordon's letter, 107; possesses the head of the Lar Wang, 107, 108; frenzied state of, 108; scene with Macartney at Quinsan, 108, 109; his threats, 109; his grave reflection on Macartney, 109, 110; writes to Macartney, 111; makes public retractation, 111; other expressions of regret, 112; refuses Chinese presents, ibid.; suspension in active command, ibid.; retakes the field, 113; "the destiny of China in his hands," ibid.; attacks places west of Taiho Lake, 114-5; enrolls Taepings, 115; severely wounded, 116; second reverse, ibid.; receives bad news, ibid.; alters his plans, ibid.; his force severely defeated, 117; retrieves misfortune, ibid.; describes the rebellion, 118; made Lieut.-Colonel, ibid.; his further successes, 119; another reverse, ibid.; his final victory, 120; what he thought he had done, ibid.; visits Nanking, ibid.; drills Chinese troops, 121; appointed Ti-Tu and Yellow Jacket Order, 122; his mandarin dresses, 123; his relations with Li Hung Chang, ibid.; the Gold Medal, ibid.; his diary destroyed, 124; returns home, ibid.; view of his achievements, 125-6; a quiet six months, 128; his excessive modesty, ibid.; pride in his profession, 129; appointment at Gravesend, ibid.; his view of the Thames Forts, 130; his work there, ibid.; his mode of living, 131; supposed angina pectoris, ibid.; wish to join Abyssinian Expedition, 132; described as a modern Jesus Christ, ibid.; his mission work, 132-3; his boys, 133; sends his medal to Lancashire fund, ibid.; his love for boys, 134; his kings, ibid.; some incidents, ibid.; his pensioners, 135; his coat stolen, ibid.; his walks, 136; the Snake flags, ibid.; leaves Gravesend, ibid.; at Galatz, 137; no place like England, ibid.; goes to Crimea, 138; attends Napoleon's funeral, ibid.; casual meeting with Nubar, and its important consequences, 139-40; "Gold and Silver Idols," 140; appointed Governor of the Equatorial Province, 145; reasons for it, ibid.; leaves Cairo, 146; describes the "sudd," ibid.; his steamers, 147; his facetiousness, ibid.; reaches Gondokoro, ibid.; his firman, ibid.; his staff, 148; his energy, ibid.; establishes line of forts, ibid.; collapse of his staff, 149; his Botany Bay, ibid.; his policy and justice, 150; his poor troops, ibid.; organises a black corps, 151; his sound finance, ibid.; deals with slave trade, 152; incidents with slaves, ibid.; makes friends everywhere, 153; his goodness a tradition, 153-4; his character misrepresented, 154; his line of forts, 155; the ulterior objects of his task, ibid.; the control of the Nile, 156; shrinks from notoriety, ibid.; describes the Lakes, 157; the question with Uganda, 157 et seq.; proceeds against Kaba Rega, 158-60; his extraordinary energy, 161; does his own work, 161; incident of his courage, 161-2; views of Khedive, 163; returns to Cairo, 163; and home, ibid. Decision about Egyptian employment, ii. 1; receives letter from Khedive, 2; consults Duke of Cambridge, ibid.; returns to Cairo, ibid.; appointed Governor-General of the Soudan, 2-3; appointed Muchir, or Marshal, etc., 3; sums up his work, 4; his first treatment of Abyssinian Question, 5-6; his entry into Khartoum, 6; public address, 7; first acts of Administration, ibid.; proposes Slavery Regulations, 7; receives contradictory orders on subject, 8; his decision about them, 8-9; disbands the Bashi-Bazouks, 9; goes to Darfour, ibid.; relieves garrisons, 10-11; enters Fascher, 11; recalled by alarming news in his rear, ibid.; his camel described, ibid.; reaches Dara without troops, 12; his interview with Suleiman, ibid.; Slatin's account of scene, 12-13; his views on the Slave Question, 13; follows Suleiman to Shaka, 14; indignant letter of, 15; his decision about capital punishment, ibid.; his views thereupon, 16; some characteristic incidents, ibid.; what the people thought of him, ibid.; "Send us another Governor like Gordon," ibid.; his regular payments, 17; his thoughtfulness, ibid.; summoned to Cairo, ibid.; appointed President of Financial Inquiry, 18; his views of money, ibid.; acts with Lesseps, 19; meets with foreign opposition, 20; scene with Lesseps, 21; scene with Major Evelyn Baring, ibid.; Gordon's financial proposal, 22; last scenes with Khedive, 23; Gordon's bold offer, ibid.; financial episode cost Gordon L800, 24; his way of living, ibid.; leaves Cairo and visits Harrar, 25; his finance in the Soudan, 25-6; deals with Suleiman, 26 et seq.; takes the field in person, 30; clears out Shaka, 31; again summoned to Cairo, ibid.; proclaims Tewfik, ibid.; returns to Cairo, 32; entrusted with mission to Abyssinia, ibid.; receives letter from King John, 33; called "Sultan of the Soudan," ibid.; enters Abyssinia, 34; goes to Debra Tabor, ibid.; interview with King John, ibid.; prevented returning to Soudan, 35; his opinion of Abyssinia, ibid.; Khedive's neglect of, 36; called "mad," ibid.; his work in the Soudan, 36-7; goes to Switzerland, 38; his opinion of wives, 38; first meeting with King of the Belgians, 39; offered Cape command, 40; his memorandum on Eastern Question, 40-2; accepts Private Secretaryship to Lord Ripon, 42; regrets it, 43; interview with Prince of Wales, ibid.; his letters about it, 44; views on Indian topics, ibid.; sudden resignation, ibid.; the Yakoob Khan incident, 45-8; invited to China, 49; full history of that invitation, 49-50; letter from Li Hung Chang, 49; his telegrams to War Office, 50-1; leaves for China, 51; announces his intentions, 52; what he discovered on arrival in China, 53; ignores British Minister, ibid.; stays with Li Hung Chang, 55; his reply to German Minister, 56; his letter on Li, 57; his advice to China, 58-61; baffles intrigues and secures peace, 59; further passages with War Office, 60; on the Franco-Chinese war, 61, 62; on the Opium Question, 63-4; arrives at Aden, 65; his Central African letters, ibid.; visits Ireland, 65-6; letter on Irish Question in Times, 66-7; letter on Candahar, 68-70; opinion of Abyssinians, 70; his article on irregular warfare, 70-1; offers Cape Government his services for Basutoland, 71; takes Sir Howard Elphinstone's place in the Mauritius, 72; his work there, 72-3; views of England's power, 73; views on coaling stations, ibid.; visits Seychelles, 74; views on Malta and Mediterranean, 74-5; attains rank of Major-General, 75; summoned to the Cape, ibid.; leaves in a sailing ship, 76; financial arrangement with Cape Government, ibid.; his pecuniary loss by Cape employment, ibid.; his memorandum on Basutoland, 77-9; accepts temporarily post of Commandant-General, 80; drafts a Basuto Convention, 80-1; requested by Mr Sauer to go to Basutoland, 82; relations with Masupha, ibid.; visits Masupha, 83; betrayed by Sauer, ibid.; peril of, ibid.; his account of the affair, 84-5; memorandum on the Native Question, 85-7; his project of military reform, 88; his resignation of Cape command, ibid.; corresponds with King of the Belgians, 89; goes to the Holy Land, ibid.; his view of Russian Convent at Jerusalem, 90; advocates Palestine Canal, 90-1; summoned to Belgium, 91; telegraphs for leave, 92; the mistake in the telegram, ibid.; decides to retire, ibid.; King Leopold's arrangement, ibid.; his plans on the Congo, 93-4; public opinion aroused by his Soudan policy, 93-5; visit to War Office, 94; makes his will, ibid.; goes to Brussels, ibid.; Soudan not the Congo, 95; leaves Charing Cross, 95; final letters to his sister, 95-6; interview with ministers, 96; loses clothes and orders, ibid.; his predictions about the Soudan, 97-8; the task imposed on him, 106; why he accepted it, 106-7; memorandum on Egyptian affairs, 107-9; opinions on Hicks's Expedition, 109; on English policy, 110; on the Mahdi, ibid.; his interview with Mr Stead of Pall Mall Gazette, 111-5; his eagerness to go to the Soudan, 115; suggestions by the Press of his fitness for the post, 116-7; "generally considered to be mad," 117; Sir Charles Dilke puts his name forward, ibid.; Lord Granville's despatch, ibid.; Lord Cromer opposes his appointment, 118, et seq.; consequences of that opposition, and the delay it caused, 118-21; the arrangement with King Leopold, 121; went to Soudan at request of Government, 122; his departure, ibid.; his instructions, 123-4; doubts about them, 124; his views about Zebehr, 124 et seq.; suggests his being sent to Cyprus, 125; change in his route, ibid.; goes to Cairo, ibid.; changed view towards Zebehr, 126; his memorandum on their relations, 126-8; wishes to take him, 128; a "mystic feeling," ibid.; interview with Zebehr, ibid.; final demands for Zebehr, 129-30; leaves Cairo, 133; the task before him, 134-5; hastens to Khartoum, 136; reception by inhabitants, ibid.; his first steps of defence, ibid.; his conclusion that "Mahdi must be smashed up," 137; his demands, 138; on our "dog in the manger" policy, 139; "caught in Khartoum," ibid.; appeal to philanthropists, ibid.; "you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi," 140; his lost diary, 141; his first fight, ibid.; bad conduct of his troops, 141-2; lays down three lines of mines, 142; his steamers, ibid.; their value, ibid.; force at his disposal, ibid.; loses a steamer, 143; sends down 2600 refugees, ibid.; his care for them, 143-4; Soudan Question must be settled by November, 144; sends down Abbas, 145; full history of that incident, 144-6; left alone at Khartoum, 146; sends away his steamers to help the Expedition, 146-7; hampered by indecision of Government, 147; his telegrams never published, ibid.; position at Khartoum, ibid.; his point of observation, 148; cut off from Omdurman, ibid.; anxiety for his steamers, 149; "To-day I expected one of the Expedition here," ibid.; the confidence felt in Gordon, ibid.; his defiance of the Mahdi, 150; his position, 150-1; his last Journal, 151; views on Soudan Question, 152-3; his relations with the Government, 152-6; effect of silence from Khartoum, 156; his view of the Relief Expedition, 159; his shrewdness, ibid.; his last messages, 160; situation desperate, ibid.; "the town may fall in ten days," 165; "quite happy, and, like Lawrence, have tried to do my duty," ibid.; "spilt milk," ibid.; his last message of all, 168; death of, 169; details supplied by Slatin, 169-70; a great national loss, 173; his example, 173. Gordon, David, i. 2. Gordon, General Enderby, i. 8, 9. Gordon, Fred, i. 5, 138. Gordon, Sir Henry W., i. 4-6, 8-10, 60, 102, 134; ii. 19, 43, 91, 92, 95, 132. Gordon, Miss Mary Augusta, i. 10; ii. 130; correspondence with Zebehr, 130-2, 143. Gordon, General Peter, i. 2. Gordon, William Augustus, i. 3. Gordon, William Augustus, junior, i. 5. Gordon, Mrs, mother of Charles Gordon, i. 127, 128; death of, 138. Gordon, William Henry, Lieut.-General, i. 3, 4. Gordon, Sir William, i. 131. Gordon, Sir William, of Park, i. 2. Goschen, Mr, ii. 19, 23. Graham, Sir G., i. 12, 13, 22, 24, 25; ii. 125, 128, 129, 153, 156, 165. Grand Canal, the, i. 69. Grant, Colonel, ii. 51. Granville, Earl, ii. 96, 117-123, 155. Gravesend, i. 129, 132, 136. Gresswell, Mr, ii. 83. Griffin, Sir Lepel, ii. 45. Gubat, see Abou Kru, ii. 164. Gura, ii. 34. Gura plateau, ii. 5. Guyon, General, i. 34.

Hake, Mr Egmont, revives Gordon's retracted libel on Sir Halliday Macartney, 109. Halfiyeh, ii. 141, 167. Hamacem, ii. 5. Hangchow, i. 116. Hankow, i. 68, 69. Hanyang, i. 68. Harcourt, Sir W., ii. 40. Harrar, ii. 25. Haroun Sultan, ii. 10, 32. Hart, Sir Robert, i. 113; ii. 49, 54, 55. Hartington, Marquis of, ii. 96. See Devonshire. Hassan Helmi, ii. 11. Havelock, reference to, ii. 161, 172. Heang Yung, i. 71. Hensall, M., ii. 145. Herbin, M., ii. 144-46. Hicks, Colonel, ii. 102, 103, 109. Hienfung, Emperor, i. 47. Hill, Dr Birkbeck, ii. 11, 47, 65. Holland, Capt., i. 57-60. Holy Land, the, ii. 89-91. Hoo Wang, i. 74, 119. Hoonan, i. 67, 68. Hope, Admiral, i. 45, 49, 57. Hukumdaria, the, ii. 136. Hung-tsiuen, i. 62, see Tien Wang. Huntly family, the, i. 2, 3. Husseinyeh, ii. 148, 149. Hwaiking, i. 69. Hwangho, the, i. 69. Hyson, steamer, i. 81, 83-87, 90-92, 94, 95.

Ibrahim Pasha, i. 141. Idris Ebter, ii. 128. Inkerman, i. 16-7. Ireland, ii. 65-8. Ismail, Khedive, i. 106, 140; his alarm, 143-4; why he appointed Gordon, 145-7, ii. 1-3, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 31; Gordon's opinion of, 114, and passim. Ismail Yakoob Pasha, ii. 144, 146-8. Ismailia, steamer, ii. 99, 148-9.

Jaalin tribe, ii. 164. Jaffa, ii. 89. Jakdul, ii. 161-3; splendid force at, 163, 172. James, Sir H., i. 32. Jebel Gedir, ii. 100. Jebel Masa, ii. 100. Jefferies, Mr, i. 4. Jerusalem, ii. 89. John, King of Abyssinia, ii. 5-6, 32, 33-4. Jones, Captain, i. 92. Jones, Sir Harry, i. 31. Joubert, M., ii. 19. Journal, the, ii. 165.

Kaba Rega, i. 155, 157-9, 162. Kabbabish tribe, the, ii. 104. Kachiaou, i. 56. Kahding, i. 50-2. Kahpoo, i. 91. Kaifong, i. 69. Kajow, the, i. 90-2, 94. Kalgan, i. 48. Kanghi, i. 122. Kars, i. 34, 36. Kassala, ii. 105, 134, 151. Katamori, i. 32. Kawa, i. 98. Kemp, Mr, i. 148. Kemp Terrace, i. 1. Khalifa Abdullah, ii. 169. Khartoum, advantageous position of, i. 141-2; ii. 6, 101-3, 105; panic at, ii. 119; position at, ii. 134-5; scene at, ii. 136; distance from Cairo, ii. 136, 140; position of, 147-8; the only relieving force to, ii. 150; anxiety in England about, ii. 156. Kherson, i. 28. Kimberley, Earl of, ii. 75, 80-1. Kimburn, i. 28. King William's Town, ii. 82. Kinglake, i. 9, 20, 22, 24; opinion of Gordon, i. 25. Kintang, i. 115-6. Kirkham, Major, i. 94. Kitchener, Sir H., Gordon's opinion of, ii. 158; his suggestion, ibid. Kiukiang, i. 68-9. Kolkol, ii. 11. Kongyin, i. 116-8. Kordofan, i. 99, 102. Korosko Desert, i. 154; ii. 143, 155. Korti, ii. 158, 161-3. Kuldja, ii. 50. Kung Prince, i. 123. Kurds, the, i. 36. Kuyukdere, i. 34, 36. Kweiling, i. 66.

Laguerre, Admiral, i. 72. Laing, Mr Samuel, ii. 22. Lar Wang, i. 98-9-100-2, 105, 108. Lardo, i. 155. Lausanne, ii. 38-39. Lazes, the, i. 37. Leeku, i. 97. Leopard tribe, ii. 11. Leopold, King of the Belgians, ii. 39, 89, 91, 92; agrees to compensate Gordon, ibid.; 93-95, 121. Lerothodi, ii. 77, 83-85. Lesseps, M. de, ii. 19-23. Letsea, ii. 77, 82, 83, 85. Li Hung Chang, i. 57, 58; admires Gordon, 80; reconnoitres Quinsan, 84; opposes Burgevine, 89; relations with Macartney, 89, 90; energy of, 95; statement about Gordon, 99; withholds pay, 100; protected by Gordon, ibid.; seeks shelter in Macartney's camp, 106; exonerates Gordon, 107; sends Macartney as envoy to Quinsan, 107; gives a breakfast to Gordon and Macartney, 111; summons Gordon to return, 116; solicitude for Gordon, ibid.; supports Gordon, 119; lays wreath on Gordon's monument, 123; ii. 50, 53-59, 61, 63. Lilley, Mr W. E., i. 13, 135. Limming Pass, i. 70. Linant, M., i. 147, 150. Liprandi, General, i. 17. Livadia, ii. 50. Liyang, i. 114-116, 119. Long, Colonel, i. 147, 157. Loring, Colonel, ii. 5, 6. Low Mun, the, i. 97, 98. Lucknow Residency, resemblance between its siege and Khartoum, ii. 161, 172. Lupton Bey, ii. 105. Lytton, Lord, ii. 45.

Macartney, Sir Halliday: sent to Gordon on a mission, i. 88-9; his work described by Gordon, 89-90; with Gordon on the wall of Soochow, 101; scene there, 103; requested by Gordon to go to Lar Wang's palace, ibid.; his earlier relation with Gordon, 104; offered and accepts succession to command of army, 104-5; what he learnt at the palace, 105; tries to find Gordon, 106; and Li Hung Chang, ibid.; discovers latter in his own camp, ibid.; declines to translate Gordon's letter, ibid.; sent to Quinsan by Li, 107; Gordon shows him the head of Lar Wang, ibid.; scene at the breakfast-table, 108; his advice, 108-9; hastens back to Soochow, 109; Gordon's libel on, 110; explains facts to Sir Harry Parkes and Sir F. Bruce, 110-11; receives letter from Gordon, 111; Gordon's public apology and retractation, 111-12; a full amende, 112; happy termination of incident, 113; ii. 43. Mackinnon, Sir W., ii. 65, 89, 91, 92. Macmahon, Marshal, ii. 137. Magungo, i. 156, 157. Mahdi, the (or Mahomed Ahmed), ii. 98; his first appearance, ibid.; defies Egyptian Government, 99; meaning of name, ibid.; his first victory, 100; defeats Rashed, ibid.; further victories, 101; captures El Obeid, 102; annihilates Hicks's expedition, 104; height of his power, 105; basis of his influence, 105-6; Zebehr on, 130, 135; salaams Gordon, 136; basis of his power, 137; learns of loss of Abbas, 146; arrives before Khartoum, 149; knowledge as to state of Khartoum, 150; exaggerated fear of, 161; aroused by Stewart's advance, 163; sends his best warriors to Bayuda, 164; captures Khartoum, 167; mode of that capture, 169. Mahe, i. 74. Mahmoud Khalifa, ii. 162. Maida, i. 3. Maiwand, ii. 45, 68. Majuba Hill, ii. 70. Malakoff, the, i. 21-23, 26. Malta, ii. 74. Mamelon, the, i. 21, 22. Mansourah, ii. 147. Markham, Mr, i. 80. Marseilles, i. 14, 15. Masindi, i. 157, 159. Massowah, ii. 25, 32-35. Masupha, ii. 77, 80, 82; character of, 83, 85-89. Mauritius, the, ii. 72-75. Mediterranean, the, ii. 74. Medjidieh Order, i. 160; ii. 3. Mehemet Ali, conquers Soudan, i. 141, 154. Menelik, ii. 6, 32. Merowe, ii. 160. Merriman, Mr, ii. 84, 85, 87, 88. Metemmah, ii. 17, 161-166; delay at, 166-7. Moffitt, Dr Andrew, i. 10. Moffitt, Mrs, i. 10. Molappo, i. 77, 82. Mombasa, i. 155. Monding, i. 94. Mow Wang, i. 75, 90, 93, 98-100. Mrooli, i. 158. Mtesa, i. 155, 157-60, 162. Muchir or Marshal, ii. 3. Munzinger Bey, ii. 5. Murchison Falls, i. 157.

Najao, i. 51. Nanking, i. 49, 58, 68, 69, 72, 76, 120; capture of, 121. Nanning, i. 64. Napier of Magdala, Lord, i. 132. Naval Brigade, the, ii. 164. Negus, the, ii. 32. Nelson, references to, ii. 162, 172. New York Herald, ii. 62. Niam Niam, i. 151. Nile, the, ii. 142; "not a bad Nile," 157. Nineteenth Century, The, i. 14; ii. 129. Ningpo, i. 74, 81. Northbrook, Earl of, ii. 96, 132. North China Herald, the, i. 111. North Fort, the, ii. 147. Nubar Pasha, i. 139, 140, 145; ii. 109, 120, 128, 139. Nuehr Agha, i. 158, 159.

O'Donovan, Edmond, ii. 102. Omdurman, i. 141; ii. 102, 103, 136; fort of, 147-8; isolated, 149; capture of, 149, 150, 163, 164; scene at, 169; date of fall, 166. Opium, ii. 63, 64. Orpen, Mr, ii. 80, 84, 85. Osman Bey, i. 35. Osman Digma, ii. 103, 105, 136, 139, 156. Outram, reference to, ii. 161, 172.

Palestine Canal, the, ii. 90, 91. Pall Mall Gazette, the, ii. 111, 120, 124. Paoting-fu, i. 49. Parkes, Sir H., i. 110. Paskievitch, i. 34. Patachiaou, i. 91, 93. Pattison, Mr A., ii. 83. Peking, ii. 46, 47, 56, 70. Pelissier, General, i. 20, 22, 25. Pelissier, Colonel, i. 34. Pembroke Dock, i. 8, 14. Perry, Capt., i. 99. Pitso, A., ii. 79. Power, Mr Frank, ii. 134, 135, 137, 144; leaves on Abbas, ibid.; death of, 145-6. Prestonpans, i. 2. Protet, Admiral, i. 50, 52.

Quarries, the, i. 21. Quinsan, i. 78, 81, 82-88, 90, 107, 108.

Rabi, ii. 29, 32. Raglan, Lord, i. 22, 23, 25. Ragouf Pasha, i. 147. Raouf Bey, i. 149. Raouf Pasha, ii. 25, 98-100. Ras Alula, ii. 33, 34. Ras Arya, ii. 34. Rashed Bey, ii. 100. Ratib Pasha, ii. 5, 6. Redan, the, i. 21-2; attack on, 22-4; second attack, 26-7. Redout, Kaleh, i. 41. Revenue, the, of Soudan, ii. 25-26. Riaz Pasha, ii. 108. Rionga, i. 157-158. Ripon, Marquis of, ii. 42-44, 47-49, 68. Rivers Wilson, Mr, now Sir Charles, ii. 19, 107. Roberts, Lord, ii. 68. Robinson, Sir Hercules, ii. 75, 87. Rockstone Place, i. 127. Rogers, Mr, i. 4. Russia, i. 54-55, 62. Russian Army, Gordon's opinion of, i. 28. Russian Convent at Jerusalem, ii. 90.

Said Pasha, ii. 102. San Diego, ii. 74. San Tajin, i. 81-82, 95-97, 113, 116. Sankolinsin, i. 70. Santals, the, ii. 147-148. Saphia, ii. 147. Saubat, i. 148. Sauer, Mr, ii. 82; betrays Gordon, 83; his treachery, ibid.; his misrepresentation, 84-85. Scanlan, Mr T., ii. 81-82, 88. Schweinfurth, Dr, i. 142-143, 156. Scotia, ii. 76. Sebastopol, i. 16-17, 28-30. Sennaar, ii. 134, 151. Seton, Sir Bruce, ii. 43. Seward, Mr, i. 93. Seychelles, ii. 72, 74. Shabloka, ii. 167. Shaka, ii. 12, 14, 27, 31. Shanghai, i. 49-50-55; Triad rising at, i. 72; loss of Chinese city, i. 73. Shekan, ii. 104. Shendy, ii. 17, 143, 145-147, 158. Shereef Said Hakim, ii. 6. Siaon Edin, i. 85-86. Simmons, Sir Lintorn, i. 33, 41. Siuen-hoa, i. 48. Slatin Pasha, i. 162; ii. 12-13, 16, 104-105, 166, 168-169; his epitaph on Gordon, ii. 170. Slave Trade, i. 148-149, 152-153; proposed regulations, ii. 7; Convention, ii. 8. Smith, Sir Harry, ii. 86. Snake flags, the, i. 136. Soady, Captain, i. 5. Soochow, i. 74-75, 78, 84-87, 91, 94-98, 100-102. Souakim, i. 146; ii. 25, 153. Soudan, meaning of name, i. 141; easily conquered, i. 142; slave trade in, ibid.; situation in, ii. 97; the, Gordon's views on, ii. 111, et seq. passim; people of, ii. 114. Southampton, i. 127; the home at, ii. 93. Speke, Captain, i. 142. Stanley, Mr H. M., ii. 93. Stannard, Mr Arthur, i. 14, 129-130. Stanton, Colonel, i. 32-33; ii. 21. Staveley, Sir Charles, i. 19, 50-52, 54, 56, 58-60, 78, 132. Stead, Mr W. T., ii. 111. Steamers, the penny, ii. 142; bullet marks on, ii. 143, 147, 151. Stewart, Colonel Donald, ii. 122, 125, 137, 141, 144; leaves on Abbas, ibid.; fate of, ii. 144-146; should not have left Gordon, ii. 146. Stewart, Sir Herbert, ii. 162; trammelled by his instructions, ibid.; returns to Jakdul, 163; wounded, 164; death of, 165; his intention, 166. Stokes, Colonel, ii. 19. Strangeways, General, i. 9. "Sudd," the, i. 146. Suders, General, i. 31. Suleiman, Zebehr's son, ii. 10-14, 25-29; execution of, ii. 30; ii. 126-128. Sulina, i. 137. Sultan, proposal to surrender Soudan to the, ii. 119, 121. Sultan Idris, ii. 29. Summer Palace at Peking, i. 45-46. Sungkiang, i. 54-55, 60, 78-80, 83, 88, 90, 121. Sussex Regiment, the, ii. 164.

Ta Edin, i. 85, 91. Taeping, meaning of name, i. 65. Taepings, the, i. 50, 53-54, 59 (see Chapter IV.); capture Nanking, i. 68; march on Peking, i. 69-70; their military strength, i. 75; and the missionaries, i. 76. Taiho Lake, i. 95, 101-102, 113. Taitong, i. 48. Taitsan, i. 52, 59, 80-83. Taiyuen, i. 49. Takee, i. 54, 56-58. Taku Forts, i. 45, 47; ii. 59. Talataween, ii. 147, 167. Tamanieb, ii. 156. Taoukwang, i. 61. Tapp, Colonel, i. 119. Taunton, i. 4. Tayan, i. 119. Tchad, Lake, ii. 10. Tchernaya, i. 17, 26. Teb, ii. 156. Tewfik Pasha (Khedive), ii. 31-32, 36, 106-109, 118, 125, 139. Thaba Bosigo, ii. 77. Thames Forts, i. 129-130. Theodore, ii. 33. Tientsin, i. 45-47, 70. Tien Wang, i. 49, 62, 65; occupies Nanking, i. 68; retires into his palace, i. 71-72; death of, i. 120-121. Times, The, i. 124; ii. 40, 66, 68, 92, 94, 110, 116-117, 134. Ti-Tu, i. 122. Todleben, General, i. 17. Tokar, ii. 105, 136. Transkei, the, ii. 77. Travers, Colonel John, i. 6. Trebizonde, i. 34. Triads, the, i. 61, 66. Tseedong, i. 56. Tseki, i. 57. Tseng Marquis, ii. 59. Tseng Kwofan, i. 67-68, 72-73, 120. Tseng Kwotsiuen, i. 74. Tsing, i. 70. Tsinghai, i. 70. Tsingpu, i. 50-52, 54-55, 57. Tsipu, i. 50. Tung Wang, i. 71. Tunting, i. 67. Tuti Island, ii. 147, 167.

Uganda, i. 155, 159. Unyoro, i. 155, 157.

Victoria Lake, i. 155-156. Vivian, Mr (afterwards Lord), ii. 1-2, 20, 38. Vivian, Mrs, ii. 39.

Wadelai, i. 155. Wade, Sir Thomas, ii. 53-55. Wady Halfa, i. 144; ii. 138-139, 154, 159, 161. Waiquaidong, i. 85-86, 95. Waisso, i. 117, 119. Walad el Michael, ii. 5, 6, 33. Wales, Prince of, ii. 43. Wales, Princess of, ii. 43. Wall, the Great, i. 47-9. Wangchi, i. 101. Wangs, the, i. 65. Wangs, execution of, i. 102. Wanti, i. 95. War Office, ii. 92, 93 passim. Ward, i. 54-57. Watson, Colonel Charles, i. 148; ii. 96, 128-30, 165. Watson, Mrs, ii. 96, 165. Willes, Capt., i. 51, 52. Wilson, Sir Charles, succeeds to the command, ii. 165; his book "Korti to Khartoum," ibid.; not to be made a scapegoat, 166; the letter in his charge, ibid.; sails for Khartoum, 167; under hot fire, ibid.; wrecked, ibid.; rescued by Lord C. Beresford, ibid.; the letter in his charge, ibid.; comparatively small measure of his responsibility, 172. Wittgenstein, Prince F. von, i. 102. Wokong, i. 94. Wolseley, Lord, ii. 95, 96, 121, 125, 138; receives message from Gordon, 151; his letter of 24th July, 157; largely responsible for Khartoum mission, ibid.; his address to the soldiers, 158; his view of the expedition, 159; receives full news of Gordon's desperate situation, 160; his grand and deliberate plan, 161; perfect but for—Time, ibid.; will risk nothing, 162; his instructions to Sir Herbert Stewart, ibid.; sole responsibility of, 171; ties Stewart's hands, ibid.; the real person responsible for death of Gordon and failure of expedition, 172. Wongepoo, i. 57. Wongkadza, i. 50, 56. Wood, Sir Evelyn, ii. 125. Woolwich Common, i. 1. Wouchang, i. 68. Wou Sankwei, i. 67, 122. Wuliungchow, i. 94, 95. Wurantai, i. 64, 66. Wusieh, i. 94, 95, 113, 116.

Yakoob Khan, ii. 44-49, 68. Yalpukh, i. 32. Yangchow, i. 69. Yellow Jacket Order, its origin, i. 122. Yesing, i. 114, 115. Yungan, i. 66. Yusuf Pasha, ii. 101.

Zanzibar, ii. 65. Zebehr Rahama, i. 143, 144; ii. 10, 13, 32, 98, 101, 105, 110, 111, 118, 119, 124-26; interview with Gordon, 128-29; doubts as to his real attitude, 129-30; letters to Miss Gordon, 130-32; to Sir Henry Gordon, 132; his power, 133. Zeila, ii. 25. Zouaves, the, i. 20.

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[Transcriber's Notes:

The transcriber made the following changes to the text to correct obvious errors:

1. p. 110, Madhi's —> Mahdi's 2. p. 137, opinons —>opinions 3. p. 142, trooops —> troops 4. p. 144, beween —> between 5. p. 149, Thoughout —> Throughout 6. p. 153, Madhi —> Mahdi 7. p. 166, Madhi —> Mahdi 8. p. 175, Burnaby, ... i. 164. —> Burnaby, ... ii. 164. 9. p. 178, returns to Cairo, 164; —> returns to Cairo, 163; 10. p. 180, Hicks, Colonel, 102 —> Hicks, Colonel, ii. 102 11. p. 182, Outram, ... i. 161, 172. —> Outram, ... ii. 161, 172. 12. p. 183, Suleiman ... 25-19 —> Suleiman ... 25-29

End of Transcriber's Notes]