This conversation being communicated to Arnold, he caught eagerly at the proposition, though without openly discovering any solicitude on the subject; and, in the beginning of August, repaired to camp, where he renewed the solicitations which had before been made indirectly.

At this juncture, Sir Henry Clinton embarked on an expedition he meditated against Rhode Island, and General Washington was advancing on New York. He offered Arnold the left wing of the army, which that officer declined under the pretexts mentioned in his letter to General Schuyler.

Incapable of suspecting a man who had given such distinguished proofs of courage and patriotism, the Commander-in-chief was neither alarmed at his refusal to embrace so splendid an opportunity of recovering the favour of his countrymen, nor at the embarrassment accompanying that refusal. Pressing the subject no farther, he assented to the request which had been made, and invested Arnold with the command of West Point. Previous to his soliciting this station, he had, in a letter to Colonel Robinson, signified his change of principles, and his wish to restore himself to the favour of his Prince by some signal proof of his repentance. This letter opened the way to a correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton, the immediate object of which, after obtaining the appointment he had solicited, was to concert the means of delivering the important post he commanded to the British general.

Major John Andre, an aid-de-camp of Sir Henry Clinton, and adjutant general of the British army, was selected as the person to whom the maturing of Arnold's treason, and the arrangements for its execution should be entrusted. A correspondence was carried on between them under a mercantile disguise, in the feigned names of Gustavus and Anderson; and, at length, to facilitate their communications, the Vulture sloop of war moved up the North River, and took a station convenient for the purpose, but not so near as to excite suspicion.

[Sidenote: Treason and escape of Arnold.]

The time when General Washington met the Count de Rochambeau at Hartford was selected for the final adjustment of the plan; and, as a personal interview was deemed necessary, Major Andre came up the river, and went on board the Vulture. The house of a Mr. Smith, without the American posts, was appointed for the interview; and to that place both parties repaired in the night—Andre being brought under a pass for John Anderson, in a boat despatched from the shore. While the conference was yet unfinished, day light approached; and, to avoid discovery, Arnold proposed that Andre should remain concealed until the succeeding night. He is understood to have refused peremptorily to be carried within the American posts; but the promise to respect this objection was not observed. They continued together the succeeding day; and when, in the following night, his return to the Vulture was proposed, the boatmen refused to carry him because she had shifted her station during the day, in consequence of a gun which was moved to the shore without the knowledge of Arnold, and brought to bear upon her. This embarrassing circumstance reduced him to the necessity of endeavouring to reach New York by land. To accomplish this purpose, he reluctantly yielded to the urgent representations of Arnold; and, laying aside his regimentals, which he had hitherto worn under a surtout, put on a plain suit of clothes, and received a pass from General Arnold, authorizing him, under the name of John Anderson, to proceed on the public service to the White Plains, or lower if he thought proper.

With this permit, he had passed all the guards and posts on the road unsuspected, and was proceeding to New York in perfect security, when one of three militia men who were employed between the lines of the two armies, springing suddenly from his covert into the road, seized the reins of his bridle, and stopped his horse. Losing his accustomed self-possession, Major Andre, instead of producing the pass[43] from General Arnold, asked the man hastily where he belonged? He replied "to below;" a term implying that he was from New York. "And so," said Andre, not suspecting deception, "am I." He then declared himself to be a British officer on urgent business, and begged that he might not be detained. The appearance of the other militia men disclosed his mistake, too late to correct it. He offered a purse of gold, and a valuable watch, with tempting promises of ample reward from his government, if they would permit him to escape; but his offers were rejected, and his captors proceeded to search him. They found concealed in his boots, in Arnold's hand writing, papers containing all the information which could be important respecting West Point. When carried before Lieutenant Colonel Jameson, the officer commanding the scouting parties on the lines, he still maintained his assumed character, and requested Jameson to inform his commanding officer that Anderson was taken. Jameson despatched an express with this communication. On receiving it, Arnold comprehended the full extent of his danger, and, flying from well merited punishment, took refuge on board the Vulture.

[Footnote 43: Mr. Johnson says he did produce it; but that, on being surprised, he had thrust a paper containing a plan of the route in his boot, which, having been perceived, was demanded, and led to his discovery.]



When sufficient time for the escape of Arnold was supposed to have elapsed, Andre, no longer affecting concealment, acknowledged himself to be the adjutant general of the British army. Jameson, seeking to correct the mischief of his indiscreet communication to Arnold, immediately despatched a packet to the Commander-in-chief containing the papers which had been discovered, with a letter from Andre, relating the manner of his capture, and accounting for the disguise he had assumed.

The express was directed to meet the Commander-in-chief, who was then on his return from Hartford; but, taking different roads,[44] they missed each other, and a delay attended the delivery of the papers, which insured the escape of Arnold.

[Footnote 44: General Lafayette adds some circumstances which are not found among the manuscript papers of General Washington. The Commander-in-chief with Generals Lafayette and Knox had turned from the direct route in order to visit a redoubt. Colonels Hamilton and M'Henry, the aids-de-camp of Generals Washington and Lafayette, went forward to request Mrs. Arnold not to wait breakfast. Arnold received Andre's billet in their presence. He turned pale, left them suddenly, called his wife, communicated the intelligence to her and left her in a swoon, without the knowledge of Hamilton and M'Henry. Mounting the horse of his aid-de-camp, which was ready saddled, and directing him to inform General Washington on his arrival that Arnold was gone to receive him at West Point, he gained the river shore, and was conveyed in a canoe to the Vulture.

The Commander-in-chief, on his arrival, was informed that Arnold awaited him at West Point. Taking it for granted that this step had been taken to prepare for his reception, he proceeded thither without entering the house, and was surprised to find that Arnold was not arrived. On returning to the quarters of that officer he received Jameson's despatch, which disclosed the whole mystery.]

[Sidenote: Precautions for the security of West Point.]

Every precaution was immediately taken for the security of West Point; after which, the attention of the Commander-in-chief was turned to Andre. A board of general officers, of which Major General Greene was president, and the two foreign generals, Lafayette and Steuben, were members, was called, to report a precise state of his case, and to determine the character in which he was to be considered, and the punishment to which he was liable.

The frankness and magnanimity with which Andre had conducted himself from the time of his appearance in his real character, had made a very favourable impression on all those with whom he had held any intercourse. From this cause he experienced every mark of indulgent attention which was compatible with his situation; and, from a sense of justice as well as of delicacy, was informed, on the opening of the examination, that he was at liberty not to answer any interrogatory which might embarrass his own feelings. But, as if only desirous to rescue his character from imputations which he dreaded more than death, he confessed every thing material to his own condemnation, but would divulge nothing which might involve others.

[Sidenote: Trial and execution of Major Andre.]

The board reported the essential facts which had appeared, with their opinion that Major Andre was a spy, and ought to suffer death. The execution of this sentence was ordered to take place on the day succeeding that on which it was pronounced.

Superior to the terrors of death, but dreading disgrace, Andre was deeply affected by the mode of execution which the laws of war decree to persons in his situation. He wished to die like a soldier, not as a criminal. To obtain a mitigation of his sentence in this respect, he addressed a letter[45] to General Washington, replete with the feelings of a man of sentiment and honour. But the occasion required that the example should make its full impression, and this request could not be granted. He encountered his fate with composure and dignity; and his whole conduct interested the feelings of all who witnessed it.

[Footnote 45: See note No. IV. at the end of the volume.]

The general officers lamented the sentence which the usages of war compelled them to pronounce; and never perhaps did the Commander-in-chief obey with more reluctance the stern mandates of duty and policy. The sympathy excited among the American officers by his fate, was as universal as it is unusual on such occasions; and proclaims alike the merit of him who suffered, and the humanity of those who inflicted the punishment.

Great exertions were made by Sir Henry Clinton, to whom Andre was particularly dear, first, to have him considered as protected by a flag of truce, and afterwards, as a prisoner of war.

Even Arnold had the hardihood to interpose. After giving a certificate of facts tending, as he supposed, to exculpate the prisoner, exhausting his powers of reasoning on the case, and appealing to the humanity of the American general, he sought to intimidate that officer, by stating the situation of many of the most distinguished individuals of South Carolina, who had forfeited their lives, but had hitherto been spared through the clemency of the British general. This clemency, he said, could no longer be extended to them should Major Andre suffer.

It may well be supposed that the interposition of Arnold could have no influence on Washington. He conveyed Mrs. Arnold to her husband in New York,[46] and also transmitted his clothes and baggage, for which he had written; but, in every other respect, his letters, which were unanswered, were also unnoticed.

[Footnote 46: General Lafayette mentions a circumstance not previously known to the author, which serves to illustrate the character of Washington, and to mark the delicacy of his feelings towards even the offending part of that sex which is entitled to all the consolation and protection man can afford it.

The night after Arnold's escape, when his letter respecting Andre was received, the general directed one of his aids to wait on Mrs. Arnold, who was convulsed with grief, and inform her that he had done every thing which depended on him to arrest her husband, but that, not having succeeded, it gave him pleasure to inform her that her husband was safe. It is also honourable to the American character, that during the effervescence of the moment, Mrs. Arnold was permitted to go to Philadelphia, to take possession of her effects, and to proceed to New York under the protection of a flag, without receiving the slightest insult.]

The mingled sentiments of admiration and compassion excited in every bosom for the unfortunate Andre, seemed to increase the detestation in which Arnold was held. "Andre," said General Washington in a private letter, "has met his fate with that fortitude which was to be expected from an accomplished man and a gallant officer; but I am mistaken if at this time Arnold is undergoing the torments of a mental hell. He wants feeling. From some traits[47] of his character which have lately come to my knowledge, he seems to have been so hardened in crime, so lost to all sense of honour and shame, that, while his faculties still enable him to continue his sordid pursuits, there will be no time for remorse."

[Footnote 47: This allusion is thus explained in a private letter from Colonel Hamilton—"This man (Arnold) is in every sense despicable. In addition to the scene of knavery and prostitution during his command in Philadelphia, which the late seizure of his papers has unfolded, the history of his command at West Point is a history of little as well as great villanies. He practised every dirty act of peculation, and even stooped to connexions with the suttlers to defraud the public."]

From motives of policy, or of respect for his engagements, Sir Henry Clinton conferred on Arnold the commission of a brigadier general in the British service, which he preserved throughout the war. Yet it is impossible that rank could have rescued him from the contempt and detestation in which the generous, the honourable, and the brave, could not cease to hold him. It was impossible for men of this description to bury the recollection of his being a traitor, a sordid traitor, first the slave of his rage, then purchased with gold, and finally secured at the expense of the blood of one of the most accomplished officers in the British army.

His representations of the discontent of the country and of the army concurring with reports from other quarters, had excited the hope that the loyalists and the dissatisfied, allured by British gold, and the prospect of rank in the British service, would flock to his standard, and form a corps at whose head he might again display his accustomed intrepidity. With this hope he published an address to the inhabitants of America, in which he laboured to palliate his own guilt, and to increase their dissatisfaction with the existing state of things.

This appeal to the public was followed by a proclamation addressed "To the officers and soldiers of the continental army, who have the real interests of their country at heart, and who are determined to be no longer the tools and dupes of congress or of France."

The object of this proclamation was to induce the officers and soldiers to desert the cause they had embraced from principle, by holding up to them the very flattering offers of the British general, and contrasting the substantial emoluments of the British service with their present deplorable condition. He attempted to cover this dishonourable proposition with a decent garb, by representing the base step he invited them to take, as the only measure which could restore peace, real liberty, and happiness, to their country.

These inducements did not produce their intended effect. Although the temper of the army might be irritated by real suffering, and by the supposed neglect of government, no diminution of patriotism had been produced. Through all the hardships, irritations, and vicissitudes of the war, Arnold remains the solitary instance of an American officer who abandoned the side first embraced in this civil contest, and turned his sword upon his former companions in arms.

When the probable consequences of this plot, had it been successful, were considered, and the combination of apparent accidents by which it was discovered and defeated, was recollected, all were filled with awful astonishment; and the devout perceived in the transaction, the hand of Providence guiding America to independence.

The thanks of congress were voted to the three militia men[48] who had rendered this invaluable service; and a silver medal, with an inscription expressive of their fidelity and patriotism, was directed to be presented to each of them. In addition to this flattering testimonial of their worth, and as a farther evidence of national gratitude, a resolution was passed granting to each, two hundred dollars per annum during life, to be paid in specie or an equivalent in current money.

[Footnote 48: Their names were John Paulding, David Williams, and Isaac Vanwert.]

The efforts of General Washington to obtain a permanent military force, or its best substitute, a regular system for filling the vacant ranks with draughts who should join the army on the first day of January in each year, were still continued. Notwithstanding the embarrassments with which congress was surrounded, it is not easy to find adequate reasons for the neglect of representations so interesting, and of recommendations apparently so essential to the safety of the United States.

[Sidenote: Parties in Congress.]

Private letters disclose the fact that two parties still agitated congress. One entered fully into the views of the Commander-in-chief. The other, jealous of the army, and apprehensive of its hostility to liberty when peace should be restored, remained unwilling to give stability to its constitution by increasing the numbers who were to serve during the war. They seemed to dread the danger from the enemy to which its fluctuations would expose them, less than the danger which might be apprehended for the civil authority from its permanent character. They caught with avidity at every intelligence which encouraged the flattering hope of a speedy peace,[49] but entered reluctantly into measures founded on the supposition that the war might be of long duration. Perfectly acquainted with the extent of the jealousies entertained on this subject, although, to use his own expressions to a friend, "Heaven knows how unjustly," General Washington had foreborne to press the necessity of regular and timely reinforcements to his army so constantly and so earnestly as his own judgment directed. But the experience of every campaign furnished such strong additional evidences of the impolicy and danger of continuing to rely on temporary expedients, and the uncertainty of collecting a force to co-operate with the auxiliaries from France was so peculiarly embarrassing, that he at length resolved to conquer the delicacy by which he had been in some degree restrained, and to open himself fully on the subject which he deemed more essential than any other to the success of the war.

[Footnote 49: The following extract from a private letter of General Washington to a member of congress, shows how sensible he was of the mischief produced by this temper. "The satisfaction I have in any successes that attend us, even in the alleviation of misfortunes, is always allayed by the fear that it will lull us into security. Supineness, and a disposition to flatter ourselves, seem to make parts of our national character. When we receive a check and are not quite undone, we are apt to fancy we have gained a victory; and when we do gain any little advantage, we imagine it decisive, and expect the war immediately to end. The history of the war is a history of false hopes and temporary expedients. Would to God they were to end here! This winter, if I am not mistaken, will open a still more embarrassing scene than we have yet experienced, to the southward. I have little doubt, should we not gain a naval superiority, that Sir Henry Clinton will detach to the southward to extend his conquests. I am far from being satisfied that we shall be prepared to repel his attempts."]

[Sidenote: August.]

In August, while looking anxiously for such a reinforcement to the Chevalier de Tunay as would give him the command of the American seas, and while uncertain whether the campaign might not pass away without giving a single advantage promised at its opening, he transmitted a letter to congress, fully and freely imparting his sentiments on the state of things.

[Sidenote: Letter of General Washington on American affairs.]

As this letter contains an exact statement of American affairs, according to the view taken of them by General Washington, and a faithful picture of the consequences of the ruinous policy which had been pursued, drawn by the man best acquainted with them, copious extracts from it will, at least, be excused.

After examining the sources of supplies for the campaign, he proceeds to say—"But while we are meditating offensive operations which may not be undertaken at all, or, being undertaken, may fail, I am persuaded congress are not inattentive to the present state of the army, and will view in the same light with me the necessity of providing in time against a period (the first of January) when one half of our present force will dissolve. The shadow of an army that will remain, will have every motive, except mere patriotism, to abandon the service, without the hope which has hitherto supported them, of a change for the better. This is almost extinguished now, and certainly will not outlive the campaign, unless it finds something more substantial to rest upon. This is a truth of which every spectator of the distresses of the army can not help being convinced. Those at a distance may speculate differently; but on the spot an opinion to the contrary, judging human nature on the usual scale, would be chimerical.

"The honourable the committee of congress, who have seen and heard for themselves, will add their testimony to mine; and the wisdom and justice of congress can not fail to give it the most serious attention. To me it will appear miraculous, if our affairs can maintain themselves much longer in their present train. If either the temper or the resources of the country will not admit of an alteration, we may expect soon to be reduced to the humiliating condition of seeing the cause of America, in America, upheld by foreign arms. The generosity of our allies has a claim to all our confidence, and all our gratitude; but it is neither for the honour of America, nor for the interest of the common cause, to leave the work entirely to them."

He then reviewed the resources of Great Britain; and, after showing her ability still to prosecute the war, added—"The inference from these reflections is, that we can not count upon a speedy end of the war; and that it is the true policy of America not to content herself with temporary expedients, but to endeavour, if possible, to give consistency and solidity to her measures. An essential step to this will be immediately to devise a plan and put it in execution, for providing men in time to replace those who will leave us at the end of the year; and for subsisting and for making a reasonable allowance to the officers and soldiers.

"The plan for this purpose ought to be of general operation, and such as will execute itself. Experience has shown that a peremptory draught will be the only effectual one. If a draught for the war or for three years can be effected, it ought to be made on every account; a shorter period than a year is inadmissible.

"To one who has been witness to the evils brought upon us by short enlistments, the system appears to have been pernicious beyond description; and a crowd of motives present themselves to dictate a change. It may easily be shown that all the misfortunes we have met with in the military line, are to be attributed to this cause.

"Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting at Brandywine with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of every thing in a situation neither to resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these states, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by five thousand men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance, and a want of enterprise in the enemy; we should not have been, the greatest part of the war, inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them, pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford; to see the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same cause."

After presenting in detail the embarrassments under which the civil departments of the army also had laboured, in consequence of the expensiveness and waste inseparable from its temporary character, he proceeded to observe—"There is every reason to believe, that the war has been protracted on this account. Our opposition being less, made the successes of the enemy greater. The fluctuation of the army kept alive their hopes; and at every period of a dissolution of a considerable part of it, they have flattered themselves with some decisive advantages. Had we kept a permanent army on foot, the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since. If the army is left in its present situation, it must continue an encouragement to the efforts of the enemy; if it is put in a respectable one, it must have a contrary effect; and nothing I believe will tend more to give us peace the ensuing winter. Many circumstances will contribute to a negotiation. An army on foot, not only for another campaign, but for several campaigns, would determine the enemy to pacific measures, and enable us to insist upon favourable terms in forcible language. An army insignificant in numbers, dissatisfied, crumbling to pieces, would be the strongest temptation they could have to try the experiment a little longer. It is an old maxim that the surest way to make a good peace is to be well prepared for war.

"I can not forbear returning in this place to the necessity of a more ample and equal provision for the army. The discontents on this head have been gradually matured to a dangerous extremity. There are many symptoms that alarm and distress me. Endeavours are using to unite both officers and men in a general refusal of the money, and some corps now actually decline receiving it. Every method has been taken to counteract it, because such a combination in the army would be a severe blow to our declining currency. The most moderate insist that the accounts of depreciation ought to be liquidated at stated periods, and certificates given by government for the sums due. They will not be satisfied with a general declaration that it shall be made good.

"I have often said, and I beg leave to repeat it, the half pay provision is in my opinion the most politic and effectual that can be adopted. On the whole, if something satisfactory be not done, the army (already so much reduced in officers by daily resignations as not to have a sufficiency to do the common duties of it) must either cease to exist at the end of the campaign, or will exhibit an example of more virtue, fortitude, self-denial, and perseverance, than has perhaps ever yet been paralleled in the history of human enthusiasm.

"The dissolution of the army is an event that can not be regarded with indifference. It would bring accumulated distress upon us; it would throw the people of America into a general consternation; it would discredit our cause throughout the world; it would shock our allies. To think of replacing the officers with others is visionary. The loss of the veteran soldiers could not be replaced. To attempt to carry on the war with militia against disciplined troops, will be to attempt what the common sense and common experience of mankind will pronounce to be impracticable. But I should fail in respect to congress, to dwell on observations of this kind in a letter to them."

[Sidenote: Proceedings of Congress respecting the army.]

At length the committee presented their report, reorganizing the regiments, reducing their number, and apportioning on the several states their respective numbers to complete the establishment. This report, being approved by congress, was transmitted to the Commander-in-chief for his consideration. By this arrangement, the states were required to recruit their quotas for the war, and to bring them into the field by the first of January; but, if in any state, it should be found impracticable to raise the men for the war by the first day of December, it was recommended to such state to supply the deficiency with men engaged to serve for not less than one year.

In compliance with the request of congress, General Washington submitted his objections to the plan, in a long and respectful letter.

He recommended that legionary corps should be substituted in the place of regiments entirely of cavalry. He thought it more adviseable that the infantry attached to the cavalry should compose a part of the corps permanently, than that it should be drawn occasionally from the regiments of foot.

The reduction in the number of regiments appeared to him a subject of great delicacy. The last reduction, he said, had occasioned many to quit the service, independent of those who were discontinued; and had left durable seeds of discontent among those who remained. The general topic of declamation was, that it was as hard as dishonourable, for men who had made every sacrifice to the service, to be turned out of it, at the pleasure of those in power, without an adequate compensation. In the maturity to which their uneasiness had now risen from a continuance of misery, they would be still more impatient under an attempt of a similar nature.

It was not, he said, the intention of his remarks to discourage a reform, but to show the necessity of guarding against the ill effects which might otherwise attend it, by making an ample provision both for the officers who should remain in the service, and for those who should be reduced. This should be the basis of the plan; and without it, the most mischievous consequences were to be apprehended. He was aware of the difficulty of making a present provision sufficiently ample to give satisfaction; but this only proved the expediency of making one for the future, and brought him to that which he had so frequently recommended as the most economical, the most politic, and the most effectual, that could be devised; this was half pay for life. Supported by the prospect of a permanent provision, the officers would be tied to the service, and would submit to many momentary privations, and to those inconveniences, which the situation of public affairs rendered unavoidable. If the objection drawn from the principle that the measure was incompatible with the genius of the government should be thought insurmountable, he would propose a substitute, less eligible in his opinion, but which would answer the purpose. It was to make the present half pay for seven years, whole pay for the same period. He also recommended that depreciation on the pay received, should be made up to the officers who should be reduced.

No objection occurred to the measure now recommended, but the expense it would occasion. In his judgment, whatever would give consistency to the military establishment, would be ultimately favourable to economy. It was not easy to be conceived, except by those who had witnessed it, what an additional waste and increased consumption of every thing, and consequently what an increase of expense, resulted from laxness of discipline in an army; and where officers thought they did a favour by holding their commissions, and the men were continually fluctuating, to maintain discipline was impossible. Nothing could be more obvious to him than that a sound military establishment and real economy were the same. That the purposes of war would be greatly promoted by it was too clear to admit of argument. He objected also to the mode of effecting the reduction. This was by leaving it to the several states to select the officers who should remain in service. He regretted that congress had not thought proper to retain the reduction and incorporation of the regiments under their own discretion. He regretted that it should be left to the states, not only because it was an adherence to the state system, which in the arrangements of the army, he disapproved; but because also he feared it would introduce much confusion and discontent in a business which ought to be conducted with the greatest circumspection. He feared also that professing to select the officers to be retained in service would give disgust both to those who should be discontinued, and to those who should remain. The former would be sent away under the public stigma of inferior merit, and the latter would feel no pleasure in a present preference, when they reflected that, at some future period, they might experience a similar fate.

He wished with much sincerity that congress had been pleased to make no alteration in the term of service, but had confined their requisition to men who should serve for the war, to be raised by enlistment, draught, or assessment, as might be found necessary. As it now stood, there would be very few men for the war, and all the evils of temporary engagements would still be felt. In the present temper of the states, he entertained the most flattering hopes that they would enter on vigorous measures to raise an army for the war, if congress appeared decided respecting it; but if they held up a different idea as admissible, it would be again concluded that they did not think an army for the war essential. This would encourage the opposition of men of narrow, interested, and feeble tempers, and enable them to defeat the primary object of the revolution.

This letter was taken into consideration; and the measures it recommended were pursued in almost every particular. Even the two great principles which were viewed with most jealousy,—an army for the war, and half pay for life,—were adopted. It would have greatly abridged the calamities of America, could these resolutions have been carried into execution. Every effort for the purpose was made by the Commander-in-chief.

To place the officers of the army in a situation which would render their commissions valuable, and hold out to them the prospect of a comfortable old age, in a country saved by their blood, their sufferings, and the labours of their best years, was an object which had always been dear to the heart of General Washington, and he had seized every opportunity to press it on congress. That body had approached it slowly, taking step after step with apparent reluctance, as the necessity of the measure became more and more obvious.

The first resolution on the subject, passed in May, 1778, allowed to all military officers who should continue in service during the war, and not hold any office of profit under the United States or any of them, half pay for seven years, if they lived so long. At the same time the sum of eighty dollars, in addition to his pay, was granted to every non-commissioned officer and soldier who should serve to the end of the war. In 1779 this subject was resumed. After much debate, its farther consideration was postponed; and the officers and soldiers were recommended to the attention of their several states, with a declaration that their patriotism, valour, and perseverance, in defence of the rights and liberties of their country, had entitled them to the gratitude, as well as the approbation of their fellow citizens.

In 1780, a memorial from the general officers, depicting in strong terms the situation of the army, and requiring present support, and some future provision, was answered by a reference to what had been already done, and by a declaration "That patience, self-denial, fortitude and perseverance, and the cheerful sacrifice of time and health, are necessary virtues which both the citizen and soldier are called to exercise, while struggling for the liberties of their country; and that moderation, frugality, and temperance, must be among the chief supports, as well as the brightest ornaments of that kind of civil government which is wisely instituted by the several states in this Union."

This philosophic lecture on the virtues of temperance to men who were often without food, and always scantily supplied, was still calculated to assuage irritations fomented by the neglect which was believed to have been sustained. In a few days afterwards, the subject was brought again before congress, and a more conciliating temper was manifested. The odious restriction, limiting the half pay for seven years to those who should hold no post of profit under the United States or any of them, was removed; and the bounty allowed the men was extended to the widows and orphans of those who had died or should die in the service; at length, the vote passed which has been stated, allowing half pay for life to all officers who should serve in the armies of the United States to the end of the war.

Resolutions were also passed, recommending it to the several states to make up the depreciation on the pay which had been received by the army; and it was determined that their future services should be compensated in the money of the new emission, the value of which, it was supposed, might be kept up by taxes and by loans.

While the government of the Union was thus employed in maturing measures for the preservation of its military establishment, the time for action passed away without furnishing any material event. The hostile armies continued to watch each other until the season of the year forced them out of the field.

Just before retiring into winter quarters, a handsome enterprise was executed by Major Talmadge, of Colonel Sheldon's regiment of light dragoons. That gentleman had been generally stationed on the lines, on the east side of the North River, and had been distinguished for the accuracy of his intelligence.

He was informed that a large magazine of forage had been collected at Coram, on Long Island, which was protected by the militia of the country, the cruisers in the Sound, and a small garrison in its neighbourhood.

[Sidenote: Major Talmadge destroys the British stores at Coram.]

[Sidenote: Nov. 21.]

At the head of a detachment of eighty dismounted dragoons, under the command of Captain Edgar, and of eight or ten who were mounted, he passed the Sound where it was twenty miles wide, marched across the island in the night, and so completely surprised the fort, that his troops entered the works on three different sides before the garrison was prepared to resist them. The British took refuge in two houses connected with the fortifications, and commenced a fire from the doors and windows. These were instantly forced open; and the whole party, amounting to fifty-four, among whom were a lieutenant colonel, captain, and subaltern, were killed or taken. Stores to a considerable amount were destroyed, the fort was demolished, and the magazines were consumed by fire. The objects of the expedition being accomplished, Major Talmadge recrossed the Sound without having lost a man. On the recommendation of General Washington, congress passed a resolution, expressing a high sense of the merit of those engaged in the expedition.

[Sidenote: December.]

[Sidenote: The army retires into winter quarters.]

No objects for enterprise presenting themselves, the troops were placed in winter quarters early in December. The Pennsylvania line was stationed near Morristown; the Jersey line about Pompton, on the confines of New York and New Jersey; and the troops belonging to the New England states, at West Point, and in its vicinity, on both sides the North River. The line of the state of New York remained at Albany, to which place it had been detached for the purpose of opposing an invasion from Canada.

[Sidenote: Irruption of Major Carlton into New York.]

Major Carlton, at the head of one thousand men, composed of Europeans, Indians, and Tories, had made a sudden irruption into the northern parts of New York, and taken forts Ann and George, with their garrisons. At the same time, Sir John Johnson, at the head of a corps composed of the same materials, appeared on the Mohawk. Several sharp skirmishes were fought in that quarter with the continental troops, and a regiment of new levies, aided by the militia of the country. General Clinton's brigade was ordered to their assistance; but before he could reach the scene of action, the invading armies had retired, after laying waste the whole country through which they passed.

[Sidenote: European transactions.]

While the disorder of the American finances, the exhausted state of the country, and the debility of the government, determined Great Britain to persevere in offensive war against the United States, by keeping alive her hopes of conquest, Europe assumed an aspect not less formidable to the permanent grandeur of that nation, than hostile to its present views. In the summer of 1780, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, entered into the celebrated compact, which has been generally denominated "THE ARMED NEUTRALITY." Holland had also declared a determination to accede to the same confederacy; and it is not improbable that this measure contributed to the declaration of war which was made by Great Britain against that power towards the close of the present year.

The long friendship which had existed between the two nations was visibly weakened from the commencement of the American war. Holland was peculiarly desirous of participating in that commerce which the independence of the United States would open to the world: and, from the commencement of hostilities, her merchants, especially those of Amsterdam, watched the progress of the war with anxiety, and engaged in speculations which were profitable to themselves and beneficial to the United States. The remonstrances made by the British minister at the Hague against this conduct, were answered in the most amicable manner by the government, but the practice of individuals continued the same.

When the war broke out between France and England, a number of Dutch vessels trading with France, laden with materials for shipbuilding, were seized, and carried into the ports of Great Britain, although the existing treaties between the two nations were understood to exclude those articles from the list of contraband of war. The British cabinet justified these acts of violence, and persisted in refusing to permit naval stores to be carried to her enemy in neutral bottoms. This refusal, however, was accompanied with friendly professions, with an offer to pay for the vessels and cargoes already seized, and with proposals to form new stipulations for the future regulation of that commerce.

The States General refused to enter into any negotiations for the modification of subsisting treaties; and the merchants of all the great trading towns, especially those of Amsterdam, expressed the utmost indignation at the injuries they had sustained. In consequence of this conduct, the British government required those succours which were stipulated in ancient treaties, and insisted that the casus foederis had now occurred. Advantage was taken of the refusal of the States General to comply with this demand, to declare the treaties between the two nations at an end.

The temper produced by this state of things, inclined Holland to enter into the treaty for an armed neutrality; and, in November, the Dutch government acceded to it. Some unknown causes prevented the actual signature of the treaty on the part of the States General, until a circumstance occurred which was used for the purpose of placing them in a situation not to avail themselves of the aid stipulated by that confederacy to its members.

While Mr. Lee, one of the ministers of the United States, was on a mission to the courts of Vienna and Berlin, he fell in company with a Mr. John de Neufwille, a merchant of Amsterdam, with whom he held several conversations on the subject of a commercial intercourse between the two nations, the result of which was, that the plan of an eventual commercial treaty was sketched out, as one which might thereafter be concluded between them. This paper had received the approbation of the Pensionary Van Berkel, and of the city of Amsterdam, but not of the States General.

Mr. Henry Laurens, late president of congress, was deputed to the States General with this plan of a treaty, for the double purpose of endeavouring to complete it, and of negotiating a loan for the use of his government. On the voyage he was captured by a British frigate; and his papers, which he had thrown overboard, were rescued from the waves by a British sailor. Among them was found the plan of a treaty which has been mentioned, and which was immediately transmitted to Sir Joseph Yorke, the British minister at the Hague, to be laid before the government.

The explanations of this transaction not being deemed satisfactory by the court of London, Sir Joseph Yorke received orders to withdraw from the Hague, soon after which war was proclaimed against Holland.

This bold measure, which added one of the first maritime powers in Europe to the formidable list of enemies with whom Britain was already encompassed, was perhaps, not less prudent than courageous.

There are situations, to which only high minded nations are equal, in which a daring policy will conduct those who adopt it, safely through the very dangers it appears to invite; dangers which a system suggested by a timid caution might multiply instead of avoiding. The present was, probably, one of those situations. Holland was about to become a member of the armed neutrality, after which her immense navigation would be employed, unmolested, in transporting the property of the enemies of Britain, and in supplying them with all the materials for shipbuilding, or the whole confederacy must be encountered.

America, however, received with delight the intelligence that Holland also was engaged in the war; and founded additional hopes of its speedy termination on that event.



CHAPTER IX.

Transactions in South Carolina and Georgia.... Defeat of Ferguson.... Lord Cornwallis enters North Carolina.... Retreats out of that state.... Major Wemyss defeated by Sumpter.... Tarlton repulsed.... Greene appointed to the command of the Southern army.... Arrives in camp.... Detaches Morgan over the Catawba.... Battle of the Cowpens.... Lord Cornwallis drives Greene through North Carolina into Virginia.... He retires to Hillsborough.... Greene recrosses the Dan.... Loyalists under Colonel Pyle cut to pieces.... Battle of Guilford.... Lord Cornwallis retires to Ramsay's mills.... To Wilmington.... Greene advances to Ramsay's mills.... Determines to enter South Carolina.... Lord Cornwallis resolves to march to Virginia.

[Sidenote: 1780.]

[Sidenote: Transactions in South Carolina and Georgia.]

In the South, Lord Cornwallis, after having nearly demolished the American army at Camden, found himself under the necessity of suspending, for a few weeks, the new career of conquest on which he had intended to enter. His army was enfeebled by sickness as well as by action; the weather was intensely hot, and the stores necessary for an expedition into North Carolina had not been brought from Charleston. In addition, a temper so hostile to the British interests had lately appeared in South Carolina as to make it unsafe to withdraw any considerable part of his force from that state, until he should subdue the spirit of insurrection against his authority. Exertions were made in other parts of the state, not inferior to those of Sumpter in the north-west. Colonel Marion, who had been compelled by the wounds he received in Charleston to retire into the country, had been promoted by Governor Rutledge to the rank of a brigadier general. As the army of Gates approached South Carolina, he had entered the north-eastern parts of that state with only sixteen men; had penetrated into the country as far as the Santee; and was successfully rousing the well-affected inhabitants to arms, when the defeat of the 16th of August chilled the growing spirit of resistance which he had contributed to increase.

With the force he had collected, he rescued about one hundred and fifty continental troops who had been captured at Camden, and were on their way to Charleston. Though compelled, for a short time, to leave the state, he soon returned to it, and at the head of a few spirited men, made repeated excursions from the swamps and marshes in which he concealed himself, and skirmished successfully with the militia who had joined the British standard, and the small parties of regulars by whom they were occasionally supported.

His talents as a partisan, added to his knowledge of the country, enabled him to elude every attempt to seize him; and such was his humanity as well as respect for the laws, that no violence or outrage was ever attributed to the party under his command.

The interval between the victory of the 16th of August, and the expedition into North Carolina, was employed in quelling what was termed the spirit of revolt in South Carolina. The efforts of the people to recover their independence were considered as new acts of rebellion, and were met with a degree of severity which policy was supposed to dictate, but which gave a keener edge to the resentments which civil discord never fails to engender. Several of the most active militia men who had taken protections as British subjects, and entered into the British militia, having been afterwards found in arms, and made prisoners at Camden, were executed as traitors. Orders were given to officers commanding at different posts to proceed in the same manner against persons of a similar description; and these orders were, in many instances, carried into execution. A proclamation was issued for sequestering the estates of all those inhabitants of the province, not included in the capitulation of Charleston, who were in the service, or acting under the authority of Congress, and of all those who, by an open avowal of what were termed rebellious principles, or by other notorious acts should manifest a wicked and desperate perseverance in opposing the re-establishment of royal authority.[50]

[Footnote 50: Rem.]

While taking these measures to break the spirit of independence, Lord Cornwallis was indefatigable in urging his preparations for the expedition into North Carolina.

The day after the battle near Camden, emissaries had been despatched into that state for the purpose of inviting the friends of the British government to take up arms. Meanwhile the utmost exertions were continued to embody the people of the country as a British militia; and Major Ferguson was employed in the district of Ninety Six, to train the most loyal inhabitants, and to attach them to his own corps.[51] After being employed for some time in Ninety Six, he was directed to enter the western parts of North Carolina, for the purpose of embodying the royalists in that quarter.

[Footnote 51: Sted.]

The route marked out for the main army was from Camden, through the settlement of the Waxhaws to Charlottestown, in North Carolina. On the 8th of September Lord Cornwallis moved from Camden, and reached Charlotte late in that month, where he expected to be joined by Ferguson. But in attempting to meet him, Ferguson was arrested by an event as important as it was unexpected.

[Sidenote: September.]

Colonel Clarke, a refugee from Georgia, had formed a plan for the reduction of Augusta, which was defended only by a few provincials, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Brown. About the time Lord Cornwallis commenced his march from Camden, Clarke advanced against Augusta, at the head of a body of irregulars whom he had collected in the frontiers of North and South Carolina, and invested that place. Brown made a vigorous defence; and the approach of Lieutenant Colonel Cruger with a reinforcement from Ninety Six, compelled Clarke to relinquish the enterprise, and to save himself by a rapid retreat. Intelligence of the transactions at Augusta was given to Ferguson, who, to favour the design of intercepting Clarke, moved nearer the mountains, and remained longer in that country than had been intended. This delay proved fatal to him. It gave an opportunity to several volunteer corps to unite, and to constitute a formidable force. The hardy mountaineers inhabiting the extreme western parts of Virginia and North Carolina, assembled on horseback with their rifles, under Colonels Campbell, M'Dowell, Cleveland, Shelby, and Sevier, and moved with their accustomed velocity towards Ferguson. On receiving notice of their approach, that officer commenced his march for Charlotte, despatching, at the same time, different messengers to Lord Cornwallis with information of his danger. These messengers being intercepted, no movement was made to favour his retreat.

When within about sixteen miles of Gilbert-town, where Ferguson was then supposed to lie, Colonel M'Dowell deputed to Gates with a request that he would appoint a general officer to command them; and, in the mean time, Colonel Campbell of Virginia was chosen for that purpose. On reaching Gilbert-town, and finding that the British had commenced their retreat, it was determined to follow them with the utmost celerity. At the Cowpens, this party was joined by Colonels Williams, Tracy, and Branan, of South Carolina, with about four hundred men, who also gave information respecting the distance and situation of their enemy. About nine hundred choice men were selected, by whom the pursuit was continued through the night, and through a heavy rain; and, the next day, about three in the afternoon, they came within view of Ferguson, who, finding that he must be overtaken, had determined to await the attack on King's mountain, and was encamped on its summit,—a ridge five or six hundred yards long, and sixty or seventy wide.

[Sidenote: October 7.]

The Americans, who had arranged themselves into three columns, the right commanded by Colonel Sevier and Major Winston, the centre by Colonels Campbell and Shelby, and the left by Colonels Cleveland and Williams, immediately rushed to the assault. The attack was commenced by the centre, while the two wings gained the flanks of the British line; and, in about five minutes, the action became general. Ferguson made several impetuous charges with the bayonet, which, against riflemen, were necessarily successful. But, before any one of them could completely disperse the corps against which it was directed, the heavy and destructive fire of the others, who pressed him on all sides, called off his attention to other quarters, and the broken corps was rallied, and brought back to the attack.

[Sidenote: Defeat of Ferguson.]

In the course of these successive repulses, the right and centre had become intermingled, and were both, by one furious charge of the bayonet, driven almost to the foot of the mountain. With some difficulty they were rallied and again brought into the action; upon which the British, in turn, gave way, and were driven along the summit of the ridge, on Cleveland and Williams, who still maintained their ground on the left. In this critical state of the action, Ferguson received a mortal wound, and instantly expired. The courage of his party fell with him, and quarter was immediately demanded.[52] The action continued rather more than an hour.

[Footnote 52: The details of this battle are chiefly taken from a paper signed by Colonels Campbell, Shelby, and Cleveland, and published in the Virginia Gazette of the 18th of November, 1780.]

In this sharp action one hundred and fifty of Ferguson's party were killed on the spot, and about the same number were wounded. Eight hundred and ten, of whom one hundred were British troops, were made prisoners, and fifteen hundred stand of excellent arms were taken.

The Americans fought under cover of trees, and their loss was inconsiderable; but among the slain was Colonel Williams, who was greatly and justly lamented. As cruelty generally begets cruelty, the example set by the British at Camden was followed, and ten of the most active of the royalists were selected from the prisoners, and hung upon the spot. The victorious mountaineers, having accomplished the object for which they assembled, returned to their homes.

[Sidenote: Lord Cornwallis retreats out of North Carolina.]

The destruction of this party arrested the progress of Lord Cornwallis in North Carolina, and inspired serious fears for the posts in his rear. He retreated to Wynnsborough, between Camden and Ninety Six, where he waited for reinforcements from New York.

The victory obtained on the 16th of August having suggested views of more extensive conquest in the south, Sir Henry Clinton had determined to send a large reinforcement to the southern army. In the opinion that Lord Cornwallis could meet with no effectual resistance in the Carolinas, he had ordered the officer commanding this reinforcement to enter the Chesapeake in the first instance, and to take possession of the lower parts of Virginia, after which he was to obey the orders he should receive from Lord Cornwallis, to whom a copy of his instructions had been forwarded.

The detachment amounted to near three thousand men, under the command of General Leslie. It sailed on the 6th of October, and, entering James River after a short passage, took possession of the country on the south side as high as Suffolk. After a short time, Leslie drew in his out-posts, and began to fortify Portsmouth. At this place he received orders from Lord Cornwallis to repair to Charleston by water.

While Cornwallis waited at Wynnsborough for this reinforcement, the light corps of his army were employed in suppressing the parties which were rising in various quarters of the country, in opposition to his authority. Marion had become so formidable as to endanger the communication between Camden and Charleston. Tarlton was detached against him, and Marion was under the necessity of concealing himself in the swamps. From the unavailing pursuit of him through marshes which were scarcely penetrable, Tarlton was called to a different quarter, where an enemy supposed to be entirely vanquished, had reappeared in considerable force.

[Sidenote: Major Wemyss attacks and is defeated by Sumpter.]

Sumpter had again assembled a respectable body of mounted militia, at the head of which he advanced towards the posts occupied by the British. On receiving intelligence of his approach, Earl Cornwallis formed a plan for surprising him in his camp on Broad River, the execution of which was committed to Major Wemyss. That officer marched from Wynnsborough at the head of a regiment of infantry and about forty dragoons, reached the camp of Sumpter several hours before day, and immediately charged the out piquet, which made but a slight resistance. Only five shots are said to have been fired, but from these Wemyss received two dangerous wounds which disabled him from the performance of his duty. The assailants fell into confusion, and were repulsed with the loss of their commanding officer and about twenty men. After this action, Sumpter crossed Broad River, and, having formed a junction with Clarke and Branan, threatened Ninety Six.

Alarmed for the safety of that post, Earl Cornwallis recalled Tarlton, and ordered him to proceed against Sumpter. So rapid was his movement that he had nearly gained the rear of his enemy before notice of his return was received. In the night preceding the day on which he expected to effect his purpose, a deserter apprised Sumpter of the approaching danger, and that officer began his retreat. Tarlton, pursuing with his usual rapidity, overtook the rear guard at the ford of the Ennoree, and cut it to pieces; after which, fearing that Sumpter would save himself by passing the Tyger, he pressed forward, with, as he states, about two hundred and eighty cavalry and mounted infantry, and, in the afternoon, came within view of the Americans, who were arranged in order for battle.

Sumpter had reached the banks of the Tyger, when the firing of his videttes announced the approach of his enemy. He immediately posted his troops to great advantage on a steep eminence, having their rear and part of their right flank secured by the river, and their left covered by a barn of logs, into which a considerable number of his men were thrown.

Tarlton, without waiting for his infantry, or for a field piece left with them in his rear, rushed to the charge with his usual impetuosity. After several ineffectual attempts to dislodge the Americans, he retired from the field with great precipitation and disorder, leaving ninety-two dead, and one hundred wounded.

After remaining in possession of the ground for a few hours, Sumpter, who was severely wounded in the action, crossed the Tyger, after which his troops dispersed. His loss was only three killed, and four wounded.

Availing himself of the subsequent retreat and dispersion of the American militia, Tarlton denominated this severe check a victory; while congress, in a public resolution, voted their thanks to General Sumpter and the militia he commanded, for this and other services which had been previously rendered.

The shattered remains of the army defeated near Camden, had been slowly collected at Hillsborough, and great exertions were made to reorganize and reinforce it. The whole number of continental troops in the southern army amounted to about fourteen hundred men.

On receiving intelligence that Lord Cornwallis had occupied Charlotte, Gates detached Smallwood to the Yadkin, with directions to post himself at the ford of that river, and to take command of all the troops in that quarter of the country. The more effectually to harass the enemy, a light corps was selected from the army and placed under the command of Morgan, now a brigadier general.

As Lord Cornwallis retreated, Gates advanced to Charlotte, Smallwood encamped lower down the Catawba on the road to Camden; and Morgan was pushed forward some distance in his front. In the expectation that farther active operations would be postponed until the spring, Gates intended to pass the winter in this position. Such was the arrangement of the troops when their general was removed.

[Sidenote: November 5.]

On the 5th of November, without any previous indications of dissatisfaction, congress passed a resolution requiring the Commander-in-chief to order a court of inquiry on the conduct of General Gates as commander of the southern army, and to appoint some other officer to that command, until the inquiry should be made.

[Sidenote: Greene appointed to the command of the southern army.]

Washington, without hesitation, selected Greene for that important and difficult service. In a letter to congress recommending him to their support, he mentioned General Greene as "an officer in whose abilities, fortitude, and integrity, from a long and intimate experience of them, he had the most entire confidence." To Mr. Matthews, a delegate from South Carolina, he said, "You have your wish in the officer appointed to the southern command. I think I am giving you a general; but what can a general do without men, without arms, without clothing, without stores, without provisions?" About the same time the legion of Lee was ordered into South Carolina.

[Sidenote: Arrives in camp.]

Greene hastened to the army he was to command; and, on the second of December, reached Charlotte, then its head quarters. Soon after his arrival in camp, he was gratified with the intelligence of a small piece of good fortune obtained by the address of Lieutenant Colonel Washington.

Smallwood, having received information that a body of royal militia had entered the country in which he foraged, for the purpose of intercepting his wagons, detached Morgan and Washington against them. Intelligence of Morgan's approach being received, the party retreated; but Colonel Washington, being able to move with more celerity than the infantry, resolved to make an attempt on another party, which was stationed at Rugely's farm, within thirteen miles of Camden. He found them posted in a logged barn, strongly secured by abattis, and inaccessible to cavalry. Force being of no avail, he resorted to the following stratagem. Having painted the trunk of a pine, and mounted it on a carriage so as to resemble a field piece, he paraded it in front of the enemy, and demanded a surrender. The whole party, consisting of one hundred and twelve men, with Colonel Rugely at their head, alarmed at the prospect of a cannonade, surrendered themselves prisoners of war.[53]

[Footnote 53: The author received this account both from General Morgan and Colonel Washington.]

[Sidenote: Detaches Morgan over the Catawba.]

To narrow the limits of the British army, and to encourage the inhabitants, Greene detached Morgan west of the Catawba, with orders to take a position near the confluence of the Pacolet with the Broad River. His party consisted of rather more than three hundred chosen continental troops, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard, of Maryland, of Washington's regiment of light dragoons, amounting to about eighty men, and of two companies of militia from the northern and western parts of Virginia commanded by Captains Triplet and Taite, which were composed almost entirely of old continental soldiers. He was also to be joined on Broad River by seven or eight hundred volunteers and militia commanded by General Davidson, and by Colonels Clarke and Few.

After making this detachment, Greene, for the purpose of entering a more plentiful country, advanced lower down the Pedee, and encamped on its east side, opposite the Cheraw hills. Lord Cornwallis remained at Wynnsborough, preparing to commence active operations, so soon as he should be joined by Leslie.

The position he occupied on the Pedee was about seventy miles from Wynnsborough, and towards the north of east from that place. The detachment commanded by Morgan had taken post at Grindal's ford on the Pacolet, one of the south forks of Broad River, not quite fifty miles north-west of Wynnsborough. The active courage of his troops, and the enterprising temper of their commander, rendered him extremely formidable to the parties of royal militia who were embodying in that quarter of the country.

Supposing Morgan to have designs on Ninety Six, Lord Cornwallis detached Lieutenant Colonel Tarlton with his legion, part of two regiments of infantry, and a corps of artillery with two field pieces, consisting altogether of about one thousand men, across the Broad River, to cover that important post. As he lay between Greene and Morgan, he was desirous of preventing their junction, and of striking at one of them while unsupported by the other. To leave it uncertain against which division his first effort would be directed, he ordered Leslie to halt at Camden until the preparations for entering North Carolina should be completed. Having determined to penetrate into that state by the upper route, he put his army in motion and directed his course northwestward, between the Catawba and Broad Rivers. Leslie was directed to move up the banks of the former, and to join him on the march; and Tarlton was ordered to strike at Morgan. Should that officer escape Tarlton, the hope was entertained that he might be intercepted by the main army.[54]

[Footnote 54: Letter of Lord Cornwallis.—Stedman.]

High waters delayed Cornwallis and Leslie longer than had been expected; but Tarlton overcame the same obstacles, and reached Morgan before a correspondent progress was made by the other divisions.[55]

[Footnote 55: Letter of Lord Cornwallis.—Stedman.]

[Sidenote: 1781 January 14.]

[Sidenote: Sixteenth.]

The combined movements of the British army were communicated to General Morgan on the 14th of January. Perceiving the insecurity of his own position, he retired across the Pacolet, the fords over which he was desirous of defending. But a passage of that river being effected at a ford about six miles below him, he made a precipitate retreat; and, on the evening of the same day, his pursuers occupied the camp he had abandoned. Morgan retired to the Cowpens, where he determined to risk a battle. It was believed that he might have crossed the Broad River, or have reached a mountainous country which was also near him, before he could have been overtaken; and the superiority of his adversary was so decided as to induce his best officers to think that every effort ought to be made to avoid an engagement. But Morgan had great and just confidence in himself and in his troops; he was unwilling to fly from an enemy not so decidedly his superior as to render it madness to fight him; and he also thought that, if he should be overtaken while his men were fatigued and retreating, the probability of success would be much less than if he should exhibit the appearance of fighting from choice.

These considerations determined him to halt earlier than was absolutely necessary.[56]

[Footnote 56: These reasons for his conduct were given to the author by General Morgan soon after his return from the southern campaign.]

[Sidenote: Battle of the Cowpens.]

Tarlton, having left his baggage under a strong guard, with orders not to move until break of day, recommenced the pursuit at three in the morning.

Before day, Morgan was informed of his approach, and prepared to receive him.

Although censured by many for having determined to fight, and by some for the ground he chose, all admit the judgment with which his disposition was made.

On an eminence, in an open wood, he drew up his continental troops, and Triplet's corps, deemed equal to continentals, amounting to between four and five hundred men, who were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard. In their rear, on the descent of the hill, Lieutenant Colonel Washington was posted with his cavalry, and a small body of mounted Georgia militia commanded by Major M'Call, as a corps de reserve. On these two corps rested his hopes of victory, and with them he remained in person. The front line was composed entirely of militia, under the command of Colonel Pickens. Major M'Dowell, with a battalion of North Carolina volunteers, and Major Cunningham, with a battalion of Georgia volunteers, were advanced about one hundred and fifty yards in front of this line, with orders to give a single fire as the enemy approached, and then to fall back into the intervals, which were left for them in the centre of the first line. The militia, not being expected to maintain their ground long, were ordered to keep up a retreating fire by regiments, until they should pass the continental troops, on whose right they were directed again to form. His whole force, as stated by himself, amounted to only eight hundred men.

Soon after this disposition was made, the British van appeared in sight. Confident of a cheap victory, Tarlton formed his line of battle, and his troops rushed forward with great impetuosity, shouting as they advanced.

After a single well directed fire, M'Dowell and Cunningham fell back on Colonel Pickens, who, after a short but warm conflict, retreated into the rear of the second line.[57] The British pressed forward with great eagerness; and, though received by the continental troops with a firmness unimpaired by the rout of the front line, continued to advance. Soon after the action with the continental troops had commenced, Tarlton ordered up his reserve. Perceiving that the enemy extended beyond him both on the right and left, and that, on the right especially, his flank was on the point of being turned, Howard ordered the company on his right to change its front, so as to face the British on that flank. From some mistake in the officer commanding this company, it fell back, instead of fronting the enemy, upon which the rest of the line, supposing a change of ground for the whole to have been directed, began to retire in perfect order. At this moment General Morgan rode up, and directed the infantry to retreat over the summit of the hill, about one hundred yards to the cavalry. This judicious but hazardous movement was made in good order, and extricated the flanks from immediate danger. Believing the fate of the day to be decided, the British pressed on with increased ardour, and in some disorder; and when the Americans halted, were within thirty yards of them. The orders then given by Howard to face the enemy were executed as soon as they were received; and the whole line poured in a fire as deadly as it was unexpected. Some confusion appearing in the ranks of the enemy, Howard seized the critical moment, and ordered a charge with the bayonet. These orders were instantly obeyed, and the British line was broken.

[Footnote 57: Some of them formed afterwards, and renewed the action on Howard's right.]

At the same moment the detachment of cavalry on the British right was routed by Washington. The militia of Pickens, who rode to the ground, had tied their horses in the rear of Howard's left. When the front line was broken, many of them fled to their horses, and were closely pursued by the cavalry, who, while the continental infantry were retiring, passed their flank, and were cutting down the scattered militia in their rear. Washington, who had previously ordered his men not to fire a pistol, now directed them to charge the British cavalry with drawn swords. A sharp conflict ensued, but it was not of long duration. The British were driven from the ground with considerable slaughter, and were closely pursued. Both Howard and Washington pressed the advantage they had respectively gained, until the artillery, and great part of the infantry had surrendered. So sudden was the defeat, that a considerable part of the British cavalry had not been brought into action; and, though retreating, remained unbroken. Washington, followed by Howard with the infantry, pursued them rapidly, and attacked[58] them with great spirit; but, as they were superior to him in numbers, his cavalry received a temporary check; and in this part of the action he sustained a greater loss than in any other. But the infantry coming up to support him, Tarlton resumed the retreat.[59]

[Footnote 58: In the eagerness of pursuit, Washington advanced near thirty yards in front of his regiment. Three British officers, observing this, wheeled about, and made a charge upon him. The officer on his right aimed a blow to cut him down as an American sergeant came up, who intercepted the blow by disabling his sword arm. The officer on his left was about to make a stroke at him at the same instant, when a waiter, too small to wield a sword, saved him by wounding the officer with a ball from a pistol. At this moment, the officer in the centre, who was believed to be Tarlton, made a thrust at him which he parried; upon which the officer retreated a few paces, and then discharged a pistol at him, which wounded his horse.]

[Footnote 59: The author has received statements of this action from General Morgan and from Colonels Howard and Washington.]

In this engagement upwards of one hundred British, including ten commissioned officers, were killed; twenty-nine commissioned officers, and five hundred privates were made prisoners. Eight hundred muskets, two field pieces, two standards, thirty-five baggage wagons, and one hundred dragoon horses, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

Tarlton retreated towards the headquarters of Lord Cornwallis, then about twenty-five miles from the Cowpens.

This complete victory cost the Americans less than eighty men in killed and wounded.

Seldom has a battle in which greater numbers were not engaged, been so important in its consequences as that of the Cowpens. Lord Cornwallis was not only deprived of a fifth of his numbers, but lost a most powerful and active part of his army. Unfortunately, Greene was not in a condition to press the advantage. The whole southern army did not much exceed two thousand men, a great part of whom were militia.

[Sidenote: Pursuit of the American army through North Carolina into Virginia.]

The camp of Lord Cornwallis at Turkey Creek on the east side of Broad River, was as near as the Cowpens to the fords at which Morgan was to cross the Catawba. Of consequence, that officer had much cause to fear that, encumbered as he was with prisoners and military stores, he might be intercepted before he could pass that river. Comprehending the full extent of his danger, he abandoned the baggage he had taken, and leaving his wounded under the protection of a flag, detached the militia as an escort to his prisoners, and brought up the rear in person with his regulars. Passing Broad River on the evening of the day on which the battle was fought, he hastened to the Catawba, which he crossed on the 23d, at Sherald's ford, and encamped on its eastern bank.

[Sidenote: January.]

Lord Cornwallis employed the 18th in forming a junction with Leslie. Early next morning he put his army in motion, and, on the 25th, reached Ramsay's mills, where the roads taken by the two armies unite. At this place, to accelerate his future movements, he destroyed his baggage; and, after collecting a small supply of provisions, resumed the pursuit. He reached Sherald's ford in the afternoon of the 29th; and, in the night, an immense flood of rain rendered the river impassable.

[Sidenote: January 31.]

While Morgan remained on the Catawba, watching the motions of the British army, and endeavouring to collect the militia, General Greene arrived, and took command of the detachment.

In his camp on the Pedee, opposite the Cheraw hills, Greene had been joined by Lee's legion, amounting to about one hundred cavalry, and one hundred and twenty infantry. The day after his arrival, he was ordered to join Marion for the purpose of attempting to carry a British post at Georgetown, distant about seventy-five miles from the American army. The fort was surprised, but the success was only partial.

On receiving intelligence of the victory at the Cowpens, Greene detached Stevens' brigade of Virginia militia, whose terms of service were on the point of expiring, to conduct the prisoners to Charlottesville in Virginia, and turned his whole attention to the effecting of a junction between the two divisions of his army. It was principally with a view to this object that he hastened to the detachment under Morgan, leaving the other division to be commanded by General Huger.

[Sidenote: February 1.]

Early in the morning of the first of February, Lord Cornwallis forced a passage over the Catawba, at a private ford which was defended by General Davidson, with about three hundred North Carolina militia. Davidson was killed, and his troops dispersed. They were followed by Tarlton, who, hearing in the pursuit, that several bodies of militia were assembling at a tavern about ten miles from the ford, hastened to the place of rendezvous, and charging them with his usual impetuosity, broke their centre, killed some, and dispersed the whole party.

It was found impracticable to bring the militia into the field, and Huger, who had been directed to march to Salisbury, was ordered to effect a junction between the two divisions of the army at some place farther north.

Greene retreated along the Salisbury road, and, in the evening of the third, crossed the Yadkin at the trading ford. His passage of the river, then already much swollen by the rain of the preceding day, was facilitated by boats which had been previously collected. The rear guard, which, being impeded by the baggage of the whigs who fled from Salisbury did not cross till midnight, was overtaken by the van of the British army, and a skirmish ensued in which some loss was sustained, but the Americans effected the passage of the river.

[Sidenote: February 3.]

[Sidenote: Ninth.]

The rains having rendered the Yadkin unfordable, and the boats being collected on the opposite side, the pursuit was necessarily suspended; but Greene continued his march to Guilford court house where he was joined by Huger.

After some delay, and apparent hesitation respecting his movements, Lord Cornwallis marched up the Yadkin, which he crossed near its source on the morning of the eighth.

After the junction between the divisions of Huger and Morgan, the infantry of the American army, including six hundred militia, amounted to about two thousand effectives; and the cavalry to between two and three hundred. Lord Cornwallis lay twenty-five miles above them at Salem, with an army estimated from twenty-five hundred to three thousand men, including three hundred cavalry. Having failed in his attempt to prevent the junction of the two divisions of the American army, his object was to place himself between Greene and Virginia, and force that officer to a general action before he could be joined by the reinforcements which were known to be preparing for him in that state. His situation favoured the accomplishment of this object.

Greene, on the other hand, was indefatigable in his exertions to cross the Dan without exposing himself to the hazard of a battle. To effect this object, the whole of his cavalry, with the flower of his infantry, amounting together to rather more than seven hundred men, were formed into a light corps, for the purpose of harassing and impeding the advance of the enemy, until the less active part of his force, with the baggage and military stores should be secured. Morgan being rendered incapable of duty by severe indisposition, the command of this corps was conferred on Colonels Otho and Williams.

Lord Cornwallis had been informed that it would be impossible to obtain boats at the ferries on the Dan in sufficient numbers for the transportation of the American troops before he could overtake them. And, as the river could not be forded below, he calculated with confidence on succeeding in his object by keeping above Greene, and prevent his reaching those shallow fords by which alone it was thought possible to escape into Virginia.