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The effect of such proceedings on a people whose country had never before been the seat of war, and whose non-resistance had been occasioned solely by the expectation of that security which had been promised as the reward of submission to the royal authority, could not fail to equal the most sanguine hopes of the friends of the revolution. A sense of personal wrongs produced a temper which national considerations had proved too weak to excite; and, when the battles of Trenton and Princeton relieved the inhabitants from fears inspired by the presence of their invaders, the great body of the people flew to arms; and numbers who could not be brought into the field to check the advancing enemy, and prevent the ravages which uniformly afflict a country that becomes the seat of war, were prompt in avenging those ravages. Small bodies of militia scoured the country, seized on stragglers, behaved unexceptionably well in several slight skirmishes, and were collecting in such numbers as to threaten the weaker British posts with the fate which had befallen Trenton and Princeton.
To guard against that spirit of enterprise which his adversary had displayed to such advantage, General Howe determined to strengthen his posts by contracting them. The position taken for the purpose of covering the country were abandoned; and the British force in New Jersey was collected at New Brunswick, on the Raritan, and at Amboy, a small town at the mouth of that river.
Feeble as was the American army, this movement was not effected without some loss. On the evacuation of Elizabeth town, General Maxwell attacked the British rear, and captured about seventy men with a part of their baggage.
The American troops had been so diminished by the extreme severity of the service, that it was with much difficulty the appearance of an army could be maintained. Fresh militia and volunteers arrived in camp, whose numbers were exaggerated by report. These additions to his small remaining regular force enabled the General to take different positions near the lines of the enemy, to harass him perpetually, restrain his foraging parties, and produce considerable distress in his camp.
{January 12.}
While, with little more than an imaginary army, General Washington thus harassed and confined his adversary, he came to the hazardous resolution of freeing himself and his troops from the fear of a calamity which he found it impossible to elude, and which had proved more fatal in his camp than the sword of the enemy.
[Sidenote: American army inoculated.]
Inoculation having been rarely practised in the western world, the American youth remained liable to the small pox. Notwithstanding the efforts to guard against this disease, it had found its way into both the northern and middle army, and had impaired the strength of both to an alarming degree. To avoid the return of the same evil, the General determined to inoculate all the soldiers in the American service. With the utmost secrecy, preparations were made to give the infection in camp; and the hospital physicians in Philadelphia were ordered to carry all the southern troops, as they should arrive, through the disease. Similar orders were also given to the physicians at other places; and thus an army exempt from the fear of a calamity which had, at all times, endangered the most important operations, was prepared for the ensuing campaign. This example was followed through the country; and this alarming disease was no longer the terror of America.
As the main body of the British army was cantoned in Jersey, and a strong detachment occupied Rhode Island, General Washington believed that New York could not be perfectly secure. His intelligence strengthened this opinion; and, as an army, respectable in point of numbers, had been assembled about Peekskill, he ordered General Heath to approach New York for the purpose of foraging, and, should appearances favour the attempt, of attacking the forts which guarded the entrance into the island. The hope was entertained that General Howe, alarmed for New York, might either withdraw his troops from Jersey, or so weaken his posts in that state as to endanger them. Should this hope be disappointed, it was believed that something handsome might be done, either on York or Long Island.
[Sidenote: General Heath moves down to Kingsbridge, but returns to Peekskill without effecting anything.]
In pursuance of this plan, General Heath marched down to West Chester, and summoned fort Independence to surrender; but, the garrison determining to hold the place, a council of war deemed it unadviseable to risk an assault. An embarkation of troops which took place, about that time, at Rhode Island, alarmed General Heath for his rear, and induced him to resume his ground in the Highlands.
Though this attempt entirely failed, the Commander-in-chief still meditated important operations during the winter. All the intelligence from Europe demonstrated the necessity of these operations, and the fallacy of the hope, still extensively cherished, that the war would be abandoned by Great Britain. The administration was still supported by great majorities in parliament; and the nation seemed well disposed to employ all its means to reannex to the empire, what were still denominated, revolted colonies. It was not to be doubted that large reinforcements would arrive in the spring; and the safety of the nation would be in hazard should General Howe remain in full force till they should be received. The utmost efforts were made by the Commander-in-chief to collect a sufficient number of troops to enable him to give a decisive blow to some one of the positions of his enemy. The state sovereignties, where the real energies of government resided, were incessantly urged to fill their regiments, and to bring their quotas into the field; and congress, at his instance, passed resolutions authorizing him to draw the troops from Peekskill, and to call out the militia of the neighbouring states. "It being," these resolutions proceed to say, "the earnest desire of congress, to make the army under the immediate command of General Washington sufficiently strong, not only to curb and confine the enemy within their present quarters, and prevent their drawing support of any kind from the country, but, by the divine blessing, totally to subdue them before they can be reinforced."
These resolves were communicated to the general, in a letter, manifesting the confident expectation of congress that the desire expressed in them would soon be realized. But the energy displayed in their passage could not be maintained in their execution.
Many causes concurred to prevent the collection of a force competent to those vigorous operations which the enterprising genius of the Commander-in-chief had provisionally planned, and the sanguine temper of congress had anticipated. Some of the state assemblies did not even complete the appointment of officers till the spring; and then, bitter contests concerning rank remained to be adjusted when the troops should join the army. After these arrangements were made, the difficulty of enlisting men was unexpectedly great. The immense hardships to which the naked soldiers had been exposed, during a winter campaign, in the face of a superior enemy; the mortality resulting from those hardships, and probably from an injudicious arrangement of the hospital department which was found to be the tomb of the sick; had excited a general disgust to the service; and a consequent unwillingness to engage in it.
From these causes the army continued so feeble that the general, instead of being able to execute the great designs he had meditated, entertained serious fears that Sir William Howe would take the field during the winter, force his positions, cross the Delaware on the ice, and proceed to Philadelphia. In the apprehension of this attempt, and to avoid that confusion which would result from the removal of stores in the crisis of military operations, he had taken the precaution, as soon as the armies were in winter quarters, to convey those which were most valuable, to a distance from the route which it was supposed the British army would pursue.
{March 4.}
The real condition of the army is exhibited in a letter from the Commander-in-chief to congress, in answer to that which enclosed the resolutions already mentioned, and which expressed the brilliant schemes of victory formed by the government. "Could I," said the general, "accomplish the important objects so eagerly wished by congress; confining the enemy within their present quarters, preventing their getting supplies from the country, and totally subduing them before they are reinforced, I should be happy indeed. But what prospect or hope can there be of my effecting so desirable a work at this time? The enclosed return,[56] to which I solicit the most serious attention of congress, comprehends the whole force I have in Jersey. It is but a handful, and bears no proportion on the scale of numbers to that of the enemy. Added to this, the major part is made up of militia. The most sanguine in speculation can not deem it more than adequate to the least valuable purposes of war."
[Footnote 56: See note No. VIII. at the end of the volume.]
[Sidenote: Skirmishes.]
Though unable to act with the vigour he wished, the American general kept up a war of skirmishes through the winter. In the course of it, the British loss was believed to be considerable; and hopes were entertained that, from the scarcity of forage, neither their cavalry nor draft horses would be in a condition to take the field when the campaign should open. Their foraging parties were often attacked to advantage. Frequent small successes, the details of which filled the papers throughout the United States, not only increased the confidence of the American soldiers, but served greatly to animate the people.
[Sidenote: State of the army.]
The hope of collecting a sufficient force during the winter to make any valuable impression on the British army being disappointed, the views of the General were directed to the next campaign.
As the new army was to be raised by the authority of the state governments, he urged on them the necessity of bringing a respectable force into the field early in the spring, with all the earnestness which was suggested by his situation, and zeal for the service.
In Connecticut and Massachusetts, the country was laid off into districts, each of which was required, by a given day, to furnish a soldier enlisted for three years, or during the war; in default of which, one person, from those capable of bearing arms, was to be drafted to serve until the first of the ensuing January. The Commander-in-chief, though still deprecating the introduction of men into the army whose terms of service would be of short duration, felt the necessity of submitting to this expedient, as the most eligible which could now be adopted.
In Virginia, where the same difficulty attended enlistments, it was proposed by the executive to fill the regiments with volunteers, who should engage to serve for six months. This plan was submitted to General Washington by Governor Henry, and his opinion asked upon it. "I am under the necessity of observing," said the General in reply, "that the volunteer plan which you mention will never answer any valuable purpose, and that I can not but disapprove the measure. To the short engagements of our troops may be fairly and justly ascribed almost every misfortune that we have experienced."
In a subsequent letter to the same gentleman, enforcing earnestly the necessity of bringing a sufficient army into the field, though coercive measures should be adopted, some alternatives were suggested, which, in a later period of the war, constituted the basis of various experiments to furnish the quota of troops required from that state.
As the season for active operations approached, fresh difficulties, growing out of the organization of the American system, unfolded themselves. As every state was exposed to invasion, and the command of the ocean enabled the British general to transfer the war, at pleasure, to any part of the Union, the attention of each was directed exclusively to its particular situation. Each state in the neighbourhood of the great theatre of action, contemplating its own danger, claimed the protection which is due from the whole to its parts. Although the object of the confederation was the same with that pursued by each of its members, the spirit incident to every league could not be controlled in an empire where, notwithstanding the existence of a head, the essentials of government resided in the members. It was displayed in repeated efforts to give to the energies of the army such various directions, as would leave it unable to effect any great object, or to obstruct any one plan the enemy might form. The patriotism of the day, however, and the unexampled confidence placed by all the state governments in the Commander-in-chief, prevented the mischiefs this spirit is so well calculated to generate. His representations made their proper impression; and the intention of retaining continental troops for local defence was abandoned, though with some reluctance. The burden, however, of calling militia from their domestic avocations, at every threat of invasion, to watch every military post in each state, became so intolerable, that the people cast about for other expedients to relieve themselves from its weight. The plan of raising regular corps, to be exclusively under state authority, and thus be a perpetual substitute for the yeomanry of the country, presented itself as the most effectual and convenient mode of protecting the coasts from insult.
During the winter, General Howe kept his troops in their quarters, attending to their comfort. As the season for more active operations approached, his first attention was directed to the destruction of the scanty supplies prepared by the Americans for the ensuing campaign. A small place on the Hudson called Peekskill, about fifty miles above New York, was generally the residence of the officer commanding in the Highlands, and was used for the reception of stores, to be distributed into the neighbouring posts as occasion might require. Its strength, like that of all others depending for defence on militia, was subject to great fluctuation. As soon as the ice was out of the river, General Howe took advantage of its occasional weakness, to carry on an expedition against it, for the purpose of destroying the stores there deposited, or of bringing them away.
{March 23.}
[Sidenote: Destruction of stores at Peekskill.]
Colonel Bird was detached up the river on this service, with about five hundred men, under convoy of a frigate and some armed vessels. General M'Dougal, whose numbers did not at that time exceed two hundred and fifty men, received timely notice of his approach, and exerted himself for the removal of the stores into the strong country in his rear. Before this could be effected, Colonel Bird appeared; and M'Dougal, after setting fire to the remaining stores and barracks, retired into the strong grounds in the rear of Peekskill. The British detachment completed the conflagration, and returned to New York. During their short stay, a piquet guard was attacked by Colonel Willet, and driven in with the loss of a few men; a circumstance, believed by General M'Dougal, to have hastened the re-embarkation of the detachment.
[Sidenote: At Danbury.]
{April.}
Military stores to a considerable amount had likewise been deposited at Danbury, on the western frontier of Connecticut. Although this place is not more than twenty miles from the Sound, yet the roughness of the intervening country, the frequent passage of troops from the eastward through the town, and the well known zeal of the neighbouring militia, were believed sufficient to secure the magazines collected at it. Against Danbury an expedition was projected; and two thousand men under the command of Governor Tryon, major general of the provincials in the British service, assisted by Brigadiers Agnew and Sir William Erskine, were employed in it.
{April 28.}
On the 25th of April the fleet appeared off the coast of Connecticut; and in the evening the troops were landed without opposition between Fairfield and Norwalk. General Silliman, then casually in that part of the country, immediately despatched expresses to assemble the militia. In the mean time Tryon proceeded to Danbury, which he reached about two the next day. On his approach, Colonel Huntingdon, who had occupied the town with about one hundred and fifty men, retired to a neighbouring height, and Danbury, with the magazines it contained, was consumed by fire. General Arnold, who was also in the state superintending the recruiting service, joined General Silliman at Reading, where that officer had collected about five hundred militia. General Wooster, who had resigned his commission in the continental service, and been appointed major general of the militia, fell in with them at the same place, and they proceeded in the night through a heavy rain to Bethel, about eight miles from Danbury. Having heard next morning that Tryon, after destroying the town and magazines, was returning, they divided their troops; and General Wooster, with about three hundred men, fell in his rear, while Arnold, with about five hundred, crossing the country, took post in his front at Ridgefield. Wooster came up with his rear about eleven in the morning, attacked it with great gallantry, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which he was mortally wounded,[57] and his troops were repulsed. Tryon then proceeded to Ridgefield, where he found Arnold already intrenched on a strong piece of ground, and prepared to dispute his passage. A warm skirmish ensued, which continued nearly an hour. Arnold was at length driven from the field; after which he retreated to Paugatuck, about three miles east of Norwalk. At break of day next morning, after setting Ridgefield on fire, the British resumed their march. About eleven in the forenoon, they were again met by Arnold, whose numbers increased during the day to rather more than one thousand men; among whom were some continental troops. A continued skirmishing was kept up until five in the afternoon, when the British formed on a hill near their ships. The Americans attacked them with intrepidity, but were repulsed and broken. Tryon, availing himself of this respite, re-embarked his troops, and returned to New York.
[Footnote 57: Congress voted a monument to his memory.]
The loss of the British amounted to about one hundred and seventy men. That of the Americans, was represented by Tryon, as being much more considerable. By themselves, it was not admitted to exceed one hundred. In this number, however, were comprehended General Wooster, Lieutenant Colonel Gould, and another field officer, killed; and Colonel Lamb wounded. Several other officers and volunteers were killed. Military and hospital stores to a considerable amount, which were greatly needed by the army, were destroyed in the magazines at Danbury; but the loss most severely felt was rather more than one thousand tents, which had been provided for the campaign about to open.
Not long afterwards this enterprise was successfully retaliated. A British detachment had been for some time employed in collecting forage and provisions on the eastern end of Long Island. Howe supposed this part of the country to be so completely secured by the armed vessels which incessantly traversed the Sound, that he confided the protection of the stores, deposited at a small port called Sagg Harbour, to a schooner with twelve guns, and a company of infantry.
[Sidenote: Expedition of Colonel Meigs to Sagg Harbour.]
{May.}
{May 24.}
General Parsons, who commanded a few recruits at New Haven, thinking it practicable to elude the cruisers in the bay, formed the design of surprising this party, and other adjacent posts, the execution of which was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Meigs, a gallant officer, who had accompanied Arnold in his memorable march to Quebec. He embarked with about two hundred and thirty men, on board thirteen whale boats, and proceeded along the coast to Guilford, where he was to cross the Sound. With about one hundred and seventy of his detachment, under convoy of two armed sloops, he proceeded across the Sound to the north division of the island near South Hold, in the neighbourhood of which a small foraging party, against which the expedition was in part directed, was supposed to lie; but they had marched two days before to New York. The boats were conveyed across the land, a distance of about fifteen miles, into a bay which deeply intersects the eastern end of Long Island, where the troops re-embarked. Crossing the bay, they landed at two in the morning, about four miles from Sagg Harbour, which place they completely surprised, and carried with charged bayonets. At the same time, a division of the detachment secured the armed schooner, and the vessels laden with forage, which were set on fire, and entirely consumed. Six of the enemy were killed, and ninety taken prisoners. A very few escaped under cover of the night.
The object of his expedition being effected without the loss of a man, Colonel Meigs returned to Guilford with his prisoners. "Having," as was stated in the letter to General Parsons, "moved with such uncommon celerity, as to have transported his men, by land and water, ninety miles in twenty-five hours." Congress directed a sword to be presented to him, and passed a resolution expressing the high sense entertained of his merit, and of the prudence, activity, and valour, displayed by himself and his party.
The exertions made by the Commander-in-chief through the winter to raise a powerful army for the ensuing campaign, had not been successful. The hopes respecting its strength which the flattering reports made from every quarter had authorized him to form, were cruelly disappointed; and he found himself not only unable to carry into effect the offensive operations he had meditated, but unequal even to defensive war. That steady and persevering courage, however, which had supported himself and the American cause through the gloomy scenes of the preceding year, did not forsake him; and that sound judgment which applies to the best advantage those means which are attainable, however inadequate they may be, still remained. His plan of operations was adapted to that which he believed his enemy had formed. He was persuaded either that General Burgoyne would endeavour to take Ticonderoga, and to penetrate to the Hudson, in which event General Howe would co-operate with him by moving up that river, and attempting to possess himself of the forts and high grounds commanding its passage; or that Burgoyne would join the grand army at New York by sea; after which the combined armies would proceed against Philadelphia.
To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might be, to defend the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York, and Philadelphia, against two powerful armies so much superior to him, in arms, in numbers, and in discipline, it was necessary to make such an arrangement of his troops as would enable the parts reciprocally to aid each other, without neglecting objects of great, and almost equal magnitude which were alike threatened, and were far asunder. To effect these purposes, the troops of New England and New York were divided between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from Jersey to North Carolina inclusive, were directed to assemble at the camp to be formed in Jersey. The more southern troops remained in that weak quarter of the union for its protection.
[Sidenote: Camp formed at Middlebrook.]
These arrangements being made, and the recruits collected, the camp at Morristown was broken up, the detachments called in, and the army assembled at Middlebrook, just behind a connected ridge of strong and commanding heights, north of the road leading to Philadelphia, and about ten miles from Brunswick.
This camp, the approaches to which were naturally difficult, was rendered still more defensible by intrenchments. The heights in front commanded a prospect of the course of the Raritan, the road to Philadelphia, the hills about Brunswick, and a considerable part of the country between that place and Amboy; so as to afford a full view of the most interesting movements of the enemy.
The force brought into the field by America required all the aid which could be derived from strong positions, and unremitting vigilance. On the 20th of May, the total of the army in Jersey, excluding cavalry and artillery, amounted to only eight thousand three hundred and seventy-eight men, of whom upwards of two thousand were sick. The effective rank and file were only five thousand seven hundred and thirty-eight.
Had this army been composed of the best disciplined troops, its inferiority, in point of numbers, must have limited its operations to defensive war; and have rendered it incompetent to the protection of any place, whose defence would require a battle in the open field. But more than half the troops[58] were unacquainted with the first rudiments of military duty, and had never looked an enemy in the face. As an additional cause of apprehension, a large proportion of the soldiers, especially from the middle states, were foreigners, many of them servants, in whose attachment to the American cause full confidence could not be placed.
[Footnote 58: The extreme severity of the service, aided perhaps by the state of the hospitals, had carried to the grave more than two-thirds of the soldiers who had served the preceding campaign, and been engaged for more than one year.]
General Washington, anticipating a movement by land towards Philadelphia, had taken the precaution to give orders for assembling on the western bank of the Delaware, an army of militia, strengthened by a few continental troops, the command of which was given to General Arnold, who was then in Philadelphia, employed in the settlement of his accounts.
The first and real object of the campaign, on the part of General Howe, was the acquisition of Philadelphia. He intended to march through Jersey; and, after securing the submission of that state, to cross the Delaware on a portable bridge constructed in the winter for the purpose, and proceed by land to that city. If, in the execution of this plan, the Americans could be brought to a general action on equal ground, the advantages of the royal army must insure a victory. But should Washington decline an engagement, and be again pressed over the Delaware, the object would be as certainly obtained.
Had Sir William Howe taken the field before the continental troops were assembled, this plan might probably have been executed without any serious obstruction; but the tents and camp equipage expected from Europe did not arrive until General Washington had collected his forces, and taken possession of the strong post on the heights of Middlebrook. It would be dangerous to attack him on such advantageous ground; for, although his camp might be forced, victory would probably be attended with such loss, as to disable the victor from reaping its fruits.
If it was deemed too hazardous to attack the strong camp at Middlebrook, an attempt to cross the Delaware, in the face of an army collected on its western bank, while that under General Washington remained unbroken in his rear, was an experiment of equal danger. It comported with the cautious temper of Sir William Howe to devise some other plan of operation to which he might resort, should he be unable to seduce the American general from his advantageous position.
The two great bays of Delaware and Chesapeake suggested the alternative of proceeding by water, should he be unable to manoeuvre General Washington out of his present encampment.
{June.}
{June 12.}
The plan of the campaign being settled, and some small reinforcements with the expected camp equipage being received from Europe, General Howe, leaving a garrison in New York, and a guard in Amboy, assembled his army at Brunswick, and gave strong indications of an intention to penetrate through the country to the Delaware, and reach Philadelphia by land.
Believing this to be his real design, Washington placed a select corps of riflemen under the command of Colonel Morgan, an officer who had distinguished himself in the unfortunate attempt to storm Quebec, and in whom those peculiar qualities which fit a man for the command of a partisan corps, designed to act on the lines of a formidable enemy, were eminently united.
He was ordered to take post at Vanvighton's Bridge on the Raritan, just above its confluence with the Millstone River, to watch the left flank of the British army, and seize every occasion to harass it.
[Sidenote: Sir William Howe moves out to Somerset Court House in great force.]
Early in the morning of the 14th, Sir William Howe, leaving two thousand men under the command of General Matthews at Brunswick, advanced in two columns towards the Delaware. The front of the first, under Lord Cornwallis, reached Somerset Court House, nine miles from Brunswick, by the appearance of day; and the second, commanded by General de Heister, reached Middlebush about the same time.
This movement was made with the view of inducing General Washington to quit his fortified camp, and approach the Delaware,[59] in which event, the British general expected to bring on an engagement on ground less disadvantageous than that now occupied by the American army. But that officer understood the importance of his position too well to abandon it. On the first intelligence that the enemy was in motion, he drew out his whole army, and formed it, to great advantage, on the heights in front of his camp. This position was constantly maintained. The troops remained in order of battle during the day; and, in the night, slept on the ground to be defended. In the mean time the Jersey militia, with an alacrity theretofore unexampled in that state, took the field in great numbers. They principally joined General Sullivan, who had retired from Princeton, behind the Sourland hills towards Flemingtown, where an army of some respectability was forming, which could readily co-operate with that under the immediate inspection of the Commander-in-chief.
[Footnote 59: General Howe's letter.]
The settled purpose of General Washington was to defend his camp, but not to hazard a general action on other ground. He had therefore determined not to advance from the heights he occupied, into the open country, either towards the enemy, or the Delaware.
The object of General Howe seems to have been, by acting on his anxiety for Philadelphia, to seduce him from the strong ground about Middlebrook, and tempt him to approach the Delaware, in the hope of defending its passage. Should he succeed in this, he had little doubt of being able to bring on an engagement, in which he counted with certainty on victory. The considerations which restrained General Howe from attempting to march through Jersey, leaving the American army in full force in his rear, had determined Washington to allow him to proceed to the Delaware, if such should be his intention. In that event, he had determined to throw those impediments only in the way of the hostile army which might harass and retard its march; and, maintaining the high and secure grounds north of the road to be taken by the enemy, to watch for an opportunity of striking some important blow with manifest advantage.
He was not long in penetrating the designs of his adversary. "The views of the enemy," he writes to General Arnold in a letter of the 17th, "must be to destroy this army, and get possession of Philadelphia. I am, however, clearly of opinion, that they will not move that way until they have endeavoured to give a severe blow to this army. The risk would be too great to attempt to cross a river, when they must expect to meet a formidable opposition in front, and would have such a force as ours in their rear. They might possibly be successful, but the probability would be infinitely against them. Should they be imprudent enough to make the attempt, I shall keep close upon their heels, and will do every thing in my power to make the project fatal to them.
"But, besides the argument in favour of their intending, in the first place, a stroke at this army, drawn from the policy of the measure, every appearance contributes to confirm the opinion. Had their design been for the Delaware in the first instance, they would probably have made a secret, rapid march for it, and not have halted so as to awaken our attention, and give us time to prepare for obstructing them. Instead of that they have only advanced to a position necessary to facilitate an attack on our right, the part in which we are most exposed. In addition to this circumstance, they have come out as light as possible, leaving all their baggage, provisions, boats, and bridges, at Brunswick. This plainly contradicts the idea of their intending to push for the Delaware."
[Sidenote: Returns to Amboy.]
Finding the American army could not be drawn from its strong position, General Howe determined to waste no more time in threatening Philadelphia by land, but to withdraw from Jersey, and to embark his army as expeditiously as possible for the Chesapeake or the Delaware. On the night of the 19th he returned to Brunswick, and on the 22d to Amboy, from which place, the heavy baggage and a few of his troops passed into Staten Island, on the bridge which had been designed for the Delaware.
General Washington had expected this movement from Brunswick, and had made arrangements to derive some advantage from it. General Greene was detached with three brigades to annoy the British rear; and Sullivan and Maxwell were ordered to co-operate with him. In the mean time the army paraded on the heights of Middlebrook, ready to act as circumstances might require.
About sunrise, Colonel Morgan drove in a piquet guard, soon after which that division commenced its march to Amboy. Some sharp skirmishing took place between this party and Morgan's regiment, but the hope of gaining any important advantage was entirely disappointed; and the retreat to Amboy was effected with inconsiderable loss.
{June 24.}
In order to cover his light parties, which still hung on the British flank and rear, General Washington advanced six or seven miles, to Quibbletown on the road to Amboy; and Lord Stirling's division was pushed still farther, to the neighbourhood of the Metucking Meeting House, for the purpose of co-operating with the light parties, should the retreat to Staten Island afford an opportunity of striking at the rear.
[Sidenote: Endeavors to cut off the retreat of the American army to Middlebrook, but is disappointed.]
Believing it now practicable to bring on an engagement, and probably hoping to turn the left of the American army, and gain the heights in its rear, General Howe, in the night of the 25th, recalled the troops from Staten Island; and, early next morning, made a rapid movement, in two columns, towards Westfield. The right, under the command of Lord Cornwallis, took the route by Woodbridge to the Scotch Plains; and the left, led by Sir William Howe in person, marched by Metucking Meeting House, to fall into the rear of the right column. It was intended that the left should take a separate road, soon after this junction, and attack the left flank of the American army at Quibbletown; while Lord Cornwallis should gain the heights on the left of the camp at Middlebrook. Four battalions with six pieces of cannon were detached to Bonhamtown.[60]
[Footnote 60: General Howe's letter.]
[Sidenote: Lord Cornwallis skirmishes near the Scotch Plains with Lord Stirling.]
{June 30.}
About Woodbridge, the right column fell in with one of the American parties of observation which gave notice of this movement. General Washington discerned his danger, put the whole army instantly in motion, and regained the camp at Middlebrook. Lord Cornwallis fell in with Lord Stirling, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Americans were driven from their ground with the loss of three field pieces, and a few men. They retreated to the hills about the Scotch Plains, and were pursued as far as Westfield. Perceiving the passes in the mountains on the left of the American camp to be guarded, and the object of this skilful manoeuvre to be, consequently, unattainable, his lordship returned through Rahway to Amboy; and the whole army crossed over to Staten Island.
{July 2.}
General Washington was now again left to his conjectures respecting the plan of the campaign. Before Sir William Howe had, in any degree disclosed his views, intelligence was received of the appearance of Burgoyne on Lake Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened. This intelligence strengthened the opinion that the design of Howe must be to seize the passes in the mountains on the Hudson, secure the command of that river, and effect a junction between the two armies. Yet he could not permit himself to yield so entirely to this impression, as to make a movement which might open the way by land to Philadelphia. His army therefore maintained its station at Middlebrook; but arrangements were made to repel any sudden attack on the posts which defended the Hudson.
Some changes made in the stations of the British ships and troops having relieved the American general from his apprehensions of a sudden march to Philadelphia, he advanced Sullivan's division to Pompton Plains, on the way to Peekskill; and proceeded with the main body of his army, to Morristown;—thus approaching the highlands of New York, without removing so far from Middlebrook as to be unable to regain that camp should General Howe indicate an intention to seize it.
Meanwhile, the British General prosecuted, diligently, his plan of embarkation, which was, necessarily, attended with circumstances indicating a much longer voyage than that up the North River. These circumstances were immediately communicated to the eastern states, and congress was earnestly pressed to strengthen the fortifications on the Delaware, and to increase the obstructions in that river.
{July 16.}
In the midst of these appearances, certain intelligence was received that Burgoyne was in great force on the lakes, and was advancing against Ticonderoga. This intelligence confirmed the opinion that the main object of Howe must be to effect a junction with Burgoyne on the North River. Under this impression, General Washington ordered Sullivan to Peekskill, and advanced, himself, first to Pompton Plains, and afterwards to the Clove, where he determined to remain until the views of the enemy should be disclosed.
While the General thus anxiously watched the movements of his adversary, an agreeable and unexpected piece of intelligence was received from New England. The command of the British troops in Rhode Island had devolved on General Prescot. Thinking himself perfectly secure in an island, the water surrounding which was believed to be entirely guarded by his cruisers, and at the head of an army greatly superior to any force then collected in that department, he indulged himself in convenient quarters, rather distant from camp; and was remiss with respect to the guards about his person. Information of this negligence was communicated to the main, and a plan was formed to surprise him. This spirited enterprise was executed, with equal courage and address, by Lieutenant Colonel Barton of the Rhode Island militia.
[Sidenote: General Prescot surprised and taken.]
On the night of the 10th, he embarked on board four whale boats, at Warwick Neck, with a party consisting of about forty persons, including Captains Adams and Philips, and several other officers. After proceeding about ten miles by water, unobserved by the British guard-boats, although several ships of war lay in that quarter, he landed on the west of the island, about midway between Newport and Bristol ferry, and marching a mile to the quarters of Prescot, dexterously seized the sentinel at his door, and one of his aids. The general himself was taken out of bed, and conveyed to a place of safety.
The success of this intrepid enterprise diffused the more joy throughout America, because it was supposed to secure the liberation of General Lee, by enabling General Washington to offer an officer of equal rank in exchange for him.
Congress expressed a high sense of the gallant conduct of Colonel Barton, and his party; and presented him with a sword as a mark of approbation.
As the fleet fell down towards Sandy Hook, General Washington withdrew slowly from the Clove, and disposed his army in different divisions, so as to march to any point which might be attacked.
[Sidenote: The British army embarks.]
At length, the embarkation was completed, and the fleet put to sea.
CHAPTER VIII.
General Washington commences his march to the Delaware.... Takes measures for checking Burgoyne.... British army lands at Elk River.... General Washington advances to Brandywine.... Retreat of Maxwell.... Defeat at Brandywine.... Slight skirmish near the White Horse, and retreat to French Creek.... General Wayne surprised.... General Howe takes possession of Philadelphia.... Removal of Congress to Lancaster.
{1777}
{July.}
[Sidenote: General Washington commences his march to the Delaware.]
On receiving intelligence that the British fleet had sailed from New York, the American army commenced its march to the Delaware. About the time of its departure, a letter from Sir William Howe, directed to General Burgoyne at Quebec, was delivered to General Putnam by the person who had received it, as was said, for the purpose of carrying it to Quebec, and was transmitted by Putnam to the Commander-in-chief. In this letter, General Howe said that "he was exhibiting the appearance of moving to the southward, while his real intent was against Boston, from whence he would co-operate with the army of Canada." This stratagem entirely failed. General Washington, at once, perceived that the letter was written with a design that it should fall into his hands, and mislead him with respect to the views of the writer.
[Sidenote: He takes measures for checking Burgoyne.]
While the utmost vigilance and judgment were required to conduct the operations of the army under the immediate command of General Washington, the transactions in the north were too vitally interesting not to engage a large share of his attention. He not only hastened the march of those generals who were designed to act in that department, and pressed the governors of the eastern states to reinforce the retreating army with all their militia, but made large detachments of choice troops from his own;—thus weakening himself in order to strengthen other generals whose strength would be more useful. The fame of being himself the leader of the victorious army did not, with false glare, dazzle his judgment, or conceal the superior public advantage to be derived from defeating the plans of Burgoyne.
On the 30th of July, all doubts respecting the destination of the British fleet were supposed to be removed by its appearance off the capes of Delaware; and orders were immediately given for assembling the detached parts of the army in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia. Scarcely were these orders given, when the aspect of affairs was changed, and they were countermanded. An express from Cape May brought the information that the fleet had sailed out of the bay of Delaware, and was proceeding eastward. From this time, no intelligence respecting it was received until about the 7th of August, when it appeared a few leagues south of the capes of Delaware, after which it disappeared, and was not again seen until late in that month. The fact was, that on entering the capes of Delaware, the difficulties attending an attempt to carry his fleet up that bay and river, determined General Howe to relinquish his original design, and to transport his army to the Chesapeake. Contrary winds prevented his gaining the mouth of that bay until the 16th of August.
The several divisions of the army were immediately ordered[61] to unite in the neighbourhood of Philadelphia, and the militia of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and the northern counties of Virginia, were directed to take the field.
[Footnote 61: These orders were received by General Sullivan, who had been encamped about Hanover, in Jersey, on his return from an expedition to Staten Island. The British force on that island amounted to between two and three thousand men, of whom nearly one thousand were provincials, who were distributed along the coast, opposite the Jersey shore. The Europeans occupied a fortified camp near the watering place; and General Sullivan thought it practicable to surprise the provincials, and bring them off before they could be supported by the Europeans. Only six boats had been procured for the conveyance of his troops; yet they crossed over into the island before day undiscovered, and completely surprised two of the provincial parties, commanded by Colonels Lawrence and Barton, both of whom, with several officers and men were taken. The alarm being given, Sullivan attempted to withdraw from the island. The number of boats not being sufficient for the embarkation of all his troops at the same time, some confusion obtained among them. General Campbell advanced in force on the rear guard while waiting for the return of the boats, which was captured after making a gallant resistance.
This enterprise was well planned, and in its commencement, happily executed; but ought not to have been undertaken without a number of boats sufficient to secure the retreat.
The loss of the British in prisoners amounted to eleven officers, and one hundred and thirty privates. That of the Americans, is stated by Sullivan, at one major, one captain, one lieutenant, and ten privates killed, and fifteen wounded, and nine officers, and one hundred and twenty-seven privates prisoners. General Campbell, in his account of the action says, that he made two hundred and fifty-nine prisoners, among whom were one lieutenant colonel, three majors, two captains, and fifteen inferior officers.]
[Sidenote: British fleet comes up the Chesapeake and lands an army under Sir William Howe at Elk River.]
The British fleet, after entering the Chesapeake, sailed up it with favourable winds, and entered Elk River, up which the admiral proceeded as high as it was safely navigable; and on the 25th of August the troops were landed at the ferry.
The British army, at its disembarkation, has been generally computed at eighteen thousand men. They were in good health and spirits, admirably supplied with all the implements of war, and led by an experienced general, of unquestionable military talents.
[Sidenote: General Washington advances to Brandywine.]
The day before Sir William Howe landed, the American army marched through Philadelphia, and proceeded to the Brandywine. The divisions of Greene and Stephen were advanced nearer to the Head of Elk, and encamped behind White Clay creek.
Congress had directed General Smallwood and Colonel Girt to take command of the militia of Maryland, who had been ordered by General Washington to assemble near the head of the bay. The militia of the lower counties of Delaware, commanded by General Rodney, were directed also to assemble in the British rear, and to co-operate with those of Maryland. Colonel Richardson's continental regiment, which had been stationed on the Eastern shore, was ordered to join this corps.
The militia of Pennsylvania, commanded by Major General Armstrong, were united with the main body of the army. Great exertions were used to bring them promptly into the field, and they came forward generally with some degree of alacrity. Although the numbers required by congress did not assemble, more appeared than could be armed.
The real strength of the American army can not be accurately stated. It was estimated by Sir William Howe at fifteen thousand, including militia; and this estimate did not far exceed their real total, as exhibited by the returns. But it is a fact, attributable in some degree to the badness of their clothing, and scarcity of tents, and in some degree to the neglect of the commissary department, to provide those articles of food which contribute to the preservation of health, that the effective force was always far below the total number. The effectives, including militia, did not exceed eleven thousand.
Morgan's regiment of riflemen having been detached to the northern army, a corps of light infantry was formed for the occasion, the command of which was given to General Maxwell. This corps was advanced to Iron Hill, about three miles in front of White Clay creek. The cavalry, consisting of four regiments, amounting to about nine hundred men, including persons of every description, were employed principally on the lines.
[Sidenote: Lord Cornwallis attacks Maxwell's corps, and compels them to retreat.]
One division of the British army, commanded by Sir William Howe in person, had taken post at Elkton, with its van advanced to Gray's Hill. General Knyphausen, with a second division, had crossed the ferry and encamped at Cecil Court House. He was directed to march up on the eastern side of the river, and to join Sir William Howe seven or eight miles south of Christiana. The intention to make this movement being disclosed by the preparatory arrangements, General Washington advised Maxwell to post a choice body of men in the night on an advantageous part of the road, in order to annoy him on his march. In the morning of the third of September, the two divisions under Lord Cornwallis and General Knyphausen, moved forward and formed a junction at Pencader, or Atkins' tavern, where they encamped. In their way, the column led by Lord Cornwallis fell in with and attacked Maxwell, who retreated over White Clay creek, with the loss of about forty killed and wounded.
{September 5.}
The whole American army, except the light infantry, took a position behind Red Clay creek, on the road leading from the camp of Sir William Howe to Philadelphia. On this ground, the General thought it probable that the fate of Philadelphia, and of the campaign, might be decided; and he resorted to all the means in his power to encourage his troops, and stimulate them to the greatest exertions.
{September 8.}
On the 8th of September, the British army was again put in motion. The main body advanced by Newark, upon the right of the Americans, and encamped within four miles of that place, extending its left still farther up the country. Meanwhile, a strong column made a show of attacking in front, and, after manoeuvring some time, halted at Milton, within two miles of the centre.
{September 9.}
General Washington was soon convinced that the column in front was designed only to amuse, while the left should effect the principal and real object. Believing that object to be to turn his right, and cut off his communication with Philadelphia, he changed his ground, and, crossing the Brandywine early in the night, took post behind that river, at Chadd's Ford. General Maxwell was advanced in front, and placed, advantageously, on the hills south of the river, on the road leading over the ford. The militia, under General Armstrong, were posted at a ford two miles below Chadd's; and the right extended some miles above, with a view to other passes deemed less practicable. In this position, General Washington attended the movements of the adverse army.
In the evening, Howe marched forward in two columns, which united, early the next morning, at Kennet's Square; after which he advanced parties on the roads leading to Lancaster, to Chadd's Ford, and to Wilmington.
The armies were now within seven miles of each other, with only the Brandywine between them, which opposed no obstacle to a general engagement. This was sought by Howe, and not avoided by Washington. It was impossible to protect Philadelphia without a victory, and this object was deemed throughout America, and especially by congress, of such magnitude as to require that an action should be hazarded for its attainment.
In the morning of the 11th, soon after day, information was received that the whole British army was in motion, advancing on the direct road leading over Chadd's Ford. The Americans were immediately under arms, and placed in order of battle, for the purpose of contesting the passage of the river. Skirmishing soon commenced between the advanced parties; and, by ten, Maxwell's corps, with little loss on either side, was driven over the Brandywine below the ford. Knyphausen, who commanded this column, paraded on the heights, reconnoitred the American army, and appeared to be making dispositions to force the passage of the river. A skirt of woods, with the river, divided him from Maxwell's corps, small parties of whom occasionally crossed over, and kept up a scattering fire, by which not much execution was done. At length one of these parties, led by Captains Waggoner and Porterfield, engaged the British flank guard very closely, killed a captain with ten or fifteen privates, drove them out of the wood, and were on the point of taking a field piece. The sharpness of the skirmish soon drew a large body of the British to that quarter, and the Americans were again driven over the Brandywine.[62]
[Footnote 62: The author was an eye-witness of this skirmish.]
About eleven in the morning, information reached General Washington that a large column with many field pieces, had taken a road leading from Kennet's Square, directly up the country, and had entered the great valley road, down which they were marching to the upper fords of the Brandywine. This information was given by Colonel Ross of Pennsylvania, who was in their rear, and estimated their numbers at five thousand men.
On receiving this information, Washington is said to have determined to detach Sullivan and Lord Stirling to engage the left division of the British army, and with the residue of his troops, to cross Chadd's Ford in person, and attack Knyphausen. Before this plan could be executed, counter intelligence was received inducing an opinion that the movement of the British on their left was a feint, and that the column under Lord Cornwallis, after making demonstrations of crossing the Brandywine above its forks, had marched down the southern side of that river to reunite itself with Knyphausen.
Not long after the first communication was made by Colonel Ross, information was received from Colonel Bland of the cavalry, which produced some doubt respecting the strength of this column. He saw only two brigades; but the dust appeared to rise in their rear for a considerable distance. A major of the militia came in, who alleged that he left the forks of the Brandywine so late in the day that it was supposed Lord Cornwallis must have passed them by that time, had he continued his march in that direction, and who asserted that no enemy had appeared in that quarter. Some light horsemen who had been sent to reconnoitre the road, returned with the same information.
The uncertainty produced by this contradictory intelligence was at length removed; and about two in the afternoon, it was ascertained that the column led by Lord Cornwallis, after making a circuit of about seventeen miles, had crossed the river above its forks, and was advancing in great force.
A change of disposition was immediately made. The divisions commanded by Sullivan, Stirling, and Stephen, took new ground, advanced farther up the Brandywine, and fronted the British column marching down that river. The division commanded by Wayne remained at Chadd's Ford, to keep Knyphausen in check; in which service Maxwell was to co-operate. Greene's division, accompanied by General Washington in person, formed a reserve, and took a central position between the right and left wings.
The divisions detached against Lord Cornwallis formed hastily on an advantageous piece of ground, above Birmingham Meeting House, with their left near the Brandywine, and having both flanks covered by a thick wood. The artillery was judiciously posted, and the disposition of the whole was well made. Unfortunately, Sullivan's division, in taking its ground, made too large a circuit, and was scarcely formed when the attack commenced.
[Sidenote: The American army defeated at Brandywine, and retreat to Chester.]
On perceiving the Americans, the British army was formed in order of battle; and, about half past four, the action began. It was kept up warmly for some time. The American right first gave way, and by its flight exposed the flank of the remaining divisions to a galling fire. The line continued to break from the right, and, in a short time, was completely routed. The right wing made some attempts to rally, but, being briskly charged, again broke, and the flight became general.
On the commencement of the action on the right, General Washington pressed forward with Greene, to the support of that wing; but, before his arrival, its rout was complete, and he could only check the pursuit. For this purpose, the 10th Virginia regiment commanded by Colonel Stevens, and a regiment of Pennsylvania commanded by Colonel Stewart, neither of which had been in action, were posted advantageously on the road taken by the defeated army. The impression made by the fire of these regiments, and the approach of night, induced Sir William Howe, after dispersing them, to give over the pursuit.
When the American right was found to be fully engaged with Lord Cornwallis, Knyphausen made real dispositions for crossing the river. Chadd's Ford was defended by an intrenchment and battery, with three field pieces, and a howitzer. After some resistance, the work was forced; and, the defeat of the right being known, the left wing also withdrew from its ground. The whole army retreated that night to Chester, and the next day to Philadelphia.
The loss sustained by the Americans in this action has been estimated at three hundred killed, and six hundred wounded. Between three and four hundred, principally the wounded, were made prisoners.
As must ever be the case in new raised armies, unused to danger, and from which undeserving officers have not been expelled, their conduct was not uniform. Some regiments, especially those which had served the preceding campaign, maintained their ground with the firmness and intrepidity of veterans, while others gave way as soon as they were pressed. The authors of a very correct history of the war,[63] speaking of this action, say, "a part of their troops, among whom were particularly numbered some Virginia[64] regiments, and the whole corps of artillery, behaved exceedingly well in some of the actions of this day, exhibiting a degree of order, firmness, and resolution, and preserving such a countenance in extremely sharp service, as would not have discredited veterans. Some other bodies of their troops behaved very badly."[65]
[Footnote 63: Annual Register.]
[Footnote 64: The third Virginia regiment commanded by Colonel Marshall, which had performed extremely severe duty in the campaign of 1776, was placed in a wood on the right, and in front of Woodford's brigade, and Stephen's division. Though attacked by much superior numbers, it maintained its position without losing an inch of ground, until both its flanks were turned, its ammunition nearly expended, and more than half the officers, and one third of the soldiers were killed and wounded. Colonel Marshall, whose horse had received two balls, then retired in good order to resume his position on the right of his division; but it had already retreated.]
[Footnote 65: Deboore's brigade broke first; and, on an inquiry into his conduct being directed, he resigned. A misunderstanding existed between him and Sullivan, on whose right he was stationed.]
The official letter of Sir William Howe stated his loss at rather less than one hundred killed, and four hundred wounded. As the Americans sustained very little injury in the retreat, this inequality of loss can be ascribed only to the inferiority of their arms. Many of their muskets were scarcely fit for service; and, being of unequal calibre, their cartridges could not be so well fitted, and, consequently, their fire could not do as much execution as that of the enemy. This radical defect was felt in all the operations of the army.
From the ardour with which the Commander-in-chief had inspired his troops before this action, it is probable that the conflict would have been more severe, had the intelligence respecting the movement on the left of the British army been less contradictory. Raw troops, changing their ground in the moment of action, and attacked in the agitation of moving, are easily thrown into confusion. This was the critical situation of a part of Sullivan's division, and was the cause of the right's breaking before Greene could be brought up to support it; after which, it was impossible to retrieve the fortune of the day.
But had the best disposition of the troops been made at the time, which subsequent intelligence would suggest, the action could not have terminated in favour of the Americans. Their inferiority in numbers, in discipline, and in arms, was too great to leave them a probable prospect of victory. A battle, however, was not to be avoided. The opinion of the public, and of congress, demanded it. The loss of Philadelphia, without an attempt to preserve it, would have excited discontents which, in the United States, might be productive of serious mischief; and action, though attended with defeat, provided the loss be not too great, must improve an army in which, not only the military talents, but even the courage, of officers, some of them of high rank, remained to be ascertained.
Among the wounded was the Marquis de la Fayette, and Brigadier General Woodford.
The battle of Brandywine was not considered as decisive by congress, the General, or the army. The opinion was carefully cherished that the British had gained only the ground; and that their loss was still more considerable than had been sustained by the Americans. Congress appeared determined to risk another battle for the metropolis of America. Far from discovering any intention to change their place of session, they passed vigorous resolutions for reinforcing the army, and directed General Washington to give the necessary orders for completing the defences of the Delaware.
{September 12.}
From Chester, the army marched through Darby, over the Schuylkill bridge, to its former ground, near the falls of that river. General Greene's division, which, having been less in action, was more entire than any other, covered the rear; and the corps of Maxwell remained at Chester until the next day, as a rallying point for the small parties, and straggling soldiers, who might yet be in the neighbourhood.
Having allowed his army one day for repose and refreshment, General Washington recrossed the Schuylkill, and proceeded on the Lancaster road, with the intention of risking another engagement.
Sir William Howe passed the night of the 11th on the field of battle. On the succeeding day, he detached Major General Grant with two brigades to Concord meeting-house; and on the 13th, Lord Cornwallis joined General Grant, and marched towards Chester. Another detachment took possession of Wilmington; to which place the sick and wounded were conveyed.
To prevent a sudden movement to Philadelphia by the lower road, the bridge over the Schuylkill was loosened from its moorings, and General Armstrong was directed, with the Pennsylvania militia to guard the passes over that river.
On the 15th, the American army, intending to gain the left of the British, reached the Warren tavern, on the Lancaster road, twenty-three miles from Philadelphia. Intelligence was received, early next morning, that Howe was approaching in two columns. It being too late to reach the ground he had intended to occupy, Washington resolved to meet and engage him in front.
{September 16.}
Both armies prepared, with great alacrity, for battle. The advanced parties had met, and were beginning to skirmish, when they were separated by a heavy rain, which, becoming more and more violent, rendered the retreat of the Americans a measure of absolute necessity. The inferiority of their arms never brought them into such imminent peril as on this occasion. Their gun-locks not being well secured, their muskets soon became unfit for use. Their cartridge-boxes had been so inartificially constructed, as not to protect their ammunition from the tempest. Their cartridges were soon damaged; and this mischief was the more serious, because very many of the soldiers were without bayonets.
[Sidenote: After a slight skirmish compelled again to retire, cross the Schuylkill, and proceed to French Creek.]
The army being thus rendered unfit for action, the design of giving battle was reluctantly abandoned, and a retreat commenced. It was continued all the day, and great part of the night, through a cold and most distressing rain, and very deep roads. A few hours before day, the troops halted at the Yellow Springs, where their arms and ammunition were examined, and the alarming fact was disclosed, that scarcely a musket in a regiment could be discharged, and scarcely one cartridge in a box was fit for use. This state of things suggested the precaution of moving to a still greater distance, in order to refit their arms, obtain a fresh supply of ammunition, and revive the spirits of the army. The General therefore retired to Warwick furnace, on the south branch of French Creek, where ammunition and a few muskets might be obtained in time to dispute the passage of the Schuylkill, and make yet another effort to save Philadelphia.
The extreme severity of the weather had entirely stopped the British army. During two days, General Howe made no other movement than to unite his columns.
From French Creek, General Wayne was detached with his division, into the rear of the British, with orders to join General Smallwood; and, carefully concealing himself and his movements, to seize every occasion which this march might offer, of engaging them to advantage. Meanwhile, General Washington crossed the Schuylkill at Parker's ferry, and encamped on both sides of Perkyomy Creek.
{September 19.}
[Sidenote: General Wayne surprised, and after a sharp action compelled to retreat.]
General Wayne lay in the woods near the entrance of the road from Darby into that leading to Lancaster, about three miles in the rear of the left wing of the British troops encamped at Trydruffin, where he believed himself to be perfectly secure. But the country was so extensively disaffected that Sir William Howe received accurate accounts of his position and of his force. Major General Gray was detached to surprise him, and effectually accomplished his purpose. About eleven, in the night of the 20th, his pickets, driven in with charged bayonets, gave the first intimation of Gray's approach. Wayne instantly formed his division; and while his right sustained a fierce assault, directed a retreat by the left, under cover of a few regiments who, for a short time, withstood the violence of the shock. In his letter to the Commander-in-chief, he says that they gave the assailants some well-directed fires which must have done considerable execution; and that, after retreating from the ground on which the engagement commenced, they formed again, at a small distance from the scene of action; but that both parties drew off without renewing the conflict. He states his loss at about one hundred and fifty[66] killed and wounded. The British accounts admit, on their part, a loss of only seven.
[Footnote 66: The British accounts represent the American loss to have been much more considerable. It probably amounted to at least three hundred men.]
When the attack commenced, General Smallwood, who was on his march to join Wayne, a circumstance entirely unexpected by General Gray, was within less than a mile of him; and, had he commanded regulars, might have given a very different turn to the night. But his militia thought only of their own safety; and, having fallen in with a party returning from the pursuit of Wayne, fled in confusion with the loss of only one man.
Some severe animadversions on this unfortunate affair having been made in the army, General Wayne demanded a court martial, which, after investigating his conduct, was unanimously of opinion, "that he had done every thing to be expected from an active, brave, and vigilant officer;" and acquitted him with honour.
{September 21.}
Having secured his rear, by compelling Wayne to take a greater distance, Sir William Howe marched along the valley road to the Schuylkill, and encamped on the bank of that river, from the Fatland ford up to French Creek, along the front of the American army. To secure his right from being turned, General Washington again changed his position, and encamped with his left near, but above the British right.
[Sidenote: Washington marches to Pottsgrove.]
{September 22.}
General Howe now relinquished his plan of bringing Washington to another battle; and, thinking it adviseable, perhaps, to transfer the seat of war to the neighbourhood of his ships, determined to cross the Schuylkill, and take possession of Philadelphia. In the afternoon, he ordered one detachment to cross at Fatland ford which was on his right, and another to cross at Gordon's ford, on his left, and to take possession of the heights commanding them. These orders were executed without much difficulty, and the American troops placed to defend these fords were easily dispersed.
This service being effected, the whole army marched by its right, about midnight, and crossing at Fatland without opposition, proceeded a considerable distance towards Philadelphia, and encamped, with its left near Sweed's ford, and its right on the Manatawny road, having Stony run in its front.
It was now apparent that only immediate victory could save Philadelphia from the grasp of the British general, whose situation gave him the option of either taking possession of that place, or endeavouring to bring on another engagement. If, therefore, a battle must certainly be risked to save the capital, it would be necessary to attack the enemy.
Public opinion, which a military chief finds too much difficulty in resisting, and the opinion of congress required a battle; but, on a temperate consideration of circumstances, Washington came to the wise decision of avoiding one for the present.
His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and Smallwood had not yet joined the army. The continental troops ordered from Peekskill, who had been detained for a time by an incursion from New York, were approaching; and a reinforcement of Jersey militia, under General Dickenson, was also expected.
To these powerful motives against risking an engagement, other considerations of great weight were added, founded on the condition of his soldiers. An army, manoeuvring in an open country, in the face of a very superior enemy, is unavoidably exposed to excessive fatigue, and extreme hardship. The effect of these hardships was much increased by the privations under which the American troops suffered. While in almost continual motion, wading deep rivers, and encountering every vicissitude of the seasons, they were without tents, nearly without shoes, or winter clothes, and often without food.
A council of war concurred in the opinion the Commander-in-chief had formed, not to march against the enemy, but to allow his harassed troops a few days for repose, and to remain on his present ground until the expected reinforcements should arrive.
Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, the distressed situation of the army had been represented to congress, who had recommended it to the executive of Pennsylvania to seize the cloths and other military stores in the ware houses of Philadelphia, and, after granting certificates expressing their value, to convey them to a place of safety. The executive, being unwilling to encounter the odium of this strong measure, advised that the extraordinary powers of the Commander-in-chief should be used on the occasion. Lieutenant Colonel Hamilton, one of the General's aids, a young gentleman already in high estimation for his talents and zeal, was employed on this delicate business. "Your own prudence," said the General, in a letter to him while in Philadelphia, "will point out the least exceptionable means to be pursued; but remember, delicacy and a strict adherence to the ordinary mode of application must give place to our necessities. We must, if possible, accommodate the soldiers with such articles as they stand in need of, or we shall have just reason to apprehend the most injurious and alarming consequences from the approaching season."
All the efforts, however, of this very active officer could not obtain a supply, in any degree, adequate to the pressing and increasing wants of the army.
[Sidenote: General Howe takes possession of Philadelphia.]
[Sidenote: Congress removes to Lancaster.]
Colonel Hamilton was also directed to cause the military stores which had been previously collected to a large amount in Philadelphia, and the vessels which were lying at the wharves, to be removed up the Delaware. This duty was executed with so much vigilance, that very little public property fell, with the city, into the hands of the British general, who entered it on the 26th of September. The members of congress separated on the eighteenth, in the evening, and reassembled at Lancaster on the twenty-seventh of the same month.
From the 25th of August, when the British army landed at the Head of Elk, until the 26th of September when it entered Philadelphia, the campaign had been active, and the duties of the American general uncommonly arduous. The best English writers bestow high encomiums on Sir William Howe for his military skill, and masterly movements during this period. At Brandywine especially, Washington is supposed to have been "outgeneraled, more outgeneraled than in any action during the war." If all the operations of this trying period be examined, and the means in possession of both be considered, the American chief will appear, in no respect, inferior to his adversary, or unworthy of the high place assigned to him in the opinions of his countrymen. With an army decidedly inferior, not only in numbers, but in every military requisite except courage, in an open country, he employed his enemy near thirty days in advancing about sixty miles. In this time he fought one general action; and, though defeated, was able to reassemble the same undisciplined, unclothed, and almost unfed army; and, the fifth day afterwards, again to offer battle. When the armies were separated by a storm which involved him in the most distressing circumstances, he extricated himself from them, and still maintained a respectable and imposing countenance.
The only advantage he is supposed to have given was at the battle of Brandywine; and that was produced by the contrariety and uncertainty of the intelligence received. A general must be governed by his intelligence, and must regulate his measures by his information. It is his duty to obtain correct information; and among the most valuable traits of a military character, is the skill to select those means which will obtain it. Yet the best selected means are not always successful; and, in a new army, where military talent has not been well tried by the standard of experience, the general is peculiarly exposed to the chance of employing not the best instruments. In a country, too, which is covered with wood, precise information of the numbers composing different columns is to be gained with difficulty.
It has been said "that the Americans do not appear to have made all the use that might be expected of the advantages which the country afforded for harassing and impeding the British army."
In estimating this objection, it ought to be recollected that General Smallwood was directed, with the militia of Maryland and Delaware, supported by a regiment of continental troops, to hang on and harass the rear of the enemy: that General Maxwell, with a select corps consisting of a thousand men, was ordered to seize every occasion to annoy him on his march: that General Wayne, with his division, was afterwards detached to unite with Smallwood, and command the whole force collected in the rear, which would have been very respectable.
If the militia did not assemble in the numbers expected, or effect the service allotted to them, their failure is not attributable to General Washington. His calls on them had been early and energetic; and the state of his army did not admit of his making larger detachments from it to supply the place they had been designed to fill.
Loud complaints had been made against General Maxwell by the officers of his corps; and a court was ordered to inquire into his conduct, by whom he was acquitted. Whether that officer omitted to seize the proper occasions to annoy the enemy, or the cautious and compact movements of Sir William Howe afforded none, can not be easily ascertained. General Washington felt the loss of Morgan, and wrote pressingly to Gates, after his success against Burgoyne, to restore him that officer, with his regiment, as soon as possible.
CHAPTER IX.
Measures to cut off the communication between the British army and fleet.... Battle of Germantown.... Measures to intercept supplies to Philadelphia.... Attack on fort Mifflin.... On Red Bank.... The Augusta blows up.... Fort Mifflin evacuated.... Fort Mercer evacuated.... The British open the communication with their fleet.... Washington urged to attack Philadelphia.... General Howe marches out to Chestnut Hill.... Returns to Philadelphia.... General Washington goes into winter quarters.
{1777}
{September.}
[Sidenote: Measures taken to prevent a communication between the British army in Philadelphia and their fleet.]
Philadelphia being lost, General Washington sought to make its occupation inconvenient and insecure, by rendering it inaccessible to the British fleet. With this design, works had been erected on a low marshy island in the Delaware, near the junction of the Schuylkill, which, from the nature of its soil, was called Mud Island. On the opposite shore of Jersey, at a place called Red Bank, a fort had also been constructed which was defended with heavy artillery. In the deep channel between, or under cover of these batteries, several ranges of frames had been sunk, to which, from their resemblance to that machine, the name of chevaux-de-frise had been given. These frames were so strong and heavy as to be destructive of any ship which might strike against them, and were sunk in such a depth of water as rendered it equally difficult to weigh them or cut them through; no attempt to raise them, or to open the channel in any manner could be successful until the command of the shores on both sides should be obtained.
Other ranges of these machines had been sunk about three miles lower down the river; and some considerable works were in progress at Billingsport on the Jersey side, which were in such forwardness as to be provided with artillery. These works and machines were farther supported by several galleys mounting heavy cannon, together with two floating batteries, a number of armed vessels, and some fire ships.
The present relative situation of the armies gave a decisive importance to these works. Cutting off the communication of General Howe with his fleet, they prevented his receiving supplies by water, while the American vessels in the river above fort Mifflin, the name given to the fort on Mud Island, rendered it difficult to forage in Jersey, General Washington hoped to render his supplies on the side of Pennsylvania so precarious, as to compel him to evacuate Philadelphia.
The advantages of this situation were considerably diminished by the capture of the Delaware frigate.
{September 27.}
The day after Lord Cornwallis entered Philadelphia, three batteries were commenced for the purpose of acting against any American ships which might appear before the town. While yet incomplete, they were attacked by two frigates, assisted by several galleys and gondolas. The Delaware, being left by the tide while engaged with the battery, grounded and was captured; soon after which, the smaller frigate, and the other vessels, retired under the guns of the fort. This circumstance was the more interesting, as it gave the British General the command of the ferry, and, consequently, free access to Jersey, and enabled him to intercept the communication between the forts below, and Trenton, from which place the garrisons were to have drawn their military stores.
{September 28.}
{September 30.}
{September 29.}
{October 3.}
All the expected reinforcements, except the state regiment and militia from Virginia, being arrived, and the detached parties being called in, the effective strength of the army amounted to eight thousand continental troops, and three thousand militia. With this force, General Washington determined to approach the enemy, and seize the first favourable moment to attack him. In pursuance of this determination, the army took a position on the Skippack road, about twenty miles from Philadelphia, and sixteen from Germantown,—a long village stretching on both sides the great road leading northward from Philadelphia, which forms one continued street nearly two miles in length. The British line of encampment crossed this village at right angles near the centre, and Lord Cornwallis, with four regiments of grenadiers, occupied Philadelphia. The immediate object of General Howe being the removal of the obstructions in the river, Colonel Stirling, with two regiments, had been detached to take possession of the fort at Billingsport, which he accomplished without opposition. This service being effected, and the works facing the water destroyed, Colonel Stirling was directed to escort a convoy of provisions from Chester to Philadelphia. Some apprehensions being entertained for the safety of this convoy, another regiment was detached from Germantown, with directions to join Colonel Stirling.[67]
[Footnote 67: Annual Register.—Stedman.]
This division of the British force appeared to Washington to furnish a fair opportunity to engage Sir William Howe with advantage. Determining to avail himself of it, he formed a plan for surprising the camp at Germantown, and attacking both wings, in front and rear, at the same instant.
The divisions of Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by Conway's brigade, were to march down the main road, and, entering the town by the way of Chesnut Hill, to attack the left wing; while General Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was to move down the Manatawny road[68] by Vanduring's mill, and turning the left flank to attack in the rear. The Commander-in-chief accompanied this column.
[Footnote 68: Better known as the Ridge road.]
The divisions of Greene and Stephen, flanked by M'Dougal's brigade, were to take a circuit by the Lime Kiln road, and, entering the town at the market house, to attack the right wing.
The militia of Maryland and Jersey, under Generals Smallwood and Forman, were to march down the old York road, and turning the right to fall upon its rear.
The division of Lord Stirling, and the brigades of Nash and Maxwell, were to form a corps de reserve.
Parties of cavalry were silently to scour the roads to prevent observation, and to keep up the communication between the heads of the several columns.
{October 4.}
[Sidenote: Royal army attacked at Germantown.]
The necessary arrangements being made, the army moved from its ground at seven in the afternoon. Before sunrise the next morning, the advance of the column led by Sullivan, encountered and drove in a picket placed at Mount Airy, the house of Mr. Allen.[69] The main body followed close in the rear, and engaging the light infantry and the 40th regiment, posted at the head of the village, soon forced them to give way, leaving their baggage behind them. Though closely pursued, Lieutenant Colonel Musgrave threw himself with five companies of the 40th regiment into a large stone house belonging to Mr. Chew, which stood directly in the way of Wayne's division, and poured on the Americans an incessant and galling fire of musketry from its doors and windows. After making some unsuccessful, and bloody attempts to carry this house by storm, and then battering it for a few minutes with field artillery, which was found too light to make any impression on its walls, a regiment was left to observe the party within it, while the troops who had been checked by Colonel Musgrave again moved forward, passing to the left of the house.
[Footnote 69: Since Robinson's.]
In rather more than half an hour after Sullivan had been engaged, the left wing, having formed the line, came also into action; and, attacking the light infantry posted in front of the British right wing, soon drove it from its ground. While rapidly pursuing the flying enemy, Woodford's brigade,[70] which was on the right of this wing, was arrested by a heavy fire from Chew's house, directed against its right flank. The inefficiency of musketry against troops thus sheltered being instantly perceived, the brigade was drawn off to the left by its commanding officer, and the field-pieces attached to it were ordered up to play on the house, but were too light to be of service. Some time was consumed in this operation, and the advance of the brigade was, of course, retarded. This part of the line was consequently broken, and the two brigades composing the division of Stephen were not only separated from each other, but from the other division which was led by General Greene in person. That division, consisting of the brigades of Muhlenberg and Scott, pressing forward with eagerness, encountered and broke a part of the British right wing, entered the village, and made a considerable number of prisoners.
[Footnote 70: The author was in this brigade, and describes this part of the action from his own observation.]
Thus far the prospect was flattering. The attack had been made with great spirit; several brigades had entered the town; and such an impression had been made on the British army as to justify the expectation that its wings might be separated from each other, and a complete victory be obtained. Had the American troops possessed the advantages given by experience; had every division of the army performed with precision the part allotted to it, there is yet reason to believe that the hopes inspired by this favourable commencement would not have been disappointed. But the face of the country, and the darkness of the morning produced by a fog of uncommon density, co-operating with the want of discipline in the army, and the derangements of the corps from the incidents at Chew's house, blasted their flattering appearances, and defeated the enterprise.
The grounds over which the British were pursued abounded with small and strong enclosures, which frequently broke the line of the advancing army. The two divisions of the right wing had been separated at Chew's house; and immediately after their passing it, the right of the left wing was stopped at the same place, so as to cause a division of that wing also. The darkness of the morning rendered it difficult to distinguish objects even at an inconsiderable distance; and it was impossible for the Commander-in-chief to learn the situation of the whole, or to correct the confusion which was commencing. The divisions and brigades separated at Chew's house could not be reunited; and, even among those parts which remained entire, a considerable degree of disorder was soon introduced by the impediments to their advance. Some regiments pursuing with more vivacity than others, they were separated from each other, their weight lessened, and their effect impaired. The darkness which obstructed the reunion of the broken parts of the American army, also prevented their discerning the real situation of the enemy, so as to improve the first impression; and, in some instances, some corps being in advance of others, produced uncertainty whether the troops, seen indistinctly, were friends or foes.
The attacks on the flanks and rear, which formed a part of the original plan, do not appear ever to have been made. The Pennsylvania militia came in view of the chasseurs who flanked the left of the British line, but did not engage them closely. The Maryland and Jersey militia just showed themselves on the right flank, about the time Greene was commencing a retreat.
[Sidenote: The Americans repulsed.]
These embarrassments gave the British time to recover from the consternation into which they had been thrown. General Knyphausen, who commanded their left, detached two brigades to meet the right of Sullivan which had penetrated far into the village, before his left, which had been detained at Chew's house, could rejoin him; and the action became warm in this quarter. The British right also recovered from its surprise, and advanced on that part of Greene's division which had entered the town. After a sharp engagement these two brigades began to retreat, and those which were most in advance were surrounded and compelled to surrender. About the same time the right wing also began to retreat. It is understood that they had expended their ammunition. |
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